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Summary 
 
 
Reasonableness as a concept used in determining delictual liability or liability in tort 
law, is either embraced or perceived by some as frustrating. It is a normative concept 
which is inextricably linked with the concepts of fairness, justice, equity, public policy 
and the values of the community. These concepts assist in providing value judgements 
in determining liability. 
 
 
It is apparent from this study that the influence of reasonableness is predominantly 
implicit on the French law of delict, but more explicit on the South African law of delict 
and Anglo-American tort law. Its influence varies with respect to each element of tort 
or delictual liability. In order to hold a person liable for a delict or tort, it is only 
reasonable that all the elements of a delict or tort are present. Common to all the 
jurisdictions studied in this thesis is the idea of striking a balance between the 
defendant’s interests promoted, the plaintiff’s interests adversely affected and the 
interests of society. Where liability is based on fault, the reasonableness of conduct is 
called into question. In respect of causation whichever test or theory is used, what must 
ultimately be determined is whether according to the facts of the case, it is reasonable 
to impute liability on the defendant for the factually caused consequences. Whether loss 
or harm is required, assumed or not required, the question of the appropriate remedy 
or compensation which is reasonable under the circumstances is called into question. 
 
 
In South African and Anglo-American law, the multiple uses of the standards of the 
reasonable person, reasonable foreseeability of harm, reasonable preventability of 
harm, whether it is reasonable to impose an element of liability, or whether it is 
reasonable to impute liability, often cause confusion and uncertainty. At times, the role 
of these criteria with regard to a specific element may be valid and amplified while, at 
other times, their role is diminished and controversial. However, there is nothing wrong 
with the concept of reasonableness itself; indeed, it is a necessary and useful concept 
in law. Rather, it is the way that it is interpreted and applied in determining liability that 
is problematic. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 “Although torts traditionally may emphasize justice or fairness far more than policy or utility, 
 the two goals are in harmony in many cases. It is just that the wrongdoer must pay 
 compensation for his wrong, and it is also good policy to deter wrongdoing. When policy 
 goals are at odds with justice to individuals, different views have been advanced, and 
 courts have sometimes emphasized justice, sometimes policy. For lawyers arguing 
 cases, the question is not likely to be whether judges must wholly exclude policy or 
 wholly exclude justice. Instead, advocacy requires lawyers to show judges why one 
 approach or the other is most appropriate for the particular case. In that respect, at 
 least, the particular individuals before the court with their complaints and defences 
 can be heard.”1 
 
1. Background  
 
Generally, in South African law, it is reasonable to hold a person liable in delict for 
damage sustained only if all the elements of a delict have been established.2 The 
elements of a delict include: conduct, in the form of an omission or commission; 
wrongfulness; fault;3 causation; and harm, also referred to as “loss” or “damage”. 
Furthermore, cognisance must be taken of the values enshrined in our Constitution,4 
which is the supreme law in South Africa and pertinent to the law of delict.5 Particular 
attention must be given to the Bill of Rights contained in Chapter 2. 
 
As will be shown in this thesis,6 the implicit influence of reasonableness in the South 
African law of delict is evident in establishing: conduct,7 fault in the form of intention,8 
and factual causation.9 The concept of reasonableness influences the applicability 
                                                          
1  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 19. 
2  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 4, 79. 
3  There are exceptions, for example, in cases of strict liability where fault is not a 
 requirement. This includes damage caused by animals, vicarious liability and strict liability 
 imposed by legislation. See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 379-402; chapter 3 
 para 1. 
4  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
5  Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 444. In 
 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 953-954, the Constitutional Court referred to the judiciary’s duty to 
 develop the common law in line with the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of rights. See 
 also Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 396-397; Faircape 
 Property Developers (Pty) Ltd v Premier, Western Cape 2000 2 SA 54 (C) 65 in respect of 
 the boni mores test for wrongfulness; Neethling 2002 SALJ 286 who specifically refers to 
 the indirect application of the Bill of Rights in regard to “the boni mores test for 
 wrongfulness and the reasonable person test for negligence”; K v Minister of Safety and 
 Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) 428; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 17; Van der Walt and 
 Midgley Delict 18. 
6  In chapter 3. 
7  See chapter 3 para 2. 
8  See chapter 3 para 4.2. 
9  See chapter 3 para 5.1. 
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of automatism as a defence negating conduct. In respect of factual causation, the 
influence of reasonableness is implicit, insofar as it is reasonable to hold a 
wrongdoer delictually liable only if the damage sustained was factually caused by 
the wrongdoer’s conduct. Reasonableness plays a more explicit role in determining 
whether the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the damages sustained and in 
assessing the plaintiff’s loss. 
 
It will be shown that the explicit influence of reasonableness 10  is evident in 
determining: wrongfulness;11 fault in the form of negligence;12 legal causation13 and 
harm14 sustained. 
 
To some extent, there is confusion and uncertainty in general on the role of 
reasonableness in determining: delictual liability; the elements of delictual liability; 
and the tests for determining these elements. Confusion and uncertainty have 
occurred, in particular, where the influence of reasonableness is explicit, in respect 
of wrongfulness, negligence, and legal causation. The main reason for this stems 
from the fact that these elements involve value judgements and policy 
considerations, which in turn play a role in determining delictual liability. To a certain 
degree, the tests for determining these elements, as well as the elements 
themselves, have been conflated. 15  The courts have used the concept of 
reasonableness as a safety net and as a tool to bring about fair and just outcomes. 
 
The concept of reasonableness, although distinct, is also interrelated with the 
concepts of fairness, equity, justice, public policy and the boni mores in South 
African law.16 The influence of reasonableness on the law of delict is thus important, 
multifaceted and complex. As a result of the recent trend of the courts in determining 
wrongfulness; the role of reasonableness, particularly in some key elements of 
                                                          
10  In chapter 3. 
11  See chapter 3 para 3. 
12  See chapter 3 para 4.3. 
13  See chapter 3 para 5.2. 
14  See chapter 3 para 6. 
15  See chapter 3 para 4.4. 
16  See Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard (Pty) Ltd 1990 2 SA 520 (W) 528-
 529; Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A) 652 
 with regard to wrongfulness; S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A) 40-41 with regard to legal 
 causation; chapter 2 paras 3.1-3.3. 
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delictual liability, namely, wrongfulness, fault in the form of negligence and legal 
causation has become rather controversial. For this reason there is a need to clarify 
the role of reasonableness in respect of the delictual elements, in order to bring 
about certainty. 
 
2. Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the explicit and implicit influence of 
reasonableness on the elements of delictual liability. In light of the fact that 
reasonableness is an important concept, which influences the determination of the 
existence of the elements that may lead to delictual liability, it is necessary to 
analyse the extent to which reasonableness influences delictual or tort liability in 
some foreign jurisdictions. After such an analysis, recommendations can then be 
made on how to bring about clarity and certainty on the influence of reasonableness 
on the elements of delictual liability in South Africa. 
 
3. Research methodology 
 
The research will be based on a study of the relevant literature, including case law 
and legislation. The study will entail a critical analysis of the South African literature 
as well as a comparative study of the explicit and implicit influence of 
reasonableness on tort liability in the United Kingdom, tort liability in the United 
States of America, and delictual liability in France. The United States of America 
and the United Kingdom represent the common law family, 17  while France 
represents the civil law family.18 For ease of reference, when referring to law in the 
United States of America and law in the United Kingdom, the terms English law and 
American law respectively will be used.  
 
                                                          
17  Common law is based on case law that has developed over time. Adjudicators refer to prior 
 existing decisions. English and American law is based on common law and therefore form 
 part of the common law family. See Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 41, 69. 
18  In respect of the civil law tradition, the law ruling the jurisdiction is codified. Adjudicators 
 need not refer to prior existing decisions but refer to the codified law. In France, the 
 adjudicators refer to the French Civil Code of 1804 and therefore French law, like German 
 law (the Bϋrgerliches Gesetzbuch ‒ the Civil Code of Germany) forms part of the civil 
 law family. See Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 69, 74, 143-144. 
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The reason for choosing English law in the study is that English law has influenced 
South African law.19 English law has also influenced American law. During the 
English colonial expansion, the common law spread throughout Africa and America. 
However, since the United States of America declared its independence from Britain 
in 1776, its law has undergone change, particularly due to the adoption of a written 
constitution.20 Social and economic development in the United States of America 
has also influenced the development of law.21 Pound, the founder of sociological 
jurisprudence in America, saw the legal system as a system which interacts with 
society’s ever changing political, economic and social circumstances. He was of the 
view that law teachers should be well versed in sociology, politics and economics. 
This tradition was been carried forward and developed further.22 For this reason 
many American judgments and contributions of American academic writers reflect 
sociological jurisprudence.23 This is evident, particularly with regard to the aims of 
tort law and the determination of negligence in American tort law.24 Zweigert and 
Kӧtz25 point out that even though American law is based on English law, it has 
developed its own style and it would be a mistake not to include it in a comparative 
study. The mix of English and American law is commonly referred to as Anglo-
American law. This term will also be used in this thesis when referring to English 
and American law. 
 
Roman-Dutch law was introduced to South Africa by the Dutch during the 
seventeenth century.26 The South African law of delict is therefore a mix of English 
common law and Roman-Dutch law.27 The South African civil law of procedure was 
adopted from English law, hence the adoption of the precedent system in South 
Africa.28 Whenever Roman-Dutch law was unclear or insufficient, the courts would 
                                                          
19  See Hahlo and Khan The South African legal system 575-578. 
20  U.S. Const. The constitution encompasses basis rights which generally cannot be infringed 
 by the legislature, the executive or the judiciary. The country also has a federal structure. 
 See Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 219, 239. 
21  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 239. 
22  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 247. 
23  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 249. 
24  See chapter 2 paras 1-3; chapter 5 paras 1 and 3. 
25  Comparative law 41. 
26  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 231. 
27  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 231. 
28  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 232. 
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refer to English case law.29 After Anglicisation came to a halt in South Africa in 1910, 
the courts in South Africa paid particular attention to Roman-Dutch law sources.30 It 
is for this reason, coupled with South Africa’s adoption of a written constitution31 and 
recognition of the applicability of South African customary law,32 that South African 
law is now referred to as a hybrid system or mixed jurisdiction.33 
 
French law stems from the Romanistic legal family within the greater civil law 
tradition.34 France and the United Kingdom have produced two major legal systems 
of the world, both of which have influenced many other legal systems.35 For this 
reason, French law, as one of the most influential systems in the civil law tradition, 
is a good choice for comparative research in addition to English and American law. 
This choice of jurisdictions should produce insights from a variety of perspectives in 
respect of the chosen field of study.  
 
Like Roman law, the common law of torts initially developed with specific categories 
of liability, but on the continent, a general approach in determining liability was 
followed.36 This general approach is followed in South African37 and French law.38 
The Anglo-American law kept to the tradition of separate torts which was developed 
under the writ system.39 Each separate tort is independent with its own elements, 
possible defences, and protects particular interests.40 
 
                                                          
29  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 233. 
30  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 234. 
31  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
32  Provided it is consistent with the constitutional provisions and has not been affected by 
 legislation. See ss 211 and 13(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; 
 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) [365]-[383]; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 30 
 fn 3-5; Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 45-46. 
33  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 72, 235. 
34  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 41, 74. 
35  Van Dam European tort law 9. The French Civil Code of 1804 was the basis for civil law in 
 Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Portugal and some African 
 countries. See Van Dam European tort law 52; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 5; 
 chapter 6 para 1. 
36  See Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 605. 
37  See chapter 3. 
38  See chapter 6. 
39  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 605. 
40  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 605. 
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South African, English and American law follow the precedent system due to the 
common law influence on the law of civil procedure. Thus adjudicators41 decide on: 
whether a delict or tort was committed; whether a defence is applicable in limiting or 
excluding liability; and the amount of compensation that should be awarded to the 
plaintiff. Constitutions, legislation, international treaties and conventions, in 
conjunction with the common law may play a role in determining delictual liability or 
liability in tort law.42 The French law of delict is based primarily on the French Civil 
Code of 1804. The precedent system is not followed in the French law of civil 
procedure.43 Thus French adjudicators need not refer to prior decisions. 
 
4. Scope of study and outline of chapters 
 
To begin with, the research is based on private law, and more specifically the law of 
delict or tort law. There is much to be written on the influence of reasonableness in 
the law of delict or tort law. In trying to limit the scope and provide reasonable 
parameters, the following should be noted: 
 
(a) Parameters 
 
The discussion of South African law will deal mainly with the five elements of 
delictual liability, that is: conduct; wrongfulness; fault; causation; and harm. 
Generally, liability for the infringement of personality interests or rights will not be 
discussed except for liability for the infringement of body and physical liberty. 
Wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims will also be discussed. 
Due to the fact that English and American tort law differentiates between many 
intentional torts and the tort of negligence, some intentional torts will be considered 
in order to compare the influence of reasonableness on intention. The torts of 
trespass to the person were chosen. The torts of trespass to the person include: the 
tort of battery; the tort of assault; and the tort of false imprisonment. For this reason, 
liability for the infringement of body and physical liberty will be discussed briefly 
                                                          
41  In the United States of America where a jury is appointed, the jury is regarded as the trier 
 of facts. This will be discussed further in chapter 5. 
42  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 3 with reference to English and 
 American law. 
43  See Borghetti 2012 JETL 180; Van Dam European tort law 55; chapter 6 para 1. 
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under South African law. In Anglo-American law, under the tort of negligence, 
specific categories of duties are recognised for inter alia: omissions; psychiatric 
injury or mental harm; pure economic loss; wrongful conception, wrongful birth and 
wrongful life.44 American law inter alia also recognises the duty owed by health care 
providers as a specific duty category. For this reason, liability for pure economic 
loss, psychiatric injury, wrongful conception, wrongful birth, and wrongful life claims 
under South African law, as well as their equivalents in the other chosen legal 
systems, will be discussed. 
 
Although the influence of reasonableness on harm will be discussed under all the 
jurisdictions in a general manner, the principles of assessment and the quantification 
of damages, which fall within the domain of the law of damages, will not be 
discussed in detail. Strict liability (liability without fault) will not be discussed under 
American, English, and South African law save to outline the ambit in which it applies 
and the reasons for applying strict liability. In French law, delictual liability is 
predominantly governed by strict liability rules and for this reason both foundations 
of liability will be discussed in French law. 
 
(b) Outline of chapters 
 
Chapter 2 will briefly refer to the historical development of the concept of 
reasonableness from a legal-philosophical perspective. The definition of 
reasonableness within the context of the law of delict or tort law will be discussed. 
The standard of the “reasonable person”, which is applied in all the jurisdictions 
discussed in this thesis, will be referred to briefly. Due to the fact that 
reasonableness is related to the concepts of equity, fairness, justice, public policy 
and the boni mores in South African law, it is necessary to briefly refer to their 
interrelatedness. This will be discussed at the end of chapter 2.  
 
                                                          
44  Wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims are in general controversial. In 
 this thesis these claims will only be referred to very briefly. The focus will be on whether 
 the claims are allowed in delict or tort law and the types of damages that may be awarded 
 in relation to the influence of reasonableness. 
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Chapter 3 will provide an analysis of the explicit and implicit influence of 
reasonableness on the South African law of delict. In chapter 4, the explicit and 
implicit influence of reasonableness on the torts of trespass to the person and the 
tort of negligence in English law will be analysed. Chapter 5 will provide an analysis 
of the explicit and implicit influence of reasonableness on the torts of trespass to the 
person and the tort of negligence in American law. In chapter 6, the explicit and 
implicit influence of reasonableness on the French law of delict will be considered. 
Finally, chapter 7 will provide a summary of the findings as well as 
recommendations, taking into account insights from legal philosophy and the 
comparative studies undertaken. A conclusion will be provided at the end of the 
thesis. 
 
5. Gender, terminology and definitions used in this thesis  
 
In this thesis the masculine gender is used only for the sake of simplicity and 
convenience. Gender discrimination is not intended. 
 
South African civil law, like some other civil law systems found on the European 
continent whose civil law was influenced by Roman law, make use of the word 
“delict” and the “law of delict” when referring to a “civil wrong”45 or the “law of civil 
wrongs” respectively. The word “tort”, an Anglo-French46 word of Latin origin,47 is 
synonymous with the word “delict” referring to a “civil wrong”.48 It is used by certain 
legal systems which were influenced by English law.49 In this thesis, the words “tort” 
and “delict” are essentially used as synonyms and the jurisdictional context 
determines which one of them is used in any given part of the text.  
 
In this thesis, the words: “defendant”; “wrongdoer”; “offender”; and “tortfeasor” are 
also used interchangeably in referring to the person who allegedly committed the 
                                                          
45  See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 1; Burchell Delict 1. 
46  Lunney and Oliphant Tort 1. 
47  “Tort”, (derived from the Latin word “tortum”) and “wrong” (originating from the English 
 word “wrung”) were initially synonymous, meaning conduct which is “crooked or twisted” 
 and departing from the norm as opposed to conduct which is “straight or right (rectum)” – 
 Heuston and Buckley Salmond and Heuston on the law of torts 13 fn 50. See also Dobbs, 
 Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
48  Heuston and Buckley Salmond and Heuston on the law of torts 12. 
49  See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 5 fn 2; Burchell Delict 1. 
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delict or tort. The words: “plaintiff”; “claimant”; 50  “victim”, “injured person”; and 
“wronged person” are used interchangeably in referring to the person who has 
allegedly suffered harm, loss or damage, as a result of an alleged delict or tort 
committed against him. 
 
The word “explicit”, according to the Oxford dictionary,51 means “[s]tated clearly and 
in detail, leaving no room for confusion or doubt”. The word explicit will be used in 
this sense in this thesis. 
 
The word “implicit”, according to the Oxford dictionary,52 means “[s]uggested though 
not directly expressed”. The word implicit will be used in this sense in this thesis. 
                                                          
50  In the English law of torts, the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 1999, replaced the term 
 “plaintiff” with the word “claimant”, so currently the term “claimant” is used instead of the 
 term “plaintiff”.  
51  See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/explicit (Date of use: 17 September 2017). 
52  See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/implicit (Date of use: 17 September 2017). 
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Chapter 2: Concepts 
 
“The law’s use of the terms ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ are legion and notorious. Indeed, 
the law’s seemingly carefree attitude in throwing around these terms has often served Legal 
Realists and their descendants while in their effort to depict legal language as simply a shell 
through which actors exercise the widest sort of discretion to select their favoured outcomes or 
policies. Conversely, ambitious agendas from philosophers and economists have often found 
that ‘reasonableness’ provides a readily available anchor in the positive law for their normative 
theories. Work by moral and political philosophers devoted to analyzing ‘the reasonable’ and 
work by economists, decision theorists, and game theorists on rationality understandably turn 
the law’s use of ‘reasonableness’ into a magnet for legal theory. In these respects, 
‘reasonableness’ might be seen as the third ‘r’ of legal theory. Like ‘rights’ and ‘responsibility,’ 
‘reasonableness’ is beloved by legal theorists and equally beloved by the sceptics who spend 
their time skewering those theorists.”1 
 
1. Historical development of the concept “reasonableness” 
 
Before considering the explicit and implicit influence of reasonableness on the 
elements of delictual or tort liability, it is necessary to briefly: consider the historical 
development of the concept; 2  explain the concept reasonableness; explain the 
concept of the “reasonable person”; and explain the concepts which are closely linked 
to the concept reasonableness. 
 
Historically, the concept reasonableness developed gradually over time under the 
shadow of the concept of “justice”. It became a well-known, independent concept when 
it was propagated by the contemporary American philosopher Rawls in the 1990s. 
Thus, in order to trace its historical development, it is necessary to trace the 
development of the concept of “justice” which emerged in ancient Greece. 
 
In ancient Greece, the poet Homer referred to the “just person”.3 Plato, the Greek 
philosopher and student of Socrates, believed in the four fundamental moral virtues, 
namely: wisdom or prudence; courage; temperance or self-control; and justice. 4 
Aristotle, the Greek philosopher and student of Plato, was of the opinion that justice 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1  Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2132. 
2  There is much to be said about the historical, philosophical and political development of the 
 concept “reasonableness” which would require a study on its own. For the purposes of this 
 study a few philosophers’ theories will very briefly be mentioned in order to trace its 
 development.  
3  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (date of use: 18 September 2017). 
4  See in general Tarnass The passion of the western mind 16-45 with regard to Plato. 
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required proportional equality. According to Aristotle, distributive justice involved 
dividing both burdens and benefits equally amongst equal members of society. On the 
other hand, corrective justice was aimed at restoring a fair balance between 
interpersonal relations of members where such balance was lost.5 
 
The early Christian philosopher, Augustine, embraced Plato’s view of the four 
fundamental moral virtues which became known as the “cardinal virtues”. Justice was 
viewed simply as giving a person what was due to him. A just society was one where 
no person harmed another. Instead, a person must try to help other members of 
society if possible. Augustine was of the view that if man’s law violates the natural law 
of God, it is not morally binding on a person and may even be disobeyed.6 
 
Aquinas, the medieval Christian philosopher, also embraced the cardinal virtues. In 
respect of justice, he drew from Aristotle’s idea of proportional equality. According to 
Aquinas, the virtue of justice meant that a person must respect the rights of others. He 
supported Augustine’s view that man’s law must not contravene the natural law.7 The 
golden rule, a principle of natural law, is to not do to others that which you would not 
want them to do to you.8 Natural law is given content by conclusions based on practical 
reasonableness.9 Thus, natural law allows a person to infringe another’s right under 
certain circumstances which may be justified and reasonable. Looking at the example 
of self-defence, Aquinas was a proponent of the view that in such instances, the self-
defensive action must be reasonable and in proportion to the actions of the attacker 
under the circumstances. Reasonable conduct is natural and in accordance with the 
nature of things. 10  Aquinas’s theory of justice is a blend of Aristotle’s and 
Augustine’s.11 
 
Hobbes, the English philosopher, believed in Socrates’ social contract theory, in that 
a person’s moral and or political obligations are dependent upon a reciprocal 
                                                                                                                                                                            
5  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). See also 
 Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2350. 
6  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017).  
7  Natural law could be known to man through reason and rationalism, but divine law could not. 
 See Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). 
8  Viola 2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 105, 109. 
9  Viola 2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 91 
10  Viola 2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 96. 
11  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017).  
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agreement which forms the basis of society. He believed that rights were not naturally 
attained, but were determined and given by a sovereign ruler. He further believed that 
laws were required to codify rules of justice as people could not be trusted to honour 
their social agreements unless they were being forced to do so. According to Hobbes, 
the law of justice forces us to obey positive laws of the state and any deliberate 
violation of such law is considered a crime, subject to punishment.12 
 
The early modern English philosopher, Locke, did not provide a general theory of 
justice. His greatest contribution lay in the idea of natural rights to property, consisting 
of one’s estate, life and liberty.13 Hume, the Scottish philosopher, was of the opinion 
that the basic requirements of justice lead to the promotion of the welfare of society. 
He believed that our approval of just conduct is based on reason and reflection.14 To 
Hume, rules of justice include protecting one’s proprietary rights, which are not 
absolute and subject to limitations. The individual’s sense of justice stems from a 
combination of self-interest and sympathy towards others. Hume explained that moral 
sentiment varies from person to person, but there is common ground among humans 
with regard to moral attitudes.15 Hume is regarded as the most significant expounder 
of the naturalistic theory.16 
 
Kant, the modern German philosopher, believed that the reason we should do what is 
right is because it’s the right thing to do,17 and this has nothing to do with good 
consequences.18 He introduced the deontological theory; the study of duties, rights 
and obligations. 19  He propounded the test that: a person “ought to do” what is 
reasonably right and must be able to distinguish between right and wrong 
(accountability).20 This is thought to be the essence of reasonableness.21 Thus, a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
12  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017).  
13  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). See also 
 Zipursky 2004 Fordham L Rev 1925. 
14  Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2400. 
15  Hume Human nature 575-576 referred to by Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2399. Cf Sibley 1953 
 Philosophical Rev 558. 
16  Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2396. 
17  Fletcher 1985 Harv L Rev 961. 
18  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). 
19  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). 
20  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). The concept 
 of “accountability” has been adopted in South African law, see chapter 3 para 4.1. 
21  Sibley 1953 Philosophical Rev 558. 
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person has a duty to respect others, and, as moral rational beings, people should try 
to act in such a way that it is reasonably possible to lay down the law for a moral 
state.22 Kant made reference to the duties of justice and duties of merit. To him justice 
was entwined with obligations that one was required to comply with, thus there is a 
duty to punish those who are guilty.23 Kant referred to three rules: that a person should 
be just in his dealing with others; a person should avoid being unjust to others, even if 
it meant that he should avoid associating with a disagreeable person altogether; and 
if he cannot avoid associating with such person he should, at the very least, try to 
respect them.24 Fairness and corrective justice are deontological principles. An actor 
who commits wrongful conduct violates rights. 25  Rawls, Dworkin and Ripstein 
(discussed below) drew from Kant’s theory of rights.26 
 
Mill, the modern English philosopher, was a supporter of the views of Bentham 
(another modern English philosopher). Bentham proposed the principle of “utility”, later 
called the “greatest happiness principle”27 and referred to five aspects of justice.28 
They were: that respect for others’ legal rights is just, while violating them is unjust; 
respect for the moral right someone has to something is just, while disrespecting that 
right is unjust; it is just to give a person what he deserves, while it is unjust not to do 
so; it is just to keep trust in others, while it is unjust to lose trust in them; in certain 
instances it is just to be impartial, while in some instances it is unjust to be partial.29 
Bentham advocated deterrence and criminal sanction as a means of enhancing 
happiness.30  According to Mill, a person could legitimately interfere with another 
person’s freedom to act in order to protect himself. Furthermore, force could be 
justifiably used against another in trying to prevent such person from harming others.31 
Mill rejected the idea of equality as being an indispensable component to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
22  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). See Viola 
 2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 104 who disagrees with Kant’s ideas of cognitive 
 demands.  
23  Kant Metaphysical elements of justice 102. See Fletcher 1985 Harv L Rev 963. 
24  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). See also 
 Fletcher 1985 Harv L Rev 965-966.  
25  Simons 2008 Loy LA L Rev 1183. 
26  Zipursky 2004 Fordham L Rev 1926 
27  According to the happiness principle, in order to evaluate what is right and wrong, the 
 greatest happiness of the greatest number of people must be considered. 
28  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). 
29  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). 
30  Schwartz 1997 Tex L Rev 1832. 
31  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017).  
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understanding justice. To Mill, justice embodied moral requirements which were the 
most important social utility.32 
 
Hart,33 the contemporary English philosopher and supporter of the legal positivist 
theory,34 submits that there are primary and secondary rules of law. The primary basic 
duty imposes rules that demarcate what one is required to do, or refrain from doing.35 
The primary rules interact with the secondary rules, which are dependent on the 
primary rules, and confer powers whether in a public or private setting ‒ this is, 
according to Hart, the essence of law.36 The secondary rules may authorise: the 
introduction of new primary rules; the abolition or modification of existing rules; or 
regulation of the primary rules.37  The criteria used to establish the primary rules 
include reference to legislation, authoritative texts, customary practices or case law.38 
More weight may be attached to, for example, legislation than to customary 
practices.39 Starr40 with reference to Hart’s views explains that the secondary rule 
which confers power on the adjudicator, allows the adjudicator to sanction the violation 
of a primary rule. The interaction between the primary rules and secondary rules with 
the “ultimate rule of recognition” whereby one supreme rule governs validity over all 
rules is the essence of law. Starr41 refers to Hart’s “ultimate rule of recognition” within 
the context of English law where “what the Queen in parliament enacts is law”. The 
“ultimate rule of recognition” may be equated with a constitution.42 Starr43 submits that 
Hart believes that law and morality are closely linked. Hart44 refers to the words 
“should”, “ought”, “must”, “right” and “wrong” when judging conduct. However, Hart is 
                                                                                                                                                                            
32  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017).  
33  Concept of law 151. See Starr 1984 Marq L Rev 675. 
34  The positive law theory insists on referring to existing law whether in terms of legislation, case 
 Law, etcetera, not natural law or morality. See explanation by Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2361; 
 Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 41. Bentham and Mill also supported legal 
 positivism over natural law theories supported by Aquinas, Locke, Hume and Kant. 
35  For example, a person may not trespass or exceed the speed limit. See Hart Concept of law 
 91, 93; Starr 1984 Marq L Rev 676. 
36  Hart Concept of law 151. See Starr 1984 Marq L Rev 675. 
37  Hart Concept of law 78-79. See Starr 1984 Marq L Rev 676. 
38  Hart Concept of law 97. See Starr 1984 Marq L Rev 677. 
39  Hart Concept of law 92-93. See Starr 1984 Marq L Rev 677. 
40  1984 Marq L Rev 678. 
41  1984 Marq L Rev 678. 
42  See Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 42, 47 who refer to the Constitution of 
 the Republic of South Africa, 1996 as the rule of recognition, the supreme law of the land to 
 which all law must conform. 
43  1984 Marq L Rev 673, 686. 
44  Concept of law 56, 191-194. 
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of the view that morality is not a requirement for law to be valid but it does shape law 
inter alia either through legislation or the judicial process.45 The law must develop laws 
prohibiting one person from harming another.46 
 
Rawls,47 the contemporary American philosopher, revived the social contract theory 
and was of the view that two basic principles should be adopted in the hope of a just 
society, namely: allocating fundamental basic rights and duties equally to all; and 
social and economic inequalities are acceptable only if they result in benefiting the 
greater good.48 He49 submits that a Kantian view of a society of people that are 
rational, reasonable, morally autonomous, free and equal, is a preferable alternative 
to the utilitarian theory. 50  To Rawls, justice is the primary social virtue. 51  Justice 
requires eliminating any arbitrary distinctions and establishing a practice whereby a 
balance is struck between competing interests and claims.52 Rawls53 submits that 
discrimination and injustice may occur when an adjudicator or others holding 
authoritative positions fail to apply a rule or interpret it correctly due to “subtle 
distortions of prejudice and bias”. Where there is different treatment, it must be justified 
with reference to legal principles and rules. Each person is expected to decide for 
himself whether an action is reasonably and morally justifiable.54 Rawls advocates a 
universal concept of justice and believes in the tolerance and mutual respect for 
incompatible views and values whether relating to religious, philosophical, or moral 
values, so long as they are reasonable.55 According to Keating’s56 account of Rawls’57 
ideas, the terms that reasonable people will suggest and adhere to are terms that all 
members of society, as free and equal individuals, could reasonably expect. Society’s 
                                                                                                                                                                            
45  Hart Concept of law 199-200. See Starr 1984 Marq L Rev 686-687. 
46  See Starr 1984 Marq L Rev 677. 
47  1958 Philosophical Rev 165. See Fletcher 1972 Harv L Rev 550. 
48  Rawls 1958 Philosophical Rev 166. 
49  Rawls Political liberalism 302. See Keating 1996 Stan L Rev 318. 
50  See Rawls Political liberalism 164, 294-299; Zipursky 2004 Fordham L Rev 1925; Keating 
 1996 Stan L Rev 322. 
51  Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 September 2017). 
52  Philosophical Rev 164. 
53  Justice 235. See Moran Reasonable person 164-165 with reference to Rawls. 
54  Rawls Philosophical Rev 170-171. 
55  Rawls Political liberalism 36. See Pomerleau http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest (Date of use: 18 
 September 2017); Keating 1996 Stan L Rev 318, 323-324. 
56  1996 Stan L Rev 318. 
57  Political liberalism 50. 
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willingness to adhere to such terms is based on reciprocity. To Rawls, 58  being 
reasonable encompasses the idea that a person accepts that others have equal rights 
to pursue their goals and it is therefore necessary to find terms acceptable to all 
members of society. Rawls catapulted the concept of reasonableness to a separate 
and distinct concept distinguishing it from the concept of justice.59 
 
Dworkin, 60  the contemporary American philosopher, criticised Hart’s 61  views and 
propounded the theory of law as integrity. According to this theory law should be 
interpreted constructively taking into account a community’s shared principles. In 
difficult cases, the adjudicator considers existing rules, principles, and precedents that 
fit best. If, for example, a number of earlier decisions fit, then the adjudicator must 
choose one, justifying the choice while taking into consideration moral principles such 
as fairness and justice.62 Dworkin63 states that certain interests or rights, including 
fundamental rights, must be protected against the government. It would be wrong to 
sacrifice certain important individual interests for the collective benefit.64 Dworkin is 
well known for his idea of trumping rights. However, Costa Neto,65 with reference to 
Dworkin’s ideas, explains that according to Dworkin, competing rights are not weighed 
against each other. Rights of the individual cannot be weighed against society’s 
demands. Certain interests trump any benefit and cannot be weighed. There are 
however, instances where a right may be limited, which include: where the values 
embraced by the original right are not at stake; or where the cost to society would be 
“great enough to justify whatever assault on dignity or equality might be involved”.66 
Costa Neto 67  convincingly argues that, in general, competing interests may be 
weighed against each other. Certain rights (trumps) may be assigned a greater 
abstract weight (a winning margin) when weighed against other constitutional values. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
58  Political liberalism 48-54.See Viola 2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 99 who, like 
 Fletcher, supports Rawls’ idea of reasonableness and reciprocity. 
59  See in general Mandle 1999 CJPH 75 ff who summarises the use of reasonableness by 
 Rawls. 
60  Taking rights seriously 82-130. 
61  See in general Dworkin Law’s empire. 
62  See Dworkin Law’s empire 42, 49, 227, 231, 239.  
63  Taking rights seriously 191. See Costa Neto 2015 Rev Direito GV 160 with reference to 
 Dworkin. 
64  See Dworkin Taking rights seriously 31,173; Costa Neto 2015 Rev Direito GV 161. 
65  2015 Rev Direito GV 161 with reference to Dworkin Taking rights seriously 197-198. 
66  Taking rights seriously 200. See Costa Neto 2015 Rev Direito GV 162. 
67  2015 Rev Direito GV 159 ff. 
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In South African customary law, the emphasis is on solidarity, group interests or rights, 
duties and obligations.68 The aim of customary law is to restore justice based on 
healing between the parties as well as the community69 rather than penalising the 
individual.70 This is expressed in the concept of ubuntu which has been recognised as 
a constitutional principle:71 
 
“ubuntu translates as ‘humaneness’. In its most fundamental sense it translates as personhood 
and ‘morality’. Metaphorically, it expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the 
significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the survival of communities. 
While it envelops the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, 
conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity 
and morality. Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a shift from confrontation 
to conciliation. In South Africa ubuntu has become a notion with particular resonance in the 
building of a democracy. It is part of our rainbow heritage, though it might have operated and 
still operates differently in diverse community settings. In the Western cultural heritage, respect 
and the value for life, manifested in the all-embracing concepts of ‘humanity’ and 
‘menswaardigheid’, are also highly prized. It is values like these that Section 35 [of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996] requires to be promoted. They give meaning 
and texture to the principles of a society based on freedom and equality”. 
 
Historically, ubuntu played a part in reconciling and mending society after the 
apartheid era where people were separated on grounds of race and colour. In modern 
times, it represents solidarity which is interrelated with equality and liberty. They are 
regarded as three pivotal constitutional values.72 
 
Restorative justice entails: meeting to discuss the harm caused as well as the way 
forward from that point; concentrating on repairing the harm done instead of punishing 
the offender; restoring mutual respect between the parties; and participation between 
the parties, thereby encouraging other people close to the parties to also participate. 
Restorative justice in modern times is evident in mediation and dispute resolution 
                                                                                                                                                                            
68  Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 197. 
69  S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) [26], [34]. See Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African 
 customary law 213. 
70  Makgoro J in Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) [69] stated that the aim of traditional 
 customary law is the “restoration of harmonious human and social relationships where they 
 have been ruptured by an infraction of community norms”. See also Himonga and Nhlapo 
 (eds) African customary law 212. 
71  In S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) [307]. See also Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
 Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) [37]; Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African 
 customary law 213. 
72  As explained by Sachs J in Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) [113]. 
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procedures.73 It has been used as part of a remedy for defamation where a retraction 
and apology to the victim for the defamatory statements was ordered.74 
 
Traditionally, customary law did not formulate punishment in the form of torture, 
detention, imprisonment, or hard labour.75 Punishment was formulated in the form of 
fines, confiscation of property and loss of social standing within the community.76 
However, for serious offences (such as witchcraft), banishment from the community 
and execution could be imposed by the chief or king.77 Banishment, execution and 
corporal punishment have been abolished in South Africa. 78  Customary law is 
generally voluntarily observed by the community members out of fear of “supernatural 
punishment”.79 Customary law does not make a clear distinction between criminal law 
and the law of delict.80 There are set prescribed damages for delicts committed.81 
Crimes under the Natal Code of Zulu Law82 whereby customary law was codified 
during the colonial, Union and apartheid era include inter alia: a failure by individuals 
who have a natural duty to care for and provide necessities for others; and failing to 
warn neighbours or others of contagious or infectious disease carried by one’s 
livestock.83 In respect of damage to property, for example, where an animal is killed, 
the owner of the animal must be notified and the animal must be replaced. The person 
who killed the animal is entitled to keep the carcass of the dead animal. 84 
Compensation is paid for damage to crops and where a person failed to put out a fire.85 
It is clear that customary law focus on repairing relations between parties in an 
amicable way keeping respect and dignity. The focus is not on monetary 
compensation. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
73  As explained by Sachs J in Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) [114]. 
74  See Le Roux v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici 
 Curiae) 2011 6 BCLR 577 (CC) [199]-[203]; The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride (Johnstone 
 as Amici Curiae) 2011 8 BCLR 816 (CC) [132]; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 30 fn 22; 
 chapter 3 para 6.1.  
75  Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 213. 
76  Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 214. 
77  Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 214. 
78  See authority referred to by Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 215 fn 23-25. 
79  Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 214. 
80  Rautenbach and Bekker Legal pluralism 157-158. 
81  Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 198. However, the amount of damages is 
 not set where delicts such as theft and assault are committed against the leader. 
82  Proc R151 of 1987. 
83  See other offences referred to by Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 221-22. 
84  Rautenbach and Bekker Legal pluralism 167. 
85  Rautenbach and Bekker Legal pluralism 167. 
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As shown from the philosophers’ views and South African customary law, the concept 
of “reasonableness” developed from the concept of “justice”. Justice requires: a 
balancing of interests; mutual respect of other’s interests or rights; and treating 
individuals equally as advocated by Rawls, Dworkin and the South African customary 
law principle ubuntu. Under certain circumstances it is justified to infringe another’s 
interests, and reasonable, as advocated by Aquinas. Acting reasonably is about doing 
what is right from a moral perspective which involves duties, rights and obligations as 
advocated by Kant. Moral principles shape the law as submitted by Hart. Acting 
reasonably depends on what the law prescribes as reasonable conduct as advocated 
by Hobbes, Mill and Hart. What is considered as reasonable can be gleaned from 
society’s views. When interests or rights are infringed, there must be redress from the 
law to restore the balance that was lost as advocated by Aristotle. The South African 
customary law concept Ubuntu, propagates restorative justice aimed at repairing the 
harm done as well as the relations between the parties. It is evident that the concept 
of ubuntu, fairness, justice, equity, policy considerations, society’s views and 
reasonableness are all intertwined. Thus acting reasonably requires: taking others’ 
interests into consideration besides one’s own interests; consideration of moral 
principles; and what the law sets as boundaries to reasonable conduct. Redress is 
called for when a person has acted unreasonably in infringing another’s interests or 
rights unreasonably. When deciding whether it is reasonable to restore the balance 
under the circumstances and find one responsible or liable, fairness and equality must 
be applied to all parties as well as their interests and rights ‒ then justice is served.  
 
2. The modern use of the concept “reasonableness” 
 
According to the Oxford dictionary, 86  the word “reasonableness” means: having 
“[s]ound judgement; fairness”; “[t]he quality of being based on good sense”; “[t]he 
quality of being as much as is appropriate or fair; moderateness”. It is evident that it is 
a word often closely associated with other words, terms or concepts such as “fairness” 
and belongs to a family of general clauses.87 Indeed, in South African law, it has been 
                                                                                                                                                                            
86  https://www.enoxforddictionaries.com˃reasonableness (Date of use: 20 September 2017). 
87  See Artosi in Bongiovanni, Sartor and Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and law 69; Nivarra 
 2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 321. 
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closely linked to the concepts of “justice”, “equity” and “fairness”.88 Legal academic 
writers have not provided a precise definition of the word “reasonableness” but as will 
be shown they have tried to characterise or qualify it. Moran89 explains that both 
reasonableness and equality have been referred to as “weasel words” because they 
encourage and require the use of discretion in judgments. Spadaro90 submits that the 
word and concept reasonableness is “slippery, ambiguous”, and “polysemous”, but it 
is about the way rights are applied or protected ‒ it is the middle ground between an 
excess of rationality and sentimentality. Zipursky91 submits that “the word ‘reasonable’ 
is a paradigmatic example of a standard in the law, and its meaning is, if nothing else, 
vague”. Legal, philosophical and economic theories have been used to flesh out the 
concept.92 Viola93 points out that the question of reasonableness is central to political 
philosophy debates. In terms of determining negligence, an economic or deontic 
(referring to duties, obligations, rights and powers) 94  approach is used. 95  The 
economic approach which has been followed in American law will be discussed further 
in chapter 5.96 Coleman97 explains that generally tort law has a deontic form which is 
reflected in the norms and remedies. Morality, corrective justice98 and the idea of 
recourse explain the deontic form. Wells 99  submits that according to the deontic 
approach, conduct is evaluated with an objective, rational set of moral principles. The 
deontic approach is one of the two types of moral theories. The second moral theory 
called the “consequentialist” theory determines conduct according to its 
consequences, in the sense that conduct is good if, on a balance, the consequences 
are beneficial. 100  Utilitarianism and the economic theory of law in determining 
                                                                                                                                                                            
88  See Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard (Pty) Ltd 1990 2 SA 520 (W) 528-529; 
 Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A) 652; and S 
 v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A) 40-41; chapter 1 para 1. 
89  Reasonable person 283. 
90  2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 299-300. 
91  2015 U Pa L Rev 2134. 
92  See in general Rawls Justice; Rawls Political liberalism; Scanlon What we owe to each other; 
 Spadaro 2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 300 points out that the concept has also been 
 studied from a constitutional perspective in respect of its role in constitutional justice. 
93  2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 99. 
94  Coleman 2012 Yale LJ Forum 557. 
95  Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2134. 
96  See chapter 5 para 3.3. 
97  2012 Yale LJ Forum 558, 565. 
98  Based on the idea that if the defendant has wronged the plaintiff “to whom he owes a duty of 
 care” then he has a duty to repair the harm done to him. See Coleman and Kraus 1986 Yale 
 LJ 1338-1339. 
99  1990 Mich L Rev 2395-2396. 
100  Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2395. 
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negligence form part of the consequentialist theories.101 It is also closely linked to the 
concept of “rationality”. Rationality is distinct from reasonableness102 and thought to 
be goal-orientated while reasonableness is thought to be value-orientated. Rationality 
encompasses three components: logic; end-reasoning;103 and reliability or empirical 
truth. On the other hand reasonableness is thought to refer to the correct way of acting 
and what is moral.104 In respect of decision-making in order to determine whether, for 
example, an action was reasonable; the action in question would need to be both 
rational and moral.105 
 
Nivarra106 correctly submits that the concept of “reasonableness” is used as a tool to 
qualify conduct and as a decision-making tool. It is a normative concept whereby inter 
alia interests, values and principles are balanced. 107  It is generally used in the 
assessment of law, actions, decisions, rules, arguments and judgments.108 
 
The antonym of reasonable ‒ “unreasonable” – is often used to differentiate between 
the positive and negative. For example, conduct may be reasonable in a positive way 
or unreasonable in a negative way. There is also an adjectival use of the word to 
modify a noun, as in: a reasonable inference; a reasonable belief; or reasonable 
reliance which is epistemic relating to justified exercise of judgment. There is an 
adverbial use of the word where the word “reasonably” is used to modify adjectives as 
in “reasonably necessary”. It is used as a verb, as in “reasonably relied” or 
“unreasonably interfered”.109 Phrases such as “reasonable mistake” and “reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                                            
101  Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2395 fn 160. 
102  See Sibley 1953 Philosophical Rev 554 ff; Keating 1996 Stan L Rev 311; Viola 2002 
 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 104; Spadaro 2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 300. 
103  Sibley 1953 Philosophical Rev 556 submits that “rationality” is an “intellectual virtue” but also 
 encompasses one’s will. In acting rationally one promotes his own interests, but whether 
 one’s conduct is reasonable is based on an objective impartial judgment taking into account 
 others’ interests (557). Rawls Political liberalism 48-50 submits that reasonableness involves 
 practical reasoning, like rationality. However, in acting reasonably, one restrains his pursuit of 
 his own desires to accommodate for those of other people. See Keating 1996 Stan L Rev 
 311-312; Zipursky 2004 Fordham L Rev 1928. 
104  According to Von Wright Images of science referred to by Alexy in Bongiovanni, Sartor and 
 Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and law 5. 
105  See Sartor in Bongiovanni, Sartor and Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and law 17; Alexy in 
 Bongiovanni, Sartor and Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and law 5. 
106  2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 321, 330. 
107  Spadaro 2002 Yearbook of legal hermeneutics 303. 
108  Alexy in Bongiovanni, Sartor and Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and law 7. 
109  See Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2136-2141. 
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risk”, etcetera, are used to refer to discernment of the reasonable person.110 The idea 
of balancing or weighing, for example, competing interests, risks and benefits, is at the 
heart of reasonableness.111 
 
The various ways the concept reasonableness is used in the law is vast.112 It is 
evident, though, that reasonableness is a normative concept linked to rationality and 
moral principles. It involves the exercise of judgment and the weighing of inter alia 
interests, risks and benefits. It is broadly used to judge conduct and to reach a 
decision. In this thesis, the aim is not to define the concept “reasonableness” with 
precision113 nor refer to its various literary uses. The focus in this thesis will be on the 
current influence of the concept “reasonableness” on the elements of delictual liability 
in South African and French law; and on liability on the torts of trespass to the person 
and the tort of negligence in Anglo-American law. 
 
3. General concepts related to the concept “reasonableness” 
 
The concepts: reasonableness; fairness; justice; public policy; legal policy; policy 
considerations; and the boni mores (legal convictions of the community) are 
ambiguous and difficult to define with precision. There is no consensus with regard to 
their precise meanings and the boundaries between the meanings are often somewhat 
blurred. Nevertheless, there is consensus that: they are closely related to one another; 
they involve value judgments; and they can be distinguished. In respect of the chosen 
field of study of this thesis, they are in the end tools used by the adjudicators to 
determine delictual liability or liability in tort law. 
 
3.1 Public policy, legal policy and policy considerations  
 
According to the Oxford dictionary,114 “public policy” in its ordinary use means “[t]he 
principles, often unwritten, on which social laws are based”. From a legal perspective 
                                                                                                                                                                            
110  Fletcher 1985 Harvard L Rev 949. 
111  Alexy in Bongiovanni, Sartor and Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and law 8. 
112  Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2135. 
113  See Keating 1996 Stan L Rev 312 fn 2 who also does not try to define reasonableness with 
 “philosophical precision” but tries to explain it intuitively. 
114  https://www.enoxforddictionaries.com˃policy (Date of use: 21 September 2017). 
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it refers to “[t]he principle that injury to the public good is a basis for denying the legality 
of a contract or other transaction”. 115  Public policy, legal policy and policy 
considerations are often used interchangeably. 
 
Jones,116  in respect of determining the existence of a duty of care in the tort of 
negligence in English law 117  states that justice and reasonableness is a test of 
“common sense” and “ordinary reason” which involves a number of considerations:  
 
“At its narrowest, it focuses on justice and fairness as between the parties. At a broader level, 
it will consider the reasonableness of a duty from the perspective of legal policy, focusing on 
the operation of the legal system and its principles. At a still wider but more controversial level, 
it may take account of the social and public policy implications of imposing a duty.” 
 
Jones,118 with reference to English tort law under the heading “public policy” refers to 
“general considerations of the ‘public good’” which may be viewed as a concept similar 
to the concept of the boni mores.119 Under “legal policy”, Jones120 essentially refers to 
what is commonly known in the South African law of delict as “policy considerations”121 
such as: the floodgates argument where the concern of imposing liability in a case 
may result in a high influx of claims in the future; and fear of indeterminate liability. 
There is no numerus clausus with regard to policy considerations. Other policy 
considerations include: vulnerability to risk, where the plaintiff is considered vulnerable 
to risk because he cannot protect himself adequately by other legal remedies; 
conservation and conservatism of the law in the sense that there is for example a 
reluctance to provide a delictual or tort law remedy if a contractual one exists, or the 
law of delict or tort law should not undermine the law of contract; allocation of loss 
concerning which party can afford to bear the loss and whether the parties are insured; 
and the practical effect of imposing liability ‒ will the decision act as a deterrent for 
future behaviour or have some other adverse effect? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
115  https://www.enoxforddictionaries.com˃policy (Date of use: 21 September 2017). The term 
 “policy” here relates to contracts. 
116  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 450. 
117  Under the criterion of whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the 
 defendant. 
118  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 454. 
119  See Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 319. 
120  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 452-453. 
121  See in particular the policy factors considered with regard to liability for pure economic loss 
 discussed in chapter 3 para 9. 
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Floyd122 states that in South African law, public policy manifests itself in: legislation; 
the common law; the boni mores; and what is in the public interest ‒ all of which since 
1994 have been underpinned by constitutional norms and values. 
 
Public policy, legal policy and policy considerations, when applied to limiting or 
excluding liability, should be reasonable. Generally public policy, legal policy and 
policy considerations are used as a tool by adjudicators to justify their decisions for 
limiting or excluding liability. As will become apparent further on in this study, policy 
considerations are prevalent in excluding liability in cases of omissions, psychiatric 
injury, pure economic loss and wrongful life claims.123 
 
3.2 Justice, equity and fairness 
 
Often, when dealing with delictual liability or liability in tort law, whether based on fault 
or strict liability, moral terms such as blameworthiness, reasonableness, fairness, 
justice, inter alia, are referred to under the theory of corrective justice.124 Aristotle 
applied corrective justice to voluntary and involuntary transactions, loosely 
distinguishing between contracts and tort law respectively.125 Aristotle submitted126 
that it does not matter whether a good man has defrauded a bad man and vice versa, 
nor whether a good or bad man committed adultery; “the law looks only to the 
distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong 
and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received 
it”. Thus there is a duty to rectify the harm caused by the wrongdoing. The defendant 
must act wrongfully (adikei) and cause harm (eblapsen) while the plaintiff must be 
wronged (adiketei) and suffer harm (beblaptai).127 The wrong must be remedied and 
the equilibrium restored by the adjudicator in providing a remedy.128 
                                                                                                                                                                            
122  In Hutchison and Pretorius 175 (with reference to the South African law of contracts) referred 
 to by Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 306. 
123  See, for example, under South African law, chapter 3 paras 3.1.10-3.1.11, 8, 9 and 10; 
 English law, chapter 4 paras 3.2.2.1, 3.3.1-3.3.3; American law, chapter 5 paras 3.4.1-3.4.5; 
 French law, chapter 6 paras 6-9; chapter 7 paras 2.9.1-2.9.4.  
124  Aristotle (Book V, chapter 4) Nicomachean ethics. Chapter 4 deals with corrective justice 
 while chapter 3 deals with distributive justice. See Epstein Torts 86; Fischer 1999 Tenn L Rev 
 1136; Posner 1981 J Legal Studies 189. 
125  Aristotle Nicomachean ethics 111-112. See Posner 1981 J Legal Studies 189. 
126  See Ross Nicomachean ethics 114-115; Posner 1981 J Legal Studies 189. 
127  As explained by Posner 1981 J Legal Studies 190, 194. 
128  See Epstein Torts 86; Posner 1981 J Legal Studies 190. 
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According to the Oxford dictionary, “justice”129 means “[t]he quality of being fair and 
reasonable … [t]he administration of the law or authority in maintaining this”. Rawls130 
submits: 
 
“The conception of justice which I want to develop may be stated in the form of two principles 
as follows: first, each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal right to 
most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all; and second, inequalities are arbitrary 
unless it is unreasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage, and 
provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are 
open to all. These principles express justice as a complex of three ideas: liberty, equality, and 
reward for services contributing to the common good.” 
 
According to Rawls, equality and reasonableness are required for justice. The Oxford 
dictionary, 131  defines “fair” as: “[treating people equally without favouritism or 
discrimination … [j]ust or appropriate in the circumstances … [c]onsiderable though 
not outstanding in size or amount … [m]oderately good”.  
 
Equality, according to the Oxford dictionary,132 means “[t]he state of being equal, 
especially in status, rights, or opportunities”. 
 
Van Zyl133 submits that the prerequisites for justice are “reasonableness, generality, 
equality, certainty and fair process”. He134 points out that the concept of “equity” is 
subordinate in the legal systems based on Roman law, like South African law. It is 
resorted to only when existing law does not prescribe a suitable solution or when the 
solution “causes undue hardship and inequity”. In English law, the concept constitutes 
a body of law that has developed beside the common law, whereas in South Africa the 
concept has played a role separately or with the concepts of “reasonableness”, 
“fairness” and “justice”. The English and South African use of the concept of “equity” 
is however not similar, as the South African concept was developed from Roman and 
Greek law. Van Zyl135 states that closely linked to the concept of morality, in relation 
to justice, are the boni mores which “more or less, approximates to the ‘public policy’ 
of English and South African law”. He136 submits that the concepts, justice and equity 
                                                                                                                                                                            
129  https://www.enoxforddictionaries.com˃justice (Date of use: 22 September 2017). 
130  Philosophical Rev 165. 
131  https://www.enoxforddictionaries.com˃fair (Date of use: 22 September 2017). 
132  https://www.enoxforddictionaries.com˃equality (Date of use: 22 September 2017). 
133  1988 SALJ 274. 
134  Van Zyl 1988 SALJ 277-278. 
135  1988 SALJ 284.  
136  Van Zyl 1988 SALJ 289-290. 
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are distinct but closely linked to the boni mores, public policy and reasonableness. 
Van Zyl states:137 
 
“‘Justice’ … may be described as the state of harmony … which comes into existence after a 
conflict of interests in a particular society between particular interest-bearing persons … has 
been resolved … . ‘Equity’, on the other hand, is indicative of those principles of law which have 
evolved to mitigate the harshness of the existing law … . Concepts such as justice, equity, good 
faith and boni mores contain strongly subjective elements when they pertain to a particular 
person or group of persons. It has equally strong links, however, with surrounding 
circumstances and with general considerations relating to these concepts … . Such 
considerations require to be assessed, alongside the relevant personal circumstances and 
surrounding circumstances, as objectively as possible in resolving any conflict … . The means 
to achieve this end … is to apply the (objective) criterion of ‘right reason’ (ratio recta) or 
reasonableness”. 
 
Just as equality plays a multifaceted and complex role in law 138  so does 
reasonableness and fairness. Equality plays a central role in protecting rights and 
ensuring equal treatment to all.139 In terms of equity, individuals and their interests 
must be treated equally, that is, without bias. Justice is thus served when the parties 
are treated fairly and equally. In order to reach a fair judgment, the criterion of objective 
reasonableness is applied.  
 
3.3 Boni mores (legal convictions of the community) 
 
According to the Jurist Florentinus, mores in Roman law referred to the following two 
things: consuetudo, meaning “local legal customs and usages”; and boni mores huius 
civitatis, meaning “local social-moral standards of a community”.140 Conduct which 
was contra bonos mores, producing delictual obligations, was actionable in a court of 
law.141 The adjudicator was the interpreter of the boni mores of the informed sector of 
the community.142 As the concept boni mores developed in Roman law, it became 
associated with the doctrine of “public policy”.143 Ferreira144 submits that public policy 
construes the Latin term boni mores which currently refers to good morals or a good 
moral standard. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
137  1988 SALJ 290. 
138  Moran Reasonable person 169-170 fn 15 refers to the vast literature on this concept as well 
 as the debate about its exact scope and importance. 
139  See Moran Reasonable person 169 fn 11 as well as the authority cited therein. 
140  Plescia 1987 RIDA 269. 
141  Plescia 1987 RIDA 270, 278. 
142  Plescia 1987 RIDA 285. 
143  Plescia 1987 RIDA 269. Plescia refers to boni mores and in brackets public policy. 
144  Fundamental rights 108. 
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Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche145 point out with reference to the requirement of boni 
mores in the German law of delict, that the concept is flexible, ever-changing and 
“refers to a minimal set of legal-ethical principles (rechtsethische Minimum) seen as a 
set of legal value assessments (rechtliche Wertungen)”. Conduct which is contra 
bonos mores is behaviour which to a large extent offends “morally acceptable conduct 
towards persons with whom one is in a legal relationship”.146  
 
Currently the concept boni mores in the South African law of delict is influenced by 
constitutional norms and values,147 customary law values,148 social, moral, ethical, 
religious149 and other pertinent values150 which are ever-changing.151 It serves as a 
criterion in determining whether the defendant’s conduct in question is delictually 
wrongful.152 In determining wrongfulness, according to the traditional approach,153 the 
question is: “whether, according to the legal convictions of the community and in light 
of all the circumstances of the case, the defendant infringed the interests of the plaintiff 
in a reasonable or unreasonable manner”. 154  The courts refer to the criterion of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
145  Tort 231. 
146  Grundanschauungen loyalen Umgangs unter Rechtsgenossen: BGH 2 June 1981, 2184-2185 
 quoted by Canaris and referred to in Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 231. 
147  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See Carmichele v Minister of Safety 
 and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 962-963; 
 Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust, as amicus curiae) 
 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 396-397; Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 
 SA 431 (SCA) 444-448; Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC) 315; DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 
 (CC) 101; Neethling 2005 SALJ 580; chapter 3 paras 3.1.3-3.1.4. 
148  For example, in Fosi v RAF 2008  3 SA 560 (C) [17], the court stated that in terms of 
 customary law, a child with the financial means has a duty to support a parent in need of 
 financial assistance. It is contra bonos mores where a child with the financial means does not 
 support a parent in need. See also Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 29. 
149  See, for example, Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender 
 Equality Intervening) 1999 4 ALL SA 421 (SCA) [23] where the court recognised a duty of 
 support “out of a de facto monogamous Islamic marriage” as a result of the change in the boni 
 mores; Osman v RAF 2015 6 SA 74 (GP) [21], [24] where the court considered Hindu and 
 Islamic cultures (like customary law) which recognise the duty of children to support their 
 parents (Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 30-31).   
150  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 37 fn 24 refer to Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 3 
 SA 1049 (SCA) 1053 fn 3 where Marais J questioned what a legal conviction is and stated 
 “what the law ought to be”. Hefer J in Minister of Law and Order v Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A) 
 318-319 referred to “society’s notions of what justice demands”.    
151  See for example in DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC), where the Constitutional Court confirmed 
 that an innocent spouse may no longer be entitled to sue a third party in delict for adultery as 
 a result of the public’s changing attitude towards adultery. See chapter 2 para 3.3; chapter 3 
 para 3.1.4.  
152  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 37 fn 24. 
153  See chapter 3 para 3.1. 
154  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 37. 
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reasonableness or the boni mores as a benchmark in determining wrongfulness.155 
According to the recent approach to determining wrongfulness,156 the Constitutional 
Court in DE v RH157 referred to the boni mores which it submitted is about public policy 
“informed by our constitutional values”. It tells us whether a delictual claim may be 
established − or put differently whether it is “reasonable to impose delictual liability?” 
Thus in a sense the boni mores is used, whether the traditional or recent approach is 
considered in the South African law of delict; to determine whether the defendant’s 
conduct is reasonable and whether it is reasonable to hold him liable in delict, provided 
all the other elements of a delict are present. If conduct is contra bonos mores in the 
South African law of delict, it generally has the effect of negating the element of 
wrongfulness.158 
 
Hawthorne159 submits that Hobbes and Locke planted the “seeds of public policy”. The 
modern use of the concept of public policy in South African law stems from the “Roman 
and Roman-Dutch norm of boni mores – standards of good morals and the English 
law rule of public policy”.160 Hawthorne,161 upon investigating the origin of the term 
“public policy” in South African law points out that numerous academic writers and 
adjudicators currently refer to the concepts boni mores and public policy 
interchangeably, at least in the context of the law of contract. When reference is made 
to conduct being contra bonos mores, it has been referred to as conduct which is 
contrary to public policy.162 Hawthorne163 has considered some academic writers’ 
views in trying to ascertain whether there is a difference between the terms public 
policy and boni mores. She found that the general consensus of the academic writers 
                                                                                                                                                                            
155  See list of cases referred to by Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s Law of personality 
 54 fn 182. 
156  See chapter 3 para 3.2. 
157  2015 5 SA 83 (CC) 101. 
158  An infringement of an interest may be considered contra bonos mores and therefore wrongful. 
 The boni mores performs an important function in establishing wrongfulness with regard to 
 iniuria and the requirement that conduct must not be against the legal convictions of the 
 community – Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s Law of personality 47, 54. For 
 example, a person may consent to the infringement of his body in respect of the risk of injury 
 when partaking in a sporting activity or undergoing medical treatment. However, a person 
 cannot consent to murder or serious bodily harm, as it is considered contra bonos mores 
 (Neethling and Potgieter Delict 113). 
159  2013 Fundamina 319. 
160  Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 319 
161  2013 Fundamina 300ff. 
162  See authority cited by Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 303-304. 
163  2013 Fundamina 304ff.  
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is that they are not easily distinguishable.164 Hawthorne165 refers to Barkhuizen v 
Napier166 and submits that the Constitutional Court recognised the concept of “public 
policy” as the yardstick for the concepts of “reasonableness” and “fairness”. She167 
states that “combining the norms of boni mores and public policy is historically as well 
as dogmatically incorrect. It either stretches sound morals beyond recognition or risks 
turning public policy into moralising paternalism”. Hawthorne168 submits that although 
the boni mores is closely associated with public policy, they are not the same and 
cannot be used synonymously.  
 
It is evident that South African courts do not draw a clear distinction between the boni 
mores, and public policy. However in the law of delict, the boni mores yardstick is 
limited to determining wrongfulness, whereas public policy, legal policy, and policy 
considerations may be considered by the adjudicator in determining other elements of 
a delict. 169  The “boni mores” and “public policy” are both concepts used by the 
adjudicators in reaching and justifying their decisions. Furthermore, both concepts 
take into consideration the public interest, which is ever-changing and is usually 
associated with the concepts of “justice”, “reasonableness”, “fairness” and “equity”.  
 
Public policy does manifest itself in the boni mores. For example, Van Zyl J in 
Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard (Pty) Ltd170 stated that “public policy, 
in the sense of the boni mores, cannot be separated from concepts such as justice, 
equity, good faith and reasonableness, which are basic to harmonious community 
relations and may indeed be regarded as the purpose of applying public policy 
considerations”. In Barkhuizen v Napier,171 Ngcobo J stated that “[n]otions of fairness, 
justice and equity, and reasonableness cannot be separated from public policy. Public 
policy takes into account the necessity to do simple justice between individuals”. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
164  See authority cited by Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 306. 
165  2013 Fundamina 303. 
166  2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 339. 
167  Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 318. 
168  2013 Fundamina 308. 
169  Such as negligence, legal causation and in determining damage.  
170  1990 2 SA 520 (W) 529 within the context of the law of delict. 
171  2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 339 within the context of law of contracts. 
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It may be concluded that there is a difference between reasonableness and rationality, 
but being reasonable encompasses rationality. There is a difference between morality 
and reasonableness in the sense that moral principles guide what is reasonable, but 
what is immoral may not be illegal.  
 
Public policy plays a more dominant role in deciding whether a particular element172 
in respect of delictual liability or liability in tort law is present. Policy may also play a 
role in excluding liability and policy should be reasonable. In English law, the policy 
that the state may not be held liable for pure omissions may be regarded as 
unreasonable in some jurisdictions but it is considered reasonable and justified in the 
United Kingdom.173 The difference between the United Kingdom, France, South Africa 
and the United States of America is that the latter three countries have written 
constitutions.174 Thus fundamental rights are protected and even the state may be held 
liable. In English law, due to the principle of sovereignty,175 the state may be immune 
from liability for pure omissions. In South African law, the boni mores does encompass 
moral principles and reflects the public’s values, but it is subject to a written constitution 
which applies equally to all, including the state. A citizen’s rights may be limited if it is 
considered reasonable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution (the “limitation 
clause”).176 Thus in South African law, the boni mores reflects reasonableness as it is 
subject to the limitation clause in the Constitution. There is a difference between public 
policy or policy considerations, which may apply to a number of elements of a delict; 
and the boni mores that applies specifically to the element of wrongfulness in 
determining delictual liability. Public policy if applied in South African law must also be 
                                                                                                                                                                            
172  For example, in South African law, particularly whether wrongfulness, negligence and legal 
 causation is present (see chapter 3 paras 3, 4.3 and 5.2). In Anglo-American law whether a 
 duty of care is owed, in determining negligence and legal causation or scope of liability (see 
 chapter 4 paras 3.2, 3.4 and 4.2; chapter 5 paras 3.1-3.3 and 4.2). 
173  See chapter 4 para 3.3.1; chapter 3 paras 3.1.10-3.1.11 under the discussion of Carmichele v 
 Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 
 (CC) 957-960 where the Constitutional Court alluded to the approach followed in English law 
 of not holding the state liable for omissions, as the South African pre-constitutional approach.  
174  See chapter 3 para 3.1.3; chapter 5 para 1; chapter 6 paras 1 and 6. 
175  See Starr 1984 Marquette L Rev 679. 
176  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. S 36 states that: the rights “in the Bill 
 of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the 
 limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
 dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including ‒ (a) the 
 nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and 
 extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less 
 restrictive means to achieve the purpose. (2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any 
 other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights”.  
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reasonable as it is subject to the limitation clause in the Constitution. There is a 
difference between equity, fairness and justice. Justice is the end result, whereby in 
reaching the result, the criterion of reasonableness is applied as well as equity and 
fairness. In a strict sense, a decision or judgment may not seem reasonable, fair and 
just to a particular party and ideas of reasonableness, fairness and justice may change 
with the times. For example, previously, claims for pure economic loss and psychiatric 
harm were limited or excluded, even though the harm or loss was sustained. This may 
not have been considered fair, just and reasonable to the person that legitimately 
suffered the harm or loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct. This was indeed the 
case in most jurisdictions. Liability for such claims was not recognised until recently in 
most jurisdictions. However, reasonableness, fairness, justice, equity, public policy 
and the boni mores are all considered in excluding or limiting liability. In this sense 
they are interrelated. In deciding whether an element is present for delictual liability or 
liability in tort law, the influence of reasonableness may be explicit or implicit, but in 
reaching the final decision as to whether liability should be found in delict or tort law, 
the influence of reasonableness is implicit. 
 
4. The standard of the “reasonable person”  
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed in this thesis, the standard of the reasonable person 
is encountered. The standard is usually used to assess conduct in determining 
negligence, but it has been used in determining other elements of delictual liability or 
liability in tort law. 177  The concept of the bonus pater familias, “the good family 
father”, 178  originated from Roman law, and is synonymous with the term, “the 
reasonable person” or its equivalent referred to in this thesis. The reasonable person 
standard is normative.179 
                                                                                                                                                                            
177  See for example, chapter 3 para 3.4 where the standard of the reasonable person is 
 encountered in the grounds of justification: private defence; necessity; provocation and official 
 command. It is also encountered in determining damages (see para 6.5). In English law, the 
 standard of the reasonable person is applied in determining a number of defences, elements 
 in the torts of trespass to a person and in all the elements used to determine the tort of 
 negligence (see chapter 4 paras 2, 2.4.1-2.4.3, 3.2-3.5, 4 and 5.2). In American law, the 
 standard is also encountered in some defences such as self-defence, consent and 
 comparative or contributory fault (see chapter 5 paras 2.5.1, 2.5.6, 3.5.1). See also chapter 6 
 para 2.2; chapter 7 paras 2.2-2.5, 2.7.  
178  Is used in the French law of delict, see chapter 6 para 2.2.3.  
179  Miller and Perry 2012 NYU LR 323. 
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In trying to establish what exactly the reasonable standard is, a number of academic 
writers’ views will be referred to. Artosi180 states that the reasonable person is a well-
known, fictional, abstract character supposed to be endowed with morals, virtues and 
reasoning which society expects from its members. Hart181 submits that the standard 
of reasonableness “created space for ordinary moral reasoning”. Zipursky182 submits 
that the reasonable person standard is used as a decision-making tool for adjudicators 
that allow them to make determinations of reasonableness with ease. Weinrib183 
submits that the reasonable person standard outlines the limit between the 
defendant’s freedom to act as he wishes and “the plaintiff’s interest in security by 
treating certain risks as unreasonable”. Ripstein 184  states that the standard 
encompasses the idea of fair terms with regard to social interactions where there are 
dividing risks that accompany everyday acceptable human conduct. Generally, a 
person who fails to meet the required benchmark of acceptable behaviour may be held 
liable for the harm caused to others.185 The standard has been criticised,186 inter alia, 
for being favourable to men187 and specific classes of persons. When the standard is 
interpreted by adjudicators, there is a tendency at times to reflect their subjective views 
in judgments.188 Nevertheless, as a standard it is useful and illustrates the law’s 
devotion to justice.189 
 
It is interesting to note the views of Moran190 who refers to the various understandings 
of reasonableness in the reasonable person standard. After studying the role of the 
reasonable person standard in a number of common law jurisdictions, she submits 
that the reasonable person is regarded as the ordinary, normal, human being. His 
                                                                                                                                                                            
180  In Bongiovanni, Sartor and Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and law 69. See also Neethling 
 and Potgieter Delict 141-147. 
181  Concept of law 132-133. See Moran Reasonable person 281. 
182  2015 U Pa L Rev 2149. 
183  Tort 47. See Moran Reasonable person 174. 
184  In Bongiovanni, Sartor and Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and law 255, 258. 
185  See Zipursky 2004 Fordham L Rev 1929 who refers to Ripstein’s concept of the reasonable 
 person as “objective and value laden”. Ripstein shares similar views with Keating 1996 Stan L 
 Rev 329-332, 337-341 which draws on Rawls’ idea of reasonableness. 
186  See in general Moran Reasonable person. 
187  See Bender 1988 Journal of Legal Education 3ff. Bender (20-25) traces how, initially, the 
 concept was formulated in the masculine form, illustrating bias. See also Martin Anglo-Am L 
 Rev 1994 334, 342-345; Mullender 2005 Modern LR 682. 
188  Mullender 2005 Modern LR 683. 
189  Mullender 2005 Modern LR 681-682. 
190  Reasonable person. 
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conduct must be “accepted as normal and general by other members of the community 
in similar circumstances”. 191  Moran 192  makes a distinction between normal and 
reasonable behaviour. The distinction is irrelevant in instances where normal 
behaviour is considered reasonable behaviour. She193 points out that in practice; the 
reasonable person standard is fraught with different understandings of what is normal, 
natural and ordinary. Moran 194  submits that in practice, it is normal and thus 
reasonable for young boys to be inattentive with their own and other’s safety, while 
with young girls, it is not normal and therefore unreasonable to be imprudent. Moran195 
refers to Gilligan196  who found substantial gender differences in moral reasoning 
whereby “girls use a voice of relation, of care and connection, which differs from boys’ 
emphasis on abstract rules and … ethics of justice”.197 A woman,198 young girl,199 and 
a mentally impaired person, are held to a harsher standard of reasonableness.200 
Children are generally held to a more relaxed standard when compared to adults, in 
that, to begin with very young children in some jurisdictions cannot be held 
negligent. 201  It is submitted that generally, the child’s age, intellect, maturity, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
191  Moran Reasonable person 133. Moran (133) quotes Flemming Torts 119-120 (9 ed 1998). 
 See later edition, Sappideen and Vines (eds) Fleming’s torts 128-129. See further authority 
 cited by Moran 134 fn 15 with reference to customs and the community.  
192  Reasonable person 7. 
193  Moran Reasonable person 9, 17. 
194  Reasonable person 9.  
195  Reasonable person 178. 
196  Psychological theory and women’s development 1982. 
197  Moran Reasonable person 178 in reference to Gilligan’s findings. 
198  See extensive authority cited by Moran Reasonable person 199 fn 1. Moran (199-231) points 
 out that in a criminal context with regard to provocation, self-defence, and sexual assault, the 
 standard of reasonableness applies differently to women (see Donovan and Wildman 1981 
 Loy LA L Rev 435).  
199  Moran Reasonable person 110-111 and Welke American liberty 94 refer to Michigan Central 
 Railroad v Hassenyer 48 Mich 205, 209-210 (SC 1882) involving the death of a thirteen year 
 old who was killed when an engine backed up as she was crossing the railway track. Cooley 
 J’s instructions to the jury was that however negligent the railroad company had been they 
 must consider the standard of ordinary care that she should have had with regard to herself. 
 To Cooley J, care referred to being more cautious than a male ‒ “a woman would be likely to 
 be more prudent, careful and particular in many positions and in the performance of many 
 duties than a man would. She would, for example, be more vigilant and indefatigable in her 
 care of a helpless child; she would be more particular to keep within the limits of absolute 
 safety when the dangers which threatened were such as only great strength and courage 
 could venture to encounter”. Moran (111-125), in support of the unequal treatment, refers to a 
 number of cases highlighting that the reasonableness of conduct of girls is judged more 
 harshly than that of boys.  
200  Moran Reasonable person 14. 
201  See chapter 3 para 4.1 with regard to accountability of young children in South African law; 
 chapter 4 para 1.1 where in English law no age is provided but naturally a child under two 
 years of age may not have capacity; chapter 5 para 3.2 where in the United States of 
 America, some states hold that a child from under the age of five years cannot be held liable 
 in tort. See also chapter 7 para 2.2. 
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experience etcetera as subjective factors are considered when judging their 
conduct.202 The subjective factors may be considered directly or indirectly and lend to 
the more relaxed treatment applied to children, which is reasonable and justifiable. In 
English law the reasonable child test is applied.203 In South African law, it must first be 
considered whether a child can be held accountable. Under accountability, subjective 
factors such as whether the child can tell the difference between right and wrong, the 
experience, maturity, intellect, and so on, are considered. Even though the age of the 
child may not be referred to, the other subjective factors considered, correlate with the 
child’s age.204 In American law, a child’s conduct is tested against the reasonable 
person of his own age, intelligence, maturity, and experience faced with similar 
circumstances.205 In French law, the parents are generally held strictly liable for the 
conduct of the children still living with them.206  A more relaxed standard is also 
recommended for the elderly members of the community.207 
 
With reference to a mentally impaired person, Moran208 explains that the impairment 
is regarded as an abnormality, an “idiosyncrasy or peculiarity”. Such person is not 
regarded as a full member of the community. The mentally impaired are judged 
according to the uniform standard of the reasonable person in spite of their cognitive 
and intellectual shortcomings.209 Moran refers to the following reasons supplied for 
applying this uniform standard to the mentally impaired: that it is in line with the idea 
of the general welfare of the community; it deters dangerous conduct and ensures that 
                                                                                                                                                                            
202  However, in France the requirement of discernment similar to the concept of accountability 
 and capacity has been dispensed with. See chapter 6 para 2.2.2; chapter 7 para 2.2. 
203  See chapter 4 paras 1.1 and 3.4. 
204  See chapter 3 para 4.3. 
205  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 233; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
 torts 179; chapter 5 para 3.2.; chapter 7 para 2.2. 
206  In terms of Article 1384 of the French Civil Code of 1804. See chapter 6 paras 2.2.2-2.2.3 and 
 5.2; chapter 7 paras 2.2, 2.9. 
207  Moran Reasonable person 24-26, 138. She refers to Barett III 1984 J Marshall L Rev 873 who 
 proposes a relaxed standard for the elderly. See also chapter 6 para 2.2.2 in respect of 
 French law with regard to a person over the age of seventy years; chapter 5 para 3.5.1 in 
 respect of American law where contributory negligence cannot applied to an institutionalised 
 elderly person; chapter 7 para 2.2.  
208  Reasonable person 9, 147-154 illustrates how historically women were also not considered as 
 full citizens. Their liberty was restrained and they were generally considered the weaker sex. 
 Moran (183) refers to Vogel in Vogel and Moran (eds) Citizenship 62 where historically the 
 following groups inter alia lacked legal capacity: children; women; the insane; slaves and 
 serfs. Certain religious groups such as Jews and Catholics as well as certain ethnic groups 
 were denied full legal rights and membership. Moran (184-197) refers to the inequality applied 
 to people from different racial groups and people with different financial standings. 
209 Moran Reasonable person 13. 
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the victim is compensated;210 even though it does impose a form of strict liability it can 
be justified as the conduct involves heightened risk and is deemed unreasonably risky 
conduct;211 on grounds of equality and fairness, the victim who sustains harm as a 
result of the defendant’s mental impairment should be compensated;212 and it would 
be burdensome for the courts to try and establish the extent of a person’s mental 
capacity.213 
 
According to Holmes,214 the community generally expects individuals to forgo their 
peculiarities to a certain extent. Prosser,215 along the same lines, submits that one 
who lives within a community must conform to such standards and be responsible for 
the harm or loss. Moran216 distinguishes between a person without objectively viewed 
mental or physical impairments and a person with physical disabilities. She refers to 
Vaughan v Menlove.217 In this case, the defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging 
that he was acting to the best of his cognitive abilities. The court applied an objective 
standard of a man of ordinary prudence, dismissing his subjective cognitive 
shortcomings. Moran218 refers to Roberts v Ramsbottom219 where the driver suffered 
a stroke while driving and was found negligent even though the court acknowledged 
that he was not able to appreciate that he should have stopped. This came close to 
strict liability which contradicts fault liability of the tort of negligence itself.220 She221 
points out, however, that this was revisited by the Court of Appeal in Mansfield v 
Weetabix222 where the court took into account the driver’s hypoglycaemic state which 
he was unaware of and found him not to have been negligent. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
210  See the discussion by Moran Reasonable person 31-39 with regard to the deterrence and 
 compensation rationale. 
211 Moran Reasonable person 41-42, 45. 
212  Moran Reasonable person 137-138 refers to Fleming Torts 126 (9 ed 1998, see later edition 
 Sappideen and Vines (eds) Fleming’s torts 132) citing Adamson v Motor Vehicle Insurance 
 Trust (1957) 58 WALR 56 (SC) and Alexander and Szas 1967 Notre Dame L Rev 26 who 
 state that mental illness is a deviation “from normal moral and social standards”. One must 
 however take into account the year the contribution was written by latter authors. 
213  Moran Reasonable person 28. 
214  Common law 86 referred to by Moran Reasonable person 162. 
215  Torts 153 referred to by Moran Reasonable person 163. 
216  Reasonable person 19. 
217  1837 3 Bing NC 468; 132 ER 490 (CP). 
218  Reasonable person 20-21. 
219  1980 1 All ER 7 (QBD). 
220  Moran Reasonable person 39, however, refers to the idea that the reasonable person 
 standard does in a way apply strict liability as the person’s shortcomings are disregarded.  
221  Moran Reasonable person 22. 
222  1988 1 WLR 1263 (CA). 
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Moran223 illustrates that common sense reasoning is applied in assuming what is 
normal, natural and reasonable. She224 submits that there is a connection between the 
freedom to act, blameworthiness and prevention of harm. She225 points out that Rawls, 
Holmes and Honoré all require that the actor has the capacity to prevent harm. Normal 
natural behaviour is considered as non-culpable conduct. 
 
By applying the standard of the reasonable person, Moran226 submits that sometimes 
there is inequality which does not adhere to corrective justice.227 She228 does not 
propose a subjective approach which in her opinion would result in discrimination. 
She229 submits that reasonableness is interpreted as ordinariness with reference to 
customary norms. This is problematic as what is regarded as ordinary or customary 
leads to discrimination against inter alia: the mentally impaired; girls; and women. The 
result she submits is that the standard “operates as an (unjustifiable) standard of 
ordinariness rather than as a (justifiable) standard of reasonableness”.230 In order to 
ensure that the reasonableness standard lives up to its egalitarian promise, she 
proposes that the objective reasonableness standard be understood as “appropriate 
attentiveness to the interests of others” and unreasonable conduct as “culpable 
indifference to the interests of others”.231 In short she proposes removing the person 
from the standard as her answer to the objective egalitarian approach.232 
 
Turning to Mansfield v Weetabix 233  she applies her approach stating that the 
defendant was not indifferent to the interests of others, his conduct was not 
blameworthy or negligent. 234  She applies the same approach to Roberts v 
Ramsbottom235 stating that due to the sudden stroke suffered by the defendant, he 
                                                                                                                                                                            
223  Reasonable person 131-135. 
224  Moran Reasonable person 175. 
225  Moran Reasonable person 177, 241-248. 
226  Reasonable person 11, 52. 
227  Moran Reasonable person 56. 
228  Moran Reasonable person 206. 
229  Moran Reasonable person 286. 
230  Moran Reasonable person 13. 
231  Moran Reasonable person 304. 
232  Moran Reasonable person 316. 
233  1988 1 WLR 1263 (CA). 
234  Moran Reasonable person 309. 
235  1980 1 All ER 7 (QBD). 
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was not indifferent to the interests of others. Therefore his conduct was not objectively 
unreasonable. 236  In Vaughan v Menlove 237  where the defendant claimed limited 
intelligence, his conduct showed self-preference for his own interests and indifference 
to others’ interests which was culpable.238 
 
Mullender239 submits that Moran underestimates the tools available in negligence law 
which would assist in the adaptation of the law according to her proposal. With 
reference to Mansfield v Weetabix,240 Mullender241 submits that the defendant did not 
act; hence he was not a wrongdoer. In terms of corrective justice, the defendant should 
not be held liable. Mullender submits that there is no problem with the concept of 
reasonableness itself, but there is a failure on the part of some adjudicators in 
dispensing justice within the scope of reasonableness.  
 
Martin 242  also calls for the abandonment of the reasonable person test. He 243 
proposes that liability should be “based on the scope of responsibility of each actor 
and each activity”. The responsibilities should be imposed by parliament. 
 
At times the adjudicator may apply the imperitia culpae ad numeratur rule whereby the 
standard is raised in instances where the defendant has expertise in a certain field.244 
For example, the conduct of a doctor would be tested against the standard of the 
reasonable doctor and not against the standard of the reasonable person.  
 
The criteria applied under the reasonable person standard will be discussed in more 
detail under the study of each jurisdiction. As illustrated above, the standard of 
reasonableness may apply differently to children, the elderly, professionals, mentally 
impaired, young girls and women. Nevertheless, the influence of reasonableness on 
the standard of the reasonable person is explicit. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
236  Moran Reasonable person 287. 
237  1837 3 Bing NC 468. 
238  Moran Reasonable person 310. 
239  Modern LR 694-695. 
240  1988 1 WLR 1263 (CA). 
241  Modern LR 688. 
242  1994 Anglo-Am L Rev 334ff. 
243  Martin 1994 Anglo-Am L Rev 372. 
244  Scott 2014 De Jure 390. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
There are many different understandings of and nuances to reasonableness. Its 
influence in law is vast and ever changing. Its nuances are still being discovered and 
acknowledged from its historical development to its modern use. Even though it may 
not be possible to define reasonableness, or clarify its role with precision from a legal 
philosophical point of view, there is consensus that the concept is important and 
influential. There is consensus that it is a general concept which is closely linked to 
public policy, justice, equity, fairness, and the legal convictions of the community. It 
implicitly and explicitly infiltrates the law of delict and tort law. It is possible to proceed 
with an investigation of the explicit and implicit influence of reasonableness on 
delictual liability in South Africa and France; and liability in tort law in the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America with a general understanding of what 
reasonableness entails as well as the other concepts closely related to it. 
39 
 
Chapter 3:  Law of South Africa  
 
“Legally it will only be reasonable to hold a person liable for damage if he has committed a 
delict. It is therefore incorrect to equate the reasonableness of holding a person liable with 
wrongfulness; it is unreasonable to hold a person liable if any one of the elements of a delict, 
namely conduct, causation, wrongfulness, fault or damage is absent.”1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the focus will be on the explicit and implicit influence of 
reasonableness on the elements of delictual liability in South African law. To begin 
with, the purpose of the law of delict; the definition of a delict; the different elements 
which ground delictual liability; strict liability; the types of remedies available in South 
African law; and South African customary law, will be referred to briefly. Thereafter a 
more detailed discussion of the influence of reasonableness on each element of a 
delict will follow. The influence of reasonableness on claims for wrongful conception, 
wrongful birth and wrongful life; psychiatric injury; pure economic loss; and wrongful 
deprivation of liberty will also be referred to briefly. 
 
In general, the law of delict recognises conflicting interests that require the protection 
of the law. In achieving a balance between these conflicting interests, which may 
have been infringed or are about to be infringed in an unlawful and blameworthy 
manner, causing harm to a person as a result of the wrongdoer’s conduct;2 the law 
of delict pronounces whether a delict has been committed or not. If a delict has been 
committed, then such wronged person is entitled to relief. Relief may be in the form 
of an interdict,3 or fair and reasonable compensation in respect of the harm or loss 
suffered.4 
 
Although academic writers have provided a number of different definitions of a delict,5 
there can be no precise definition. Even if it were possible, it would as Burchell6 put 
it ‒ be short-lived. It is submitted that the following definition provided by Neethling 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 82. 
2  In the form of an omission or a commission. 
3  In order to preventing harm or the continuation of harm. 
4  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 3; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 1. 
5  See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 7-8; Burchell Delict 9-10. 
6  Delict 10. 
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and Potgieter7 is the simplest and most suitable in that it neatly captures all the 
elements of delict, even though it may be criticised for not accommodating delictual 
liability without fault.8 
 
“A delict is an act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable way causes harm to another.” 
 
It is generally accepted that the five elements of a delict which ground liability are: 
conduct, whether in the form of an omission or commission; wrongfulness; fault; 
causation; and harm (also referred to as “damage” or “loss”).9 In instances where an 
interdict is sought, harm and fault is not a requirement. The reason being, that the 
purpose of the interdict is to prevent harm, or the continuation of harm.10 
 
Although the South African law of delict is predominantly fault-based, strict liability, 
where fault is not required, is applicable in certain instances.11 The following actions 
were inherited from Roman law, whereby the defendant may be held strictly liable: 
the actio de pauperie, an action for the recovery of loss caused by domestic animals; 
the actio de pastu, an action for the recovery of loss caused by grazing animals; the 
actio de feris, an action for the recovery of loss as a result of bringing wild and 
dangerous animals to a public area; the actio de effuses vel deiectis, an action for the 
recovery of damage caused by objects thrown, falling or poured from a building; the 
condictio furtiva, an action for the recovery of loss of a stolen item; and the Praetorian 
Edict de nautis, cauponibus et stabularis, an action for the recovery of damage to 
stored goods during shipping or held by stable and inn-keepers.12 
 
Vicarious liability is another form of strict liability inherited from common law where a 
person is held liable to third parties for the delict committed by another.13 For 
                                                                                                                                                                            
7  Delict 4. See also McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent a Car v Sunset Beach Trading 300 t/a 
 Harvey World Travel 2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 556. 
8  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 1. Cf Burchell Delict 10. 
9  See McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent A Car v Sunset Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey World 
 Travel 2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 556; Telematrix Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising 
 Standards AuthoritySA 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 468; Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and 
 Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus curiae) 2003 1 SA 389 (SA) 395; 
 Neethling and Potgieter 2014 TSAR 889-890; Knobel 2008 THRHR 651; Neethling and 
 Potgieter Delict 4; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 2-3; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 2. 
10  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 269-270; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 297-299. 
11  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 379; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 46. 
12  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 381-387; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 46-
 51; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 375-381. 
13  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 389-399; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 51-
 60; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 383-396. 
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example, this applies in the employer-employee relationship, where the employer is 
held strictly liable for the delict committed by an employee. 
 
Due to industrialisation, social and economic development not only in South Africa 
but in the other jurisdictions discussed in this thesis, there has been an increased 
need for strict liability. The increased need for strict liability stems from the individual’s 
increased exposure to high, dangerous, abnormal, or unusual risks14  which may be 
regarded as unreasonable risks. Linked to the increased exposure to risk, the 
insurance industry has grown considerably and has in turn influenced the 
development of the law of delict. This is due to increased litigation as a result of 
insurance companies trying to avoid or recover loss.15 Out of all the jurisdictions 
discussed in this thesis, France has experienced the most significant increase in strict 
liability whereby fault liability is seen as the exception.16 In South Africa, legislation 
has been enacted for: product liability;17 genetically modified organisms;18 damage 
caused by aircrafts;19 nuclear damage;20 and damage caused to telecommunication 
lines or call box cabinets.21 
 
The reasons for the need of strict liability include: the risk creator gains some kind of 
benefit; the risk creator with the deeper pocket has control over his activities and of 
the risk it carries; it is possible for the risk creator to take out insurance; the risk creator 
is in a better position to take out insurance and transfer the loss to the insurer which 
ultimately results in the distribution of loss; certain activities carry with them increased 
risk of harm; and with the increased risk of harm, the degree of care required 
increases ‒ it provides an incentive for the risk creator to exercise greater care.22 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
14  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 379. 
15  See chapter 4 para 1. 
16  See chapter 6. 
17  See the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, discussed by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
 399-400. 
18  See the Genetically Modified Organisms Act 15 of 1997 discussed by Neethling and 
 Potgieter Delict 402; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 382. 
19  See the Civil Aviation Act 13 of 2009, discussed by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 401. 
20  See the National Nuclear Regulator Act 47 of 1999, discussed by Neethling and Potgieter 
 Delict 400-401; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 382. 
21  See the Post and Telecommunication-Related Matters Act 44 of 1958, discussed by 
 Neethling and Potgieter Delict 379; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 382. 
22  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 379-380.  
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The two main theories advanced for strict liability are: the risk theory and the profit 
theory. A manufacturer’s liability for defective products provides a good example for 
illustrating these two theories. According to the risk theory, the manufacturer of 
pharmaceutical drugs creates the drugs and therefore the risk of harm. Due to the 
fact that the manufacturer creates the potential for harm, it may be considered 
reasonable for him to be held strictly liable ‒ this is the basis of the risk theory. In light 
of the fact that the risk was created in the pursuit of profit by the manufacturer, it is 
only reasonable that the manufacturer should be held strictly liable for harm caused 
from the use of the drugs. The manufacturer who gains a benefit must also bear any 
loss. This is the basis of the profit theory.23 Thus the influence of reasonableness on 
strict liability is implicit. 
 
Returning to fault-based liability, the courts in South Africa do not have a specific 
order in which the elements must be determined when finding delictual liability. In 
practice, the elements are established in any order the courts deem fit under the 
circumstances of the case.24 Nugent JA in First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v 
Duvenage25 stated that the human mind is flexible and “capable of enquiring into each 
element separately, in any order, with appropriate assumptions being made in relation 
to others, and that is often done in practice to avoid prolonging litigation, for though 
the elements are naturally interrelated, each involves a distinct enquiry”.26 Even 
though the courts do not follow a specific order in determining the elements of a delict, 
Neethling and Potgieter27 correctly submit that it can only be reasonable to hold a 
person liable in delict for harm suffered if all the elements of a delict have been 
established.  
 
A delict may result in either patrimonial (pecuniary) loss (damnum iniuria datum), 
where damages are recovered with the actio legis Aquiliae;28 injury to personality 
                                                                                                                                                                            
23  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 379; Giliker Tort 322. 
24  Boberg Delict 271 fn 11. 
25  2006 5 SA 319 (SCA) 320-321. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 130,183 fn 4. 
26  See para 3 below. 
27  Delict 82.  
28  Patrimonial loss may occur as a result of pure economic loss, physical harm to a person, or 
 damage to property. The requirements for the actio legis Aquiliae are: conduct, whether in 
 the form of an act, omission or statement; wrongfulness; fault, whether in the form of 
 intention or negligence; causation and harm (patrimonial loss). See Van der Walt and 
 Midgley Delict 1; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 27. 
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(iniuria), where damages are recovered with the actio iniuriarum;29 or pain and 
suffering,30 where damages are recovered with the action for pain and suffering.31 All 
these remedies generally32 require the presence of conduct, wrongfulness, fault, 
either in the form of negligence or intention, causation and harm. It is acknowledged 
that the South Africa law of delict follows a general approach. In comparison, the 
Anglo-American systems follow a “casuistic approach”33 where separate torts were 
developed with specific requirements. Thus liability will ensue only when the specific 
requirements for the tort have been met.34 
 
Due to the influence of English common law over our law, certain forms of iniuria, 
such as wrongful deprivation of liberty, defamation, insult, invasion of privacy35 and 
damnum iniuria datum (such as psychiatric or psychological injury, negligent 
misrepresentation or misstatement, and pure economic loss)36 became known as 
“separate delicts”, with their own specific requirements but within the realm of the 
general principles of delict.37 As mentioned,38 in this thesis, the focus will as far as 
possible be on the elements of delictual liability in order to limit the scope of the study. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
29  The requirements for the actio iniuriarum are: conduct, which in practice is more commonly 
 found in the form of either a positive act or statement; wrongfulness; fault, in the form of 
 intention (animus iniuriandi); causation and harm. The harm may result in an infringement of 
 one’s bodily integrity (corpus), dignity (dignitas) or reputation (fama). See Van der Walt and 
 Midgley Delict 1; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 27. 
30  The requirements for the action for pain and suffering are: conduct, whether in the form of an 
 act, omission or statement; wrongfulness; fault, whether in the form of intention or 
 negligence; causation and harm (non-patrimonial). See Van der Waltand Midgley Delict 1; 
 Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 27. 
31  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 5; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 1; Loubser and Midgley 
 (eds) Delict 14. Unlike the actio legis Aquiliae and the actio iniuriarum, which originated in 
 Roman law, the origin of the action for pain and suffering is Germanic (Van der Walt and 
 Midgley Delict 15-16). 
32  With the exception of remedies involving strict liability. 
33  In Perlman v Zoutendyk 1934 CPD 151 155, the the court held that: “Roman Dutch Law 
 approaches a new problem in the continental rather than the English way, because in 
 general all damage caused unjustifiably (injuria) is actionable, whether caused intentionally 
 (dolo) or by negligence (culpa)”. See Gowar 2011 THRHR 686; Neethling and Potgieter 
 Delict 4; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 9, 39; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 16.  
34  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 4; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 16; Van der Walt and 
 Midgley Delict 39. 
35  Neethling and Potgieter Delict xi-xii refer to other specific forms of iniuria namely: malicious 
 deprivation of liberty; wrongful arrest; malicious prosecution; attachment of property; 
 abduction; enticement and harbouring; and breach of promise. Adultery is no longer 
 regarded as a specific form of iniuria in South African law, see DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC). 
36  Neethling and Potgieter Delict xi also refer to: action of dependants and non-dependants 
 (where patrimonial loss is suffered as a result of injury or death of another); interference with 
 a contractual relationship; manufacturer’s liability; and unlawful competition as specific forms 
 of damnum iniuria datum. 
37  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 6. 
38  In chapter 1 para 4. 
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What is known as “separate delicts” in South African law will not be discussed except 
for: claims for wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life; pure economic 
loss; psychiatric or psychological injury; and wrongful deprivation of liberty.  
 
Customary law is “the customs and usages traditionally observed among the 
indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the culture of those 
peoples”.39 Some customary law provisions may be found unconstitutional, but the 
provisions that are not in conflict with the constitutional provisions may be recognised 
and applicable.40 
 
There is a distinction between “official customary law” and “living customary law”.41 
Official customary law is found in written customary law codes,42 legislation,43 case 
law and authoritative texts.44 “Living customary law” is unwritten customary law which 
is constantly changing and is practised within the communities.45 
 
Customary law is rarely referred to by the courts in delictual cases, but there are some 
instances where it has been referred to.46 Customary law generally does not make a 
clear distinction between criminal law and the law of delict.47 Van der Walt and 
Midgley48 refer to the consideration of customary law in the law of delict in determining 
                                                                                                                                                                            
39  As defined in s 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. See Van der 
 Walt and Midgley Delict 29 fn1. 
40 See para 3.1.3 below. 
41  Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 33. 
42  See, for example, Natal Code of Zulu Law Proc R151 of 1987; the KwaZulu Act on the Code 
 of Zulu Law 16 of 1985; Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 33 fn 55. 
43  See repealed Black Administration Act 38 of 1927; Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African 
 customary law 33 fn 56. 
44  Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 33. 
45  See Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 
 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) [87], [152] where the court acknowledged the two forms of customary 
 law, but the court refused to develop customary law in terms of s 39(2) of the Constitution of 
 the Republic of South Africa, 1996 [112]; Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T) 1074; Shibi 
 v Sithole, SA Human Rights Commission v President of RSA 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) [87], 
 [152]; Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 25-35 and other cases cited (43 fn 
 12); Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 29-30 fn 1. 
46  See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 29. 
47  Rautenbach and Bekker Legal pluralism 157-158. 
48  Delict 29. 
45 
 
remedies,49 recognising a dependant’s action50 and in giving content to the boni 
mores.51 Customary law recognises vicarious liability52 of the head of the group or 
family53 for delicts committed by the member of the group or family. Defamation,54 
adultery,55 seduction,56 defloration of an unmarried girl,57 and damage to property58 
are instances of delictual liability that are recognised in African customary law. 
 
Attention will now be given to the individual elements of a delict emphasising the 
explicit and implicit influence of reasonableness on these elements. 
 
2. Conduct 
 
Conduct is defined as a “voluntary human act or omission”.59 From this definition it is 
apparent that conduct may be in the form of an omission (a failure to act) or a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
49  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 29 refer to Mogale v Seima 2008 5 SA 637 (SCA) [9] where 
 the court referred to customary law which played an implicit role in reducing the award for 
 compensation in a case of defamation; Le Roux v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and 
 Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 2011 6 BCLR 577 (CC) [199]-[203] where the 
 Constitutional Court referred to the customary law concept of ubuntu which postulates 
 restorative justice. In restoring justice a retraction and apology in addition to monetary 
 compensation was ordered. See also chapter 2 para 1; para 6.1 below. 
50  A duty of support stemming from customary law relationships is recognised. For example, in 
 Fosi v RAF 2008 3 SA 560 (C) [16], the court recognised the customary tradition of a child’s 
 duty to support a parent in need of such support. See further authority referred to by Van der 
 Walt and Midgley Delict 29-30 with regard to the widow’s entitlement to loss of support. 
51 See chapter 2 para 3.3; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 29. 
52  In K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) [24], the Constitutional Court, in 
 reference to vicarious liability, referred to a similar principle applied in customary law 
 whereby the head of the kraal is also held liable for loss caused by a kraal inhabitant. See 
 Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 29. 
53  See s 102 of the KwaZulu-Natal and Natal Codes of Zulu Law Proc R151 of 1987 where, in 
 KwaZulu-Natal, the father, guardian or family head may be held liable depending on the 
 circumstances for the delicts committed by the minor. See Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) 
 African customary law 197-198. Cf Rautenbach and Bekker Legal pluralism 158-160, who 
 refer to liability of the head as accessory, or co-liability. 
54  See s 93 of the KwaZulu-Natal Codes of Zulu Law Proc R151 of 1987 which refers to 
 malicious statements made alleging evil conduct such as witchcraft; Mogale v Seima 2008 5 
 SA 637 (SCA) 641; Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 199-200; Rautenbach 
 and Bekker Legal pluralism 166. 
55  See ss 99 and 102 of the KwaZulu-Natal and Natal Codes of Zulu Law Proc R151 of 1987; 
 Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 200-203; Rautenbach and Bekker Legal 
 pluralism 163-166. 
56  See in general Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 203-207; Rautenbach and 
 Bekker Legal pluralism 161-163. 
57  See in general Rautenbach and Bekker Legal pluralism 160-161. 
58  Rautenbach and Bekker Legal pluralism 157, 167. If an animal is killed, the dead animal 
 must be replaced. 
59  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 25; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 90; Loubser and Midgley 
 (eds) Delict 63. 
46 
 
commission (a positive physical act or statement).60 The act or omission generally 
must have been committed by a human61 or a juristic person such as a close 
corporation or company.62 The act must be voluntary.63 
 
Voluntariness refers to the person’s mental ability to control his muscular 
movements.64 A person’s conduct need not be reasonable or desired in order to be 
voluntary.65 There are certain recognised conditions which may result in an act being 
regarded as involuntary. For example: absolute compulsion;66 unconsciousness or in 
a state of sleep;67 extreme intoxication;68 reflex muscular movements; black-outs;69 
fits;70 severe emotional pressure;71 heart attacks;72 hypnosis; and mental 
conditions,73 are all regarded as conditions which may render one’s actions 
involuntary while in such condition.74 Automatism is the well-known defence which 
                                                                                                                                                                            
60  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 92; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 63; Burchell Delict 37. 
61  In instances where a human uses an animal as an instrument to commit a delict, such 
 conduct will be considered a human act, qui facit per alium facit per se - he who acts through 
 another commits the act himself (Burchell Delict 37). See Jooste v Minister of Police 1975 
 1 SA 349 (E) 354 where Addleson J referred to instances where the police make use of dogs 
 just as they use “other suitable and appropriate instruments”. In this case a police dog bit 
 and injured a boy in the course of an arrest. The court found that the circumstances did not 
 call for the use of the dog, the use of the dog was not justified. The court awarded damages 
 to the boy’s father, in his capacity as father and natural guardian, for the harm suffered by 
 the son. See also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 25; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 90; 
 Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 64. 
62  Which can be held delictually liable through the actions of its organs which are humans. See 
 Neethling and Potgieter Delict 25-26; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 90; Loubser and 
 Midgley (eds) Delict 64. 
63  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 25; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 90-91; Loubser and 
 Midgley (eds) Delict 64. 
64  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 26; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 91; Loubser and Midgley 
 (eds) Delict 64. 
65  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 26; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 64. 
66  See S v Goliath 1972 3 SA 1 (A). 
67  See R v Dhlamini 1955 1 SA 120 (T). 
68  See S v Chretien 1981 1 SA 1097 (A). If a person consumes alcohol while foreseeing that he 
 might drive a motor vehicle later on, his conduct will still be considered voluntary even 
 though at the time of the accident he was so inebriated that his actions were in actual fact 
 involuntary. See Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1096. 
69  See Government v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1973 3 SA 797 (D); Molefe v 
 Mahaeng 1999 1 SA 562 (SCA). 
70  See R v Mkize 1959 2 SA 260 (N). 
71  See S v Arnold 1985 3 SA 256 (C). 
72  See Gabellone v Protea Assurance Ltd 1981 4 SA 171 (O). 
73  See S v Mahlinza 1967 1 SA 408 (A). Conduct by a person living with a mental disability or 
 an infant is generally voluntary, but such person may not be held delictually liable due to the 
 exclusion of fault or lack of accountability. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 26; Van der 
 Walt and Midgley Delict 90-91; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 64-65. 
74  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 27; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 65; Van der Walt 
 and Midgley Delict 91; Burchell Delict 23. 
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refutes a voluntary act or omission.75 The applicant relying on this defence bears the 
onus of proof.76 The defence of automatism will not succeed if the defendant 
negligently or intentionally created the situation in which he claims to have behaved 
involuntarily.77 With regard to the alleged negligent conduct of the defendant, what 
must be determined “is whether the reasonable person in the position of the 
defendant would have foreseen the possibility of the ensuing harm while in a state of 
automatism and would have prevented such harm”.78 For example, if a defendant 
who is prone to epileptic fits forgets to take his medication one morning and it later 
transpires that he suffered an epileptic fit while driving, thereby causing an accident,79 
he cannot rely on automatism. The courts take into account the defendant’s conduct 
prior to the state of automatism.80 A reasonable person in the position of the 
defendant would have taken his medication, thus preventing the occurrence of a fit 
which resulted in the ensuing harm.81 The courts, in trying to ascertain whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
75  See Government v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1973 3 SA 797 (D) 799; Molefe v 
 Mahaeng 1999 1 SA 562 (SCA); cf Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in 
 honour of Johann Neethling 50. 
76  Molefe v Mahaeng 1999 1 SA 562 (SCA) 569. 
77  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 28-29; Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays 
 in honour of Johann Neethling 50. 
78  Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 50. See 
 Neethling and Potgieter Delict 28; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 91; Burchell Delict 36-37. 
79  Which resulted in the injury of an innocent victim. 
80  Gabellone v Protea Assurance Ltd 1981 4 SA 171 (O) 173-174. Van der Merwe and Olivier 
 Delict 26-29 submit that automatism does not exclude conduct, but rather wrongfulness or 
 fault. Their view may be illustrated with reference to the example in the text above in that the 
 actual conduct which led to the accident is not voluntary, but that there were prior voluntary 
 acts (or, in the example, an omission to take medication) which caused the innocent victim’s 
 injury. They submit that the conduct was voluntary, but that fault is absent resulting in no 
 delictual liability. Neethling and Potgieter (Delict 29) admit that this view may be theoretically 
 correct, but criticise it on the ground that it conforms to a narrow view of automatism and 
 further that the plaintiff may have difficulty in proving negligence. The latter authors are of 
 the view that one must look at the act which caused the harm (not the prior acts) and if it is 
 involuntary then there is no “conduct”. If, however, the defendant knew or should have 
 reasonably foreseen that his omission could cause harm, he will not be able to rely on 
 automatism because his liability will be based on his prior conduct. 
81  See Molefe v Mahaeng 1999 1 SA 562 (SCA) where the defendant suffered a blackout 
 raising automatism as a defence and succeeded. Even though the defendant had slipped 
 and fell earlier on the day of the accident, the court held that there was a lack of evidence in 
 proving that the reasonable person should have been aware of the possibility of a blackout 
 as a result of the fall earlier that day (569). In this case, the court followed a similar approach 
 to that in English law (with regard to the tort of negligence) where the standard applied is the 
 “reasonable person” and fault in the form of negligence is absent. English tort doctrine 
 generally does not differentiate between the element of conduct and fault. See Mansfield v 
 Weetabix 1988 1 WLR 1263 (CA). Mullender Modern LR 688, however, agrees that in such 
 instances the defendant does not act (see chapter 2 para 4). In Molefe v Mahaeng, the court 
 followed a similar approach to that in English law (with regard to the tort of negligence) 
 where the criterion applied is the “reasonable person” and fault in the form of negligence is 
 absent. In Wessels v Hall and Pickles (Coastal) (Pty) Ltd 1985 4 SA 153 (C) 158, the 
 defendant suffered a hypoglycaemic attack resulting in a diabetic coma while driving and 
 causing an accident, the court held that the defendant was negligent for failing to take 
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conduct was voluntary, consider the conduct, prior to the state of automatism, of the 
hypothetical reasonable person in a similar position as the defendant. This relates to 
negligence.82 Similarly, with reference to the example above, intentional conduct may 
be considered. Thus, if the defendant intentionally and deliberately does not take his 
medication one morning leading to him suffering an epileptic fit while driving, thereby 
causing an accident, it is doubtful that he will be able to rely on automatism. The 
doctrine, actio libera in causa (the wrongdoing he commits can be imputed to him for 
actions unfree in themselves, but free in their causes) may be applied and the 
defendant may be held liable for any harm or loss suffered by the plaintiff.83  
 
The influence of reasonableness on conduct is implicit.84 It is in principle reasonable 
to hold a defendant liable in delict only if the element of conduct is present with all the 
other required elements.85 It is reasonable to hold a person liable only if the voluntary 
conduct was present in the form of an act or omission and was undertaken by a 
human. Naturally, if the conduct was not undertaken by a human and involuntary, 
then it is unreasonable to hold the defendant liable as there is no conduct. In cases 
where an animal is used as an instrument by a human to commit a delict, then it may 
be deemed a human act, as the human is in control of the animal. In a similar vein, 
conduct by a natural person acting as an organ of a juristic person may be deemed 
human conduct and it may be reasonable to hold the defendant liable, provided all 
the other elements of a delict are present too. 
 
Generally, in determining whether conduct is present, the adjudicator will consider 
the facts of the case. It is predominantly a factual enquiry. However, in the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 precautions by eating a mid-morning snack in his insulin-dependent diabetic condition. The 
 reasonable person would have foreseen the possibility that if he missed his mid-morning 
 snack, his blood sugar level might have dropped unexpectedly, thereby causing him to lose 
 control of the vehicle. But see Gabellone v Protea Assurance Ltd 1981 4 SA 171 (O) 173-
 174 where the driver suffered from coronary thrombosis prior to his death and subsequently 
 suffered a cardiac disturbance which affected his ability to control the vehicle he was driving 
 shortly before the accident. The court held that what happened thereafter was “not due to 
 any voluntary action or inaction on his part”. Edeling AJ found that on the balance of 
 probabilities the (deceased) driver, at the time of the accident, suffered a heart attack which 
 was not due to his negligence (174). See also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 28-29; Van der 
 Walt and Midgley Delict 91; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 66. 
82  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 66-67; Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) 
 Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 50. 
83  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 28; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 91; Loubser and Midgley 
 (eds) Delict 65. 
84  Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 50. 
85  Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 50. 
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requirement that the conduct must be voluntary, normative elements become more 
prominent. In principle, if the conduct is voluntary, then conduct may be present and 
it is reasonable to hold the defendant liable in delict, providing all the other elements 
are proved. In respect of the defence of automatism − it may be argued that it is 
reasonable for the defence to apply if the person was mentally unable to control his 
muscular movements. Thus if the defendant was mentally able to control his muscular 
movements then in principle: his conduct may be considered voluntary; the defence 
of automatism will not be applicable; and it is reasonable to hold the defendant 
delictually liable. As mentioned, automatism will not succeed if the defendant’s prior 
intentional or negligent conduct led to the involuntary bodily movements which 
resulted in harm to the plaintiff. The influence of reasonableness is apparent in both 
forms of fault, negligence and intention, discussed further on.86 It would thus be 
unreasonable for automatism to succeed as a defence to the element of conduct, if 
the defendant’s prior negligent or intentional conduct led to the subsequent 
involuntary bodily movements which resulted in harm to the plaintiff.  
 
3. Wrongfulness  
 
Wrongfulness is an essential and individual element required in respect of 
determining delictual liability.87 It has been argued that wrongfulness should 
preferably be determined before fault88 since it seems logical to find fault on the part 
of a person only when it has been found that such person has acted wrongfully.89 
                                                                                                                                                                            
86  See paras 4.2-4.3 below. 
87  Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 490; Smit v Suid-Afrikaanse Vervoerdientse 1984 1 SA 
 246 (C) 249; Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Bros (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 
 475 (A) 496-497; Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA) 1060-1061; 
 Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA (SCA) 
 [19]; Gouda Boerdery BK v Transnet 2005 5 SA 490 (SCA) 498; Van der Walt and 
 Midgley Delict 96; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 33; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 140.  
88  Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA) 1054-1055; Administrateur, 
 Transvaal v Van der Merwe 1994 4 SA 347 (A) 364; Minister of Safety and Security v Van 
 Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 442. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 130 fn 7; Van 
 der Walt and Midgley Delict 225; Boberg Delict 268, 271; Knobel 2010 THRHR 115 ff. Cf 
 Fagan 2005 SALJ 139-141. 
89  In respect of determining intent, what must be established is direction of the will and 
 awareness of the wrongfulness of his conduct. Seen in this sense it is not logical to establish 
 fault without first establishing wrongfulness (see Neethling and Potgieter Delict 129 fn 4; Van 
 der Walt and Midgley Delict 225; Knobel 2010 THRHR 115ff). However, Knobel in Potgieter, 
 Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 236, convincingly submits 
 that in line with wrongfulness being an independent element, in determining intent, the 
 wrongdoer must be aware of the unreasonableness of his conduct rather than aware of the 
 wrongfulness of his conduct. 
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However, according to case law, it no longer matters if fault is determined before 
wrongfulness90 and vice versa. The courts consider what is more convenient 
depending on the circumstances of the case.91 The enquiry into wrongfulness is 
separate from the enquiry into fault92 and when the one element is established it does 
not necessarily mean that the other element is also automatically established.93 In 
instances where certain factors may be relevant to both the question of fault and 
wrongfulness, the factors are still viewed from different angles and with a different 
focus.94 Boberg95 points out that in respect of wrongfulness, the question is whether 
the defendant brought about the consequences in an objectively unreasonable 
manner determined ex post facto in light of surrounding circumstances. This includes 
all consequences not foreseen by the defendant, or consequences that resulted 
beyond the defendant’s control. The focus is on the effect of the conduct. If 
wrongfulness is found, it illustrates the law’s disapproval of the consequences. With 
negligence, the question is whether the actor behaved in an unreasonable manner 
judged ex ante by the standard of the reasonable person, in view of his actual 
circumstances. If negligence is found, it illustrates the law’s disapproval of the actor’s 
part in producing the consequences.96 The focus of reasonableness under fault and 
wrongfulness is thus different.97 The wrongfulness of an act is determined with 
                                                                                                                                                                            
90  See Mkhatswa v Minister of Defence 2000 1 SA 1104 (SCA) 1111; Sea Harvest Corporation 
 (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 827 (SCA) 838; Hawekwa Youth 
 Camp v Byrne 2010 6 SA 83 (SCA) 91; Fagan 2005 SALJ 139-14; Ahmed 2012 Obiter 416-
 417; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 157; cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter 
 Delict 130 fn 7. 
91  Local Transitional Council of Delmas v Boshoff 2005 5 SA 514 (SCA) 522; Minister of Safety 
 and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 442; Gouda Boerdery Bpk v 
 Transnet 2005 5 SA 490 (SCA) 499; Hawekwa Youth Camp v Byrne 2010 6 SA 83 (SCA) 
 91. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 156-157; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 129-130. 
92 McNally v M & G Media (Pty) Ltd 1997 4 SA 267 (W) 273; Cape Town Municipality v 
 Bakkerud 2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA) 1060-1061; Minister of Safety and Security v Van 
 Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 441; McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent A Car v Sunset 
 Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey World Travel 2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 560; Van der Walt and 
 Midgley Delict 93. 
93  Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 441. 
94  Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA) 1060-1061; Moses v Minister of 
 Safety and Security 2000 3 SA 106 (C) 113; Simon’s Town Municipality v Dews 1993 1 SA 
 191 (A) 196.  
95  Delict 269-270. Boberg submits that the reasonable person test is objective-subjective. It is 
 objective in the sense that the standard applies to all but subjective when the particular 
 circumstances are taken into account. However, with regard to wrongfulness the test is more 
 objective when compared with the reasonable person test for negligence which is more 
 subjective. 
96  Boberg Delict 270. 
97  Du Bois 2000 Acta Juridica 12. 
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reference to its consequence.98 The term, “wrongfulness” and “unlawfulness” are 
often used synonymously in the law of delict.99 Unlawfulness is the more accepted 
term for a more or less equivalent concept in criminal law, but unlawful conduct in 
criminal law does not necessarily mean that conduct is wrongful in terms of delictual 
liability.100 
 
There are two approaches to determining wrongfulness according to case law and 
academic writers.101 The approach emanating from the decision of Minister van 
Polisie v Ewels102 (which will be referred to as the “traditional approach” in this thesis) 
is that in order for conduct to be deemed wrongful, the harm suffered must be caused 
in a legally reprehensible or unreasonable manner, contra bonos mores in light of all 
surrounding circumstances.103 The other approach recently applied (referred to as 
the “recent approach” in this thesis) or the “new test”104 or “variation” of the traditional 
                                                                                                                                                                            
98  The act and its resulting consequence are separated in time and space and only when the 
consequence has occurred may the act be found wrongful. For example, in the case of a 
foetus being injured while in the mother’s womb as a result of a motor vehicle accident ‒ only 
when the child is born with the injuries may the act be considered wrongful. See RAF v Mtati 
2005 6 SA 215 (SCA); Neethling and Potgieter Delict 34-35; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 
143. 
99  Viv’s Tippers (Edms) Bpk v Pha Phama Staff Services (Edms) Bpk h/a Pha Phama Security 
2010 4 SA 455 (SCA) 458. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 140. 
100  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 93 fn 11 refer to Bophuthatswana Transport Holdings (Edms) 
Bpk v Matthysen Busvervoer (Edms) Bpk 1996 2 SA 166 (A) in that where a person does not 
stop at an intersection, he may be behaving in a negligent manner, but no delictual liability will 
follow unless some harm occurred. 
101  Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 51-52. 
102  1975 3 SA 590 (A) 597. 
103  See Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 596-597; Minister of Law and Order v 
Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A) 317-318; Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; 
Administrateur, Transvaal v Van der Merwe 1994 4 SA 347 (A) 361; Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Basdeo 1996 1 SA 355 (A) 367; Carmichele v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2001 1 SA 489 (SCA) 494; cases referred to Neethling and Potgieter Delict 36 
fn 19-21. The authors Neethling and Potgieter in the earlier edition of their textbook on Delict 
used the words “legally reprehensible” and “unreasonable” interchangeably. For example, to 
quote directly from the text (6 ed 33), the authors, in the earlier edition stated that “[f[or liability 
to follow, prejudice must be caused in a wrongful, i.e., a legally reprehensible or unreasonable 
manner. … [I]f it is clear that an individual interest has been prejudiced, legal norms must be 
used to determine whether such prejudice occurred in a legally reprehensible or unreasonable 
manner”. The authors in the later edition (Delict 7 ed 33-34) have removed the words 
“unreasonable” from the text on these pages and state that “[i]n essence, wrongfulness lies in 
the infringement of a legally protected interest (or an interest worthy of protection) in a legally 
reprehensible way. … If it is clear that a legally protected interest has been prejudiced, legal 
norms must be used to determine whether such prejudice occurred in a legally reprehensible 
manner”. The authors in the later edition (Delict 37) associate or refer to the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s conduct with regard to the boni mores test. 
104  Scott in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 433 refers 
to the recent approach as the “new test”; Scott 2014 De Jure 388. 
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approach105 by our courts,106 stemming from Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle 
Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA107 is that according to policy 
considerations or public policy, it would be reasonable to hold a person liable, or that 
wrongfulness turns on “the reasonableness of imposing liability for conduct that has 
been shown, or is assumed to be, negligent”.108 These two approaches will now be 
discussed in more detail. 
 
3.1 The traditional approach: the harm suffered must be caused in an unreasonable 
manner 
 
In determining wrongfulness, the basic question is whether a legally recognised 
interest was infringed and if so whether it was infringed in a legally reprehensible or 
unreasonable manner.109 The criterion used to determine whether a legally 
recognised interest was infringed in a legally reprehensible or unreasonable manner 
is the boni mores yardstick.110 The boni mores yardstick is an objective test based on 
the criterion of reasonableness.111 It is referred to as the fundamental test for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
105  Nugent JA in Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd v Rocklands Poultry Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122 
referred to the current approach as a variation of the test for wrongfulness (see Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 78). 
106  See Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA 
2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 468; Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC) 315; Hawekwa Youth Camp 
v Byrne 2010 6 SA 83 (SCA) 90-91; cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 80 fn 
303. 
107  2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 468. 
108  See Fagan 2005 SALJ 93; Fagan 2007 SALJ 292; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 140 who 
state that “wrongfulness is closely linked to the central idea of the law of delict, which is that 
liability is imposed when a person unreasonably causes harm to another”. Cf Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 99. 
109  Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A) 498-
499; Premier Western Cape v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 13 (SCA) 
31-32; Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; eBotswana (Pty) Ltd v Sentech 
(Pty) Ltd 2013 6 SA 327 (GSJ) 340; Oosthuizen v Van Heerden 2014 6 SA 423 (GP) 433; 
Neethling 2006 SALJ 209; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 33; Neethling and Potgieter 2014 
TSAR 890; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 142 146. 
110  In other words the question asked is, does the community find the conduct in question wrongful 
for the purposes of a delict? See Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 596-597; 
Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2001 1 SA 489 (SCA) 494; Moses v Minister of Safety and Security 2000 3 SA 106 
(C) 113; Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus 
Curiae) 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 395; Minister of Law and Order v Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A) 317-
318; Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 140; F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 
SA 536 (CC) 566; Paixão v Road Accident Fund 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA) 381; Lee v Minister of 
Correctional Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 149 167; Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, 
Department of Infrastructure Development 2014 2 SA 214 (SCA) 222; Oosthuizen v Van 
Heerden 2014 6 SA 423 (GP) 433; Neethling and Potgieter 2014 TSAR 890; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 36 (see cases referred to in fn 21-22); Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 142 
144; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 113-114; Boberg Delict 33; Burchell Delict 39. 
111  See cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 36 fn 20.  
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wrongfulness112 and is a value-based judgment113 generally taking into consideration 
all the surrounding circumstances, inter alia ever changing114 good morals (boni 
mores) of the South Africa community,115 thereby referring to what is “reasonable and 
proper”.116 Case law has also reiterated that:  
 
“in a mixed country like South Africa, with its variety of races, cultures, languages and religions, 
and its wide social and economic differences. No single group has a monopoly of such a 
society’s ‘right thinking’ members, and the ‘mythical consensus’ must encompass them all”.117 
 
3.1.1 Objective ex post facto approach to determining wrongfulness118 
 
The boni mores test is in essence an objective test.119 All the surrounding 
circumstances are taken into account.120 It is based on the yardstick of 
reasonableness.121 
 
The courts may be faced with two or more competing interests which the plaintiff and 
defendant rely on and which require protection of the law.122 In such instances the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
112  See list of cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 36 fn 21; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 100; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 144. 
113  See Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 140; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 24-25, 
144. 
114  See Silva’s Fishing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Maweza 1957 2 SA 256 (A) 265; Cape Town 
Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA) 1056; Ries v Boland Bank PKS Ltd 2000 4 
SA 955 (C) 968; Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA) 
1329; DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC); Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 100. 
115  Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 442; Deneys Reitz 
v SA Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union 1991 2 SA 685 (W) 693; Marais v 
Richard 1981 1 SA 1157 (A) 1168; Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom 
Party 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 593; National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1212; but 
see Clarke v Hurst 1992 4 SA 630 (D) 653 where English and American cases were referred 
to with regard to society’s attitudes (Neethling and Potgieter Delict 40 fn 41).  
116  Boberg Delict 33. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 37 fn 24. 
117  Demmers v Wyllie 1978 4 SA 619 (D) 629. See Du Bois 2000 Acta Juridica 11. 
118  See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 96; Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays 
in honour of Johann Neethling 51. 
119  Moses v Minister of Safety and Security 2000 3 SA 106 (C) 113; Oosthuizen v Van Heerden 
2014 6 SA 423 (GP) 433. 
120  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Basdeo 1996 1 SA 355 (A) 367; Van Eeden v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 396. 
121  Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 395; Argus Printing and 
Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 588; Knop v Johannesburg 
City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; S M Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Cathkin Park Hotel (Pty) Ltd 
2000 4 SA 1019 (SCA); Kadir v Minister of Law and Order 1992 3 SA 737 (C) 742; Minister 
van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 597; Borgin v De Villiers 1980 3 SA 556 (A) 577; 
Ramsay v Minister van Polisie 1981 4 SA 802 (A) 811; Moses v Minister of Safety and Security 
2000 3 SA 106 (C) 113; Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 140; Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 37; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 99; Burchell Delict 38. 
122  Such as freedom of expression, dignity and reputation. See Argus Printing and Publishing Co 
Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 585; National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 
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courts must weigh the different interests123 and decide according to the particular 
circumstances of the case whether the infringement of the plaintiff’s interests was 
reasonable or not.124 
 
There are different opinions125 on whether wrongfulness should be determined 
objectively and ex post facto, that is, after the fact – taking into account what actually 
transpired including the resultant consequences.126 However, the courts sometimes 
use an ex ante (before the event) approach to determine wrongfulness and this is 
evident when they determine the conduct of the defendant in respect of certain 
grounds of justification127 from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position 
of the defendant. Knobel128 makes the following distinction between wrongfulness, 
where an ex post facto approach is applied, and negligence, where an ex ante 
approach is generally applied: 
 
“wrongfulness is the objective unreasonableness of conduct, based on the facts known to the 
court after a full factual investigation. Fault, on the other hand, is the subjective awareness of 
the unreasonableness of conduct, which the wrongdoer either had (intention) or should have 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1196 (SCA); H v W 2013 5 BCLR 554 (GSJ). See other examples listed by Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 141, 145. 
123  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 110; Burchell Delict 38. 
124  See Oosthuizen v Van Heerden 2014 6 SA 423 (GP) 434, where it was alleged that cattle 
carrying an infectious disease had wandered onto a neighbour’s land infecting the neighbour’s 
cattle. The court held that in “balancing the respective interests of the parties it must be 
recognised that both have the right to the reasonable use of their properties”. Taking all the 
factors into account, the court in respect of wrongfulness concluded that it was not reasonable 
to expect the owner of one property to take sole responsibility and bear the cost of erecting a 
fence in order to ensure that the risk of infection is allayed, while the other owner is expected 
to do nothing. Thus, the court held that to “place this responsibility on the [one landowner] 
would be contrary to the underlying principles governing the reasonable use of property 
between neighbours” (435). See also Natal Fresh Produce Growers’ Association v Agroserve 
(Pty) Ltd 1990 4 SA 749 (N) 753-754; Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 140; as well as 
other cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 38 fn 27. Cf Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 145; Van der Walt & Midgley Delict 187-189. 
125  See para 3.3 below. 
126  Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 121 (CC) 139; NM v 
Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 207 5 SA 250 (CC) 274; Alley Cat 
Clothing v De Lisle Weare Racing 2002 1 All SA 123 (D) 134; Knobel 2008 THRHR 7; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 33 38; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 156; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 67; Burchell Delict 38; Boberg Delict 33. See contra Fagan 2005 SALJ 92, 95 
who states that wrongfulness should be determined from an ex ante point of view instead. 
Brand JA in Roux v Hattingh 2012 6 SA 428 (SCA) 440-441 submitted that an ex post facto 
approach to establishing wrongfulness renders the defendant’s subjective mental disposition 
irrelevant, this is criticised by Neethling and Potgieter who state that subjective factors are 
considered (2014 THRHR 122-123; 2014 SALJ 252-253). 
127  For example, in respect of self-defence (discussed below in para 3.4.2), necessity (discussed 
below in para 3.4.3), provocation (discussed below in para 3.4.4) and official command 
(discussed below in para 3.4.7). 
128  In Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in Honour of Johann Neethling 236. 
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had (negligence), based on the facts that were known to the wrongdoer and/or the facts that 
should have been known to the wrongdoer”.129 
 
3.1.2 General factors considered in determining whether or not conduct is reasonable 
 
There are a number of factors which have an influence in determining whether or not 
conduct is unreasonable and there is no numerus clausus. Neethling and Potgieter130 
provide the following comprehensive list of factors that may be taken into account: 
the nature of the relationship between the parties;131 the nature and extent of the 
harm suffered by the plaintiff;132 motive of the defendant (a subjective factor); 
foreseen harm and reasonable foreseeability of the harm;133 the possible value to 
society or the defendant of the harmful conduct; the costs and effort of steps which 
could have been taken to prevent the harm; the probability of success of the 
preventative measures (these latter four factors are also considered in determining 
negligence);134 economic concerns; comparative legal positions;135 ethical and moral 
                                                                                                                                                                            
129  Italicised for emphasis.  
130  Delict 38. See also Boberg Delict 33.  
131  Hamilton v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 All SA 678 (C) 694-695. In Van Eeden v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 400, the court stated that a special 
relationship between the parties is one of several factors which may be considered with regard 
to a legal duty. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 146.  
132  See Mpongwanav Minister of Safety and Security 1999 2 SA 794 (C) 803-804; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 100. 
133  S M Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Cathkin Park Hotel (Pty) Ltd para 7; Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Basdeo 1996 1 SA 355 (A) 367-368; Premier, Western Cape v 
Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd para 42; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 107-110. 
134  Foreseeability of harm and the other fault related factors in determining the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s conduct (in respect of wrongfulness) has been held to be relevant even 
though it may not be suitable as it leads to the conflation of wrongfulness, negligence and 
causation. See Country Cloud Trading v Mec, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 
1 SA 1 (CC) 14-16. 
135  S 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights, a court must consider international law and may consider foreign law. See 
National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1212 where the court stated that the 
solution to the problem could be found in the law of England, Australia and the Netherlands in 
considering whether numerous defamatory articles were published lawfully. In DE v RH (2015 
5 SA 83 (CC) 91-93), the Constitutional Court considered the changing attitudes of society 
towards delictual liability stemming from adultery in numerous foreign jurisdictions. The court 
finally concluded that according to the changing attitudes and public policy, adultery is no 
longer wrongful and it is no longer reasonable to impose delictual liability for adultery. In H v 
Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC), the Constitutional Court was called upon to 
consider whether South African law could recognise a child’s delictual claim for “wrongful life”. 
The court considered international and foreign law, concluding that such a delictual claim could 
be developed and recognised. The Constitutional Court stated that the rights of a child and 
other constitutional rights did not bar a claim and referred the matter back to the High Court to 
determine whether such a claim existed.  
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concerns; public policy;136 the values and norms underpinning the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa137 and the Bill of Rights138 (Chapter 2 of the Constitution).139 
 
The influence of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa;140 the boni mores 
as interpreted by the adjudicators; public policy and policy considerations which are 
considered by the adjudicators are important in determining wrongfulness and 
whether conduct is reasonable or not, requiring further discussion. 
 
3.1.3 The influence of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa141  
 
The Bill of Rights entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”),142 which inter alia provides for the rights 
to privacy,143 equality,144 human dignity,145 freedom of expression,146 freedom and 
security of a person,147 must infiltrate the law of delict.148 Numerous fundamental 
rights, relevant to the law of delict were already acknowledged and the fact that they 
are also now acknowledged as constitutional rights just catapults the status of these 
rights to the highest protection in terms of the law.149 Where there is a conflict between 
the fundamental rights, for example, in a case of defamation, between the right to 
freedom of expression and the right to human dignity, a weighing or balancing of the 
interests will have to transpire in exercising a value judgment.150 Even the 
fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution are not absolute and may be 
                                                                                                                                                                            
136  See Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 588; 
National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1204; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 
99-101; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 146. 
137  1996. See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 953-954; DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC), 89-90; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 39. 
138  According to s 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, in developing 
the common law, the courts “must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. 
139  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 38-39; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 146; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 110-112. 
140  1996. 
141  1996. 
142  1996. 
143  S 14 of the Constitution. 
144  S 9 of the Constitution. 
145  S 10 of the Constitution. 
146  S 16 of the Constitution. 
147  S 12 of the Constitution. 
148  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) 885; National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 
(SCA) 1216. 
149  See H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 211; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
20; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 33. 
150  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 19-20. 
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restricted and limited in terms of section 36151 (hereinafter referred to as the “limitation 
clause”) to the extent that the limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. 
 
There is direct152 and indirect153 application of the Constitution. In terms of direct 
application, the Bill of Rights is applied directly to all law, superseding any conflicting 
law and providing a constitutional remedy154 as well as any other remedy if 
necessary.155 A direct application of the Constitution may take place where there is 
either a duty imposed on the state to not perform any act that infringes a fundamental 
right; or to provide “appropriate protection to everyone through laws and structures 
designed to afford such protection”156 as long as it is reasonable and justifiable 
according to the limitation clause.157 In terms of indirect application, private law for 
example, the common law, the law of delict remains, but is either adapted or 
developed to bring it in harmony with the Constitution.158 The Bill of Rights will have 
an indirect effect on the law of delict affecting all the delictual elements as it is only 
reasonable to hold a wrongdoer liable in delict if all the elements of a delict are 
present; in particular, the elements of wrongfulness, fault, causation159 and harm 
where policy and concepts such as reasonableness, justice and fairness are 
prevalent.160 The Constitution is the supreme law in South Africa and if there is a 
conflict between public policy, the common law and the constitutional values,161 the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
151  Of the Constitution. 
152  See ss 8(1), 8(2), 8(3) of the Constitution. 
153  See ss 39(2), 39(3) of the Constitution. 
154  A constitutional wrong may occur where a fundamental right has been violated, but it is not 
the same as a delict. In respect of a delict, it is not necessary for a fundamental right to be 
violated, such as in the case of pure economic loss. The aim of a constitutional remedy is to 
protect, vindicate and protect the fundamental rights entrenched in Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights), 
whereas the main aim of a delictual remedy is to generally provide compensation. Damages 
may also be awarded for a constitutional wrong. Even though there is an overlap between a 
constitutional wrong and a delict, a constitutional wrong and a delict have different 
requirements with different aims. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 20-21. 
155  See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 19-20, 110-112. 
156  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 957. See Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 17. 
157  See s 36 of the Constitution. 
158  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 18; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 32. 
159  See Van Aswegen 1995 SAJHR 59-60; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 22; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 20-22. 
160  See Du Plessis v De Klerk 905-906; O v O 1995 4 SA 482 (W). The court took additional notice 
of constitutional rights and weighed the plaintiff’s dignity with the defendant’s privacy when 
considering the unlawfulness of the defendants conduct (Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 112 
fn 18). Neethling and Potgieter Delict 22. 
161  See Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 448; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 111-112. 
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constitutional values must prevail.162 The Constitution acknowledges inter alia the 
following sources of law: the common law; South African customary law;163 
legislation; international law; and religious or other beliefs.164 All sources of law must 
however, not be in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution.165 If a delictual 
principle is in conflict with a provision of the Constitution, the common law (law of 
delict) must be adapted to resolve the conflict. If a delictual principle falls short of the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, then the law of delict must be developed 
to remedy the short fall.166 Any adaptation or development must be done within the 
common law’s paradigm to bring harmony between the law of delict and the 
Constitution.167 In promoting the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights, there 
may be a direct and/or indirect application of the Constitution which will provide the 
same results.168 The courts however, when developing the common law must bear in 
mind that law reform should be undertaken by the legislature.169 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
162  S 2 of the Constitution; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (CC) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 
953; Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) 707; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 111-112.  
163  S 211 and s 13(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, provides that 
customary law must now form part of the law, provided that it is consistent with constitutional 
norms and values and has not been affected by customary law legislation. SS 30-31 of 
Constitution protects cultural rights as long as they are compatible with constitutional values. 
See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 30 fn 5; Rautenbach and Bekker Legal pluralism 157; s 
39(3) of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any 
other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or 
legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill”. 
164  Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 47. 
165  Himonga and Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 47. 
166  See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 953-954; S v Thebus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) 531; K v Minister 
of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) 429; Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC) 508; DE 
v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC) 89-90; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 32 35; Loureiro v iMvula 
Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 520 where Van der Westhuizen J stated 
that it “is well-established that the law of contract and the law of delict give effect to, and 
provide remedies for violations of, constitutional rights”; H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 
SA 193 (CC) 200 where the common law was developed to recognise a wrongful life claim; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 17; Scott 2006 De Jure 478 who refers to K v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) where the common law was developed in line with 
constitutional imperatives in respect of vicarious liability. 
167  Dendy v University of Witwatersrand 2007 5 SA 382 (SCA); S v Thebus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) 
531. In National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA), the SCA developed defamation 
without having regard to the then Interim Constitution of 1993 itself, but the court did in any 
event consider whether its decision in respect of the common law was in conformity with the 
values enshrined in the Interim Constitution (1216 ff). In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC), the Constitutional 
Court found that the applicable common law rule did not give sufficient weight to the 
constitutional values and held that its application to the facts of the case did not give effect to 
the value of women’s safety and security (Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 20-22).  
168  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 22. 
169  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 954. 
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There is a strong link between the Constitution and the influence of reasonableness, 
in that all rights are protected but may be limited where it is reasonable and justifiable. 
Section 36 of the Constitution provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights may only be 
limited to the extent that such “limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors”.170 Thus if a person’s right is violated then it may only be violated 
to the extent of this limitation clause. Froneman J in H v Fetal Assessment Centre171 
stated that many interests and rights that were protected under common law “quite 
easily translate into what we now recognise as fundamental rights under the 
Constitution”. Thus most rights or interests in terms of the law of delict are protected 
right to the extent of the limitation clause. Neethling and Potgieter172 convincingly 
submit that in the process of balancing the interests and exercising a value judgment 
“the general principles which have already crystallised in our law with regard to the 
reasonableness or boni mores (legal convictions of the community) criterion for 
delictual wrongfulness may serve as prima facie indications of the reasonableness of 
a limitation in terms of the Bill of Rights”. Where there are competing interests they 
must both be weighed and tested against the limitation clause, they are in fact limited 
and tested against the criterion of reasonableness. For example, in Carmichele v 
Minister of Safety and Security,173 K v Minister of Safety and Security,174 and F v 
Minister of Safety and Security,175 where the state was held liable for the omissions 
of the state; the court, in protecting the fundamental rights and providing a remedy 
for the violation of the rights, developed the common law in applying constitutional 
imperatives. There was an unreasonable violation of the interests of the victims and, 
in the circumstances, the courts found it reasonable and justifiable to hold the Minister 
of Safety and Security liable.176 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
170  See chapter 2 para 3.2-3.3. 
171  2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 211. 
172  Delict 20. 
173  2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
174  2005 6 SA 419 (CC). 
175  2012 3 BCLR 244 (CC). 
176  See para 3.1.10-3.1.11 below. 
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3.1.4 The boni mores yardstick 
 
As stated,177 the boni mores must also include and give effect to the values outlined 
in the Constitution. The courts therefore have an obligation to develop the boni mores 
in order to ensure that it is in line with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.178 The boni mores is thus a flexible, open-ended,179 juridical yardstick that 
gives expression to the evolving convictions of the community180 allowing the courts 
to continuously adapt the law and provide value judgements.181 For example, in the 
recent decision of DE v RH,182 the Constitutional Court in dealing with delictual liability 
stemming from adultery, took note of the changing mores and the softening attitudes 
towards adultery in South Africa. The court at length also referred to foreign 
comparative law183 and in the end concluded that, in South Africa,184 delictual liability 
stemming from adultery will no longer be permissible. 
 
When the courts consider the conduct of the defendant with regard to wrongfulness, 
they do not literally and actually test what the legal convictions of the community are, 
but rather in making their decision, take note of the “boni mores” (good morals) with 
respect to legal and public policy, rules, prior decisions, circumstances of the case 
and so forth.185 When a court takes cognisance of the legal convictions of the 
community in the law of delict,186 the question asked is – whether the community 
                                                                                                                                                                            
177  See chapter 2 para 3.2-3.3. 
178  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 39-40. 
179  Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 396, 400. 
180  See Paixão v Road Accident Fund 2012 6 SA 377 (SCA) 381, 388-389 where the common 
law was extended to allow an action of a heterosexual life partner (as a dependant), which 
shows the changing views of the boni mores. In DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC), the Constitutional 
Court confirmed that in respect of the actio iniuriarum based on adultery, an innocent spouse 
is no longer entitled to a claim for contumelia (injury to one’s self-esteem) and loss of 
consortium (deprivation of the wife’s company). Adultery is no longer wrongful attracting 
delictual liability as a result of the changing mores. 
181  See Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 396; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 40; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 99-101; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 
144, 146. 
182  2015 5 SA 83 (CC) 91-93. 
183  DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC) 94-101. 
184  Except for the possibility of patrimonial loss, which was left open.  
185  See Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 679; Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of 
South African law 1100; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 42-43. 
186  National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1204; Silva’s Fishing Corporation (Pty) 
Ltd v Maweza 1957 2 SA 256 (A) 265; Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 597. 
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regards the defendant’s conduct as delictually wrongful and not with what the 
community regards as “socially, morally, ethically or religiously right or wrong”.187 
 
3.1.5 Public policy and policy considerations 
 
The investigation into the role of public policy in delict requires a study on its own, but 
for the purposes of this study, it will be sufficient at this point to just briefly refer to its 
role in determining wrongfulness and delictual liability. 
 
As mentioned,188 public policy is not clearly defined and, in the law of delict, it 
manifests itself in the boni mores. Furthermore, there is a close relationship between 
public policy, constitutional values and norms, as well as the concepts of 
reasonableness, justice, equity and fairness. 
 
Van Zyl J in Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard (Pty) Ltd189 stated that 
the: 
“community’s perception of boni mores is closely linked to the concept of good faith in 
community relations. These concepts … are similarly associated with the community’s 
perception of justice, equity and reasonableness. … This association may be traced back to 
natural law theories, which are contained in expressions such as ‘natural justice’ and ‘the 
fundamental principles of ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’. … From this it appears that public policy, in the 
sense of boni mores, cannot be separated from concepts such as justice, equity, good faith 
and reasonableness, which are basic to harmonious community relations and may indeed be 
regarded as the purpose of applying public policy considerations”.190 
 
Hefer JA in National Media Ltd v Bogoshi191 stated: 
 
“In our law the lawfulness of a harmful act or omission is determined by the application of a 
general criterion of reasonableness based on considerations of fairness, morality, policy and 
the Court’s perception of the legal convictions of the community”.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
187  See Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus 
Curiae) 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 395-396; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 41; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 100; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 144. 
188  See chapter 2 para 3.1. 
189  1990 2 SA 520 (W) 528-529. 
190  Referred to in Neethling and Potgieter Delict 37 fn 25. See also Van der Walt and Midgley 
Delict 100 fn 25. 
191  1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1204. See also SM Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Cathkin Park Hotel (Pty) 
Ltd 2000 4 All SA 407 (A) [7]; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 
1981 2 SA 173 (T) 188 referred to by Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 146. 
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In DE v RH,192 Madlanga J with respect to determining wrongfulness referred with 
approval to the role of public policy as enunciated in Barkhuizen v Napier (within the 
context of contracts):193 
 
“Public policy represents the legal convictions of the community; it represents those values 
that are held most dear by the society. Determining the content of public policy was once 
fraught with difficulties. That is no longer the case. Since the advent of our constitutional 
democracy, public policy is now deeply rooted in our Constitution and the values which 
underlie it. … What public policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy 
must now be determined by reference to the values that underlie our constitutional democracy 
as given expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights”.  
 
Madlanga J194 further stated that the boni mores:  
 
“are about public policy … a notion that is now informed by our constitutional values ... [t]he 
constitutional norms and changing attitudes are not necessarily separate notions: 
constitutional norms also inform present-day attitudes.” 
 
Van der Walt and Midgley195 also submit that the: 
 
“general criterion of reasonableness, based upon public policy, the legal convictions of the 
community, or boni mores, now plays a dominant role in fixing and limiting liability, and has 
replaced the focus on foreseeability of harm. The test for wrongfulness and legal causation, in 
particular, having a strong policy base, but these are not the only instances where policy 
decisions are made. Policy also dictates whether a delictual action is available, whether liability 
should be strict or based upon fault, whether someone has title to sue, what form intention 
should take, what constitutes negligent conduct, what constitutes actionable harm, who should 
bear the onus of proof and the extent of such onus”. 
                                                                                                                              
Public policy and policy considerations play a role in extending,196 limiting197 or 
                                                                                                                                                                            
192  2015 5 SA 83 (CC) 90. 
193  2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 339. 
194  DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC) 101. 
195  Delict 40. 
196  See Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 182-186. She refers to examples where delictual liability was 
extended in our law in instances of pure economic loss and unlawful competition. She refers 
to Compass Motors Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard (Pty) Ltd 1990 2 SA 520 (W) 528-529, 
where Van Zyl J specifically referred to the boni mores, policy and the concepts of “justice, 
equity, good faith and reasonableness”, in determining wrongfulness and extending delictual 
liability to hold a security company liable for the theft of the plaintiff’s vehicle which was stolen 
while they were the very company contracted to look after the vehicle.  
197  Where for example, the damage is apportioned based on how far each party strayed from the 
conduct of the reasonable person reflected as a percentage (in determining negligence on the 
part of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff). Thus depending 
on the plaintiff’s degree of fault, his award may be limited (reduced). It is trite that public policy 
plays a role in determining negligence. See Van Aswegen 1995 SAJHR 59-60; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 22. 
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excluding delictual liability.198 Van Aswegen199 points out that when adjudicators refer 
to policy considerations, it is rather ambiguous and unspecific, in that no exact or full 
explanation is given for the policy consideration used in justifying their decision. 
She200 refers to Union Government v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation 
Ltd201 where the criterion of reasonable foreseeability was acknowledged as a device 
created “to avoid the impression of delivering an unreasoned moral judgment ex 
cathedra as to how the injurer should have behaved”. Van Aswegen refers to the 
policy consideration of indefinite or limitless liability. On the one hand there is the view 
that the administration of justice could be hampered if courts were flooded with claims 
(the opening of the floodgates argument) which is relevant whether conduct leading 
to indefinite liability should be regarded as impermissible (wrongfulness) and, on the 
other hand, whether the defendant should be burdened with the unlimited or 
indeterminate liability (legal causation) to keep liability within reasonable 
parameters.202 
 
For example, in both Union Government v Ocean Accident and Guarantee 
Corporation Ltd203 and Minister of Safety and Security v Scott,204 where it was alleged 
that negligent interference with a contractual relationship caused pure economic loss, 
the courts referred to the fear of indeterminate liability. In Union Government v Ocean 
Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd,205 the court also stated that the law must 
be conservative in extending remedies under the lex Aquilia: “growth must be 
controlled, not only in the interests of systematic development of the law but also in 
the interests of practical convenience. Justice may sometimes be better served by 
denying a remedy rather than by granting one”.206 In the end, the court did not find 
the defendant liable due to “considerations of justice or convenience”.207 The court 
                                                                                                                                                                            
198  See for example, Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 
1 SA 475 (A) and Country Cloud Trading v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 
2015 1 SA 1 (CC) where the courts were not prepared to allow delictual claims for pure 
economic loss as there were other (contractual) remedies available. 
199  1993 THRHR 191. 
200  Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 191. 
201  1956 1 SA 577 (A) 585. 
202  Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 191. 
203  1956 1 SA 577 (A) 535-536. 
204  2014 6 SA 1 (SCA) 11, 13-15. 
205  1956 1 SA 577 (A) 584, 587. 
206  See also Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 478; Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v 
Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A) 500; Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank 
van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (A) 831, 832-833. 
207  Union Government v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd 1956 1 SA 577 (A) 587. 
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was influenced by a policy consideration. This approach is similar to the English 
approach of developing the law incrementally in recognising a duty of care 
category.208 
 
The policy consideration of conservatism of the law, where a delictual remedy need 
not be applied where another remedy such as in contract exists, were relied on by 
the court to reach a decision in Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington 
Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd209 and Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of 
Infrastructure Development.210 Both these cases dealt with claims for pure economic 
loss.211 
 
In Minister of Safety and Security v Scott,212 the court stated that both wrongfulness 
and causation “serve as a brake on indeterminate liability”. With respect to 
wrongfulness, the court held that “[p]olicy considerations militate strongly against the 
imposition of liability upon the minister”,213 and that it would be “untenable to right 
minded people” to hold the minister liable in the circumstances of the case.214 In 
respect of legal causation, the court held that the damages relating to pure economic 
loss215 claimed were “too remote to be recoverable”216 and in the end did not hold the 
defendant liable either. 
 
The boni mores test for wrongfulness,217 the imputability test for legal causation, the 
reasonable person test for negligence,218 and the fair and reasonable approaches in 
determining damage, all involve public policy and concepts such as reasonableness, 
justice and fairness.219 Thus it is evident that public policy and policy considerations 
are used as tools in determining not only whether the defendant’s conduct is wrongful 
                                                                                                                                                                            
208  See chapter 4 para 3.2.2.2. 
209  1985 1 SA 475 (A). 
210  2015 1 SA 1 (CC). 
211  See para 9 below. 
212  2014 6 SA 1 (SCA) 12. 
213  Minister of Safety and Security v Scott 2014 6 SA 1 (SCA) 13. 
214  Minister of Safety and Security v Scott 2014 6 SA 1 (SCA) 15. 
215  R49 million in respect of loss of contractual income and loss of profits. 
216  Minister of Safety and Security v Scott 2014 6 SA 1 (SCA) 14. 
217  See Du Plessis v De Klerk 905-906; O v O 1995 4 SA 482 (W). The court took additional notice 
of constitutional rights and weighed the plaintiff’s dignity with the defendant’s privacy when 
considering the unlawfulness of the defendants conduct (Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 112 
fn 18). Neethling and Potgieter Delict 22. 
218  Van Aswegen 1995 SAJHR 59-60; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 22. 
219  Cf Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 192. 
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but other elements, and in turn whether delictual liability will ensue. Van Aswegen220 
convincingly also argues that policy considerations should be viewed as an integral 
part of the legal materials available in law making, but warns that such function must 
be applied with constraint and in a principled manner, aligning it with existing rules. 
 
3.1.6 The role of the adjudicator 
 
Boberg221 describes the criterion of wrongfulness as a formula for “expressing an 
intuitively-reached policy conclusion, a cloak of respectability for judicial gut-reaction”. 
It is undoubtedly true that the adjudicator plays a vital role in: developing the law of 
delict in general; pronouncing on the function of each element; the use of concepts 
such as justice, fairness, and reasonableness in support of an outcome; and 
interpreting the legal convictions of the community in light of the surrounding 
circumstances.222 Adjudicators must guard against postulating a subjective view 
point223 which might not necessarily encompass the prevailing convictions of the 
community.224 There is also the valid argument that the judiciary comprising a small 
minority of society cannot interpret the needs of the community or serve it.225 
Nevertheless, the courts after weighing the different interests and considering all the 
facts will form an “intuitive opinion” as to whether the defendant acted unreasonably 
and justify such opinion by “invoking the legal convictions of the community as 
interpreted by itself”.226 The courts227 should have regard to prevailing public policy, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
220  1993 THRHR 194-195. 
221  Delict 146. 
222  Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (A) 832-833; Bayer South 
 Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 4 SA 559 (A) 570; Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank 
 Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A) 797; Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; Minister 
 of Law and Order v Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A) 318. 
223  S 165(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, states that the courts must 
 apply the law “impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.” An adjudicator must ignore 
 his personal feelings ‒ see Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 190-191; Argus Printing and 
 Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 591. 
224  Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 679; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 42-43; Loubser and 
 Midgley (eds) Delict 145. 
225  Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 194; Motala 1991 CILSA 299-314. 
226  Boberg Delict 214 fn 11. See Du Bois 2000 Acta Juridica 18. 
227  See Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 
 158; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 43. 
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previous decisions,228 foreign law229 and views of academic writers.230 Marais JA in 
Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud231 stated that it: 
 
“has to be recognised that in applying the test of what the legal convictions of the community 
demand and reaching a particular conclusion, the courts are not laying down principles of law 
intended to be generally applicable. They are making value judgments ad hoc”.232 
 
3.1.7 Subjective factors 
 
It is important to note that subjective beliefs of the parties usually play a role in 
determining fault233 but may also play a role in determining wrongfulness.234 Under 
certain circumstances subjective factors such as the defendant’s improper motive,235 
intention,236 or subjective knowledge of the impending harm to the plaintiff such as in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
228  The law of delict (common law) is developed by judicial decisions which are in a sense binding, 
but may be altered by later decisions. See Du Bois in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of 
South African law 36. 
229  S 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, states that in interpreting the 
Bill of Rights the courts must consider international law and may consider foreign law. See H 
v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 203-210 where foreign law was considered 
in recognising a wrongful life claim. 
230  Which are often considered and incorporated in decisions; see Du Bois in Du Bois (gen ed) 
Wille’s Principles of South African law112-113. 
231  2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA) 1056-1060. 
232  See Du Bois 2000 Acta Juridica 10-11. 
233  For example, where a person subjectively and incorrectly believes that he is wrongfully 
arrested, cannot resist arrest. His subjective belief and mistake will not exclude wrongfulness, 
but may have a bearing on fault. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 43.  
234  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 109. 
235  A few examples may be referred to. In Gien v Gien 1979 2 SA 1113 (T) 1121 the court found 
a brother’s motive wrongful and his actions unreasonable when he erected an apparatus which 
caused loud explosive noises meant to disturb the peace on his brother’s (neighbour’s) farm. 
The noise adversely affected the animals, the farming activities and occupants on the farm. In 
Kirsch v Pincus 1927 TPD 199, the court found that the planting of deciduous trees along the 
border of a neighbour’s wall where leaves fell on the neighbour’s property, unreasonable and 
wrongful. In Bress Designs (Pty) Ltd v GY Lounge Suite Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1991 2 SA 
455 (W) 475, the court found the defendant’s motive to harm his competitor’s good will in an 
unreasonable manner, wrongful. The examples above illustrate the so-called “abuse of rights” 
which relates to the determination of whether the defendant exceeded his powers of ownership 
thereby acting in a wrongful manner in relation to his neighbour. The test is objective taking 
into consideration the principles of “reasonableness” by considering various factors and by 
weighing the benefit to the defendant in him exercising his interests against the prejudice to 
the plaintiff. “Fairness” is also considered whereby the prejudice or potential prejudice is 
distributed equally between the parties (Rand Waterraad v Bothma 1997 3 SA 120 (O) 136). 
See chapter 6 para 2.2.4. See also Mediterranean Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Tebe Trading 2007 
All SA 489 (SCA) 494; Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 
4 SA 371 (D) 386-387; International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 694; 
Aetiology Today CC t/a Somerset Schools v Van Aswegen 1992 1 SA 807 (W) 820; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 108-109; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 44-45, 123-128; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 158; Boberg Delict 32-34, 206-210. 
236  See Minister of Finance v Gore NO 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA) 139-140 where the court held that 
intentional fraudulent conduct in processing a public tender that caused pure economic loss 
was wrongful. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 157; Boberg Delict 33. 
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the case of omissions or pure economic loss,237 may be relevant in determining the 
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.238 In this sense, the blameworthiness of the 
wrongdoer which is an aspect of fault is brought into the determination of 
wrongfulness.239 This, in a sense, leads to an overlap between wrongfulness and 
fault. Du Bois240 points out that, according to the orthodox view, the distinction 
between fault and wrongfulness lies in the former being concerned with subjective 
reasonableness and the later with objective reasonableness, but this distinction is not 
made in instances when the courts look at subjective factors in determining 
wrongfulness. Knobel241 points out that both “intention and carelessness are states 
of mind”, which relate to a subjective inquiry. Yet there is consensus that the 
“reasonable person” test for negligence is objective, hence the subjective-objective 
dichotomy. The test is objective in that it is imposed uniformly. Knobel,242 like Brand 
JA,243 is not in favour of the fault-related subjective factors used in determining 
wrongfulness as they lead to the conflation between wrongfulness and fault. 
However, Khampepe J in Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of 
Infrastructure Development244 pointed out that: 
 
“The relevance of the nature of fault and fault-related considerations in the wrongfulness 
enquiry has been recognised on a number of occasions by the Supreme Court of Appeal … . 
This is not to conflate the elements of fault and wrongfulness, or to suggest that the 
establishment of fault is necessarily a prerequisite for establishment of wrongfulness. Fault, 
like all other delictual elements, must still be separately established. It is merely recognition of 
the fact that where fault rises to the level of intention, and where other fault-related elements 
(such as motive to cause harm) are present, this may be relevant in establishing 
wrongfulness.” 
 
3.1.8 The practical approach to determining wrongfulness 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
237  See Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1SA 
1 (CC) 15-16.  
238  For example, in Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 400, the 
court took cognisance of the police’s knowledge that the prisoner was dangerous and would 
probably commit further crimes if released. The police had a legal duty to prevent the 
prisoner’s escape as the prisoner subsequently assaulted and raped a young woman after 
escaping. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 45; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 141. 
239  See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 158. 
240  Du Bois 2000 Acta Juridica 15. 
241  In Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 237. 
242  In Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 239. 
243  In Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 183 (SCA) 198 Brand 
JA stated that “foreseeability” should not be used as a factor in determining wrongfulness. See 
Knobel in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 241. 
244  2015 1 SA 1 (CC) 15-16.  
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In practice, wrongfulness can be determined more precisely by making use of either 
of the two well-known practical applications of the basic test for wrongfulness, that is, 
by either establishing: whether there was an infringement of a right,245 or breach of a 
legal duty to prevent harm.246 In this sense the boni mores test is seen as a 
supplementary test247 and is used in three types of scenarios: 
 
(1) In unique situations where there is no distinct violation of a legal standard248 or 
ground of justification applicable249 (such as in instances of omissions,250 or pure 
economic loss),251 the question asked is – whether there was a legal duty on the 
defendant to prevent the harm or loss; that is, taking all surrounding circumstances 
into account, would the community regard the omission as wrongful?252 
 
(2) In establishing wrongfulness in borderline and novel cases,253 for example, where 
there is uncertainty whether the defendant’s conduct exceeded the bounds of a 
ground of justification.254 
 
(3) The application of a ground of justification. The boni mores would condone the 
prima facie infringement of interests255 or breach of a legal duty based on the criterion 
of reasonableness.256 In actual fact, the defendant exercises his own lawful rights and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
245  See Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T); 
 Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 140-141; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 45-58; Van 
 der Walt and Midgley Delict 105, 113-114; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 146. 
246  See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 105, 115-116; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 47-50; 
 Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 145, 147-148; Burchell Delict 39. 
247  The boni mores test is used as a supplementary test in instances where no ground of 
justification is applicable or in borderline cases. See McMurray v H L & H (Pty) Ltd 2000 4 SA 
887 (N) 904-905 where the court referred to the boni mores test as supplementary. See 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 47-50. 
248  Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 1 SA 836 (W) 878. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 147; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 48-49. 
249  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 70. 
250  See Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 441-442; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 48-49; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 70-71. 
251  See Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 26; Zimbabwe Banking Corporation 
Ltd v Pyramid Motor Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 1985 4 SA 553 (ZS) 563. 
252  See Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 597; Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender 
Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 121 (CC) 138. 
253  See Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 441 (A) 383; Van 
der Walt and Midgley Delict 71. 
254  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 50 and the example referred to of S v Goliath 1972 3 SA 1 
(A) with reference to the ground of justification, necessity. 
255  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 190. 
256  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 162-163. 
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the plaintiff’s rights are thereby limited by the defendant’s exercise of his rights.257 
Proof of a ground of justification illustrates reasonableness of conduct and the 
defendant’s conduct may not be found wrongful.258 Grounds of justification are 
discussed in more detail further on.259 
 
The option of which route to take in determining wrongfulness, will depend on the 
facts of the case. In some instances it may be easier to identify the right infringed260 
while in others, a legal duty to prevent harm or loss may be more easily established.261 
Causing of physical harm by a commission or infringement of an interest may be 
considered prima facie wrongful.262 However, not all factual infringements of interests 
are prima facie wrongful263 and it is possible that a ground of justification may still be 
applicable.264 
 
3.1.9 Categories of protected subjective rights 
 
Different categories of protected subjective rights have been identified and there is 
no numerus clauses of such rights.265 Different categories of rights may still evolve or 
new categories may be given recognition (for example, such as the right to goodwill 
or trade secrets).266 The following categories of rights have been identified:267 
                                                                                                                                                                            
257  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 88. 
258  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 101. 
259  See para 3.4 below. 
260  The doctrine of subjective rights is established in our law since the decision of Universiteit van 
Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T) 387. 
261  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 146. 
262  Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A) 
497; See cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 45 fn 69; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 146. 
263  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 46 who refer to instances of omission, pure economic loss, 
defamation and infringements of privacy, dignity, goodwill and so on. In such instances 
wrongfulness must be determined with reference to the boni mores, applied in the sense of 
the views and thoughts of the reasonable person. 
264  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 46. 
265  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 52; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 146. 
266  See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 146-147; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 114; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 53. 
267  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 52; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 20 146-147. 
70 
 
personal rights; real rights; personality rights;268 immaterial property rights;269 and 
personal immaterial property rights.270 
 
A person (the legal subject) is the holder of subjective rights which entitle him to the 
use, enjoyment and disposal of such rights (legal objects). The rights may be 
protected and enforced against others as permitted by our law.271 There is a dual 
relationship that exists between firstly the legal subject and legal object, and secondly 
between the legal subject and other legal subjects.272 With every subjective right 
exists a simultaneous duty on others not to infringe “the holder’s relation to the 
object”.273 
 
The actual infringement may be in the form of disturbing or limiting the holder of the 
right against his use, enjoyment, or destruction of such right. Such infringement must 
also take place in a legally reprehensible or unreasonable manner (without there 
being an applicable ground of justification) in order for the conduct to be regarded as 
wrongful.274 Where it is difficult to establish a factual interference with the object of a 
protected right, that is, where the harm is not prima facie wrongful, the focus of the 
enquiry may then rest on whether there was a breach of a legal duty.275 In some 
instances where an applicable right has not yet been identified, it may be more 
suitable to establish wrongfulness in questioning whether there was a breach of a 
legal duty.276 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
268  For example, the right to corpus or body, physical liberty, identity, dignity, feelings, privacy and 
to one’s good name – see, in general, Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of 
personality 24-38; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 52; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 146. 
269  For example, one’s invention of the mind or creation such as a book or painting – see 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 20-23; Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 52; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 146. 
270  For example, one’s credit worthiness or capacity to earn - see Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
52 and Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 17-20; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 146. 
271  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 51; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 147. 
272  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 51-52; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 113. 
273  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 113. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 147. 
274  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 147; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 55-56. 
275  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 147. 
276  For example, in cases of omission or pure economic loss, except in cases of unlawful 
competition when dealing with the right to good will – see Neethling and Potgieter Delict 55; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 147. 
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3.1.10 Determining wrongfulness in cases of omissions 
 
In cases of liability for an omission or pure economic loss, wrongfulness is determined 
according to the boni mores or general criterion of reasonableness and dependant 
on whether the defendant had a legal duty to prevent harm or loss and failed to 
prevent such ensuing harm or loss.277 The question is − was it reasonable according 
to the boni mores to expect the defendant to have taken some positive steps in 
preventing the ensuing harm or avoid the pure economic loss?278 For the sake of 
convenience pure economic loss will be discussed further on.279 
 
Generally a person is not held liable for his omission, unless such omission was found 
to be wrongful.280 In Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security,281 the court stated:  
 
“An omission is wrongful if the defendant is under a legal duty to act positively to prevent the 
harm suffered by the plaintiff. The test is one of reasonableness. A defendant is under a legal 
duty to act positively to prevent harm to the plaintiff if it is reasonable to expect of the defendant 
to have taken positive measures to prevent the harm”. 
 
3.1.11 Factors in establishing the presence of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss 
 
There are a number of factors282 which could be taken into account in establishing 
the presence of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss, and there is no numerus clausus 
in respect of these factors. It is possible that an interplay of a number of factors 
including constitutional imperatives and public policy may be present simultaneously 
                                                                                                                                                                            
277  Minister of Law and Order v Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A) 320; Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and 
Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 389; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 122-123. 
278  Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus Curiae) 
2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 389 395; Deacon v Planet Fitness 2016 2 SA 236 (GP) 241; Neethling 
and Potgieter Delict 56; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 123; Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 147; Burchell Delict 39. 
279  See para 9 below. 
280  Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 596; Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud2000 
3 A 1049 (SCA) 1054; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 58; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 124; 
Burchell Delict 39; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 219. 
281  2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 395. See also Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 597; Lee 
v Minister for Correctional Services 2013 2 SA 144 (CC) 167; Minister of Safety and Security 
v Hamilton 2004 2 SA 216 (SCA) 229; Swinburne v Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 
296 (KZD) 302-303; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 54-55. 
282  See in general Deacon v Planet Fitness 2016 2 SA 236 (GP) 242; Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 60-78; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 116; Burchell Delict 40-45; McKerron Delict15-
25. 
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which can assist in establishing whether the omission is wrongful.283 There are certain 
factors which have over time been identified as indicators leading to the 
establishment of whether there was legal duty to act positively. Where such a factor 
is present, it usually indicates the presence of a legal duty and the application of the 
general criterion of reasonableness is not necessary.284 It should be noted that similar 
factors are considered in the English tort of negligence in determining whether a duty 
of care is owed (to a foreseeable type of claimant) in instances of omissions. These 
factors are considered as exceptions to the general rule of no liability in cases of 
omissions.285 These factors are: prior conduct;286 a particular office assumed;287 
control over a dangerous object;288 rules of law;289 foreseeability of harm (also 
                                                                                                                                                                            
283  See Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 396; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 73 refer to Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) where the following 
factors: statutory duty to prevent harm to the prisoner; special relationship between the police 
officer and prisoner; and the public office assumed by the policeman could have been 
considered in establishing a legal duty to prevent harm. 
284  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 61.  
285  See chapter 4 para 3.3.1. 
286  Prior conduct in the form of a positive act which subsequently creates a new source of danger 
may be an indication of a legal duty to take steps in order to prevent the harm ensuing. For 
example, where a person through his own conduct creates a potentially dangerous situation 
(starts a fire), he has a legal duty (because of the prior conduct) to prevent harm to another 
(the fire spreading to a neighbour’s property which could result in damage to crops and harm 
to animals). Originally prior conduct was a prerequisite in determining the presence of a legal 
duty. This viewpoint changed with the decision of Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 
(A) 596-597 where Rumpff CJ held that “prior conduct” is not an essential prerequisite for 
wrongfulness but one of the indicators which may lead to establishing wrongfulness. See 
alsoSilva’s Fishing Corporation v Maweza 1957 2 SA 256 (A) 265; Regal v African Superslate 
(Pty) Ltd 1963 1 SA 102 (A) 116-117; Minister of Forestry v Quathlamba (Pty) Ltd 1973 3 SA 
69 (A) 82; Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA) 1059-1060. See 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 60-62; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 124; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict (eds) Delict 154 221; Burchell Delict 40-42. 
287  For example, a policeman (as a result of the position he holds) is under a legal duty to prevent 
a member of the public from being harmed (Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A)). 
See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 71; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 154 223; Burchell 
Delict 44. 
288  For example control over a dangerous object (firearm or animal) or a person may be an 
indicator in determining whether the person in control of the dangerous object or person had 
a legal duty to prevent harm. Neethling and Potgieter Delict 62-63 state that what must be 
established first is whether control over the dangerous object or person was present and 
secondly whether there was a legal duty on the defendant to prevent harm while actually 
having control over the dangerous object or person. Wrongfulness will be deemed to be 
present if it is found that there was a legal duty to prevent harm as a result of the omission to 
control the dangerous object or person. Usually under these circumstances, the courts tend 
to disregard the question of wrongfulness and refer to the test for negligence, that is, whether 
the defendant foresaw the possibility of harm and took reasonable steps to prevent harm. See 
Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 400; Swinburne v Newbee 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 296 (KZD) 303-304; Minister of Forestry v Quathlamba (Pty) 
Ltd 1973 3 SA 69 (A) 82. See also Boberg Delict 212; Burchell Delict 43; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 125; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 221-222. 
289  The law, whether in the form of a statute or the common law, may require a person to perform 
specific acts, such as a policeman, who has an obligation to protect citizens. See for example 
Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 320-323, but see Kadir v 
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relevant in determining negligence and legal causation);290 a special relationship 
between the parties;291 social and economic concerns;292 contractual undertaking for 
the safety of a third party;293 and creation of an impression that the interests of a third 
party will be protected.294 A breach of a statutory duty295 may also be an indication 
that the violation of the plaintiff’s interests took place in a wrongful manner. Although 
these factors may be indicative in instances of omissions of the legal duty upon the 
defendant to act positively in preventing harm, the question ultimately remains – was 
the defendant’s omission reasonable in light of all surrounding circumstances?296 
 
It is submitted that these factors, if present, may be indicative of the need to act 
positively and reasonably in order to prevent harm, in light of all surrounding 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Minister of Law and Order 1992 3 SA 737 (C) 739-740 where the court found that there was 
no legal duty upon the police to record details relating to a motor vehicle accident. Cf Neethling 
and Potgieter Delict 66-69. In Woji v Minister of Police 2015 1 All SA 68 (SCA) 77, the court 
held that the investigating officer had a public law duty not to violate the suspect’s right to 
freedom, either by not opposing the bail application or by ensuring that all the relevant 
information for consideration was placed before the court. Furthermore, the state was liable 
for the failure of the policeman to perform the duties imposed on the state by the Constitution. 
The policeman’s omission to perform his public duty was found to be wrongful. In this case, 
the court found an infringement of a right and considered a number of factors in finding 
wrongful conduct. 
290  When the defendant foresees the possibility of harm ensuing, such foresight or awareness 
may be a factor in establishing whether the defendant had a duty to prevent such harm. See 
McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent a Car v Sunset Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey World Travel 
2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 566 as well as other cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
65-66. Cf Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 223. 
291  The existence of a special relationship between parties such as: parent-child; an employer-
employee (e.g. in Silva’s Fishing Corporation v Maweza 1957 2 SA 256 (A)); policeman and 
citizen or prisoner (e.g. Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A)); and doctor-patient. 
The legal duty does not arise automatically merely as a result of the relationship. The facts 
and circumstances surrounding the case must be tested against the bonis mores. See 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 69-71; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 222; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 125; Burchell Delict 43. 
292  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 223 refer to the social, economic and legal effect of imposing 
liability in respect of omissions. Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 185 refers to the policy 
consideration influencing the issue of loss spreading aimed at protecting economic interests.  
293  Where the defendant fails to take steps, for example, in ensuring the safety of another as 
provided for in terms of a contractual undertaking, the legal duty is breached and wrongfulness 
is present. See cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 71-72. Cf Burchell Delict 
44-45. 
294  For example, where a security company creates the impression that property left in their care 
by third parties will be protected. See Compass Motors v Callguard (Pty) Ltd 1990 2 SA 520 
(W); Viv’s Tippers (Edms) Bpk v Pha Phama Services (Edms) Bpk h/a Pha Phama Security 
2010 4 SA 455 (SCA); Neethling and Potgieter Delict 72-73; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 
222. 
295  For example, where a particular provision of a statute enforces a legal duty on a person to 
prevent a crime from being committed as in the case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 963. The courts 
took into account the provisions of the previous Police Act 7 of 1958. See in general Neethling 
and Potgieter Delict 78-79; Burchell Delict 44. 
296  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 77. 
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circumstances. To illustrate this, the first two factors mentioned above will be referred 
to briefly as examples. 
 
If a fire is started on a property (prior conduct), it is reasonable that the owner of the 
property should be expected to control it and extinguish it so that it does not spread 
onto the neighbour’s land. But, if for the sake of argument, the owner was not aware 
of the fire and was out of the country then, of course, he would not be expected to 
control and extinguish the fire. From here on we will assume that he was aware of 
the fire and was physically present on his property. If the fire should spread, there is 
a probability that the neighbour could sustain harm or loss. If the harm or loss 
materialises, then it may be established that there was a legal duty upon the owner 
to take positive steps to prevent the fire from spreading as a result of the prior conduct 
and also as a result of being in control over a dangerous object or situation. In not 
taking reasonable positive steps to prevent the harm from occurring, his omission 
may be regarded as unreasonable, contra bonos mores and wrongful, according to 
the traditional approach. Also, providing all the other elements are present, according 
to the recent approach to determining wrongfulness − it is reasonable that the owner 
should be held liable for the harm or loss as a result of his subsequent failure to 
prevent the harm or loss according to public policy. His failure to act positively is 
unreasonable and therefore it is reasonable to impose liability.297 This is indeed what 
transpired in Minister of Water Affairs v Durr.298 In this case, the City of Cape Town 
(as the owner of the property where the fire started) and the Minister of Water Affairs 
and Forestry (whose employees had felled and stacked trees on property where the 
fire subsequently spread) were held liable for the loss to the neighbour’s properties 
as a result of not preventing the spread of fire there.  
 
If a person holds a particular office, such as a policeman, it is reasonable due to the 
office he assumes in society, that he should be expected to act reasonably in 
protecting and preventing harm to a citizen. Thus there may be a legal duty, a 
statutory duty299 and a constitutional duty300 upon the policeman to protect the citizen 
and ensure that harm does not come to him. In instances where a policeman assaults 
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and rapes a woman, he fails to protect and prevent harm towards her. In fact he 
causes the harm and breaches his legal duty, statutory duty and violates fundamental 
rights. There is no doubt that his conduct is therefore unreasonable, contra bonos 
mores and wrongful (according to the traditional approach) in terms of common law, 
the relevant statute, and the Constitution. In both K v Minister of Safety and 
Security301 and F v Minister of Safety and Security302 where policemen had assaulted 
and raped young women, the Minister was held vicariously liable for inter alia, the 
failure of the policemen to act positively in protecting and preventing harm to the 
women.  
 
The landmark decision of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security303 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Carmichele”) serves as a good example of the approach to determining 
wrongfulness in cases of omissions and will now be discussed further.  
 
According to the facts, Coetzee was convicted and sentenced on a number of 
offences. He was also facing a charge of rape and attempted murder but had been 
subsequently released by the state. The investigating officer was aware of the 
previous convictions and charges, but still made a recommendation to the prosecutor 
to release Coetzee on bail. The prosecutor did not oppose bail and failed to provide 
the magistrate, presiding over the bail hearing, with crucial evidence relating to 
Coetzee’s previous convictions and history of violent behaviour. The police on three 
different occasions were requested to detain Coetzee until the date of trial in respect 
of the charges for rape and attempted murder. A few days after the last request was 
made to the police, a young woman, Carmichele, was brutally assaulted by Coetzee. 
Coetzee was then convicted of inter alia attempted murder and sentenced to 
imprisonment. 
 
The state had omitted to place crucial evidence before the court and oppose bail. 
Their omissions were found to be unreasonable, contra bonos mores and wrongful.304 
Had this evidence been available, the magistrate might have refused bail, preventing 
                                                                                                                                                                            
301  2005 6 SA 419 (CC). 
302  2012 3 BCLR 244 (CC). 
303  (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC). 
304  See Carmichel ev Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 965-968 where the court highlighted the omissions by the 
state according to the facts of the case. 
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harm to Carmichele.305 Carmichele subsequently instituted a claim in delict against 
the state on the premise that the state had a legal duty to protect her from harm. She 
alleged that the state had breached that duty wrongfully and negligently resulting in 
harm to her. The court a quo found that “there was no evidence upon which a court 
could reasonably find that the police or prosecutors had acted wrongfully”.306 
Carmichele appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal307 but the appeal was 
dismissed. On appeal to the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court found that 
the Supreme Court of Appeal had not considered the Constitution and referred the 
matter back to the court a quo. The Constitutional Court308 held that in principle, a 
prosecutor aware of the assailant’s history of violence could be held liable for the 
harm suffered by the victim as a result of the failure to bring pertinent information to 
the court. In the end the court a quo found in favour of Carmichele, but the matter 
went on appeal again to the Supreme Court of Appeal309 where that court finally held 
that the police and prosecutors did indeed have a duty to either oppose bail or place 
all relevant information before the court.310 The state had breached that duty.311 
 
The Constitutional Court in this case provided much guidance in finding that there is 
a general obligation312 upon the courts to develop the common law313 where it 
deviates from the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.314 Both lower courts 
followed the pre-constitutional common law test in respect of determining 
wrongfulness for omissions without considering the Constitution.315 What must be 
determined is whether the defendant could have reasonably (according to the legal 
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 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 969. 
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 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 945. 
307  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2000 1 SA 489 (SCA). 
308  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 968. 
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310  Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 321. See Loubser and 
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312  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 955. 
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314  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 954. 
315  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 955. 
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convictions of the community) been expected to act to prevent the harm.316 There is 
a duty on the state not to perform any act that violates a person’s constitutional rights 
and in some instances there may be a legal duty on the state to take positive action 
to protect fundamental rights.317 In determining whether there is a legal duty on the 
state to act, a “proportionality exercise” must take place where the interests of the 
parties are weighed against the conflicting interests of the community. This exercise 
depends on the interplay of different factors which must “now be carried out in 
accordance with the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’”.318 The court319 
further stated that under the Constitution “concepts such as ‘policy decisions and 
value judgments’ reflecting ‘the wishes . . . and the perceptions . . . of the people’ and 
‘society’s notions of what justice demands’ might well have to be replaced, or 
supplemented and enriched by the appropriate norms of the objective value system 
embodied in the Constitution”. The net of unlawfulness may need to be cast wider as 
constitutional obligations are now placed on the state to “respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”.320 The element of wrongfulness in particular 
with regard to omissions must be developed and shaped in line with the 
Constitution.321 
 
Knobel322 points out that in this case, at the centre of the wrongfulness test was the 
duty to protect Carmichele’s fundamental rights, which is an indirect way of stating 
that Carmichele’s fundamental rights were infringed. Thus the state’s conduct was 
unreasonable. In essence he submits “at the heart of any wrongfulness inquiry is a 
rights issue. Infringing a right is wrongful and amounts to the unreasonableness of 
conduct after all”.323 Knobel’s idea also touches on the difficulty between 
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differentiating between an omission and a commission. Our courts have stated that 
in instances there may be an omission and a commission in a particular case. For 
example, in K v Minister of Safety and Security,324 O’Regan J held that the conduct 
of the policeman in committing rape is considered a commission, in them violating 
her fundamental right, while at the same time an omission, in them failing in their legal 
duty to protect the woman from harm.325 Thus wrongfulness is determined in the 
infringement of a right and breach of a legal duty to prevent harm.  
 
It should also be noted that the decision of Carmichele was important in that the 
Constitutional Court made it possible for the extension of delictual liability in holding 
the state vicariously liable for wrongful conduct in the form of omissions. For example, 
after the decision of Carmichele, in Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security,326 
the Minister was held liable for allowing a prisoner to escape. The prisoner 
subsequently assaulted and raped a young woman after escaping. In K v Minister of 
Safety and Security,327 the state was held liable in delict where three policemen in 
uniform and on duty raped a young woman. The court328 held that the protection of 
the woman’s fundamental rights was of “profound constitutional importance” and that 
it was part of the police’s constitutional obligations to ensure public safety and prevent 
crime. In another landmark decision, F v Minister of Safety and Security,329 the 
Constitutional Court upon similar facts as that in K v Minister of Safety and Security 
found the state vicariously liable for the delict committed by its employee. The 
difference in this case was that the policeman who committed the rape was not in 
uniform and on standby duty. In the recent decision of Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development v X,330 the state was held delictually liable where once 
again the prosecutor failed to provide the court with all relevant information before a 
bail hearing in respect of an accused who had previously committed a number of 
offences, including rape. In this case, once the accused was released on bail, he went 
on to abduct and rape a five year old child. The court,331 following Carmichele did not 
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hesitate in finding that according to the circumstances of the case, “the legal 
convictions of the community would certainly demand the imposition of a legal duty 
requiring the prosecutor to do everything in his power to prevent [the accused’s] 
release, by placing all the information” required by the magistrate in order to make an 
informed decision with regard to granting or refusing bail.  
 
The Constitutional Court in Carmichele332 considered English tort law (in respect of 
the tort of negligence) and stated that in giving effect to the Constitutional values, the 
approach in South African law to holding the state liable is opposite to that of the 
approach generally followed in English tort law where policy considerations dictate 
that it would generally not be fair, just and reasonable to impose liability on local 
authorities. One of the reasons advanced for not imposing a duty of care is that the 
police might not be able to perform their functions and duties if they had to be 
concerned about liability being imposed on them. Thus the influence of the 
Constitution changes the pre-constitutional approach which is in a sense the 
approach followed in the United Kingdom. The Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land which holds the highest regard for fundamental rights.333 The court,334 in 
reference to the approach in English law stated that with respect to the argument that 
the police in terms of policy considerations should not be held liable − “the chilling 
effect such delictual liability might have on the proper exercise of duties by public 
servants are sufficiently met by the proportionality exercise which must be carried out 
and also by the [English law requirements relating to the tort of negligence] of 
foreseeability and proximity” which will establish limits to liability. This aspect of the 
decision in Carmichele will be discussed further in the next chapter on English law.335 
 
Although the examples of omissions provided above referred mainly to the state 
(policeman336 and other state officials) in failing to provide protection or failing in their 
                                                                                                                                                                            
332  See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
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duties towards members of the public; omissions may occur in a number of instances. 
What must be determined is whether the failure to act positively in preventing the 
harm to the plaintiff may be considered unreasonable, contra bonos mores and 
without there being a ground of justification applicable.337 
 
In cases where it is not easy to determine an infringement of a subjective right or 
breach of a legal duty, then the courts must use the general test for wrongfulness.338 
Whichever approach is used the conclusion “often involves public policy and a value 
judgment”.339 
 
3.2 The recent approach: it must be reasonable to hold the wrongdoer liable340 
 
According to this recent approach, wrongfulness is present if according to the 
adjudicator’s perception of “public and legal policy”, it would be reasonable to hold 
the wrongdoer liable, assuming that all the other elements are present.341 As 
mentioned,342 this recent approach made its debut in Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix 
Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA343 dealing with a claim for pure 
economic loss. Harms JA344 stated that “conduct is wrongful if public policy 
considerations demand that in the circumstances the plaintiff has to be compensated 
for the loss caused by the negligent act or omission of the defendant. It is then that it 
can be said that the legal convictions of society regard the conduct as wrongful”.345 
                                                                                                                                                                            
389 (SCA) where the police failed to detain a dangerous criminal from escaping from their 
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It is submitted that this recent approach was borrowed from English law. In order to 
ground liability in the English tort of negligence, it must be established that: the 
defendant owed the claimant a duty of care; the defendant failed to adhere to the 
required standard of care,346 that is he breached the duty of care; and the claimant 
sustained damage caused by the defendant’s conduct.347 In general, the three criteria 
considered in order to determine whether the defendant owes the claimant a “duty of 
care” is: foreseeability of harm; proximity; and whether it is fair, just and reasonable 
to impose a duty of care.348 The last and third criterion has in a sense been adopted 
and adapted in our law as the recent approach, “new test” or variation to determining 
wrongfulness. The difference is that in our law, the third criterion is used to establish 
wrongfulness instead of a duty of care. The third criterion in English law was 
enunciated in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman349 which coincidentally also dealt with 
a claim for pure economic loss in respect of alleged negligent misstatements. It has, 
with respect to English law, been described as a normative question relating to inter 
alia: public policy; legal policy; ordinary reason; common sense; the concepts of 
reasonableness, fairness and justice; and involves the “exercise of judicial 
pragmatism”.350 This will become more apparent when English law is considered in 
the next chapter. At this stage it is necessary to point out the connection in order to 
validate the submission made above. It is also submitted that it was unlikely that 
Harms JA intended to adopt the third criterion in establishing a duty of care into our 
law, as he made it clear in Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v 
Advertising Standards Authority SA351 that our law should not adopt the English tort 
of negligence. He was faced with a case where it was not appropriate to use the 
breach of a legal duty to prevent harm approach in determining wrongfulness. He 
instead referred to policy considerations which would justify awarding compensation 
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to the plaintiff.352 Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court353 has endorsed the recent 
approach. 
 
For example, Van der Westhuizen J in the Constitutional Court decision of Loureiro v 
iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd,354 referred to the boni mores as the test for 
wrongfulness enunciated in Minister van Polisie v Ewels355 but stated that now the 
boni mores takes on “constitutional contours” and are “by necessity underpinned and 
informed by the norms and values of our society, embodied in the Constitution”. Thus 
in essence the boni mores must consider and conform to the constitutional values. 
Van der Westhuizen J356 further stated that the wrongfulness enquiry: 
 
“focuses on the conduct and goes to whether the policy and legal convictions of the 
community, constitutionally understood, regard it as acceptable. It is based on the duty not to 
cause harm − indeed to respect rights − and questions the reasonableness of imposing 
liability”. 
 
With these words, Van der Westhuizen J effectively reconciled the traditional and the 
recent approaches. The recent approach is used in the end to justify the imposition 
of wrongfulness. In this case, a private security company was held liable in contract 
and vicariously liable in delict for harm or loss suffered as a result of the conduct of a 
security guard, employed by the security company. The security guard opened the 
pedestrian gate to a person who posed as a policeman without verifying that the 
person was indeed a policeman and without trying to communicate with the imposter 
before opening the gate. As soon as the security guard opened the gate, armed 
robbers gained access to the premises whereafter they committed theft and held the 
family and house staff at gunpoint. Van der Westhuizen J357 reasoned that there were 
sufficient public policy reasons for imposing liability and finding the security guard’s 
conduct wrongful. 
 
“The constitutional rights to personal safety and protection from theft of or damage to one’s 
property are compelling normative considerations. There is a great public interest in making 
                                                                                                                                                                            
352  Neethling, Potgieter and Scott Casebook on the law of delict 100. 
353  See Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC) 315; Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2013 2 
BCLR 129 (CC) 150; Country Cloud Trading v MEC, Department of Infrastructure 
Development 2015 1 SA 1 (CC) 8; Loureiro v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 
511 (CC) 525; DE v RH 2015 5 SA 83 (CC) 101; H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 
(CC) 216. 
354  2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 521. 
355  1975 3 SA 590 (A). 
356  In Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 525. 
357  Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 526. 
83 
 
sure that private security companies and their guards, in assuming the role of crime prevention 
for remuneration, succeed in thwarting avoidable harm. If they are too easily insulated from 
claims for these harms because of mistakes on their side, they would have little incentive to 
conduct themselves in a way that avoids causing harm. And policy objectives (such as the 
deterrent effect of liability) underpin one of the purposes of imposing delictual liability. The 
convictions of the community as to policy and law clearly motivate for liability to be imposed.” 
 
It is evident that according to the recent approach, the courts do still consider the boni 
mores, constitutional values, policy considerations and the parties competing 
interests in deciding whether to impose liability upon the defendant.358 It is also 
evident that the recent approach seems to attach more weight to policy 
considerations. The recent approach to establishing wrongfulness was initially 
applied in instances of omissions and pure economic loss.359 However, it is no longer 
limited to instances of omissions and pure economic loss. In the recent decision of 
DE v RH,360 the Constitutional Court in answering the question of whether our law still 
recognises adultery as a specific form of iniuria, concluded that public policy dictates 
that it is not reasonable to attach delictual liability to adultery. Thus adultery is no 
longer considered wrongful.361 The court’s decision was however influenced by the 
changing mores or softening of the attitude towards adultery. 
 
In H v Fetal Assessment Centre362 where the court was called upon to determine 
whether our law recognises a wrongful life claim, Froneman J stated that: 
 
“our law has developed an explicitly normative approach to determining the wrongfulness 
element in our law of delict. It allows courts to question the reasonableness of imposing liability 
… on grounds rooted in the Constitution, policy and legal convictions of the community. … 
Part of the established wrongfulness enquiry is to determine whether there has been a breach 
of a legal duty not to harm the claimant, or whether there has been a breach of the claimant’s 
rights or interests”. 
 
Clearly the Constitutional Court has not done away with the traditional approach to 
determining wrongfulness but has actually just added another dimension or approach 
to determining wrongfulness.  
 
Brand JA too, still refers to principles of the traditional approach to determining 
wrongfulness in order to reach the conclusion as to whether it is reasonable to impose 
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liability based on policy considerations. In ZA v Smith,363 the deceased had slipped 
on ice and fell over the edge of a gorge in a private game reserve resulting in his 
death. The deceased’s wife sued the owner and corporation that carried on business 
on the farm for loss of support as a result of her husband’s death. She alleged inter 
alia that they omitted to warn the public of the danger of slipping on ice, of not fencing 
off areas and ensuring that the areas were safe for visitors. Brand JA364 referred to 
one of the factors, namely “control of dangerous property” that may indicate the 
presence of a legal duty in cases of omissions as a “stereotype” and stated that these 
stereotypes: 
 
“still afford guidance in answering the question whether or not policy considerations dictate 
that it would be reasonable to impose delictual liability on the defendant in a particular case 
… . Hence the enquiry is whether – on the assumption (a) that the respondents in this case 
could have prevented the deceased from slipping and falling to his death; and (b) that he had 
died because of their negligent failure to do so – it would be reasonable to impose delictual 
liability upon them for the loss that his dependants had suffered through their negligence. … 
Apart from the fact that both respondents were in control of a property, which held a risk of 
danger for visitors, the second respondent, with the knowledge and consent of the first 
respondent, as owner of the property, allowed members of the public, for a fee, to make use 
of a four-wheel drive route, designed to lead directly to the area which proved to be extremely 
dangerous”. 
 
It should be noted that these “stereotypes” or rather factors indicating a presence of 
a legal duty to act are referred to as exceptional circumstances in the English tort of 
negligence where a duty of care in cases of omissions is recognised. Thus there is 
no need to refer to the criteria of whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a 
duty of care. Naturally though, it may be argued that the presence of the factor 
indicates the need to act positively which may be reasonably expected of the 
defendant in order to prevent harm. Thus it may still be concluded that it is fair, just 
and reasonable to impose a duty of care.365 Our courts have reiterated on many 
occasions that the requirement of a “duty of care” in establishing liability in the English 
tort of negligence straddles both wrongfulness and negligence and should be 
avoided.366 It is submitted that this is correct. First of all, the third criterion has already 
in a sense been adopted and adapted in our law. Fault co-determines wrongfulness 
                                                                                                                                                                            
363  2015 4 SA 574 (SCA). 
364  ZA v Smith 2015 4 SA 574 (SCA) 585-586. 
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in that the question often asked is whether it is reasonable to impose liability for 
negligent conduct. The other two criteria in establishing a duty of care: reasonable 
foreseeability of harm; and proximity (referring to the relationship between the parties) 
are factors considered by our courts in determining wrongfulness (the 
unreasonableness of the defendant’s conduct and the presence of a legal duty to 
prevent harm) and fault in the form of negligence. To complicate matters further, 
reasonable foreseeability of harm is also a criterion applied in determining legal 
causation in both English and South African law.367 
 
It is submitted that even though we may have in a sense adopted and adapted the 
third criterion of the duty of care, it is applied differently in our law. Of importance, the 
recent approach is still influenced by the boni mores, as public policy is reflected in 
the boni mores and in the Constitution. For example, in determining wrongfulness, 
and especially where the defendant’s conduct is considered unreasonable, our 
Constitution has had a ground breaking impact in finding wrongfulness for omission 
by the state. Whereas, in English law, the state is not easily held liable for omissions 
due to policy considerations as will be shown in the next chapter.368 However, English 
law is developing too and even though in many instances the courts are reluctant to 
impose liability in negligence for omissions by the state, there are instances where it 
occurs.369 According to the Human Rights Act 1988 which came into effect on 2 
October 2000 in the United Kingdom, the English courts have an obligation to 
consider a number of rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms which is similar to a number of our fundamental rights.370 
The impact of these Convention rights may have the same effect in developing 
English law as our Constitution did in holding the state liable for omissions. It should 
be noted that at the time of writing this chapter, the United Kingdom has voted to no 
longer be part of the European Union (Brexit) which in effect means that the United 
Kingdom is entitled to withdraw from the Convention. The United Kingdom may also 
repeal the Human Rights Act and adopt a new Bill of Rights (this will be discussed 
further in the next chapter). We have yet to see what will happen.  
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The recent approach, to my mind, as far as can be ascertained, began with the views 
of Du Bois,371 was adapted by Fagan,372 supported by Harms JA373 and Brand JA,374 
and then recently endorsed by the courts.375 This recent approach enunciated by 
Harms JA376 in Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising 
Standards Authority SA was endorsed by the courts just as the traditional approach 
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pronounced in Minister van Polisie v Ewels377 was subsequently endorsed by the 
courts. According to this recent approach, wrongfulness attains superiority as the 
central element in determining delictual liability and is linked with legal causation 
which also involves considerations of public policy in that they “both serve as safety 
valves preventing the imposition of liability”.378 
 
3.3 Dogmatic views on the recent approach to determining wrongfulness 
 
3.3.1 Du Bois   
 
Du Bois is of the view that the law of delict involves “the creation and enforcement of 
obligations”379 and that the purpose is to provide a means for people to obtain 
judgment and ensure enforcement of such obligations. It encompasses a “system of 
rules and principles of personal responsibility” that control conflicting interests.380 The 
victims are at liberty to decide whether they want to institute legal proceedings, and 
whether they do indeed obtain compensation depends on the wrongdoer’s 
resources.381 The purpose of the law of delict can only be accomplished if it is 
justifiable to impose internal382 and external383 “juridification costs”.384 In other words, 
from a financial point of view, is it worth bringing the dispute before the court, taking 
into account inter alia the social and economic costs in obtaining relief in terms of the 
law of delict?385 Whether the costs can be justified depends on either jurisdictional or 
protective concerns. With regard to jurisdictional concerns, for example, “the costs 
are held to be too high because it is unlikely that a ‘right answer’ exists in respect of 
the issue in question,” and with protective concerns, “the costs are held to be too high 
because ‘recourse to adjudication would unjustifiably harm practices and institutions 
which serve other valuable ends as well, so as to protect the ability of the latter to do 
                                                                                                                                                                            
377  1975 3 SA 590 (A). 
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384  Du Bois 2000 Acta Juridica 28. 
385  Visser’s take on Du Bois views in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 
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so’”.386 Du Bois’s approach was acknowledged by the Constitutional Court in Country 
Cloud Trading v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 387 where 
Khampepe J stated: 
 
“Wrongfulness … functions to determine whether the infliction of culpably caused harm 
demands the imposition of liability or, conversely, whether ‘the social, economic and other 
costs are just too high to justify the use of the law of delict for the resolution of the particular 
issue’. Wrongfulness typically acts as a brake on liability … where it is overly burdensome to 
impose liability.” 
 
Du Bois is not keen on the traditional test for wrongfulness as enunciated in Minister 
van Polisie v Ewels388 and instead provides his own view of the test and function of 
wrongfulness, inspired by Cicero.389 He submits that wrongfulness must reconcile:  
 
“the judicial development of the law with a frank recognition that there exists a plurality of 
competing community convictions, also with regard to where the line is to be drawn between 
what is ‘merely’ immoral and what legal. It must do so in a manner that affords both a plausible 
justification, and guidance, for the exercise of judicial discretion concerning the boundaries of 
liability in delict, and that sheds light on what the courts actually do”.390 
 
According to Du Bois, wrongfulness turns on “when it is proper for the law of delict to 
step in”.391 He392 submits that it is essential for the court to consider whether the law 
of delict “‘can lay its strong arms on’ a dispute”. He393 submits that wrongfulness is a 
separate element, not part of fault, “but is to play the distinctive role of directing the 
courts’ attention to the factors that bear on whether the law of delict ‘can lay its strong 
arm’ on a dispute”. 
 
Visser394 points out that Du Bois’s approach makes it clear that unreasonable conduct 
does not equate to wrongfulness and that the determining factors considered in 
establishing wrongfulness are public utility and economic efficiency. Visser,395 
however, admits that although wrongfulness is not primarily concerned with whether 
conduct is reasonable or not, it sometimes is. He provides the example that our law 
regards physical security highly and “almost never considers the juridification costs 
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of adjudicating consequences of physical harm too high”. If a defendant causes harm 
to another and raises the defence of necessity, the reasonableness of his conduct is 
considered in determining wrongfulness.  
 
It is submitted that the similarity between Du Bois’s approach and the recent approach 
is rather close. Du Bois’s approach is also similar to Fagan’s396 approach (supported 
by Brand JA)397 and this may be illustrated by juxtaposing the two approaches:398 
directing the courts’ attention to the factors that bear on whether the law of delict “‘can 
lay its strong arm’” on a dispute/wrongfulness is concerned with the reasonableness 
of imposing liability.399 
 
Du Bois’s approach is predominantly focused on whether it is feasible in a financial 
sense to bring a dispute in delict before the court and that is in reality not always the 
case. For example, sometimes matters are brought to the court for the purpose of: 
developing the law, which includes aligning the law of delict with the evolving boni 
mores;400 confirming principles; adapting it to conform to constitutional imperatives; 
extending delictual liability,401 and so on. The purpose of the law of delict, as 
Neethling and Potgieter402 put it, is “to indicate which interests are recognised by law, 
under which circumstances they are protected against infringement … and how such 
a disturbance in the harmonious balance of interests may be restored”. Furthermore, 
if it is not feasible to litigate because the harm or loss is slight, it is trite law that the 
maxim de minimus non curat lex will apply whereby the adjudicator will not preside 
over a case if the transgression is slight or minor. It sometimes transpires in practice 
that the defendant does not have sufficient funds to satisfy a judgment award at the 
time, and sometimes this only comes to light after judgment. In any case such 
judgment remains valid for some time, which covers instances when the defendant 
may at a later stage acquire funds. It also happens in practice, in instances of 
vicarious liability, that it is more feasible to sue the employer with the deeper pocket. 
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Economic and social concerns are therefore only some of the factors that may be 
considered when determining whether the defendant’s conduct is reasonable or not 
in respect of wrongfulness. 
 
3.3.2 Fagan 
 
Fagan403 submits that the similarity between the English duty of care requirement in 
determining the tort of negligence and the South African legal duty to prevent harm 
involves policy considerations.  
 
“By the policy aspect of the duty of care is presumably meant all those further conditions that 
determine the moral reasonableness of imposing liability for the careless performance of an 
activity … these further conditions are of two kinds. Some affect the moral reasonableness of 
imposing liability for carelessness by affecting the moral reasonableness of carelessness 
itself. Examples given were the nature of the foreseeable harm, of the conduct and of the 
relationship between parties. Others, such as the floodgates argument, have no impact on the 
moral reasonableness of carelessly performing an activity. But they do provide reasons 
against imposing liability on conduct that is morally unreasonable because it is careless.”404 
 
As already submitted,405 the recent approach to determining wrongfulness in respect 
of whether it is reasonable to impose liability on the defendant is similar to the third 
criterion in establishing a duty of care. Fagan was instrumental in the recent approach 
being adopted and adapted into our law. 
 
He406 continues that with the English duty of care, the “basic condition … of the moral 
reasonableness of imposing liability on an act is the fact that it is careless”. It will be 
unreasonable to impose liability for an act innocently performed and reasonable to 
impose liability for intentional or negligent acts. Fagan407 states that the question in 
South African law is − would it be wrongful for the act to be performed culpably? This 
is another way of saying, as in English law, is a duty of care owed by the defendant, 
or is it reasonable to impose a duty of care? The South African legal duty to prevent 
harm, according to Fagan, is almost identical to the English duty of care;408 it is a duty 
to act without negligence.409 This submission is incorrect. As will be explained in the 
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next chapter on English law,410 a duty of care usually exists if: there is reasonable 
foreseeability of harm to the claimant or claimants within a specific class; there is a 
relationship of proximity between the claimant and defendant; and if it is fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendant in light of policy considerations. 
It is submitted that both the traditional and recent approaches to determining 
wrongfulness do not depend on there being reasonable foreseeability of harm and a 
relationship of proximity in all instances. Although these are factors in determining 
whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable and whether a legal duty to prevent 
harm exists; other factors are considered too, such as constitutional imperatives. 
Wrongfulness still lies in the infringement of a right or breach of a legal duty to prevent 
harm. The boni mores or reasonableness criterion, in addition to the influence of the 
constitutional norms and values, as well as public policy which is reflected in the boni 
mores criterion, still forms part of the wrongfulness enquiry. The influence of the 
Constitution on our law should not be underestimated as, in essence, when applied 
in our law; it brings about different results as compared to establishing a duty of care. 
This is evident with the different outcomes reached by the South African and English 
courts with respect to determining liability for omissions, in particular by the state.411 
In English law there may be no duty of care owed to the claimant in respect of an 
omission by a state, but in South African law, as held in Carmichele,412 there is a duty 
on the state not to perform any act that infringes a person’s Constitutional rights. In 
some instances there may be a legal duty on the state to take positive action to protect 
fundamental rights.413 Furthermore, in Carmichele,414 the Constitutional Court stated 
that under the Constitution, policy decisions and value judgments reflecting the boni 
mores might have to be supplemented and enriched by the norms of the Constitution. 
Indeed, the net of unlawfulness is thus cast wider when constitutional obligations are 
placed on the state.415 
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Neethling and Potgieter416 convincingly submit that the duty of care concept with 
which Fagan equates to the legal duty in respect of determining wrongfulness; 
“creates the impression that the legal duty deals with the question of whether the 
defendant acted negligently … [and] can lead to the essence of the wrongfulness 
inquiry, i.e. whether a legal duty existed according to the boni mores to act positively 
to prevent an infringement of a legally protected interest, being negated”. Our courts 
have also clearly stated that they will not equate a legal duty to prevent harm or loss 
with the English duty of care.417 Furthermore, the fact that Fagan refers to negligent 
conduct begs the question as to what happens in respect of a legal duty to prevent 
harm where there is intentional conduct. For example, in Country Cloud Trading CC 
v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development,418 dealing with a case involving 
pure economic loss, the court found intention on the part of the wrongdoer but still 
found it unreasonable to impose liability based on policy considerations. The duty of 
care concept in English law refers to the tort of negligence, requiring negligent 
conduct. In English law,419 the purpose of a remedy in intentional torts is the 
protection of the claimant’s legally recognised interest and the lawfulness of the 
wrongdoer’s conduct is assessed. For example, if we look at an intentional tort of 
false imprisonment: intentional; unlawful (unjustified); complete restriction of the 
claimant’s movement is required. The duty of care concept in the tort of negligence 
does not feature in the intentional tort of false imprisonment. Thus, for the above 
reasons, the requirement of duty of care cannot be equated with the legal duty to 
prevent harm. 
 
The similarity between the breach of a legal duty in South African law in respect of 
omissions and the establishing of a duty of care in the English tort of negligence for 
omissions is: the factors which may indicate the presence of a legal duty in the South 
African law of delict; and the factors which indicate that there is a duty of care owed 
by the defendant to take reasonable steps to prevent harm according to the English 
tort of negligence. These factors include: a special relationship of care; assumption 
of responsibility; control over a dangerous person or thing; creation of danger; and 
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prior conduct. In the English tort of negligence they are referred to as exceptional 
circumstances where a duty of care will be recognised in instances of omission.420 
 
Fagan421 submits that:  
 
“where harm has been caused intentionally, it makes good sense that wrongfulness should 
turn on the ex ante rather than ex post facto reasonableness of the harm-causing conduct. … 
[W]here harm has been caused negligently, it would make no sense that liability should, in 
addition depend on wrongfulness, if wrongfulness were to turn on the ex post facto 
reasonableness of conduct. It would make no sense, because it would have the result that 
liability would on occasion, be avoided when it should be imposed. However, it does make 
sense that liability should, in addition depend on wrongfulness, if wrongfulness turns on the 
reasonableness of imposing liability for conduct that has been shown, or is assumed to be 
negligent. Then wrongfulness would have the important function, namely to avoid the 
allocation of accidental loss by judicial application of the negligence standard when the cost 
of so doing outweighs the benefit”. 
 
Fagan’s approach in actual fact telescopes the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
conduct into one single inquiry based on an ex ante approach to determining both 
wrongfulness and fault. This approach conflates wrongfulness and negligence. This 
is illustrated where the courts, in determining the presence of some of the grounds of 
justification, used an ex ante approach to determine wrongfulness as explained 
further on.422 
 
Fagan’s423 support for the ex ante reasonableness approach to determining 
wrongfulness of negligent conduct requires fault to be determined before 
wrongfulness and consciousness of wrongfulness should not be a necessary element 
of intent. This approach conflates wrongfulness and fault.424 This approach is 
opposite to the view that wrongfulness should be determined ex post facto before 
fault and that consciousness of wrongfulness is a requirement for intent.  
 
It is submitted that our courts in South Africa stand in unison and solidarity on three 
very important points: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
420  See chapter 4 para 3.3.1. 
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1. That they do not want to incorporate the English tort of negligence into our law, no 
doubt because our law follows a generalising approach as compared to the English 
law which is made up of specific torts with specific requirements relating to those 
torts. Furthermore intentional torts requiring intention are separate from the tort of 
negligence requiring negligence (the English law of torts will be discussed in the next 
chapter).  
 
2. That they want both wrongfulness and fault to remain as two separate and distinct 
elements in our law. 
 
3. Our law of delict must be shaped to incorporate the values and norms enshrined 
in our Constitution which is the supreme law of the land. 
 
To this end at least there is hope to redeem our law from any confusion or uncertainty. 
Our courts have reiterated these three points time and time again425 and it is clear 
that they do not intend to conflate the elements even though at times they do.426 The 
role of academic writers is to assist our adjudicators who are tasked with the important 
function of dispensing law. The goal of academic writers, when law is developed and 
principles are applied incorrectly, should be aimed at, pointing out, in a constructive 
manner, where the courts are applying the theoretical principles of our law incorrectly 
to practical situations.  
 
It is submitted that the approach should not be to research a number of cases that 
were to some extent theoretically incorrectly decided, although justice was served, 
and then sanction it as the correct approach. In effect, Fagan has justified incorrect 
approaches to determining a delict under the guise of developing the law ‒ “rethinking 
wrongfulness”. The main criticism against Fagan’s ideas is that he is clearly 
encouraging the adoption of the English tort of negligence which does not distinguish 
between our delictual elements of conduct, wrongfulness and fault.427 The recent test 
to determining wrongfulness is vague and incomplete when it stands alone as the 
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“reasonableness of imposing liability”.428 The traditional approach is quite developed 
and flexible to accommodate any practical situation. It is understandable that our 
adjudicators would prefer the recent approach because it appeals to their sense of 
justice (reasonableness of imposing liability), but at the same time it encourages the 
conflation of wrongfulness, fault and legal causation due to the influence of policy 
considerations and reasonableness.429 Furthermore the approach which is meant to 
determine wrongfulness only is almost equated with the idea of whether the 
defendant should be held liable for a delict as a whole, taking into account all the 
elements of a delict.430 The elements are being confused and blurred. It may lead to 
the redundancy of some elements as the recent approach is being tested and 
developed in our courts. The recent test is usurping the other elements of a delict 
placing wrongfulness on the throne of supremacy.431 
 
3.3.3 Brand (in his capacity as an academic writer and as a judge) 
 
Brand432 acknowledges the decision of Rumpff CJ in Minister van Polisie v Ewels,433 
where in respect of omissions it was stated that conduct will be deemed wrongful 
where the omission is not only morally indignant, but where the boni mores requires 
that the omission be regarded as wrongful. However, he434 states that Rumpff CJ did 
not acknowledge that a legal duty to prevent harm, leading to the imposition of liability, 
as a result of an omission, or due to pure economic loss, depends on policy 
considerations. Brand does not endorse the boni mores criterion in so many words, 
but emphasises public and legal policy considerations in determining wrongfulness. 
Brand435 submits that “references to concepts such as ‘legal duty’ or ‘the boni mores’ 
or ‘the legal convictions of the community’ are no more than attempts at formulating 
some kind of practical yardstick as to when policy considerations will require the 
imposition of legal liability”. He adds that the general criterion of reasonableness is 
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430  Knobel in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 231-232. 
See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 52. 
431  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 78-82 who in detail criticise the recent approach. 
432  2013 THRHR 61-62. 
433  1975 3 SA 590 (A) 597. 
434  Brand 2013 THRHR 61-62. 
435 2013 THRHR 63. 
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also one of these yardsticks.436 Brand437 prefers not to associate reasonableness with 
wrongfulness but states: 
 
“it would have been better to avoid the reference to ‘reasonableness’ entirely, because it is 
easily confused with the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, which is an element of 
negligence. The same happened with the yardstick of a ‘legal duty’ which in turn led to 
confusion with the concept of a duty of care in English law which is more commonly associated 
with negligence”.  
 
It is submitted that Brand’s view to determining wrongfulness is very close to the third 
criterion of the requirement of duty of care in the tort of negligence. The effect of this 
approach as mentioned above in English law is that policy considerations are used 
to keep the state immune from liability even if their conduct is negligent. Due to the 
effect of the Constitution on our law and the protection of fundamental rights, the state 
may be held liable for negligent and unreasonable conduct. Thus, even policy 
considerations applied in determining the limiting of the fundamental rights must be 
reasonable according to section 36 of the Constitution. An organ of the state in South 
Africa is also subject to the constitutional provisions.438  
 
As mentioned,439 the boni mores concept was adopted in our law from Roman law 
while the concept of public policy appears to have been adopted in our law from 
English law. As mentioned above with reference to English law,440 public policy takes 
into consideration the “public good” which is similar to the concept of the boni mores 
and public policy is also reflected in the boni mores. In terms of the development of 
the recent approach thus far, our Constitutional Court in reference to the boni mores 
and public policy expects these concepts to incorporate constitutional values and 
norms. If we look once again441 at DE v RH,442 the Constitutional Court held that the 
boni mores is about “public policy” “informed by our constitutional values” which tell 
us whether a delictual claim may be established − or, put differently, whether it is 
“reasonable to impose delictual liability”. Other Constitutional Court decisions 
following similar approaches include inter alia H v Fetal Assessment Centre,443 and 
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Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd.444 What is also noticeable about the 
application of the recent approach is that the courts do not refer to the recent 
approach of reasonableness of imposing liability on its own but also refer to: the boni 
mores; public and legal policy; the constitutional norms and values; and further state 
that the test for wrongfulness is still determined by breach of a legal duty or in the 
infringement of a right. To reiterate445 in H v Fetal Assessment Centre446 the court 
held: 
 
“our law has developed an explicitly normative approach to determining the wrongfulness 
element … it allows courts to question the reasonableness of imposing liability … on grounds 
rooted in the Constitution, policy and legal convictions of the community. … Part of the … 
enquiry is to determine whether there has been a breach of a legal duty … or whether there 
has been a breach of the claimant’s rights or interests”. 
 
In respect of Brand’s distaste for the reasonableness criterion in determining 
wrongfulness as a result of the possible confusion between the test for negligence 
and wrongfulness; it may be argued that the influence of reasonableness is actually 
evident, whether implicitly or explicitly, in every element. It varies in respect of the 
different elements just as the influence of public policy varies in respect of the different 
elements of wrongfulness, fault, legal causation and in determining damage.447 It is 
ingrained in our law. It is unacceptable to determine wrongfulness solely on 
considerations of policy. Brand’s ideas with respect to the recent approach to 
determining wrongfulness are similar to those found in English tort law which is similar 
to the pre-constitutional test to determining wrongfulness. Relying solely on policy 
considerations detracts from established basic principles of the law of delict backed 
by scientific and empirical evidence. Relying solely on policy considerations is the 
easy way out for an adjudicator to dispense justice and justify a decision, but can also 
equally lead to injustice. Thus the recent approach may be used to reach a final 
conclusion but should only be used once wrongfulness is determined according to 
the established traditional approach. 
 
Brand,448 like Fagan, submits that in respect of intent, “consciousness of 
wrongfulness” should not be an element.449 He prefers the ex ante approach to 
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determining wrongfulness because he believes that the “ex post facto test … renders 
the defendant’s mental disposition entirely irrelevant”.450 This is incorrect, as 
subjective factors as stated above451 are considered in the determination of 
wrongfulness. Brand452 has further, in a sense, equated the test for legal causation 
(imputability of liability) with the recent test for wrongfulness (imposition of liability). 
 
Brand JA in Le Roux v Dey453 held:   
 
“our courts have come to recognise, however, that in the context of the law of delict: (a) the 
criterion of wrongfulness ultimately depends on a judicial determination of whether ‒ assuming 
all the other elements of delictual liability to be present ‒ it would be reasonable to impose 
liability on a defendant for damages flowing from specific conduct; and (b) that the judicial 
determination of that reasonableness would in turn depend on considerations of public and 
legal policy in accordance with constitutional norms. Incidentally, to avoid confusion it should 
be borne in mind that, what is meant by reasonableness in the context of wrongfulness has 
nothing to do with the reasonableness of imposing liability on the defendant for the harm 
resulting from that conduct”.  
 
Brand JA repeated this passage verbatim in later judgments454 he presided over. In 
this same decision Brand JA at least agreed that the test for wrongfulness and 
negligence should remain separate instead of being combined into one test when the 
courts determine the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.455 Brand JA456 
submits that wrongfulness introduces a measure of control and serves as a “‘long-
stop’ to exclude liability in situations where most right minded people, including 
judges, will regard the imposition of liability as untenable, despite the presence of all 
other elements of Aquilian action. … If the test for negligence and wrongfulness is 
telescoped into one, the function of the later element as a measure of control is lost 
completely”. This aspect of limiting liability argued by Brand JA is discussed further 
on with respect to legal causation.457 
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3.3.4 Gowar  
 
Gowar upholds the traditional test for determining wrongfulness458 and endorses the 
approach set out in Minister of Police v Ewels459 in respect of omissions but also 
recognises the courts’ recent approach.460 Her461 main concern, like Nugent,462 is that 
wrongfulness should remain a separate and distinct element. The courts should, 
when dealing with delictual liability, ensure that they find both wrongfulness and fault 
(assuming that both elements are in dispute during the litigation process) and not only 
investigate the question of negligence, thereby omitting to find wrongfulness or 
assume that wrongfulness is present.463 
 
3.3.5 Loubser and Midgley 
 
Loubser and Midgley464 point out that, according to the recent approach, two 
questions arise: 
 
“● Should a court, as a matter of policy, impose liability on the defendant in these 
circumstances? 
● Is it reasonable to compensate the plaintiff for the loss, and for the defendant to bear the 
loss?” 
 
They465 submit that: 
 
 “[u]nderlying delict is a sense of morality and fairness. The law of delict should give 
 substance to these concepts, and sometimes it requires judges to decide which conflicting 
 moral principles should be given practical effect when regulating behaviour in society”.466 
 
Loubser and Midgley467 submit that wrongfulness is linked to the general idea of 
delictual liability in that liability is imposed on the defendant when he unreasonably 
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causes harm to the plaintiff. They criticise the view that wrongfulness is concerned 
with the infringement of a right or interest worthy of protection by the law, in that the 
description is so wide it may refer to the idea of delictual liability.468 However, it is 
submitted that it is the opposite. Finding wrongfulness based on the infringement of 
a right according to the boni mores is narrower and more specified than the wide 
notion of the reasonableness of imposing liability on the defendant for harm suffered 
by the plaintiff.  
 
Loubser and Midgley submit469 that public policy determines whether a legal duty to 
prevent harm or loss exists: 
 
“In some cases this involves considering the broad social and economic impact of imposing 
liability, and in others, a more limited focus on legal and factual aspects of the relationship 
between the parties. In each case, the question is whether it is reasonable for the law of delict 
to shift the burden of harm from the plaintiff to the defendant.”  
 
They state that the policy considerations the courts consider include: the economic 
and social consequences of imposing delictual liability; whether there are other 
remedies available, such as a contractual remedy; the demand for accountability of 
the state while on the other hand taking into consideration that the proposed liability 
may hinder such state bodies or officials in exercising their functions in the interests 
of the public; constitutional rights which may imply a legal duty to prevent harm; 
certain factual circumstances which may indicate a duty to prevent harm;470 the 
nature of the defendant’s conduct (whether there was a positive act or omission); the 
nature of the protected interest;471 the nature of the defendant’s fault and subjective 
factors such as motive.   
 
Loubser and Midgley472 submit that:  
 
“wrongfulness supplements the other elements of  delict, adding a further value, or  a policy-
based dimension to the enquiry into liability, and requires judicial discretion. With all the other 
elements of liability (conduct, causation, harm and fault) proved or assumed to be present, 
wrongfulness involves a value judgment on whether the affected interest of the plaintiff should 
prevail over a conflicting interest of the defendant, or deserves protection from the defendant’s 
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action or lack of it, so that the burden of damage should be shifted from plaintiff to defendant. 
Wrongfulness is thus essentially concerned with the scope of protection afforded to various 
rights and interests, the scope of responsibility to act, and overall policy considerations that 
relate to the question of whether the law of delict should intervene”.  
 
Loubser and Midgley emphasise that out of all the elements, wrongfulness is the most 
clearly policy-based element, much more so than the others. The policy-based 
criterion of wrongfulness is much more vague and pliable and seems to emphasise 
different policy considerations in different cases. The elements of wrongfulness, fault, 
conduct, causation and harm – add up to confirm whether a delict is committed, and 
whether a defendant is thus liable. Loubser and Midgley acknowledge the dominance 
of the element of wrongfulness in determining delictual liability. Nevertheless, 
Loubser and Midgley473 conclude that it is generally accepted that the boni mores 
yardstick in the end involves policy considerations and a value judgment. 
 
Loubser and Midgley474 submit that both fault and wrongfulness are determined ex 
post facto, since the defendant’s conduct is judged in hindsight but with a different 
focus. According to them, the focus of wrongfulness infiltrates all the remaining 
elements of a delict but in the end involves value judgments and public policy. Thus 
the courts make a decision based on whether the plaintiff’s interests require 
protection from the defendant’s omission or commission generally from an ex post 
facto point of view. With respect to fault in the form of intention, the focus is on 
whether the defendant intended to cause harm knowing that it was wrong to cause 
such harm. With regard to fault in the form of negligence they submit that the question 
is whether the defendant behaved reasonably and whether the harm was reasonably 
foreseeable and preventable at the time of the delict. This enquiry involves an ex ante 
approach.475 The authors refer here to the dichotomy between the objective-
subjective enquiries in respect of determining negligence, to which Knobel476 also 
refers. 
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3.3.6 Van der Walt and Midgley 
 
Van der Walt and Midgley477 submit that the current test for wrongfulness depends 
on the adjudicators’ determination on the reasonableness of imposing liability on the 
defendant, assuming all the other elements of delictual liability are present. However, 
they explain that it will be socially desirable, acceptable and reasonable to impose 
liability if the following factors are taken into account: the boni mores; the infringement 
of the plaintiff’s interests or rights; breach of a legal duty; legal policy; public policy 
which is linked to justice, equity, reasonableness and good faith; constitutional values 
and norms; the interest of the parties weighed against that of the community; the 
consequences of the defendant’s conduct; and surrounding circumstances of the 
case.478 The adjudicator’s decision is a conclusion of a value judgment as to whether 
it is acceptable to impose liability and therefore reasonable. If it is legally 
reprehensible to impose liability, then it is unreasonable.479 They480 submit that the 
test is objective based on the reasonableness of conduct with regard to the 
consequences. It is directional in that wrongfulness “must be established in relation 
to a particular consequence, and a particular person or class of persons. It cannot 
exist ‘in the air’”. 
 
The academic writers on the one hand agree that the test for wrongfulness is inter 
alia objective, based on reasonableness of conduct tested against the boni mores 
and constitutional values, but then submit that it is established in relation to a person 
or class of persons. This almost appears to equate wrongfulness with the English 
concept of duty of care in the tort of negligence insofar as a duty of care is owed to a 
foreseeable person or class of persons.481 
 
3.3.7 Knobel 
 
Knobel482 points out that, in terms of the recent approach, wrongfulness usurps the 
functions of the other elements of delict, in particular fault and legal causation which 
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propagates confusion. Furthermore whether it is reasonable to hold the defendant 
liable entails an investigation into all the elements of a delict.483 Knobel484 points out 
that the recent approach is criticised mainly for being incomplete rather than incorrect. 
Knobel485 acknowledges that the problematic cases dealing with wrongfulness 
involve instances of omissions and pure economic loss. Wrongfulness in these 
instances is usually determined if there is a breach of a legal duty. However, whether 
there is an infringement of a right or breach of a legal duty, the conduct on the part of 
the defendant must be unreasonable. Therefore he regards as incorrect the 
statement that wrongfulness does not have anything “to do with the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s conduct”. 
 
With respect to wrongfulness, Knobel supports the ex post facto approach, taking into 
account all the facts and consequences of the conduct whereafter a proper weighing 
of interests can take place based on the boni mores. Such investigation should “not 
be unduly influenced by the subjective views of the parties to the litigation”. Knobel486 
refers to the idea with respect to the legal duty to prevent harm “that the damage must 
be of a kind prompting the law, as a matter of policy, to intervene rather than to let 
the damage rest where it falls”. Thus wrongfulness is judged with respect to conflicting 
interests and whether an interest should be protected against infringement. 
 
Knobel487 points out that the “common denominator” in the functions of wrongfulness, 
fault and legal causation is that they all aid in establishing whether the harm factually 
caused by the defendant’s conduct was reasonable or not and the “difference in their 
functions is associated with the level at which reasonableness is determined in each 
instance”. Knobel488 convincingly submits that with respect to wrongfulness, the 
“question is whether the defendant’s act was reasonable with particular reference to 
the interests adversely affected thereby, balanced against the interests promoted 
thereby”. In respect of fault, the “personal blameworthiness of the alleged wrongdoer 
for the objectively unreasonable (therefore wrongful) act must be established, taking 
into account the subjective views and mindset of the alleged wrongdoer”. In the case 
                                                                                                                                                                            
483  Knobel in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 232. 
484  In Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 231 fn 15. 
485  In Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 233-234. 
486  2008 THRHR 653. 
487  2008 THRHR 652. 
488  2008 THRHR 652-655. 
104 
 
of legal causation, the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is established with 
“reference to the proximity or remoteness of the act to its consequence”.  
 
3.3.8 Scott 
 
Scott489 submits that Fagan with his views on wrongfulness and fault stands in 
“academic” isolation” but refers to the views of Brand JA as well as Visser490 who 
stand in conformity with Fagan’s views. Scott491 does not approve of the recent 
approach to determining wrongfulness and his views with regard to the traditional test 
to determining wrongfulness generally conform to that of Neethling and Potgieter. 
Scott492 also agrees that Harms JA in Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking 
v Standards Authority493 was misguided by Fagan’s494 incorrect interpretation of the 
extract from Minister of Polisie v Ewels495 with respect to the recent approach to 
determining wrongfulness. Scott is concerned that the English law of negligence, with 
respect to pure economic loss, has influenced our law and his concerns are certainly 
valid. Scott496 refers to the recent approach as the new test or “new criterion for 
wrongfulness” which is more appropriate with the system of torts found in the Anglo-
American system. He497 emphasises that in our law wrongfulness may be easily 
established where there is an infringement of an interest which is unreasonable in 
terms of the boni mores and there is no need to refer to the recent approach for 
wrongfulness. He498 correctly submits that our law follows a generalising approach 
where it is usual to consider whether conduct in the form of a commission or an 
omission adheres to the requirements of a delict of which wrongfulness is one of the 
elements. He499 states: 
 
“It is suggested that the new test for wrongfulness, seemingly firmly established after its 
conception in the Telematrix case in 2006, and which has grown into a general wrongfulness 
test for all human conduct (and not only for omissions and causing pure economic loss), is 
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running out of control and is now threatening the fabric of our law of delict which has been so 
carefully developed with the help of academics over many decades.” 
 
3.3.9 Neethling and Potgieter  
 
Much of the views of Neethling and Potgieter have already been referred to in the 
discussion of wrongfulness thus far, but Neethling and Potgieter sum up their criticism 
of our courts’ recent approach to determining wrongfulness on the following four 
grounds:500 
 
1. The test which was formulated in Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking 
v Advertising Standards Authority SA501 was based on Fagan’s incorrect 
interpretation of Rumpff CJ’s dictum in Minister of Police v Ewels502 (as a result of 
reading it out of context and distorting the meaning):503 
 
“It appears that the stage of development has been reached in which an omission is regarded 
as wrongful conduct also when the circumstances of the case are of such a nature that the 
omission not only incites moral indignation but also that the legal convictions of the community 
demand that the omission ought to be regarded as wrongful and that the damage suffered by 
the plaintiff ought to be made good by the person who failed to act positively.”504 
 
2. Compensation for harm suffered is dependent upon the existence of a delict which 
requires the existence of all the elements of a delict and does not depend solely on 
the determination of wrongfulness.505 
 
3. It is not a suitable approach when an interdict is sought. The aim of an interdict is 
to prevent wrongful conduct causing harm. However, the recent approach deals with 
holding the defendant liable for harm or damages already sustained and caused in a 
negligent manner.506 
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4. The approach “is vague and under-developed in respect of concrete guidelines 
enabling its application”.507 
 
As mentioned, in respect of the traditional approach, what must be determined is 
whether the defendant infringed the interests of the plaintiff in an unreasonable 
manner according to the boni mores which must take into account constitutional 
imperatives and all surrounding circumstances of the case. In respect of inter alia 
omissions and claims for pure economic loss, many factors which include 
constitutional imperatives and policy considerations may have a bearing on whether 
there was a legal duty upon the defendant to (act positively in cases of omissions 
and) prevent the harm or loss. The criterion of reasonableness or boni mores 
yardstick is applied.508 The question is whether it is reasonable to expect the 
defendant to take positive steps or prevent the harm or loss. Thus, as pointed out by 
Knobel,509 at the heart of the wrongfulness enquiry is an issue of rights.  
 
According to the traditional approach, the focus is much more specific and narrow as 
compared to the recent approach where the focus is wide (it depends on whether it 
is reasonable to impose delictual liability on the defendant). The traditional approach 
is much more developed, based on established legal principles backed by scientific 
and empirical evidence. The boni mores test is also flexible, capable of being applied 
to reasonable policy considerations.  
 
In respect of the recent approach, all the elements must be present and fault must be 
determined before wrongfulness, thereby encouraging the ex ante approach to 
determining both wrongfulness and fault. This encourages the conflation of 
wrongfulness, fault, and even legal causation. The reasonableness of the 
wrongdoer’s conduct is only indirectly considered in reaching a conclusion as to 
whether liability is imposed. Fault is also seen to co-determine wrongfulness.510 
 
According to the traditional approach, wrongfulness deals directly with the 
reasonableness of the wrongdoer’s conduct and even the plaintiff’s conduct (in 
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respect of certain grounds of justification which will be discussed in the next 
paragraph) when judged according to the boni mores. In respect of the traditional 
approach, wrongfulness is determined ex post facto while negligence is generally 
determined ex ante. Wrongfulness should preferably be determined before fault and 
consciousness of wrongfulness should remain an element of intent.  
 
In respect of both approaches there is a balancing of conflicting interests but, in 
respect of the traditional approach when the balancing takes place, a number of 
factors are considered under the criterion of reasonableness which includes public 
policy, constitutional imperatives, social and economic concerns and so forth. In 
respect of the recent approach, the reasonableness of imposing liability on the 
defendant is based on public policy and policy considerations. According to Brand 
JA, whose judgments on delict have been influential in recent times, the boni mores, 
legal duty and the concept of reasonableness are mere attempts to formulate the 
yardstick of the recent approach.  
 
Nevertheless, according to both approaches, the influence of reasonableness is 
apparent. It is still linked to the boni mores criterion, as the courts state that the boni 
mores is about public policy. In both approaches common denominators are: the 
influence of reasonableness; constitutional imperatives; and a policy-based inquiry. 
Even though our courts have in a sense adopted the third criterion of the test to 
establish the duty of care in determining the tort of negligence in English law, our 
Constitutional Court still refers to the traditional approach alongside the recent 
approach. At the heart of our Constitution are the Bill of Rights and the protection of 
fundamental rights. At the heart of the wrongfulness enquiry is still the balancing of 
interests and rights.  
 
3.4 Grounds of justification 
 
According to the recent approach, the courts511 have reiterated that what is meant by 
reasonableness in the context of wrongfulness has nothing to do with the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. This is unfounded, as will be shown 
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below in dealing with grounds of justification.512 In order to reach a conclusion as to 
whether the defendant’s infringement of the plaintiff’s interests are justified; the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, in light of the boni mores, constitutional 
imperatives, and all surrounding circumstances of the particular case, are taken into 
account. Even if the recent approach to determining wrongfulness is considered, it is 
submitted that in order to reach the conclusion as to whether liability should be 
imposed based on public policy or policy considerations; the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s conduct in infringing the plaintiff’s interests must still be considered in 
light of the circumstances of the case and constitutional imperatives.  
 
As mentioned, conduct that may seem wrongful and unreasonable can be regarded 
as reasonable if there is an applicable ground of justification. A ground of justification 
negates the element of wrongfulness, thereby rendering the defendant’s conduct 
lawful.513 However, at times, our courts have incorrectly found certain grounds of 
justification excluding the element of fault.514 There must be a distinction between 
defences that exclude wrongfulness and those that exclude fault.515 
 
There are numerous grounds of justification identified in our law which are really just 
practical expressions of the legal convictions of the community, the boni mores 
occurring in everyday practical situations.516 There is no numerus clausus in respect 
of the grounds of justification.517 New grounds of justification may be developed in 
future: in line with the Constitution;518 the evolving boni mores based on the criterion 
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whether there was an infringement of a subjective right according to the boni mores and, 
thereafter, if there was fault. 
515  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 190. See the discussion of the defences excluding 
wrongfulness below. An example of a defence excluding fault is “contributory intent” ‒ see 
Ahmed Contributory intent 55-89. 
516  Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 141; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 87; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 125; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 162-163; Burchell Delict 67; Boberg 
Delict 645; Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1137. 
517  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 87-88; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 190; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 163; Burchell Delict 67; Boberg Delict 645; Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) 
Wille’s Principles of South African law 1137. See also National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 
SA 1196 (SCA) 1204; Roux v Hattingh 2012 6 SA 428 (SCA) 440; Clarke v Hurst 1992 4 SA 
630 (D) 650. 
518  See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 190. 
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of reasonableness;519 and legal or public policy.520 In practice, the defendant must 
prove the ground of justification on which he relies.521 
 
The influence of reasonableness is apparent in determining whether a ground of 
justification is applicable or not. The following most common grounds of justification 
within the general framework of the criterion of reasonableness522 are:523 consent; 
private defence (or self-defence); necessity; provocation; statutory authority; official 
capacity; official command; and the power to discipline. Fair comment, privileged 
occasion, truth and public benefit524 are additional categories under the actio 
iniuriarum. Van der Walt and Midgley525 submit that “in every instance the overarching 
defence available to a person is the defence of “reasonableness”526 which has 
already been recognised in instances of actio iniuriarum and could in future be 
recognised in other claims. For the purpose of this research study, the most common 
grounds of justification under the actio legis Aquiliae will be discussed briefly in order 
to illustrate the influence of reasonableness.  
 
3.4.1 Consent to injury or to the risk of injury527 
 
Consent to the injury or to the risk of injury (epitomised in the maxim volenti non fit 
iniuria)528 is recognised as a ground of justification and is employed in instances 
                                                                                                                                                                            
519  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 87. 
520  Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 588; National 
Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1204; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 190. 
521  Santam Insurance Co Ltd v Vorster 1973 4 SA 764 (A) 780; Mabaso v Felix 1981 3 SA 865 
(A) 872; National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1215; Kgaleng v Minister of 
Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 854 (W) 856; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 88; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 190; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 163; Burchell Delict 67; Boberg 
Delict 644, 789-790, 792, 799, 823-824. 
522  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 88; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 163. 
523  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 88; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 163; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 190. See in general the grounds of justification referred to by Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 88-123; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 175-179; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Delict 192-225; Burchell Delict 68-82. 
524  See Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 588. 
525  Delict 190. 
526  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 190, 221-222 rely on National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 
SA 1196 (SCA) 1212 where the court stated that the publication of the defamatory and false 
allegations of fact will not be wrongful if it was reasonable to publish such facts in a particular 
manner and time. With regard to the reasonableness of the publication, the extent, nature and 
tone of the allegations must be considered. 
527  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 108-114; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 167-
170; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 207-214; Burchell Delict 69-73. 
528  The well-known Roman and Roman-Dutch law maxim meaning: he who consents cannot be 
injured. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 108; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 207. 
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where a plaintiff529 allows the defendant to cause specific harm or consents to the 
risk of harm.530 
 
According to the accepted requirements:531 consent must be given freely and 
voluntarily by a person capable of volition; the plaintiff must have full knowledge, and 
realise the nature and extent, of the harm;532 he must actually consent to the harm or 
risk thereof; and of importance such consent must not be unreasonable or contra 
bonos mores.533 
 
Turning to the influence of reasonableness on the requirements: naturally, if the 
consent is given involuntarily, under duress,534 as a result of misrepresentation or 
fraud, then the consent is invalid and the defendant’s conduct, based on the 
infringement of the plaintiff’s body will be considered unreasonable. The plaintiff’s 
freedom of choice is tainted and restricted.535 It would be different though if, for 
example, a surgeon performed a medical procedure upon a person incapable of 
volition (such as a person in a coma or a mentally impaired person) in order to save 
his life. The surgeon’s conduct would not be unreasonable and may still be justified 
on the ground of necessity.536 
 
Visser537 points out that section 12(2) of the Constitution relating to “freedom and 
security of the person” is applicable in determining whether consent is contra bonos 
mores and reasonable. Section 12(2) states that: 
                                                                                                                                                                            
529  Unilaterally, express or implied. 
530  For example, a patient can consent to specific harm such as the removal of a kidney or consent 
to the risk of harm that he may die while undergoing an operation to remove his kidney. See 
Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 207-208; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 163-164. 
531  Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 141; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 111-114; Neethling 
and Potgieter 2012 THRHR 675 ff; Ahmed 2012 Obiter 415-416; Ahmed Contributory intent 
18-21; Ahmed 2014 SALJ 91. Cf Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 209-211; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 164-167. 
532  See Oldwage v Louwrens 2004 1 All SA 532 (C) where voluntary assumption of risk as a 
ground of justification failed because informed consent was lacking. See also Ahmed 
Contributory intent 32-33. 
533  See the locus classicus case Boshoff v Boshoff 1987 2 SA 694 (O) where the voluntary 
assumption of risk by the plaintiff was found reasonable and not contra bonos mores. See also 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 113; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 213; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 163. 
534  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 111 fn 562; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 211. 
535  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 211. 
536  See Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148, 150; Strauss 1964 SALJ 186 fn 53; Ahmed Contributory 
intent 22 fn 139. 
537  In Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1143. 
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“Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right− 
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body; and 
(c) not be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent.”  
 
In establishing the limits of consent, the boni mores yardstick, or criterion of 
reasonableness, is employed in respect of which conduct is lawful or unlawful.538 
Factors which may be considered are: 
 
“the motives of the perpetrator and the injured party, the nature and seriousness of the injury 
as well as the nature of the object infringed. Thus the more valuable the object infringed, for 
example, life, liberty, bodily integrity, etcetera, the more likely it is that the transgression will 
be deemed to be contra bonos mores”.539 
 
Therefore consent to severe bodily injury such as undertaking a hazardous activity540 
and murder may be considered unreasonable and contra bonos mores,541 but 
consent to bodily injury (or to the risk of injury thereof) may not be contra bonos mores 
in cases of participation in lawful sport,542 undergoing medical treatment543 or where 
the injury is negligible.544 Strauss545 submits that whether or not consent should be 
applied as a defence must be judged by public policy. Public policy in this sense refers 
to the economic, social and moral concerns of the community.  
 
In terms of the boni mores, medical treatment should be conducted within the 
framework of accepted medical science and rules of hygiene.546 Consent to 
reasonable treatment with curative benefits will not be considered contra bonos 
                                                                                                                                                                            
538  See Strauss 1964 SALJ 183-184; Ahmed Contributory intent 21-22; Ahmed 2014 SALJ 91; 
Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1142. 
539  Ahmed Contributory intent 21 in reference to Strauss 1964 SALJ 183-184. See also Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 213. 
540  See Santam Insurance Co Ltd v Vorster 1973 4 SA 764 (A). Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 
213 and Burchell Delict 72 submit that the real reason for the failure of the defence of volenti 
non fit iniuria was due to the fact that dicing on a public road is contrary to public policy. See 
also Ahmed 2014 SALJ 97-99; Ahmed Contributory intent 34-39. In Mandelbaum v Bekker 
1927 CPD 375, the court held that voluntary assumption of risk does not cover the risk of being 
shot with gun with a blank cartridge (see Ahmed Contributory intent 39; Visser in Du Bois (gen 
ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1142). 
541  Ahmed 2014 SALJ 91; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 213. 
542  See Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 141; Roux v Hattingh 2012 6 SA 428 (SCA); 
Boshoff v Boshoff 1987 2SA 694 (O); Clark v Welsh 1976 3 SA 484 (A); Ahmed 2014 SALJ 
97; Ahmed Contributory intent 23-24; Ahmed 2012 Obiter 420 ff.  
543  Ahmed Contributory intent 22-23; Ahmed 2014 SALJ 91. 
544  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 113; Ahmed 2014 SALJ 97. 
545  1964 SALJ 181. 
546  Strauss 1964 SALJ 187-188; Ahmed Contributory intent 22. 
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mores.547 Even consent involving reasonable cosmetic procedures which will not 
harm a person’s health or life will not be considered contra bonos mores.548 Consent 
for the purpose of, for example, donating blood or bone marrow in order to help save 
another’s life (where the donor is healthy) will not be considered unreasonable or 
contra bonos mores. The interests of the parties are thus weighed. Consent to 
unreasonable experimentation on one’s body would however be contra bonos 
mores.549 
 
Informed consent is based on the idea that a person, who may be held accountable, 
has a right to determine what shall be done to his own body. A medical practitioner 
who performs an operation without the consent of the patient may be held liable.550 
This refers to the patient’s autonomy551 which gives him the right to decide and agree 
under what circumstances his body may be handled and his interests infringed, 
thereby making such infringement reasonable and lawful. He must be informed of the 
general nature of the consequences beforehand. 
 
This relates to the requirements that the plaintiff must have knowledge of the risk of 
injury, appreciate the nature and extent of such risk,552 and reasonably foresee such 
risk, subjectively.553 Before a patient undergoes a medical procedure, he must be 
informed of any material risks.554 It is unreasonable to expect a medical practitioner 
to explain in detail every risk of harm or complication which may arise, but the medical 
practitioner must at least refer to material risks and provide a general idea of the 
treatment and consequences.555 Thus, when the patient consents to medical 
treatment and is aware of the risk of injury, his rights are in fact reasonably limited by 
the defendant’s reasonable exercise of his own rights. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
547  Ahmed Contributory intent 22. 
548  Ahmed Contributory intent 22. 
549  Strauss 1964 SALJ 187-188; Ahmed Contributory intent 22. 
550  Richart 1979 NDLR 244; cf Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 3 SA 710 (T) 
722,726; Oldwage v Louwrens 2004 1 All SA 532 (C). 
551  See Castell v De Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C) 426. 
552  See Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 3 SA 710 (T); Lampert v Hefer 1955 2 SA 
507 (A) 508; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 107; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 210. 
553  Santam Insurance Co Ltd v Vorster 1973 4 SA 764 (A). 
554  See Castell v De Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C) 426. 
555  See Lymbery v Jefferies 1925 AD 236, 240; Richter v Estate Hamman 1976 3 SA 226 (C) 232, 
235. 
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With respect to the risk of injury during sporting activities, it follows that a participant 
only consents to the risk of injury, if an injury occurs while in the normal course of the 
sporting activity. In other words, consent to the risk of injury is implied if the activity 
was conducted according to the normal rules of the game.556 Consent is valid where 
the sporting injuries resulted from reasonable sports conduct.557 The criterion of 
unlawfulness involves the reasonableness of the conduct in the particular 
circumstances”. The conduct of all the players must be reasonable.558 If a player does 
not play according to the rules of the game, for example, by deliberately or recklessly 
disregarding the rules of the game − then his conduct will be considered 
unreasonable.559 
 
The courts have often overlooked the important requirement that consent must not 
be unreasonable or contra bonos mores. If it is determined that the consent to the 
risk of injury in the form of voluntary assumption of risk is unreasonable and contra 
bonos mores, then it cannot apply as a ground of justification but it may, depending 
on the circumstances, apply as a ground excluding fault. Thus, contributory intent 
may be applicable.560 
 
This defence of volenti non fit iniuria has been applied with caution561 and has only 
been successfully invoked562 in Card v Sparg,563 Boshoff v Boshoff564 and Maartens 
v Pope.565 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
556  See Prinsloo 1991 TSAR 43; Ahmed Contributory intent 24. 
557  See Boshoff v Boshoff 1987 2 SA 694 (O) 695; Hattingh v Roux 2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 141, 
142-143; Ahmed Contributory Intent 24. 
558  Boshoff v Boshoff 1987 2 SA 694 (O) 695. 
559  Boshoff v Boshoff 1987 2 SA 694 (O) 702. 
560  See Burchell Delict 72; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 214-215; Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 171; Ahmed 2012 Obiter 416, 426; Ahmed 2010 THRHR 700-701; Ahmed Contributory 
intent 55-90. 
561  Waring and Gillow Ltd v Sherborne 1904 TS 340, 344; Santam Insurance Co Ltd v 
Vorster1973 4 SA 764 (A) 764; cf Van Wyk v Thrills Incorporated (Pty) Ltd 1978 2 SA 614 (A) 
616; Clark v Welsh 1975 4 SA 469 (W); Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 207. 
562  See Ahmed 2012 Obiter 419; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 208 fn 4. 
563  1984 4 SA 667 (E). 
564  1987 2 SA 694 (O). 
565  1992 4 SA 883 (N). However, see Castell v De Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C) where, by implication, 
volenti non fit iniuria succeeded in respect of certain claims. Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 
208 fn 4 also refer to Lampert v Hefer 1955 2 SA 507 (A), as a case where the defence of 
volenti non fit iniuria has been successful. However, as submitted, the latter case was 
concerned with contributory intent (see Ahmed 2010 THRHR 700; Ahmed 2014 SALJ 91-95; 
Ahmed Contributory intent 17, 24-29; Ahmed 2012 Obiter 419). 
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The influence of reasonableness on the requirements of consent is partly implicit and 
partly explicit in establishing whether the plaintiff’s interests have been reasonably 
infringed (presuming the consent is valid) and whether the defendant acted 
reasonably in exercising his own interests, within the limits of such consent. The 
influence of reasonableness is explicit on the requirement that the consent must not 
be unreasonable or contra bonos mores but more implicit on the remainder of the 
requirements. If the defendant’s conduct is considered reasonable in light of the boni 
mores, constitutional imperatives, and all surrounding circumstances of the case, 
then his conduct is justified in infringing the plaintiff’s interests. Thus the defence of 
consent may succeed. If the recent approach to determining wrongfulness is applied, 
it will still depend on the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct and public policy 
influenced by constitutional imperatives in concluding whether the defendant should 
not be held liable, and whether his conduct is justified. In order to state that public 
policy dictates whether liability should be imposed, the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s conduct must still be considered. Public policy is reflected in the boni 
mores. We have yet to see how the courts will apply the recent approach in instances 
of consent.  
 
3.4.2 Private defence (defence or self-defence)566  
 
A defendant’s conduct may be found lawful and reasonable under the circumstances 
if in protecting his interests567 or that of another’s568 against an imminent or actual 
attack, he causes harm to the attacker.569 The attack or impending attack as well as 
the conduct in retaliation by the defender must meet the following requirements: the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
566  See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 54. 
567  In instances where the defender’s own interests are infringed or threatened, such defender 
acts in self-defence and where the defender acts by protecting the interests of another or 
where another’s interest are threatened, the defender acts in defence (Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 193-194). 
568  See R v Patel 1959 3 SA 121 (A) where the defender shot his own brother in defence; Ntanjana 
v Vorster and Minister of Justice 1950 4 SA 398 (C) where the defender shot a fellow 
policeman in defence. See also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 92 fn 410; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 193; Boberg Delict 791; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 175. 
569  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 88; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 175; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 193; Burchell Delict 73-74; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of 
personality 95. 
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conduct must emanate from a human being;570 be objectively571 wrongful572 and must 
have begun or be imminently threatening,573 but must not have stopped.574 Fault on 
the part of the attacker is not a requirement.575 Thus the defensive conduct may be 
directed towards an attacker who lacks culpability or accountability.576 
 
If, for example, two people both attack each other unlawfully using dangerous 
weapons, then private defence will not be applicable because it is clearly contra 
bonos mores and unreasonable to seriously injure or kill a person.577 If a person is 
lawfully attacked, such as in an instance of a lawful arrest by a policeman, then such 
person cannot rely on self-defence if he harms the policeman.578 The policeman’s 
conduct is thus reasonable. 
 
There are two approaches followed by the courts which actually produce the same 
result albeit by using different approaches: the first being more theoretically sound 
according to the established principles of the law of delict in the South African law; 
and the second lending to confusion between the elements of wrongfulness and fault 
‒ an approach followed in Anglo-American tort law579 where there is no differentiation 
between wrongfulness and fault. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
570  If one is attacked by an animal, the defence that should be employed is necessity. However, 
if an animal is deployed as an instrument by the plaintiff to attack the defendant or another, 
then such defendant may rely on defence. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 89; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 193; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 175. 
571  Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 854 (W) 865; Neethling 2002 SALJ 283 
ff; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 90; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 194-195; Burchell Delict 
74; Boberg Delict 788. 
572  The attack must be unlawful, unreasonable, and violate any protected interest such as life, 
property, bodily integrity or honour. See R v Attwood 1946 AD 331, 340; R v Ndara 1955 4 SA 
182 (A) 184; Ntanjana v Vorster and Minister of Justice 1950 4 SA 398 (C) 404-405; Ntsomi v 
Minister of Law and Order 1990 1 SA 512 (C); Neethling and Potgieter Delict 89-90; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 193; Boberg Delict 788; Loubser and Midgley et al Delict 175. 
573  See R v Patel 1959 3 SA 121 (A); Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of 
Personality 95. 
574  S v Kibi 1978 4 SA 173 (E) 181; S v Mogohlwane 1982 2 SA 587 (T) 592; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 91-92; Boberg Delict 788; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 176. 
575  Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 854 (W) 865; Neethling and Potgieter 
2007 SALJ 282; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 86 fn 358-359; Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 176. 
576  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 92; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 194. 
577  See S v Jansen 1983 3 SA 534 (NC) 536-537; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 90 fn 394; Van 
der Walt and Midgley Delict 194. 
578  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 90 fn 394; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 175. 
579  See chapter 4 para 2.4.3; chapter 5 para 2.5.1; chapter 7 paras 2.4-2.5. 
116 
 
1. The attack must be wrongful based on the actual events that occurred ex post 
facto. In terms of the ex post facto approach, in such instances of putative defence 
where the person incorrectly believes that the attack on him is unlawful; his defensive 
attack objectively viewed will be wrongful.580 However, fault in the form of negligence 
or intention may be absent.581 In Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security,582 X shot 
and killed a person in the belief that the deceased was activating a hand grenade and 
was about to throw it at him. In actual fact, it was not a hand grenade but a tear gas 
canister. X pleaded self-defence, alternatively that “he bona fide and reasonably 
believed that he was entitled to do so”.583 Cloete J584 held that the ground of 
justification defence is aimed at showing that “the attack by the defendant was not 
wrongful. For that very reason, the test is objective” and the fact that X was not in 
physical danger did not justify his shooting the deceased.585 Therefore the plea of 
defence did not succeed.586 X did however escape delictual liability based on the 
surmise that fault in the form of intention587 was absent as well as negligence, as the 
reasonable person would have acted no differently.588 
 
2. The attack must be wrongful according to an ex ante objective approach589 − based 
on whether the reasonable person believed that there was an unlawful attack590 or an 
                                                                                                                                                                            
580  Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 854 (W). 
581  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 84 and Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 194; contra Fagan 
2005 SALJ 97, but see Botha’s criticism (2013 SALJ 154ff) of Fagan’s view, where he states 
that Fagan’s views are incorrect in respect of the ex ante approach and is influenced by 
English Law. 
582  2001 4 SA 854 (W). 
583  Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 854 (W) 856. 
584  In Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 854 (W) 865. See also Boberg Delict 
788. 
585  See Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius 2016 1 All SA 346 (SCA) [52]. 
586  Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 854 (W) 865. 
587  To achieve a particular result and consciousness of wrongfulness, or consciousness of the 
unreasonableness of the conduct based on the facts known objectively, as submitted by 
Knobel in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 236. 
588  Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 854 (W) 874-875. See also S v De 
Oliveira 1993 2 SACR 59 (A) 63-64. 
589  See Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1144-1145. 
590  Botha 2013 SALJ 156-162 validly criticises the two requirements for private defence 
formulated by Fagan (2005 SALJ 97-99). According to Fagan, the requirements are, firstly that 
the reasonable person in the wrongdoer’s position “would have believed that the victim posed 
a danger” to the wrongdoer or third person; and secondly the means of defence used by the 
wrongdoer must be reasonably commensurate with the danger. Botha states that Fagan does 
not refer to the “triggering requirement of an imminent or commenced unlawful act” (157), he 
refers to a mere belief of harm and not specific harm of death or serious injury (160). 
Furthermore Botha points out that neither Ntanjana v Vorster and Minister of Justice 1950 4 
SA 398 (C) nor Minister of Law and Order v Milne 1998 1 SA 289 (W) supports Fagan’s 
requirement of the belief of harm as both cases in fact required an unlawful attack (161). 
Turning to the second requirement, Botha (161-162) states that in respect of Fagan’s second 
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imminent attack.591 Fagan592 points out that the courts followed an ex ante approach 
based on the reasonable belief of an attack and the circumstances manifest at the 
time in Ntanjana v Vorster and Minister of Justice,593 Ntsomi v Minister of Law and 
Order,594 Minister of Law and Order v Milne,595 and Mugwena v Minister of Safety and 
Security.596 The defensive acts were judged against the action of a reasonable 
person. The supporters of the ex ante approach believe that the approach is more 
suitable especially in instances where a person harms another intentionally.597 
However, the ex ante approach does not necessarily produce better results, in fact, 
the opposite may be argued. The defender’s subjective belief may be relevant but 
should not be the decisive factor in concluding the presence of danger or imminent 
danger.598 Neethling and Potgieter599 correctly submit that this approach conflates 
the elements of wrongfulness and negligence. By using the ex ante approach the 
court confused the role of reasonableness in respect of the elements of fault and 
wrongfulness and in fact alludes to the test for negligence pronounced in Kruger v 
Cotzee.600 They argue however that in Ntsomi v Minister of Law and Order,601 the 
reasonable policeman was used as an embodiment of the objective boni mores 
criterion, in the sense that according to the boni mores, the policeman acted 
reasonably.602 The correct approach that the courts should apply in ensuring correct 
theoretical foundations in the law of delict relating to practical situations, is the 
objective ex post facto approach followed in Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and 
Security.603 The ex ante approach supported by Fagan is the approach followed in 
Anglo-American law.604 The defence is generally applied to the intentional torts of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
requirement there is no mention of the aspect that the defensive act must be necessary 
because “it does not fit into his theory” which in fact shows the conflict between the belief 
requirement (prevalent in instances of homicide in criminal law) and the requirements for 
defence. 
591  See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 178. 
592  See 2005 SALJ 97-99. See Botha’s criticism of Fagan’s ex ante approach (Botha 2013 SALJ 
171 ff). 
593  1950 4 SA 398 (C) 405-406. 
594  1990 1 SA 512 (C) 526. 
595  1998 1 SA 289 (W) 293. 
596  2006 4 SA 150 (SCA) 159. 
597  Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1144, 1146. 
598  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 194. 
599  2007 SALJ 282-283. 
600  1966 2 SA 428 (A) 78-79. 
601  1990 1 SA 512 (C) 526. 
602  Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA) 1054-1055; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 49 fn 83, 92-93 fn 415. 
603  2001 4 SA 854 (W) 864-865, 874-875. 
604  See chapter 4 para 2.4.3; chapter 5 para 2.5.1. 
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trespass to the person. A reasonable belief of an attack in the circumstances may be 
sufficient.605 The reasonable belief is judged ex ante but objectively by the standard 
of the reasonable person.606 It should also be noted that the intentional torts require 
intentional conduct from the defendant and the duty of care, or breach of duty does 
not feature in determining the intentional torts. In using the ex ante approach in our 
law, as followed in Anglo-American tort law, wrongfulness and fault are indeed 
combined in considering the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct which should 
be avoided. 
 
The defensive act must be: directed towards the aggressor; necessary (not 
excessive)607 in that there must be no other reasonable alternative way of protecting 
one’s interest or that of another’s,608 and the defensive act must be objectively 
reasonable.609 If for instance there is an alternative way to avert the harm then the 
defence may not succeed.610 But that does not necessarily mean that the defence 
will not succeed if there were less harmful alternative ways of averting danger.611 
Different factors are considered when judging the reasonableness of the defensive 
act612 and there need not be strict proportionality between the attack and the 
defensive act, or between the values of the conflicting interests.613 The courts do not 
expect the defender to necessarily flee.614 Nor do they expect the defender to choose 
a particular course of action615 or weapon that might be considered more appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                                            
605  See chapter 4 para 2.4.3; chapter 5 para 2.5.1. 
606  See chapter 4 para 2.4.3; chapter 5 para 2.5.1. 
607  Minister of Law and Order v Milne 1998 1 SA 289 (W) 293; Ntamo v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2001 1 SA 830 (Tk) 836; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 194; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 176. 
608  R v Attwood 1946 AD 331, 340; Ntanjana v Vorster and Minister of Justice 1950 4 SA 398 (C) 
406, Minister of Law and Order v Milne 1998 1 SA 289 (W) 293; Ntamo v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2001 SA 830 (Tk) 837; Ntsomi v Minister of Law and Order 1990 1 SA 512 (C) 
528-530; S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 449; Mugwena v Minsiter of Safety and 
Security 2006 4 SA 150 (A) 158; Boberg Delict 793; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 92-93. 
609  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 194; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of 
personality 96. 
610  Chetty v Minister of Police 1976 2 SA 450 (N) 455-456; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 176. 
611  Ntanjana v Vorster and Minister of Justice 1950 4 SA 398 (C) 408; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Delict 194. 
612  See Ntamo v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 SA 830 (Tk) 840-841; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 94 fn 427; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 194; Loubser and Midgley et al 
Delict 176-177. 
613  See Ex parte Die Minister van Justice: In re S v Van Wyk 1967 1 SA 488 (A) 496-498; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 94; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 194; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 178; Burchell Delict 74; Boberg Delict 788-789. 
614  Ntsomi v Minister of Law and Order 1990 1 SA 512 (C) 530; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
93; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 177. 
615  See Ntanjana v Vorster and Minister of Justice 1950 4 SA 398 (C) 406. 
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under the circumstances in employing such defensive act in a situation of imminent 
danger.616 However, a notable disproportion between conflicting interests will lead to 
the defensive action being considered unreasonable and wrongful.617 For example, 
traditionally, a person may under certain circumstances kill another to protect his 
property,618 defend one’s chastity,619 or a wife’s honour,620 but not for stealing 
something trivial like butter.621 It inevitably depends on the circumstances of the 
case622 and whether the defensive act employed was justified and reasonable.623 It 
follows that if there were other alternatives to averting the harm or if the defensive act 
in retaliation was clearly disproportionate and unreasonable under the circumstances, 
then the ground of justification, defence may not be applicable, negating 
wrongfulness. In Ntamo v Minister of Safety and Security624 where a policeman shot 
and killed an attacker raising self-defence, the court held that the use of force was 
not necessary. There were other alternatives to avert harm. The policeman was 
unable to prove an absence of wrongfulness.  
 
The influence of reasonableness plays a partially explicit and partially implicit role in 
establishing whether the defendant may justifiably infringe the interests of the plaintiff 
in self-defence or defence. The influence of reasonableness is explicit on the 
requirements that: there must have been no other reasonable means of protecting 
one’s interest or that of another’s; and that the defensive act must be objectively 
reasonable. The influence of reasonableness on the remainder of the requirements 
is more implicit. Thus if the defendant acts reasonably, then his infringement of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
616  Ntsomi v Minister of Law and Order 1990 1 SA 512 (C) 530; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
97; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 194. 
617  Ex parte Die Minister van Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk 1967 1 SA 488 (A) 498; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 95; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 178; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 
Neethling’s law of personality 96. 
618  See Ex parte: Die Minister van Justisie In re S v Van Wyk 1967 1 SA 488 (A) where the 
defender set up a gun in order to protect property, however, in casu the defender did take 
reasonable precautions to warn people of the potential harm. See S v Makwanyane 1995 3 
SA 391 (CC) 449 where the court held that killing a person in defence of protecting property 
might not in future be in line with constitutional values. See also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
94 fn 427; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 195; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 175. 
619  S v Mokoena 1976 4 SA 162 (O). 
620  R v Van Vuuren 1961 3 SA 305 (E); Neethling and Potgieter Delict 90; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 176. 
621  Ex parte Die Minister van Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk 1967 1 SA 488 (A) 503-504; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 194. 
622  See Ntanjana v Vorster and Minster of Justice 1950 4 SA 398 (C) 408 ff. 
623  Ntanjana v Vorster and Minister of Justice 1950 4 SA 398 (C) 408; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Delict 195. 
624  2001 1 SA 830 (Tk) 837. 
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attacker’s interests in protecting his own or another’s interests is not wrongful and the 
defence will succeed. The boundary as to how far the defendant may go in infringing 
the attacker’s interests is dependent on whether the conduct is considered 
reasonable or not in light of the boni mores, constitutional imperatives, and all 
surrounding circumstances of the case. If the defendant, in retaliating, exceeds the 
boundary of reasonableness by striking the plaintiff when there is no threat of attack 
or if the attack has ceased; or using unnecessary, excessive and clearly 
disproportionate force for something trivial, then his conduct may be considered 
contra bonos mores and unreasonable. In turn, he may not rely on defence. Naturally 
if the defendant uses necessary force in order to protect his interests, or those of 
another, against an imminent attack, then his conduct may be considered reasonable. 
The defence may then succeed.  
 
If the recent approach to determining wrongfulness is applied, it will still inevitably 
depend on the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct in view of public policy 
influenced by constitutional imperatives. A conclusion may then be made as to 
whether liability should be imposed on the defendant for acting in defence, in 
infringing the interests of the plaintiff. The interest of both parties is still weighed as 
in the traditional approach. 
 
3.4.3 Necessity625 
 
A defendant when faced with such a situation of (vis maior) superior force, in which 
he protects his interests or that of another’s only by reasonably violating the interests 
of an innocent third person; may rely on the defence of necessity in order to escape 
delictual liability.626 In terms of necessity, the harm is inflicted on an innocent person, 
whereas in terms of defence, the attack is directed at the attacker.627 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
625  See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 54-
55. 
626  Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122; Maimela 
v Makhado Municipality 2011 6 SA 533 (SCA) 539-540; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 97; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 171; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 192; Burchell Delict 
75; Boberg Delict 787-788; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 97. 
627  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 192; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 98-99; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 171; Burchell Delict 75; Boberg Delict 788-789; Visser in Du Bois (gen 
ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1146. 
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The following requirements must be met: the state of necessity must objectively628 be 
present or at least be imminent but not have ceased to exist.629 A person may act out 
of necessity in defending himself against an attack by an animal or some other natural 
force.630 
 
Whether a state of necessity existed must be considered objectively, taking into 
account what actually transpired.631 A subjective belief by the defendant that he was 
justified in acting in the manner he did is not sufficient to succeed with the defence.632 
Subjective factors such as fear may affect accountability or fault, but not 
wrongfulness.633 As in the case of defence, any legally recognised interest may be 
infringed, such as property, life, privacy, and so forth.634 The act performed in such 
state of necessity must have been necessary,635 reasonable and not excessive.636 
Loubser and Midgley637 point out that the general criterion of reasonableness applies 
to necessity. Factors such as the extent of the harm, the value of the interest that is 
threatened, the nature of the threat, and the likelihood of harm are considered.638 If a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
628  Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122. 
629  Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 123; Neethling 
and Potgieter Delict 99; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 174; Burchell Delict 75. An interdict 
or, under certain circumstances, a declaratory order may be of relief in instances of future 
expected harm. 
630  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 99; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 192; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 171, 173; Burchell Delict 75; Boberg Delict 79. 
631  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 192. 
632  Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122. See S v 
Pretorius 1975 2 SA 85 (SWA) where a father believed that his child had taken a number of 
pills and thought that the child’s life was in danger. He was charged with exceeding the 
speeding limit on a public road. The court found that the father acted reasonably in a state of 
necessity and set aside the conviction of speeding. In reality, the child was not in danger and 
the fact that there was putative necessity renders the father’s conduct unlawful, therefore the 
defence of necessity would not have been applicable. However, the father should have 
escaped a conviction as fault was absent. The father bona fide believed that he had to rush 
his child to hospital, exceeding the speed limit out of necessity which is what the reasonable 
person would have done in the circumstances. See Loubser and Midgley’s (Delict 172-173) 
discussion of the case above as well as Petersen v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 1 All 
SA 19 (SCA) where the actions of the police in staving off an attack by firing rubber bullets at 
a crowd which led to the injury of a boy was justified by necessity. See also Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 99 fn 455; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 192; Burchell Delict 76. 
633  See R v Mahomed 1938 AD 30. See Boberg Delict 791; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 99; 
Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 193 fn 12. 
634  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 100; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 173; Burchell Delict 75. 
635  There should not have been any other way of averting the harm ‒ Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd 
t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 123. If fleeing is a possibility then that 
option should be taken (S v Bradbury 1967 1 SA 387 (A) 404). See Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 100; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 174; Burchell Delict 75. 
636  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 101; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 192; Burchell Delict 75.  
637  (Eds) Delict 171-172. 
638  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 192. 
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person is legally obliged to endure harm he may not rely on the defence of 
necessity.639 
 
In S v Goliath,640 our courts justified homicide by an act of compulsion out of 
“necessity”, however, it was pointed out by the court that in this case, it was based 
on the facts of the case and the defence of necessity must generally be applied with 
caution. With regard to defence there need not be proportionality between the 
conflicting interests, but in necessity such proportionality should apply.641 It depends 
on the facts of the case.642 Although it is contentious, the defence of necessity may 
be raised where one creates the state of necessity oneself.643 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v 
Rieck,644 held that the question that needs to be asked in each case “is whether the 
conduct that caused the harm was a reasonable response to the situation that 
presented itself”645 and whether the reasonable person would have acted in the same 
manner.646 Nugent JA647 stated that it has not yet been authoritatively confirmed in 
our law whether necessity excludes wrongfulness or fault in the form of negligence648 
and also did not find it necessary to pronounce whether it excluded fault or 
wrongfulness. Nevertheless, Scott649 points out that most academic authors view 
necessity as a ground of justification. Nugent JA650 found that in this case, the 
“causing of bodily harm was wrongful (on any jurisprudential approach) in accordance 
                                                                                                                                                                            
639  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 192; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 103; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 174; Burchell Delict 75. 
640  1972 3 SA 1 (A). 
641  Maimela v Makhado Municipality 2011 6 SA 533 (SCA) 541. See Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 101; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 192. Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 174 point 
out that the rationale behind the need for proportionality is because the harm is caused to an 
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642  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 102. 
643  See R v Mahomed 1938 AD 30; S v Pretorius 1975 2 SA 85 (SWA) 90; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 192; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 102-103; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 
173. But see S v Kibi 1978 4 SA 173 (E) 179 and S v Bradley 1967 1 SA 387 (A) 393 where it 
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644  2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122-123. 
645  Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122; Boberg 
Delict 788. 
646  Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 123; See S v 
Pretorius 1975 2 SA 85 (SWA) referred to by Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 172. 
647  In Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122-123. 
648  122. 
649  Scott 2007 De Jure 393-397 refers to inter alia Boberg Delict 787-788, Price 1954 SALR 15 
as well as Van der Walt and Midgley, Neethling and Potgieter. 
650  Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 124. 
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with ordinary principles. The harm was clearly foreseeable, and ought reasonably to 
have been avoided by refraining from shooting … and in the circumstances it was 
negligent to have caused it”. The court referred to the factors in determining 
preventability of harm651 and in this case, too, conflated the elements of wrongfulness 
and fault.652 Neethling and Potgieter653 state that the correct approach would have 
been to determine the existence of the two elements separately by first establishing 
(ex post facto – taking into account what actually transpired) whether a state of 
necessity existed.654  The defendant’s fault in the form of negligence must then be 
determined (ex ante) based on the reasonable person test.  
 
The influence of reasonableness on necessity is partly implicit and partly explicit in 
considering the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct in infringing the interests 
of the plaintiff. The influence of reasonableness is explicit with regard to the 
requirement that the act performed in such a state of necessity must have been 
reasonable, necessary and not excessive. If the defendant is faced with a situation of 
necessity and has no other option but to infringe the interests of the plaintiff, then 
depending on the circumstances of the case, taking factors such as the value of the 
interest threatened, the nature of the threat, etcetera, into account, his conduct may 
be reasonable and justifiable. If the state of necessity ceased to exist; or if the 
defendant infringed the interests of the plaintiff unnecessarily, using extreme 
measures to protect his or another’s interests, then his conduct may be considered 
unreasonable. The conflicting interests of both parties are weighed in determining 
whether the defendant acted reasonably in infringing the plaintiff’s interests and 
protecting his own or that of another. Thus if the defendant’s conduct is reasonable 
according to the boni mores, constitutional imperatives and in light of all surrounding 
circumstances of the case, then his conduct is justified. The defence will apply 
negating wrongfulness. 
 
Again, according to the recent approach, the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
conduct, public policy and constitutional imperatives will be applicable in concluding 
whether or not it is reasonable to impose liability on the defendant or rather not to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
651  123. 
652  See Scott 2007 De Jure 397-400; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 98. 
653  Delict 98 fn 447. 
654  Burchell Delict 76; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 127. 
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impose liability on the defendant because his conduct was justified. Again we have 
yet to see how the courts will apply and formulate the recent approach to grounds of 
justification.  
 
3.4.4 Provocation655   
 
A defendant may rely on the defence of provocation in instances where he causes 
harm to the plaintiff as a result of being provoked by actions or words.656 Provocation 
differs from necessity and private defence in that it is as an “act of revenge”.657 The 
retaliatory conduct takes place immediately after the provocative conduct. It is still to 
be confirmed in our law whether it applies as a complete defence or as a mitigating 
factor658 in determining compensation,659 and whether it excludes wrongfulness or 
fault.660 Nevertheless, there is a fair amount of support in our law for the view that it 
applies as a ground of justification.661 With regard to wrongfulness, the provocative 
conduct is objectively weighed against the retaliatory action using the 
reasonableness criterion (according to the boni mores) in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances.662 Where the retaliatory conduct and the provocative conduct are 
                                                                                                                                                                            
655  See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 55. 
656  Powell v Jonker 1959 4 SA 443 (T) 445-446; Bennet v Minister of Police 1980 3 SA 24 (C) 31-
32; Bester v Calitz 1982 3 SA 864 (O) 875, 880-881; Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 2 
SA 414 (D) 419-420; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 104; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 
179; Boberg Delict 827; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 104. 
657  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 105. See also Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 206; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 180. 
658  The following cases support the view that provocation should be applied as a mitigating factor 
and not a complete defence: Thomson v Harding 1914 CPD 32; Blou v Rose Innes 1914 TPD 
102, 104-105; Powell v Jonker 1959 4 SA 443 (T) 446; Winterbach v Masters 1989 1 SA 922 
(E) 925. 
659  See Bester v Calitz 1982 3 SA 864 (O) 875 ff; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 180; Neethling 
and Potgieter Delict 104; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 104. 
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accountable (Powell v Jonker 1959 4 SA 443 (T)). In Jeftha v Williams 1981 3 SA 678 (C) 683, 
the court held that provocation excluded fault in the form of intention. Boberg Delict 829 in 
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law. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 104; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 204; Boberg 
Delict 828. 
661  See Bester v Calitz 1982 3 SA 864 (O) 877-881; Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 2 SA 
414 (D) 419-420; Mordt v Smith 1968 4 SA 750 (RA); Dzvairo v Mudoti 1973 3 SA 287 (RA), 
as well as Neethling and Potgieter Delict 104 fn 502, in respect of authors supporting this view 
and further case law. 
662  See Powell v Jonker 1959 4 SA 443 (T) 446; Bennett v Minister of Police 1980 3 SA 24 (C) 
31-32; Bester v Calitz 1982 3 SA 864 (O) 878-881; Van Aswegen 1982 De Jure 370-371; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 105.Cf Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 204-205. 
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disproportionate, provocation as a complete defence may fail but provocation may 
apply in limiting the award of compensation.663 The courts consider the nature and 
value of the interest affected, the provocative conduct as well as the retaliatory 
conduct.664 Loubser and Midgley665 submit that the retaliatory conduct must be 
reasonable according to the boni mores, where reasonableness is equated with the 
reaction of the reasonable person. In instances where an insult by both the plaintiff 
and the defendant are in proportion as a result of compensatio, both delicts (iniuriae) 
negate each other.666 
 
Provocation is usually not applied as a complete defence in circumstances where X 
verbally assaults Y, and Y then retaliates by physically assaulting X. This is 
disproportionate and the conduct is unreasonable.667 If however, X physically 
assaults Y provoking him and Y thereafter in retaliation physically assaults X, then Y 
may rely on provocation as a complete defence;668 provided Y’s reaction was 
immediate669 and reasonable. That is, the physical assault by Y must not be out of 
proportion in respect of the physical assault by X.670 
 
The question asked by our courts is whether the reasonable person in the position of 
the defendant would have been provoked by the plaintiff’s conduct (assault, 
defamation or insult).671 Subjective factors, such as the defendant’s state of mind672 
are considered in determining the reasonableness of the conduct.673 Once again this 
approach (which conforms to the ex ante approach) has been criticised by Neethling 
                                                                                                                                                                            
663  Powell v Jonker 1959 4 SA 443 (T) 446; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 181. 
664  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 181. 
665  (Eds) Delict 180-181. 
666  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 108. Cf Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 204. 
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105; Powell v Jonker 1959 4 SA 443 (T) 446; Bennett v Minister of Police 1980 3 SA 24 (C) 
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See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 106; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 180-181. 
672  For example, anger or rage. 
673  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 107 fn 528; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of 
personality 105. 
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and Potgieter674 as bringing about conflation in respect of the elements of 
wrongfulness and fault. They state that prima facie unlawful conduct is sometimes 
determined with reference to the boni mores embodied in the reasonable person. 
 
The influence of reasonableness on provocation is partly implicit and partly explicit: 
whether it applies as a complete defence or a mitigating factor; or whether it applies 
as defence negating wrongfulness or fault; and whether the traditional approach or 
the recent approach to wrongfulness is applied. It is submitted that the 
reasonableness of both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s conduct is compared and 
weighed. The provocative conduct is objectively weighed against the retaliatory 
conduct using the criterion of reasonableness in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances. Naturally, if the provocative conduct clearly outweighs the retaliatory 
conduct, then in principle it is reasonable to apply provocation as a complete defence. 
Factors relevant in determining the reasonableness of the conduct, such as the 
nature and value of the interest affected, etcetera, are considered. There are factors 
which are common to determining wrongfulness and fault in our law (such as 
subjective factors) and relate to whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable. 
This does lead to the conflation of the two elements but have been applied by our 
courts.675 Furthermore, as reiterated,676 the ex ante approach to determining the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct also leads to the confusion of the two 
elements. 
 
3.4.5 Statutory authority 
  
In respect of statutory authority, a defendant’s conduct is considered lawful if his 
actions infringe another’s interest in terms of a statute.677 This defence is often 
invoked by policemen, prison wardens and other peace officers.678 There are two 
requirements: the statute must authorise the infringement of the interests and the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
674  Delict 49.  
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676  See paras 3.4.2; 3.4.3. above 
677  Union Government (Minister of Railways) v Sykes 1913 AD 156; East London Western District 
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conduct of the defendant must not go beyond the parameters conferred by the 
particular statute.679 In respect of the first requirement, the intention of the legislature 
must be considered.680 With regard to the latter requirement, the defendant’s conduct 
must be reasonable. There should have been no alternative means of preventing or 
limiting harm.681 The courts refer to the general criterion of reasonableness682 and 
constitutional imperatives.683 Previously the courts stated with regard to 
reasonableness of the conduct that the statutory powers should not have been 
negligently exceeded.684 Burchell685 points out that this was before there was a clear 
recognition of the distinction between the elements of wrongfulness and fault and the 
courts did thereafter acknowledge that it is a question of wrongfulness.686 The courts 
consider the cost and effectiveness of actions employed in order to avoid or limit the 
infringement of the interest while exercising such statutory authority.687 In order to 
illustrate the application of the reasonableness criterion, an example with regard to 
section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act,688 the “[u]se of force in effecting arrest”, 
may be used. The police officer may only use force if he believes on reasonable 
grounds that it is necessary. There must be no other alternative means of affecting 
an arrest such as by means of an oral warning, warning shot or shooting the suspect 
in the leg.689 The force used must be proportional under the circumstances in order 
to affect an arrest or stop the suspect from fleeing.690 Thus only reasonable force 
must be used. 
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685  Delict 81. See Van der Walt and Midgley (eds) Delict 198-199 who refer to the courts’ use of 
due care, or the duty of care, which was influenced by English law where there is no 
conceptual difference between wrongfulness and fault. 
686  See Simon’s Town Municipality v Dews 1993 1 SA 191 (A) 196. 
687  Breede River (Robertson) Irrigation Board v Brink 1936 AD 359; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
116 fn 592; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 183. 
688  51 of 1977. 
689  Matlou v Makhuhubedu 1978 1 SA 946 (A) 958. 
690  Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2000 1 SA 959 (D) 967; Matlou v Makhuhubedu 
1978 1 SA 946 (A) 956; Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: in re State v Walters 2002 4 
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The defendant who relies on the defence of statutory authority must prove that the 
causing of harm was within the statutory bounds of authority691 and the plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant exceeded the bounds of statutory authority.692 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the requirements for statutory authority is also 
partially implicit and partially explicit. A statute which authorises the infringement of a 
person’s interests must be reasonable. Here the Constitution is applicable as the 
fundamental rights are protected. It is trite that any provision in legislation which is in 
conflict with the Constitution and Bill of Rights may be struck off as invalid and the 
courts may request the legislature to remedy any defect.  
 
The requirement that the conduct of the defendant must not go beyond the 
parameters conferred by the particular statute relates to reasonableness. This is 
explicitly illustrated in terms of the example of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act693 provided above. The act itself allows a policeman to make an arrest on 
reasonable grounds of suspicion. Force may only reasonably be used if there is no 
other option. In using the necessary force, there must be no other reasonable 
alternative means of affecting an arrest. The force used to arrest or apprehend the 
suspect must be reasonable. Naturally if unnecessary, excessive force is used − then 
the use of such force may be considered unreasonable according to the boni mores, 
constitutional imperatives and surrounding circumstances of the case. The defendant 
in using such reasonable force lawfully exercises his own interests authorised by the 
statute in infringing the interests of the suspect. Thus the defence of statutory 
authority may succeed. If the recent approach to determining wrongfulness is used, 
the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct will still be considered in light of public 
policy and constitutional imperatives in reaching a conclusion as to whether or not it 
will be reasonable to impose liability on the defendant.694 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
SA 613 (CC) 643; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 117-118; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 
183. Cf Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 196. 
691  Johannesburg Municipality v African Reality Trust 1927 AD 163, 175; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 193; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 182; Burchell Delict 82. 
692  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 116; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 196-197. 
693  51 of 1977. 
694  See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 198. 
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3.4.6 Official Capacity 
 
Public officials such as law enforcement personnel and judicial officers may rely on 
official capacity in instances where they cause harm to a plaintiff in a reasonable 
manner, while acting in such capacity.695 The reason for their immunity from liability 
while exercising their authority in such capacity is because of the idea that the law 
enforcement and judiciary must remain independent. They must be able to exercise 
their functions without the fear of being held liable.696 An obvious example is where a 
judicial officer detains the plaintiff for contempt of court after warnings were given and 
not heeded to. In such instances the judicial officer’s conduct is reasonable and he 
may be immune from liability. If a judicial officer acts with malice, his conduct may be 
considered unreasonable and wrongful.697 In such a case, the public official exceeds 
his bound of authority.698 The policy consideration behind immunity from liability is 
understandable, however, such immunity from liability will only apply if the public 
official’s conduct was reasonable in light of the boni mores, constitutional imperatives 
and all surrounding circumstances (according to the traditional approach to 
determining wrongfulness). Notice may be taken again of the decision in the 
Carmichele saga and all other decisions following the approach where the state was 
held liable for the conduct of the public officials. The public officials in the Carmichele 
saga had breached their legal duty to protect Carmichele from harm. Their conduct 
was unreasonable and the state was held liable for the omissions. Thus the state was 
not immune from liability.  
 
In respect of the recent approach, with regard to whether the defence of official 
capacity will apply thereby negating wrongfulness, it will still depend on whether the 
public official’s conduct was reasonable and justifiable in allowing immunity from 
liability. Thus in both approaches the influence of reasonableness is apparent. As 
                                                                                                                                                                            
695  See Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA 
2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 470; May v Udwin 1981 1 SA 1 (A) 19-20; Moeketsi v Minister van 
Justisie 1988 4 SA 707 (T) 711-713; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 119; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 202; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 183. 
696  May v Udwin 1981 1 SA 1 (A) 19; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 119; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Delict 202. 
697  May v Udwin 1981 1 SA 1 (A) 19-20; Moeketsi v Minister van Justisie 1988 4 SA 707 (T) 711-
713; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 119; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 136. 
698  Moeketsi v Minister van Justisie 1988 4 SA 707 (T) 713; May v Udwin 1981 1 SA 1 (A) 19; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 119; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 204; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 183. 
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mentioned,699 even though our courts refer to the reasonableness of imposing liability, 
they still also refer to the boni mores, public policy, constitutional imperatives and the 
practical tests to determining wrongfulness. These practical tests relate to the 
infringement of rights or breach of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss.  
 
3.4.7 Official command  
 
In instances where a defendant obeys an official command and in so doing infringes 
the interests of the plaintiff, his infringement may be considered lawful.700 According 
to S v Banda,701 the following requirements must be met: the command must come 
from an official with the required authority over the defendant; there must have been 
a duty on the defendant to obey the command; and the defendant must have caused 
no more harm than was necessary in carrying out the order.702 
 
Whether the command given was lawful, is of importance when questioning whether 
there was a duty upon such subordinate to obey the command. The courts have 
acknowledged that there is no blind duty to obey orders.703 There are two recognised 
approaches: the first, that a wrongful order remains wrongful704 and the second, that 
only the execution of an illegal order is wrongful.705 In instances where a subordinate 
obeys a wrongful command, such person in reality acts out of necessity as a result of 
being forced to obey.706 Whether the command is wrongful has been determined with 
reference to the judgement of the reasonable person in the position of the subordinate 
who acted upon the official command.707 In instances where X obeys a wrongful 
order, the applicable ground of justification is necessity in the form of compulsion.708 
                                                                                                                                                                            
699  See para 3.2 above. 
700  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 119-120; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 204; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 183; Burchell Delict 78. 
701  1990 3 SA 466 (B) 480; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 120; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 
183-184; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 204. 
702  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 120; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 183-184. 
703  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 120. 
704  R v Arlow 1960 2 SA 449 (T) 452; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 120. 
705  S v Banda 1990 3 SA 466 (B) 480; R v Arlow 1960 2 SA 449 (T) 452; Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 120; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 204; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 184 fn 117-
118. 
706  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 114; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 184. 
707  S v Banda 1990 3 SA 466 (B) 496; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 120; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 184; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 137. 
708  See S v Goliath 1972 3 SA 1 (A); Neethling and Potgieter Delict 120; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 184. 
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Friedman J in S v Banda709 was of the view that there is a difference between the 
objective criterion of reasonableness and the reasonableness person test for 
wrongfulness. Neethling and Potgieter submit that the question that needs to be 
answered in respect of wrongfulness is what would the reaction of the reasonable 
person (as an embodiment of the boni mores) be in the circumstances?710 Van der 
Walt and Midgley711 are not comfortable with the test and state that, strictly speaking, 
it is not in accordance with the determination of wrongfulness based on the objective 
criterion (an ex post facto approach). As reiterated above,712 this approach leads to 
the confusion between the elements of wrongfulness and fault. 
 
In instances where the defendant in obeying a lawful command infringes the plaintiff’s 
interests, such infringement must take place in a reasonable manner according to the 
boni mores, constitutional imperatives and in light of all surrounding circumstances. 
In respect of the defendant, his conduct may be considered reasonable if he used 
only the required necessary force on the plaintiff to execute the lawful command. If 
the defendant uses excessive, unnecessary force in executing the lawful command, 
then his conduct may be considered unreasonable, contra bonos mores and 
unjustified. In instances where a subordinate executes an unlawful  command, his 
conduct may still be considered reasonable as he acts out of necessity due to being 
forced to execute such unlawful command. Alternatively his conduct may be 
considered reasonable as the reasonable person as the embodiment of the boni 
mores would have reacted in the same manner. The influence of reasonableness 
here is thus explicit and implicit on the other requirements of the defence of official 
command. According to the recent approach, the reasonableness of the policeman’s 
conduct may still be considered even if indirectly in concluding that, according to 
public policy, it would not be reasonable to impose liability on the subordinate.  
 
3.4.8 Discipline  
 
In terms of common law, a parent or person in loco parentis, such as guardians and 
teachers, may apply their discretion in disciplining a child for educational or 
                                                                                                                                                                            
709  1990 3 SA 466 (B) 484; 495. 
710  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 120-121 fn 633. 
711  Delict 204 fn 5. 
712  See para 3.4.2 -3.4, 3.4.7 above. 
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correctional purposes.713 Corporal punishment has been abolished by the 
legislature.714 The harm suffered by the child in meting out such discipline may be 
regarded as lawful715 as long as the disciplinary conduct was metered out reasonably 
and moderately.716 For example, punishing a child repetitively (where prior 
punishment did not correct the child’s behaviour), malice or improper motive is a 
strong indication of unreasonableness.717 According to case law the following factors 
may be taken into account in determining what reasonable and moderate punishment 
is:718 the “nature and seriousness of the transgression”; the degree of force or 
punishment inflicted; the “physical and mental condition” of the child; age and gender 
of the child; the “physical disposition of the child”; the “purpose and motive of the 
person inflicting the punishment”; and the method used in respect of such correction. 
There is a presumption that the person meting out the punishment is acting 
reasonably and without malice, but if one wants to challenge such conduct, he has 
the onus of proving that such conduct was unreasonable.719 
 
If the conduct used in meting out punishment to a child in order to discipline such 
child is reasonable and moderate, then the harm suffered by the child is justified. 
Thus the interests of the child are infringed lawfully if, according to the boni mores 
and constitutional imperatives, in light of all surrounding circumstances, the conduct 
of the parent or person in loco parentis in exercising the discipline is reasonable. The 
influence of reasonableness is more explicit on the defence of discipline. Not too long 
ago it was common practice for schools to mete out punishment in order to regulate 
behaviour by means of corporal punishment. Parents or guardians were also free to 
use physical force in order to discipline children. However, the boni mores has 
changed with regard to disciplining children by using physical means – it has in fact 
                                                                                                                                                                            
713  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 120. 
714  Section 10 of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996. 
715  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 121; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 201; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 184; Burchell Delict 78. 
716  Du Preez v Conradie 1990 4 SA 46 (B) 51 53 ; R v Scheepers 1915 AD 337, 338 ; R v Roux 
1932 OPD 59, 61; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 185; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 122; 
Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 201. 
717  R v Janke and Janke 1913 TPD 385, 388; Du Preez v Conradie 1990 4 SA 46 (B) 51-52; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 185; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 122. 
718  See R v Janke and Janke 1913 TPD 385-386; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 122; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 201; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 185.  
719  Hiltonian Society v Crofton 1952 3 SA 130 (A); Neethling and Potgieter Delict 123; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 185; Boberg Delict 844. 
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been abolished. Furthermore, the Constitution provides for the right of a child not to 
be punished in a degrading, cruel and inhuman manner.720   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The influence of reasonableness on wrongfulness as shown is explicit, whether the 
traditional test to wrongfulness is applied, that is, the harm suffered must be caused 
in an unreasonable manner according to the boni mores, or the recent approach, that 
wrongfulness depends on whether it would be reasonable to hold a person liable 
according to public policy or policy considerations. According to the recent approach, 
the traditional approach to determining wrongfulness is still applied, but the courts 
have in a sense integrated the recent approach as part of the test to determining 
wrongfulness. 
 
Thus at the core of the wrongfulness enquiry is a balancing of interests. The question 
is: whether the plaintiff’s interests have been infringed in a reasonable manner by the 
defendant’s conduct; whether the defendant exercised his own lawful interests in 
infringing the plaintiff’s interest; and whether the exercise of the interests are in 
conformity with the public interest. The wrongfulness enquiry currently encompasses: 
the practical approach to determining wrongfulness in the infringement of rights or 
breach of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss; a balancing of interests; the 
consideration of constitutional imperatives; the consideration of public policy which is 
reflected in the boni mores; and whether it is reasonable to impose liability, assuming 
all the other elements are present.721 
 
4. Fault 
 
The explicit (in respect of fault in the form of negligence) and implicit influence (in 
respect of fault in the form of intention) of reasonableness on the delictual element of 
fault will now be critically analysed. The courts in South Africa often conflate the 
delictual elements of wrongfulness and fault and it is apparent that the influence of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
720  See s 12(1) of the Constitution. 
721  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 216; Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection 
(Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 525. 
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reasonableness is at the centre of this confusion.722 Therefore, it is necessary to 
critically analyse the differences as well as the overlap with regard to these two 
elements. 
 
Fault is generally a requirement in order to establish delictual liability.723 As 
mentioned, there are exceptions where fault is not a requirement, such as in 
instances of strict liability724 and where an interdict is sought.725 Fault refers to the 
culpability, legal blameworthiness, or reprehensible state of mind or conduct of 
someone who has acted wrongfully.726 Blameworthiness relates to the defendant’s 
“reprehensible state of mind or conduct of someone who acted wrongfully”.727 Insofar 
as fault relates to the defendant’s state of mind, fault is referred to as the subjective 
element of delict.728 Wrongfulness is said to qualify the conduct whereas fault is said 
to qualify the wrongdoer.729 
 
4.1 Accountability 
 
Accountability is a pre-requisite for fault730 and entails an investigation into whether a 
person at the time of the delict had the mental capacity to be at fault, to understand 
the difference between what is right and wrong and thereafter act in accordance with 
such understanding.731 An investigation into subjective factors relating to the 
defendant, such as his state of mind, knowledge, experience, maturity and general 
mental development at the time of the delict are considered.732 Our law has 
                                                                                                                                                                            
722  See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 61. 
723  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 129; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 103. 
724  See para 1 above. 
725  See para 1 above. 
726  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 225 submits that the courts are indecisive as to whether 
wrongfulness should be determined before fault. 
727  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 129. Cf Knobel in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays 
in honour of Johann Neethling 235 fn 34 who does not approve of the characterisation of fault, 
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728  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 129; cf Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 103; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 225. 
729  See Boberg Delict 269-270; para 3 above. 
730  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 130-131; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 103; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 226; Burchell Delict 84; Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of 
South African law 1122. 
731  Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 389; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 131; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 104; Burchell Delict 83; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 226. 
732  Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 390; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 226-227; cf Burchell Delict 83. 
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acknowledged that under certain circumstances children;733 mentally impaired, 
emotionally distressed,734 intoxicated735 and provoked736 persons may lack 
accountability.737 
 
According to sections 7 and 11 of the Child Justice Act;738 a child from birth to nine 
years of age is culpae incapax and cannot be held accountable. A child from ten to 
fourteen years of age can be held accountable unless the contrary is proven and a 
child between fourteen to eighteen years of age is presumed to be culpae capax. In 
terms of common law, a child below the age of seven is culpae incapax and a child 
between seven and fourteen years of age is culpae capax.739 A child between 
fourteen and eighteen years of age is culpae capax depending on the circumstances 
of the case.740 Jansen and Neethling741 submit that the Child Justice Act742 applies to 
the accountability of children with regard to crimes. The common law position still 
applies to delictual liability.743 
 
In respect of the influence of reasonableness, it is generally unreasonable to hold a 
very young child accountable as their mental capacity may not have developed 
sufficiently to understand what is right and wrong and act in accordance with such 
                                                                                                                                                                            
733  Boberg Delict 659. 
734  See S v Campher 1987 1 SA 940 (A); S v Laubscher 1998 1 SA 163 (A); Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 132; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 107. 
735  See S v Chretien 1981 1 SA 1097 (A) where the accused was found not guilty of murder and 
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and lacking fault in the form of intention. See also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 132; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 227; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 227. If a person takes an 
intoxicating substance before he becomes intoxicated, thereafter committing a delict, he may 
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736  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 132; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 108. 
737  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 131-132; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 105; Visser in Du 
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738  75 of 2008. 
739  See Weber v SantamVersekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) and Eskom Holdings 
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that the children were between seven and fourteen years of age and did not act in accordance 
with the appreciation between what was right and wrong. 
740  See Weber v Santam Versekerings-maatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 389, 399; Jones v 
Santam Bpk 1965 2 SA 542 (A) 552-554; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 131-132; Visser in Du 
Bois (gen ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 1123; Loubser and Midgley’s (eds) Delict 
105-107 discussion of Weber and Eskom Holdings Ltd; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 227. 
741  2017 THRHR 474. 
742  75 of 2008. 
743  See also Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 105; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 227 who 
refer to the common law position with regard to delictual liability of children. See also Jansen 
and Neethling 2017 THRHR 474-482. 
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understanding. Naturally, if a child has the mental capacity to distinguish between 
right and wrong and act in accordance with such understanding then it may be 
reasonable to hold him accountable. If a person at the time of the commission of the 
delict was mentally impaired, emotionally distressed, intoxicated or provoked to such 
an extent that he did not have the mental capacity to distinguish between right and 
wrong and act in accordance with such appreciation, then it may be unreasonable to 
hold him accountable. Furthermore his actions may be regarded as involuntary 
negating the element of conduct. Thus if his actions are involuntary then it is 
unreasonable to hold him liable as conduct will be absent. However, the facts of each 
case must be considered and it is possible that it may still be reasonable to hold a 
person, such as, an intoxicated person accountable and liable in delict based on prior 
conduct (prior to the state of intoxication) which was negligent or intentional.744 It is 
only reasonable that all the surrounding circumstances of the case must be 
considered. 
 
4.2 Intention  
 
The two forms of fault recognised are intention (dolus) and negligence (culpa in the 
narrow sense).745 In respect of the actio legis Aquiliae and the Germanic action for 
pain and suffering, fault in the form of intention or negligence is sufficient to ground 
delictual liability, providing that all the other elements are present, whereas in respect 
of the actio iniuriarum, fault in the form of intention, animus iniuriandi (literally “the will 
to injure”) is required.746 
 
The test for intention is subjective in that it involves the assessment of the defendant’s 
state of mind in respect of the result.747 A person acts with intent when he directs his 
will towards achieving a consequence while aware that his conduct in order to achieve 
such result is wrongful.748 Intention thus encompasses two elements: direction of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
744  See para 1 above. 
745  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 130; Burchell Delict 85; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 226; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 103; Burchell Delict 85; Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s 
principles of South African law 1123. 
746  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 130; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 103-104. 
747  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 109; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 227. 
748  Dantex Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Brenner 1989 1 SA 390 (A) 396; Hattingh v Roux 2011 
5 SA 135  (WCC)141;Minister of Finance v Gore 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA) 139-140; cf 
Mediteranean Shipping Co (Pty) Ltdv Tebe Trading (Pty) Ltd 2007 2 All SA 489 (SCA) 494; 
Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 854 (W) 874; Neethling and Potgieter 
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will; and subjective awareness that the willed conduct is wrongful with reference to 
the criterion of reasonableness (consciousness of wrongfulness).749 It is therefore 
logical according to the second element that wrongfulness should be determined 
before intent as in order to be “conscious of wrongfulness”, wrongfulness must be 
present. However, according to the recent approach to determining wrongfulness 
where fault is assumed, wrongfulness does not need to be determined before fault. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of whether the traditional or recent approach is followed, 
the defendant must regard his conduct as unreasonable. 
 
In Le Roux v Dey,750 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that in respect of animus 
iniuriandi (intention to injure) for purposes of the actio iniuriarum, “consciousness of 
wrongfulness” is not a requirement. Even with regard to specific forms of iniuria under 
the actio iniuriarum, such as unlawful detention, or wrongful attachment of goods, the 
courts, due to policy considerations, may modify the rules with regard to intention, 
requiring an attenuated form of intention where consciousness of wrongfulness is not 
required.751 Fagan752 is also of the opinion that knowledge of wrongfulness is not a 
necessary element of intent. It makes sense that he would be inclined to support this 
view because he submits that wrongfulness need not be determined before fault and 
that wrongfulness turns on an ex ante approach as to whether it is reasonable to 
impose liability on the defendant. Nevertheless, Neethling753 submits that it has not 
yet been confirmed by the Constitutional Court754 that “consciousness of 
wrongfulness” is no longer an element of intent, therefore it is still accepted as an 
element of intent, even in cases on iniuria.755 Neethling and Potgieter756 also point 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Delict 132; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 227; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 109; Boberg 
Delict 268; Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1129; Knobel 
2010 THRHR 115-116; Neethling and Potgieter 2014 SALJ 252. 
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 and Potgieter Delict 132-133. 
750  2010 4 SA 210 (SCA) 224. 
751  See Dantex Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Brenner 1989 1 SA 390 (A) 396-397; Minister of 
Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 3 SA 131 (A) 154; Ramsay v Minister van Polisie 1981 4 SA 802 (A) 
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of intent and therefore found it unnecessary for it to do so too (Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 
(CC) 319)). See also Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 112. 
755  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 135-136; Ahmed 2012 Obiter 417; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 111-112; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 135-136. 
756  Delict 135 fn 43. 
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out that it is problematic applying the element of “consciousness of wrongfulness” to 
the recent approach to determining wrongfulness ‒ can the defendant be consciously 
aware of the reasonableness of imposing liability on himself? As opposed to the 
consciousness of whether one’s conduct is reasonable according to the boni mores. 
On another note, a defendant cannot in a strict sense, legally be conscious of 
wrongfulness of his conduct and have intent in respect of himself.757 
 
There are three forms of intent. A person can direct his will: directly (dolus directus, 
where the defendant desires to bring about a particular consequence); indirectly 
(dolus indirectus, where the defendant desires to bring about a consequence but 
concurrently indirectly causes another consequence which he is aware of, he thus 
has indirect intent in respect of the second consequence); or by actually subjectively 
foreseeing the possibility of a harmful consequence ensuing, reconciling himself with 
such possibility and nevertheless continuing with the conduct (dolus eventualis).758 
The courts759 sometimes make use of the word “reckless” when referring to the 
defendant’s intent in the form of dolus eventualis, stating that the defendant 
nevertheless “recklessly” continues with the conduct. Respected authors are of the 
opinion that recklessness is a term associated with negligence, a more serious 
degree of negligence, and should be avoided when referring to intent.760 With regard 
to negligence, the question is whether objectively viewed, the consequence seen was 
reasonably foreseeable whereas with respect to dolus eventualis, the question is 
whether the defendant actually subjectively foresaw the possibility of the harmful 
consequence.761 If the defendant foresees the possibility of a harmful consequence 
with respect to his action but believes that it will not happen, then dolus eventualis is 
not present as the defendant did not accept or reconcile himself with the harmful 
consequence, but rather luxuria or conscious negligence, may be present.762 
                                                                                                                                                                            
757  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 44 fn 58, 129 fn 7; Neethling and Potgieter 2014 SALJ 252; 
Ahmed 2012 Obiter 419. 
758  Black v Joffe 2007 3 SA 171 (C) 186; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 227-228; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 109-111; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 133-135; Boberg Delict 268-269; 
Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 1129. 
759  For example, see Black v Joffe 2007 3 SA 171 (C) 186 where Dlodlo J stated that in respect 
of dolus eventualis “one acts with the intention of attaining a particular object but subjectively 
realises or appreciates that another consequence may reasonably result and one reconciles 
oneself with this possibility, and recklessly proceeds with the conduct nevertheless”. See also 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Moleko 2008 3 All SA 47 (SCA) [64]. 
760  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 134; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 228. 
761  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 134. 
762  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 134; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 111. 
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In respect of definite intent (dolus determinatus), the defendant has a specific person 
or object in mind and intent may be present in instances of direct intent, indirect intent 
or dolus eventualis. In respect of indefinite intent (dolus indeterminatus), the 
defendant does not have a specific person or object in mind but may have direct intent 
(in respect of a specific consequence), indirect intent (in realising that other 
consequences will inevitably occur) or dolus eventualis (by foreseeing and reconciling 
himself with the possibility of the harmful consequence as a result of his conduct).763 
Even though theoretically different forms of intent are recognised, in practice, any 
form of intention is sufficient to ground delictual liability, providing the other elements 
are present and no specific weight is attached to the different forms of intent.764 
 
The following defences,765 depending on the circumstances may exclude intent: 
emotional distress; jest; intoxication; provocation; and mistake. A bona fide mistake 
may exclude either of the elements of intent (“direction of the will”766 or 
“consciousness of wrongfulness”) where the defendant thought his actions were 
lawful and reasonable, but, in reality, were not.767 In principle, whether there is a 
mistake regarding an aspect of law, a fact, or whether the mistake is reasonable or 
not, such mistake should exclude fault.768 Van der Walt and Midgley769 submit that 
the requirement that a mistake must be reasonable (for example, where the media is 
the defendant) and not negligent is irreconcilable with the subjective nature of intent 
which focuses on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the delict. The defendant 
(media) must show that their lack of intention was reasonable thus showing that there 
was no “consciousness of wrongfulness”. The focus should not be on the 
reasonableness of conduct (publication of the defamatory statement) and not whether 
the conduct was negligent.770 A last note with regard to intent, one’s motive should 
                                                                                                                                                                            
763  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 134-135. 
764  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 134. 
765  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 364; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 115-117; 
Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 233-235. 
766  For example, when one accidentally clicks on send, subsequently sending a defamatory 
message. 
767  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 364; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 115-116; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 163. 
768  See National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA); Maisel v Naeren 1960 4 SA 836 
(C); Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 115-116; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 135-136; cf Van 
der Walt and Midgley Delict 233. 
769  Delict 233-234. See Hassen v Post Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1965 3 SA 562 (W). 
770  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 223-224. 
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not be confused with intent. Motive refers to the reason for one’s conduct and may 
assist in proving intent, in particular “consciousness of wrongfulness”771 or as 
Knobel772 interprets it, consciousness of the unreasonableness of the conduct. 
 
4.2.1 Conclusion 
 
The influence of reasonableness on intent is partly implicit and partly explicit. It is only 
reasonable to hold the defendant liable if intention is present with respect to the first 
element. That is, if the wrongdoer directs his will with the aim of achieving a 
consequence whether such consequence is achieved directly or indirectly, with a 
definite person or object in mind, or without a definite person or object in mind. The 
consequence may be in the form of harm or loss. It is also reasonable that the 
wrongdoer should be held liable for the consequences he intended, providing all the 
other elements of delictual liability are present. In this sense the influence of 
reasonableness is implicit. According to the second element of intent, consciousness 
of wrongfulness, wrongfulness co-determines intention. If we consider the view that 
the second element of intent is the conscious unreasonableness of one’s conduct, 
then the influence of reasonableness is explicit. 
 
It may be unreasonable, in principle, to hold the defendant liable when the defendant 
makes a joke or mistake. If the defendant causes harm to the plaintiff as a result of 
the joke or mistake, then the defendant must prove that his lack of intention was 
reasonable in focusing on the defendant’s state of mind instead of proving that the 
joke or mistake was reasonable. For example, in Le Roux v Dey,773 schoolchildren in 
making a joke, created an image in which the faces of the school principal and deputy 
principal were super-imposed on an image of two naked men sitting in a sexually 
indelicate manner. This image was publicly posted and viewed by many. The 
Constitutional Court confirmed that this was defamatory and injured the feelings of 
the deputy principal who brought a claim to the court in terms of the actio iniuriarum. 
The schoolchildren alleged that they lacked intent (animus iniuriandi) and that they 
did not appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct.774 The court held that a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
771  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 136; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 223. 
772  In Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 236. 
773  2011 (3) SA 274 (CC). 
774  Le Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) 317. 
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“defendant who foresaw the possibility that his attempt at humour might be 
defamatory to the plaintiff, but nonetheless proceeds with the attempt”, will have intent 
in the form of dolus eventualis.775 The children knew that they were “messing” with 
the deputy principal’s image and carried on regardless. They intended to amuse 
others by ridiculing and humiliating the two figures of authority.776 With regard to the 
second element of intent, the court held that accountability was not in dispute and the 
fact that the children admitted that they would not superimpose the face of their 
parents or church leader on the image, proved that they knew what they were doing 
was wrongful.777 The schoolchildren were ordered to make an apology and pay a sum 
of money778 which may be considered reasonable. Thus the children did not prove 
that their lack of intention was reasonable in their aim to humiliate and make fun of 
the two figures of authority. Nor did they show that their lack of intention was 
reasonable due to an absence of being aware that their conduct was wrongful or 
unreasonable. 
 
The relationship between reasonableness and blameworthiness in instances of 
intention is implicit insofar as it is reasonable, in principle, to hold someone liable if 
he has directed his will at attaining a particular harmful result. In addition, the 
contested premise that the defendant must consciously be aware of the wrongfulness 
or unreasonableness of his conduct, would strengthen the relationship between 
intention and reasonableness and could, depending on terminology, make the role of 
reasonableness explicit. 
 
In instances where a person is severely intoxicated it is submitted that intention may 
be absent as the defendant may not be conscious of wrongfulness or the 
unreasonableness of his conduct. However, it is necessary to investigate whether 
there was voluntary intentional conduct prior to the state of intoxication. If there was, 
then it may be reasonable to hold the defendant liable, in principle, as conduct and 
fault in the form of intent is present. In instances of severe emotional distress, 
depending on the circumstances, it may be unreasonable to hold the defendant liable 
as the conduct may be involuntary negating the element of conduct. Wrongfulness 
                                                                                                                                                                            
775  Le Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) 317-318. 
776  Le Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) 318. 
777  Le Roux v Dey 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) 318-319. 
778  See chapter 2 par 1 and par 6.2 below with regard to the principle of restorative justice and 
the customary law concept of ubuntu. 
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may be absent as the conduct may be regarded as reasonable (when acting out of 
necessity) as well as fault in the form of intention (because the defendant was not 
conscious of the wrongfulness or unreasonableness of the conduct) or negligence 
(as the reasonable person in the same position would have acted no differently).779 
In instances of provocation, depending on the circumstances, wrongfulness may be 
absent, as the conduct may not be considered unreasonable. Fault in the form of 
intention may be absent because consciousness of wrongfulness or 
unreasonableness of one’s conduct is lacking. Negligence may also be absent if the 
conduct undertaken was no different from that of the reasonable person. If 
provocation were to apply as a mitigating factor reducing the plaintiff’s claim, then 
negligence is present on the part of the defendant as his conduct strayed from that of 
the reasonable person, and contributory negligence is present on the part of the 
plaintiff, in that his conduct also strayed from that of the reasonable person.  
 
4.3 Negligence and contributory negligence 
 
The test for determining negligence is objective when compared to intention in that 
the defendant’s state of mind is not enquired into, but instead the defendant’s conduct 
is compared with the yardstick of the fictitious “reasonable person” (diligens or bonus 
paterfamilias).780 Nonetheless, at a theoretical level there is recognition that 
negligence, as a form of fault and hence blameworthiness, is or may be related to a 
mental state of carelessness, thoughtlessness or imprudence on the part of the 
wrongdoer. The test for negligence may be described as more objective than that of 
intention, but more subjective than wrongfulness.781 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
779  See para 2 above. 
780  See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 117; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 137; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 237; Boberg Delict 274. 
781  Cf Neethling and Potgieter Delict 137; Knobel in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays 
in honour of Johann Neethling 234-237. 
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The reasonable person test is the basic criterion for determining negligence.782 It is 
flexible and value based.783 Members of the community generally assume that fellow 
members will comply with a “uniform standard of conduct” and a member’s conduct 
must conform to the “ideals and standards of a particular community”.784 The 
adjudicator in determining negligence must however try to take into account all the 
relevant facts and circumstances785 that were subjectively known to the defendant at 
the time of the “alleged wrongdoing”. All the relevant facts and circumstances that 
would have been foreseeable by the reasonable person in the position of the 
defendant at the time of the “alleged wrongdoing” must also be considered.786 When 
the adjudicator considers the conduct of the defendant in comparison to the conduct 
of the reasonable person an ex post facto approach is not applied.787 How far a 
person’s conduct strayed from the standard of the reasonable person applies to 
“contributory negligence” too.788 Negligence relates to the defendant’s conduct while 
“contributory negligence” relates to the plaintiff’s conduct.789 The same reasonable 
person test applied to the defendant applies to the plaintiff. Contributory negligence 
on the part of the plaintiff has the effect of reducing his claim for compensation.790 
“Contributory negligence” is regulated by the Apportionment of Damages Act.791 For 
the purpose of this study, this act will not be discussed further. It should however be 
noted that it is reasonable to reduce the award of damages claimed by the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                                                                            
782  See Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 325 and Sea Harvest 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 827 (SCA) 839-840 
where the courts stated that “the true criterion for determining negligence is whether in the 
particular circumstances the conduct complained of falls short of the standard of the 
reasonable person”. Dividing the enquiry into different stages, however useful, is no more than 
an aid or guideline for resolving this issue. It is probably so that there can be no universally 
applicable formula which will prove to be appropriate in every case”. See Kruger v Coetzee 
(1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430) with regard to the different stages of enquiry as well as the adapted 
version in Mukheiber v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA) 1077 (which is the concrete approach to 
determining negligence). 
783  See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 237, 243. 
784  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 237. 
785  In Mkhatswa v Minister of Defence 2000 1 SA 1104 (SCA) [23] the court stated that the 
determination of negligence “ultimately depends upon a realistic and sensible judicial 
approach to all the relevant facts and circumstances that bear on the matter at hand”. See 
Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 244 fn 9. 
786  See Knobel 2008 THRHR 654; cf Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 240. 
787  Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 325; S v Bochris 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1988 1 SA 861 (A) 866-867; McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent A Car v 
Sunset Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey World Travel 2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 567; iMvula Quality 
Protection (Pty) Ltd v Loureiro 2013 3 SA 407 (SCA) 417. 
788  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 170; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 237-238. 
789  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 167. 
790  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 167. 
791  34 of 1956. 
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depending on the circumstances, in instances where the plaintiff besides the 
defendant, is also at fault with respect to the damage he sustains. 
 
The courts have provided the following guidelines as an aid in determining 
negligence, or rather refer to stages of enquiry in determining negligence, which was 
formulated by Holmes JA in Kruger v Coetzee792 and has been endorsed by our 
courts:793 
 
“(a) a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the defendant-  
(i) would foresee the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another in his person or 
property and causing him patrimonial loss; and 
(ii) would take reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence; and  
(b) the defendant failed to take such steps”.794 
 
Holmes JA795 pointed out that requirement (a)(ii) above is sometimes overlooked and 
that the reasonable steps that would be taken must depend on the circumstances of 
each case.796 Based on the above test it is evident that four factors must be taken 
into account in the enquiry relating to negligence.797 
 
Firstly the adjudicator must place the objective, hypothetical, abstract, concept of the 
“reasonable person” that is supposed to embody the qualities of the ever-changing 
South African community798 in the position of the defendant.799 There is much to be 
said about the reasonable person test that requires a study on its own but for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
792  1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430. 
793  See Ngubane v SA Transport Services 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 776; Minister of Safety and Security 
v Hamilton 2004 2 SA 216 (SCA) 237-238; Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 
3 SA 305 (SCA) 325; Minister of Safety and Security v Rudman 2005 2 SA 16 (SCA) 39; 
Neethling v Oosthuizen 2009 5 SA 376 (WCC) 379-380; Minister of Safety and Security v Van 
Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 441, 448; McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent A Car v Sunset 
Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey World Travel 2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 566; Hawekwa Youth Camp 
v Byrne 2010 6 SA 83 (SCA) 91; Minister of Correctional Services v Lee 2012 3 SA 617 (SCA) 
626; Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 527. See also cases 
cited by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 138-139 fn 68; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 118; 
Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 242-244. 
794  In Mukheibir v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA) 1077, the court endorsed Boberg’s (Delict 390) 
adaptation of the test (which is the concrete approach to negligence), but the courts in any 
case subsequently reaffirmed the classic test (see previous footnote). See also Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 244 fn 1; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 138 fn 65; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 118-119, 123 fn 62. 
795  Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430. 
796  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 138; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 119. 
797  As pointed out by Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 119. 
798  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 142; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 118. 
799  See Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 410-411; Neethling 
and Potgieter Delict 142; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 117-118. 
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purposes of this study some general remarks will suffice in illustrating the explicit 
influence of reasonableness on negligence.  
 
The reasonable person does not relate to a specific gender800 or particular physical 
characteristics of a person,801 such person is not exceptionally skilled, developed or 
too careful, nor is the person underdeveloped, thoughtless or reckless.802 It is settled 
in our law that the “reasonable person” yardstick applies to children who may be held 
accountable.803 Thus the reasonable person test is flexible and adaptable in that the 
courts adapt the standard depending on the circumstances of each case, so if in a 
given case the courts are trying to determine the negligence of an expert such as a 
doctor, the “reasonable doctor”804 standard is applied. The “reasonable expert” test 
is similar to the reasonable person test albeit a reasonable measure of the particular 
expertise is applied.805 It is submitted that it is reasonable to adapt the standard of 
reasonableness when dealing with an expert in the interests of fairness and justice. 
 
The Constitutional Court decision of Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 
(hereinafter referred to as “Loureiro”)806 referred to earlier807 serves as a good 
example of how the courts determine negligence and will be referred to as the four 
                                                                                                                                                                            
800  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 142. 
801  Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 410-411. 
802  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 141-142; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 117-
118, 133-136; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 239.Van den Heever JA in Herschel v Mrupe 
1954 3 SA 464 (A) 490 stated that the concept of the “bonus paterfamilias is not that of a 
timorous faintheart always in trepidation lest he or others suffer some injury; on the contrary, 
he ventures out into the world, engages in affairs and takes reasonable chances. He takes 
reasonable precautions to protect his person and property and expects others to do likewise”. 
See also iMvula Quality Protection v Loureiro 2013 3 SA 407 (SCA) 416. 
803  Previously our courts used to follow the “reasonable child” test which took into account the 
youthfulness of the child wrongdoer, but the approach took a turn in Jones v Santam Bpk 1965 
2 SA 542 (A) 551-552 when the court stated that in all cases the objective “reasonable person” 
test must be applied. In Roxa v Mtshayi 1975 3 SA 761 (A) 765-766, the court stated that first 
it must be ascertained whether the child is accountable taking subjective factors into account 
and thereafter testing negligence. This approach was endorsed in Weber v Santam 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 400 and in Eskom Holdings Ltd v Hendricks 
2005 5 SA 503 (SCA) 511-512. See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 143-145; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 135-136 and their discussion of Haffajee v South African 
Railways and Harbours 1981 3 SA 1062 (W); Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 273-274; 
Burchell Delict 90-91. 
804  See Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 456; Lymbrey v Jefferies 1925 AD 236; Esterhuizen v 
Administrator, Transvaal 1957 3 SA 710 (T) 723; Louwrens v Oldwage 2006 1 All SA 197 
(SCA) 207; Medi-Clinic v Vermeulen 2015 1 SA 241 (SCA) 243 with respect to the reasonable 
doctor test. 
805  See Neethling 2002 SALJ 287; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 145-147; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 134; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 269-270; Boberg Delict 346. 
806  2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 529. 
807  See para 3.2 above. 
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factors mentioned above are discussed. It is recalled that in this case, the security 
guard opened the pedestrian gate to a robber who posed as a police officer. The 
court in referring to the “reasonable person” adapted the standard and tested the 
security guard’s conduct against the conduct of a reasonable security guard. In the 
end, the court concluded that the security guard in the circumstances of the case 
“failed to meet the standard of a reasonable security guard”. 
 
Secondly, the adjudicator must evaluate whether the reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position would have reasonably foreseen the possibility of his conduct 
causing harm. This is considered the cornerstone of the test for negligence.808 
Loubser and Midgley809 advise that with regard to reasonable foreseeability of harm 
an adjudicator should avoid applying the objective, ex post facto criterion of 
reasonableness used in determining wrongfulness, but what should be considered is 
the foresight of the reasonable person.810 There are two main approaches in respect 
of the application of the reasonable foreseeability test: the abstract (absolute) 
approach and the concrete (relative) approach.811 According to the abstract approach 
the question that must be answered is whether, in light of all the circumstances, 
damage was in general reasonably foreseeable.812 Thus it is not necessary that the 
nature or extent of the damage, or the resulting consequence is reasonably foreseen. 
The resultant consequence is addressed with reference to legal causation.813 This 
approach was enunciated in Kruger v Coetzee.814 There is however more support for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
808  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 246. 
809  (Eds) Delict 112-113. 
810  Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 325. See Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 119-120; Boberg Delict 274; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 150 fn 151. 
See in general Burchell Delict 92-97. 
811  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 121-122; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 148-150; Burchell 
Delict 92-93. 
812  Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 474; Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430. 
813  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 121; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 148. 
814  1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430. However, Knobel SALJ 584 submits that if one reads the decision of 
Kruger v Coetzee as a whole it may be argued that the concrete approach, not the abstract 
approach, was applied. See further Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 242-244 who refer to the 
abstract approach (formulated in Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430), the relative 
approach (followed in Mukheiber v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA) 1077) and a third approach 
(Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 827 839 
‒ a hybrid of the abstract and the relative approach which appears to be the approach with 
more support (see eBotswana v Sentech 2013 6 SA 327 (GSJ) 342). Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 122 refer to this third approach as the hybrid of the relative approach. Boberg 
Delict 276-277; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 149; as well as Burchell Delict 93-94 121-122 
prefer the relative approach (legal causation must still be established). Cf Knobel 2006 SALJ 
579ff. 
147 
 
the concrete approach815 enunciated in Mukheiber v Raath816 which is a modified 
version of the abstract approach formulated in Kruger v Coetzee. According to the 
concrete approach, the question relating to negligence is based on the reasonable 
foreseeability of the specific consequence.817 If this approach were to be applied in a 
strict sense then the enquiry into legal causation may seem unnecessary.818 
However, the courts in the application of this approach, state that the precise nature 
and extent of the damage as well the precise manner in which it was caused need 
not be reasonably foreseeable, but the general nature of the damage and the general 
manner in which it was caused must be reasonably foreseeable.819 In this way, the 
enquiry into legal causation as a requirement to establishing delictual liability is not 
negated.820 If the concrete approach is followed where the general nature of the 
damage and the general manner in which it was caused was not foreseeable, there 
would be no finding of negligence. If the abstract approach is followed, negligence 
may be present if harm in general was foreseeable. The conclusion in respect of the 
element of negligence may differ depending on which approach is used, but in terms 
of delictual liability the end result may be the same.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
815  See Mukheiber v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA) 1077; Van der Spuy v Minister of Correctional 
Services 2004 2 SA 463 (SE) 472-473; Ablort-Morgon v Whyte Bank Farms (Pty) Ltd 1988 3 
SA 531 (E) 536; Boberg Delict 276-277; iMvula Quality Protection v Loureiro 2013 3 SA 407 
(SCA) 416; Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 
827 (SCA) 839. See previous footnote in respect of the authors that prefer the (relative) 
concrete approach.  
816  1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA) 1077 which was a formulation of negligence proposed by Boberg Delict 
390. Cf Scott 2000 De Jure 360ff. 
817  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 143; McKerron Delict 28-34, Boberg Delict 276-277; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 121. 
818  See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 121-122; Burchell Delict 93-94. 
819  In Mukheiber v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA) 1077 the court stated:  
 “(a) A reasonable person in the position of the defendant: 
 (i) Would have foreseen harm of the general type that actually occurred 
 (ii) Would foresee the general type of causal sequence by which that harm occurred  
 (iii) Would have taken steps to guard against it.(b) The defendant failed to take those steps”. 
 See iMvula Quality Protection v Loureiro 2013 3 SA 407 (SCA) 416; Sea Harvest Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd v Duncan Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 827 (SCA) 839; Boberg Delict 276-277; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 149 fn 144; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 122-123. 
820  Even though the Supreme Court of Appeal stated a preference for the concrete approach they 
still employed the criteria for legal causation to limit liability in Mukheiber v Raath 1999 3 SA 
1065 (SCA) 1077 and Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) 
Ltd 2000 1 SA 827 (SCA) 839; Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C) 163. See further Standard 
Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 4 SA 747 (A) 768; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 149 fn 145; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 122. 
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The important factors to be considered are how significant is the likelihood of the 
harm materialising and how serious the damage will be if the risk materialises?821 If 
the likelihood of the risk of harm is significant, then it may be concluded that harm is 
reasonably foreseeable822 and if the likelihood of harm is slight then there may be no 
reasonable foreseeability of harm.823 It will inevitably depend on the circumstances of 
each case as it is not possible to lay down hard and fast rules.824 
 
Turning to Loureiro, the court indeed referred to all relevant facts and circumstances 
present in South Africa, as well as all the relevant facts and circumstances that would 
have been foreseeable by the reasonable person in the position of the security guard 
at the time of the “alleged wrongdoing”. In this case, Van der Westhuizen J825 pointed 
out that South Africa is plagued with crime where more than sixteen thousand 
murders took place during 2012 and 2013. Almost one hundred and six thousand 
armed robberies took place during 2012 and 2013. He pointed out that many of “our 
people live behind high walls and electrified fences; others rely on the communities 
around them for security; and many are mercilessly exposed to the cruelty of crime”. 
He826 also pointed out that our Police Service is not perceived as capable of 
performing their function in combatting crime and that the private security industry is 
“a large and powerful feature of South Africa’s crime-control terrain”. Bearing the 
aforesaid in mind, upon evaluating whether the reasonable person in the defendant’s 
position would have reasonably foreseen the possibility of his conduct causing harm, 
he stated:827 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
821  Lomagundi Sheetmetal and Engineering (Pvt) Ltd v Basson 1973 4 SA 523 (RA) 524-525; 
McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent A Car v Sunset Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey World Travel 
2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 567; Za v Smith 2015 4 SA 574 (SCA) 587. See Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 251-252; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 122; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
150. 
822  See, for example, Lomagundi Sheetmetal and Engineering (Pvt) Ltd v Basson 1973 4 SA 523 
(RA) 525 where it was held that the reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of fire 
and would have taken steps to remove the flammable bales. See discussion of this case by 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 251-252 and Neethling and Potgieter Delict 150 fn 153 . 
823  Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 477. See Bolton v Stone 1951 AC 850f and Stratton v 
Spoornet 1994 1 SA 803 (T) 810-811 where the court held that although it might be reasonable 
to foresee that children may be harmed as a result of an accident with a train, it was not 
reasonably foreseeable that a child might suffer injury as a result of an electric shock. See 
also Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 123; Van der Walt and Midgley 251-252 Delict 178-179; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 150-151 fn 153. 
824  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 122; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 150. 
825  Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 513. 
826  Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 513. 
827  Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 527. 
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“[a] reasonable person would have foreseen the possibility that the man at the gate was an 
imposter. The robbers drove up in an unmarked car. While the car had a flashing blue light, 
the light was fixed to the dashboard of the car, not to its roof. Underneath his reflective vest, 
the man who walked up the driveway was dressed in a blazer of a type that an on-duty police 
officer would not usually wear. He did not announce his identity or his business. According to 
[the security guard]’s evidence, the man only “flashed” the identity card at him, giving him no 
opportunity to compare the card’s picture with the man bearing it. 
[The security guard] was stationed at the entrance of the Loureiros’ home for the express 
purpose of ensuring that unauthorised persons did not gain access. That required him to make 
sure that all persons who seek access are entitled to do so. And a reasonable person in his 
position as a security guard on duty would have foreseen the possibility that an unauthorised 
person might try to gain access by purporting to be someone that he is not – including, or 
indeed especially, a police officer. It is exactly because police officers are clothed in authority 
that it is foreseeable that an imposter may exploit this apparent authority. Robbers seldom 
disclose their identity and announce their intention to rob when they seek access to their 
target.” 
 
Thus it was held that the harm or loss was reasonably foreseeable.828  
 
Thirdly, in respect of reasonable preventability of harm, the question that must be 
answered is whether with respect to the foreseeable harm, the defendant took 
adequate reasonable steps to prevent the manifestation of the harm. The courts take 
the following factors829 into account in respect of reasonable preventability: the 
degree or extent of the risk of harm created by the wrongdoer;830 the gravity of the 
possible damage if the risk of harm materialises;831 the utility of the wrongdoers 
conduct;832 and the cost and difficulty of taking preventative steps.833 The degree or 
                                                                                                                                                                            
828  Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 527. 
829  Ngubane v SA Transport Services 1991 1 SA 756 SA 46 (A) 776; Pretoria City Council v De 
Jager 1997 2 SA 46 (A) 55-56; Cape Metropolitan Council v Graham 2001 1 SA 1197 (SCA); 
Mostert v Cape Town CityCouncil 2001 1 SA 105 (SCA) 119. See further cases referred to by 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 152 fn 158; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 254-259; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 124-129; Burchell Delict 100-103. 
830  If the harm would have been foreseen by the reasonable person but such harm would have 
been slight, then the reasonable person may not have taken steps to prevent harm and so too 
the defendant may not be found negligent. See Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 477 481; 
Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 254-255; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 152 fn 159. 
831  Even if there is only a slight possibility that the risk of harm may materialise but the risk of 
harm would be significant if it materialises, then the reasonable person would take steps to 
prevent such harm and, so too, the wrongdoer may be found negligent if he did not take steps 
to prevent the harm. See Ngubane v South African Transport Services 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 777; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 152 fn 160. 
832  See S v Makwanazi 1967 2 SA 593 (N) where the court weighed the utility of the driver’s 
conduct (getting passengers to their destination on time) against the risk of travelling on the 
wrong side of the road in order to overtake a stationary vehicle which could have caused harm 
(resulting in an accident) and found that the extent of the risk in relation to the risk and gravity 
of the harm outweighed the interests of the passengers. The driver was found negligent. See 
Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 256-257; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 153 fn 162. 
833  See Oosthuizen v Van Heerden 2014 6 SA 423 (GP) 433 where the court held that the risk of 
passing an infectious disease onto neighbouring cattle was low. The cost of erecting a fence 
to contain the affected cattle so that they would not wander onto the neighbouring land 
infecting other cattle was high. The court held that the respondent was thus not negligent in 
the circumstances of the case. 
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extent of the risk of harm must be weighed against the utility of the wrongdoers 
conduct, and the cost and difficulty of taking preventative measures. If the degree or 
extent of the risk outweighs the utility of the wrongdoers conduct, then the reasonable 
person would take measures to prevent the ensuing harm. If the wrongdoer failed to 
take such steps, then he acted negligently. Vice versa, if the cost and difficulty of 
taking preventative measures outweigh the degree or extent of the risk, then the 
reasonable person would not take measures to prevent the ensuing harm.834 It goes 
without saying that a person should not be expected to guard against every possibility 
of harm.835 
 
Once again, turning to Loureiro, Van der Westhuizen J836 considered the following 
factors in respect of reasonable preventability of harm: 
 
“the risk created by providing access to a person without first verifying who he is or what he 
wants was great, as was the gravity of possible consequences. The burden of eliminating this 
risk was slight. A reasonable person would have taken steps to ascertain the identity of the 
man at the gate including, for example, determining whether the card flashed was a legitimate 
police identity card and at least enquiring why the man sought access to the premises. Even 
if one were to believe that he was a police officer, a reasonable person would have still 
checked that he was making a lawful demand. If he could not satisfy these enquiries, a 
reasonable person would not have opened the gate. A reasonable person also would have 
attempted to make contact with the main house or his employer to find out if the police were 
expected. [The security guard] failed to take any of these fairly easy precautions. When one 
is tasked with protecting a property against intruders, it is simply not reasonable to open a 
door for a stranger without adequately verifying who that person is or what he or she wants. 
[The security guard’s] conduct fell short of that of a reasonable person”. 
 
Fourthly, only if it transpires that the wrongdoer’s conduct falls short in comparison to 
the reasonable steps taken by the reasonable person, then such wrongdoer would 
be found negligent837 as the court in Loureiro correctly concluded.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
834  See for example S v Makwanazi 1967 2 SA 593 (N) where it was held that a reasonable person 
would have taken simple precautions which were not too costly by putting padlocks on the 
gates or erecting a structure in order to prevent harm; Enslin v Nhlapo 2008 5 SA 146 (SCA) 
149-150 where it was held that simple measures could have been taken to prevent a herd of 
cattle from straying onto a public road, in particular, a cattle grid could have been erected or 
a padlock could have been put onto a steel gate preventing the cattle from entering the public 
road or installing a cattle grid; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 127-128; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 153 fn 164. 
835  Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 827 
(SCA) 837; Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 445; 
Boberg Delict 210. 
836  Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 BCLR 511 (CC) 528. 
837  Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 119; Boberg Delict 
274; Burchell Delict 103-104. 
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It is also important to note that negligence must be determined in light of the prevailing 
conditions or surrounding circumstances. The following factors have been considered 
by our courts when judging negligence in light of surrounding circumstances: 
situations of sudden emergency;838 instances where one makes an error in judgment 
(such error must be bona fide and reasonable); an assumption that others will act in 
a reasonable manner; acting according to the general practice of a community; 
statutory exclusions that apply; when dealing with dangerous objects or situations, 
greater care is usually required; greater care is expected of a person dealing with 
minors, people living with disabilities839 or persons living with a mental impairment. 
 
4.3.1 Conclusion 
 
The influence of reasonableness on negligence is explicit with regard to the conduct 
of the defendant and the plaintiff (in respect of contributory negligence). In respect of 
negligence, with regard to the explicit influence of reasonableness, what must be 
determined is − did the defendant’s conduct and or the plaintiff’s conduct, if relevant, 
stray from the standard of the reasonable person? And if answered in the affirmative, 
then how far did the conduct stray? This is usually expressed as a percentage by the 
courts which is relevant in reducing the plaintiff’s award of compensation.840 As 
mentioned,841 the courts recently have tried to distinguish between wrongfulness and 
negligence by stating that the inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
conduct is a question of negligence and not wrongfulness. As said, and shown, this 
distinction is not plausible as the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is also 
important in respect of the enquiry into wrongfulness. Rather reasonableness has 
varying degrees of influence on both wrongfulness and negligence which is in fact 
explicit.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
838  However, the defendant must be in a situation of imminent peril which was not caused as a 
result of his own doing and he must not have acted in an unreasonable manner. 
839  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 154-158; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 130-133; Van 
der Walt and Midgley Delict 262-272. 
840  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 170. 
841  See para 3.4 above. 
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4.4 The conflation of the elements of wrongfulness, fault and legal causation842 
 
As mentioned, both the test for wrongfulness and negligence is generally objective in 
nature at least in contrast to intention. However, Knobel843 and Loubser and 
Midgley844 point out that the test for negligence is not purely objective but entails an 
objective-subjective enquiry. It is objective in the sense that the standard of the 
reasonable person applies to all but compared to wrongfulness is subjective, in that: 
“the reasonable person is placed in the position of the wrongdoer to take account of 
the facts known to the wrongdoer as well as the facts that he should have known”.  
 
As mentioned also, wrongfulness is established: if the defendant infringes the 
plaintiff’s interests in an unreasonable manner according to the boni mores, according 
to the traditional approach; or if it is reasonable to impose liability on the defendant, 
according to the recent approach. Negligence is determined with reference to the 
conduct of the reasonable person. The courts however sometimes conflate the 
elements of not only wrongfulness and negligence but also causation. The concept 
of reasonableness is at the epicentre of the conflation. In particular the conflation 
stems from: the courts’ application of the requirement of “duty of care” in the English 
tort of negligence in our law which refers to the tests for negligence, wrongfulness 
and legal causation; the use of the criterion of reasonable foreseeability of harm 
(which is the subjective foresight or knowledge on the part of the defendant that his 
conduct would cause harm)845 by our courts in determining wrongfulness, fault and 
legal causation; the use of the criterion of reasonable preventability of harm by our 
courts in determining both wrongfulness and negligence; and the use of the test for 
negligence (reasonable foreseeability and preventability of harm) in determining 
wrongfulness. 
 
(a) The influence of the requirement of “duty of care” in the English tort of negligence 
 
A number of academic writers point out that the confusion between wrongfulness and 
negligence has been brought about largely due to the influence of the “duty of care” 
                                                                                                                                                                            
842  See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 56-
57. 
843  In Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 237. 
844  (Eds) Delict 156-157. See para 3.3.5 above. 
845  Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 184. 
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concept in the English tort of negligence.846 The notion of a legal duty to prevent harm 
is sometimes misinterpreted by the courts “as a legal duty not to act negligently” or 
other synonymous statements.847 In respect of the legal duty relating to wrongfulness, 
Neethling and Potgieter848 refer to the enquiry as to “whether a legal duty existed 
according to the boni mores to act positively to prevent an infringement of a legally 
protected interest”. The courts must refrain from referring to the legal duty as a “legal 
duty not to act negligently”.849 This statement associates the wrongfulness enquiry, 
in particular a breach of a legal duty, with the test for negligence usurping the test for 
negligence.850 This clearly conflates the elements of wrongfulness and fault851 and in 
fact alludes to the English concept of the “duty of care” and “breach of the duty of 
care” which encompasses the enquiry into wrongfulness and negligence 
simultaneously. Our courts have not regarded the concept of a duty of care as being 
a part of our law.852 The courts also often refer to the duty of care synonymously with 
the legal duty to prevent harm when determining wrongfulness which should be 
avoided as it creates legal uncertainty. Loubser and Midgley853 point out that the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
846  See Brand 2007 SALJ 80; Boberg Delict 30-31; Gowar 2011 THRHR 685ff. Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 149; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 158-160; Nugent 2006 SALJ 559; Van 
der Walt and Midgley Delict 121 fn 5; Ahmed 2012 Obiter 418.Cf Scott 1999 De Jure 342. 
847  See Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 2006 3 SA 138 
(SCA) 144; Gouda Boerdery BK v Transnet 2005 5 SA 490 (SCA) 499; Hattingh v Roux  
2011 5 SA 135 (WCC) 140; Minister of Correctional Services v Lee 2012 3 SA 617 (SCA) 623-
624; Fagan 2000 Acta Juridica 51-53; Fagan 2005 SALJ 110-112; cases referred to by 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 57 fn 135. Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 151 submit that 
“this statement basically implies that: negligence renders negligent conduct wrongful … 
[w]rongfulness assumes that all the other requirements for liability either have been met, or 
will be met. It seems that the best way to describe the legal duty required for wrongfulness in 
its full sense is ‘the legal duty not to cause harm negligently or intentionally’, or, in the case of 
strict liability, simply ‘not to cause harm’”.  
See also Brand 2007 SALJ 80-81; Neethling and Potgieter 2007 THRHR 123-125; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 115. 
848  Delict 57. 
849  See Scott 1999 De Jure 342. 
850  See Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 2006 3 SA 138 
(SCA) 144; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 57; Neethling and Potgieter 2006 TSAR 611 ff; 2007 
THRHR 123-124.  
851  See Neethling and Potgieter 2006 TSAR 611, 2007 THRHR 123-124; Neethling 2006 SALJ 
212-213. 
852  Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; Local Transitional Council of Delmas 
v Boshoff 2005 5 SA 514 (SCA) 522; Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v 
Advertising Standards AuthoritySA 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 468; Trustees, Two Oceans 
Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 2006 3SA 138 (SCA) 144; Hawekwa Youth 
Camp v Byrne 2010 6 SA 83 (SCA) 90; Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 485-486; 
Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (A) 833; McCarthy Ltd t/a 
Budget Rent A Car v Sunset Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey World Travel 2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 
559-561; Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2014 
2 SA 214 (SCA) 222 . 
853  (Eds) Delict 149. They refer to the courts unfortunate use of the duty of care concept in Union  
 Government v Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation Ltd 1956 1 SA 577 (A) 585. 
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concept of “reasonable foreseeability” of harm has been used in the determination of 
wrongfulness with reference to the “duty of care” concept based on the test of the 
reasonable person thus blurring the distinction between wrongfulness and fault.854 It 
is manifestly clear that the concept of “duty of care” involves the tests for 
wrongfulness and negligence and the various uses of “reasonable foreseeability of 
harm” leads to the confusion.  
 
(b) The use of the criterion “reasonable foreseeability of harm” by our courts in 
determining wrongfulness, fault and legal causation855 
 
Reasonable foreseeability of harm has been used as a factor in determining 
wrongfulness,856 that is, in establishing whether conduct is unreasonable or not and 
in establishing the presence of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss. Reasonable 
foreseeability of harm is also one of the legs of inquiry in respect of negligence.857 It 
is evident that there is an overlap where the courts use reasonable foreseeability of 
harm to determine both wrongfulness and negligence. 
 
Neethling and Potgieter858 refer to Gouda Boerdery BK v Transnet859 where Scott JA 
acknowledged that in the past, the courts “determined the issue of foreseeability as 
part of the enquiry into wrongfulness and, after finding that there was a legal duty to 
act reasonably, proceeded to determine the second leg of the negligence inquiry 
[preventability], the first (being foreseeability) having already been decided”. Scott 
                                                                                                                                                                            
854  1956 1 SA 577 (A) 585. 
855  See Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2014 2 SA 
214 (SCA) 225. 
856  See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Basdeo 1996 1 SA 355 (A) 368-370; 
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 3 SA 151 (SCA) 159-160; 
Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking Standards Authority SA 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 
468; Gouda Boerdery BK v Transnet 2005 5 SA 490 (SCA) 499; Minister of Safety and Security 
v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 324; Harrington No v Transnet (Ltd) 2007 2 SA 228 (C) 
246; Stewart v Botha 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA) 314; eBotswana (Pty) Ltd 2013 6 SA 327 (GSJ) 
340; iMvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd v Loureiro 2013 3 SA 407 (SCA) 418. Cf Country 
Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2014 2 SA 214 (SCA) 
225. See contra Cape Empowerment Trust Limited v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 183 
(SCA) 197-198 where Brand JA held that “foreseeability and direct consequences … do not 
play a role in establishing wrongfulness”. Cf Neethling 2006 SALJ 206-207. 
857  McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent A Car v Sunset Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey World Travel 
2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 566. 
858  Delict 163 fn 222. 
859  2005 5 SA 490 (SCA) 499 referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163 fn 222. 
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JA860 did, however, warn that if this approach is taken the distinction between 
wrongfulness and negligence should not be overlooked.  
 
Loubser and Midgley861 also refer to Premier, Western Cape v Faircape Property 
Developers (Pty) Ltd862 where Lewis JA used reasonable foreseeability of harm as a 
factor in determining both wrongfulness and negligence, but state that although it may 
add weight in determining wrongfulness it may not be the decisive factor:863 
 
“The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is also ‘a relevant consideration in the determination 
of lawfulness’… . One of the enquiries, then, for determining whether the Minister was under 
a legal duty to prevent harm … is whether the Minister should have foreseen that his conduct 
‘might endanger or prejudice others in regard to their legally protected interests’. A similar 
question is inevitably repeated when one is determining the issue of negligence. … Would a 
reasonable Minister have foreseen that the applicant … would be prejudiced or would suffer 
loss.” 
 
The court in Premier, Western Cape v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd864 held 
that the “test for reasonableness goes not only to negligence, but also to determine 
the boundaries of lawfulness”.865 In Country Cloud Trading v MEC, Department of 
Infrastructure Development,866 dealing with intention and pure economic loss, the 
Constitutional Court stated that: 
 
“[t]he relevance of fault and fault-related considerations in the wrongfulness query has been 
recognised on a number of occasions by the Supreme Court of Appeal. …This is not to 
conflate the elements of fault and wrongfulness. … It is merely a recognition of the fact that 
where fault rises to the level of intention, and where other fault-related elements (such as 
motive to cause harm) are present, this may be relevant in establishing wrongfulness.” 
 
In this case, Khampepe J867 in respect of “foreseeability of harm” opined that it was 
not relevant to wrongfulness but to fault and that it served to “limit potential plaintiffs 
and diminish the risk of limitless liability”. The idea of limiting potential plaintiffs is 
echoed in the “duty of care” concept. Furthermore the idea of diminishing the risk of 
limitless liability, a policy consideration relevant to establishing wrongfulness 
                                                                                                                                                                            
860  Gouda Boerdery BK v Transnet 2005 5 SA 490 (SCA) 499. 
861  (Eds) Delict 149-150. 
862  2003 6 SA 13 (SCA) [42], [46]. 
863  See Neethling and Potgieter TSAR 894. 
864  2003 6 SA 13 (SCA) [42]. 
865  See Cape Empowerment Trust v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 183 (GSJ) 193. 
866  2015 1 SA 1 (CC) 15-16. 
867  Country Cloud Trading v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 (CC) 
16.  
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according to the recent approach and a duty of care, conflates wrongfulness and legal 
causation.  
 
Neethling and Potgieter868 point out that Harms JA in Steenkamp NO v Provincial 
Tender Board, Eastern Cape869 stated that even though the role of reasonable 
foreseeability might be a factor taken into account in determining wrongfulness “it can 
never be decisive of the issue … and since foreseeability also plays a role in 
determining legal causation, it would lead to the temptation to make liability 
dependent on the foreseeability of harm without anything more, which would be 
undesirable”. If the criterion of reasonable foreseeability of harm is regarded as a 
determining factor in the enquiry into wrongfulness, there will be conflation between 
wrongfulness and negligence leading to the “absorption of the English law tort of 
negligence into our law, thereby distorting it”.870 
 
Fagan871 states that in certain instances the reasonable foreseeability criterion does 
not have a bearing on conduct but is used as tool to limit liability. The courts872 too, 
have held on occasion that the criterion of reasonable foreseeability is more 
appropriately considered as part of the determination of legal causation rather than 
wrongfulness. Brand JA in Cape Empowerment Trust v Fisher Hoffman Sithole873 
stated that the criterion of “reasonable foreseeability” does “not play a role in 
establishing wrongfulness”.874 As will be discussed further on “reasonable 
foreseeability” of harm is one of the subsidiary theories that may be applied in 
determining legal causation, the primary theory being the flexible test based on policy 
considerations, fairness, reasonableness and justice.875 The courts have also viewed 
the criterion of reasonable foreseeability as an independent test which should be 
                                                                                                                                                                            
868  Delict 163 fn 222; Neethling and Potgieter 2014 TSAR 893-894. 
869  2006 3 SA 151 (SCA) 159-160 referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163 fn 222. 
870  Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA 2006 1 
SA 461 (SCA) 468; Neethling and Potgieter TSAR 894. 
871  2005 SALJ 110; cf Neethling 2006 SALJ 212. 
872  See Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 
163; eBotswana vSentech 2013 6 SA 327 (GSJ) 342; Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, 
Department of Infrastructure Development 2014 2 SA 214 (SCA) 225; Country Cloud Trading 
CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 (CC) 14; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 164 fn 222. 
873  2013 5 SA 183 (GSJ) 197-198. 
874  Neethling and Potgieter 2014 TSAR 895. 
875  See S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A) 40-41; Smit v Abrahams 1994 4 SA 1 (A) 18; Neethling 
and Potgieter 2014 TSAR 891. 
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applied in a flexible manner.876 Neethling and Potgieter877 acknowledge that the 
criterion of reasonable foreseeability may be relevant in determining wrongfulness 
and legal causation, but warn that the distinctive functions of the two elements must 
not be overlooked.  
 
In eBotswana v Sentech878 Splig J referred to the element of wrongfulness with the 
issue of remoteness (legal causation). Splig J submitted “wrongfulness, as one of the 
requirements of delictual liability, is established provided that it is not too remote”. 
However, Spilg J was referring to situations where a plaintiff does not have a legal 
duty to prevent pure economic loss when faced with indeterminate liability, relating to 
the wrongfulness enquiry.879 Spilg J stated that “foreseeability is formulated as more 
properly falling within the ambit of causation. The issue involves considerations of the 
application of the abstract (absolute) theory of negligence”880 but also stated that it is 
better suited under wrongfulness − “I would prefer to consider it under the question 
of wrongfulness in the sense of foreseeability of both the actual harm and of the 
manner in which it occurred … . The issue of culpability will still involve … an enquiry 
into whether [the defendant] ought to have foreseen harm of the kind that actually 
occurred …”.881 Neethling and Potgieter882 point out that although reasonable 
foreseeability of harm is a policy consideration which is considered as a factor in 
determining wrongfulness, it is, as Van Aswegen883 argues, more appropriate to deal 
with it under legal causation. The reason for this is not to “denaturise the functions of 
the different delictual requirements”. Van Aswegen884 correctly points out that the 
“scope of delictual liability is controlled by proper application of all the requirements 
for delictual liability, including legal causation”.885 
                                                                                                                                                                            
876  Neethling and Potgieter 2014 TSAR 894 refer to Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National 
Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 164-165 and Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v 
Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 276 (SCA) 297-298. 
877  2014 TSAR 891. 
878  2013 6 SA 327 (GSJ) 340. 
879  Neethling and Potgieter 2014 TSAR 893. 
880  In eBotswana v Sentech 2013 6 SA 327 (GSJ) 342. 
881  eBotswana v Sentech 2013 6 SA 327 (GSJ) 340. 
882  2014 TSAR 893. 
883  1993 THRHR 192-193. 
884  1993 THRHR 192. 
885  Knobel 2008 THRHR 657 submits that the floodgates argument may be relevant to 
wrongfulness (in determining whether an interest is worthy of protection or whether based on 
policy it is desirable to protect such interest), fault, or legal causation, in the sense that if the 
damage to the plaintiff was unforeseeable to the reasonable person, fault is lacking and if it 
was foreseeable it may nevertheless be too remote (where legal causation is lacking). 
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It is evident that the various uses of the criterion of reasonable foreseeability are 
leading to legal uncertainty as illustrated above. Knobel886 convincingly argues that 
the “reasonable foreseeability” of harm criterion does not assist in determining 
wrongfulness or legal causation and is best suited to determining negligence.887 Van 
der Walt and Midgley888 in a similar vein submit: 
 
“[t]he reasonableness test in the context of the wrongfulness enquiry is indeed very different 
from the reasonableness test for negligence. Negligence concerns the degree and extent of 
care that the defendant should have exercised when conducting the harmful activity. The 
enquiry focuses on the objective care that the defendant displayed, which is a fundamentally 
different issue from that of wrongfulness. The test for negligence requires courts to look at the 
defendant’s conduct and to place themselves in the position of the actor at the time of the 
conduct; in other words, not to consider the matter objectively from the point of view of an 
interested bystander, but objectively from the defendant’s point of view at the time of the 
incident, without considering the broader interests of the plaintiff or society, or factors that 
were not known to the defendant at the time. The cornerstone of the negligence test is 
foreseeability of harm but also whether steps ought to have been taken to prevent such harm.” 
 
(c) The use of the criterion “reasonable preventability of harm” by our courts in 
determining both wrongfulness and negligence889  
 
Brand JA in Za v Smith890 stated that the test for establishing wrongfulness in cases 
of omissions as enunciated in Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security891 was 
unfortunate in that it confuses the elements of wrongfulness and fault. Brand JA 
submitted that if the test for wrongfulness in cases of omissions is “whether it would 
be reasonable to have expected the defendant to take positive measures, while the 
test for negligence is whether the reasonable person would have taken such positive 
measures, confusion between the two elements is almost inevitable”. 
 
Loubser and Midgley,892 and Neethling and Potgieter893 refer to the following factors 
inter alia such as: the nature and extent of the risk of harm; the magnitude of the harm 
                                                                                                                                                                            
886  2008 THRHR 656-657. 
887  Fabricius J in McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent A Car v Sunset Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey 
World Travel (2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 563) submitted that foreseeability is really part of the 
element of negligence, although it can overlap with wrongfulness in respect of omissions 
(566). 
888  Delict 96-97. 
889  See Neethling 2006 SALJ 207-208. 
890  2015 4 SA 574 (SCA) 584. 
891  (Women’s Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 395. 
892  (Eds) Delict 158-159. 
893  Delict 164 fn 223. 
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if the risk materialises; resources available; cost of repair; cost of preventative 
measures and the utility of the defendant’s conduct (usually taken into account in 
respect of establishing negligence under reasonable preventability of harm) which 
the courts894 consider in determining the existence of a legal duty in respect of 
determining wrongfulness and the presence of grounds of justification.895 Neethling896 
admits that it may be pragmatic “to assume that where the defendant had a legal duty 
to prevent harm to another because he had reasonable and practical preventative 
measures at his disposal, his failure to comply with the legal duty would also be 
negligent because a reasonable person in his position would have taken preventative 
steps, and the defendant failed to take such steps”. However, it may happen that the 
defendant’s conduct will be considered wrongful in that he failed to comply with regard 
to his legal duty to prevent harm but may nevertheless escape liability because his 
attempt coincided with the conduct of the reasonable person. In this way the functions 
of the two elements remain intact.  
 
(d) The use of the criterion “reasonable foreseeability” and “reasonable preventability 
of harm” in determining wrongfulness 
 
In a number of decisions, our courts897 have also used reasonable foreseeability and 
preventability to determine wrongfulness. For example, in Road Accident Fund v 
Mtati,898 Farlam JA used the criterion of reasonable foreseeability and preventability 
to determine the existence of a legal duty of a driver of a motor vehicle. Scott899 points 
                                                                                                                                                                            
894  See Ngubane v South African Transport Services 1991 1 SA 765 (A) 766; Mpongwana v 
Minister of Safety and Security 1999 2 SA 794 (C) 803; Administrateur, Transvaal v Van der 
Merwe 1994 4 SA 347 (A) 361; Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security (Women’s Legal 
Centre Trust v amicus curiae) 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 400; Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 123; Eskom Holdings Ltd v Hendricks 2005 
5 SA 503 (SCA) 509; Neethling 2006 SALJ 207-208; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 164 fn 
223. 
895  Minister of Law and Order v Milne 1998 1 SA 289 (W) 294 where Nugent J stated that what 
must be asked is whether the reasonable person in the position of the defendant “would have 
considered that there was a real risk that death or serious injury was imminent” − this relates 
to reasonable preventability of harm in determining negligence which was used to determine 
wrongfulness. See also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 164 fn 223; Neethling 2006 SALJ 210; 
cf Fagan 2005 SALJ 97-99. 
896  2006 SALJ 211-212. 
897  See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Basdeo 1996 1 SA 355 (SCA) 370; Premier 
v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 13 (SCA). See Neethling 2006 SALJ 205-
206. 
898  2005 6 SA 215 (SCA) 228. 
899  2007 De Jure 397-400. 
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out that in Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck,900 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal applied the classic test for negligence in respect of determining the 
ground of justification, necessity. On the other hand our courts901 have also in 
numerous decisions reiterated that the elements of wrongfulness and negligence are 
distinct and should not be confused. 
 
It is acknowledged that although our courts’ intention is not to conflate the elements 
of wrongfulness and fault, these elements are indeed being conflated.  
 
4.5 Should the conflation between wrongfulness and fault be encouraged or not for 
theoretical or practical reasons?902 
 
Neethling and Potgieter903 do accept the slight overlap between the elements of 
wrongfulness and fault but warn that in accepting such overlap the functions of the 
two elements should not be refuted.  
 
Loubser and Midgley904 submit that there is some overlap between wrongfulness and 
fault which does not: 
 
“indicate a logical grey area or lack of definition of the elements of a delict … . The aim is not 
to develop a theory of delict that is made up of elements that fit into perfectly separate 
compartments. Wrongfulness and fault have broadly different focus areas (in the case of fault: 
blameworthiness of conduct, and in the case of wrongfulness: overall balance of interests and 
the scope of responsibility), but there are also common areas. Both these elements of delict 
are based on reasonableness and involve value judgments”. 
 
Nugent905 does not accept the conflation between wrongfulness and fault. He validly 
points out that our law could be reformulated to combine wrongfulness and 
negligence, as in English law, under one heading “negligence” which includes the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
900  2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122-123. 
901  See Simon’s Town Municipality v Dews 1993 1 SA 191 (A) 196; Knop v Johannesburg City 
Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking Standards 
Authority SA 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 468; Gouda Boerdery BK v Transnet 2005 5 SA 490 (SCA) 
499; Stewart v Botha 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA) 314; Local Transitional Council of Delmas v 
Boshoff 2005 5 SA 514 (SCA) 522; Road Accident Fund v Mtati 2005 6 SA 215 (SCA) 227-
228; Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 441-442; 
National Media Ltd v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 (SCA) 1204; Neethling 2006 SALJ 204-205. 
902  See Neethling 2006 SALJ 209 ff; Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in 
honour of Johann Neethling 56-57. 
903  2006 SALJ 214. 
904  (Eds) Delict 159. 
905  2006 SALJ 557ff. 
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element of “duty of care”, but that wrongfulness and negligence have been developed 
and have different distinctive roles in our law. Nugent906 submits that wrongfulness 
establishes whether “conduct is capable of attracting liability for negligence. 
Negligence determines whether the conduct has indeed attracted liability … 
[wrongfulness] first identifies a range of harmful conduct that is capable of attracting 
liability, and then attaches liability to that conduct if it is accompanied by fault”. 
Nugent907 however also condones the recent approach to determining wrongfulness, 
and does not agree that wrongfulness should be determined before fault. It is 
contradictory that Nugent states that two elements can be determined separately but 
then states that wrongfulness firstly identifies the harmful conduct that attracts liability 
for negligence.  
  
Botha908 criticises Fagan’s views who he states is under the influence of English law 
at least with respect to the ground of justification “defence”. He prefers the ex post 
facto approach to determining wrongfulness but does not have any issue with the use 
of the concept of the reasonable person in respect of determining whether the ground 
of justification “defence” is applicable. He909 states that it is logical for an adjudicator 
to refer to the reasonable grounds for thinking that there was harm and then ultimately 
questions whether or not the situation existed depending on whether the reasonable 
person in that position would have believed there was danger. Botha910 states that 
when the court refers to the reasonable person in this context as in Chetty v Minister 
of Police,911 the court refers to whether the person had reasonable grounds to believe 
something,912 which is not the same as saying the reasonable person would have 
foreseen and prevented harm, the test for negligence. Botha submits that in any event 
it remains with the fault enquiry as one is referring to a state of mind. 
 
“There must have been reasonable grounds for thinking that, because of the crowd’s 
behaviour, there was such danger (commenced or imminent) … as to require Police action. 
Whether or not such a situation existed must be considered objectively, the question being 
whether a reasonable man in the position of the Police would have believed that there was 
danger.” 
                                                                                                                                                                            
906  2006 SALJ 562. 
907  2006 SALJ 562. 
908  2013 SALJ 177ff. 
909  Botha 2013 SALJ 168. 
910  2013 SALJ 168-171. 
911  1976 2 SA 450 (N) 452-453. 
912  See Scott 2007 De Jure 394; Scott 2007 TSAR 193 ff who refers to the formulation of 
“reasonable grounds for thinking” unfortunate. 
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Botha913 submits: 
 
“[i]t is not necessarily so that the ‘ex ante reasonable person test’ of the courts in private 
defence conflates wrongfulness and negligence. Neither is … the court … necessarily 
appl[ying] ‘the second leg of the test for negligence’ when they refer to the reasonable person 
… . The test for negligence cannot claim exclusive ownership of reference to the reasonable 
person in law, not even in the law of delict.” 
 
Even though Botha914 does not agree with the views of Neethling and Potgieter, his 
view is closer to theirs in the sense that in these particular instances they all agree 
that the concept of the “reasonable person” is not being used to test negligence. 
Neethling and Potgieter have gone a step further into justifying the use of the concept 
of the reasonable person within the enquiry into wrongfulness by stating that it is 
being used to “express the objective boni mores criterion”.  
  
In light of the confusion and legal uncertainty, it is necessary to briefly refer to the 
difference between wrongfulness and negligence. Van Reenen J in Moses v Minister 
of Safety and Security915 aptly stated: 
  
“In the context of delictual liability a clear distinction is made in our law between wrongfulness 
and negligence … It is generally accepted that in the absence of an established norm or a 
recognised ground of justification, wrongfulness is determined according to the criterion of 
reasonableness with reference to the legal convictions of the community as established by the 
Courts … . The test is an objective one based on all the facts of a particular case … . By 
contrast, reasonableness in the context of negligence is determined with reference to the 
conduct of a bonus paterfamilias in the position of the person whose conduct is under 
consideration.”  
 
Neethling916 and Potgieter917 point out the following differences between the test for 
wrongfulness and negligence: 
 
(a) A defendant’s conduct will be considered wrongful if, after balancing competing 
interests, it was found that the plaintiff’s interest was infringed in an unreasonable 
manner according to the boni mores, whereas in the case of negligence, the 
defendant’s conduct will be tested against the yardstick of the fictitious reasonable 
person and an enquiry as to whether the defendant should have reasonably foreseen 
                                                                                                                                                                            
913  2013 SALJ 169. 
914  2013 SALJ 170. 
915  2000 3 SA 106 (C) 113. 
916  2002 SALJ 283. 
917  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163-167. See also Neethling and Potgieter 2004 Obiter 484-
485; Neethling 2002 SALJ 285-286. 
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the harm, and taken reasonable steps to prevent such harm from ensuing. The courts 
have in the past referred to reasonable foreseeability and reasonable preventability 
of harm when determining wrongfulness which no doubt brings about confusion and 
uncertainty.918 
 
(b) Wrongfulness refers to the legal reprehensibility of the wrongdoer’s conduct, 
whereas negligence refers to the legal blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct. 
Wrongfulness qualifies the conduct of the defendant and negligence qualifies the 
defendant.   
 
(c) Wrongfulness is determined ex post facto on facts that actually happened919 
whereas negligence is determined ex ante based on probabilities.920 An example of 
the correct approach as explained by Neethling921 and Potgieter was taken in Kgaleng 
v Minister of Safety and Security,922 where a policeman in self-defence shot and killed 
the deceased. It transpired that the policeman thought the deceased was about to 
activate a grenade and throw it in his direction. The policeman who thought his life 
was in danger reacted by shouting at the deceased to drop the grenade, fired a 
warning shot, and thereafter killed the deceased with the second shot. Cloete J first 
determined wrongfulness ex post facto and found that the policeman had acted 
wrongfully. His life was not really in danger because the deceased in actual fact was 
carrying a tear gas canister and not a grenade. With regard to fault, the policeman 
did not have intention as he was not conscious of the wrongfulness of the act. He 
thought his actions were justified. Furthermore the policeman was not negligent 
because a reasonable person would have acted in the same manner. 
 
(d) Wrongfulness is determined before negligence.923  
 
(e) The test for wrongfulness is narrower than the test for negligence. A defendant’s 
conduct may be regarded as unreasonable and therefore wrongful, but such person 
                                                                                                                                                                            
918  See the cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163 fn 222-224. 
919  Although, as mentioned, an ex ante approach has been applied by our courts in respect of 
certain grounds of justification. See para 3.4 above with regard to the grounds of justification. 
920  See NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 5 SA 250 (CC) 
274; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 164 fn 227. 
921  See Neethling 2006 SALJ 210-211; Neethling 2002 SALJ 284-286. 
922  2001 4 SA 854 (W). 
923  See Neethling and Potgieter 2001 THRHR 480-481; para 3 above. 
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may have acted reasonably according to the standard of the reasonable person 
thereby negating fault in the form of negligence and in turn delictual liability. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
As has been shown thus far, the influence of reasonableness on the delictual 
elements of wrongfulness and fault has resulted in the courts conflating the tests for 
wrongfulness, negligence,924 and legal causation. This has occurred as a result of the 
separate application of the two legs of the test for negligence in establishing 
wrongfulness as well as legal causation (which will be discussed further under the 
next paragraph) and also by applying the entire test for negligence to establish 
wrongfulness.925 The tests for wrongfulness, fault and legal causation are distinct, 
specific and cannot be combined in a theoretically correct or practical sense. 
However, there are certain factors such as reasonable foreseeability of harm that are 
relevant to the enquiry of wrongfulness, fault and legal causation. The trick is to 
always bear in mind the role of the factors in determining the specific elements as 
there is a specific focus in such enquiry, and to ensure that the distinctive function of 
each element is not negated.  
 
The concept of reasonableness plays a different role in determining the different 
elements. In respect of the traditional approach to determining wrongfulness, the 
question is – did the defendant act reasonably or fail to act reasonably (where there 
was a legal duty to prevent harm or loss) according to the boni mores, constitutional 
imperatives and in light of all surrounding circumstances, in infringing the plaintiff’s 
interests? In respect of the recent approach, the question is – is it reasonable to 
impose liability on the defendant? In respect of intention, only if the wrongdoer 
intended to cause harm or loss to the plaintiff would it be reasonable to hold the 
wrongdoer liable. In respect of negligence the question is − did the defendant’s 
conduct stray from that of the reasonable person, and if so how far? 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
924  Neethling 2006 SALJ 204ff. See also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 163-167. 
925  Neethling 2006 SALJ 209. See further Fagan 2005 SALJ 90ff. 
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5. Causation 
 
In this paragraph, the influence of reasonableness on “causation” will be analysed. 
There is often uncertainty and confusion between the elements of wrongfulness, fault 
and causation, once again due to the influence of reasonableness. Therefore it is 
necessary to critically analyse and compare the influence of reasonableness on these 
three elements in order to bring about clarity and certainty in respect of their different 
roles in determining delictual liability.  
 
5.1 Factual causation 
 
When determining delictual liability, the damage suffered must have been caused by 
the wrongful conduct of the culpable defendant.926 The enquiry into causation is 
based on two components, factual and legal causation.927 A factual causal nexus is 
determined by looking at the facts of the case.928 Various theories of causation have 
been developed but almost all the theories use929 the conditio sine qua non (“but-for” 
test) theory as the starting point in order to determine whether factual causation is 
present.930 According to this theory, positive conduct on the part of the defendant 
must be thought away in order to establish whether the consequences would have 
ensued.931 In cases of omissions hypothetical positive conduct is inserted.932 The 
                                                                                                                                                                            
926  mCubed International (Pty) Ltd v Singer 2009 4 SA 471 (SCA) 481; Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 69. 
927  Siman & Co Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 2 SA 888 (A) 914-915; Fourway Haulage 
SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) [34]; International 
Shipping Company (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 700; Minister of Police v Skosana 
1977 1 SA 31 (A) 34-35 43-44; mCubed International (Pty) Ltd v Singer 2009 4 SA 471 (SCA) 
[22]; McCarthy Ltd t/a Budget Rent A Car v Sunset Beach Trading 300 t/a Harvey World Travel 
2012 6 SA 551 (GNP) 568; Lee v Minister for Correctional Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 
144; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 275; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 183-184; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 70. 
928  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 183. 
929  Most authors and the courts prefer the conditio sine qua non theory. See International 
Shipping Company (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 700; Cape Empowerment Trust v 
Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 183 (GSJ) 192 and the list of authors referred to by 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 185 fn 11 as well as the cases where this theory was applied 
(fn 12). Cf Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 71. 
930  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 183. See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays 
in honour of Johann Neethling 57. 
931  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 278; Burchell Delict 115. 
932  By inserting positive hypothetical conduct, a retrospective analysis is applied of what would 
probably have occurred taking into account the evidence and what can be expected in the 
“ordinary course of human affairs” ‒ Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 
6 SA 431 (SCA) 449; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 72; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 191-
192. 
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enquiry involves whether one fact follows from another.933 If the harmful 
consequence(s) would have resulted without the defendant’s conduct then there is 
no factual causation.934 This theory has been criticised935 for it not applying as a test 
for causation but rather as an affirmation of an ex post facto conclusion of an already 
established factual causal link.936 Even though the but-for test is commonly referred 
to by the courts, it is either applied more flexibly or is not the only test used. There 
are exceptions937 where common sense standards are applied.938 It is unclear from 
academic writers’ opinions and case law whether the common sense standard is part 
of the but-for test, adding a flexible dimension to it, or, is it a standard on its own, 
separate from the but-for test? Neethling and Potgieter,939 for example, refer to the 
common sense standard as a flexible approach to the but-for test, whereas Van der 
Walt and Midgley940 refer to the common sense standard as a separate standard 
apart from the but-for test. Case law does not provide clarity either. A flexible 
approach to the but-for test using the common sense standard was formulated and 
applied in Minister of Finance v Gore,941 where it was held that the application of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
933  Lee v Minister for Correctional Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 144; Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 195; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 72; Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) 
Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 58. 
934  See International Shipping Company (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 700; Neethling 
and Potgieter Delict 187; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 278; Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 71-72. 
935  In that it is “circuitous”, cannot be used in cases of cumulative causation and merely expresses 
the already determined causal link. See the points of criticism on the conditio sine qua non 
theory provided by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 187-191; Burchell Delict 114-115; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 77-78. Neethling and Potgieter Delict 195-196 are of the view that 
the conditio sine qua non test cannot apply as a test for factual causation and that “knowledge 
and experience, as well as reliable evidence, are required to determine a causal link. … Since 
there is no magic formula by which one can generally establish a causal nexus, the existence 
of such a nexus will be dependent on the facts of a particular case, and a characteristic of a 
causal nexus is that one fact arises out of another”. 
936  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 190 195; Burchell Delict 114-115. 
937  Where a strict application of the conditio sine qua non theory is not suitable. See Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 280-281, 284-285 who explain that the question of liability, indivisibility and 
the burden of proof are considered as policy issues and are dealt with under legal causation. 
See also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 188-189; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 78.  
938  See Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2013 2 SA 144 (CC); 162; ZA v Smith 2015 4 SA 
574 (SCA) 589 where Brand JA applied a common sense practical approach in determining 
factual causation. Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 80 argue that the common sense 
approach to determining factual causation is not a suitable test in that the idea of common 
sense varies between people and it does not encourage providing proper reasons for arriving 
at the conclusion. See also Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 280. 
939  Delict 193-194. 
940  Delict 280-281. 
941  2007 1 SA 111 (SCA) 125. See Siman and Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 2 
SA 888 (A) 917-918 where a common sense approach was referred to; Lee v Minister for 
Correctional Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 146 where the court stated that common sense 
must sometimes apply; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 194; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 
280; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 73 79-80. 
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but-for test is not based on philosophy, science or mathematics but on common 
sense. In Minister of Police v Skosana942 the court stated that the question is whether 
the defendant’s conduct “caused or materially contributed” to the plaintiff’s damage. 
In Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden,943 the court stated that factual 
causation may be determined by a “sensible retrospective analysis” of what would 
have probably occurred. Neethling and Potgieter944 point out that in cases of multiple 
or successive causes in South African law, such as in the facts of the English decision 
of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd945 (discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter),946 where the plaintiffs are unable to pinpoint exactly which defendants’ 
caused the harm, the but-for test used flexibly would still result in liability being 
excluded. They suggest that instead of an unfair outcome in South African law, the 
flexible approach to determining legal causation may assist in reaching a fair 
outcome. As will be shown in the discussion of causation in English,947 American948 
and French law,949 a pragmatic approach is followed in reaching a just outcome, and 
policy considerations are often considered under factual causation as the but-for test 
strictly applied would reach an unfair outcome. In South African law, a factual nexus 
either exists or it does not and a factual nexus is usually easily found. Policy 
considerations are considered under legal causation and not under factual 
causation.950 
 
The courts determine a causal link between the act and the consequences based on 
the evidence produced and probabilities of how one fact arises from another.951 A 
single act can in reality result in an endless chain of harmful events. In terms of 
fairness and legal policy, a wrongdoer should not be subject to unlimited liability, thus 
                                                                                                                                                                            
942  1977 1 SA 31 (A) 43-44. See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 281-283. 
943  2002 3 All SA 741 (SCA) 449. 
944  Delict 194. 
945  2003 1 AC 32. 
946  See chapter 4 para 4. 
947  See chapter 4. Para 4.1. 
948  See chapter 5 para 4.1. 
949  See chapter 4 para  4.1. 
950  See Lee v Minister for Correctional Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 149-150 where Nkabinde 
J confirmed that factual causation is determined on the facts of the case and cannot depend 
on social and policy considerations “[t]here is no pressing need to contaminate the factual part 
of the causation enquiry with these kinds of normative standards based on social and policy 
considerations”. See also Neethling and Potgieter Delict 195 and Van der Walt and Midgley 
Delict 285. 
951  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 191, 195-196; Lee v Minister for Correctional Services 
2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 144. 
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legal causation brings about the limitation of liability.952 The following hypothetical 
situation illustrates the interplay between factual and legal causation: 
 
X, stops at a filling station to purchase fuel. He does not check to see whether the 
petrol attendant has removed the hose used to fill the fuel tank. X drives off and the 
hose breaks, releasing fuel on the ground and around the petrol pump. Almost 
immediately another driver, Y, drives in and flicks his unfinished lit cigarette into the 
area where the spilled fuel has settled. This causes a fire which results in people 
getting hurt and damage to property. X, in respect of factual causation could be the 
factual cause for all the harmful consequences flowing from his conduct, but by 
employing the criteria of legal causation, and accepting that there is a novus actus 
interveniens – a break in the casual link – his liability in respect of causation can be 
limited. 
 
In establishing factual causation in cases of omissions, the courts953 insert a 
hypothetical positive act, such as some form of reasonable conduct in place of the 
actual omission.954 This then raises the question of whether the inserted conduct must 
be determined objectively, in terms of what the reasonable person would have done, 
or subjectively, what the defendant would have done.955 By using the subjective 
approach, confusion may result in respect of factual causation and negligence. 
Ideally, what should be established first is whether the defendant could have done 
something to prevent the harm, thereby establishing causation, and thereafter 
whether there was a legal duty to act and the defendant failed to comply with that 
                                                                                                                                                                            
952  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 183-184; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 281, 285; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 89. It should be noted that in a strict sense not only legal causation 
limits liability as the other elements also assist in limiting delictual liability. For example 
wrongfulness also limits liability. See Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads 
Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 163-174; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 199 fn 99; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 98; Burchell Delict 119. 
953  See S v Van As 1967 4 SA 594 (A) where the policeman failed to search for children who later 
died of exposure. The court described the course of conduct of hypothetical police officers 
who would have taken reasonable steps to search for the children thus preventing their death. 
See also Minister of Police v Skosana 1977 1 SA 31 (A) 34 where the court referred to the 
hypothetical enquiry into what would have happened if the policemen would have ensured that 
the deceased received medical treatment in time thereby preventing the deceased’s death; cf 
Burchell Delict 115-116; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 282-284; Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 191-193; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 72-73. 
954  International Shipping Company (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 700; Lee v Minister for 
Correctional Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 145; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 191; Van 
der Walt and Midgley Delict 283. 
955  See Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 329; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 192; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 75-76. 
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legal duty, thereby determining wrongfulness. Finally, in respect of the question of 
negligence − would the reasonable person in the position of the wrongdoer have 
acted in order to prevent the harm?  Should the adjudicator enquire whether “lawful 
and reasonable conduct would have prevented the harmful consequence, the 
enquiries into factual causation, wrongfulness and negligence are raised 
simultaneously and confusion may result”.956 
 
The influence of reasonableness on factual causation is implicit. What needs to be 
determined is whether the defendant’s conduct factually caused the harm or loss to 
the plaintiff for purposes of delictual liability. It will only be reasonable to hold the 
defendant liable if he in fact caused the harm. In general, South African law follows 
the rule res perit domino or “damage rests where it falls”, and this means that a good 
reason must exist to make someone pay for damage suffered by another person.957 
Delict is one such reason, and fundamental to delictual liability is the understanding 
that the wrongdoer can in principle only be held liable for damage that he has in fact 
caused.958 If a factual causal link between the conduct and the consequences cannot 
be found, then naturally factual causation is absent and so is delictual liability. The 
common sense standard, whether part of the but-for test or as a standard on its own, 
lends to the reasonableness of finding factual causation in instances where the strict 
application of the but-for test leads to unjust results. Usually factual causation where 
conduct takes the form of a positive act is easily determined by the courts. Problems 
may arise with omissions where a subjective approach as opposed to an objective 
approach is applied to inserting positive reasonable conduct. The influence of 
reasonableness here is prevalent with regard to the inserted hypothetical positive 
conduct. Factual causation should be established first by considering what positive 
steps the wrongdoer could have taken (in terms of the but-for test), thereafter whether 
there was a legal duty to act (determining wrongfulness in cases of omissions) and 
then negligence (would the reasonable person have acted in order to prevent the 
harm).  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
956  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 193. 
957  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 3. 
958  There are exceptional instances where a defendant can be held liable for damage that he has 
not caused, for example, an employee may be held vicariously liabile for the delict of an 
employer ofourse in such an instance the defendant cannot really be said to be a wrongdoer. 
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5.2 Legal causation  
 
In respect of factual causation, the focus is on the facts of the case, whereas in 
respect of legal causation, public or legal policies, as well as value judgments, are 
considered.959 Legal causation is used to determine which consequences a 
defendant should be held delictually liable for, also commonly referred to as 
“imputability of harm”. The defendant is not liable for damage which is “too remote”, 
also referred to as the “remoteness of damage”.960 Neethling and Potgieter961 point 
out that limitation of liability is implicitly considered when the courts consider the other 
elements of a delict, in particular wrongfulness and fault. The courts expressly deal 
with legal causation where there is a chain of consecutive consequences. In the past, 
the courts referred to a number of tests in order to determine legal causation962 such 
as:963 two of English descent, the “direct consequences” theory964 and the 
“reasonable foreseeability” theory;965 and one of continental origin, the “adequate 
                                                                                                                                                                            
959  Minister of Police v Skosana 1977 1 SA 31 (A) 34-35; Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National 
Bank Ltd 1984 2 SA 888 (A) 914; Tuck v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1988 3 SA 819 
(A) 832-833; S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A) 39 ff; International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 
1990 1 SA 680 (A) 700-701; Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 
4 SA 747 (A) 763 ff; Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 332; 
Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 163-
164; Neethling v Oosthuizen 2009 5 SA 376 (WCC) 388; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 197-
198 fn 94; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 71; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 285. 
960  Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 2 SA 888 (A) 914; Tuck v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1988 3 SA 819 (A) 832-833;  International Shipping Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 700-702; Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v 
Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 4 SA 747 (A) 763 ff; Road Accident v Sauls 2002 2 SA 55 (SCA) 61; 
OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2002 3 SA 688 (SCA) 697; 
Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 163-
164; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 198 fn 95; Neethling and Potgieter 2014 TSAR 890; 
Boberg Delict 440. 
961  Delict 198. 
962  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 203-216; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 94-98; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 286; Burchell Delict 119-121 with regard to the application of some of 
the subsidiary theories. 
963  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 200; cf Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 91. 
964  In terms of this theory the defendant is liable for all the direct consequences stemming from 
the negligent conduct and not limited to the foreseeable consequences. Because this test may 
result in casting a wide net of liability, the courts limit it to physical consequences and apply 
the “foreseeable plaintiff” theory. This theory has been applied by our courts and is still used 
as a subsidiary test. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 94-95; Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 205-206; Boberg Delict 440-442; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 290-291; Burchell 
Delict 119-120. 
965  According to this approach, the general nature of the damage (consequences) should have 
been reasonably foreseeable by the defendant before liability may follow. See Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 95-96; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 214-216; Boberg Delict 442-445; 
Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 292-293; Burchell Delict 120-121. 
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cause” theory.966 967 Initially, the “direct consequences” theory and thereafter the 
“reasonable foreseeability” theory were the tests most commonly applied968 until the 
Appellate division in S v Mokgethi969 adopted a flexible umbrella approach which 
acknowledges all the tests as subsidiary tests and does not rely on a single test.970 
In respect of this approach, there is no single test for legal causation and what must 
be considered is “whether there is a close enough relationship between the 
wrongdoer’s conduct and its consequence for such consequence to be imputed to 
the wrongdoer in view of policy considerations based on reasonableness, fairness 
and justice”.971 Thus the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is determined 
with “reference to the proximity or remoteness of the act to its consequence or 
consequences”.972 Neethling and Potgieter973 aptly point out that the different theories 
should be regarded as: 
 
“pointers or criteria reflecting legal policy and legal convictions about when damage should be 
imputed to a person: damage is imputable when, depending on the circumstances, it is a direct 
consequence of the conduct, or reasonably foreseeable, or if it is an adequate relationship to 
the conduct, or for a combination of such reasons, or simply for reasons of legal policy. A court 
is not bound beforehand to a single, specific theory, but has the freedom in each case to apply 
the theory which serves reasonableness and justice best in light of the circumstances, taking 
into account considerations of policy”. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
966  This theory (of German and the Netherland descent) imputes a consequence or 
consequences on the defendant if, in the usual course of events, the conduct of the defendant 
has the tendency of bringing about those consequences. This theory has received criticism 
but is applied in criminal law. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 96-97; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 203-204; Boberg Delict 445-447; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 294-295; 
Burchell Delict 120. 
967  A theory also exists whereby the determination of legal causation is irrelevant as fault is 
sufficient. The defendant may be held liable for intended consequences as intended 
consequences cannot be too remote. Alternatively the defendant may be held liable for those 
consequences that he should have reasonably foreseen and prevented (especially according 
to the concrete approach of determining negligence). See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 207-
214 who argue that negligence and intent cannot meaningfully apply as a criterion for legal 
causation. cf Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 97-98; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 182; 
Boberg Delict 440. 
968  See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 91; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 200; Visser in Du 
Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1130. 
969  1990 1 SA 680 (A). 
970  See International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) 700; mCubed 
International (Pty) Ltd v Singer 2009 4 SA 471 (SCA) 482; Smit v Abrahams 1994 4 SA 1 (A) 
14 ff; Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 4 SA 747 (A) 764 ff; OK 
Bazaars (1929) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2002 3 SA 688 (SCA) 699; Clark v 
Hurst 1992 4 SA 630 (D) 659; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 200 fn 111 in respect of other 
cases which sanctioned the flexible approach. Cf Visser in Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles 
of South African law 1130. 
971  S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 40-41. 
972  Knobel 2008 THRHR 654. See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in 
honour of Johann Neethling 59. 
973  Delict 202. 
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With respect to causation, the novus actus interveniens (break in the causal link or 
intervening act) is an important concept in limiting974 or excluding liability.975 A novus 
actus interveniens may stem from the conduct of a third person, the plaintiff or a force 
of nature and is applied if it was not reasonably foreseeable.976 In the hypothetical 
case referred to above in reference to legal causation, the flicking of the unfinished lit 
cigarette could be regarded as a break in the causal link or an intervening act. In 
applying the accepted flexible approach, the question would rest on whether the 
novus actus (Y’s conduct) had a bearing on the resultant harm to such an extent that 
the resultant harm cannot be imputed to X, based on public policy, reasonableness, 
fairness and justice. Reference could also be made to a subsidiary test. For example, 
if consideration is given to the reasonable foreseeability criterion, it may be stated 
that the harmful consequences would not have been reasonably foreseeable by X, 
therefore X should not be liable in respect of the harm suffered or the damage 
sustained.977 
 
In respect of the talem qualem (thin skull or egg shell) rule, one must take his victim 
as he finds him, in other words, with all his inherent infirmities, whether physical, 
psychological or financial. Such person suffers more extensive loss or injury as a 
result of the weakness and the defendant is generally held liable for all the loss 
sustained.978 In a sense, it may seem unreasonable that the defendant is held liable 
for the full extent of the loss, but on the other hand it is reasonable to compensate 
the plaintiff who would have not suffered harm or loss had the defendant not caused 
such harm. Contributory fault where applicable may reduce an award or exclude 
liability. There is uncertainty as to the reasoning or justification of how the defendant 
should be held liable or which theory for legal causation should be applied, but the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
974  See for example, Mafesa v Parity Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1968 2 SA 603 (O) where the 
plaintiff sustained a fractured leg as a result of an accident. He did undergo surgery which 
included inserting a steel plate and the bone set satisfactorily. The plaintiff, while using 
crutches, subsequently slipped and fell fracturing his leg again. When the plaintiff sued the 
defendant, the court only held the defendant liable for the consequences as a result of the first 
fracture of the leg and found that the second incident was a novus actus interveniens which 
was not reasonably foreseeable. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 99-100; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 291. 
975  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 216-219; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 99-
100; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 291. 
976  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 218-219; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 99; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 291. 
977  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 217. 
978  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 219. 
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flexible approach is the most plausible.979 In respect of the flexible approach, the 
plaintiff’s inherent infirmity is just another fact in the particular case to be taken into 
account “in view of policy considerations based on reasonableness, fairness and 
justice”, in determining the imputability of harm.980 
 
Legal causation and wrongfulness both serve to limit liability by means of policy 
considerations.981 The concept of reasonableness is common to both. The question 
of negligence is also policy based which creates a danger of the conflation of the 
elements of wrongfulness, negligence and causation.982 Brand JA in Cape 
Empowerment Trust v Fisher Hoffman Sithole983 submitted that wrongfulness and 
legal causation are both “determined by considerations of legal and public policy” and 
they “perform the same function” serving as “safety valves preventing imposition of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
979  The reasonable foreseeability theory, direct consequences theory and the fault theory have 
been considered. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 219-220; cf Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 99. 
980  See Smit v Abrahams 1994 4 SA 1 (A) 14-15; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 220. 
981  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 95. 
982  See Lee v Minister for Correctional Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 155 where Nkabinde J 
stated:“[t]he concern that a flexible approach to factual causation and the relaxation of the but-
for test in appropriate cases may lead to limitless liability, especially in relation to omissions, 
has been addressed by the development of the test for reasonableness in the wrongfulness 
enquiry. That enquiry now concerns the reasonableness of imposing liability on a defendant, 
and is not restricted to the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, which is an element of 
the separate negligence enquiry in our law”. This is unacceptable as delictual liability is based 
on the proving of each element and in each element liability may be limited. With regard to 
causation itself (and the application of the but-for test) a single act can be the factual cause of 
many harmful events, but legal causation (where the flexible approach is applied, will limit the 
defendant’s liability (in respect of the separate element of causation). Brand JA in Cape 
Empowerment Trust v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 183 (SCA) 193-194 stated that “the 
element of wrongfulness introduces a measure of control. It serves to exclude liability in 
situations where most right-minded people, including judges, will regard the imposition of 
liability as untenable, despite the presence of all other elements of Aquilian liability”. If the test 
for negligence and wrongfulness is telescoped into one [as submitted by Loubser], the function 
of the latter element as a measure of control is lost completely (see Roux v Hattingh 2012 6 
SA 428 (SCA) [35]). The problem is demonstrated thus by Harms JA in Telematrix [14]: “To 
illustrate: there is obviously a duty ‒ even a legal duty ‒ on a judicial officer to adjudicate cases 
correctly and not to err negligently. That does not mean that a judicial officer who fails in the 
duty, because of negligence [or even gross negligence], acted wrongfully. Put in direct terms: 
can it be unlawful, in the sense that the wronged party is entitled to monetary compensation, 
for an incorrect judgment given negligently [or even grossly negligently] by a judicial officer, 
whether in exercising a  discretion or making a value judgment, assessing the facts or in 
finding, interpreting or applying the appropriate legal principle? Public or legal policy 
considerations require that there should be no liability, i.e., that the potential defendant should 
be afforded immunity against a damages claim, even from third parties affected by the 
judgment’.” Brand is of the view that wrongfulness and legal causation, because they are 
determined by considering public policy, serve to limit liability. This view as submitted above 
cannot be accepted as each element in a sense limits liability and, in actual fact, policy 
considerations are considered in determining wrongfulness, negligence, legal causation and 
damage. Furthermore it would be unreasonable to hold a wrongdoer liable if all the elements 
of a delict as required are not present. 
983  2013 5 SA 183 (SCA) 197-198. 
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liability in a particular situation which most right-minded people will regard as 
untenable, despite the presence of all other elements of delictual liability and since 
wrongfulness and legal causation (remoteness) are both determined by 
considerations of policy, a certain degree of overlapping is inevitable”. He continued 
by stating that wrongfulness and (legal) causation are two different elements: 
 
“each with its own characteristics and content. Even where negligent conduct resulting from 
pure economic loss is for reasons of policy found to be wrongful, the loss may therefore, for 
other reasons of policy, be found to be too remote and therefore not recoverable. This 
happened, for example, in International Shipping Co… . Determination of remoteness also 
requires application of yardsticks such as foreseeability and direct consequences which do 
not play a role in establishing wrongfulness … these yardsticks should not be applied 
dogmatically but rather, in a flexible manner”. 
 
First of all, as mentioned,984 it is not correct that the criterion of reasonable 
foreseeability does not play a role in determining wrongfulness. Secondly, 
wrongfulness and legal causation should not be equated because they both limit 
liability. Indeed every element of a delict should serve to limit liability.985 In a sense, 
imposition of liability in determining wrongfulness according to the recent approach 
and imputability of liability in determining legal causation are being used 
synonymously, usurping the other elements of delict in that these two elements are 
regarded as superior and are being equated with the general test for delictual 
liability.986 This breeds confusion and legal uncertainty. Neethling and Potgieter987 
point out that there is no difference between the boni mores yardstick as interpreted 
by the adjudicators which Brand JA opposes and the opinion of most right-minded 
people, including adjudicators, to which he refers. Furthermore, if these concepts are 
similar then Brand JA is applying the boni mores yardstick to determine legal 
causation. Neethling and Potgieter988 refer to an example from English law, Weller & 
Co v Foot-and-mouth Disease Research Institute989 referred to by Visser,990 where 
the foot-and-mouth virus escaped from the institute and spread, causing loss to 
farmers and other companies. Visser is of the view that the escape of the virus was 
unreasonable but not wrongful, because it would have been unreasonable to hold the 
defendant liable as liability was extended too far. Neethling and Potgieter point out 
                                                                                                                                                                            
984  See para 4.3 above. 
985  See Lee v Minister for Correctional Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) 155. 
986  See also Neethling and Potgieter 2014 TSAR 898-899. 
987  2014 TSAR 897-898. 
988  2014 TSAR 899. 
989  1966 1 QB 569. 
990  In Du Bois (gen ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 1099. 
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that as a result of the “clear unreasonableness of the conduct” wrongfulness was 
present, but it would have been “unreasonable to hold the alleged wrongdoer liable 
on account of the absence of legal causation”. Indeed the concepts of imposition of 
liability and imputability of liability could lead to the redundancy of legal causation as 
an element according to the application of the recent approach to determining 
wrongfulness as pointed out by Neethling and Potgieter.991 
 
Loubser and Midgley992 point out that even when conduct is found to be wrongful, the 
damage may be considered too remote in light of other reasons of policy thereby 
excluding delictual liability.993 Knobel994 convincingly argues that the difference “is 
that in the wrongfulness inquiry, legal policy primarily evaluates the negatively and 
positively impacted interests, whereas in the inquiry into legal causation, legal policy 
evaluates the remoteness between the act and the consequence”.995 
 
5.3 Conclusion  
 
There is no doubt that reasonableness and public policy do play an important role in 
determining fault, wrongfulness and legal causation,996 however, the elements are 
distinct in nature and function in determining delictual liability.997 Neethling and 
Potgieter998 aptly state that: 
 
“the question of whether a wrongdoer should be held liable for a “remote consequence”, is  
completely different from the question of whether the wrongdoer’s conduct was unreasonable 
according to the legal convictions of the community (the question of wrongfulness), from the 
question of whether the wrongdoer should be legally blamed because he foresaw and 
reconciled himself with the consequence and the possible wrongfulness thereof (the question 
of intent), and from the question of whether injury was foreseeable with such a degree of 
probability that the reasonable man would have taken steps to avoid injury (the question of 
negligence). Wrongfulness, fault, factual and legal causation (imputability of harm) should be 
clearly distinguished. A delict is a complex juristic fact which is traditionally divided into a 
number of different elements. This classification is based on considerations of fairness, 
efficacy and logic and should not lightly be disregarded. Anyone who, for example, without 
due consideration, drags an element of wrongfulness into the requirement of fault or damage, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
991  2014 TSAR 899. 
992  Delict 98. 
993  See International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A); Fourway Haulage SA 
(Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 164; Cape Empowerment 
Trust Limited v Fisher HoffmanSithole 2013 5 SA 183 (SCA) 197-198. Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 98; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 201 fn 114. 
994  2008 THRHR 654-655. 
995  See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 59. 
996  See Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171ff. 
997  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 201 fn 114. 
998  Delict 213. 
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or an element of wrongfulness or fault into the requirement of legal causation, could be caught 
up in a web of confusion of ideas”.  
 
One of the criteria to determine whether the defendant owes the claimant a duty of 
care in the tort of negligence in English law is: whether it is fair just and reasonable 
to impose a duty of care. Our recent approach to determining wrongfulness is: 
whether it is reasonable to impose liability on the defendant. Our test for legal 
causation is based on whether the consequences are either close or remote with 
reference to the act; to impute liability on such defendant based on reasonableness, 
fairness and justice. This test has also been used to determine causation in English 
tort law.999 These tests are indeed very similar; they involve normative questions 
based on policy, and the common normative concept is reasonableness. In turn 
reasonableness is closely linked to the normative concepts of “justice” and “fairness”. 
However, even though the way the concept of reasonableness is used in all three 
tests is similar, they all serve to determine different elements. In English law it serves 
to determine whether there is a duty of care in the tort of negligence and causation. 
In South African law it is used to determine wrongfulness and legal causation. Even 
though the recent approach to determining wrongfulness is different from the 
traditional approach, in the end they either directly or indirectly refer to the boni mores, 
as public policy is reflected in the boni mores. They both must consider constitutional 
imperatives. The traditional approach directly refers to rights, while in order to answer 
the question posed according to the recent approach, rights must still be considered. 
In focusing on interests, the ultimate question is whether the defendant acted 
reasonably or failed to act reasonably, in infringing the interests of the plaintiff. At the 
heart of the question of legal causation is one of remoteness between the conduct 
and the consequences. The concepts of reasonableness, fairness and justice are 
used to determine whether or not the defendant should be held delictually liable for 
all the consequences factually caused by his conduct. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
999  See chapter 4 para 4.1. 
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6. Harm, loss or damage 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this paragraph, the influence of reasonableness will be identified and briefly 
analysed with respect to the element of harm, loss or damage. There is much to be 
said about the assessment and quantification of damage, but for purposes of this 
study, the influence of reasonableness on the element of damage will be briefly 
discussed.  
 
The element of damage is necessary in respect of delictual liability.1000 Firstly, it must 
be established whether there is damage, based on the proven facts of the case and 
on a balance of probabilities. Secondly, whether compensation should be awarded 
for the damage sustained, based on public policy,1001 and finally, the extent of the 
damage which involves quantification of the damage.1002 
 
“Damage is the detrimental impact upon any patrimonial or personality interest 
deemed worthy of protection by the law.”1003 There are two broad types of loss 
recognised: non-patrimonial loss (non-pecuniary loss) and patrimonial loss 
(pecuniary loss).1004 Patrimonial loss includes financial loss associated with a bodily 
injury, damage to property,1005 and pure economic loss which does not flow from 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1000  Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA) 283 286; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 221; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 45; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 60. 
1001  For example in Van Jaarsveld v Bridges 2010 4 SA 558 (SCA), the court taking into account 
the prevailing mores and public policy dismissed a claim for damages stemming from a breach 
of a promise to marry (broken engagement). Also our law did not previously allow 
compensation for psychiatric injury or pure economic loss. See also Union Government 
(Minister of Railways Harbours) v Warneke 1911 AD 657, 665 where the court held that loss 
of comfort and society of one’s wife who was killed cannot be compensated in terms of the 
actio legis Aquiliae. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 47; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
222; Burchell Delict 123. 
1002  Turkstra Ltd v Richards 1926 TPD 276, 282-283; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 60. 
1003  Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund (Women’s Legal Centre Trust as Amicus Curiae) 2006 
4 SA 230 (CC) 252; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 222; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 47; 
see Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 59. 
1004  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 33-36; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 223-225; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 49-50; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 62-64. 
1005  In the landmark decision Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk 
1973 1 SA 769 (A) 776-777, 781it was held  that a plaintiff who suffers from negligently inflicted 
“nervous shock” which results in psychiatric or psychological injuries is entitled to claim 
damages for patrimonial loss under the lex Aquilia. See also Gibson v Berkowitz 1996  4 
SA 1029 (W) 1038; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 135; Neethling 2000 TSAR 1-2; Ahmed 
and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 182. 
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injury to the plaintiff or property of the plaintiff.1006 Non-patrimonial loss may be 
claimed where personality rights have been infringed. Damages for “pain and 
suffering” may also be claimed. A plaintiff may generally recover damages in terms 
of: the actio legis Aquiliae; the actio iniuriarum, under the Germanic remedy of pain 
and suffering for infringements of physical-mental integrity in cases of physical 
injury;1007 the actio de pauperie and the actio de pastu aimed at compensating the 
plaintiff who suffered patrimonial loss and pain and suffering as a result of the conduct 
of animals.1008 
 
In respect of injury to personality, the purpose of the award is to provide monetary 
compensation for solace (satisfaction) and to ease wounded feelings.1009 Customary 
law principles such as ubuntu which postulates restorative justice have been taken 
into account in cases of defamation.1010 In respect of the actio legis Aquiliae, the aim 
is compensatory in nature and not penal.1011 The aim is to put the plaintiff in the 
position he would have been in had the delict not occurred and ensure that he 
receives full monetary compensation for all past and future loss.1012 With regard to 
pain and suffering, the purpose is reparation, to provide monetary “imperfect 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1006  Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 2 SA 888 (A) 911; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 50; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 136. 
1007  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 22. 
1008  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 400. 
1009  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 60; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 263. 
1010  The concept of ubuntu and restorative justice in a case of defamation was first advocated by 
Mokgoro J and Sachs J in their minority judgments in Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC). 
In this case the Constitutional Court confirmed that a member of the legislature was not 
immune from liability for defamatory statements made about another member of the legislature 
during a Standing Committee hearing. Damages were initially awarded in the amount of R110 
000 by the High Court. The Constitutional Court did not want to interfere with the lower court’s 
award [102], but both Mokgoro J [63]–[80] and Sachs J [112]-[121] found the award 
unreasonably excessive in that it was out of proportion when compared with injury to 
Mokhatla’s reputation. They did not approve of penalising the defendant in a financial way 
which would push the parties further apart rather than reconcile them and restore the lost 
dignity and respect between them. In support of their opinions, the adjudicators referred to the 
principle of ubuntu as well as the Roman-Dutch law remedy amende honorable comprising of 
a retraction and a sincere and sufficient apology. Sachs J [120] submitted that a monetary 
award of damages is still necessary in cases of defamation as the threat of damages will deter 
a person from making defamatory statements. Furthermore damage to a person’s reputation 
is not fully restored by an apology and counter-publication. Solace for the harm to one’s 
reputation may still be found in the form of monetary compensation.Van der Walt and Midgley 
Delict 29 point out that the minority views of Sachs J and Mokgoro J was recognised in Le 
Roux v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 
2011 6 BCLR 577 (CC) [199]-[203] where the Constitutional Court held that ordering a 
retraction and apology was an appropriate remedy for defamation. The Constitutional Court 
stated that ubuntu advocated restorative justice [202]. 
1011  Burchell Delict 123. 
1012  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 401. 
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compensation” (not full compensation as it is difficult to quantify)1013 as a result of 
physical injuries sustained.1014 It is submitted that the aim of satisfaction, 
compensation and reparation relate to reasonableness. The question is whether it is 
reasonable to compensate the plaintiff for the harm or loss suffered and whether the 
defendant should pay such compensation. The idea behind focusing on 
compensating the plaintiff as opposed to penalising the defendant is a reasonable 
aim with respect to the purpose and function of the law of delict. 
 
6.2 Patrimonial loss 
 
Patrimonial loss may be described as the loss in value of a positive asset in the 
plaintiff’s estate or the increase of a negative element in such estate.1015 An increase 
in a negative element may refer to a debt or an expectation of a debt, which is 
reasonably likely to occur in future.1016 Patrimonial loss includes: damnum emergens 
(actual loss already sustained up until the date of trial);1017 lucrum cessans (loss of 
profit and some forms of future loss);1018 pure economic loss, damage to property;1019 
direct and consequential loss (loss flowing from direct loss);1020 and general1021 and 
special damage.1022 
 
There is a general rule that loss of income earned illegally, for example, by means of 
criminal activity, statutory prohibitions or immoral activity, cannot be considered in a 
claim based in delict as it is against public policy.1023 It is submitted that this is also 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1013  See Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers Ltd 1941 AD 194 199; Potgieter, Steynberg and 
Floyd Damages 507. 
1014  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 434; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 304; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 253. 
1015  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 229-230. In Union Government (Minister of Railways and 
Harbours) v Warneke 1911 AD 657 patrimony was referred to as “a universitas of rights and 
duties”. See also Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 50; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 63. 
1016  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 229-230; cf Burchell Delict 123. 
1017  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 64-65; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 231; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 63. 
1018  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 64-65 129-152; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
223-224; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 63. 
1019  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 65. 
1020  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 65-66. 
1021  General damage in practice usually refers to non-patrimonial loss, pain and suffering as well 
as future loss, whereas special damage refers to patrimonial loss incurred before the trial 
(Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 23 66-68). Cf Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 306. 
1022  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 231; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 306. 
1023  See for example, Dhlamini v Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1974 4 SA 906 (A) where a hawker 
prior to an accident earned an income illegally without the required licence. The court refused 
her claim for future loss of income based on public policy. See also Heese NO v Road Accident 
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reasonable as the law of delict or law in general cannot condone illegal activity. It is 
reasonable that the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover loss of income sustained 
as a result of his own illegal activity. Wrongfulness may be excluded as such activity 
is considered unlawful or there is no damage with regard to the specific head of 
damage, loss of income.1024 In English law this relates to the defence of illegality 
which when applied to the tort of negligence negates the element of duty of care, 
while in the intentional torts; it excludes the claim in the specific tort based on public 
policy.1025 This rule is, however, less severe when dealing with loss of earning 
capacity. Damages may be awarded even if past loss of earnings were considered 
illegal.1026 This approach is also extended to dependants. Thus exceptions apply, for 
instance: where the unlawful activity may have discontinued; where no harm to the 
public is envisaged; where the legislation could have been challenged; or where the 
activity was legalised after the breadwinner’s death.1027 It is submitted that this again 
relates to reasonableness, in that compensation for loss of earning capacity is based 
on the future which is uncertain and there is no guarantee in knowing that the illegal 
activity would have continued in the future. Furthermore, it may be unreasonable that 
an innocent dependant who relied on the illegal income is deprived of the loss of 
income. However, this will have to be weighed against the idea that the law cannot 
condone illegal activity.  
 
The courts make use of the sum-formula approach in assessing patrimonial 
damage.1028 It is a comparative method whereby the plaintiff’s current patrimonial 
position after the damage has occurred, is subtracted from the hypothetical position 
the plaintiff would have been in had the damage not occurred.1029 A sum of money is 
attached to the hypothetical position and compared with the plaintiff’s current 
position.1030 Sometimes the courts also make use of the concrete concept of damage 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Fund 2014 1 SA 357 (WCC). See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 248-250; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 312-313; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 420-421; Burchell Delict 
129-132. 
1024  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 249. 
1025  See chapter 4 para 2.4.7. 
1026  See Marine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd v Katz 1979 4 SA 961 (A) 970. 
1027  See case law referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 250 fn 285. 
1028  See Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke 1911 AD 657; 
Dippenaar v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1979 2 SA 904 (A) 917; De Vos v SA Eagle 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1985 3 SA 447 (A) 451; Rudman v Road Accident Fund 2003 
2 SA 234 (SCA) 240; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 232 fn 101; Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 416. 
1029  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 76-78 criticism of the sum-formula approach. 
1030  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 22; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 232. 
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when assessing patrimonial damage. The position prior to the delict and the position 
after the delict are compared. A hypothetical position is not taken into account.1031 
Due to the fact that patrimonial damage may easily be reflected in mathematical 
figures, it is submitted that these methods of assessment are reasonable methods. 
Furthermore it is a reasonable approach in compensating the plaintiff, as even though 
he cannot be placed in exactly the same position he would have been in had the delict 
not occurred, he is still fairly compensated.1032 
 
Where the plaintiff has incurred medical and similar related expenses as a result of 
an injury; the claimant may recover such costs reasonably incurred.1033 Reasonably 
incurred costs refer to costs incurred as a result of remedying, or mitigating the extent 
of the loss. The plaintiff is not obliged to use public medical service providers in order 
to comply with the requirement of incurring reasonable medical and similar related 
costs.1034 Reasonable transport costs incurred may be claimed for travelling to and 
from the hospital or other medical providers’ etcetera. This may apply to the plaintiff’s 
relatives too, such as a wife attending to her husband while in hospital, or other 
persons depending on the circumstances of the case.1035 Where the plaintiff suffers 
a disability, as a result of the injury sustained and requires: special prosthesis; 
equipment; modification to his home or vehicle and so on, these additional costs, in 
principle may be claimed.1036 Here too, reasonable ‒ necessary costs can be 
recovered. The same principles relating to reasonableness of past medical and 
similar related expenses apply to future medical and related costs. The plaintiff must 
however provide proof by way of expert medical evidence of the future costs.1037  
 
In respect of loss of support, as a result of the death of the breadwinner, the obligation 
or right of support must be proven by the dependant. The point is to put the dependant 
in the position he would have been in had the breadwinner not been killed. Past and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1031  See Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd v Van Zyl NO 2007 1 SA 610 (C) 625; Santam 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 150; De Jager v Grunder 1964 
1 SA 446 (A) 449 456; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 78-80; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 32; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 416. 
1032  See Steynberg 2011 PER 2 ff. 
1033  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 456. 
1034  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 456. 
1035  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 457-458. 
1036  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 458. 
1037  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 459. 
182 
 
future loss of support may be claimed.1038 Funeral expenses may be recovered but 
are limited to the reasonable, necessary costs of: preparing the body for burial or 
cremation; the hearse; transport to attend the ceremony; telephone calls; 
refreshments; and for erecting the tombstone.1039 
 
The plaintiff is entitled to claim past loss of income as well as loss of future income. 
With regard to past loss of income, the plaintiff must prove his actual loss.1040 In 
respect of loss of earning capacity, a person suffers loss in the form of a reduction in 
earning capacity. This head of damages if difficult to assess as it is based on 
assumptions of future events. Actuarial evidence plays an important role and is often 
relied on by the courts.1041  
 
6.3 Non-patrimonial loss 
 
Non-patrimonial loss does not affect a person’s patrimony or estate but has a 
negative effect on one’s personality interests.1042 The legally recognised personality 
rights (corpus, fama and dignitas) include: reputation, liberty, privacy, physical-mental 
integrity, dignity, feelings, and identity.1043 Under the Germanic remedy of pain and 
suffering, the following damages which include both physical and mental injury may 
be claimed: pain and suffering, shock, loss of amenities, shortened life expectancy, 
and disfigurement.1044 
 
In assessing non-patrimonial loss a comparative method is also used in that the “utility 
or quality of the personality interests” is compared before and after the delict in order 
to determine the presence and extent of the loss.1045 In determining the extent of the 
loss, our courts try to attach a monetary value commensurate to the nature, duration 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1038  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 478-490 with regard to the method of assessing 
loss of support. 
1039  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 478. 
1040  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 463. 
1041  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 464-477. 
1042  Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund (Women’s Legal Centre Trust as Amicus Curiae) 2006 
4 SA 230 (CC) 253; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 250. 
1043  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 251. 
1044  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 253-255. See further Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 424-427; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 317-318; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd 
Damages 497; Burchell Delict 135-140. 
1045  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 252. 
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and intensity of the physical and mental harm experienced.1046 Objective factors such 
as a person’s life expectancy, age, gender, social status, lifestyle, degree of 
consciousness and culture are considered.1047 The object of the award is to 
compensate the plaintiff without unnecessarily burdening the defendant.1048 Of 
importance, a fair and reasonable approach (ex aequo et bono) is adopted by the 
courts in assessing non-patrimonial loss.1049 In exercising the fair and reasonable 
approach, the court must on the one hand compensate the plaintiff in a conservative 
manner1050 and should not unnecessarily burden the defendant.1051 Potgieter, 
Steynberg and Floyd1052 aptly submit: 
 
“[i]n a sense ‘fairness’ (equity) is a vague concept without a fixed meaning and a court should 
therefore guard against describing its award as ‘fair’ merely for safety’s sake without having 
actually used a fair method of assessment. Fairness is probably a collective concept in respect 
of inter alia the following principles: the court should consider all the relevant circumstances 
which give an indication of the extent of the non-pecuniary loss and ignore irrelevant 
considerations such as undue sympathy for the defendant; the basic compensatory function 
should receive the necessary emphasis; the court should, without being unreasonable, 
exercise its discretion carefully and conservatively and rather award too little than too much; 
the amount of damages should not unnecessarily burden a defendant in favour of the plaintiff; 
an award should as far as reasonably possible be consistent with awards in comparable 
decisions; the tendency to grant higher awards may be considered as a factor; the high value 
placed on personality interests in the Constitution must be taken into consideration in 
assessing damages; the general economic conditions in the country should be taken into 
account in a justifiable manner. If these principles are applied, one may safely assume that a 
fair approach has been adopted.”  
 
The court must take into account prior comparable awards1053 where the 
circumstances of the particular case are generally similar to the cases being 
compared.1054 
 
With regard to the actio iniuriarum, in respect of intentional personality infringements 
(iniuria), the courts are at liberty to make a monetary award based on ex aequo et 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1046  Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers Ltd 1941 AD 194; Jacobs v Chairman, Governing Body, 
Rhodes High School 2011 1 SA 160 (WCC) 190; Swartbooi v Road Accident Fund 2012 3 All 
SA 593 (WCC) [22]; Radebe v Hough 1949 1 SA 380 (A); Neethling and Potgieter Delict 260. 
1047  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 261; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 424; Potgieter, 
Steynberg and Floyd Damages 498-499. 
1048  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 261; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 500. 
1049  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 261-262; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 500-502. 
1050  See Pitt v Economic Insurance Co Ltd 1957 3 SA 284 (D) 287. 
1051  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 500-502; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 326. 
1052  Damages 501-502. 
1053  See Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Lamb 1971 1 SA 530 (A) 535-536. 
1054  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 262; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 327; Potgieter, 
Steynberg and Floyd Damages 502-506. 
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bono, what is fair and just.1055 The “court has a wide discretion to determine damages 
which is fair and reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case and 
the prevailing attitudes of the community”.1056 Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd1057 
point out that “the principle of fairness can be embodied in the judgement of the 
reasonable person: will the reasonable person, in light of all the relevant 
circumstances, view the award as fair in accordance with the legal convictions of the 
community?” The court in considering what is reasonable and fair depending on the 
circumstances of the case and the boni mores must consider a number of factors, 
such as general factors, constitutional imperatives,1058 and mitigating as well as 
aggravating circumstances.1059 
 
For the purposes of this study, one case of iniuria, “defamation” may be referred to 
just to illustrate the type of factors considered by the courts. Similar principles are in 
any case applicable to other forms of iniuria. The general factors that may be 
considered are inter alia: the character of the plaintiff;1060 the status of the plaintiff or 
defendant in society;1061 severity of the defamation;1062 nature and extent of the 
publication;1063 political effect of defamation, if any;1064 prior decisions which may 
influence the award; the effect of oral defamation in comparison to written defamation; 
conduct of the defendant in failing to apologise up until the date of trial;1065 amount of 
the award suggested by the plaintiff and defendant.1066 The following mitigating 
factors are also considered which may have the effect of reducing the award:1067 truth 
in the defamatory statement; whether an apology or retraction was offered;1068 lack 
of intention or improper motive;1069 personal state of the defendant; where the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1055  Jonker v Schultz 2002 2 SA 360 (O) 367; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 513; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 263; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 427; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 319-320. 
1056  Tuch v Myerson 2010 2 SA 462 (SCA) 468, where the court was dealing was a case of 
defamation. 
1057  Damages 514. 
1058  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 319-320. 
1059  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 515-517. 
1060  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 517-518. 
1061  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 519-520. 
1062  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 521-522. 
1063  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 520-521. 
1064  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 522. 
1065  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 523. 
1066  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 524. 
1067  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 264-265; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 319-320. 
1068  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 526-529. 
1069  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 529-530. 
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defendant was not the author of defamation;1070 any delay in the plaintiff instituting 
the action;1071 and any provocation by the plaintiff.1072 The following aggravating 
circumstances may be considered in increasing the award:1073 conduct of the 
defendant;1074 the manner in which it was published, for example if recklessness was 
involved;1075 significance of defamation;1076 improper motive;1077 whether the 
defendant succeeded in tarnishing the plaintiff’s good name;1078 and the penal aim of 
satisfaction.1079 
 
6.4 Damage to property1080 
 
A plaintiff is entitled to compensation for damage to his property resulting from a 
delict. The “reasonable market value” of the property before and after the date of 
delict is compared (“diminution in market value”). If the property is beyond repair or 
completely damaged then the damage is assessed at the market value at the time it 
was completely damaged.1081 However, this comparison is not always used in 
practice because it is often difficult to prove the market value of the property before 
and after the delict. In such instances the reasonable cost of necessary repairs is 
referred to as a simpler option in assessing damage.1082 In Erasmus v Davis,1083 the 
court referred to the following instances where the reasonable cost of repairs method 
cannot be appropriately applied: in instances where the cost of repairs exceeds the 
market value of the property before the date of the delict; where the repair costs 
exceed the decrease in value of the property; and where the repairs restore the 
property to its position before the date of delict but not its value before the date of 
delict (the plaintiff would receive little compensation).1084 Furthermore, any 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1070  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 530. 
1071  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 531. 
1072  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 531. 
1073  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 264; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 320. 
1074  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 531-532. 
1075  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 534. 
1076  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 532. 
1077  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 533. 
1078  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 534. 
1079  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 534-535. 
1080  See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 60. 
1081  See Monumental Art Co v Kenston Pharmacy (Pty) Ltd 1976 2 SA 111 (C). 
1082  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 247; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 307; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 417; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 419-421; 
Burchell Delict 127. 
1083  1969 2 SA 1 (A) 18. 
1084  See also Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 420-421. 
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consequential loss in respect of the damage to the property may be recovered.1085 
Neethling and Potgieter1086 refer to other principles applied in assessing quantum of 
damage with regard to: alienation; theft; or destruction of property; loss of use; 
negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation; unlawful competition; infringement of 
immaterial property rights; duress; nuisance; unlawful competition; claims in terms of 
statues; defamation; adultery; unlawful imprisonment and other special damages 
which will not be discussed for purposes of this study. 
 
6.5 Principles applicable to patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss 
 
Some general factors are considered by the courts when quantifying loss1087 such as: 
inflation;1088 interest;1089 tax;1090 time of the assessment;1091 currency;1092 and 
contingencies.1093 
 
Patrimonial and non-patrimonial damage is generally assessed from the date of 
cause of action.1094 All past and prospective loss must generally1095 be claimed once 
based on a single cause of action, in terms of the once and for all rule.1096 It is 
submitted that this is a reasonable rule as it would be unfair to expect the defendant 
to pay compensation indefinitely in the future. It is reasonable that all loss should be 
assessed and claimed once and for all so that the defendant is able to pay the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1085  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 307. 
1086  Delict 247-248. See also Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 424-452. 
1087  See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 60. 
1088  Especially relevant with prior comparable awards, future expenses, as well as loss of earnings. 
See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 328-329; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 412-413; 
Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 325-329. 
1089  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 330; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 412. 
1090  Considered in assessing past loss of earnings and future earning capacity. See Van der Walt 
and Midgley Delict 329; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 412. 
1091  Usually assessed from the date of delict. See General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd v 
Summers; General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd v Nhlumayo, Southern 
Versekeringsassosiasie Bpk v Carstens 1987 3 SA 577 (A); Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 
330; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 411-412. 
1092  Payment may be made in a foreign currency or the equivalent South African Rand value. See 
Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 4 SA 747 (A); Burger v Union 
National South British Insurance Co 1975 4 SA 72 (W) 74-75; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 
331; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 413-414. 
1093  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 414-415. 
1094  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 92. 
1095  See the exceptions referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 236, and Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 407-408. 
1096  Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 814 (A) 835. See in general Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 235-236; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 315-316; Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 404-407. 
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compensation with the knowledge that it will be the end of the matter. This is also 
reasonable in terms of the legal processes.  
 
Mention should be made briefly of “contingencies” which are uncertain positive or 
negative events.1097 They are unrelated to the defendant’s conduct. If these events 
materialise, it would affect a person’s “health, income, earning capacity, quality of life, 
life expectancy or dependency on support in future or could have done so in the 
past”.1098 They must be considered in a fair and reasonable manner and may result 
in increasing or decreasing the plaintiff’s award during quantification of the award. To 
begin with, the plaintiff must prove a likelihood of prospective loss occurring on a 
balance of probabilities.1099 Thereafter the court considers whether the likelihood will 
materialise making allowance for such contingency usually reducing1100 the award by 
a percentage1101 (between five to eighty percent).1102 The courts do not rely on a 
particular test and in practice rely on actuarial evidence as a guide in order to 
establish the probability of the likelihood of the contingency arising thereafter deciding 
how much the award should be reduced by.1103 However, the courts need not rely on 
the actuarial evidence1104 and deal with each case based on its own facts relying on 
normative concepts such as fairness and reasonableness.1105 The courts “make an 
award of an arbitrary, globular amount of what seems to it to be fair and reasonable, 
even though the result may be no more than an informed guess”.1106 For example, 
the following contingencies are often considered by the courts: that the plaintiff’s 
business might not be a success; the probability of future non-fatal accidents; the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1097  Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (A) 117; Minister of Defence v 
Jackson 1991 4 SA 23 (ZSC) 34-35; Ngubane v SA Transport Services 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 
781-782; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 313-314. 
1098  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 25, 142. 
1099  See Burger v Union National South British Insurance Co 1975 4 SA 72 (W) 74-75; Blyth v Van 
den Heever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) 225-226; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 314. 
1100  See Steynberg 2008 De Jure 109-125 who in detail discusses positive and negative 
contingencies. See also Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 144 fn 105. 
1101  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 314. 
1102  See Steynberg 2007 THRHR 238. 
1103  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 225; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 415. 
1104  Krugell v Shield Versekeringsmaatskappy 1982 4 SA 95 (T) 101; see cases referred to by 
Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 145 fn 107. 
1105  See Southern Insurance v Association v Bailey 1984 1 SA 98 (SA) 113-114 116-117; Griffiths 
v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 1994 1 SA 535 (A) 546; Van Minister of Defence v 
Jackson 1991 4 SA 23 (ZSC) 31; Ngubane v SA Transport Services 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 781; 
Hendricks v President Insurance Co Ltd 1993 3 SA 158 (C) 163-165; Lebona v President 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1991 3 SA 395 (W); Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 415; Van 
der Walt and Midgley Delict 314; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 144-145 fn 106. 
1106  See Griffiths v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 1994 1 SA 535 (A) 546; Van der Walt and 
Midgley Delict 314. 
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probability of the plaintiff being employed in the future; the prospect of a widow 
remarrying or the likelihood of a divorce if her husband had not died when quantifying 
loss of support; shortened life expectancy which means that an award for future 
income may be reduced.1107 
 
A plaintiff may also gain a benefit when loss is sustained. This benefit is referred to 
as “a compensating advantage”, such as ex gratia (charitable) benefits or insurance 
benefits. Some benefits may be taken into account in reducing the plaintiffs claim and 
some may not be taken into account as they are regarded irrelevant - res inter alios 
acta (also referred to as the collateral source rule).1108 The courts have in the past 
adopted a casuistic approach in dealing with the collateral source rule, but there 
seems to be some kind of consensus in that ex gratia benefits and benefits acquired 
through ordinary insurance contracts where monthly premiums are paid by the 
plaintiff; are excluded in quantifying the damages. Employment benefits relating to 
paid sick leave, medical insurance payments, pension payments and disability 
benefits generally are considered in reducing the compensation awarded for 
damages.1109 
 
In respect of compensating advantages, there are two conflicting considerations 
where a balance must be obtained. On the one hand it may seem as though the 
plaintiff receives double compensation, while on the other hand society would frown 
upon the idea of the defendant benefitting from the plaintiff’s precaution in securing 
insurance or from a third party’s generosity.1110 
 
For example, in Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v Dugmore,1111 the plaintiff, who 
had been injured in a motor vehicle accident and was incapacitated and unable to 
work, was entitled to monthly disability pension payments and benefits in terms of an 
insurance policy. The court had to decide whether these amounts should be 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1107  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 415. 
1108  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 238-244; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 323-
324; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 408-411; Burchell Delict 141-145. 
1109  See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 324; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 232-233; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 239-242; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 410 with respect to 
some examples of the benefits that the courts consider or not in quantifying the damages. 
1110  Standard General Ins Co Ltd v Dugmore 1997 1 SA 33 (A) 48; Zysset v Santam Ltd 1996 1 
SA 273 (C) 279; Van Wyk v Santam Bpk 1998 4 SA 731 (C) 737; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Delict 323-324; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 232-233. 
1111  1997 1 SA 33 (A). 
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disregarded or taken into account in quantifying the damages. The court in the end 
did not take account of the insurance policy benefit, but did take into account the 
pension benefit. The court agreed with Boberg1112 that there is no single test 
applicable to determine which benefits are deductible and which are collateral. In 
South Africa and in England the problem is normative in nature. Policy considerations 
and fairness play a role. The courts have thus adopted a flexible approach and take 
into account general principles such as reasonableness, fairness, and justice.1113 Van 
der Walt and Midgley1114 state that the collateral source rule functions as an ex post 
facto rationalisation of the adjudicator’s conclusion that a benefit is legally res inter 
alios acta. Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd1115 list the following factors and principles 
inter alia the courts consider in respect of the collateral source: source of the benefit; 
characteristic of the benefit; how the benefit is financed; assessment of the value of 
the benefit; the reason for and basis of the benefit; the intention with which the benefit 
is received or given; the relevance of the benefit; the nature of the loss; causation; 
and whether a punitive element should be considered.  
 
A plaintiff must take reasonable steps where applicable to mitigate his initial loss or 
prevent further loss caused by the defendants conduct.1116 This applies to patrimonial 
and non-patrimonial loss suffered till date of trial, as well as future loss.1117 A failure 
to take such reasonable steps or an omission to prevent further loss1118 will result in 
the plaintiff not being entitled to compensation for damages that he could have 
reasonably prevented.1119 The plaintiff must take all reasonable steps and the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1112  Delict 479. See Standard General Ins Co Ltd v Dugmore 1997 1 SA 33 (A) 41-42 47. 
1113  See Standard General Ins Co Ltd v Dugmore 1997 1 SA 33 (A) 41-42; Zysset v Santam Ltd 
1996 1 SA 273 (C) 278-279; Santam v Byleveldt 1973 2 SA 146 (A) 150-151; Van Wyk v 
Santam Bpk 1998 4 SA 731 (C) 737-738; Ongevallekommissaris v Santam Bpk 1999 1 SA 
251 (A) 261; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 229 fn 5; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
243; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 409-410; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 323. 
1114  Delict 323. See also Botha v Rondalia Versekeringskorporasie van SA Bpk 1978 1 SA 996 (T) 
1001. 
1115  Damages 270-273. See also Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 323. 
1116  See in general Neethling and Potgieter Delict 244-245; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 331; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 422-424; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 295-301; 
Burchell Delict 126. 
1117  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 295. 
1118  See cases referred to by Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 296-297 fn 150. 
1119  See Butler v Durban Corporation 1936 NPD 139; Shrog v Valentine 1949 3 SA 1228 (T); Van 
Almelo v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 411 (C); Modimogale v Zweni 1990 4 SA 122 
(B); Neethling and Potgieter Delict 244; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 331; Loubser and 
Midgley (eds) Delict 422; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 296. 
190 
 
standard of reasonableness on the part of the plaintiff need not be too high.1120 The 
plaintiff must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss as soon as he is aware or 
should have been reasonably aware that he should mitigate his loss.1121 A plaintiff 
who takes reasonable steps to mitigate the loss sustained may in addition recover 
loss incurred as a result of taking such reasonable steps.1122 The defendant need 
only compensate the plaintiff for the actual loss even if the plaintiff exceeded conduct 
expected of him.1123 If the plaintiff failed to take the reasonable steps required of him, 
the onus is on the defendant to prove same and if the defendant discharges the onus, 
then the plaintiff must prove his loss had he taken the reasonable steps.1124 Van der 
Walt and Midgley1125 point out that there is uncertainty as to whether the principle of 
mitigation of loss stems from legal causation or negligence (based on the standard of 
the reasonable person),1126 however, the two approaches reach the same conclusion. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
As shown above, reasonableness plays a more explicit role in determining whether 
compensation should be awarded for damage suffered by the plaintiff. 
Reasonableness is inextricably linked to the concepts of fairness and justice. Thus it 
may be stated that it is only reasonable for delictual liability to follow if harm, damage 
or loss is sustained.1127 In respect of the damage sustained, it is only fair and 
reasonable to compensate the plaintiff: as it may not be physically possible to put the 
plaintiff in exactly the same position he was before the delict; or for the property to be 
in the same position prior to the delict. If the plaintiff is entitled to compensation, then 
fair and reasonable compensation must be awarded to the plaintiff taking all 
considerations into account.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1120  Due to the fact that the defendant is the culpable person. See Silva v Coutinho 1971 3 SA 123 
(A) 145; Everett v Marian Heights (Pty) Ltd 1970 1 SA 198 (C) 201. See further cases referred 
to by Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 298 fn 153. 
1121  Krugell v Shield Versekeringsmpy Bpk 1982 4 SA 95 (T) 99; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
244; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 296-297. 
1122  See Romansrivier Koöp Wynkelder v Chemserve Manufacturing 1993 2 SA 358 (C) 367; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 244; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 422-423; Potgieter, 
Steynberg and Floyd Damages 299-230. 
1123  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 244; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 300. 
1124  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 245; Steynberg and Floyd Damages 301. 
1125  Delict 331. See also Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 423-424. 
1126  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 295 fn 145. 
1127 Except in instances where an interdict is sought. 
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The influence of reasonableness is apparent in determining: the plaintiff’s general 
duty to mitigate loss, assessing patrimonial loss with respect to reasonable and fair 
mathematical approaches; assessing non-patrimonial loss, where the courts apply a 
“fair and reasonable” approach; applying contingencies, considering which benefits 
may be deducted or are collateral, where reasonableness, fairness and justice are 
considered by the courts; and loss in respect of damage to property, where the 
reasonable market value of the property is considered or the reasonable costs of 
repair of such property is considered. In terms of the actio iniuriarum, the courts 
determine damage based on what is fair and reasonable taking note of all the 
prevailing circumstances and legal convictions of the community embodied in the 
judgment of the reasonable person.  
 
Finally the idea that the aim of the law of delict is to compensate the plaintiff is a 
reasonable one as opposed to penalising the defendant which is more an aim of 
criminal law. The concept of ubuntu and restorative justice also focus on repair as 
opposed to penalising the defendant. The aim with compensation as well as 
restorative justice is to bring back balance and in so doing ensure an outcome that is 
reasonable and fair.  
 
7. Wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims 
 
To begin with, it should be noted that there is a lack of authority in the law of delict for 
wrongful conception, birth, and life claims.1128 Generally, the South African textbooks 
on the law of delict do not discuss these claims. The reason being, no doubt, that 
these claims were not recognised in our law until very recently.1129 
 
Wrongful conception (also referred to as “wrongful pregnancy”) claims usually stem 
from failed sterilisation procedures, or where the sterilisation procedure was not 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1128  See however the discussion of these claims in Neethling and Potgieter Delict 70 fn 229; 
 Boezaart in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 
 93ff; Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann 
 Neethling 345 ff. 
1129  See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 
345 ff. 
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performed at all,1130 resulting in an unwanted pregnancy.1131 The child is born without 
any disabilities.1132 Wrongful birth claims stem from instances where a congenital 
condition is not detected during pregnancy, resulting in the birth of a child with a 
disability.1133 As a result of the failure to detect and inform the parents of the 
congenital condition, the parents are denied the right to choose to terminate the 
pregnancy.1134 If they had been informed of the possibility or existence of the disability 
they would have had the option to terminate the pregnancy and, thus, the right to 
autonomy is impaired.1135 In both wrongful conception and birth claims, the claim is 
usually instituted by the parents of the child against medical practitioners or medical 
institutions.1136 Wrongful life claims, on the other hand, are instituted by the child living 
with a disability or disabilities based on the failure of the medical practitioner or 
employees of medical institutions to detect the congenital disability.1137 
 
Wrongful conception claims have been recognised in South Africa both in a claim 
based in contracts1138 and in delict.1139 Administrator, Natal v Edouard,1140 dealt with 
a contractual claim for damages stemming from the failed sterilisation of the mother 
which resulted in the birth of a child. The court granted child rearing expenses which 
were pre-determined by the parties.1141 The court took note of the parent’s financial 
reasons for not wanting another child. The court held that the wrong consisted of the 
unwanted burden of the child rearing costs and not the unwanted birth.1142 The legal 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1130  Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 346-
347. 
1131  See Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A); Mukheibir v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 
(SCA).  
1132  See Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A); Mukheibir v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 
(SCA). 
1133  See Freidman v Glicksman 1996 1 SA 1134 (W); Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen 
(eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 347. 
1134  See H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 205. 
1135  See Friedman v Glicksman 1996 1 SA 1134 (W) 1138; Stewart v Botha 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA) 
319; the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1996 provides for the termination of a 
pregnancy where there is a risk that a child may be born with a disability. Sections 12(2)(a) 
and 27 of the Constitution also provide for the right to terminate a pregnancy.  
1136  See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 
347. 
1137  See H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC); Mukheibir Essays in honour of Johann 
Neethling 346-347. 
1138  In Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A). See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and 
Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 347. 
1139  In Mukheibir v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA). See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen 
(eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 347. 
1140  1990 3 SA 581 (A). 
1141  Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A) 596. 
1142  Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A) 590. 
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loss the parents suffer lies in the financial costs of maintaining the child which may 
be recovered.1143 Van Heerden J,1144 in allowing the claim for child rearing costs,1145 
stated that it would in fact assist the parents in raising the child. He thus dismissed 
the reasons advanced for not allowing child rearing expenses inter alia because it is 
morally wrong to burden the defendant with the costs of child rearing while allowing 
the parents the benefit and joy in raising the child. In Mukheibir v Raath,1146 the 
parents of the child alleged that the medical practitioner had negligently 
misrepresented to them that a sterilisation procedure had been performed on the 
mother. The parents stopped taking contraceptive measures which resulted in the 
birth of a child. The parents claimed in delict for pure economic loss. The court held 
that whether the claim is framed in contracts or in delict, the medical practitioner owes 
a duty of care to the patients and that it was not contra bonos mores for the medical 
practioner to be held liable for the damages. The court further held that delictual 
claims need not be limited to claims based on socio-economic reasons as was held 
in Administrator, Natal v Edouard. Other reasons such as a couple deciding not to 
have more children are acceptable.1147 
 
Wrongful birth claims were recognised in Friedman v Glicksman1148 and Stewart v 
Botha.1149 In Freidman v Glicksman, the medical practitioner failed to detect 
congenital defects during pregnancy. The child was born with severe disabilities. The 
mother’s claim for child rearing costs as well as future medical and hospital expenses 
were allowed by the court.1150 In Stewart v Botha, the medical practitioners were 
likewise sued for not detecting congenital defects during pregnancy. The child was 
born with severe disabilities. The court allowed the mother’s claim for damages 
consisting of costs for the child’s maintenance, special schooling needs, as well as 
future hospital and medical costs. In both these cases, wrongful life claims were also 
instituted on behalf of the child but the courts refused to recognise these claims as it 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1143  Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A) 590. See H v Fetal Assessment Centre 
2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 213. 
1144  Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A) 590. 
1145  Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A) 590. 
1146  1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA). 
1147  See Mukheibir v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA) [46], [49]. H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 
2 SA 193 (CC) 213. 
1148  1996 1 SA 1134 (W). See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour 
of Johann Neethling 347. 
1149  2008 6 SA 310 (SCA). See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour 
of Johann Neethling 347. 
1150  Friedman v Glicksman 1996 1 SA 1134 (W) 1140. 
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was considered contra bonos mores to acknowledge non-existence over 
existence.1151 
 
Mukheibir1152 points out that there has been much debate worldwide on the 
recognition of wrongful life claims because of the fact inter alia that the child’s claim 
is based on the premise that he should not have been born, acknowledging this is 
considered against public policy. Furthermore, the assessment of damages is 
considered problematic as it entails comparing the child’s current state of quality of 
life to the position had it not been born.1153 However, the Constitutional Court in South 
Africa recognised a wrongful life claim in H v Fetal Assessment Centre.1154 In this 
case, it was alleged that employees of the centre had negligently failed to notify the 
mother of the risk of Down Syndrome from a scan. Had the mother been aware of the 
risk she would have terminated the pregnancy. Damages for future medical and 
hospital expenses as well as non-patrimonial loss were claimed. 
 
Froneman J1155 criticised the particulars of claim which referred to the duty of care 
owed to the mother and the breach of the duty of care by the centre, in reference to 
negligence. He submitted that those terms are associated with the tort of negligence 
in English law that do not assist in determining wrongfulness in the South African law 
of delict. He1156 stated that the birth of a child is a celebration for most people, but the 
realities of living with disabilities should not be ignored. He further stated that the term 
“wrongful life” used is “unfortunate and wrong” as the issue is not the wrongful life of 
the child, but rather whether a child is entitled to compensation as a result of living 
with a disability. In recognising a wrongful life claim, Froneman J1157 referred to 
developing the law of delict in line with constitutional imperatives. In respect of the 
existence of harm, he referred to the loss suffered by the parents. The loss suffered 
entailed, the costs of raising a child with a disability but if the parents for any reason 
are unable to claim or do not claim, the child may in lieu of the parents be entitled to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1151  See Stewart v Botha 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA) 319. Friedman v Glicksman 1996 1 SA 1134 (W) 
1141-1142. Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann 
Neethling 348-349. 
1152  In Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 346-347. 
1153  See H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 202. 
1154  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC). 
1155  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 197. 
1156  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 201. See also Administrator, Natal v 
Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A) 585-596. 
1157  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 210. 
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claim.1158 Thus there is one wrongdoer, the medical practitioner or the medical 
institution, and the harm lies in the burden imposed on the parents.1159 With regard 
to wrongfulness, Froneman J1160 held that wrongfulness lay in the breach of a legal 
duty not to cause loss to the child and not to violate the rights of the child under 
section 28(2) of the Constitution. He submitted that the child’s dignity is not infringed 
in claiming, as allowing the claim will assist the child in dealing with the disability she 
is living with, thus enabling her to live “as comfortably as possible”.1161 Further, under 
wrongfulness, Froneman J1162 dealt with indeterminate liability, stating that the liability 
is determinate in that either the child or the parents may claim for the loss and that it 
was not unreasonable to impose liability. Factual causation lay in the fact that had 
the misdiagnosis not occurred, then the birth leading to the loss would not have 
occurred. Froneman J1163 acknowledged that policy considerations may still negate 
legal causation, but that it was for the High Court to find, including whether all the 
elements of delictual liability were present. Mukheiber1164 submits that this decision 
was positive in recognising a wrongful life claim, but criticises the claim being 
dependant on the parents not claiming. She submits that this may assist with 
indeterminate liability, but the child’s harm (patrimonial and non-patrimonial) is 
distinct from the parents. Mukheibir1165 submits that the court should have relied on 
shifting the loss onto the medical practitioner for his wrongful and culpable conduct 
instead of referring to the best interests of the child.  
 
The court provided a summary of the different jurisdictions that recognise wrongful 
life claims. For purposes of this study it was noted that the United Kingdom does not 
recognise wrongful life claims, they do not have a constitution protecting rights and 
section 1(2) of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act1166 denies wrongful life 
claims. The reasons for the denial includes inter alia the idea that it would burden 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1158  214-216. See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays honour of Johann 
Neethling 350-351. 
1159  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 215-216. 
1160  216-217. See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann 
Neethling 351. 
1161  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 217. See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel 
and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 352. 
1162  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 217. See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel 
and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 352. 
1163  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 218. See Mukheibir in Potgieter, Knobel 
and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 351. 
1164  In Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling  355. 
1165  In Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 356. 
1166  1976. 
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medical practitioners “in their socially and morally exacting role” and that medical 
practitioners would advise abortions in difficult cases out of fear of being sued.1167 
France also does not recognise wrongful life claims1168 and in the United States of 
America a few states allow such claims.1169 Wrongful birth claims are allowed in the 
United Kingdom and in most states in the United States of America.1170 
 
In respect of wrongful conception claims, the harm lies in the costs of raising the child. 
In respect of wrongful birth claims, the harm lies in maintaining the child living with a 
disability with special schooling and other needs, as well as future hospital and 
medical costs.1171 A distinction is made between a claim submitted by either the 
parents or the child. A claim by the parents is a wrongful birth claim, where the parents 
were denied the choice to terminate the pregnancy had they known of the congenital 
conditions. Wrongful life claims are instituted by the child. The harm, as Mukheiber 
convincingly argues above, suffered by the parents and the child is distinct. The child 
may be entitled to claim patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss. It is thus only 
reasonable that both the child and parents should be entitled to damages. The 
parents may suffer not only special damages based on the costs of raising the child 
with special needs but also medical and hospital costs. They may even suffer non-
patrimonial loss. The conduct is usually in the form of an omission and it is only 
reasonable to hold the medical practitioner or medical institutions liable if conduct is 
present. Wrongfulness may lie: in the breach of a legal duty by the medical 
practitioner to either inform the parents of the risk of conceiving or the risk of the child 
being born with a congenital condition; or by breach of a legal duty to prevent harm 
ensuing. We have not had a case yet where the mother was informed of a congenital 
condition and refused to terminate the pregnancy, resulting in the birth of a child living 
with a disability which led to a wrongful life claim. The parents’ right to terminate the 
pregnancy, their freedom of security of person in terms of section 12 of the 
Constitution, is limited.1172 Their right is not limited in a reasonable and justified 
manner. Therefore such limitation may be considered unreasonable. The limitation of 
the child’s rights in terms of section 28 of the Constitution is also unreasonable. Thus 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1167  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 222. 
1168  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 222. 
1169  California, New Jersey, Maine and Washington. 
1170  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 228-231. 
1171  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 213. 
1172  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) 213. 
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wrongfulness in terms of the traditional approach may be present in the breach of a 
legal duty or infringement of a right. According to the recent approach it is not 
unreasonable to hold the medical practitioner or medical institution liable. Fault 
usually in the form of negligence would be determined based on the standard of the 
reasonable professional. Thus if the conduct of the medical practitioner or staff in the 
circumstances of the case strays from the standard of the reasonable professional, 
then negligence is present. The birth of either an unexpected child which results in 
the costs of raising the child, or the costs of raising a child with special needs including 
medical costs, may not have occurred had the medical practitioners or medical staff 
acted reasonably. Thus, factual causation would be found easily. In terms of legal 
causation, it would depend on whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impute liability 
on the medical practitioners or medical institutions for the harm or loss suffered by 
either the parents or the child. Thus the influence of reasonableness on wrongful 
conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims is predominantly explicit. 
 
8. Psychiatric or psychological injury 
 
Due to a lack of authority in Roman-Dutch law in respect of claims for psychiatric or 
psychological injury, our courts have referred to English law for guidance.1173 In 
English law, claims for negligently inflicted psychiatric injury is also one of the 
recognised categories of duty of care. In other words, depending on the 
circumstances, the defendant may owe the claimant a duty to avoid causing him 
psychiatric injury. In South Africa, the majority of delictual claims that have come 
before the court relate to claims for psychiatric injury as a result of emotional 
shock.1174 Psychiatric injury may be sustained through inter alia fright, stress, 
emotional shock, or mental suffering.1175 In order to succeed in a claim in delict 
resulting from psychological or psychiatric injury, such injury must not be minor. That 
is, as Neethling and Potgieter1176 put it – the injury must be “reasonably serious”.1177 
For example, the courts have awarded compensation where the injury resulted in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1173  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 286. Chapter 4 para 3.3.2. 
1174  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 285; Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 181 ff. 
1175  There is no numerus clausus (Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 307. See also Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 285; Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 184-185. 
1176  Delict 287. 
1177  See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 307 list of psychiatric injuries that have been recognised 
and where the courts have awarded compensation. 
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“major depressive disorder”; “serious shock”, personality changes, and so forth.1178 
Furthermore evidence must be produced to prove the psychiatric injury.1179 
 
No doubt as a result of the influence of English law there is a distinction between 
“primary” and “secondary” victims of psychiatric injury or emotional shock. This is 
evident where the legislation regulating road accident claims makes reference to 
primary and secondary victims as well as numerous cases.1180 The following 
distinction between primary and second victims who suffer emotional shock may be 
referred to.  
 
“In the case of claims for emotional shock suffered by primary victims of the accident, the 
emotional shock is usually accompanied by physical injuries sustained. On the other hand, in 
the case of claims for emotional shock suffered by secondary victims, the emotional shock is 
not usually accompanied by physical injuries (although the secondary victim may have been 
in physical danger). A secondary victim is one who typically witnessed or heard of a disturbing 
event.” 1181 
 
South African law does not refer to the principles of proximity (applicable in English 
law) which limit claims for psychiatric injury especially with regard to secondary 
victims. However, in all the cases where compensation was awarded for secondary 
emotional shock “a strong emotional bond or close relationship between the 
secondary victim and the injured or deceased had existed”.1182 
 
The actio legis Aquiliae may be applied to claim patrimonial loss.1183 Where non-
patrimonial loss is suffered as a result of the infringement of the plaintiff’s physical-
mental integrity, compensation for damages may be claimed with the actio iniuriarum 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1178  See Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 190-191 with regard to the list of cases. 
1179  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 285. See authority cited by Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 
184. 
1180  S 19(g) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 makes reference to claimants who suffer 
secondary emotional shock. Such claimants are excluded from claiming from the  Road 
Accident Fund and must claim from the wrongdoer in terms of common law. Primary victims 
are in principle entitled to claim compensation for emotional shock from the Road Accident 
Fund, provided the other requirements have been met. See Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 
THRHR 186-188 in respect of the cases where reference is made to primary and secondary 
victims. 
1181  Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 185-186. 
1182  Ahmed and Steynberg THRHR 2015 188. 
1183  See Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk 1973 1 SA 769 (A) 
776-777, 781; Gibson v Berkowitz 1996 4 SA 1029 (W) 1038; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
(2010) 5, 275; Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 182.  
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or the action for pain and suffering.1184 Psychiatric injury caused intentionally or 
negligently may ground delictual liability.1185 
 
Generally all the required elements of a delict must be proven but as a result of the 
influence of English law, the courts have placed emphasis on the criterion of 
“reasonable foreseeability of harm” which as mentioned is relevant in determining 
wrongfulness, (a factor considered when determining whether the defendant’s 
conduct was reasonable in infringing a right or the presence of a legal duty to prevent 
harm), negligence (the first leg of the test to negligence) and legal causation (where 
reasonable foreseeability of harm may be one of the criterion applied as part of the 
flexible test).1186 In Barnard v Santam Bpk,1187 the court stated that it was irrelevant 
whether “reasonable foreseeability” of harm was determined within the ambit of 
negligence or legal causation.  
 
As mentioned, wrongfulness usually lies in the infringement of a right or breach of a 
legal duty. In cases of psychiatric injury the person’s physical-mental integrity is 
usually infringed. Thus the defendant’s infringement of the plaintiff’s interests is 
unreasonable, grounding wrongfulness.1188 Since Bester v Commercial Union 
Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk,1189 the nervous system and brain are deemed 
as part of a person’s body so an injury to the brain (psychiatric or psychological injury) 
is regarded as a physical injury.1190 
 
In determining negligence using the criterion of reasonable foreseeability of harm, the 
courts tend to prefer the concrete approach, thus the general nature of the harm and 
the general manner of its occurrence must be foreseen in respect of a specific 
plaintiff,1191 as opposed to the abstract approach.1192 Thus if it can be concluded on 
a balance of probabilities that the reasonable person in the position of the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1184  Where for example, emotional shock was caused intentionally, the actio iniuriarum may be an 
appropriate remedy. See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 308-309. 
1185  See authority referred to by Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 182 fn 6, 191 fn 75-76. 
1186  Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 184. 
1187  1999 1 SA 202 (SCA) 210. 
1188  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 325-326; Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 190. 
1189  1973 1 SA 769 (A) 777, 779. 
1190  Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 190. 
1191  See Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 309. 
1192  See Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 193 fn 86 in respect of the cases where the courts 
have referred to the concrete approach. See also para 2.4.2 above in respect of the difference 
between the two approaches. 
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should have foreseen the reasonable possibility of psychiatric injury to the specific 
plaintiff and would have taken reasonable steps to avoid the harm, then negligence 
is present.1193 If “the negligent conduct of the wrongdoer directly placed the plaintiff 
in personal danger, it should not be too difficult to prove that the harm to the plaintiff 
was reasonably foreseeable by the wrongdoer, and more so in the case of 
intentionally inflicted harm”.1194 When one intentionally causes shock to another, the 
court has held that the defendant “must foresee the natural consequences of his 
intentional act”.1195 
 
“Reasonable foreseeability of harm” in respect of a secondary victim could sometimes 
be more challenging to prove.1196 Botha JA in Bester v Commercial Union 
Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk,1197 stated that in instances where the victim is 
in personal danger, it is easier to conclude that the possibility of harm should have 
been reasonably foreseeable as compared to instances where the plaintiff saw the 
harm being inflicted or heard of it. Ultimately the court must consider the facts and 
the surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether the psychiatric injury 
was reasonably foreseeable and whether the defendant could have reasonably taken 
steps to prevent the harm.1198 
 
The courts do not have problems finding factual causation or the presence of conduct. 
It is reasonable to hold the defendant liable only if the defendant’s conduct caused 
the psychiatric injury. In respect of factual causation, the defendant must have 
factually caused the psychiatric injury. Mention has already been made of the fact 
that the damage or harm must be a recognised form of psychiatric or psychological 
injury but such injury must be proven. The courts however do encounter problems 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1193  Road Accident Fund v Sauls 2002 2 SA 55 (SCA) 60. See also Ahmed and Steynberg THRHR 
193-194. 
1194  Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 194 as well as the cases referred to. 
1195  Boswell v Minister of Police 1978 3 SA 268 (E) 274. See Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 
194. 
1196  Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 194. 
1197  1973 1 SA 769 (A) 781. 
1198  See Road Accident Fund v Sauls 2002 2 SA 55 (SCA) 60; Barnard v Santam Bpk 1999 1 SA 
202 (SCA) 214; Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk 1973 1 SA 
769 (A) 780; Majiet v Santam Ltd 1997 4 All SA 555 (C) 558; Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 
THRHR 194-195. 
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with finding legal causation.1199 The flexible criterion1200 is applied in determining legal 
causation and what must be established is whether there is a close enough 
relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the psychiatric injury sustained in 
order for the defendant to be held liable for the psychiatric injury in view of policy 
considerations based on reasonableness, fairness and justice.1201 If the psychiatric 
injury is too remote, for example, if a secondary victim did not have a close 
relationship with the primary victim and saw an incident over the television, his 
psychiatric injury may be regarded too remote and the defendant may not be held 
delictually liable for the secondary victim’s psychiatric injury.   
 
There is no numerus clausus with regard to which type of relationships are recognised 
by the courts.1202 In Road Accident Fund v Sauls, the court stated that the “question 
is one of legal policy, reasonableness, fairness and justice (legal causation), that is, 
was the relationship between the primary and secondary victims such that the claim 
should be allowed, taking all the facts into consideration”.1203 This could also be 
applied under the question of wrongfulness as explained by Loubser and Midgley.1204 
If the plaintiff for example was at the scene of the accident or came across the 
aftermath of the accident and subsequently suffered psychiatric injury, the courts 
would in all probability more readily conclude that the harm was reasonably 
foreseeable.1205 The number of secondary victims who could for example hear and 
see the aftermath of an accident could be limitless. The policy considerations in 
respect of indeterminate liability and the floodgates argument have been considered 
by the courts.1206 The flexible approach to establishing legal causation could easily 
limit liability with respect to psychiatric injury sustained by secondary victims.1207 Thus 
legal causation in our law serves to limit claims and the criterion of reasonable 
foreseeability of harm when applied to the different elements must be applied 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1199  See Barnard v Santam Bpk 1999 1 SA 202 (SCA) 215; Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 
195. 
1200  S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A) 39-41. See Barnard v Santam Bpk 1999 1 SA 202 (SCA) 215; 
Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 195. 
1201  S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A)  40-41. Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 195-196. 
1202  Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 196 in respect of the list of relationships. 
1203  2002 2 SA 55 (SCA) 62-63. See Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 196. Cf Swartbooi v 
Road Accident Fund 2013 1 SA 30 (WCHC) 34. 
1204  (Eds) Delict 310. 
1205  Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 196-197.  
1206  See Clinton-Parker and Dawkins v Administrator, Transvaal 1996 2 SA 37 (W) 63; Majiet v 
Santam Ltd 1997 4 All SA 555 (C) 558; Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 196. 
1207  Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 197. 
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correctly within the ambit of each element. The influence of reasonableness on claims 
for psychiatric injury is explicit, particularly with the requirement of reasonable 
foreseeability of harm. 
 
9. Pure economic loss 
 
It should be noted that the English tort of negligence where pure economic loss falls 
within what is referred to as a recognised category of duty of care has influenced 
claims for pure economic loss in the South African law of delict to a large extent.1208 
As submitted, the recent approach to determining wrongfulness by our courts is 
similar to the English third element of establishing a duty of care in the tort of 
negligence (that is, whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care). 
These two approaches are also similar to determining legal causation. They are all 
policy based inquiries but are still applied differently with regard to each element.  
 
There is no clear definition of pure economic loss.1209 It has been defined in a negative 
sense where it refers to loss which is not related to damage to corporeal property or 
physical injury.1210 Alternatively, Neethling and Potgieter1211 submit that it refers to 
“financial loss that does flow from damage to property or impairment of personality 
but which does not involve the plaintiff’s property or person; or if it does, the defendant 
did not cause such damage or injury”. Pure economic loss may be caused 
intentionally or negligently. For example, pure economic loss may be caused by a 
negligent misrepresentation1212 or by an intentional interference with contractual 
relations.1213 Pure economic loss can be difficult to quantify as the loss can be 
uncertain and may seem endless.1214 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1208  See chapter 4 para 3.3.3. 
1209  In Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority 2006 1 
SA 461 (SCA) 465 Harms JA referred to Neethling and Potgieter (4 ed) Delict as well as the 
“Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia The Laws of Scotland (1996) vol 15 para 273”. 
1210  See Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 377; 
Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A) 498; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 228. 
1211  Delict 290-291. 
1212  See Mukheiber v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA). 
1213  See Country Cloud Trading v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 
(CC) 10; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 306-309; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 234-237. 
1214  Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 378; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 228. 
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In Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk,1215 the court alluded to the 
proper determination of the elements of wrongfulness, negligence and causation 
which would assist in allaying the fear of indeterminate liability in cases of pure 
economic loss.1216 All the elements of a delict must however be present to ground 
liability.1217 
 
Wrongfulness will be established if there is either an infringement of a subjective right 
or breach of a legal duty to prevent pure economic loss.1218 Neethling and Potgieter 
point out that an infringement of a subjective right could occur for example where 
there is an interference with a contractual relationship, in cases of unlawful 
competition, and where the right to good will or a personal right is involved.1219 The 
causing of pure economic loss is not prima facie wrongful as in the case of causing 
physical harm which includes psychiatric or psychological injury.1220 However, 
wrongfulness in cases of pure economic loss is usually established where there is a 
breach of a legal duty to prevent economic loss.1221 The test applied is the boni mores 
or reasonableness criterion requiring a value judgment, taking all circumstances into 
account, and involves policy considerations.1222 In applying the boni mores criterion, 
the interests of the parties involved must also be weighed against the public 
interest.1223 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1215  1979 3 SA 824 (A). See Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 137. 
1216  See Neethling, Potgieter and Scott Casebook on the law of delict 759. 
1217  See Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority 2006  
 1 SA 461 (SCA) 468; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 291. 
1218  See Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers(SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A) 
498; Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 379; 
Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd v Pyramid Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1985 4 SA 553 
(ZS) 561, 562-563; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 291; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 138; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 230. 
1219  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 291. 
1220  Minister of Finance v Gore 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA) 138; Fourway Haulage SA Pty Ltd v SA 
National Roads Agency Ltd 156; Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd v Pyramid Motor 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1985 4 SA 553 (ZS) 561, 562-563; Country Cloud Trading v MEC, 
Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 (CC) 9. See cases referred to by 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 291 fn 155. 
1221  See Fourway Haulage SA Pty Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 156; 
Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (A) 832-833; Knop v 
Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 26-27; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 230. See 
cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter Delict 291-292 fn 153 
1222  Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A) 797;Zimbabwe Banking 
Corporation Ltd v Pyramid Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1985 4 SA 553 (ZS) 562-563; Neethling 
and Potgieter 2015 THRHR 635; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 292; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Delict 138. 
1223  Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 384; Indac 
Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A) 797-798; Zimbabwe Banking 
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Neethling and Potgieter1224 refer to the following factors1225 in applying the boni mores 
or reasonableness criterion in order to determine whether there is a legal duty to 
prevent pure economic loss: reasonable foreseeability of harm;1226 whether the 
defendant’s knew or foresaw that his negligent conduct may cause pure economic 
loss;1227 practical measures that could have been taken to avert the loss (is the cost 
involved reasonably proportionate to the loss suffered by the plaintiff and could the 
harm be averted with relative ease?);1228 where the defendant as a professional 
professing certain knowledge and competence has a duty not to cause economic 
loss;1229 the degree of the risk of economic loss that may be suffered by the plaintiff 
(where the greater the degree of the risk, the more likely the defendant would have 
been expected to prevent the loss);1230 the extent of the loss (if it is indeterminate it 
may be unlikely that the defendant had a legal duty to prevent the economic loss);1231 
where a statutory provision may indicate whether there is a legal duty on a person to 
prevent economic loss;1232 and that by not recognising a legal duty in a circumstance 
may leave a “serious lacuna in the law”.1233 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Corporation Ltd v Pyramid Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1985 4 SA 553 (ZS) 562, 564; Neethling 
and Potgieter Delict 292-293; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 138. 
1224  Delict 293-297. 
1225  There is no numerus clausus in respect of the factors that may be used by the adjudicators in 
applying the boni mores criterion in order to determine whether there is a legal duty to prevent 
pure economic loss (Neethling and Potgieter Delict 292).  
1226  Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 384. Brand 
JA in Fourway Haulage SA Pty Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 
163 stated that reasonable foreseeability of harm should rather be dealt with under legal 
causation instead of negligence. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 294 fn 167. 
1227  See Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 386; 
BOE Bank Ltd v Ries 2002 2 SA 39 (SCA) 49; Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank 
Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A) 799; Boberg Delict 146-147; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 293. 
1228  See Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 384; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 294; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 230. 
1229  See Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A) 799; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 294; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 230; 
1230  Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 384; Indac 
Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A) 799; Neethling and Potgieter 
Delict 95; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 230. 
1231  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 232. 
1232  See Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 2 SA 1 (A) 31, 33 where it was stated that there 
was no legal duty on the council to avoid pure economic loss; Minister of Law and Order v 
Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A) 319 where the court held that the police did not have a legal duty to 
take down particulars of witnesses to a hit and run motor vehicle accident which would be 
required by the road accident victim in a civil claim; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 296 fn 174; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 231. 
1233  Ries v Boland Bank PKS Ltd 2000 4 SA 955 (C) 970; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 297. 
205 
 
Loubser and Midgley1234 in addition to the factors mentioned above refer to the 
importance of whether there is a special relationship between the parties1235 and 
“fraud or dishonesty” as factors which may make lead to the conclusion that the 
causing of harm was unreasonable and wrongful.1236 Van der Walt and Midgley1237 
also refer to the principles of equity and fairness which may lean towards or against 
allowing a claim for pure economic loss.  
 
Generally, the courts are reluctant to award compensation for pure economic loss 
and in addition to the factors referred to above consider a number of policy 
considerations in determining the presence of a legal duty to prevent pure economic 
loss.1238 The common policy considerations the courts refer to for not imposing liability 
for pure economic loss include:1239 the concern of indeterminate liability;1240 the 
opening of the floodgates to a high influx of claims1241 (the courts would more readily 
impose liability for a single loss occurring once to one plaintiff);1242 where the parties 
could have protected themselves from loss or liability by other means;1243 the 
plaintiff’s vulnerability to risk of pure economic loss (where the plaintiff could have 
protected himself from vulnerability to risk of loss by other means such as by 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1234  (Eds) Delict 230-231. 
1235  For example, in cases where persons offer professional services or where a fiduciary duty is 
present. If there is no special relationship, a legal duty may not be present to prevent harm, 
the authors refer to Franschoekse Wynkelder (Ko-operatief) Bpk v South African Railways and 
Harbours 1981 3 SA 36 (C) 41. See Delphisure Group Insurance Brokers Cape (Pty) Ltd v 
Dippenaar 2010 5 SA 499 (SCA) 508-509. 
1236  Minister of Finance v Gore NO 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA) 140. 
1237  Delict 138. 
1238  See Minister of Finance v Gore NO 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA) 138. 
1239  See the policy considerations referred to in Delphisure Group Insurance Brokers Cape (Pty) 
Ltd v Dippenaar 2010 5 SA 499 (SCA) 508-509. See also Neethling and Potgieter 2015 
THRHR 636-637. Cf Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 152-156. 
1240  See Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 377-
378; Fourway Haulage SA Pty (Ltd) v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 
161; Country Cloud Trading v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 
(CC) 11; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 232. There was however no question of 
indeterminate liability found in Delphisure Group Insurance Brokers Cape (Pty) Ltd v 
Dippenaar 2010 5 SA 499 (SCA) 509; Fourway Haulage SA Pty (Ltd) v SA National Roads 
Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 161-162; Country Cloud Trading v MEC, Department of 
Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 (CC) 10. 
1241  See Shell and BP SA Petroleum Refineries (Pty) Ltd v Osborne Panama SA 1980 3 SA 653 
(D). 
1242  Greenfield Engineering Works Pty Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA 901 (N) 916-
917; Fourway Haulage SA Pty (Ltd) v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 
161; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 232. 
1243  Such as by obtaining insurance or by contractual means (Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium 
Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 2006 3 SA 138 (SCA)). See also Indac Electronics (Pty) 
Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A) 799; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 296; Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 230. 
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contractual means);1244 the law of delict should not undermine and interfere with 
contractual relations where the law of contract may be applied;1245 and liability on the 
defendant would be refused if such imposition is deemed an additional burden which 
would hamper his activities.1246 The courts try to contain liability relating to pure 
economic loss within “reasonably predictable limits”.1247 
 
Neethling and Potgieter1248 point out that in particular, vulnerability to risk in a 
contractual setting has been used more recently by the courts1249 as a factor in 
applying the boni mores criterion to determine whether there was a legal duty to 
prevent pure economic loss. They1250 state that the criterion of vulnerability to risk will 
“be satisfied if the plaintiff could not reasonably have avoided the risk by other 
means”. Brand JA, in line with the recent approach to determining wrongfulness 
stated that “under the influence of Australian Jurisprudence, vulnerability to risk 
signifies that the plaintiff could not reasonably have avoided the risk of harm by other 
means … a finding of non-vulnerability on the part of the plaintiff is an important 
indicator against the imposition of delictual liability on the defendant”.1251 
 
In order to illustrate the influence of reasonableness in determining whether delictual 
liability will follow based on claims for pure economic loss, a few examples from case 
law will be considered briefly.  
 
In Delphisure Group Insurance Brokers Cape (Pty) Ltd v Dippenaar,1252 two wheat 
farmers cancelled applications for insurance made with one company for their crop in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1244  See Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A) 799; Fourway Haulage 
SA Pty (Ltd) v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 162; Country Cloud 
Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 (CC) where the 
court held that the appellant was not vulnerable to risk and could have claimed its loss in terms 
of contractual relations; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 296-297; Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 230. 
1245  See Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 4 
(A) 500; Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 
1 SA 1 (CC) 19. 
1246  Fourway Haulage SA Pty (Ltd) v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 162; 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 297; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 232. 
1247  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 228. See also Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 138. 
1248  2015 THRHR 635. 
1249  See cases referred to by Neethling and Potgieter 2015 THRHR 636. 
1250  Neethling and Potgieter 2015 THRHR 635-636. 
1251  Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 183 (SCA) 195. See 
Neethling and Potgieter 2015 THRHR 636. 
1252  2010 5 SA 499 (SCA). 
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favour of a product called “Farmsure” which was supposed to have been underwritten 
by another company (Lloyd’s). The farmers did this as a result of the advice from an 
insurance broker and marketer. Their crops did not grow successfully during the 
season and it transpired that “Farmsure” was non-existent, meaning that they were 
not covered and it was too late for them to take out insurance with another company. 
Thus the farmers suffered pure economic loss and were unable to recover such loss 
from insurance. They sued the broker for their loss alleging negligent 
misrepresentation. In the court a quo, their claims succeeded but the broker appealed 
the decision. The Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that the misrepresentation of 
facts was negligent and that wrongfulness would be present only if there were “public 
or legal policy considerations that require liability to follow”.1253 In considering various 
factors the court stated inter alia that: there was no question of indeterminate liability 
(being limited to the farmers who were offered “Farmsure”); the risk could not have 
been avoided by contractual means (they were vulnerable to risk); the extension of 
delictual liability would not impose an unwarranted burden upon the defendant; and 
the farmers were vulnerable to risk as they were persuaded by a professional who 
gave them the advice to buy a product which did in fact not exist. Thus wrongfulness 
was present.1254 The Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that it was reasonable to 
hold the broker delictually liable for the pure economic loss sustained by one of the 
farmers, in line with the recent approach to determining wrongfulness. It may be 
argued, of course, that the same factors above are relevant in concluding that there 
was a legal duty upon the broker to prevent the pure economic loss. It is reasonable 
to expect the broker to have taken some action in preventing the harm. He should 
have acted reasonably ex post facto in light of all circumstances. He was a 
professional who provided advice which the farmers relied on. The farmers’ reliance 
on the broker’s advice could be considered reasonable. The farmers’ could not 
reasonably have avoided the risk by taking out other insurance as by the time they 
found out Farmsure did not exist they were not able to take out other insurance. 
 
In Flionis v Bartlett,1255 just over three million rand was deposited into a firm of 
attorneys’ trust account by an attorney, Bartlett, without indicating that he was the 
depositor, nor the purpose of the deposit. Bartlett was unaware at the time the deposit 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1253  Delphisure Group Insurance Brokers Cape (Pty) Ltd v Dippenaar 2010 5 SA 499 (SCA) 508. 
1254  Delphisure Group Insurance Brokers Cape (Pty) Ltd v Dippenaar 2010 5 SA 499 (SCA) 509. 
1255  2006 3 SA 575 (SCA). 
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was made, that he was a victim of fraud. Upon realising the fraud he requested his 
deposit back. The firm of attorneys’ alleged that the money was already paid out. 
Bartlett sued one of the partners of the firm of attorneys, Flionis, for pure economic 
loss. The court a quo found that there was a legal duty on the firm of attorneys to 
prevent the loss. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the court confirmed that 
Flionis was liable for the pure economic loss sustained by Bartlett, but reduced the 
award of damages as a result of contributory negligence on the part of Bartlett. In 
establishing wrongfulness, Howie P stated:1256 
 
“The enquiry remains whether there was a legal duty on Flionis … to deal with the money 
without negligence. Put another way: if he was negligent should the law impose on him liability 
for such negligence? 
This being an instance of mere economic loss resulting from omission … the incidence of the 
legal duty to act without negligence is a matter of legal policy. The decision whether the duty 
exists depends on various factors including prevailing ideas of justice and where the loss 
should fall. This enquiry involves applying the general criterion of reasonableness having 
regard to the legal convictions of the community as assessed by the court.” 
 
In considering various factors, Howie J1257 stated that in this case, Bartlett could not 
have been protected by other means. That is, by contractual means, he was 
vulnerable to risk. Howie J referred to the following in finding that there was a legal 
duty on Flionis to act reasonably in preventing the economic loss: 
 
“First and foremost [Flionis] as recipient, was a firm of practising attorneys. As such it 
proclaimed to the public that it possessed the expertise and trustworthiness to deal with trust 
money reasonably and responsibly. Second, Bartlett relied on that and particularly on the fact 
that the money would be in the appellant’s trust account until he instructed otherwise. … 
Bartlett’s reliance on the money being safe in a trust account was reasonable even if, as I shall 
point out, his failure to communicate with Flionis was not. Third, even where an attorney 
discovers an anonymous and unexplained deposit it requires minimal management to transfer 
the money to a trust suspense account. It is then a task of no difficulty to trace the depositor 
with the aid of the firm’s own bank. After that one need merely leave the money where it is 
until receipt of instructions by or on behalf of the depositor or the person for whose benefit the 
deposit was made. Fourth, unreasonable conduct that might put the money at risk would, as 
a reasonable foreseeablility, cause loss to the depositor or beneficiary. The legal convictions 
of the community would undoubtedly clamour for liability to exist in these circumstances.” 
 
In dealing with negligence, Howie P1258 submitted that a reasonable person in 
Bartlett’s position would not have deposited such a large amount of money based on 
the word of someone he hardly knew and without acquainting himself with Flionis, the 
partner of the firm in order to avoid the risk. The court found that both Flionis and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1256  Flionis v Bartlett 2006 3 SA 575 (SCA) 588. 
1257  Flionis v Bartlett 2006 3 SA 575 (SCA) 588-589. 
1258  Flionis v Bartlett 2006 3 SA 575 (SCA) 590-591. 
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Bartlett’s conduct strayed from the standard of the reasonable person.1259 This case 
referred to the traditional and recent approaches to determining wrongfulness. 
 
In Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development,1260 
the respondent (the Department) entered into a building contract with iLima. Under 
financial strain at a later stage, iLima borrowed twelve million rand from the 
appellant (Country Cloud – third party) in terms of a loan agreement. The loan 
agreement was conditional upon the Department’s managing agent paying back the 
twelve million rand to Country Cloud from the monies that would be owed to iLima by 
the Department, in respect of the building contract. The Department subsequently 
cancelled the building contract with iLima. ILima went into liquidation and Country 
Cloud sued the Department in respect of its pure economic loss relating to the 
loan.1261 The court a quo dismissed the claim. The Supreme Court of Appeal on 
appeal also dismissed Country Cloud’s claim finding that due to policy considerations 
of indeterminate liability1262 and that the plaintiff was not vulnerable to risk1263 it was 
unreasonable to impose delictual liability on the Department (referring to the recent 
approach to determining wrongfulness). The Supreme Court of Appeal in response 
to Country Cloud’s allegation that the Department unlawfully interfered with a 
contractual relationship held that the claim could not be framed within the specific 
form of damnum iniuria datum where, if proven, would be deemed prima facie 
wrongful, yet the court found intent in the form of dolus eventualis on the part of the 
Department.1264 Country Cloud then appealed to the Constitutional Court alleging 
inter alia that the department unlawfully interfered with the contractual relationship 
(loan agreement) between iLima and Country Cloud.   
 
The Constitutional Court confirmed that Country Cloud’s claim was for pure economic 
loss and that there was no unlawful interference in a contract which would have been 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1259  Flionis v Bartlett 2006 3 SA 575 (SCA) 590. 
1260  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development  2015 1 SA 1 
(CC). 
1261  2015 1 SA 1 (CC) 5-6. 
1262  In the sense that if a non-contracting party to the original contract succeeded in a claim for 
pure economic loss (in delict) against a contracting party as a result of cancellation of the 
contract, it would open the floodgate to claims by any non-contracting parties (strangers) 
suffering loss which could lead to indeterminate liability. 
1263  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 
(CC) 7-8. 
1264  This was confirmed by the Constitutional Court, see Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, 
Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 (CC) 7, 13. 
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deemed prima facie wrongful.1265 Country Cloud was deemed a third party and a 
stranger to the contract.1266 Intent in the form of dolus eventualis was however 
acknowledged.1267 In concluding that wrongfulness was absent, the court1268 stated 
that: there was no risk of indeterminate liability; the plaintiff was not vulnerable to risk; 
and therefore there was no “pressing need for the law of delict to step in to protect 
the plaintiff against loss”.1269 The court held that Country Cloud did not persuade the 
court that the Department was responsible for the economic loss, that Country Cloud 
was wronged, or that the Department “owes a duty to Country Cloud”. The claim for 
pure economic loss was dismissed. The court was not prepared to extend delictual 
liability where there were existing contractual relations and other reasonable avenues 
that the appellant could have embarked upon, such as trying to recover the loss from 
a party to the contract that stood as surety for the loan amount.1270 The court alluded 
to both the approaches to determining wrongfulness; it was not reasonable to impose 
liability on the Department for the pure economic loss sustained by iLima and there 
was no legal duty upon the department to act reasonably ex post facto in preventing 
the pure economic loss sustained by iLima. The Constitutional Court1271 referred to 
both the element of wrongfulness and legal causation with respect to policy 
considerations which assist in excluding liability for pure economic loss. 
 
In Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole,1272 the appellant sued a 
firm of auditors based on a negligent misstatement (a profit certificate) by one of the 
auditors of the firm which led to the appellant sustaining loss as a result of relying on 
the statement. Brand JA1273 stated that factual causation was present and that the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1265  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 
(CC) 2. 
1266  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 
(CC) 11. 
1267  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 
(CC) 14. 
1268  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 
(CC) 16. 
1269  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 
(CC) 19, 20-22. In this case the court held that Country Cloud could have claimed from the 
contracting party who stood as surety for the loan amount. 
1270  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 
(CC) 22-23. See also Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 
1985 1 SA 475 (A) Trustees,Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (pty) Ltd 2006 
3 SA 138 (SCA). 
1271  Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development 2015 1 SA 1 
(CC) 8-10. 
1272  2013 5 SA 183.  
1273  Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 192. 
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auditor was in fact grossly negligent. In determining wrongfulness, Brand JA1274 
stated that public and legal policy considerations dictate whether the firm of auditors 
should be “held legally liable for the loss resulting from the misstatement or whether 
it should be afforded legal immunity”. In particular he1275 referred to three 
considerations in considering whether it was reasonable to impose liability on the firm 
of auditors: “whether the representation was made in a business context and in 
response to a serious request”; “whether the plaintiff was dependent upon the 
defendant to provide the information or advice sought”; and whether the plaintiff was 
vulnerable to risk.1276 In respect of the first consideration it was found that the request 
was serious and made in a business context, however, with regard to the second 
consideration, the court doubted whether the appellant was dependant on the 
statement as he could have obtained independent advice.1277 As for the third 
consideration, whether the appellant was vulnerable to risk; Brand JA1278 found that 
the appellant was initially covered against the risk but through its own conduct 
deprived itself of contractual remedies and failed to remove itself from a 
“disadvantageous transaction”. Therefore, the appellant was the author of its own 
misfortune and made itself vulnerable to risk. It may be argued that the first two 
considerations could lead to a conclusion of the presence of a legal duty upon the 
firm of auditors to act reasonably in preventing the pure economic loss, while the third 
consideration would not. Thus a weighing of the different considerations and in light 
of all the circumstances, it may be argued that there was no legal duty on the firm of 
auditors to act reasonably in preventing the pure economic loss.  
 
In respect of legal causation, Brand JA1279 stated that wrongfulness and legal 
causation, which are both determined by legal and public policy, serve the same 
purpose in preventing the imposition of liability and that by the appellant not 
extricating itself from the transaction when it had an opportunity to do so, resulted in 
not only wrongfulness not being established but also legal causation. The court1280 
also referred to the reasonable foreseeability criterion in determining legal causation, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1274  Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 192. 
1275  Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 194. 
1276  Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 195-197. 
1277  Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 194-195. 
1278  Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 196-197. 
1279  Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 197. 
1280  Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 2013 5 SA 198-200. 
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stating that in essence, the loss was not reasonably foreseeable as the auditor did 
not reasonably foresee that the appellant would not protect itself contractually. Also, 
according to the direct consequences criterion and the flexible approach to 
determining legal causation, legal causation was absent.  
 
The facts of this case are similar to the facts in the English decision Caparo Industries 
plc v Dickman.1281 In this case, also dealing with a negligent misstatement by an 
auditor resulting in pure economic loss, the House of Lords influenced by policy 
considerations found that no duty of care was owed by the auditor to prospective 
investor shareholders and existing shareholders. In Caparo Industries plc, the 
plaintiff’s reliance on the auditor’s account was found to be unreasonable as the 
reports were relied upon for investment purposes and not in respect of statutory 
obligations.1282 
 
It is apparent that the influence of reasonableness in determining delictual liability for 
pure economic loss is linked to policy considerations. Both the tests for determining 
wrongfulness and legal causation (similar to the criteria for determining a duty of care 
in English law) are based on policy considerations. However care should be taken 
when determining the elements of wrongfulness and legal causation. In respect of 
pure economic loss, the question of wrongfulness depends on whether according to 
the boni mores there was a legal duty to act reasonably ex post facto in preventing 
the pure economic loss. According to the recent approach to determining 
wrongfulness, it depends on whether public policy dictates that it is reasonable to 
impose liability on the defendant for the pure economic loss. In determining legal 
causation in terms of the flexible approach, the question is whether it is fair, just and 
reasonable that the defendant should be held delictually liable for the pure economic 
loss factually caused by his conduct. If the pure economic loss is indeterminate, then 
the consequences may be considered too remote and legal causation may be absent. 
Turning to the influence of reasonableness on the other elements, the questions that 
must be answered are; was the conduct unreasonable when judged according to the 
standard of the reasonable person ex ante;1283 in respect of intention, did the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1281  1990 2 AC 605. 
1282  See chapter 4 paras 3.2.2.1 and 3.3.3. 
1283  In Flionis v Bartlett 2006 3 SA 575 (SCA), the court found contributory negligence on the part 
of Bartlett and negligence on the part of Flionis. 
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defendant direct his will towards causing the pure economic loss and was he 
conscious of the wrongfulness or consciousness of the unreasonableness of his 
conduct? In Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure 
Development,1284 the court found that the Department had intention in the form of 
dolus eventualis. Thus the influence of reasonableness on claims for pure economic 
loss is mainly explicit. 
 
10. Wrongful deprivation of liberty, wrongful arrest and assault 
 
As mentioned, wrongful deprivation of liberty will be referred to briefly, mainly 
because the intentional torts of trespass to a person which include battery, assault 
and false imprisonment is discussed under Anglo-American law. Therefore in order 
to compare the influence of reasonableness on Anglo-American tort law and the 
South African law of delict effectively, mention will be made of assault and wrongful 
deprivation of liberty. The influence of English law is also apparent in respect of the 
development of this as a specific form of iniuria.1285 
 
Generally any unjustified (where no ground of justification is applicable) interference 
with a person’s liberty or freedom of movement is regarded as prima facie 
wrongful1286 and actionable under the actio iniuriarum.1287 The actual deprivation of 
liberty (libertas) is in principle an infringement of a personality interest (wrongful) and 
may be considered an iniuria.1288 Furthermore section 12 of the Constitution protects 
the right to “freedom and security of a person”1289 which includes the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of freedom or without just cause. Section 21 of the Constitution 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1284  2015 1 SA 1 (CC). 
1285  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 328. 
1286  See Stoffberg v Elliott 1923 CPD 148; Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2008 2 SACR 1 (CC); Neethling and Potgieter Delict 328; Loubser and Midgley 
(eds) Delict 316. 
1287  If a person sustains patrimonial loss, such as loss of income, as a result of wrongful deprivation 
of liberty, compensation may be claimed with the Actio legis Aquiliae. An interdict may also be 
sought in order to prevent the respondent from threatening or contininuing the infringement of 
his liberty. See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 122; Neethling 
and Potgieter Delict 328. 
1288  See Birch v Johannesburg City Council 1949 1 SA 231 (T) 238; Neethling and Potgieter Delict 
329. 
1289  Which includes the right not to be detained without trial and the right not to be deprived of 
freedom arbitrarily and without just cause. 
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protects the right to “freedom of movement”.1290 Section 35 (1) of the Constitution 
specifically refers to the rights of an arrested, detained and accused person which 
include inter alia: the right to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably 
possible; to be charged or informed of the reason if detention continues; and to be 
released or released from detention if it is in the interests of justice, subject however 
to reasonable conditions. In practice, wrongful deprivation of liberty commonly occurs 
in instances of wrongful detention or wrongful arrest.1291 
 
Neethling and Potgieter1292 state that the harm suffered must not be “trivial”1293 and 
there must be intention (animus iniuriandi) to physically restrict or deprive a person 
of their freedom of movement. The restriction need not be a complete and there need 
not be total restriction.1294 In English law complete restriction is a requirement and if 
there are “reasonable means of escape” then it is not regarded as complete 
restriction.1295 According to the requirements, objectively the plaintiff’s freedom of 
movement must be restricted or deprived, thus it is not relevant if the plaintiff is 
unaware that he is being deprived of his liberty.1296 The plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant deprived him of his liberty.1297 Neethling and Potgieter point out that the 
courts ignore the requirement of intention as a result of the influence of English law 
and refer to it as a form of strict liability.1298 Loubser and Midgley refer to the 
requirement of intention (animus iniuriandi) but in an attenuated form1299 as 
consciousness of wrongfulness as a requirement for intention is also disregarded. 
The defendant cannot rely on “mistake” in order to escape liability.1300 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1290  See Thandani v Minister of Law and Order 1991 1 SA 702 (E) 707; Loubser and Midgley (eds) 
Delict 316. 
1291  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 316. 
1292  Delict 328. 
1293  The maxim de minimus non curatlex (the law does not concern itself with trifles) will apply. 
See S v Bester 1971 4 SA 28 (T) 29; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 163. 
1294  See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 113. 
1295  See chapter 4 para 2.3. 
1296  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 328-329. 
1297  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 329. 
1298  See Donono v Minister of Prisons 1973 4 SA 259 (C) 262; Shoba v Minister van Justisie 1982 
2 SA 54 (C) 559; cases referred to by Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of 
personality 119 fn 66. Neethling and Potgieter Delict 329. 
1299  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 317-318. 
1300  See Smit v Meyerton Outfitters 1971 1 SA 137 (T) 139; Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 3 
SA 131 (A) 157; Ramsay v Minister van Polisie 1981 4 SA 802 (A) 818-819; Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 120. 
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However, trivial deprivation of liberty which is normal in everyday life such as being a 
passenger on a train or bus will not be considered contra bonos mores.1301 Grounds 
of justification negating wrongfulness, which may be applicable include: consent (for 
example, where a person agrees to the deprivation of liberty  before entering a 
premises),1302 private defence (for example, where an insane person is deprived of 
his liberty because he poses a threat to the public),1303 necessity (for example, where 
passengers on a ship are temporarily confined to their cabin during a storm at 
sea),1304 discipline (confining  a child to their room as a form of reasonable 
punishment),1305 and statutory authority (for example lawful arrest).1306 
 
In instances where a prisoner is detained in custody longer than required as a result 
of negligent conduct by the state, his detention is unlawful from the moment the 
detention became unnecessary. Thus the delay in releasing the detainee will be 
unreasonable.1307 In Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development,1308 the Registrar of the Court negligently failed to issue the documents 
pertaining to the prisoner’s release and the prisoner was detained more than five 
years after his conviction and sentence were set aside.1309 The Constitutional Court 
found that the prisoner’s detention was unlawful and the state was liable in delict. The 
court placed emphasis on the constitutional right to freedom and security of a 
person.1310 
 
Where a statute authorises the deprivation of liberty, it will be lawful: if there is some 
form of physical control over the arrestee; and the arrestor informs the arrestee of the 
cause of the arrest.1311 The arrestor bears the onus of proving that the arrest was 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1301  See Bester v Calitz 1982 3 SA 864 (O) 880; Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 163; Neethling 
and Potgieter Delict 329. 
1302  See authority cited by Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 115 fn 
37. 
1303  See Naude and Du Plessis v Mercier 1917 AD 32 where the defence was raised. See 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 115 fn 35. 
1304  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 115. 
1305  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 115. 
1306  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 116. 
1307  See Neethling and Potgieter 2012 Obiter 393. 
1308  2008 4 SA 458 (CC). 
1309  See also Alves v LOM Business Solutions (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 399 (GSJ); Neethling and 
Potgieter 2012 Obiter 390ff. 
1310  S 12. 
1311  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 116-117. 
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justified.1312 An arrest may be made with or without a warrant.1313 If an arrest is made 
without a warrant1314 there must usually, among other requirements1315 be reasonable 
grounds of suspicion of a person having committed an offence.1316 If it follows that 
there were no reasonable grounds of suspecting that the arrestee committed an 
offence then the deprivation of the arrestee’s liberty is unreasonable and wrongful.1317 
As mentioned, “freedom of movement” and “freedom of security of a person” are 
fundamental rights protected by our Constitution and an arrest must be justifiable.1318 
If the arrest is made with a valid warrant1319 a copy of the warrant must be provided 
to the arrestee upon arrest.1320 Naturally, if a warrant was required by law and an 
arrest was made without the required valid warrant then the arrest would be 
unreasonable and wrongful.1321 If the arrestor incorrectly but reasonably believes that 
he is arresting the correct suspect, who subsequently turns out to be the incorrect 
person, such arrestor will not be held liable.1322 If there is an improper motive behind 
the lawful arrest, where the main intention is not to bring the arrestee before the court, 
such lawful arrest may be rendered unreasonable and wrongful.1323 The arrestor’s 
conduct may be deemed unreasonable and wrongful due to the improper motive.1324 
If the arrest was however made with the bona fide intention of questioning the 
arrestee further in order to decide whether the arrestee should be tried before the 
court, then the arrest will not be regarded as unreasonable and unlawful.1325 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1312  Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2008 2 SACR 1 (CC); Loubser 
and Midgley (eds) Delict 316. 
1313  See s 40(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; Neethling, Potgieter and 
Visser Neethling’s law of personality 118. 
1314  See in general Neethling 2011 THRHR 660ff. 
1315  See Neethling 2011 THRHR 660 refers to five other requirements: the aim must be to bring 
the arrestee before the court; the arrest must be necessary to ensure the suspect appears 
before the court; the body of the person must be touched unless the arrestee willingly submits 
to custody; as soon as reasonably possible the arrestee must be informed of his arrest; and 
he must be taken to the police station. 
1316  A Schedule 1 offence. See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 118; 
Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 316-317. 
1317  See May v Union Government 1954 3 SA 120 (N); Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 317. 
1318  See Neethling 2011 THRHR 661. 
1319  See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 117 in respect of the 
requirements for a valid warrant. 
1320  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 117. 
1321  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 118. 
1322  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 117. 
1323  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 119. 
1324  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 317. 
1325  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 119. 
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In respect of wrongful deprivation of liberty or wrongful arrest and the influence of 
reasonableness on each element of a delict, what must be determined is whether: 
the defendant’s conduct objectively caused the deprivation of liberty; the plaintiff’s 
restriction of movement is reasonably significant, not trivial; the plaintiff’s liberty was 
reasonably infringed by the defendant’s conduct (an applicable ground of justification 
would negate wrongfulness); the defendant intended to restrict the plaintiff’s freedom 
of movement (in respect of intentional conduct); the defendant’s conduct strayed from 
that of the reasonable person (in respect of negligent conduct); the defendant 
factually caused the wrongful deprivation of liberty; there is a close enough 
relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the harm suffered in order for the 
defendant to be held liable for the iniuria in view of policy considerations based on 
reasonableness, fairness and justice. Thus the influence of reasonableness on 
wrongful deprivation of liberty and wrongful arrest is predominantly explicit. 
 
There seems to be no suitable definition for assault in the South African law of delict. 
However, any infringement of the body (corpus) whether accompanied by violence or 
not, with pain or without, direct or indirect, may lead to delictual liability.1326 A threat, 
whether made verbally or by means of a gesture, can result in fear of bodily harm 
which may be actionable under the actio iniuriarum.1327 There is no specific form of 
iniuria requiring intentional conduct recognised as “battery” (the intention to make 
unlawful physical contact) or “assault” (fear or reasonable anticipation of imminent 
unlawful violence) per se as found in Anglo-American law.1328 What is important in 
South African law is to consider whether there was an infringement of the body. The 
harm suffered must not be trivial otherwise the maxim de minimis non curat lex will 
apply;1329 the infringement must be wrongful; and the wrongdoer’s conduct must be 
intentional.1330 In respect of wrongfulness in instances of commissions1331 
wrongfulness lies in the infringement of the body or corpus which is contra bonos 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1326  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 87. 
1327  See R v Umfaan 1908 TS 62, 67-68; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of 
personality 87. 
1328  See chapter 4 para 2.1. 
1329  Taking someone by the arm or giving someone a light slap may not lead to delictual liability. 
See S v Bester 1971 4 SA 28 (T); R v Van Vuuren 1961 3 SA 305 (E) 307; Neethling and 
Potgieter Delict 346 fn 55. 
1330  See Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 3 SA 710 (T) 722 and cases referred to by 
Neethling and Potgieter Delict 346 fn 56.  
1331  In respect of omissions it must be determined if there was a legal duty to act positively in 
preventing the harm. See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s law of personality 93-
94. 
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mores per se. Loubser and Midgley1332 refer to assault where “a person claims for 
damages for failed surgical operations, the cause of action is often framed as a 
violation of bodily integrity in the form of assault”. The authors do however, question 
whether it is “conceptually correct” to categorise such conduct in our law as assault. 
Van der Walt and Midgley,1333 point out that the Supreme Court of Appeal has 
questioned whether it is conceptually sound for the defendant to be held liable for 
assault in respect of medical treatment where, for instance, the medical practitioner 
fails to mention a risk.1334 It is submitted that it may be more suitable to frame a claim 
within the actio legis Aquiliae where the form of fault is negligence. Where a person’s 
blood is withdrawn from his body without his consent, it is regarded as an intentional 
infringement of a person’s bodily integrity and privacy, not an assault.1335 An 
infringement of a personality right may however, in principle, result in claims under 
the actio de pauperie, actio legis Aquiliae, actio iniuriarum and the action for pain and 
suffering.1336 
 
11. Conclusion 
 
The concept of reasonableness applies differently in respect of each delictual 
element.1337 The influence of reasonableness is implicit on the elements of conduct, 
factual causation and intent, but explicit on the elements of wrongfulness, negligence, 
legal causation and harm. In truth it can only be reasonable to hold the defendant 
delictually liable if all the elements of a delict are present.  
 
In summary, the influence of reasonableness on the elements of a delict are evident 
and what must be determined is whether: the defendant acted or failed to act 
(conduct); the defendant acted reasonably in exercising his own lawful interests 
according to the boni mores and constitutional imperatives, in infringing the interests 
of the plaintiff (the traditional approach to determining wrongfulness); it is reasonable 
to impose liability on the defendant (the recent approach to determining 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1332  (Eds) Delict 314. 
1333  Delict 164. 
1334  See Braude v McIntosh 1998 3 SA 60 (SCA) 67-68; 1998 2 All SA 555 (A) 562-563; Van der 
Walt and Midgley Delict 164 fn 11; Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 314. 
1335  Van der Walt and Midgley Delict 164. 
1336  Loubser and Midgley (eds) Delict 315. 
1337  See Ahmed in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 60. 
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wrongfulness); (where intention is relevant) the defendant intended to cause the harm 
or loss through direction of his will and was aware of the unreasonableness of the 
conduct; (where negligence is relevant) the defendant’s or plaintiff’s conduct strayed 
from that of the reasonable person  and if so, how far?; the defendant factually caused 
the harm or loss suffered by the plaintiff (factual causation); it is fair, just and 
reasonable to impute the harm or loss factually caused by the defendant’s conduct 
upon the defendant; reasonably serious harm or loss was sustained, not trivial harm 
or loss; it is fair and reasonable to compensate the plaintiff and if so what is fair, just 
and reasonable compensation that the defendant should pay (assessment of 
damage)? 
 
The concept of reasonableness is, as shown, an important concept in determining 
each element of a delict and determining whether a delict has been committed. It is 
closely linked to the principles of fairness and justice. Furthermore public policy, 
policy considerations and the constitutional imperatives have a bearing on what is 
reasonable, fair and just in providing a value judgment as to whether a delict was 
committed or not. 
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Chapter 4: Law of the United Kingdom 
 
 “Justice and reasonableness is a test of “ordinary reason and common sense’.  … As such it 
 encompasses a wide range of considerations. At its narrowest, it focuses on justice and 
 fairness as between the parties. At a broader level, it will consider the reasonableness of a 
 duty from the perspective of legal policy, focusing on the operation of the legal system and its 
 principles. At a still wider but more controversial level, it may take account of the social and 
 public policy implications of imposing a duty”.1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter the focus will be on the implicit and explicit influence of reasonableness 
on some aspects of the English law of torts. The definition of tort law and the aims of 
tort law will be referred to. Insurance and the Human Rights Act,2 as two modern 
influences of tort law will be referred to briefly. The rules pertaining to whether a person 
has capacity will be discussed. Thereafter the implicit and explicit influence of 
reasonableness on the torts of trespass to the person and the tort of negligence3 as 
well as the defences to these torts will be discussed. Finally, the implicit and explicit 
influence of reasonableness on causation and harm (loss or damage) will be 
discussed. 
 
As mentioned,4 the term “tort” in English law which is synonymous to the term “delict” 
generally refers to a “civil wrong”. In English law, there are specific torts, hence the 
generally accepted reference to the law of torts, in the plural form.5 Torts are civil 
wrongs which protect numerous interests against violation.6 There are civil wrongs 
which are not torts such as breach of contract7 or breach of trust.8 There is no generally 
accepted definition of a tort9 but the following definition offered by Witting10 is suitable 
in that it places tort law in context. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 450. 
2  1988. 
3  See chapter 1 para 4 as to reasons for choosing the tort of negligence and the torts of trespass 
to the person. 
4  In chapter 1 para 5. 
5  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 13-14. 
6  Steele Tort 3. 
7  Steele Tort 3. 
8  See also Lunney and Oliphant Tort 1. 
9  See Steele Tort 4. 
10  Witting Street on torts 3-4. 
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“Tort is that branch of the civil law relating to obligations imposed by operation of law on all 
natural and artificial persons. These obligations, owed by one person to another, embody norms 
of conduct that arise outside (or in addition to) contract and unjust enrichment. Tort enables the 
person to whom the obligation is owed to pursue a remedy on his own behalf where breach of 
a relevant norm of conduct infringes his interests to a degree recognised by the law as such an 
infringement.” 
 
What is essentially common to tort law and the law of delict is that where some harm 
or loss is suffered by the claimant as a result of infringements of legally recognised 
interests;11 the claimant is entitled to redress by the law.12 The courts may create new 
heads of tortious liability in order to reflect the changing circumstances. This may occur 
rapidly, as in the instance of the tort of inducing breach of contract, or over time, as 
with the tort of negligence.13 Conflict of interests between persons will inevitably occur 
and the conduct of a person or group of persons could cause harm or threaten to 
cause harm to others, requiring such harmed persons to turn to the law for a remedy.14  
  
According to Williams15 there are four possible aims of tort law: appeasement (which 
now plays a subordinate role in redressing torts); justice; deterrence (aimed at 
preventing commission of torts and regulating future conduct of the general 
community); and compensation (whereby the wrongdoer who caused the harm must 
compensate the victim).16 In respect of justice, Williams17 refers to the idea of the law 
of tort as an “expression of a moral principle” as well as the theory of ethical retribution 
where justice requires the wrongdoer to pay compensation to the victim. From the 
perspective of the wrongdoer, justice requires that the wrongdoer should tolerate 
financial loss and from the perspective of the victim, justice requires that the victim 
should benefit from the compensation.18 Williams19 submits that according to the 
utilitarian theory (“of which the deterrent theory is an application”) punishment meted 
out to the wrongdoer must not be greater than is necessary to remedy the mischief in 
question, but that in reality awarded damages tend to be more than is required to 
                                                                                                                                                 
11  See Witting Street on torts 10-14 who refers to inter alia the following protected interests: 
personal; proprietary; intellectual property; economic relations; business and trade; financial; 
reputation; due process; and privacy. 
12  Except if an injunction (interdict) is sought. See Witting Street on torts 4-5. 
13  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 37. 
14  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 2. 
15  1951 CLP 138. See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 18-19. 
16  See discussion by Witting Street on torts 16-19 on corrective justice, deterrence, loss 
distribution and economic analysis of tort law. 
17  1951 CLP 140. 
18  Williams 1951 CLP 140-141. 
19  1951 CLP 146. 
222 
 
remedy the mischief in question. In analysing whether the rules of tort law are 
consistent with the theories of liability, Williams concludes that where possible “the law 
seems to ride two to three horses at once”,20 in other words two to three purposes of 
tort law are achieved. However, sometimes depending on the situation, one purpose 
is selected and in dealing with intentional torts the tendency is to choose the deterrent 
purpose. In dealing with the other torts, the compensatory purpose tends to be 
chosen.21 
 
There is no doubt that tort law involves “allocating responsibility for certain types of 
losses”.22 In respect of fault based liability, the loss may be shifted to the defendant 
and in cases of strict liability where fault is not required, the focus is more on loss 
spreading.23 In English tort law, fault based liability is prevalent but there are instances 
where strict liability applies.24 Two statutes which follow strict liability are the Consumer 
Protection Act25 which regulates liability for defective products26 and the Animals Act27 
which regulates liability for damage caused by domestic and wild animals.28 Vicarious 
liability is a form of strict liability whereby the defendant is held liable for the tort of 
another. The most common example where it applies is that of the employer who is 
held vicariously liable for the tort committed by the employee.29 The rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher in regard to a type of nuisance is regarded as a form of strict liability.30 The 
rule is relied on in determining liability for damage caused “by the escape of dangerous 
things accumulated on one’s land, regardless of fault” and the dangerous things 
accumulated must not have occurred in the natural use of the land.31 For purposes of 
                                                                                                                                                 
20  Williams 1951 CLP 172. 
21  See also Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 43-47. 
22  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 2.  
23  This idea is evident in instances of for example, strict or vicarious liability as well as distribution 
of loss through social security or social insurance, and by private insurance companies paying 
for losses. See in general Giliker Tort 3-9; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 50-63. 
24  Giliker Tort 5. 
25  1987.  
26  See in general Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 590-629; 
Giliker Tort 313-344. 
27  1971. 
28  See in general Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 524-540 with 
regard to liability for animals; Giliker Tort 344-351. 
29  See in general Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 554-589. 
30  Steele Tort 593. 
31  Steele Tort 665. 
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this study, the rule will not be discussed further.32 The main rationales for imposing 
strict liability are the same in all the jurisdictions discussed in this thesis and in order 
to avoid repetition will not be repeated here, suffice it to say that the influence of 
reasonableness on strict liability is implicit.33  
 
In most instances, the claimant claims compensation in a monetary form for the harm 
or loss sustained. In some instances the defendant must “disgorge” the profits made 
from his wrongdoing (usually where the wrongful activity was illegal) even if the 
claimant has not suffered any loss.34 In order to prevent harm from occurring an 
injunction (interdict) is applied for.35  
 
As mentioned above, there are two important modern influences on English tort law; 
insurance and the Human Rights Act.36 In many tort cases, the dispute ultimately takes 
place between the claimant’s and the defendant’s insurers. Previously, whether one 
of the parties was insured was not considered by the courts. Now, who should insure 
against loss is sometimes taken into account in order to determine whether it is fair, 
just and reasonable to impose a duty on the defendant.37  
 
Lunney and Oliphant38 point out that third party insurance liability is dependent on the 
tort system and there is a willingness by the courts to acknowledge the “influence of 
insurance considerations in contexts where ‘policy’ is a relevant factor, e.g. in 
determining whether it is fair, just and reasonable to recognise a duty of care”. The 
question has been asked whether insurance liability has affected principles of liability 
in tort law, in particular, in the application of the duty of care concept. Divergent 
answers are given, and some academic writers39 are of the view that insurance liability 
                                                                                                                                                 
32  See in general Steele Tort 665-704; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 503-523. 
33  See the rationales for imposing strict liability in chapter 3 para 1, chapter 5 para 1 and chapter 
6 para 1. See also Lunney and Oliphant Tort 573-574 who refer to the rationales for strict liability 
with regard to defective products; Steele Tort 564-568 who refers to justifications for vicarious 
liability.  
34  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 2. 
35  See in general Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 874-880. 
36  1988. 
37  See Witting Street on torts 35. 
38  Tort 26-27. 
39  See Merkin 2012 MLR 301; Abraham Liability century 2008 referred to by Lunney and Oliphant 
Tort 27. 
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has been influential in changing tort law principles, while Stapleton40 regards its 
influence as limited. However, that the law of damages has been influenced by 
insurance liability is not open to doubt.  
 
The courts have an obligation according to the Human Rights Act 198841 (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Human Rights Act”) to consider the rights42 contained in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.43 The following 
rights, in particular, affect tort law: right to life (Article 2); right not to be subjected to 
torture or inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3); right to liberty and security of 
person (Article 5); right to a fair trial (Article 6); right to respect for private and family 
life (Article 8); right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9); and the 
right to freedom of expression (Article 10).44 In South Africa, the Constitution45 and the 
Bill of Rights continually influence the law of delict.46 The Human Rights Act requires 
courts or tribunals to interpret legislation in accordance with the Convention rights and 
in dealing with cases involving Convention rights must consider the European 
Commission and decisions of the Court of Human Rights. There is still some 
uncertainty as to the effect of these rights on tort law and in any case many of the 
rights are already protected by the common law.47 English tort law is yet to see the full 
impact of the Human Rights Act.48 Its influence is expected to be gradual and indirect. 
49 There is even a possibility that it may be repealed and replaced.50 
 
As will be shown further on in the study,51 a public authority will not usually incur liability 
in tort for an omission in terms of common law, but a claimant may argue that the 
public authority violated their Convention rights through an omission. In Van Colle v 
                                                                                                                                                 
40  1995 MLR 820 referred to by Lunney and Oliphant Tort 27. 
41  Which came into effect on 2 October 2000. 
42  Some Convention rights are not incorporated in the Human Rights Act 1998 (Lunney and 
Oliphant Tort 30). 
43  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 71; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 30. 
44  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 88. Cf McBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 71. 
45  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
46  See Chapter 3 para 3.1.3. 
47  Lunney and Oliphant Tort 28. 
48  Lunney and Oliphant Tort 32. 
49  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 73; Witting Street on torts 7-10. 
50  See para 3.3.1.1 below. 
51  See para 3.3.1 below. 
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Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police,52 Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police53 
and Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police,54 where the police failed to save 
victims from serious injury and death, the United Kingdom’s highest court55 had the 
opportunity to bring the tort of negligence in line with the Human Rights Act under 
Article 2 but did not find the need to.56 An example of the direct effect of the Human 
Rights Act on English common law is section 6(1), which states that it is unlawful for 
“a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right” except 
where section 6(2) applies. Section 6(2) in brief refers to an instance when a public 
authority performs a statutory duty. Thus such public authority will not be liable even 
if a Convention right is violated while performing a statutory duty, unless the statutory 
provision is incompatible with a Convention right.57 Furthermore, not all of the 
Convention rights are absolute. They may be restricted by prescribed law which is 
“necessary in a democratic society” in order to comply with certain purposes.58 In 
Osman v United Kingdom,59 the European Court of Human Rights stated that Article 
2 imposed an obligation to perform a positive act to protect the life of a person who 
was at risk, which included an obligation upon the police to “do all that could be 
reasonably expected of them to avoid a real risk” to a person’s life “of which they have 
or ought to have knowledge” of.60 According to the facts of the case, however, the 
European Court of Human Rights found that Article 2 had not been violated. As will be 
shown below,61 the European Court of Human Rights is generally cautious in ruling 
against the decisions of the English courts. Case law dealing with the violation of 
Convention rights will be discussed under the relevant paragraphs dealing with the 
particular aspects of English tort law. 
  
The influence of reasonableness on the theories of tort liability relating to 
appeasement, justice, deterrence, compensation, and vindication (in respect of 
                                                                                                                                                 
52  2009 1 AC 225. 
53  2009 1 AC 225. 
54  2015 UKSC 2. 
55  Since October 2009, the highest court in the UK known as the “House of Lords” has been 
replaced with the “Supreme Court” (see Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 1999). 
56  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 74. 
57  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 75, 81. 
58  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 73. 
59  1999 1 FLR 193. 
60  Osman v United Kingdom 1999 1 FLR 193, 223. 
61  See para 3.3.1 below. 
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violation of rights, such as the right to one’s good name)62 is implicit. It is reasonable 
to award compensation to the claimant for harm or loss suffered. It is reasonable to 
sue someone who has infringed an interest or right, for example, with respect to 
defamation in vindicating the right to one’s good name.63 It is reasonable to deter 
others from committing torts when decisions are made highlighting the consequences 
of one’s conduct. Justice is associated with fairness and reasonableness and when 
applied to a decision in tort law should result in an equitable result. The aim of delict 
and tort law is to regulate behaviour between private individuals and at the heart of it 
lies the issue of interests and rights. In contrast criminal law is penal in nature and a 
crime is an offence in the eyes of the public. 
 
1.1 Capacity  
 
At the outset of a tort case, a preliminary issue that may arise is the issue of “capacity” 
which “refers to the status of legal persons and their ability to sue or be sued in tort”.64  
 
The age of majority in English law is eighteen.65 In English tort law, there are no similar 
rules and presumptions relating to the accountability of a child as found in South 
African law.66 In English criminal law, a child under ten years of age cannot be held 
criminally accountable.67 In tort law, a person who has fulfilled the requirements for a 
tort may be held liable for the tort committed.68 In the tort of negligence, the test applied 
to a minor, is the “reasonable child”. The conduct of the child is tested against that of 
an ordinary “reasonable and prudent child of his age”.69 Even though it may seem 
harsh that a very young child can be held liable for a tort, testing the child’s conduct 
and the foreseeability of harm against that of a reasonable child of a similar age may 
be seen as a mitigating factor.70 A fifteen-year-old child who pushes a person into a 
river may have capacity and be held liable in the tort but naturally a two-year-old child 
                                                                                                                                                 
62  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 692. 
63  See in general Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 690-696 with 
regard to damages for defamation. 
64  Witting Street on torts 651. 
65  Since 1970 according to s 1(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969. 
66  See chapter 3 para 4.1. 
67  S 50 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. 
68  See Jennings v Rundall 1799 101 ER 1419, 1421-1422; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 737. 
69  Mullin v Richards 1998 1 WLR 1304; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 769. 
70  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 737. 
227 
 
will not have capacity.71 In Gorley v Codd,72 a sixteen-year-old boy was found 
negligent for accidentally shooting the claimant with a rifle.73 A guardian or parent is 
generally not held liable for the act of a minor unless: the minor is employed by the 
parent and commits a tort while in the course and scope of employment; the minor 
commits a tort authorised by the parent; or the minor commits a tort in instances where 
the parent was negligent in their supervision over the child.74 Thus a father will not be 
held liable if a dog belonging to his daughter bit another person, where the daughter 
(over sixteen years of age) was old enough to exercise control over the dog.75 
 
A mentally disordered person can generally be held liable76 unless “he cannot 
understand the nature and consequence of his act”.77 The question to be determined 
is whether the defendant had the “requisite state of mind for liability in the particular 
tort with which he is charged”.78 For example, in Morris v Marsden,79 the defendant 
had been found unfit to plead in criminal proceedings but was found liable in the tort 
of battery as he had the required intention and his actions were voluntary at the time 
the tort was committed, even though he could not tell right from wrong.80 Stable J81 
stated that if a person was in a complete state of automatism, acting without intention 
and “carelessness” causing grievous injury, then he will not be held liable.82  
 
In the tort of negligence, the criterion applied is the reasonable person. It has been 
held that the reasonable person may have certain conditions such as a condition 
                                                                                                                                                 
71  Witting Street on torts 659. 
72  1967 1 WLR 19. 
73  See Lyons 2010 30 LS 257 who highlights the inconsistent treatment in different areas of the 
law relating to the attribution of responsibility of adolescents. See Witting Street on torts 659 fn 
47. 
74  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 770-771; Witting Street on torts 660. 
75  See North v Wood 1914 1 KB 629; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 771. 
76  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 737. 
77  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 778 in reference to Hanbury v Hanbury 1892 
8 TLR 559, 569. 
78  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 778; Witting Street on torts 658. 
79  1952 All ER 925. 
80  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 778; Witting Street on torts 658-659; McBride 
and Bagshaw Tort 738. 
81  Morris v Marsden 1952 All ER 927. 
82  Witting Street on torts 659. 
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leading to a heart attack,83 and that such a person who is unaware of his condition, 
cannot be held liable for the harm he caused as a result of such condition.84 
 
Capacity in English law appears to operate at three different levels, seen from a South 
African perspective. For a person to have capacity, firstly, the conduct must be 
voluntary. Secondly, accountability is a prerequisite for both forms of fault. Thirdly, a 
mental element of intention (in the form of a special purpose or malice) is required for 
intentional torts. Where a person is mentally disordered, a lack of capacity may 
exclude liability by either finding: that the act was not voluntary or, where this is not 
the case and ordinary intention (that is, without consciousness of wrongfulness) is 
present, a further mental element (in the form of a special purpose or malice) required 
for the relevant particular tort is absent in the circumstances due to the defendant’s 
mental disorder.85 Also what is referred to as accountability in South African law may 
be absent. 
 
The influence of reasonableness on capacity is implicit. In English tort law, due to the 
fact that there are no presumptions relating to accountability of a child as in South 
African law, in principle a minor of any age may have capacity. However, this is 
reasonable because in English tort law, the test applied to a minor is the “reasonable 
child” where the conduct of the minor is judged according to a minor of the same age. 
It is therefore reasonable that a sixteen-year-old child may be held to have capacity 
and held liable for accidently shooting at someone or not being in control of a pet that 
harms another, as generally a sixteen-year-old child is old enough to understand the 
consequences of his actions. It would be unreasonable for a two-year-old child to have 
capacity as clearly any two-year-old child would not be able to understand the 
consequences of his actions. 
  
In the tort of negligence and the torts of trespass to the person, there is no general 
requirement of the element of conduct like in the South African law of delict. However, 
                                                                                                                                                 
83  See Waugh v James K Allen Ltd 1964 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 779.  
84  See Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd 1998 1 WLR 1263; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 779; chapter 3 para 2 where a similar approach has been applied in South African law 
where a person suffers a heart attack; chapter 2 para 4. 
85  See Witting Street on torts 659; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 778. 
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to ground liability in the tort of negligence or the torts of trespass to the person, some 
form of conduct is required and inferred from the facts. There is a differentiation 
between a positive act and an omission but as will be shown, generally a person may 
not be held liable for an omission.86 The defence of automatism is applicable in the 
tort of negligence and the intentional torts. It is unreasonable for the defence of 
automatism to apply where prior negligent or intentional voluntary acts subsequently 
lead to involuntary acts resulting in harm to another. Thus it is reasonable for the 
defence of automatism to apply if there were no prior negligent or intentional acts 
leading to involuntary conduct causing harm. 
 
A person who is unaware of his condition, and, for example, suffers a heart attack 
which leads to mechanical movements resulting in harm or loss, may not reasonably 
be held to have capacity or be liable in the tort of negligence. A similar approach has 
been followed in South Africa.87 It is interesting that English tort law refers to the 
reasonable person as the hypothetical ordinary person who may have a condition such 
as a heart attack leading to mechanical acts (where there was no prior fault related 
act) causing harm. In such instances there is no breach of a duty of care and therefore 
no liability in the tort of negligence. In the South African law of delict, conduct would 
be absent as the conduct is involuntary, as well as fault, providing there was no prior 
fault-related voluntary conduct which leads to the subsequent involuntary act. 88  
 
2. Torts of trespass to the person 
 
Trespass in short refers to a specific wrong.89 Unlike the tort of “negligence”, there is 
no tort of “intention” in English law. Due to historic reasons and development90 over 
time, liability stemming from intentional harm had crystallised into specific torts often 
referred to as intentional torts, such as battery, assault, false imprisonment91 and so 
on.92 There is no general definition of “intention” in the intentional torts.93 In English 
                                                                                                                                                 
86  See below para 3.3.1. 
87  See chapter 3 para 2. 
88  See chapter 3 para 2. 
89  Steele Tort 39.  
90  Which is beyond the scope of this study and will therefore not be discussed. 
91  These forms of trespass to the person stemmed from the “writ of trespass”. See Murphy in 
Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1092. 
92  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 359. 
93  Steele Tort 30. 
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criminal law, “recklessness” refers to the offender’s consciousness of the risk he is 
taking, while in tort law, recklessness in respect of the consequences, but also 
recklessness in respect of the circumstances, may fall within the ambit of “intention”.94 
In each intentional tort, the required intention varies.95 The torts of trespass are some 
of the oldest torts and embody trespass to the person, land or goods.96 Trespass to 
the person may constitute a crime and a tort.97 Even though the principles applied to 
both may overlap and the decisions dealing with trespass to the person in terms of a 
crime are useful in dealing with trespass to the person as a tort and vice versa,98 they 
still cover different areas of the law, with different requirements,99 serving different 
purposes.100 Recently, the English common law, dealing with trespass to the person 
has been supplemented by the statutory tort of “harassment”.101 Lord Sumption in 
Hayes v Willoughby102 stated that harassment is “a persistent and deliberate course 
of unreasonable and oppressive conduct … calculated to and does cause [a] person 
alarm, fear and distress”.103 Conduct deemed to be harassment is now regulated by 
the Protection From Harassment Act104 which will not be discussed in the thesis, save 
to point out that the influence of reasonableness is explicit. The influence of 
reasonableness is explicit in that the conduct of the defendant leading to liability 
depends on whether it is reasonable or not under the circumstances and whether the 
reasonable person would think that such conduct amounted to harassment.105 A 
defence may be raised that the conduct under the circumstances was reasonable.106 
It is submitted that the criterion of the reasonable person is applied objectively similar 
                                                                                                                                                 
94  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 51. 
95  In battery, intention is directed at the consequence, thus unlawful physical contact must be 
intended. In respect of assault, the defendant must intend to cause anticipation of imminent 
harm (explained in para 2.2 below). In respect of false imprisonment, the defendant must intend 
to physically restrict the claimant’s person. See Steele Tort 30; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 51. 
96  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 55; Giliker Tort 409; Lunney and 
Oliphant Tort 42. 
97  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 56. 
98  See Scott v Shepherd 1773 2 Wm Bl 892, 899; Witting Street on torts 253. 
99  For example, where mens rea referring to the subjective element of intent (knowledge of 
wrongdoing) is not required in tort law. See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 56. 
100  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 57-58. 
101  See Witting Street on torts 250; Steele Tort 81-85. 
102  2013 1 WLR 935, 1. 
103  See s 7(2) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on Torts 1101; Witting Street on torts 262-264. 
104  1997. 
105  See s 1(2) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on Torts 1101. 
106  Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1103. 
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to those rare instances where the reasonable person is applied as the embodiment of 
the boni mores in South African law.107  
 
Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (freedom from torture or degrading treatment) and 5 (Right 
to liberty and security of a person) of the European Convention on Human Rights also 
protect similar interests with those relating to trespass to the person in English 
common law. The common law has in essence been protecting the same interests but 
to a lesser degree.108 It may occur that the claimant’s claim in terms of common law 
may fail but a remedy may be available under the Convention rights.109 However, in 
terms of tort law, compensation awarded to a successful claimant may be considerably 
more than compensation awarded in terms of the Human Rights Act where the primary 
aim is to vindicate rights.110 Currently, the courts are expected to develop the common 
law in order to conform to the protection covered in the Convention rights.111 It is 
envisaged that the common law will develop and liability relating to trespass to the 
person will extend in conforming to the Convention rights.112 The general requirements 
for trespass to the person are: direct;113 positive; intentional conduct;114 resulting in 
                                                                                                                                                 
107  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 49 fn 83, 92-93 fn 415, 120-121 fn 633 who refer to the use 
of the reasonable person standard as the embodiment of the boni mores in determining 
wrongfulness instead of the negligence standard. See chapter 3 para 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4 and 
3.4.7. 
108  Witting Street on torts 259. 
109  For example, with regard to false imprisonment protected under article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, see HL v UK 2005 40 EHRR 32, Surrey CC v P 2014 2 WLR 
642; Witting Street on torts 267. 
110  Witting Street on torts 272. 
111  According to s 6 of the Human Rights Act. 
112  See Witting Street on torts 249. 
113  See Sterman v EW & W J Moore Ltd 1970 1 QB 596. Examples of “directness” with regard to 
battery, is a blow to the face. With regard to assault (where physical contact is not required) 
threatening telephone calls will fall under “directness” and with regard to false imprisonment, 
physical arrest by the police will be considered as “direct”. See also Peel and Goudkamp 
Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 56; Witting Street on torts 251, 256-257.  
114  Initially intention was not required but after Fowler v Lanning 1959 1 QB 426 and Letang v 
Cooper 1965 1 QB 232 (dealing with battery), it is clear that in trespass to the person; intention 
also including “subjective recklessness” is required (Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 56-57). It has been argued that it has not yet been ruled out that liability in the tort of 
trespass to the person may stem from negligent conduct – see Weaver v Ward 1617 80 ER 
284 and Scott v Shepherd 1773 96 ER 525. It is important to note that in English law, with the 
tort of negligence, harm is required while it is not important in trespass to a person. Furthermore 
there are different prescription periods with regard to claims in trespass and negligence. Cf 
Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1093; Witting Street on torts 251-254; 
Giliker Tort 409; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 42-45; Steele Tort 40-47; Lunney and Oliphant 
Tort 43-51. 
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immediate harm but damage need not be proven.115 In the tort of negligence, the 
claimant is awarded compensation for negligent conduct. While in trespass, the aim is 
to protect the claimant’s legally recognised interest in his land, goods, or person from 
wrongful interference by the defendant which may lead to compensation.116 Thus 
interference with a person may take place in the form of battery, assault, and false 
imprisonment.117 With the torts of trespass, the lawfulness of the wrongdoer’s conduct 
leading to the intended consequences (physical restraint or contact) is assessed.118 
The wrongdoer’s bad motive will not necessarily mean that an act is unlawful.119 The 
influence of reasonableness on trespass to the person which includes battery, assault 
and false imprisonment120 will now be discussed. 
 
2.1 Battery121 
 
Battery is an act by the “defendant that directly and intentionally” causes harm to the 
claimant through some kind of unlawful, non-consensual, undesired, physical 
contact.122 According to the requirements, there must be direct, physical, “hostile”123 
contact which is not consented to.124 However, bodily contact will not be considered 
hostile if it conforms to the ordinary, generally acceptable contact that occurs in 
everyday life, such as brushing against someone in a crowded corridor.125 There must 
                                                                                                                                                 
115  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 57; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 359; Giliker Tort 409. 
116  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 360; Giliker Tort 409. 
117  Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1092. 
118  Steele Tort 29. 
119  See Allen v Flood 1898 AC 1; Steele Tort 32.  
120  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 55. 
121  Usually referred to as assault in other jurisdictions (Giliker Tort 414). 
122  See Witting Street on torts 249. Cf Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1092; 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 362; Steele Tort 33. 
123  This was enunciated in Wilson v Pringle 1987 QB 237, but really refers to some kind of 
“offensive” conduct as submitted by Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 60. Cf 
Witting Street on torts 254 who refers to conduct that “the claimant might object to, something 
that the claimant might regard as an unlawful intrusion on his rights to physical integrity”. Lord 
Goff in F v West Berkshire HA 1990 2 AC 1, 73 did not approve of the correctness of the use 
of term “hostile”. Cf McBride and Bagshaw Tort 43-44; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 58-61. 
124  Whether or not there was consent will be determined objectively. If the claimant’s conduct 
results in the defendant reasonably believing that consent is present then battery may not be 
present, it depends on what the reasonable person thinks of the claimant’s behaviour. The 
claimant must prove that he did not consent (Frieman v Home Office (No 2) 1983 All ER 589, 
594-5). See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 61; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1143; Witting Street on torts 255. 
125  See Collins v Wilcock 1984 1 WLR 1172, 1178-1179; F v West Berkshire Health Authority 1989 
2 All ER 545, 564; Wainwright v Home Office 2004 2 AC 406, 417; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield 
and Jolowicz on tort 58-59, 60 fn 35; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1096; 
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be a voluntary126 intentional positive act by the defendant127 and the consequences 
need not be foreseeable.128 In this tort, the intention refers to the intention to make 
unlawful physical contact.129 Thus where X intends to strike Y but instead strikes Z, 
intent is present but is referred to as “transferred intent”.130 The harm or injury must be 
direct.131 This is interpreted widely. For example, in Scott v Shepherd132 the wrongdoer 
threw a lighted squib (firework) into the marketplace, the squib was picked up and 
thrown by other traders till it exploded in the plaintiff’s face. The court found the 
defendant liable for battery and that it was direct.133 In Haystead v Chief Constable of 
Derbyshire,134 a woman was punched in the face resulting in her dropping the baby 
she was holding. The court referred to this as reckless battery.135 
 
The influence of reasonableness is implicit on voluntariness but explicit on lawfulness 
and reasonableness of the defendant’s act. In principle, if the defendant’s conduct is 
involuntary or reasonable then an element may be absent or a defence to battery may 
be applicable. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to hold the defendant liable for battery 
if any of the requirements are absent. The conduct required is direct, physical, 
unlawful, non-consensual contact. If a person is reasonably expected to endure the 
direct physical voluntary contact or if the contact is inconsequential then there is no 
battery. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 362-363; Witting Street on 
torts 254; 72-73. Giliker Tort 413; Steele Tort 47-49. 
126  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 38-39. 
127  Obstructing an entrance or standing in a person’s way is not sufficient. See Witting Street on 
torts 255-256. 
128  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 58; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 1094; Giliker Tort 412. 
129  Trindade 1982 OJLS 220; Steele Tort 33. 
130  See Witting Street on torts 252-253; Giliker Tort 412. The question has been raised as to 
whether transferred malice should rather fall under negligence – see Beever 2009 LS 400ff. 
131  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 39.  
132  96 ER 525. 
133  See Witting Street on torts 253; Giliker Tort 412. 
134  2000 3 All ER 890. 
135  See Witting Street on torts 253. 
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2.2 Assault 
 
Assault is an act by the defendant that intentionally and directly “causes the claimant 
reasonably to apprehend the imminent infliction of battery”.136 In other words, it refers 
to the claimant’s fear or reasonable anticipation of imminent, unlawful violence by the 
defendant.137 Contact is not required. Thus if X points a gun at Y and misses Y, then 
X has committed assault, but if Y gets shot then it is battery.138 There must be a 
reasonable anticipation of harm. The claimant must be aware of the attempted harm139 
and this is tested objectively.140 In Stephen v Myers,141 the plaintiff was threatened 
with harm but a third party intervened and stopped the attack. Thus the defendant was 
not liable for battery but assault.142 Fault in the form of intention is required even if the 
defendant was reckless143 with regard to the consequences of his actions.144 The 
intended harm or force must be immediate145 and direct. Thus, if the claimant is aware 
that the defendant cannot inflict the harm directly and immediately, then there is no 
assault.146 In Tuberville v Savage,147 the defendant placed his hand on his sword and 
stated that “if it were not assize time, I would not take such language from you”. The 
uttered words clearly meant that the defendant would not cause harm as it was a 
conditional threat.148  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
136  See Collins v Wilcock 1984 1 WLR 1178, Witting Street on torts 249; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1092; Steele Tort 35; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 54. 
137  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 359, 361. 
138  See Giliker Tort 414. 
139  If a claimant is hit from the rear, it is considered as battery and not assault. See Witting Street 
on torts 257; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 40. 
140  A person’s own fear, which is a subjective factor is not considered; see Witting Street on torts 
258; Giliker Tort 414. 
141  172 ER 735. 
142  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 64; Giliker Tort 414; Lunney and 
Oliphant Tort 54. 
143  See Pritchard v Co-operative Group Ltd 2012 QB 320; Breslin v McKevitt 2011 NICA 33 where 
recklessness was deemed to satisfy the requirement for intention in respect of battery; Lunney 
and Oliphant Tort 53.  
144  See Bici v Ministry of Defence 2004 EWHC 786 where the claim for assault failed as the 
defendant did not cause the victim to reasonably anticipate the fear of imminent violence; 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 361; McBride and Bagshaw 
Tort 43 fn 21; Giliker Tort 414.   
145  A threat of violence or force in the future is not sufficient. See R v Beasley 1981 73 Cr App R 
44.  
146  See Giliker Tort 415. 
147  1669 1 Mod Rep 3; 86 ER 684. 
148  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 65; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 1097; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 362; 
McBride and Bagshaw Tort 39. 
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Inciting words are usually not considered as assault, however in R v Ireland,149 the 
House of Lords held that liability depends on whether the victim reasonably believed 
that the verbal threats (received telephonically) could be carried out soon, so as to 
qualify as an “immediate” threat.150 In Read v Cocker151 the defendant was found liable 
for assault when he made a gesture and threatened to break the plaintiff’s neck if he 
did not leave the shop.152 The defendant intended to commit assault. 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the requirements for assault is explicit with regard 
to immediate reasonable fear of harm or reasonable belief of an imminent threat which 
could lead to harm. If any of the requirements are absent then it is unreasonable to 
hold the defendant liable for assault. The threat of harm or violence must be imminent 
and immediate. It is unreasonable to hold a person liable for assault if the threat was 
remote, conditional or withdrawn, as then the threat is not urgent and there is no 
immediate fear of violence. Furthermore, if the threat of violence or harm is not 
immediate, then the defendant cannot be held liable for assault as the claimant is not 
in danger and should not fear imminent harm.  
 
2.3 False imprisonment  
 
False imprisonment refers to the act of the defendant who intentionally and directly 
“causes the claimant’s confinement within an area delimited by the defendant”.153 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
149  1998 AC 147. Even though this was a criminal case, the reasoning may be applied to assault 
as a tort. 
150  R v Ireland 1998 AC 147, 162. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 65; 
Witting Street on torts 258-259; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 55-57. 
151  138 ER 1437. 
152  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 40; Giliker Tort 416. 
153  Confinement need not be limited to a prison cell or room. See Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk 
and Lindsell on torts 1092, 1104; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 370; Witting Street on torts 249, 264. 
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conduct must usually consist of a positive act,154 be intentional,155 direct and 
immediate.156 There must be wrongful, unlawful157 deprivation of the claimant’s 
freedom of movement (force need not be used)158 and the claimant need not be aware 
of it.159 There must be a complete restriction of movement160 and no “reasonable 
means of escape”.161 For example, in Robertson v Balmain Ferry Co Ltd,162 the plaintiff 
was restricted from exiting the wharf until he paid a penny. The plaintiff had paid the 
penny earlier to catch a boat to the other side of the wharf and had changed his mind 
in not taking the boat but to rather exit the wharf. At the exits of the wharf above the 
turnstile was a notice requiring payment of a penny by persons entering and leaving. 
The plaintiff refused to pay the penny and was thus not allowed to leave. In the claim 
for false imprisonment, the Privy Council held that the charge of a penny was a 
reasonable condition, entitling people to exit the wharf in the circumstances. Therefore 
his claim failed. 
                                                                                                                                                 
154  For example, if the public authority omits to release a claimant, it will not necessarily amount to 
false imprisonment unless the claimant has the right to be released and the defendant is obliged 
to release the claimant. See Iqbal v Prison Officers Association 2010 QB 732 where the prison 
warders went on strike and did not release the claimant at the time the strike was going on. At 
the time, the Governor ordered that the prisoners remain in their cells throughout the day while 
the strike was going on. A failure by the prison warders to turn up to work did not lead to liability 
for false imprisonment. However, a deliberate dishonest refusal might lead to a claim for 
(omission) misfeasance in public office (per Lord Neuberger MR [40]-[42]). In Roberts v Chief 
Constable of the Cheshire Constabulary 1999 WLR 662, the claimant was arrested on 
suspicion of burglary and detained without review for over two hours longer than that authorised 
by the statute. His detention of approximately 2 hours 20 minutes was considered unlawful and 
he was falsely imprisoned for that time. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 372; Witting Street on torts 269; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 41, 59; Giliker 
Tort 416; Steele Tort 63-64. 
155  See Iqbal v Prison Officers Association 2010 QB 732 [72]; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 45. 
156  Giliker Tort 417. 
157  Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1105; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 370. 
158  Giliker Tort 416. 
159  See Grainger v Hill 132 ER 769 where the claimant was so ill and unable to move, and Meering 
v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd 1920 122 LT 44 where the claimant was detained without 
knowing he was detained. The claimant was entitled to damages for false imprisonment. Atkin 
LJ (53) opined “I think a person can be imprisoned while he is asleep, while in a state of 
drunkenness, while he is unconscious, and while he is a lunatic”. See also Murray v Ministry of 
Defence 1988 1 WLR 692, 703-704; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 66-67; 
Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1105; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 372; Witting Street on torts 270; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 
42; Giliker Tort 419. 
160  If the claimant is able to move in a different direction such as along another footpath then it 
does not amount to complete restriction as was held in Bird v Jones 1845 7 QB 742. See Peel 
and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 67-68; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 1104-1105; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 
370, 375; Witting Street on torts 266-267; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 40; Giliker Tort 417; 
Lunney and Oliphant Tort 62-64. 
161  Giliker Tort 418. 
162  1910 AC 295.  
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In certain circumstances, the defendant’s conduct may be necessary, thereby making 
the conduct reasonable in adversely impacting upon a plaintiff’s interests. Thus the 
influence of reasonableness is explicit in relation to lawfully restricting a person’s 
freedom of movement. For example, in Austin v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,163 
the police cordoned off an area, restricting movement of about three thousand people 
for just over seven hours. The appeal court held that the conduct of the police was 
reasonable and necessary in order for them to avoid violence and disorder. The House 
of Lords164 held that Article 5 (right to liberty and security of person) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights had not been violated. Holding people in a cordoned off 
section for just over seven hours did not amount to deprivation of liberty and was lawful 
and necessary under the circumstances to avoid violence. McBride and Bagshaw165 
consider this as falling under necessity, as the courts acknowledged that the police 
had no other alternative to keeping the peace other than depriving innocent people of 
their liberty. The European Court of Human Rights also upheld the decision of the 
House of Lords.166  
 
In R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L,167 the 
claimant, a patient in the mental health ward of a hospital, was not physically restrained 
but the staff did intend to section him under the Mental Health Act168 if he tried to leave. 
He did in fact attempt to leave, at which time the staff sectioned him. According to the 
evidence, the staff continuously sedated the patient and discouraged friends and 
family from visiting him. When he was discharged, he sued the hospital submitting that 
the employees had falsely imprisoned him from the time he entered the hospital until 
the time he was sectioned under the Mental Health Act. The House of Lords found the 
detention lawful based on necessity and dismissed the claim of false imprisonment.169 
The European Court of Human Rights170 however, found that the patient’s right to 
                                                                                                                                                 
163  2005 EWHC 480. 
164  2009 1 AC 564. 
165  Tort 55. 
166  See Austin v United Kingdom 2012 55 EHRR 14; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 36-37; Steele 
Tort 73-75.  
167  1998 2 WLR 764. 
168  1983. 
169  Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1106. 
170  HL v United Kingdom 2005 40 EHRR 32. 
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liberty (Article 5) had been violated.171 Here it may be argued that the staff’s conduct 
was unreasonable in not allowing visitors, in infringing his freedom of movement and 
his right not to be treated. 
  
Where the arrest and detention is lawful or where legislation authorises a person to 
use reasonable means to completely restrict the claimants freedom of movement, 
there is no false imprisonment.172 
 
In instances where intentional harm is caused indirectly, it does not fall under trespass 
to the person because the harm is caused indirectly, but the rule in Wilkinson v 
Downton173 will apply. In this case, the defendant told the plaintiff that her husband 
was involved in an accident and was seriously injured. He was in fact not involved in 
an accident and the defendant claimed it was a practical joke. However, the plaintiff 
suffered (indirect harm) severe shock as a result of the false news (there was no force 
or threat) and the defendant was held liable. Wright J174 stated that he had “wilfully 
                                                                                                                                                 
171  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 41. 
172  See s 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 which allows a person to use reasonable force in 
preventing crime or affecting a lawful arrest. See also s 12(1) of the Prison Act 1952, s 24 of 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 329 of Criminal Justice Act 2003 and s 136 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 which allows lawful arrest or detention under certain circumstances. 
These statutes will not be discussed further in this thesis as it is beyond the scope of this study. 
A local authority may however be held liable for false imprisonment if a prisoner is detained 
longer than the correct prison term. See also R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans 
(NO 2) 2001 2 AC 19 where a mistake was made in respect of the calculation of the prison term 
but the governor was still held liable for false imprisonment; R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department 2012 1 AC 245 where the majority of the court held that the imprisonment 
of the claimants (foreign national prisoners) was unlawful and resulted in false imprisonment; 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 374, 376-378; McBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 56-59, 61; Steele Tort 65-71.  
173  1897 2 QB 57 (Witting 1998 UNSWLJ 55 prefers the view that in such a case there was 
negligent as opposed to intentional conduct by the defendant). In Janvier v Sweeney 1919 2 
KB 316, the rule in Wilkinson v Downton 1897 2 QB 57 was followed where a private detective 
posed as a police officer in order to obtain letters belonging to her employer. The private 
detective threatened her with arrest for association with a German spy and she sustained 
psychiatric injury as a result. She was entitled to damages. In Khorasandjian v Bush 1993 QB 
727, the plaintiff was harassed and suffered stress. The court granted her an injunction against 
the defendant (her ex-boyfriend). The conduct of the defendant was intentional. The tort of 
harassment was not initially recognised as a tort in common law and a claim had to be framed 
under either trespass or nuisance. As mentioned, claims for harassment are now regulated by 
the Protection of Harassment Act 1997. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 
70-75; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1098-1100; Witting Street on torts 
259-261; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 378-380; Giliker 
Tort 412, 420-422; Steele Tort 77-81; para 2 above. 
174  Wilkinson v Downton 1897 2 QB 57, 59. 
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done an act calculated to cause physical harm” which “in fact … caused physical 
harm”.175  
 
The influence of reasonableness is explicit on the requirements of the tort of false 
imprisonment where it is directly related to the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
conduct. If the defendant acts unreasonably in infringing the freedom of movement of 
the claimant, then there is false imprisonment. If the defendant is detained or 
imprisoned unnecessarily longer than he should have been, then the defendant’s 
conduct is unreasonable, unlawful and there is false imprisonment. If the defendant 
exercises his lawful interests, whether it be out of necessity, by use of reasonable 
force authorised by statute or for any other lawful reason, the defendant’s conduct is 
considered reasonable and the restriction of freedom of movement does not constitute 
false imprisonment. According to the requirements, the restriction of freedom of 
movement must be complete and if there is a reasonable means of taking another exit, 
direction, path or ensuring one is no longer restricted in movement, then there is no 
false imprisonment. 
 
2.4 Defences in respect of trespass to the person 
 
There are many defences in tort law and in keeping within the scope of the study; only 
the main defences to the tort of negligence which can be compared with those in the 
South African law of delict will be discussed in this thesis. Similarly in dealing with the 
torts of trespass to the person where intentional conduct is required, only the main 
defences to trespass to the person will be discussed.  
 
Witting,176 interestingly, recognises different categories of defences, namely “absent 
element defences,” “justification defences”, “public policy defences” and “non-
defences”. With absent element defences, an element in a tort is missing; there is no 
tort, such as in instances where there is valid consent.177 This category includes the 
                                                                                                                                                 
175  The circumstance under which this rule applies has been curtailed by the decision of 
Wainwright v Home Office 2004 2 AC 406. See discussion by Lunney and Oliphant Tort 69-74. 
176  Street on torts 316-317. 
177  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 784 also submit that a “plea of consent is a 
denial and not a defence”. 
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“doctrines of inevitable accident”,178 “involuntariness”,179 and “physical compulsion”.180 
Justification defences would include self-defence, discipline, statutory authority 
etcetera where it depends on whether the defendant’s conduct is reasonable. Thus 
although a tort is committed “acting tortuously was reasonable in the circumstances” 
and liability will not ensue. In respect of public policy defences, such as illegality, a tort 
is committed but the defendant is exempt from liability as a result of the policy 
consideration. Non-defences include “insanity, infancy, duress or provocation”.  
 
2.4.1 Consent 
 
Consent may be applied as a defence to all three torts of trespass to a person.181 
Consent may be given expressly or implied182 and the claimant must prove consent 
with trespass to the person.183 If consent is given, then the physical interference with 
a person’s body is considered lawful.184 If a subjective test is applied, consent would 
be present where the claimant in fact agreed to the physical interference of his body. 
If an objective test is applied, the claimant’s subjective belief is not relevant and it 
would depend on whether the reasonable person could conclude that under the 
circumstances of the case, the claimant consented to the contact.185 In practice, it does 
not seem to matter which approach is used as the “main guide that the court has to 
                                                                                                                                                 
178  In such instances, the accident which occurred was inevitable and could not have been avoided 
by taking reasonable care under the circumstances. Because the defendant acted reasonably, 
he is not at fault, there is no negligence. In respect of trespass to the person there must be 
proof of fault in the form of intention which will also be absent (see Peel and Goudkamp Winfield 
and Jolowicz on tort 792; Witting Street on torts 319). Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 781 point out that it may apply as a defence in cases of res 
ipsa loquitur or where fault is not required such as in cases of strict liability. 
179  Witting Street on torts 318 refers to the courts and academic writers who often state that 
involuntariness negates fault in that X could be found liable for the involuntary movement (for 
example, an epileptic fit causing harm to another) if he could have avoided the movements 
occurring (by for example taking his medication to prevent epileptic fits). In actual fact it really 
negates the “act element” of the tort. This is the same view found in the South African law of 
delict (see chapter 3 para 2). 
180  Here again Witting Street on torts 319 submits that the “act” element is missing. The claimant 
carries the burden of proof with respect to the “absent element defences”. 
181  Steele Tort 36. 
182  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 784; Witting Street on torts 320. 
183  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 61, 784; Giliker Tort 424. 
184  Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) 1990 2 AC 1, 72. 
185  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 784. Witting Street on torts 320 fn 16 submits 
that it is uncertain whether the test should be subjective (whether the claimant in fact consented 
to the contact) or objective but refer to Bennett v Tugwell 1971 2 QB 267, 273 where an 
objective approach was preferred. 
241 
 
the claimant’s mental state is his conduct”.186 If the defendant mistakenly believes that 
consent is present when it is in actual fact not, even though the defendant’s mistake 
is deemed reasonable, the defendant will still be held liable.187 The consent must refer 
to a specific act.188 If there is misrepresentation,189 fraud190 or duress191 involved, then 
the apparent consent is rendered invalid.192 For example, in R v Williams,193 the 
plaintiff acquiesced to sexual assault by her singing tutor on the false information that 
it would improve her voice. Thus even though she acquiesced to sexual assault, it was 
under false information.194 Where consent is withdrawn, the general rule is that 
interference with a person’s body from the point that the consent is withdrawn will be 
considered unlawful.195 However, an exception would apply where it would not be 
reasonable to stop such interference immediately when the consent is withdrawn. In 
such instances, the defendant will have a reasonable time period within which to stop 
the interference.196 For example, in Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal and Coke Ltd,197 a 
miner was taken to the bottom of a pit to work but refused to continue working as he 
felt it was unsafe. He demanded he be taken back to the surface. The employer 
refused to take him back up until the end of the morning shift. The employee sued the 
employer submitting that he had been falsely imprisoned. The employer was not found 
liable for false imprisonment as the House of Lords held that he had voluntarily agreed 
to enter the pit, and the employer was not obliged to take him back up until the shift 
ended. McBride and Bagshaw198 point out that it was reasonable for the employer to 
take the employee back up within a reasonable time, at the end of the shift.  
                                                                                                                                                 
186  Witting Street on torts 321. 
187  See Chatterton v Gerson 1981 QB 432; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 785. 
188  If the claimant consents to a specific procedure it does not automatically mean that he consents 
to another. See Appleton v Garrett 1995 34 BMLR 32; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 784. 
189  See Chatterton v Gerson 1981 QB 432, 443; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 364. 
190  See R v Dica 2004 QB 1257; R v Cort 2004 QB 388; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 1145. 
191  See Centre for Reproductive Medicine v U 2002 EWCA Civ 565; Witting Street on torts 321 fn 
22. 
192  Witting Street on torts 321. 
193  1923 1 KB 340. 
194  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 785; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 46 fn 
31; Giliker Tort 422; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 84. 
195  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 47. 
196  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 47. 
197  1915 AC 67.  
198  Tort 47. See also Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 68-69; Deakin, Johnston 
and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 373-374. 
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In respect of sporting activities, consent to injury is implied under the circumstances if 
the rules relating to the playing of the sport are followed.199 The defence of consent 
may negate claims in battery and negligence.200 In respect of a claim in negligence, if 
the defendant, a participant acts recklessly or with a high degree of carelessness 
beyond what is expected of participants in a sport, then there will be a breach of a duty 
of care.201  
 
In respect of medical treatment, a major (adult) with full legal capacity has the right to 
either consent to medical treatment or not, even if the treatment is necessary to save 
his life.202 If there is no consent, then it may be regarded as battery.203 In English law, 
                                                                                                                                                 
199  See Blake v Galloway 2004 1 WLR 2844 where a claim for battery was dismissed as well as a 
claim in negligence. The child was injured in the eye while playing a game. The court held that 
consent to the risk of injury was present. If however, the game is not played by a player 
according to the rules, then consent is absent (McBride and Bagshaw Tort 49). See also 
Condon v Basi 1985 1 WLR 866; Witting Street on torts 320. 
200  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 768. 
201  Blake v Galloway 2004 1 WLR 2844, 2853. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis 
and Deakin’s tort law 768. 
202  See Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 1993 AC 789, 866; B v An NHS Hospital Trust 2002 EWHC 
429 where the claimant refused to remain on a ventilator and the medical practitioners refused 
to switch it off. The court held that her request to switch off the ventilator was valid as she was 
old and intelligent enough to decide whether or not to continue with the treatment. In Re JT 
(Adult refusal of medical treatment) 1998 1 FLR 48, the patient was detained under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 but capable of understanding information and able to make a decision 
regarding treatment. She had capacity and refused dialysis which was necessary to keep her 
alive. In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 1993 Fam 95, a patient refused a blood transfusion 
but the doctors administered a blood transfusion. In the circumstances, it transpired that due to 
her illness, influence of her mother and lack of information, the administration of the blood 
transfusion was lawful. There was in fact lack of capacity which did not infringe her right to 
autonomy. The courts are still not willing to approve of cases of assisted suicide no matter how 
compelling the circumstances of the case based on policy considerations. For example in Pretty 
v United Kingdom (2346/02) 2002 35 EHRR 1, the patient wanted to commit suicide as she 
was suffering from motor neuron disease and wanted her husband to assist her in her death 
but for him not be prosecuted in terms of the Suicide Act 1961. The Director of Public 
Prosecutions denied her request and the European Court of Human Rights found that it was 
justified to deny her request based on the policy decision to protect the weak and vulnerable 
people in society who may be manipulated by allowing assisted suicide. See Deakin, Johnston 
and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 368-369; Giliker Tort 425-427. Recently in 
South Africa in Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others 
(GP) (unreported case no 27401/15, 4 May 2015) Fabricius J held that a doctor assisting with 
the death of his patient who was terminally ill with prostate cancer would not face any 
prosecution or disciplinary hearings as the conduct of the doctor would be considered lawful. 
The patient however had died at the time when the ruling was handed down in the High Court. 
Cf list of cases referred to in Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 61 fn 42-43; 
McBride and Bagshaw Tort 53-55. 
203  See re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) 1990 2 AC 1; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 1993 1 All ER 
821, 881; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 363-364; Witting 
Street on torts 323. 
243 
 
the right to self-determination is held in high regard. For example, in St George’s 
Healthcare NHS Trust v S,204 the court held that a doctor who performs a caesarean 
section on a patient, who has capacity and refuses to undergo the operation in order 
to save a foetus, commits battery.205 If a person refuses to give consent for a blood 
transfusion and is given blood, then it may amount to battery.206 An adult may even 
refuse to eat and cannot be force-fed.207  
 
In terms of section 8(1) of the Family Law Reform Act,208 a minor over sixteen years 
of age may consent to medical treatment and a minor below sixteen years of age may 
also consent to medical treatment,209 provided the minor is able to understand the 
consequences of the medical treatment (according to common law).210 If the minor is 
under sixteen years of age and not capable of understanding the consequences of the 
medical treatment often stated as not “Gillick competent” (after the well-known case 
Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority),211 then one of the parents may give the 
required consent.212 In Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority, the House of Lords 
held that a girl under the age of sixteen years could consent to receive contraceptive 
advice and treatment without the parents’ consent, provided the child had “sufficient 
understanding and intelligence”. However, the court has jurisdiction to override any 
decision to consent involving a minor, being a ward of the court, where necessary. 
Such decision must be in the best interests of the child. 
 
A person must be given a broad idea of what to expect in respect of treatment.213 In 
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital,214 the House of Lords held that a medical 
practitioner need not inform the patient of all the risks of a procedure, but was required 
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to provide a reasonable amount of information pertaining to the nature of the 
procedure and any noteworthy risks to the procedure which would influence the 
judgement of the reasonable patient. The medical practitioner’s liability in negligence 
will be determined according to the “Bolam test”,215 that is, according to the practices 
of a respectable body of opinion.216 The Mental Capacity Act217 regulates which 
treatment should be administered to mental patients but whether the type of treatment 
is legal depends on principles of common law.218  
 
The influence of reasonableness on the defence of consent is partially implicit and 
partially explicit. It is reasonable to hold the defendant liable for trespass to the person 
if on the face of it, consent was obtained but such apparent consent was obtained 
through misrepresentation, fraud or duress. The apparent consent is invalid. It is 
reasonable to hold the defendant liable for trespass to the person if any requirements 
relating to the defence are absent. In respect of sporting activities, whether there is 
consent to injury, or the risk thereof, will depend on whether the participants’ conduct 
was reasonable. In other words, the question is did the participants’ play the sport 
according to the rules of the game? In English law the right to autonomy is held in high 
regard and even if a patient with capacity refuses lifesaving medical treatment (which 
may be considered by some as unreasonable) it is in accordance with the wishes of 
the patient. The patient should not be forced to undergo any treatment. If a patient is 
aware of the risks in undergoing medical treatment and consents to the performance 
of an operation resulting in detrimental consequences, then the medical practitioner’s 
conduct may be deemed reasonable. A patient should be informed of any material 
risks when undergoing treatment and a failure to inform the patient will negate the 
requirement of knowledge and appreciation of the risk of harm. It will render the 
consent invalid and the defendant’s conduct unreasonable and unjustified. It is only 
reasonable that a medical practitioner should inform the patient of material risks and 
not every single risk. This is judged according to whether the reasonable patient would 
attach any importance to such risks in making an informed decision. It has been stated 
that whether there is consent may depend on whether the reasonable person could 
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conclude that there is consent. The use of the criterion of the reasonable person in 
this manner is very similar to the approach of determining wrongfulness of conduct in 
the South African law of delict. The English use of the reasonable person standard 
here and the South African boni mores test in determining wrongfulness produce 
similar results.219  
 
2.4.2 Necessity220  
 
A defendant may in principle raise this defence if he intervenes to prevent greater 
imminent risk of harm to a third party, himself or the claimant.221 The defendant may 
not rely on this defence if he brought the situation of necessity upon himself through 
his own fault.222 The defendant must act reasonably,223 that is, he should choose the 
least harmful option to avert the harm224 and use reasonable force.225 The threat of 
harm must be reasonably imminent.226 In Rigby v CC Northhampshire,227 the police 
fired a canister of tear gas into the plaintiff’s building in order to flush out a dangerous 
person who broke into the building. The plaintiff’s building was burnt and at the time 
there was no firefighting equipment on hand. The plaintiff sued the police, inter alia in 
negligence, alleging that the police should have purchased and used equipment which 
posed no fire risk. It was held that necessity could be raised as a defence in a claim 
of trespass. The police were not negligent in creating the situation of emergency but 
they were held liable in negligence. The court held that the police had been negligent 
in firing the gas canister when no fire-fighting equipment was on hand.228 Thus their 
conduct was unreasonable. 
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English tort law does not recognise so-called private necessity where the defendant 
harms another innocent person or causes damage to such innocent person’s property 
to protect his own interests.229 For example, if a mountaineer enters another person’s 
cabin to shield himself from a storm, there is no harm done. But if he then eats the 
cabin owner’s stored food and burns some furniture to warm himself with a fire, he 
would be liable in tort to the cabin owner for the consumed food and destroyed 
furniture.230 However, in instances where a defendant destroys a house to prevent fire 
spreading onto neighbouring land231 or throws property overboard to lighten a ship in 
a storm; such conduct would be justified based on necessity.232 In these instances the 
defendant intervenes in order to prevent harm to third parties. In Austin v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis233 the confining of many people in Oxford 
Circus was considered reasonable, justified and necessary in order to prevent public 
disorder and violence.234 
 
In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilization); F v West Berkshire Health Authority,235 it was 
held that in instances where it is impractical to communicate with the patient,  it is 
necessary to take action that the reasonable person would take in the circumstances 
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and treat the patient (being in the best interests of the patient). Thus in this case, the 
defendant acts in the interests of the claimant in order to prevent further harm to the 
claimant. It is important to note that the defence of necessity, although important in 
cases involving emergency medical treatment, is not wide enough to justify treatment 
in all cases.236 The court’s approach hinged on the treatment which would be in the 
best interests of the patient.237 This is in any event codified in the Mental Capacity 
Act.238 If a patient is over sixteen and unable to make decisions, then sections 4 to 6 
of the Mental Capacity Act239 which now codifies the common law approach, provides 
that prior to the treatment, reasonable steps must be taken to establish the extent of 
the patient’s lack of capacity. Treatment may be allowed in instances where it is 
reasonably believed that the patient lacks capacity and the treatment is in the best 
interests of the patient.240 Thus it is apparent that the influence of reasonableness is 
explicit.  
 
The well-known decision of Re (A) (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical operation)241 
involved a pair of conjoined twins where the one twin was weaker than the other. The 
stronger twin would soon die if not separated from the weaker twin. Based on the 
particular facts of the case, the court held that the medical practitioners in performing 
the operation to separate the twins which would result in the weaker twin dying but 
saving the life of the stronger twin, would be carried out lawfully as a result of 
“necessity” and in the best interest of both twins.242  
 
The influence of reasonableness on the requirements of necessity is explicit, 
particularly with respect to the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct which is 
judged objectively based on the criterion of the reasonable person. The defendant 
must act reasonably in infringing another’s interest. For conduct to be deemed 
reasonable, the least harmful option must be taken with minimal violation of the 
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claimant’s interest and there must be a sense of urgency requiring one to violate the 
claimant’s interests for the greater good not just for himself, such as in Austin v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.243 In respect of providing medical treatment 
in cases of necessity, it seems that a medical practitioner’s conduct may be deemed 
reasonable and justified if the patient lacks capacity or if it is impractical to 
communicate with the patient. Again the criterion of the reasonable person is 
applicable in deciding whether the conduct was reasonable in the circumstances. 
Furthermore, emphasis is placed on acting out of necessity only when it is in the best 
interests of the patient. Violating the claimant’s interests is reasonable only when 
absolutely necessary and ensuring that it is in the claimant’s best interest.   
  
2.4.3 Self-defence 
 
The burden of proof lies with the defendant.244 There must be an honest reasonable 
belief of an attack by the defendant. The defendant’s use of force in retaliation must 
be necessary, reasonable and not disproportionate.245 Sometimes threats or contacts 
are expected to be tolerated and depending on the circumstances it might be 
reasonable to do nothing.246 The defendant need not wait till he is struck and may 
retaliate with force even if the claimant taunts him with words or actions.247 If there 
was another way that the defendant could have reasonably avoided using force 
against the aggressor, by for example locking the door that was between the two of 
them, he would have been expected to take that course of action.248 However, the 
resultant harm inflicted to ward off the attack need not be in proportion to the conduct 
of the attacker.249 The courts are more lenient with the concept of proportionality here 
and it is acknowledged that the defendant is faced with a situation of emergency and 
may even kill a person in self-defence.250 Peel and Goudkamp251 refer to the situation 
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where the defendant may be attacked by an insane person or child and point out that 
there is a lack of authority but a defendant may be justified in using defensive force in 
defending himself. The authors252 are also of the opinion that where excessive force 
is used, the defendant should not be held liable for all the damage caused but for that 
portion of the damage where the excessive force was used. In other words, the 
defendant should not be held liable for the damage caused by using reasonable force. 
The courts’ will consider all the facts of the case in judging whether the conduct was 
reasonable or not.253 Should a person use unreasonable, disproportionate or 
excessive force, such person may be held liable for battery or assault.254  
 
For example in Lane v Holloway,255 the claimant (an elderly man) provoked the 
defendant (a younger, stronger man) by insulting his wife, and striking him on the 
shoulder. The defendant retaliated by striking the claimant in the eye, whereafter he 
required surgery and eighteen stitches. The claimant was successful in claiming 
damages in battery from the defendant and the defendant could not rely on the 
provocation or illegality. The defendant's retaliatory actions were out of proportion to 
those of the claimant. If the defendant mistakenly believes that X is an attacker, such 
defendant may rely on self-defence as long as the “mistake was reasonable and the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality are satisfied according to the world as 
perceived by the defendant”.256 In Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,257 the 
police officer alleged that he acted in self-defence based on an honest and mistaken 
belief that the deceased was reaching for a weapon.258 The police officer shot and 
killed the deceased who at the time of the shooting was in actual fact unarmed. On a 
criminal charge, the police officer was acquitted as his actions resulting from the 
genuine belief were justified. In the civil claim, the House of Lords held that the police 
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officer’s mistaken belief resulting in the use of the defensive force was unreasonable. 
The police officer’s mistaken belief was unreasonable in that the belief was not 
reasonably held and the interests of both parties were considered.259 In this case inter 
alia negligence, assault and battery was alleged. The Chief Constable admitted 
negligence but in an appeal to the House of Lords denied the claim for battery and 
assault. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. It is apparent that by requiring the 
belief to be objectively reasonable trumps the defendant’s subjective belief of a 
mistake.  
 
In Cross v Kirkby,260 the claimant trespassed onto the defendant’s (a farmer) land in 
order to disrupt a hunt. The claimant attacked the defendant with a baseball bat, 
striking him. The defendant managed to take the bat away from the claimant and then 
used the bat to hit the claimant. The claimant sued the defendant for battery and the 
defendant raised self-defence and illegality. The court held that there was an 
intertwined link between the claimant’s harm and his illegal actions.261 Furthermore 
the defendant’s actions were not unreasonable in striking the plaintiff with the bat in 
self-defence.262 
 
In defending one’s property, such property must be in the person’s possession to 
institute an action in trespass.263 The law values bodily security higher than interests 
in property. Therefore in using force in self-defence to defend one’s property will be 
harder to justify than using force in self-defence to protect bodily security.264 
Proportionality is important when relying on self-defence to protect property.265 For 
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example in Revill v Newbery,266 the firing of a shotgun at a burglar who broke into a 
shed with no outward signs of violence towards the owner, was found to be 
unreasonable. Using deterrents to prevent intruders from entering the property, such 
as spiked railings, is considered reasonable. However, setting up guns or other 
devices without notice, meant to cause serious bodily harm, may be considered 
unreasonable.267 Setting up a device, such as a spring gun, to protect property is 
regarded as an offence in terms of section 31 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act.268 The courts may be more lenient though when a person protects his property 
and uses force at night rather than in the day.269 
 
The influence of reasonableness is explicit on the requirements of self-defence. The 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is judged objectively and ex ante but also 
arguably ex post facto. There must be a reasonable belief of an attack by the 
defendant (ex ante) but as shown in Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,270 
whether the belief is reasonable is judged objectively. The conduct stemming from the 
belief is judged by considering all the circumstances of the case as well as the interest 
of all parties. Thus a weighing of interests takes place. In the end when judging the 
reasonableness of the belief as well as the conduct stemming from the belief which 
may result in the infringement of the claimant’s interests; subjective, objective, ex ante 
as well as ex post facto approaches are applied. From a South African perspective 
this relates to the enquiries of wrongfulness and fault. In determining the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, the use of force in self-defence must be 
the best option chosen, necessary, reasonable and not out of proportion. Depending 
on the circumstances of the case it may even be reasonable not to retaliate at all. The 
defensive force need not be in proportion to an initial verbal or physical attack. That is 
the reason why killing a person may be justified and why one may act in self-defence 
against a person who lacks capacity. In protecting one’s property, the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s conduct will be judged more strictly and the requirement of 
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proportionality between the initial act and retaliatory conduct becomes important. 
Naturally a person’s life is much more important and valuable than property.  
 
2.4.4 Provocation 
 
Provocation is not considered as a complete defence but may reduce a claim271 where 
the victim is partly to blame for the damage he suffered.272 The influence of 
reasonableness is explicit in deciding whether to reduce the plaintiff’s claim as the 
reasonableness of both the claimant’s and the defendant’s conduct would have to be 
considered and weighed objectively. The nature and value of the competing interests 
would also have to be weighed in order to decide whether it is reasonable to reduce 
the plaintiff’s award of damages stemming from provocation.  
 
2.4.5 Statutory authority, official authority 
 
Certain public officials and bodies may rely on this defence if they cause harm while 
performing such acts which may be authorised in terms of the statute that confers such 
powers or duties upon them.273 It will depend on the interpretation of the relevant 
statute.274 In interpreting the statute, it will also have to be established whether the 
statute intended to confer immunity from liability or a defence.275 The nature of the 
power conferred must be considered. Thus if the defendant uses force in carrying out 
his functions and duties, he will be exempt from liability in tort only if he could not have 
avoided taking reasonable care.276  
 
Certain statutes authorise the interference with the person277 and this applies mostly 
to false imprisonment. For example, section 3 of the Criminal Law Act,278 and section 
76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act279 authorise a person to use reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                 
271  See Lane v Holloway 1968 1 QB 379. 
272  See Murphy v Culhane 1977 QB 94; Witting Street on torts 340. 
273  Witting Street on torts 336. 
274  Witting Street on torts 336. 
275  Witting Street on torts 336. 
276  See Manchester Corp v Farnworth 1930 AC 171; Tate & Lyle Industries Ltd v Greater London 
Council 1983 2 AC 509; Witting 336. 
277  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 59. 
278  1967. 
279  2008. 
253 
 
force in assisting with the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders in order to 
prevent crime.280 A constable may make an arrest with281 or without a warrant282 and 
will be exempt from liability if he uses reasonable force in affecting the arrest. In terms 
of making the arrest without the warrant, the conduct of the constable must be 
necessary and the arrest may only be made if there are reasonable grounds of 
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.283 A constable 
is also exempt from liability if he reasonably believes that he is arresting an offender, 
which subsequently turns out not to be the case.284 Due to the test being based on the 
subjective belief of the constable instead of an objective test, a constable is exempt 
from liability if he follows an “invalid or unlawful warrant”.285 From an objective point of 
view, in terms of tort law, it may be argued that the constable’s actions are reasonable 
because a reasonable person would have acted in the same manner – fault is absent. 
As mentioned,286 a police officer who mistakenly believes that a person has committed 
an offence may escape liability in terms of tort law if the mistake is considered 
reasonable. The influence of reasonableness is clearly explicit here. However, where 
a private person arrests another under the mistaken belief that such person has 
committed an offence, such private person may not escape liability.287 The different 
standards that are applied may be justified when one considers that the constable acts 
in a professional capacity as compared to the private individual.  
 
Statutory powers may not be used for an “improper purpose” and must “not be 
exercised in a way that is wholly unreasonable.”288 Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights relating to liberty and security, can be enforced against 
public authorities but is limited by the application of prescribed law which includes 
lawful arrest in instances where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a 
person has committed a crime.289 
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If a person is detained longer than lawfully necessary in terms of a statute, then from 
the moment his detention is unnecessary and unlawful, the defendant’s conduct will 
be considered unreasonable and unjustified. In Roberts v Chief Constable of the 
Cheshire Constabulary,290 the claimant was detained for approximately eight hours 
and twenty minutes on suspicion of conspiracy to commit burglary. Section 34(1) of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act291 provides that a person must not be detained 
longer than six hours before his detention must be reviewed. In this case, the court 
held that during the additional two hours and twenty minutes, the defendant was falsely 
imprisoned.292 
 
The influence of reasonableness on statutory authority or official authority is explicit. 
The statutes themselves expressly require the conduct of the defendant to be 
reasonable when impacting adversely upon the plaintiff’s interests. The 
reasonableness of the conduct is judged both subjectively (ex ante) and objectively 
(ex post facto). The defendant’s conduct will be justified only if he used reasonable 
necessary force and could not have avoided taking reasonable care. If he exceeds 
this boundary his conduct will be unreasonable and unjustified.  
 
2.4.6 Discipline 
 
The use of this defence is common concerning children and passengers on vessels 
and aircrafts.293 Persons in loco parentis may use reasonable corrective force to 
discipline the child.294 Parents and persons in loco parentis were previously, in terms 
of the common law, entitled to use reasonable force in disciplining children. Corporal 
punishment295 and causing bodily harm to a child while affecting such discipline is no 
longer allowed.296 Causing bodily harm to the child is considered unreasonable under 
the Children Act.297 However, detaining a child is allowed as long as such detention is 
                                                                                                                                                 
290  1999 1 WLR 662. 
291  1984. 
292  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 59. 
293  Witting Street on torts 333. 
294  R v Hopley 1860 2 F & F 202; R v Woods 1921 85 JP 272; R v Rahman 1985 81 Cr App R 349, 
353; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1165; Witting Street on torts 333. 
295  S 548 of the Education Act 1996 prohibits corporal punishment.  
296  Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1165; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 56. 
297  2004 ss 58(3) and (4). 
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reasonable and does not contravene Article 3 (relating to degrading and inhuman 
treatment) of the European Convention rights. Teachers and persons in charge of 
children in community homes298 or local authority foster care homes have very limited 
powers of discipline due to the provisions of the Education Act.299 
 
The captain of a ship300 or aircraft301 may use reasonable force against passengers 
where the captain believes that the safety of others on board the ship or flight may be 
at risk.302 The captain must believe that the use of force is necessary to prevent 
harm.303 
  
The influence of reasonableness on the defence of discipline is explicit particularly 
with regard to the requirement of using reasonable force.  
 
2.4.7 Illegality304 (ex turpi causa non oritur actio)305 
 
Illegality is a defence to all torts.306 It is considered:307  
 
“a special rule of public policy. In its wider form, it is that you cannot recover compensation for 
loss which you have suffered in consequence of your own criminal act. In its narrower and more 
specific form, it is that you cannot recover for damage which flows from loss of liberty, a fine or 
other punishment lawfully imposed upon you in consequence of your own unlawful act. In such 
a case it is the law which, as a matter of penal policy, causes the damage and it would be 
inconsistent for the law to require you to be compensated for that damage”. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
298  See Children’s Homes Regulations 1991, reg 8(2)(a) (SI 1991/1506); Witting Street on torts 
334. 
299  1996 s 548. See Witting Street on torts 334. 
300  See s 105 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995; Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on 
torts 1166. 
301  See s 94 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. See also Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell 
on torts 1166; Witting Street on torts 334. 
302  Murphy in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 1166; Witting Street on torts 334. 
303  See Hook v Cunard Steamship Co Ltd 1953 1 WLR 682. 
304  See in general the Law Commissions Consultation Paper on the Illegality Defence in Tort 
(LCCP 160, 2001), The Illegality Defence: A Consultative Report (LCCP 189, 2009); The 
Illegality Defence (Report No 320, 2010) – as of yet no legislation has been implemented. See 
also Steele Tort 285. 
305  Which means that “no cause of action may be founded upon an immoral or illegal act” (Revill v 
Newbery 1996 QB 567, 576). See Witting Street on torts 204 fn 140. 
306  In terms of common law. Illegality is also a defence under s 329 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 805; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 
749. 
307  Stated by Lord Hoffman in Gray v Thames Trains 2009 1 AC 1339 [29]. See McBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 749-750. 
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Lunney and Oliphant308 point out that the narrow application of the defence refers to 
instances where the claimant tries to avoid the consequences of criminal sanctions 
imposed on him. The wider rule applies to prevent the claimant from recovering any 
compensation as a result of his own criminal conduct. Traditionally, prior to the 
recognition of a distinction between the narrow and wide application309 there were 
three types of common illegality cases arising in practice: (a) where both parties are 
involved in criminal activity and the defendant injures the claimant;310 (b) where the 
claimant’s conduct is deemed unlawful but independent of the defendant’s tort;311 and 
(c) “sanction-shifting cases” (narrow application).312 According to the general 
requirements, there must be unlawful or grossly immoral conduct.313 The illegal 
conduct must not be of a minor nature, it must be serious.314 It can apply as a complete 
defence or deny certain heads of damages, such as loss of earnings.315  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
308  Tort 320. 
309  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 323. 
310  See Pitts v Hunt 1991 1 QB 24; Delaney v Pickett 2012 1 WLR 2149; Joyce v O’Brien 2014 1 
WLR 70; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 757; Witting Street 
on torts 206; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 315, 323-325. 
311  See Revill v Newbery 1996 QB 567; Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester 2002 1 
WLR 218 where the court held that the police did not owe the claimant a duty of care as the 
claimant was trying to escape from police custody. According to the third element of the three-
fold test stemming from Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 AC 605, it would not have 
been fair, just and reasonable to impose such duty on the police. See also Jones in Jones (gen 
ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 200-201; Witting Street on torts 206-208; Steele Tort 289-291; 
Lunney and Oliphant Tort 325-329. 
312  Where the claimant alleges that a criminal sanction has been imposed on him because of the 
defendant’s negligence and then sues the defendant. An example is that of Grey v Thames 
Trains Ltd 2009 1 AC 1339 where the claimant was injured in a train accident as a result of the 
defendant’s negligence and thereafter suffered psychiatric injury. Almost two years after the 
train accident, he killed another person after an altercation. He was convicted of manslaughter 
whereafter he then sued the defendant for damages inter alia resulting from his conviction. The 
House of Lords denied the recovery of those losses stemming from the criminal sanction (as 
not to undermine the principles of criminal law and the integrity of the legal system) but allowed 
other losses stemming from the psychiatric injury. Sanction–shifting cases generally fail on 
grounds of illegality (see Clunis v Camden & Islington HA 1998 QB 978, Worrall v British 
Railways Board unreported CA Civil Division 29 April 1999). See also Jones in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 192-193; Witting Street on torts 208; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 321-
322. 
313  Smith v Jenkins 1970 119 CLR 397, 410; Nayyar v Denton Wilde Sapte 2009 EWHC 3218 QB 
in respect of a bribe; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 805; Witting Street on 
torts 205; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 757. 
314  Revill v Newbery 1996 QB 567, 577, 579. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on 
tort 805; Witting Street on torts 205. 
315  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 805; Witting Street on torts 209. 
257 
 
In terms of the tort of negligence,316 Witting317 submits that illegality generally functions 
as a so-called absent element defence in that it negates the duty of care element,318 
whereas in the intentional torts it functions as a public policy defence.319 For example, 
in Pitts v Hunt,320 the claimant was a pillion passenger on a motorcycle. The driver, a 
sixteen-year-old boy was uninsured, intoxicated, unlicensed and lost control of the 
vehicle colliding with another vehicle while taking a turn on the bend. The driver died. 
The claimant, who was also intoxicated at the time of the accident and aware that the 
driver was unlicensed and intoxicated, claimed against the estate of the deceased. 
The defences of volenti non fit iniuria, contributory negligence and illegality were 
raised. The appeal court dismissed the claim on grounds of illegality, holding that no 
duty of care was owed to the claimant as they were both involved in criminal activity. 
Furthermore, it was held that section 148(3) of the Road Traffic Act321 denied the 
defence of volenti non fit iniuria and contributory negligence. The trial court’s finding 
of one hundred percent contributory negligence was held to be incorrect as the Act did 
not provide for such a finding. In Revill v Newberry,322 where the defendant (occupier 
of the property) shot the plaintiff (a burglar) in the arm and chest, the plaintiff claimed 
damages against the defendant for breach of a duty of care in terms of the Occupiers’ 
Liability Act323 and in terms of the tort of negligence. The defendant submitted that it 
was an accident, raised illegality, self-defence and contributory negligence. The court 
denied the defence of illegality due to policy considerations in that it was clear that 
Parliament, by enacting section 1 of the Occupiers’ Liability Act,324 did not intend for 
the burglar to be treated as an outlaw325 and that section 1(3)(b) of the Act in particular 
assisted in defining the scope of the duty of care owed in terms of common law to a 
trespasser. This section was relevant in establishing whether the defendant’s conduct 
was reasonable. Thus the defendant used unreasonable force exceeding the limits 
                                                                                                                                                 
316  See para 3 below. 
317  Street on torts 337. 
318  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 186, 190-191. 
319  See Gray v Thames Trains Ltd 2009 1 AC 1339 [51]. Cf Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 777-779. 
320  1991 1 QB 24. 
321  1988. 
322  1996 2 WLR 239; 1996 QB 567. See para 2.4.3 above.  
323  1984. 
324  1984. 
325  In medieval times an outlaw had no civil rights and no protection from the law. See McBride 
and Bagshaw Tort 749. 
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and the conduct was out of proportion to the threat posed to him by the claimant.326 In 
this case, the defendant did not fire a warning shot and even though he did not intend 
to shoot the plaintiff, the shot that was fired was likely to injure anyone near the door. 
The defendant thus owed the plaintiff a duty of care and breached such duty entitling 
him to compensation in respect of the harm and loss he sustained. The plaintiff’s award 
of compensation was however reduced as a result of his contributory negligence.327 
In Cross v Kirkby,328 where both self-defence and illegality were raised, the court found 
a link between the illegal conduct and the claimant’s loss.329 In Lane v Halloway,330 
the claimant also raised illegality where the defendant had retaliated with such force 
that the claimant was seriously injured. The court found the defendant’s use of force 
unreasonable and out of proportion when compared to the provocation he endured. 
Witting331 points out that from a study of the case law, it is clear that the defence will 
not succeed merely because the act was illegal. There must be a link between the 
illegal act and the harm. Furthermore, the offence relating to the illegality must be 
somewhat serious. The Law Commission332 has considered the defence and in its 
report recommended that the courts should consider policy considerations (in 
preventing wrongful profiteering, deterring future unlawful acts, and uphold the dignity 
of the court) and continue developing the law. Legislation was thus not required.333 
  
The influence of reasonableness on this defence too is explicit with regard to the 
requirements. It is unreasonable to benefit or obtain a remedy from the law when the 
cause of action stems from immoral, wrongful, unlawful, and unreasonable conduct 
which is against the law. Even public policy which may lead to a conclusion that a 
claim should be denied in such instances is reasonable, as clearly claiming in tort as 
a result of an illegal act is against public policy. Naturally, the illegal conduct must not 
be minor, as the consequences would lead to the claimant not being entitled to any 
remedy which may be out of proportion to the harm or loss suffered. For example, if a 
state employee damages a person’s vehicle while parked in a zone requiring valid paid 
                                                                                                                                                 
326  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 753. 
327  See Witting Street on torts 337. Cf Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 212-
214. 
328  2000 All ER (D) 212. See para 2.4.3 above. 
329  See Witting Street on torts 337-338. 
330  1968 1 QB 379. See para 2.4.3 above. 
331  Street on torts 338. 
332  See The Illegality Defence, Report 320 2010. 
333  Witting Street on torts 209. 
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parking, it would be unreasonable for the state to deny the claimant’s claim in respect 
of damage to the vehicle just because it was illegally parked. 
  
In terms of negligence, the duty of care element is negated for reasons that a duty of 
care cannot be owed where there is illegal conduct between the parties such as in 
Pitts v Hunt.334 However, it may be argued that the claimant’s conduct in accepting a 
lift with an unlicensed, intoxicated driver is unreasonable. In Revill v Newberry,335 
where illegality succeeded on grounds of public policy, the conduct of the owner was 
also unreasonable because he exceeded his use of force in protecting his property. 
He did not fire a warning shot, and the burglar showed no outward signs of being a 
threat to his safety. In Cross v Kirkby,336 even though the claimant was harmed, the 
defendant’s conduct was considered reasonable. The defendant raised self-defence 
and illegality. Whether a duty of care is negated in respect of the tort of negligence 
(discussed in the next paragraph) or public policy plays a role in denying a claim, the 
reasonableness of the conduct plays a pivotal role. 
 
3. The tort of negligence 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The tort of negligence is recognised as the most important tort due to the large number 
of cases dealing with negligently inflicted harm337 that are brought before the courts.338 
In English law, “negligence” is not only a factor to be taken into account in determining 
liability in the tort of negligence339 but is also known as a distinct tort protecting a 
number of interests.340 McBride and Bagshaw341 submit that negligence focuses on 
                                                                                                                                                 
334  1991 1 QB 24. See para 2.4.7 above. 
335  1996 2 WLR 239; 1996 QB 567. See para 2.4.3 above. 
336  2000 All ER (D) 212. See para 2.4.3 above. 
337  Negligently inflicted harm does not always result in liability in negligence, for example negligent 
conduct with respect to use of land could result in nuisance liability (Witting Street on torts 26). 
338  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 78. See also Witting Street on torts 26. 
339  It is an element of delictual liability in the terminology of the South African law of delict. See 
further McBride and Bagshaw Tort 94-95 who submit that even conduct committed deliberately 
or intentionally by the defendant may lead to liability in the tort of negligence. 
340  The interests protected include property interests; public rights; economic interests and 
interests relating to physical and mental integrity as well as reputation (Jones in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 439 fn 1). 
341  Tort 95. 
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what the defendant did and if the defendant acted unreasonably resulting in harm or 
loss to the claimant, then liability in negligence may follow, provided all the 
requirements have been met. Due to the fact that negligence protects a number of 
interests in contrast with other torts where one particular interest may be protected, 
there is sometimes some overlap.342 For example, negligent interference with one’s 
use and enjoyment of land could result in liability either in negligence or in nuisance.343 
  
The elements required to succeed in a claim for negligence are: duty, breach, 
causation and damage or harm.344 Put differently, the questions that need to be 
answered are: will liability ensue in this type of situation, did the defendant owe the 
claimant a duty of care?; did the defendant fail to adhere to the required standard of 
care (breach)?; and did the claimant suffer harm or damage as a result of the 
defendants conduct (causation and harm)?345  
 
In respect of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the claimant;346 the claimant 
must prove that the defendant owed him a duty to take reasonable care and not inflict 
harm upon him.347 The duty of care concept is important as it relates to the legal 
obligation between the defendant and the claimant.348 Academic writers have different 
opinions on the role of the duty of care.349 However, Peel and Goudkamp350 point out 
that it is doubtful whether due to the mere fact that A is owed a duty of care by B 
means that A has a right against B. A in fact does not have a right that is good against 
                                                                                                                                                 
342  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 439-440. 
343  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 440. 
344  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 99. Cf Jones in Jones (gen 
ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 441; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 78; 
Witting Street on torts 25; Steele Tort 112. 
345  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 99. 
346  A defendant will only be liable for negligent conduct if he had a legal duty to take care. Thus 
not all careless conduct by the defendant will lead to liability in negligence. Lord Esher MR in 
Le Lievre v Gould 1893 1 QB 491, 497 stated that “[a] man is entitled to be as negligent as he 
pleases to the whole world if he owes no duty to them”. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 80; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 31. 
347  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 441; Witting Street on torts 26.  
348  Witting Street on torts 26-27. 
349  See for example, Nolan 2013 LQR 561-566 who submits that the duty of care is strictly speaking 
not in actual fact a duty and it is misleading to speak of a duty in such context. Many of the 
issues dealt with under the “duty of care” concept could easily be dealt with under the other 
requirements relating to the tort of negligence. Hohfeld 1913 Yale LJ 32 is of the view that 
“‘[d]uty’ and ‘right’ are correlative terms. When a right is invaded, a duty is violated”. See Peel 
and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on torft 80-81, 99. 
350  Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 81. 
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B until A acts unreasonably with regard to B’s safety and causes harm to B.351 
Nevertheless, in spite of the uncertainty of the theoretical nature of the duty of care 
requirement, it is still recognised by the courts as an essential element in the tort of 
negligence. 
 
The duty of care question is a preliminary question of law, demarcating “the range of 
people, relationships and interests that receive the protection of the law” as a result of 
negligent conduct.352 In practice, the claimant need only prove the existence of the 
acknowledged duty of care category and the general test for duty will only be 
necessary in novel duty categories or in cases where there is doubt as to the presence 
of a particular duty category.353 
 
With regard to the breach of that duty; it is described as a factual question as to 
whether the defendant’s conduct strayed from the legally-required standard of care of 
the reasonable person (in other words, was his conduct negligent?).354  
  
The defendant’s breach of duty must have factually caused the harm or loss sustained 
by the claimant, and the loss must not be so unforeseeable or too remote355 (or must 
be within the scope of the duty).356 There must be damage for liability in negligence to 
follow.357 
 
The elements are usually established in the above-mentioned order but need not 
be.358 Adjudicators do not always differentiate between the three elements of duty, 
                                                                                                                                                 
351  This differs from the idea of subjective rights in the South African law of delict (see chapter 3 
para 3.1.9). With regard to the doctrine of subjective rights, the right exists in any case but is 
only infringed by the unreasonable conduct of the defendant. Then there is an infringement of 
the right and hence wrongfulness. A legal duty on the part of the defendant always implies the 
existence of a correlative right on the part of the plaintiff, although this right may not yet have 
been jurisprudentially identified. See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 54-55. 
352  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 102. 
353  Witting Street on torts 27. 
354  Witting Street on torts 26; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 31. 
355  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 31. 
356  The defendant may prove that a valid defence is applicable or that the damage suffered by the 
claimant is remote (Witting Street on torts 25). 
357  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 31, 441; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 99. 
358  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 441.  
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breach and causation.359 There is often an overlap360 with these elements due to the 
role of reasonable foreseeability361 relevant to the inquiry in all three elements.362 LJ 
Denning in Roe v Minister of Health363 stated that “you will find that the three questions, 
duty, causation, and remoteness, run continually into one another. It seems to me that 
they are simply three different ways of looking at one and the same problem”.364 All 
the elements must be present in order to ground liability in the tort of negligence and 
an applicable defence or absence of one of the elements365 could negate liability.366 
Peel and Goudkamp367 refer to the importance of adjudicators establishing each of the 
separate elements of the tort negligence. They refer to the tendency of the courts 
occasionally stating that it is irrelevant which element is absent in grounding liability. 
They368 state: 
 
“There are several reasons why actions are organised into elements: it is thought to aid 
understanding of the nature of the action, to help ensure that cases that are based on a given 
action are dealt with consistently and to act as a safeguard against the risk that judges will 
forget to address important questions.” 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the specific elements of the tort of negligence will 
now be discussed in more detail. 
                                                                                                                                                 
359  See Roe v Minister of Health 1954 2 QB 66, 86; Witting Street on torts 26 fn 5; Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 78 fn 3. 
360  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 31. 
361  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 79 who refer to the Australian case of 
Neindorf v Junkovic 2005 HCA 75; 80 ALJR 341 [55] where Kirby J stated that “each of the 
constituent elements of the tort of negligence – duty, breach and damage – considered seriatim, 
progressively increases the specificity of the inquiry into how the incident occurred and the way 
in which damage was sustained. The broadest and most general level of analysis occurs at the 
duty stage. Here, the inquiry is primarily concerned with whether injury to the plaintiff or a class 
of persons to whom the plaintiff belongs, was reasonably foreseeable. With respect to the 
breach element, the inquiry is directed, in part, to whether a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position would have foreseen the risk of injury to the plaintiff. Finally, the damage 
element is the most specific. The issue here is whether the damage sustained as a result of the 
breach of duty was of a kind which was reasonably foreseeable. Attempts to force more content 
into the duty element, by defining the obligation created with greater specificity, turns the 
traditional analysis of the tort of negligence on its head. It blurs the distinction between its 
constituent elements. It may also lead to the decision as to breach being pre-empted. This 
Court should avoid such an error”.    
362  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 78.  
363  1954 2 QB 66, 86. 
364  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 78 fn 3. 
365  For example, in Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police 2002 1 WLR 218, the 
Court of Appeal held that there was no duty of care owed to a prisoner (absent element) to 
prevent him from injuring himself after attempting to escape police custody by jumping from a 
building. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 466. 
366  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 79. 
367  Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 79-80. 
368  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 80. 
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3.2 Duty of care   
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
The requirement of “duty of care” is a distinct essential element owed particularly to 
the claimant.369 Lord MacMillan370 stated that “the categories of negligence are never 
closed”, thus the courts may create new duty situations when required.371 Witting372 
submits that the duty of care element “signifies the presence of a legally-recognised 
relationship between the parties, which provides the court with jurisdiction to settle a 
dispute about the breach of that duty”. The duty of care concept delineates the 
interests protected and the boundaries of what is actionable in the tort of negligence.373 
It also relates to justice between the parties and serves as a precedent for future 
similar cases.374 Even though it is a question of law whether the duty of care arises, it 
can only be ascertained from the facts of the particular case.375  
 
There are instances where the law has denied the existence of a duty of care. For 
example, a landowner owes no duty of care to his neighbours when extracting water 
from his own land which may result in the loss of water to the neighbour’s land and 
subsequent collapse of such land.376 However, where a landowner extracts water 
leading to loss of adequate support to the neighbouring land, he may be held liable.377  
 
The duty of care element has developed considerably over time and it is necessary to 
briefly refer to is historical development in order to understand its current application 
in grounding liability in the tort of negligence. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
369  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 80. 
370  In Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 AC 562, 619. 
371  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 442; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 109. 
372  Street on torts 25, 28. 
373  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 32. 
374  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 82. 
375  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 83. 
376  See Langbrook Properties Ltd v Surrey CC 1970 1 WLR 161; Stephens v Anglian Water 
Authority 1987 1 WLR 1381. 
377  Holbeck Hall Hotel v Scarborough BC 2000 QB 836. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 467-468; Witting Street on torts 28. 
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Prior378 to Donoghue v Stevenson379 (hereinafter referred to as “Donoghue”) in 1932 
there was no recognition of a general approach to establishing a duty of care in 
negligence380 or a distinct tort of negligence for that matter.381  
 
In Donoghue,382 the House of Lords found the manufacturer of a beverage (ginger 
beer) liable in negligence for harm suffered by a consumer of the beverage due to its 
defective contents. The claimant (consumer) alleged that the remains of a 
decomposed snail were in the bottle of ginger beer and that she had already consumed 
some of it before she caught sight of the decomposed snail remains. She alleged that 
she subsequently suffered gastroenteritis as a result of consuming the ginger beer. 
Besides recognising for the first time a manufacturer’s liability in tort to the consumer383 
for a defective product, Lord Atkin formulated the well-known “neighbour principle” 
which integrated those situations in which liability for negligent conduct may be 
imposed.384 He stated: 385 
 
“in English law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty 
of care ... . The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems 
as a species of ‘culpa,’ is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing 
for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code would censure 
cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to 
demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit the range of complainants and the extent 
of their remedy. The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not 
injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted 
reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer 
seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably 
to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or 
omissions which are called in question”. 
 
Lord Atkin pronounced that a duty of care would exist firstly, where the injury is 
reasonably foreseeable and secondly, that the duty was limited to persons closely and 
directly affected (neighbour) by the negligent conduct. The “neighbour principle”, also 
                                                                                                                                                 
378  However, attempts were made in Heaven v Pender 1883 11 QBD 503, 509 and Le Lievre v 
Gould 1893 1 QB 491, 497, 504 to establish a general approach to determining a duty of care. 
See Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 AC 562, 580.  
379  1932 AC 562. 
380  There were a number of recognised single duty situations – see Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 100. 
381  See Steele Tort 145-146; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 105-107. 
382  Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 AC 562. 
383  Previously a manufacturer’s liability to a person was only recognised in terms of a contractual 
relationship. 
384  Witting Street in torts 28.  
385  Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 AC 562, 580. 
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referred to as the proximity requirement, was intended as a guide to situations where 
a duty of care may be imposed.386 Under this principle, the tort of negligence was able 
to expand387 and new duty situations were easily acknowledged where the defendant 
failed to take reasonable care with regard to his “neighbour”.388 Prior to Donoghue,389 
negligence was a factor considered in establishing liability but by the 1980s Lord 
Atkin’s “neighbour principle” was regarded as applicable in all cases “unless there 
[wa]s some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion”.390 
 
The tendency towards generalising in the tort of negligence reached its zenith in the 
decision of Anns v Merton London Borough Council391 (hereinafter referred to as Anns) 
where Lord Wilberforce enunciated a universal two-stage approach in effect building 
on the “neighbour principle”. 
 
“Through the trilogy of cases in this House ‒ Donoghue v. Stevenson … Hedley Byrne & Co. 
Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd ... and Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office  …, the position has 
now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it 
is not necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which 
a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. 
First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has 
suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in 
the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause 
damage to the latter ‒ in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first 
question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any 
considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class 
of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise.” 
 
The two-stage test to novel duty of care situations entailed firstly, establishing whether 
the harm to the claimant was foreseeable and, if in the affirmative, it is presumed that 
                                                                                                                                                 
386  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 447; Witting Street on torts 28. 
387  Witting Street on torts 28. 
388  Witting Street on torts 29.  
389  Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 AC 562. 
390  As stated by Lord Reid in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd 1970 AC 1004, 1027 (this decision 
involved omissions and the responsibility for conduct of third parties). See Peel and Goudkamp 
Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 85; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 110-111; Witting Street on torts 29. 
391  1978 AC 728, 751-752. In this decision, the question raised was whether a local authority 
whose statutory purpose was to approve building constructions owed a duty of care to a 
subsequent owner of such building. The court held that all local authorities overseeing building 
constructions according to statutory regulations owed a duty of care with respect to the quality 
of buildings. In Murphy v Brentwood District Council 1991 1 AC 398, the House of Lords 
reversed the decision in Anns v Merton London Borough Council 1978 AC 728. See Deakin, 
Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 111-112. 
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a prima facie duty of care was present. Secondly, whether there were any (policy) 
reasons why the duty of care should be limited or refused.392  
 
In practice, the two-stage test expanded the duty of care categories between the 
1970s and 1980s, and this expansion was of particular significance to instances of 
psychiatric injury and pure economic loss.393 In 1984, the courts retreated from the 
general approach in Anns394 and reverted to a more strict approach of imposing a duty 
of care in specific instances.395 The test in Anns was harshly criticised396 and the courts 
commenced with the retreat of the test in Anns397 in the decision of Governors of the 
Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd398 where Lord Keith399 
stated that it is “material to take into consideration whether it is just and reasonable” 
to impose a duty of care on the defendant.400  
 
3.2.2 Different approaches applied by the courts in determining a duty of care401 
 
There are currently three different approaches applied by the courts in determining 
whether the defendant owes the claimant a duty of care.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
392  As explained by Witting Street on torts 29; cf Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 112. 
393  Witting Street on torts 30. 
394  Anns v Merton London Borough Council 1978 AC 728. 
395  Witting Street on torts 30.  
396  See discussion by Steele Tort 149-152 who points out that the main problem was that the 
“neighbour” or “proximity” principle was seen as a function of reasonable foreseeability instead 
of being regarded as a separate criterion (aiding in limiting liability) as was referred to in 
Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 AC 562. Furthermore foreseeability of harm on its own as a 
general test is insufficient to establish a duty of care.  
397  See Witting Street on torts 30-31. In Canada the test in Anns v Merton London Borough Council 
1978 AC 728 was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the decision of City of Kamloops 
v Nielsen 1984 2 SCR 2 and is the leading authority on duty of care but has been varied to 
some degree by Cooper v Hobart 2001 SCC 79 ─ see Steele Tort 148. 
398  1985 AC 210. 
399  Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd 1985 AC 210, 240. 
400  Subsequent decisions opposing the test in Anns v Merton London Borough Council 1978 AC 
728 include Yuen Kun-Yeu v A-G of Hong Kong 1988 AC 175 190-194; Rowling v Takaro 
Properties Ltd 1988 AC 473, 501; Hill v CC of West Yorkshire 1989 AC 53, 60. See Caparo 
Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 AC 605, 617-618; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 86. 
401  See Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181,189-190; Peel 
and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 87-89. 
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3.2.2.1 The three-fold test 
 
In Caparo Industries plc v Dickman402 (hereinafter referred to as “Caparo”), a case 
dealing with pure economic loss caused by alleged negligent misstatements, the court 
held403 that the test in Anns404 was no longer adequate. The three elements that must 
be established are: foreseeability of harm; proximity; and whether it is fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care.405 Steele406 points out that although it is common 
to refer to the test in Caparo as the three-stage test407 it does not apply in stages like 
the test in Anns and all the elements are of equal importance. It will from here on be 
referred to as the “three-fold test”. Caparo reinstated proximity as a separate element 
and the element relating to “policy” was recognised more widely instead of as a 
negative limiting factor. Furthermore a duty of care is no longer presumed. These three 
elements will now be considered in more detail. 
 
(a) Foreseeability of harm  
 
This question is a preliminary legal one ‒ whether liability may be imputed to the 
defendant in the type of situation.408 The test is objective.409 The limit of foreseeability 
of harm is not higher than average and real possibilities as opposed to probabilities 
are considered.410 Specific harm to the claimant need not be foreseeable and it is 
sufficient if the claimant falls within the category of persons that could be reasonably 
foreseen to be injured as a result of the defendant’s negligence.411 Whether a 
                                                                                                                                                 
402  1990 2 AC 605. 
403  Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 AC 605, 617-618, 632-633. 
404  Anns v Merton London Borough Council 1978 AC 728. 
405  The three-fold test as referred to by the courts enunciated in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 
1990 2 AC 605 was subsequently cited and approved by the courts – see Marc Rich & Co v 
Bishop Rock Marine 1996 AC 211, 235. 
406  Tort 159-160. 
407  For example, Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 448; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 112 as well as Witting Street on torts 33 refer to 
the test in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 AC 605 as the three-stage test. Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 87 refer to the test as the tripartite test. The courts 
refer to it as the three-fold test. 
408  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 442. 
409  Witting Street on torts 36. 
410  Witting Street on torts 36. 
411  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 443-444; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield 
and Jolowicz on tort 91. 
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“notional” duty412 of care exists, a broader question of law must be distinguished from 
the narrower question of whether a duty is in fact owed to a particular claimant.413 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis414 submit that in order to avoid confusion it is 
advisable to “regard duty as giving rise to a general … question … and to leave the 
issue of whether a particular claimant can recover against a particular defendant to 
the question of causation or remoteness of damage”.  
 
Thus for example, in Haley v London Electricity Board415 it was sufficient for the 
claimant to illustrate that he fell within the category of pedestrians (blind pedestrians) 
who might foreseeably be at risk of injury.416 In this case, the defendants took steps to 
warn pedestrians with the sense of sight of a trench that had been dug along the 
pavement but did not take reasonable care as to the safety of blind people. Lord 
Reid417 stated that it was reasonably foreseeable that a blind person may walk along 
a pavement.  
“In deciding what is reasonably foreseeable one must have regard to common knowledge. We 
are all accustomed to meeting blind people walking alone with their white sticks on city 
pavements. … There is evidence in this case about the number of blind people in London and 
… the proportion in the whole country is near one in 500. By no means all are sufficiently skilled 
or confident to venture out alone but the number who habitually do so must be very large. I find 
it quite impossible to say that it is not reasonably foreseeable that a blind person may pass 
along a particular pavement on a particular day.” 
Reasonable foreseeability of harm in respect of the “duty of care” element assists in 
understanding the risk of injury to possible claimants and if there is no such risk then 
no duty of care is owed and further investigation into liability is unnecessary.418  
Reasonable foreseeability of harm is one of the criteria used to establish the existence 
of a duty of care and is generally not problematic, although foreseeability of certain 
instances of non-physical harm, pure economic loss and psychiatric injury may be 
more problematic.419 
                                                                                                                                                 
412  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 442-443 make the distinction between 
notional and factual duty, in other words notional duty refers to the general duty which is a legal 
question and factual duty, whether the duty is owed to the particular claimant (dealing with 
remoteness).  
413  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 442-443. 
414  Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 104. 
415  1965 AC 778. See Witting Street on torts 37. 
416  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 444. 
417  Haley v London Electricity Board 1965 AC 778, 791. 
418  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 449; Witting Street on torts 37. 
419  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 102-103; Jones in 
Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 32; 445. 
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(b) Relationship of proximity between the parties (“neighbourhood principle” or 
“neighbour principle”) 
 
This concept generally relates to a factual question which takes into consideration, 
positive fact-based elements of the relationship between the parties, but does also 
involve policy considerations.420 Lord Oliver in Alcock v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police421 (hereinafter referred to as “Alcock”) stated that “the concept of 
‘proximity’ is an artificial one which depends more upon the court’s perception of what 
is the reasonable area for the imposition of liability than upon any logical process of 
analogical deduction”. Witting422 opines that policy considerations have “influenced the 
development of the proximity concept” and the most important policy consideration is 
that “parties who are proximate to each other usually ought to be careful because of 
the capacity to harm that such closeness brings with it”. The concept of “proximity” 
encompasses different forms of closeness including physical, assumed, causal and 
circumstantial.423 Its use varies depending on the particular case and source of 
harm.424 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis425 submit that the “ambiguous term” of 
“proximity” generally refers to “a pre-tort relationship of some kind between the 
claimant and defendant arising prior to the infliction of damage.” Peel and 
Goudkamp426 refer to the often cited passage in the Australian decision, Sutherland 
Shire Council v Heyman,427 where Deane J stated:428 
 
“The requirement of proximity is directed to the relationship between the parties in so far as it 
is relevant to the allegedly negligent act or omission of the defendant and the loss or injury 
sustained by the plaintiff. It involves the notion of nearness or closeness and embraces physical 
proximity (in the sense of space and time) between the person or property of the plaintiff and 
the person or property of the defendant, circumstantial proximity such as an overriding 
relationship of employer and employee or of a professional man and his client and what may 
(perhaps loosely) be referred to as causal proximity in the sense of the closeness or directness 
of the causal connexion or relationship between the particular act or course of conduct and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
420  Witting Street on torts 38-39. 
421  1992 1 AC 310, 411.  
422  Street on torts 38. 
423  This is evident from Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 AC 562 where the relationship of proximity 
extended from the manufacturer to the consumer. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 447, 450. 
424  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 91-93. 
425  Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 113. 
426  Clerk and Lindsell on torts 449-450. 
427  Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman 1985 157 CLR 424. 
428  1985 157 CLR 424, 498-499. 
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loss or injury sustained. It may reflect an assumption by one party of a responsibility to take 
care to avoid or prevent injury, loss or damage to the person or property of another or reliance 
by one party upon such care being taken by the other in circumstances where the other party 
knew or ought to have known of that reliance. Both the identity and the relative importance of 
the factors which are determinative of an issue of proximity are likely to vary in different 
categories of case.” 
 
Commonly recognised relationships include those between: doctor and patient; 
manufacturer and consumer; parent and child; police and prisoner; employer and 
employee; and a driver and other road users.429 There is no numerus clausus.430 It is 
evident that the presence of these relationships may indicate that a reasonable duty 
of care is owed. For example, due to the close nature of the relationship between a 
parent and child, it is reasonable to expect the parent to owe a duty of care to the child 
and vice versa when the parent has aged and can no longer fully take care of himself. 
It is reasonable to expect a policeman to take reasonable care of a prisoner in his 
charge, thus if any harm befalls the prisoner, depending on the circumstances, the 
police may be held liable. So too it is reasonable to expect an employee to provide 
safe and secure working conditions for his employee. Stemming from Donoghue,431 it 
is reasonable to expect a manufacturer to owe a duty of care to the consumer.  
 
(c) Whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendant 
 
Jones432 refers to this test as one of common sense, ordinary reason, and whether it 
is right for the court to impose a duty of care in a given case. It also refers to the 
“exercise of judicial pragmatism, which is the same as judicial policy”. In a narrow 
sense it relates to fairness and justice between the claimant and defendant. In a wider 
sense it relates to the reasonableness of imposing a duty of care based on legal 
(where the focus is on the legal system and principles) social and public policy.433  
 
In what follows is a discussion of a few specific types of relationships between 
claimants and defendants commonly occurring in practice where policy considerations 
and the principles of fairness, justice and reasonableness have been used by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
429  Witting Street on torts 28. 
430  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 83. 
431  Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 AC 562. 
432  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 450. 
433  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 450-451; Alcock v Chief Constable of 
South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310, 365. 
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courts to reach a decision as to whether a duty of care should be imposed and whether 
a claim should be allowed. There is a relationship between a duty to take reasonable 
care and remoteness of damage, especially where there is a specific relationship 
between the claimants and defendants. As Viscount Simmonds stated in Overseas 
Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd434 (hereinafter referred to as 
“the Wagon Mound (No.1)) “there is no such thing as negligence in the air, so there is 
no such thing as liability in the air”,435 that is negligence cannot exist on its own but 
only in relation to certain persons and with regard to certain types of harm.436 
 
(i) Wrongful pregnancy, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims437   
 
With regard to claims for wrongful pregnancy, where a healthy child is born, a duty of 
care may be recognised, but the mother is usually only entitled to damages resulting 
from the pregnancy.438 That is damages for: pain and suffering experienced during 
labour; maternity wear; hospital and medical related expenses; and economic loss 
resulting from taking time off work etcetera.439 She will generally not be entitled to 
damages for raising the child.440 This was held in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board441 
(hereinafter referred to as McFarlane) and Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS 
Trust442 (hereinafter referred to as Rees). However, in Rees, the mother was entitled 
to a sum of money due to her disability (visual impairment). It was found to be “fair, 
just and reasonable for the parent who was disabled to recover by way of damages 
the additional costs attributable to her disability in bringing up the child”.443 In 
McFarlane and Rees, the House of Lords found it morally offensive on a number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
434  1961 AC 388, 425. 
435  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 176. 
436  See Hurd and Moore 2002 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 333 who refer to the debate over this 
famous quote – whether negligence is a relational concept, related to a person and harm, or if 
it is non-relational concept referring to negligence as a form of fault without any relation to a 
particular person or harm.  
437  See chapter 3 para 7 with regard to the difference between wrongful conception, wrongful birth 
and wrongful life claims. 
438  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 358-359. 
439  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 359. 
440  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 359. However, in Emeh v Kensington and Chelsea and 
Westminster Area Health Authority 1985 QB 1012, the Court of Appeal found that it was not 
contrary to public policy, for the parents to recover compensation for the cost of the upbringing 
of the child. Cf McBride and Bagshaw Tort 358-359. 
441  McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 2 AC 59.   
442  2004 1 AC 309. 
443  See Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust 2004 1 AC 309, 309; McBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 360. 
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grounds for the mother to be compensated for the upbringing of the child who was 
born healthy. Lord Clyde444 in McFarlane, referred to the influence of reasonableness 
− that “reasonableness includes a consideration of the proportionality between the 
wrongdoing and the loss suffered thereby”. To make the defendant liable for the 
upbringing of the child is therefore out of proportion with respect to his fault.445 Lord 
Steyn446 referred to corrective justice and distributive justice. It was submitted that it 
would be “fair, just or reasonable” to take into account that the mother would also 
benefit from the son’s upbringing, which should be weighed against the cost of bringing 
up the son. In that case, the benefit of parenthood rule was held to cancel out the 
upbringing expenses.447  
 
In the case of wrongful birth, where the child is born with a disability, the parents may 
be entitled to compensation not for the normal costs of upbringing but for the additional 
cost associated with bringing up a child with such disability. Thus in Parkinson v St 
James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust,448 the Court of Appeal held that 
the “birth of a child with congenital abnormalities was a foreseeable consequence of 
the surgeon’s negligence”. In McKay v Essex AHA,449 a child born with disabilities as 
a result of the mother contracting German measles (rubella) while she was in her 
mother’s womb sued the medical practitioner for a wrongful life claim. It was alleged 
that the doctor negligently failed to detect that the mother had contracted rubella and 
should have advised her of the option of abortion. The Court of Appeal refused the 
claim in that it was against public policy in so far as it would constitute a violation of 
the sanctity of human life.450    
 
(ii) Prisoners and patients 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
444  McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 2 AC 59, 106. 
445  McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 2 AC 59, 91; Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital 
NHS Trust 2004 1 AC 309, 319; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 360 fn 63. 
446  McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 2 AC 59, 82. 
447  McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 2 AC 59, 97; Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital 
NHS Trust 2004 1 AC 309, 328; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 360 fn 62. 
448  2002 QB 266. 
449  1982 QB 1166. 
450  In accordance with the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, a child born (after the 
passing of this Act) cannot institute an action based on the “loss of a chance to die”. See Jones 
in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 462. 
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In Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police,451 the Court of Appeal held 
that there was no duty of care owed to a prisoner to prevent him from injuring himself 
after attempting to escape police custody by jumping from a building. The judgment 
was based on the notion that it was not fair, just and reasonable, in terms of public 
policy, to impose such a duty of care in the circumstances. In Meah v McCreamer (No. 
2),452 a road accident victim sustained a head injury which resulted in him experiencing 
a personality change. Due to the personality change he committed crimes. He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. He succeeded in a claim for damages in that had it 
not been for the accident (applying the but-for test)453 he would not have committed 
such crimes. Two women sued him for damages they sustained stemming from the 
crimes and he tried to recover the claimed amounts from the defendant, the negligent 
driver who caused his injuries. The court held that the defendant was not liable to 
compensate the two women, as the damages were deemed too remote. In terms of 
public policy it would be unjust to not let the claimant be responsible for his actions.454 
 
(iii) Rescuers 
 
A duty of care may be owed under certain circumstances to foreseeable rescuers who 
make reasonable attempts to rescue victims as a result of the defendant’s conduct. 
Due to reasons of public policy, it is considered fair, just and reasonable to impose a 
duty of care on a defendant who through his negligent conduct creates a situation in 
which he endangers a person’s life.455   
 
Witting456 points out that the third element of the three-fold test is sometimes used in 
a restrictive manner to limit the scope of duty of care.457 Alternatively, it may be used 
                                                                                                                                                 
451  2002 1 WLR 218. 
452  1986 1 All ER 943. 
453  See para 4.1 below with regard to the but-for test. 
454  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 245. 
455  See Haynes v Harwood 1935 1KB 146; Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd 1959 1 WLR 966; 
discussion by Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 462-465; Witting Street on 
torts 63-64. See paras 3.3.1, 3.5.3, and 4.2. 
456  Street on torts 48-50.    
457  In McFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 2 AC 59, the House of Lords refused a claim by the 
parents for the upbringing of a healthy child resulting from a failed vasectomy performed on the 
father of the child. Proximity was established as there was pre-tort relationship in respect of 
reliance by the parents on the skill of the surgeon in successfully performing the operation as 
well as assumption of responsibility by the doctor who gave the negligent advice. However, the 
duty of care was denied on grounds of fairness, justice and reasonableness. Lord Steyn (83) 
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in a positive manner, in recognising a duty where it was previously unrecognised or 
non-existent.  
 
An example of the court using the “fair, just and reasonable” element in a restrictive 
manner is illustrated in Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd.458 In this 
case, a ship carrying the claimants’ cargo sustained a crack while on voyage. The ship 
docked at a port. A surveyor was employed by a classification society charged with 
checking the safety of ships at sea. The surveyor, upon inspection, recommended that 
the ship continue with its voyage after some minor repairs. A couple of days later the 
ship sank. The claimants recovered a certain amount of their loss from the ship 
owner459 and tried to recover the remainder of the loss from the classification society 
“alleging breach of a duty of care owed by the society to the cargo owners to take 
reasonable care in the surveys undertaken and the recommendations made so as not 
to expose the cargo to risk of damage or loss”.460 The House of Lords found that 
reasonable foreseeability of harm as well as proximity was present but that it was not 
fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendant. In concluding that 
it was not fair, just and reasonable to impose liability on the classification society, the 
House of Lords held inter alia that: the imposition of duty of care may result in the 
classification societies refusing to inspect vessels which could result in compromising 
public safety at sea with detrimental consequences; increased litigation against such 
societies would occur and it would be a costly process diverting resources and men to 
the litigation process instead of focusing on the ships and saving lives; and that such 
recognition of a duty of care would be in conflict “with the international contractual 
structure” between ship and cargo owners.461  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
stated “[i]n my view it is legitimate in the present case to take into account considerations of 
distributive justice. That does not mean that I would decide the case on grounds of public policy. 
On the contrary, I would avoid those quicksands. Relying on principles of distributive justice I 
am persuaded that our tort law does not permit parents of a healthy unwanted child to claim 
the costs of bringing up the child from a health authority or a doctor. If it were necessary to do 
so. I would say that the claim does not satisfy the requirement of being fair, just and 
reasonable.” See discussion of this decision by Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis 
and Deakin’s tort law 114.  
458  1996 AC 211. See discussion of this case by Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on 
tort 93-94, Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 455-456; Witting Street on torts 
48-49. 
459  The sum recoverable from the ship owner was limited by an international statute. 
460  Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd 1996 AC 211, 211-212.   
461  Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd 1996 AC 211, 212, 242 
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An example of the court using the “fair, just and reasonable” element in a positive 
manner is illustrated in White v Jones.462 In this case, a legal practitioner did not draw 
up a new will as requested by the testator before his death, resulting in the testator’s 
daughters not inheriting. The House of Lords held that a duty of care should be 
imposed in such instances463 based on fairness, reasonableness and justice. Lord 
Goff464 inter alia provided the following reasons: solicitors play an important role in 
discharging their professional duties relating to the testators intentions and if they act 
negligently in fulfilling their duties it is not unjust if such solicitor should be found liable, 
there is a lacuna in the law which needs to be filled; to deny a remedy to the 
disappointed beneficiary is unjust; the testator has a right to bequeath his assets to 
whom he pleases; and legacies are important in society. 
 
Stapleton465 points out that most choices dealing with duty of care are policy 
choices.466 Robertson467 submits that policy considerations fall within two categories: 
justice between the parties; and justice taking into consideration the “community 
welfare” and any other “non-justice considerations”.468 The majority of the duty of care 
cases have been established by taking account of two broad types of policy issues: 
whether certain types of harm, such as pure economic loss and psychiatric injury, can 
ground liability in negligence; and whether the duty of care can be imposed with 
respect to certain types of conduct by for example, public authorities’ and 
professionals.469  
  
Other policy factors considered under the element of whether it is fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care include: the fear of indeterminate liability or the 
opening of the floodgates argument; vulnerability (to risk) of the claimant;470 whether 
                                                                                                                                                 
462  1995 2 AC 207. See discussion of this case by Witting Street on torts 49-50. 
463  Such duty was previously unrecognised. 
464  White v Jones 1995 2 AC 207, 259-260. 
465  2003 Aust Bar Rev 136. See Witting Street on torts 46; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 95 fn 101. 
466  Beever Negligence 29-30 submits that this element is unnecessary as the presence of duty of 
care is based on fact. See Witting Street on torts 46-47. See chapter 5 para 4.2 with regard to 
Cardi’s views ‒ the nature of a duty and whether it is a matter of law to be determined by the 
adjudicator or a matter of fact determined by the jury. 
467  2011 LQR 380.  
468  See Witting Street on torts 47. 
469  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 49. 
470  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 95. 
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a duty of care would undermine an imperative public interest;471 preference of 
protecting physical interests over pure economic loss or psychiatric injury; preference 
of protecting vulnerable victims such as the blind; the need to avoid conflict between 
claims in contract and in tort; the notion that people should be held accountable for 
their own actions; the desire to impose liability on primarily responsible parties such 
as regulatory authorities; and the notion that people should protect themselves from 
loss by taking out insurance or taking other precautionary measures.472  
 
3.2.2.2 The incremental approach stemming from Caparo473 
  
In Caparo, Lord Bridge474 stated: 
 
“I think the law has now moved in the direction of attaching greater significance to the more 
traditional categorisation of distinct and recognisable situations as guides to the existence, the 
scope and the limits of the varied duties of care which the law imposes. We must now, I think, 
recognise the wisdom of the words of Brennan J. in the High Court of Australia in Sutherland 
Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 60 A.L.R. 1, 43–44, where he said:  
 
‘It is preferable, in my view, that the law should develop novel categories of negligence 
incrementally and by analogy with established categories, rather than by a massive extension 
of a prima facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable ‘considerations which ought to 
negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed.’ 
 
One of the most important distinctions always to be observed lies in the law's essentially 
different approach to the different kinds of damage which one party may have suffered in 
consequence of the acts or omissions of another. It is one thing to owe a duty of care to avoid 
causing injury to the person or property of others. It is quite another to avoid causing others to 
suffer purely economic loss.” 
 
Lord Bridge was not encouraging the pre-Donoghue approach, but was rather 
contending that when dealing with a novel duty of care, existing authority must be 
considered and if there is a need for the law to extend, it should be extended 
incrementally resulting in a positive development.475 Witting476 points out that in the 
end the court will consider the principles of: 
 
 “justice and reasonableness in order to set the limits to what amounts to legitimate 
 incrementalism. In doing so, they are effectively applying the very Caparo test to which 
 incrementalism is said to be an alternative. … [A]ll the court is doing is assuming that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
471  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 95-96. 
472  See Witting Street on torts 48. 
473  Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 AC 605. 
474  Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 AC 605, 618. 
475  Witting Street on torts 34.  
476  Street on torts 50. 
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 proximity and foreseeability requirements are probably satisfied … and simply asking whether 
 it is fair, just, and reasonable to extend the duty of care by the marginal amount required in 
 order to cover the particular facts of the case”.  
 
3.2.2.3 Assumption of responsibility 
 
Stemming from the decision of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd477 
(hereinafter referred to as “Hedley Byrne”), the House of Lords acknowledged liability 
in the tort of negligence where the defendant voluntarily assumes responsibility for the 
accuracy of a statement made to a claimant and where the claimant relies on such 
statement.478 The test for assumption of responsibility is objective in nature and does 
not depend on the actions or intentions of the defendant.479 The phrase simply means 
that the law recognises the duty of care and assumption of responsibility may really 
just indicate proximity. Where the assumption of responsibility is established, it is not 
necessary to consider the last element of the three-fold test as such a finding 
demonstrates the existence of a duty of care and the actual relationship between the 
parties makes it fair, just and reasonable to impose the duty of care.480 
 
Lord Mance in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 481 stated: 
 
 “This review of authority confirms that there is no single common denominator, even in cases 
 of economic loss, by which liability may be determined. In my view the threefold test of 
 foreseeability, proximity and fairness, justice and reasonableness provides a convenient 
 general framework although it operates at a high level of abstraction. The concept of 
 assumption of responsibility is particularly useful in the two core categories of case identified 
 by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in White v Jones … when it may electively subsume all aspects of 
 the threefold approach. But if all that is meant by voluntary assumption of responsibility is the 
 voluntary assumption of responsibility for a task, rather than of liability towards the defendant, 
 then questions of foreseeability, proximity and fairness, reasonableness and justice may 
 become very relevant. In White v Jones itself there was no doubt that the solicitor had 
 voluntarily undertaken responsibility for a task, but it was the very fact that he had done so for 
 the testator, not the disappointed beneficiaries, that gave rise to the stark division of opinion in 
 the House. Incrementalism operates as an important cross-check on any other approach.” 
 
Lord Roskill in Caparo482 stated that:  
“there is no simple formula or touchstone to which recourse can be had in order to provide in 
every case a ready answer to the questions whether, given certain facts, the law will or will not 
impose liability for negligence or in cases where such liability can be shown to exist, determine 
                                                                                                                                                 
477  1964 AC 465. This was the first decision where the House of Lords recognised liability in the 
tort of negligence for financial loss as a result of a negligent misstatement.  
478  Referred to by Witting Street on torts 51. 
479  See Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181, 190-191. 
480  Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181, 199.  
481  Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181, 216. 
482  Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 AC 605, 628. 
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the extent of that liability. Phrases such as ‘foreseeability,’ ‘proximity,’ ‘neighbourhood,’ ‘just 
and reasonable,’ ‘fairness,’ ‘voluntary acceptance of risk,’ or ‘voluntary assumption of 
responsibility’ will be found used from time to time in the different cases. But, … such phrases 
are not precise definitions. At best they are but labels or phrases descriptive of the very different 
factual situations which can exist in particular cases and which must be carefully examined in 
each case before it can be pragmatically determined whether a duty of care exists and, if so, 
what is the scope and extent of that duty”.  
 
All these three approaches were considered in Customs and Excise Commissioners 
v Barclays Bank plc483 dealing with pure economic loss where the court confirmed that 
the three-fold test may be combined with the incremental approach together with 
reference also to the assumption of responsibility approach.484 However, the three-
fold test is the most favoured.485 In Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co 
Ltd,486 Lord Steyn487 stated that the three-fold test was acknowledged as having 
universal application and no matter what the type of harm or loss, the court must 
consider the foreseeability of harm, the relationship between the parties and whether 
it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care.488  
 
3.2.2.4 Conclusion 
 
Although the courts were at one stage very liberal in recognising different categories 
of duties of care which aided in developing the tort of negligence, they have been 
                                                                                                                                                 
483  2007 1 AC 181.  
484  Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181, 189-192. See Witting 
Street on torts 50 fn 139. 
485  See Van Colle v Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police 2009 1 AC 225, 260-261.  
486  1996 AC 211. 
487  Stated (235-236): “since the decision in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office [1970] A.C. 1004 
it has been settled law that the elements of foreseeability and proximity as well as 
considerations of fairness, justice and reasonableness are relevant to all cases whatever the 
nature of the harm sustained by the plaintiff. Saville L.J. explained, at p. 1077: ‘whatever the 
nature of the harm sustained by the plaintiff, it is necessary to consider the matter not only by 
inquiring about foreseeability but also by considering the nature of the relationship between the 
parties; and to be satisfied that in all the circumstances it is fair, just and reasonable to impose 
a duty of care. Of course . . . these three matters overlap with each other and are really facets 
of the same thing. For example, the relationship between the parties may be such that it is 
obvious that a lack of care will create a risk of harm and that as a matter of common sense and 
justice a duty should be imposed. . . . Again in most cases of the direct infliction of physical loss 
or injury through carelessness, it is self-evident that a civilised system of law should hold that 
a duty of care has been broken, whereas the infliction of financial harm may well pose a more 
difficult problem. Thus the three so-called requirements for a duty of care are not to be treated 
as wholly separate and distinct requirements but rather as convenient and helpful approaches 
to the pragmatic question whether a duty should be imposed in any given case. In the end 
whether the law does impose a duty in any particular circumstances depends upon those 
circumstances . . .’ That seems to me a correct summary of the law as it now stands. It follows 
that I would reject the first argument of counsel for the cargo owners”. 
488  See Witting Street on torts 32-33.  
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trying to limit the situations in which a duty of care is owed.489 As demonstrated, the 
courts have shown flexibility and have adopted a pragmatic approach to determining 
a duty of care. The development of the three-fold test stemming from Caparo490 was 
monumental and as demonstrated, the most widely used approach. It is a flexible test 
enabling a value judgment as to whether the defendant owes the claimant a duty to 
take reasonable care. It allows the courts to rely on policy as well principles of fairness, 
justice and reasonableness to exclude or extend a category of duty of care in the tort 
of negligence. 
  
The influence of reasonableness on the element of “duty of care” is generally explicit. 
It is explicit on the element of the three-fold test relating to reasonable foreseeability 
of harm to the type of claimant. Reasonableness applies in this instance as a yardstick 
for the type of claimant that falls within the category of persons that could be entitled 
to a claim in the tort of negligence. Here, reasonableness operates to delineate the 
type of claimant who ought to be owed a reasonable duty of care. The element of 
“reasonable foreseeability of harm” applies in determining whether the risk of injury 
was reasonably foreseeable to the possible type of claimant who may be entitled to 
claim in negligence. Thus, if the risk of injury is not reasonably foreseeable to the type 
of claimant, then there is no duty of care owed. The test applied with respect to 
foreseeability of harm to the type of claimant is that of the “reasonable person” in the 
position of the defendant. It is an ex ante objective approach based on the criterion of 
the “reasonable person”. The influence of reasonableness on the element of 
“proximity” which refers to the relationship between the parties is implicit in that if the 
relationship falls within one of the recognised categories of relationships; a duty of 
reasonable care may be owed to the claimant and expected of the defendant. It would 
depend on the nature of the relationship. If the relationship does not fall within a 
recognised category then it is reasonable to take into consideration other factors 
relating to physical, assumed, causal, or circumstantial closeness. This may assist in 
determining whether there is a relationship in which a duty of care is owed and 
expected. In the South African law of delict, the notion of proximity does not receive 
express recognition and the adoption of a complex system of proximity rules is not 
                                                                                                                                                 
489  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 32. 
490  Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 AC 605. 
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needed or desirable, but aspects of proximity arguably underlie some delictual 
principles.491  
 
The influence of reasonableness is explicit in respect of whether it is fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care. Reasonableness as a concept is applied with the 
concepts of fairness and justice. It also takes into account public policy and policy 
considerations. The way in which this element is applied is similar to the recent 
approach to determining wrongfulness in South African law.492 In English law, it is 
applied as a safety net to either recognise a duty of care or not. It is applied as part of 
the enquiry into whether a duty of care is owed and it is considered in reaching a final 
conclusion as to whether a duty of care is owed. The South African courts have been 
applying this approach in a similar way recently as part of the wrongfulness enquiry 
and in reaching a conclusion as to whether wrongfulness is present and in turn 
delictual liability.493 This third element is useful both in borderline and novel cases 
where it is difficult to conclude whether a duty of care is owed. All three elements of 
the three-fold test seem to be policy-based enquiries and the duty of care principle is 
used as a control mechanism which allows the courts to either exclude or ground 
liability in negligence.494  
 
“Assumption of responsibility” seems to be an application of the proximity requirement 
where it may be reasonable to find that a duty of care is owed to the claimant and 
expected of the defendant because of the relationship between them. Policy 
considerations apply in the sense that due to the nature of the relationship with regard 
                                                                                                                                                 
491  Insofar as proximity relates to a special relationship between parties, it may be of relevance to 
the element of wrongfulness in South African law. Thus a special relationship may give rise to 
a legal duty in certain instances of omission, but such a relationship is not an indispensable 
requirement for the existence of a legal duty (see Neethling and Potgieter Delict 69-71; chapter 
3 paras 3.1.10-3.1.11).  In respect of negligence, the reasonable person is more likely to 
foresee and prevent harm to proximate parties in many instances. Insofar as proximity relates 
to causal proximity, it may influence the flexible approach to legal causation. See chapter 3 
para 5.2 with regard to the flexible approach applied to determining legal causation. See also 
Ahmed and Steynberg 2015 THRHR 196-197 on the idea of proximity in determining legal 
causation with regard to secondary emotional shock.  
492  See chapter 3 para 3.2. 
493  See chapter 3 para 3.2. 
494  Cf Fleming 1953 Can B Rev 471; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 81. 
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to the concept of “closeness”, it may be reasonable495 or not to conclude that a duty 
of care is owed.  
 
With respect to the incremental approach, the influence of reasonableness is implicit 
in that it is reasonable that the duty of care categories should be recognised and 
developed carefully and meaningfully within the existing legal framework. It is 
submitted that adopting an approach to develop the law incrementally is a policy 
consideration. There is a fair amount of overlap between the three approaches due to 
the influence of reasonableness, fairness, justice, public policy and policy 
considerations. 
  
3.3 Recognised categories of duty of care  
 
The courts have been faced with novel and problematic cases such as in cases dealing 
with pure economic loss, psychiatric injury and liability for omissions which require 
further discussion.496  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
495  As in the decision of White v Jones 1995 2 AC 207. See discussion of this case by Witting 
Street on torts 49-50. 
496  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 102-103; Jones in 
Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 32. 
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3.3.1 Omissions 
 
In English law, there is generally no duty to act positively,497 on private persons or 
public authorities,498 in preventing harm to another499 or rescuing a person from peril500 
                                                                                                                                                 
497  There are exceptions where the law imposes a positive duty on a person to act. For example, 
an occupier of land is subject to a number of duties of care owed to a visitor or trespasser and 
if such occupier breaches those duties of care either in terms of the tort of negligence or under 
the Occupiers’ liability Act 1957, he may be held liable. For purposes of this study the Occupiers’ 
liability Act 1957 will not be discussed and all that will be pointed out is that under the above-
mentioned act, an occupier generally owes a duty to: visitors to take reasonable steps to ensure 
that the premises or land is reasonably safe for the purposes of the visit (see Everett v Comjo 
Ltd 2012 1 WLR 150); and to trespassers, a duty to take reasonable steps to safeguard such 
trespasser from any danger or harm emanating from the land. In the same vein, a landlord 
owes certain duties to a tenant, such as a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
tenant is reasonably safe from damage caused or personal harm caused by a defect in the 
property. The landlord is required to repair any defect in the property in terms of the Defective 
Premises Act 1972 (which for purposes of this study will also not be discussed, see Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 103, 106; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 245-247). 
Another example of an exception where the law imposes a positive duty on a person to act is 
the duty of the employer to ensure the safety of employees while working (see Connor v Surrey 
County Council 2011 QB 328; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort 
law 178; Steele Tort 424). 
498  See Sutradhar v National Environment Research Council 2006 4 All ER 490 where the British 
Government employed the British Geological Survey (as part of an international aid 
programme) to test the water in wells in Bangladesh but had failed to detect arsenic. The 
drinking water was contaminated and the claimant who drank the contaminated water suffered 
symptoms associated with arsenic poisoning. However, the claimant was not successful in 
claiming damages as the House of Lords dismissed the claim stating there was no duty owed 
by the British Geological Survey to the Bangladesh people or the UK government. See Lunney 
and Oliphant Tort 445. 
499  Home Office v Dorset Yacht Ltd 1970 AC 1004, 1060. In Smith v Littlewoods Organisation 1987 
AC 241, the owners of a vacant disused cinema (defendants’) intended to redevelop it. The 
contractors working on the redevelopment left it in a secure condition while not working on it 
but vandals broke into the building causing a fire which subsequently spread to the plaintiff’s 
neighbouring property. The plaintiff’s sued the defendants’ submitting that they owed them a 
duty of care to prevent the damage caused by the vandals. The court held that there was no 
breach of a duty and that the defendants did not act unreasonably (there was no fault on their 
part) in the circumstances as they were unaware of the vandals on the premises. It was not 
reasonably foreseeable that a fire would start causing damage to the neighbouring property. 
The damage was caused by third parties. Lord Goff (247) stated that the “common law does 
not impose liability for … pure omissions”. In Lamb v Camden LBC 1981 QB 625, the damage 
caused by the third parties (vagrants) was seen as too remote a consequence in relation to the 
defendant’s breach. See also Barrett v Ministry of Defence 1995 3 All ER 87 where the court 
held that military authorities did not owe a duty of care to monitor a navel airman who drank 
alcohol excessively but did owe him a duty of care from the point they put him to bed. He 
subsequently died as a result of ingesting his own vomit. The wife was entitled to damages but 
reduced due to contributory negligence. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 
103, 106; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 472-473; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 180-181; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 464-467, 481-
489.  
500  In English law, a rescuer is not obliged to rescue someone he does not know if he did not 
initially put him in a position of danger, no matter what the circumstances, that is, even if it is 
easy and does not cost the rescuer anything. Furthermore the defendant cannot raise the 
defence of volenti non fit iniuria and the rescuer’s actions will not usually break the casual link. 
See Ogwo v Taylor 1988 AC 431 where the defendant was held liable for negligently causing 
a fire leading to the injury of a fireman and volenti non fit iniuria was not applicable; Baker v TE 
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in cases of pure omissions.501 There are however exceptions to the general rule where 
a duty to act may be imposed. The following categories of circumstances502 may 
indicate the duty to take reasonable steps to prevent harm:503 where there is a 
relationship of care, in that one party is responsible for the care of the other party (from 
here on this factor will be referred to as a “special relationship” for convenience);504 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hopkins 1959 1 WLR 966 where the rescuer, a doctor tried to assist two other people but 
unfortunately they all died due to carbon monoxide poisoning. The defendant raised volenti non 
fit injuria and submitted that the conduct of the doctor constituted a novus actus interveniens. 
The court held that the doctor’s actions were not unreasonable and it was foreseeable that a 
person may come to the rescue of others. Thus the doctor’s conduct was not a novus actus 
interveniens and volenti non fit iniuria was not applicable as he did not freely and voluntarily 
accept the risk of harm - one of the requirements for the defence. A duty of care was owed to 
the doctor even if there was no relationship between the defendant and the primary victim whom 
the doctor attempted to rescue. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 195-196; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 217.  
501  See Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd 1987 2 AC 241, 271; Stovin v Wise 1996 AC 923, 
943-944; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 178-179.   
502  Or as referred to in South African law of delict, “factors” indicating a legal duty to act in 
preventing harm, where the boni mores would expect the defendant to take positive steps in 
preventing harm - see chapter 3 para 3.1.11. 
503  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 179. It is evident that 
proximity is the required connecting element. 
504  There are a number of special relationships where a common law duty of care is recognised 
generally conferring a positive duty on one person to prevent harm to another. Examples of the 
relationships include: an occupier of a property to a visitor or trespasser (see fn 498 above); an 
employer to his employee (see fn 498 above); a carrier to his passenger, school to a child (see 
Barnes v Hampshire CC 1969 1 WLR 1563 where the school was held liable when a young 
child was allowed to go home earlier than usual, the child was injured while crossing the road. 
The court reasoned that if the child would have been let off at the usual time, her mother would 
have been there to collect her and the injury could have been avoided. Thus a pre-existing 
relationship and proximity was present. In Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis 1956 AC 
549 involving negligence on the part of the school, a young child wandered out of the school 
onto a busy road. The plaintiff’s husband swerved to avoid hitting him and in that crashed into 
a tree and died. The council was held liable for the conduct of the child, stemming from the 
failure to keep the children in school during school hours.); prison authority to the prisoner, (see 
Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 2000 1 AC 360 and Kirkham v Chief 
Constable of Manchester 1990 2 QB where the police were held responsible for the failure to 
inform the prison authorities of the suicidal tendencies of the prisoner who subsequently 
committed suicide. In Home Office v Dorset Yacht Ltd 1970 AC 1004, the defendants’ were 
held liable due to the control over and the relationship they had with the young boys who had 
caused damage to the plaintiff’s boat. The court held that the Borstal officers owed a duty to 
take reasonable steps to ensure that the boys did not escape). See Peel and Goudkamp 
Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 101-106; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 476-
477; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 182-184; Witting Street 
on torts 43-44; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 243-244. Cf Lunney and Oliphant Tort 467-479 and 
the authority they refer to.  
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assumption of responsibility;505 control over a dangerous person or thing;506 creation 
of danger;507 and prior conduct.508 There is no numerus clausus with regard to factors 
that may indicate a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent harm. It is possible that 
there may be more than one factor present simultaneously. For example, a special 
relationship between the parties and an assumption of responsibility may be present 
                                                                                                                                                 
505  See Stansbie v Troman 1948 2 KB 48 where a decorator assumed responsibility for looking 
after the claimant’s house, there was also a special (pre-tort) relationship between the claimant 
and the decorator but proximity was present. The decorator failed to secure the claimants 
property. Thieves then stole some valuables and the court found the decorator liable for the 
loss to the claimant due to assumption of responsibility and a pre-tort relationship. See also 
Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 477-481. 
506  Where X is in control over a dangerous person, thing or situation and it is reasonably 
foreseeable that another person, Y, may be harmed or suffer loss by such person, thing or 
situation and if X loses control (whether negligently or not) over the dangerous person, thing or 
situation, then X may be held liable for the loss or harm suffered by Y. The basis for liability lies 
in that X owed Y a duty to take reasonable steps to keep the person, thing or situation under 
control (McBride and Bagshaw Tort 243). The leading authority relating to control over a 
dangerous situation is Goldman v Hargrave 1967 1 AC 645 (dealing with liability for the tort of 
“nuisance”). In this case, the defendant’s tree caught fire as a result of lightening. The tree was 
cut down but a section of the wood was still smouldering and the defendant failed to extinguish 
it. Thereafter due to the weather conditions the wood reignited and the fire spread to his 
neighbour’s land. The general rule is that a person does not have a duty to protect his neighbour 
from harm resulting from a third persons tortious acts even if such harm was foreseeable and 
preventable (see also Weld-Blundell v Stephens 1920 AC 956, 986; Glaister v Appelby-in-
Westmorland Town Council 2010 PIQR P6, 45). The Privy Council however, held that the 
defendant was liable, as the resultant consequence was reasonably foreseeable, he was aware 
of the danger and failed to reasonable take steps which he could easily have taken to extinguish 
the fire. There was a special relationship between the parties, they were neighbours. The 
principles in Goldman v Hargrave were followed in Leakey v National Trust 1980 QB 485 (Jones 
in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 476; Witting Street on torts 42-43). 
507  Where X (whether wrongfully or not) creates a source of danger or puts Y in a potentially 
dangerous position which then materialises causing harm to Y. Y may sue X for the harm or 
loss suffered. X may be liable either on the basis of the initial wrongful act or on the basis that 
X owed Y a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm or loss. This factor was applied 
in Haynes v Harwood 1935 1 KB 146 where the defendants left horses unattended in the street. 
A stone was thrown at the horses, causing them to bolt. The plaintiff, a policeman, tried to save 
others from being harmed by the horses but sustained injury himself. Leaving the horses 
unattended was considered as creating a source of danger and the defendants were held liable 
for the plaintiff’s damage. In Yetkin v Mahmood 2010 EWCA Civ 776, the public authority in 
charge of highways planted shrubs which obscured the view for pedestrians, thereby creating 
danger. See in general McBride and Bagshaw Tort 233-239 as well as the authority referred to 
by Steele Tort 425 fn 58. Cf Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 473.  
508  Where a prior act creates a duty to take care and the defendant fails in such duty he may be 
held liable. For example, Witting Street on torts 41 refers to a doctor who accepts responsibility 
to treat a patient (prior act). If the doctor subsequently neglects or refuses to treat the patient, 
he may be held liable in terms of common law and in terms of the National Health Service 
(General Medical Services Contracts) Regulations SI No: 2004/291, Part V reg 15 – see 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 179 fn 486. However, a 
doctor who comes across a road accident where people are injured may not be obliged to treat 
anyone unless there is an assumption of responsibility (there is no relationship between the 
doctor and injured, proximity is lacking). See Capital & Counties Plc v Hampshire CC 1997 QB 
1004, 1060; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 101; Jones in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 474; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort 
law 179; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 458-461. 
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at the same time.509 In South African law, conduct in the form of an omission is still 
regarded as conduct which may lead to liability in delict if the remaining required 
elements are also present.510 In English law, the term “misfeasance” refers to 
affirmative or positive action, synonymous with the term “commission” used in South 
African law, while “nonfeasance” refers to a failure to act in English law, synonymous 
with the term “omission” used in South African Law.511 
Lord Hoffman in Stovin v Wise512 provided the following reasons why liability is 
generally not imposed in cases of pure omissions. 
 
 “One can put the matter in political, moral or economic terms. In political terms it is less of an 
 invasion of an individual’s freedom for the law to require him to consider the safety of others 
 in his actions than to impose upon him a duty to rescue or protect. A moral version of this 
 point may be called the ‘why pick on me?’ argument. A duty to prevent harm to others or to 
 render assistance to a person in danger or distress may apply to a large and indeterminate 
 class of people who happen to be able to do something. Why should one be held liable rather 
 than another? In economic terms, the efficient allocation of resources usually requires an 
 activity should bear its own costs. If it benefits from being able to impose some of its costs on 
 other people (what economists call ‘externalities,’) the market is distorted because the activity 
 appears cheaper than it really is. So liability to pay compensation for loss caused by negligent 
 conduct acts as a deterrent against increasing the cost of the activity to the community and 
 reduces externalities. But there is no similar justification for requiring a person who is not 
 doing anything to spend money on behalf of someone else. Except in special cases (such as 
 marine salvage) English law does not reward someone who voluntarily confers a benefit on 
 another. So there must be some special reason why he should have to put his hand in his 
 pocket.” 
 
Public authorities, such as the local authorities, public schools, hospitals, ambulance 
services etcetera are as a matter of policy treated differently, especially where their 
power stems from legislation.513 Claims against them are limited based on policy 
considerations. Emergency or any other services offering aid or rescue services,514 
                                                                                                                                                 
509  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 212-213; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 458. 
510  See chapter 3 para 2. 
511  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 178; Witting Street on 
torts 40. 
512  1996 AC 923, 931-932, 943-944. See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 453-454. 
513  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 186. 
514  See East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent 1941 AC 74 where the Board under no 
obligation tried to assist the claimant by repairing a breach in the seawall. The Board’s repair 
work was done in a negligent manner and the claimant’s land was still flooded for some time. 
The House of Lords however did not hold the Board liable and found that there was no 
difference in the Board completely omitting to assist and assisting but failing to repair the wall 
properly. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 474; Steele Tort 396-399. 
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such as, the police,515 fire brigades516 and coast guards,517 are under no obligation to 
come to the aid of a member of the public.518 There is no obligation on a person to 
give a warning either. Thus there is no liability on “one who sees another about to walk 
over a cliff with his head in the air, and forbears to shout a warning”.519  
 
Some of the policy considerations include that: it is not in the general public interest to 
pay compensation to a minority of the public; liability against public authorities should 
be excluded because they need the freedom to operate without being too cautious in 
their practices;520 and claims against the various public entities could lead to the 
undermining of the framework of public protection offered by certain legislation.521  
 
The differential treatment prevalent with respect to public authorities is more prominent 
when dealing with omissions as opposed to commissions.522 The courts will generally 
not find a public authority liable in negligence for failing to “perform a duty imposed 
upon them by legislation” or “failing to exercise a statutory power”.523 To succeed with 
                                                                                                                                                 
515  See Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police 2015 UKSC 2, where a woman afraid for 
her life contacted the police requesting assistance. The police as a result of miscommunication 
between the different police departments did not attend to her call for help immediately and by 
the time they did arrive at her house she had already been stabbed to death. The UK Supreme 
Court, following the decision in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 1989 1 AC 53 found 
that no duty of care was owed to the woman. See discussion of this case by McBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 225-227 who submit that the approach taken by the court was a Diceyan 
approach, ie, if a private person would not owe the claimant a duty in this situation than neither 
should the public body. Cf Lunney and Oliphant Tort 463-464. 
516  See Capital and Counties plc v Hampshire CC 1997 QB 1004; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 180 fn 491; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 220. 
517  See OLL Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport 1997 3 All ER 897 where the coast guard sent 
a rescue team to search and assist a teacher and children in distress. The rescue team went 
to a different area of the sea, not to where the children and teacher were situated, thereby 
failing to reach them in time. Four children subsequently died and the teacher and the other 
children suffered from hypothermia. The court held that the coast guard did not owe a duty of 
care to the teacher and children to take reasonable steps to rescue them. See Jones in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 475; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 180 fn 490; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 242; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 461. 
518  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 179-180. 
519  Yuen Kun Yeu v Attorney-General of Hong Kong 1988 AC 175,192. See Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 181. Cf Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 108. 
520  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 116.  
521  See Yeun kun-Yeu v Attorney General of Hong Kong 1988 AC 175, 198; X (Minors) v 
Bedforshire County Council 1995 2 AC 633, 750; Giliker Tort 54. 
522  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 186.  
523  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 186. See Stovin v Wise 
1996 AC 923, 949 where the court held that the presence of a statutory power does not in itself 
automatically indicate that there is a duty to act; X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC 1995 2 AC 633, 
where Sir Thomas Bingham MR stated that “very potent considerations of public policy” were 
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imposing liability on the public authority in negligence, in cases of omissions, either a 
separate common law duty must be established or a private action for breach of such 
duty must be established when interpreting the legislation.524 For example, a common 
law duty of care may be more easily established in respect of public schools where 
there is an assumption of responsibility over the children525 or where there is an 
undertaking by a public authority to do something.526 
 
The public authority may however be held liable for “making matters worse” when it 
intervenes in a situation.527 The effect of this is that emergency services will not be 
held liable for failing to respond to a call for assistance but if the emergency service 
responds, there is an “assumption of responsibility”528 and they may be held liable.529 
Authorities in charge of highways and roads generally do not have a common law duty 
to maintain such roads.530 In the 2008 Consultation Paper Administrative Redress: 
                                                                                                                                                 
required in order to sue a public entity. See also McBride and Bagshaw Tort 222-223; Steele 
Tort 418-423. 
524  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 186. 
525  See Barrett v Enfield LBC 2001 2 AC 550; Phelps v Hillingdon LBC 2001 2 AC 619; D v East 
Berkshire Community NHS Trust 2005 2 AC 373; Carty v Croydon LBC 2005 1 WLR 2312; 
Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 124; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 187-188; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 251-253. 
526  Such as in Swinney v Chief Constable of the Northumbria Police 1997 QB 464 where an 
informant was assured by the police that his identity would be kept secret. The person he 
informed on found out his identity and threatened him resulting in him sustaining psychiatric 
injury. It was held that the police owed the informant a duty of care to keep his identity a secret 
(they gave an undertaking). See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 477; 
McBride and Bagshaw Tort 230; Giliker Tort 67. See also An Informer v A Chief Constable 
2013 QB 579 where the Court of Appeal thought that the police assumed responsibility to the 
claimant but did not find that the police owed the claimant a duty of care to ensure that he was 
not prosecuted as it would interfere with the police’s functions and ability to investigate 
suspected criminals (McBride and Bagshaw Tort 186-187). 
527  See Corringe v Calderdale MBC 2004 1 WLR 1057, 1067; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 186. 
528  In Kent v Griffiths 2001 QB 36, the ambulance service on three occasions told the doctor and 
the claimant’s husband that the ambulance would arrive shortly, but in actual fact it took longer 
than expected resulting in the claimant suffering respiratory failure subsequently leading to her 
miss-carrying her baby, sustaining a personality change and impaired memory. The Court of 
Appeal found that the ambulance service owed the claimant a duty of care (on acceptance of 
the call) to “take reasonable steps to get her to hospital reasonably quickly”. See Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 106-107; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 231-232. Cf 
Steele Tort 423; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 461-464. 
529  See Capital & Counties Plc v Hampshire CC 1997 QB 1004, 1035; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 186; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 232. 
530  See Stovin v Wise 1996 AC 923 where it was held that the public authority does not owe a duty 
of care to motorists to flatten a bank of earth ensuring visibility of traffic at a junction; Corringe 
v Calderdale MBC 2004 1 WLR 1057 where it was held that the public authority does not owe 
a duty of care to motorists to inform them to slow down when encountering the crest of a country 
road; Goodes v East Sussex CC 2000 1 WLR 1356 where it was held that the authority does 
not owe a duty of care to motorists to remove snow and ice. See Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 187 fn 530; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 223-224. 
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Public Bodies and the Citizen, the Law Commission did indeed propose that under 
certain circumstances a public authority should be held liable for harm or loss caused 
by positive conduct or failing to prevent harm where the public authority acts unlawfully 
or is at fault. The paper was widely criticised and there is no indication if the proposals 
will be implemented.531  
 
When interpreting legislation, the class of persons to whom a duty of care is owed may 
be limited.532 In establishing a common law duty of care and extending liability, the 
courts are cautious and ensure that they do not interfere with the functions of public 
authorities and statutory bodies.533 For example, in Hill v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire534 (hereinafter referred to as “Hill”) the mother of the last victim of an 
infamous serial killer, known as the “Yorkshire Ripper”, sued the police in negligence 
for failing to find and arrest the serial killer. The House of Lords held that there was no 
duty of care owed by the police to the victim in detecting crime and the claim was 
dismissed on inter alia lack of proximity and various policy grounds.535 It was held that 
the police could not be held liable in negligence while still investigating and trying to 
combat crime. It would affect the way they investigate crimes. Funds and resources 
would be wasted in resolving issues and as a matter of policy it will interfere with their 
functions and may open the floodgates to litigation.536  
 
In X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council537 involving five related appeals, 
(hereinafter referred to as “X (Minors)”), the first two appeals dealt with children who 
were neglected and abused by their parents. The Council was aware of this and failed 
to do something about it, that is, they failed to take reasonable steps to prevent such 
                                                                                                                                                 
531  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 254.  
532  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 187. 
533  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 188. 
534  1989 1 AC 53. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 189; 
McBride and Bagshaw Tort 221-222. 
535  See Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 1989 1 AC 53 where Lord Keith 62-63 concluded 
that the police “were immune from an action of this kind”. 
536  See Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 1989 1 AC 53, 63. The principle in Hill was 
followed in Brookes v Commissioner of Police 2005 1 WLR 1495 (where similar policy 
considerations as in Hill was referred to) and Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire and 
Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex 2009 1 AC 225. An appeal to the European Court of Human 
Rights brought by Van Colle’s parents was also rejected in Van Colle v United Kingdom 56 
EHRR 23. See Giliker Tort 69. 
537  1995 2 AC 633. See discussion of this case by Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis 
and Deakin’s tort law; Steele Tort 400-405.  
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abuse from occurring and failed to take the children in their care. It was submitted that 
they had breached statutory duties in terms of child care legislation and were 
negligent. The House of Lords held that the Council did not owe a duty of care to the 
children. In essence, this decision is authority for the view that a child, who is factually 
in the care of its parents but who is neglected or abused by them, cannot sue a public 
authority in tort law on the grounds that the public authority failed to discharge their 
statutory duty or were negligent. The statute must clearly provide for a private right of 
action which may entitle a certain class of persons to some remedy and compensation. 
If such provisions are lacking then there is no right of action against the local authority. 
It was held that it was not fair, just or reasonable to impose a duty of care on the public 
authority for a number of reasons which included inter alia that: if it were to be enforced 
against one body it would be unfair and if it were to be enforced against all bodies it 
would lead to “almost impossible problems of disentangling as between the respective 
bodies the liability, both primary and by way of contribution, of each for reaching a 
decision found to be negligent”;538 and by imposing a duty of reasonable care, the 
public authority may have to employ “defensive tactics which would be harmful to the 
broad body of children at risk”.539    
  
Some of the unsuccessful claimants (four siblings abused by their mother) in X 
(Minors)540 took the matter to the European Court of Human Rights (at the time the 
Human Rights Act was not applicable) in Z v United Kingdom.541 The European Court 
of Human Rights acknowledged that two articles of the European Convention on 
Human Rights542 had been violated but that the contravention of the Convention rights 
need not result in a remedy in the tort of negligence.543 In an earlier decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Osman v United Kingdom,544 the court held that 
Article 6 (right of access to court) of the European Convention on Human Rights had 
been violated, in that English law failed to acknowledge an action against the police 
who were aware of eminent danger to a pupil and his family. They failed to heed 
                                                                                                                                                 
538  X (Minors) v Bedforshire County Council 1995 2 AC 633, 750. 
539  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 124. 
540  X (Minors) v Bedforshire County Council 1995 2 AC 633. 
541  2002 34 EHRR 3.  
542  Articles 3 and 13, relating to “inhuman and degrading treatment” and a right to relief in respect 
of the treatment they endured. 
543  Giliker Tort 61. 
544  1998 29 EHRR 245. See criticism of this decision by Gearty 2001 MLR 159; Steele Tort 432-
433. 
290 
 
warnings and ultimately failed to protect the pupil and his family. The pupil was 
seriously injured and the father was shot and killed. The court a quo and the Court of 
Appeal following the policy considerations in Hill545 did not acknowledge that a duty of 
care was owed to the pupil and his family. The European Court of Human Rights, 
concluded that the police were entitled to immunity in certain actions in negligence in 
English law although in Z v United Kingdom,546 the court acknowledged that they had 
made a mistake regarding this aspect and that Article 6 was not violated. The court 
however, did not overrule the decision, as Article 6 relates to and is limited to 
procedural and not substantive issues.547  
 
Nevertheless, the decision of European Court of Human Rights has had an impact on 
later English decisions in that the English courts became hesitant to dismiss actions 
due to policy considerations.548 In D v East Berkshire NHS Trust,549 the House of Lords 
affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision that a duty of care to children was owed by the 
public authority in charge of child welfare. In Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough 
Council,550 the House of Lords held the Council liable in negligence on the facts of the 
case, in that the educational psychologist owed the student with special needs a duty 
of care to provide educational support for the student (assumption of responsibility) 
and take reasonable steps to ensure that the student is not disadvantaged as a result 
of his learning difficulties. Negligence claims may result in compensation for the 
damage, loss or harm caused, while human rights claims may vindicate rights and 
upholds certain norms of behaviour551 as submitted by Giliker.552  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
545  Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 1989 1 AC 53. 
546  2002 34 EHRR 3. See Steele Tort 406, 408-409. 
547  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 116-121. 
548  See Barrett v Enfield 2001 2 AC 550, 560; Steele Tort 406-407. 
549  2005 2 AC 373. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 125. 
550  2001 2 AC 619 also followed in Carty v Croyden LBC 2005 1 WLR 2312. See Deakin, Johnston 
and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 188; Steele Tort 413-416. 
551  Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire and Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex 2008 
UKHL 50 [56]. See Giliker Tort 69-72, 
552  Tort 63 with reference to Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority 2009 1 AC 853; Rabone v 
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust 2012 2 AC 72.  
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3.3.1.1 Conclusion 
 
It seems that generally, liability will not follow as a result of a failure to act, even if 
acting positively to prevent harm may not cost anything and be considered reasonable 
in the instances. Due to policy considerations, a duty of care may not be recognised 
and liability may be excluded. English tort law does not follow the generalising 
approach followed in the South Africa law of delict where all the required elements 
must be present to ground delictual liability and even a failure to act in principle may 
lead to liability, as it is considered a form of conduct. The influence of reasonableness 
is partly implicit and partly explicit in respect of the exceptional instances where a duty 
of care is recognised in cases of omissions, or rather there is a duty to take reasonable 
steps to prevent harm where: there is a special relationship; assumption of 
responsibility; control over a dangerous person or thing; creation of danger; and prior 
conduct. Incidentally in the South African law of delict these instances indicate the 
presence of a legal duty to act positively in preventing harm. It is thus considered 
reasonable to expect the defendant to act positively in preventing the harm. 
Wrongfulness is established in the breach of a legal duty to prevent harm. Thus the 
presence of any factor or circumstance mentioned above may result in the finding of 
a breach of a legal duty which may be considered wrongful and unreasonable.553  
 
In respect of the recent departure of the English courts from their approach of not 
holding the state liable for omissions in D v East Berkshire NHS Trust554 and Phelps v 
Hillingdon London Borough Council,555 it seems that the courts from a theoretical point 
of view are still relying on the exceptional instances of a special relationship between 
the parties or assumption of responsibility. The courts are however, interpreting these 
factors more widely than they had in the past. Both these instances also relate to the 
element of proximity where the influence of reasonableness is implicit. It may be 
presumed that English law in future will more readily recognise claims in the tort of 
negligence in respect of omissions. It will apply a broader approach to proximity or try 
and ensure that an exceptional instance is applicable indicating a duty of care. 
Alternatively the policy considerations will have to be in favour of concluding that it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
553  See chapter 3 paras 3.1.10-3.1.11.  
554  2005 2 AC 373.  
555  2001 2 AC 619. 
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fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care. The decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights no doubt has also influenced the English courts recognising liability 
of the state, particularly in cases of omissions. There have been “mutterings about 
abolishing the Human Rights Act”556 and replacing it with a “British Bill of Rights”.557 
With the repercussions of Brexit558 and the possible abolition of the Human Rights Act, 
there may be an overall negative effect on the protection of human rights in the United 
Kingdom. When the United Kingdom formally breaks ties with the European Union 
(hereinafter referred to as the “EU”),559 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
will not be applicable in the United Kingdom. The European Convention on Human 
Rights (hereinafter referred to as the “ECHR”) is however a different entity from the 
EU. The rights under the ECHR are safeguarded by the Human Rights Act but as 
mentioned this act may be repealed.560 Brexit does not affect the protected rights 
under the ECHR.561 The draft Bill562 dealing with the United Kingdom leaving the EU 
proposes that the Charter of Fundamental Rights will not be applicable. The effect of 
this is that “some rights which are not in the Human Rights Act, for example on the 
rights of children and general right to non-discrimination” may be weakened. Thus a 
combination of the effect of Brexit and the possibility of the government of the United 
Kingdom repealing and replacing the Human Rights Act, may cause the protection of 
human rights to be weakened “below the standard of EU law rights”.563 It is therefore 
also uncertain if the English law will further develop tort liability of the state or if state 
immunity from liability will be perpetuated and strengthened. 
 
South African law is markedly different because the common law (the law of delict) 
and any legislation may be tested against the Constitution564 which is the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                 
556  See https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/14/british-citizens-human-rights-
brexit (Date of use: 7 November 2017). 
557  See http://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/brexit-and-a-british-bill-of-rights-four-scenarios-for-
human-rights/ Date of use: 7 November 2017).  
558  See https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-human-rights-work/what-does-brexit-
mean-equality-and-human-rights-uk (Date of use: 7 November 2017). 
559  See the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill published on 13 July 2017.  
560  See para 1 above. 
561  See https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-human-rights-work/what-does-brexit-mean-
equality-and-human-rights-uk (Date of use: 7 November 2017). 
562  The Repeal Bill: White published on 30 March 2017. 
563  See https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-human-rights-work/what-does-brexit-mean-
equality-and-human-rights-uk (Date of use: 7 November 2017). 
564  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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law. In Carmichele565 the Constitutional Court referred to American566 and English 
decisions567 where the courts declined to hold the government authority liable for an 
omission. The Constitutional Court found that Article 2(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights relating to the right to life corresponds with the fundamental right to 
life found in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa568 deserving protection of 
the law.569 The court570 referred to Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council571 where 
the House of Lords held the local authority liable. Lord Browne-Wilkinson572 stated:   
 
“It is a prerequisite to there being any liability in negligence at all that as a matter of policy it is 
fair, just and reasonable in those circumstances to impose liability in negligence. … In a wide 
range of cases public policy has led to the decision that the imposition of liability would not be 
fair and reasonable in the circumstances, eg some activities of financial regulators, building 
inspectors, ship surveyors, social workers dealing with sex abuse cases. In all these cases and 
many others the view has been taken that the proper performance of the defendant’s primary 
functions for the benefit of society as a whole will be inhibited if they are required to look over 
their shoulder to avoid liability in negligence. In English law the decision as to whether it is fair, 
just and reasonable to impose a liability in negligence on a particular class of would-be 
defendants depends on weighing in the balance the total detriment to the public interest in all 
cases from holding such class liable in negligence as against the total loss to all would-be 
plaintiffs if they are not to have a cause of action in respect of the loss they have individually 
suffered. … In English law, questions of public policy and the question whether it is fair and 
reasonable to impose liability in negligence are decided as questions of law. Once the decision 
is taken that, say, company auditors though liable to shareholders for negligent auditing are not 
liable to those proposing to invest in the company (see Caparo …), that decision will apply to 
all future cases of the same kind. The decision does not depend on weighing the balance 
between the extent of the damage to the plaintiff and the damage to the public in each particular 
case.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
565  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 957-960.  
566  DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services 489 US 189 1988. 
567  In Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 1989 1 AC 53 where it was considered necessary 
to protect the police from claims based on the premise that the interests of the community would 
be better served by police not being diverted from their primary duties, and X (Minors). See 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 958 fn 34. 
568  1996. 
569  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 957-958. 
570  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 958-959.  
571  1999 3 All ER 193. 
572  Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council 1999 3 All ER 193,199. 
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The court in Carmichele573 referred to Osman v United Kingdom574 where the 
European Court of Human Rights stated that “Article 2 of the Convention may also 
imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to 
take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from 
the criminal acts of another individual.” The Constitutional Court575 with approval 
referred to both Osman and Z v United Kingdom576 where the European Court of 
Human Rights did not approve of the public policy approach of “immunity” of the police 
from liability in negligence. The Constitutional Court stated:577  
 
 “Fears expressed about the chilling effect such delictual liability might have on the proper 
 exercise of duties by public servants are sufficiently met by the proportionality exercise which 
 must be carried out and also by the requirements of foreseeability and proximity. This 
 exercise in appropriate cases will establish limits to the delictual liability of public officials. A 
 public interest immunity excusing the respondents from liability that they might otherwise have 
 in the circumstances of the present case, would be inconsistent with our Constitution and its 
 values. Liability in this case must thus be determined on the basis of the law and its 
 application to the facts of the case, and not because of an immunity against such claims 
 granted to the respondents.” 
 
 
3.3.2 Negligently inflicted psychiatric injury 
 
Lord Steyn in White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police578 (hereinafter 
referred to as “White”) stated that:  
 
 “[n]owadays courts accept that there is no rigid distinction between body and mind. Courts 
 accept that a recognisable psychiatric illness results from an impact on the central nervous 
 system. In this sense therefore there is no qualitative difference between physical harm and 
 psychiatric harm. And psychiatric harm may be far more debilitating than physical harm”.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
573  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 958. 
574  29 EHHR 245, 305. 
575  In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 959. 
576  2002 34 EHRR 3. See Steele Tort 406, 408-409. 
577  In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 959-960. 
578  1999 2 AC 455, 492. 
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It is accepted that psychiatric injury caused by the defendant’s negligence is 
compensable.579 Psychiatric injury is generally regarded as a type of personal injury580 
but is assessed more restrictively due to policy considerations compared with other 
forms of personal injury.581 According to the courts, psychiatric injury582 may be 
induced by inter alia mental injury, shock, nervous shock,583 stress,584 or emotional 
trauma.585 In order to obtain compensation, the claimant must prove that he sustained 
some form of recognisable psychiatric injury as mere mental distress, grief, fear or 
other emotions are not sufficient.586 Successful claims have been made for post-
traumatic stress disorder;587 chronic fatigue syndrome;588 hysterical personality 
disorder;589 pathological grief disorder;590 and morbid depression.591 It is also settled 
that psychiatric injury need not be accompanied by physical injury.592  
 
There is a distinction between primary victims, who were in some way directly involved 
in the accident in so far as they were either physically harmed or in danger of harm 
                                                                                                                                                 
579  See Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 190. Psychiatric injury however is not yet regarded as 
important as physical bodily injury − Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 124.   
580  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 190; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 129-130.   
581  Lunney and Oliphant Tort 338. 
582  “Psychiatric injury” is a term used more recently. Previously reference was made to “nervous 
shock”. The term psychiatric injury has not been clearly defined and there is no general 
consensus on a definition. See White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 
AC 455, 470; Steele Tort 302.  
583  “Nervous shock” refers to “a reaction to an immediate and horrifying impact, resulting in some 
recognisable psychiatric illness. There must be some serious mental disturbance outside the 
range of normal human experience, not merely the ordinary emotions of anxiety, grief or fear” 
– see Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310, 407; Page v Smith 
1996 AC 155, 167. 
584  Walker v Northumberland County Council 1995 1 All ER 737.   
585  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 129-131; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 124-125. 
586  See McLoughlin v O’Brian 1983 AC 410, 431; White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire 
Police 1999 2 AC 455, 465, 491; Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 130-131; Deakin Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 124; Witting Street on torts 65.  
587  See White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455. 
588  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155. In this case, the plaintiff did not sustain any physical injury but a 
few hours after the accident from which his claim arose, he felt exhausted and the exhaustion 
continued thereafter.  
589  Brice v Brown 1984 1 All ER 997.  
590  Vernon v Bosley 1997 1 All ER 577. 
591  Hinz v Berry 1970 2 QB 40. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 485.  
592  See Page v Smith 1996 AC 155; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 130; Jones 
in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 485. 
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and within the range of foreseeable harm;593 and secondary victims,594 who were not 
directly involved in the accident, but sustained psychiatric injury as a result of 
witnessing injury to another, hearing of an injury to another, or witnessing the 
“immediate aftermath” of an accident.595 The award of compensation particularly with 
regard to secondary victims depends on policy considerations.596 There is no doubt of 
the potential for liability for psychiatric injury. This may be illustrated by referring to 
Alcock597 and White598 where potential claimants ranged from persons sustaining 
psychiatric injury as a result of direct involvement in the incident, to those who 
sustained such injury while hearing or watching television footage of the disaster.  
 
In respect of primary victims, the requirement of reasonable foreseeability of physical 
injury or endangerment is considered sufficient as a control mechanism whereas with 
regard to secondary victims, additional control mechanisms are imposed by the courts 
in order to limit claims.599   
 
It is important to distinguish between primary and secondary victims because with 
regard to secondary victims certain control mechanisms are applied “in order to limit 
the number of potential claimants” which do not apply to the primary victim.600 The 
distinction between who qualifies as a primary and secondary victim is sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                 
593  See Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 184; White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 
1999 2 AC 455, 455; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 487. In Alcock v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310, 407, Lord Oliver referred to the primary 
victim as one who is “involved, either mediately or immediately as a participant”. In Page v 
Smith 1996 AC 155, 184, however, Lord Lloyd referred to the primary victim as a participant 
directly involved in the accident, and well within the range of foreseeable physical injury (the 
italicised words led to confusion). 
594  See Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310, 407, 410-411 where 
Lord Oliver referred to these two categories of victims. 
595  See McLoughlin v O’Brian 1983 1 AC 410, 422; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis 
and Deakin’s tort law 127.   
596  See Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310, 407; Page v Smith 
1996 AC 155, 189. 
597  Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310. 
598  White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455. 
599  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 492. 
600  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 156. 
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difficult601 as illustrated in White602 (discussed below) and the courts have not been 
consistent in their distinction or definitions.603 
 
There have been instances where claims for psychiatric injury not related to personal 
injury succeeded, illustrating that the courts have adopted a flexible approach in 
developing the law relating to psychiatric injury in general. For example, in Attia v 
British Gas Plc,604 the claimant succeeded in her claim for psychiatric injury as a result 
of witnessing her property being destroyed by fire. It may be argued that the 
defendants owed the claimant a duty of care to protect the claimant’s property and 
ensure that it did not catch fire.605 In 1998, the Law Commission reviewed liability for 
psychiatric injury606 and acknowledged that this area of the law is controversial in both 
the medical and legal fields. It has however not developed enough for complete 
codification. The report in general recommended minimalistic reform to the common 
law and provided a draft bill, mainly aimed at remedying the law relating to secondary 
victims who suffer psychiatric injury stemming from the injury or death of a loved one. 
As of yet no legislation has been promulgated and the courts are at liberty to continue 
developing the law relating to psychiatric injury.607 
 
3.3.2.1 Primary victims 
 
Liability for psychiatric injury in respect of primary victims was recognised as early as 
1901, in Dulieu v White & Sons.608 In this case, the plaintiff sustained shock as a result 
of seeing a horse and cart being driven negligently into her place of employment. She 
                                                                                                                                                 
601  The Law Commission in the report on psychiatric illness para 5.51 (Liability for Psychiatric 
Illness, Law Com No. 249) noted that there were inconsistencies present in case law and that 
the distinction between primary and secondary victims was “more of a hindrance than a help”. 
602  White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455. 
603  See Matthews, Morgan and O’Cinneide Tort 144-145 who point out that Lord Oliver in Alcock 
v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310 referred to participant and non-
participant. In Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, Lord Lloyd referred to direct involvement and range 
of foreseeability with regard to the primary victim, while in White v Chief Constable of the South 
Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455 reference was made to physical endangerment or reasonable 
fear for one’s physical safety. 
604  1988 QB 304. In Owens v Liverpool Corporation 1939 1 KB 394, the relatives of the deceased 
succeeded in a claim for psychiatric injury as a result of seeing the hearse carrying the coffin 
crash and overturn. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 485, 502. 
605  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 354. 
606  Liability for Psychiatric Illness, Law Com No. 249. 
607  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 485-486. 
608  1901 2 KB 669. See also Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 131.  
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subsequently gave birth to her child prematurely and was able to recover damages for 
the nervous shock she sustained. Kennedy J stated609 that the shock “must be a shock 
which arises from a reasonable fear of personal injury to oneself”.610 In Hambrook v 
Stokes Bros,611 Lord Atkin dismissed Kennedy’ J’s restriction in succeeding in a claim 
for shock when one fears injury to oneself (primary victim). He stated612 “it would result 
in a state of the law in which a mother, shocked by fright for herself, would recover, 
while a mother shocked by her child being killed before her eyes, could not”. In effect 
the court recognised the claim for shock of a secondary victim. In this case, a mother 
succeeded in a claim for nervous shock sustained when she witnessed a runaway 
lorry veer towards the place where she had just left her children. She was 
subsequently informed of injury to her child. 
 
 The decision of Page v Smith613 (hereinafter referred to as “Page”), although 
criticised614 remains authoritative with regard to extending liability regarding primary 
victims and differentiating between the requirements for primary and secondary victim 
claims. In this case, the claimant, a victim of a motor vehicle accident615 did not sustain 
any physical injury but was frightened by the experience and suffered nervous shock. 
Approximately three hours after the accident he suffered from severe chronic fatigue 
syndrome as a result of the nervous shock. The plaintiff had been suffering from this 
condition616 of a mild nature on and off for over twenty years prior to the accident. He 
alleged that as a result of the accident his pre-existing condition “had become chronic 
and permanent and that it was unlikely that he would be able to take full-time 
employment again”.617  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
609  Dulieu v White & Sons 1901 2 KB 669, 675. 
610  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 331; Steele Tort 305-306. 
611  1925 1 KB 141. 
612  Hambrook v Stokes Bros 1925 1 KB 141,157. 
613  1966 AC 155. 
614  The decision of Page v Smith 1996 AC 155 has been criticised by academic writers and by 
Lord Goff (in White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455, 474-480). 
See Bailey and Nolan 2010 CLJ 495; Mullany 1995 Journal of Law and Medicine 112; Handford 
1996 Tort L Rev 5; Tan 1995 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 649; Trindade 1996 LQR 22; 
Sprince 1995 Professional negligence 124; Witting Street on torts 68; Steele Tort 307-308. See 
para 3.3.2.3 below. 
615  Due to the negligent driving of a motor vehicle driven by the defendant.  
616  Myalgic Encephalomyelitis, post-viral fatigue syndrome or chronic fatigue syndrome. 
617  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 165. 
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Of importance, the House of Lords in this case extended liability for psychiatric injury 
of primary victims to include victims with inherent susceptibilities, that is the application 
of the “thin-skull” rule618 and held that in respect of primary victims, the exact type of 
psychiatric injury need not be reasonably foreseeable, whereas for secondary victims 
it is necessary.619 Regarding primary victims, it is sufficient if physical injury is 
reasonably foreseeable although such physical injury need not actually occur.620 With 
regard to personal injury, there is no need to regard physical injury and psychiatric 
injury as different types of injury.621 A claim for psychiatric injury by a primary victim 
depends on what was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant ex ante (before the 
event) but ex post facto (taking into account the surrounding circumstances and what 
actually transpired with hindsight) in respect of a claim for psychiatric injury by a 
secondary victim. The question is whether the reasonable person would have foreseen 
that the secondary victim might suffer psychiatric injury taking into account what 
transpired in the circumstances.622   
  
Lord Browne-Wilkinson opined:623 
 
“any driver of a car should reasonably foresee that, if he drives carelessly, he will be liable to 
cause injury, either physical or psychiatric or both, to other users of the highway who become 
involved in an accident. Therefore he owes to such persons a duty of care to avoid such injury. 
In the present case the defendant could not foresee the exact type of psychiatric damage in 
fact suffered by the plaintiff who, due to his M.E., was ‘an eggshell personality.’ But that is of 
no significance since the defendant did owe a duty of care to prevent foreseeable damage, 
including psychiatric damage. Once such duty of care is established, the defendant must take 
the plaintiff as he finds him”.  
 
There are a number of examples in case law where the limits have been tested as to 
who qualifies as a primary victim and the categories of primary victim claims continue 
to expand.624 Of significance, the primary victim must sustain psychiatric injury from a 
reasonable fear of harm or belief of harm to himself. The claimant need not actually 
                                                                                                                                                 
618  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 182; see also Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 
131-133; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 486. 
619  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 190. 
620  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155,190. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 486. 
621  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 190. 
622  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 188-189. Lord Lloyd in support of his submission referred to Bourhill 
v Young 1943 AC 92, 110 and McLoughlin v O'Brian 1983 1 AC 410, 420, 432 where an ex 
post facto approach was eluded to but stated that it was applicable to claims of secondary 
victims and did not make sense applied to primary victims.   
623  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 182. 
624  Steele Tort 300. 
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be in danger though due to the defendant’s negligence.625 If physical injury to the 
claimant is foreseeable, he is entitled to recover compensation for physical and or 
recognised psychiatric injury.626 
 
A discussion of a few cases will suffice in order to illustrate the explicit influence of 
reasonableness with regard to the criterion of reasonable foreseeability of harm in 
recognising a duty of care to primary victims. In White,627 the claimants (police officers) 
who rescued the victims at a football stadium were not regarded as primary victims 
because they were not within the reasonable foreseeable range of harm.628 
Furthermore, they did not qualify as secondary victims as the close tie of love and 
affection was missing. They were seen as claimants on a status no better than that of 
bystanders.629 The court acknowledged that it was part of a policeman’s job to assist 
citizens and during their employment would come across such dangerous incidents.630 
It seems as if a rescuer would only be regarded as a primary victim if exposed to 
physical danger.631 In White,632 the policemen attending to and rescuing victims at the 
disaster were denied claims for psychiatric injury. The House of Lords was influenced 
by a policy decision that it would not be just to compensate the policemen while 
denying claims brought by the relatives in Alcock.633 In Cullin v London Fire & Civil 
Defence Authority,634 the claimants (firefighters) succeeded in their claims for 
psychiatric injury after attending to fires where their colleagues were killed. It has been 
                                                                                                                                                 
625  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 131; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 485. 
626  Witting Street on torts 68. 
627  White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455.  
628  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 488. 
629  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 135; Witting Street on 
torts 72.  
630  See White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455, 511. In some 
jurisdictions in the USA, it is referred to as the “fireman’s rule”. According to this rule, a fireman 
as part of his job may come across dangerous and horrific incidents. Therefore as a 
professional he cannot claim for psychiatric injury. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 135. 
631  See Chadwick v British Railways Board 1967 1 WLR 912 where a wife succeeded in a claim 
for damages for psychiatric injury sustained by her deceased husband as a result of rescuing 
and comforting victims of the Lewisham Railway disaster. Waller J (921) stated that “shock was 
foreseeable and … rescue was foreseeable”. See also Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 488.  
632  White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455. 
633  Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310. See White v Chief 
Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455, 495; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 135. 
634  1999 PIQR 314 referred to by Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 488. 
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argued that the approach of the courts with respect to claims of rescuers where 
firefighters and policemen may fall in this category is arbitrary and it seems that the 
main concern is to limit liability.635  
 
A crane driver in Dooley v Crammell Laird636 succeeded in claiming compensation for 
psychiatric injuries after witnessing a defective sling on the crane snapping and 
causing the crane to drop its load onto the hold of the ship where he and his colleagues 
were working. Even though no one was injured, the claimant who was directly involved 
was considered a participant. He suffered psychiatric injury as a result of thinking he 
was about to cause injury or death to another. In Farrell v Avon HA,637 the father of a 
new-born baby was incorrectly told by the hospital staff that his new born son had died 
and was given a corpse to hold. His son was in fact alive but the father alleged that he 
sustained shock and subsequently developed post-traumatic stress disorder. The 
father “asserted that since grief at the death of a child was a reasonably foreseeable 
occurrence, he was entitled to recover damages for a reasonably unforeseeable but 
recognised psychiatric disorder if this subsequently developed”.638 It was held that the 
father was a primary victim and “the relevant test was whether [the defendant] ought 
reasonably to have foreseen that its conduct would expose [the father] to the risk of a 
recognised psychiatric disorder”.639 The father had proven that his post-traumatic 
stress disorder (even though it manifested at a later stage) had been caused by the 
incident at the hospital.640 
 
In Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd,641 a primary victim had been exposed 
to asbestos dust for about eight years and over time developed plural plaques. Even 
though his physical health was not affected, he developed anxiety neurosis from fear 
that he may in future contract a disease stemming from the pleural plaques present in 
his body. The claimant was informed by his doctor about thirty years after the exposure 
that there was a risk of developing an asbestos-related disease in future. The court 
                                                                                                                                                 
635  See Todd 1999 LQR 347; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 353. 
636  1951 WL 11458. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 489; Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 137-138. 
637  2001 Lloyd’s Rep Med 458. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 490, 505. 
638  Farrell v Avon HA 2001 Lloyd’s Rep Med 458. 
639  The court in Farrell v Avon HA 2001 Lloyd’s Rep Med 458 applied the test referred to in 
McLoughlin v O'Brian 1983 1 AC 410 and the principles in Page v Smith 1996 AC 155. 
640  Farrell v Avon HA 2001 Lloyd’s Rep Med 458. 
641  2008 1 AC 281. 
302 
 
found that the risk of the disease materialising or the psychiatric injury caused in 
expecting the disease to materialise was not actionable based on the notion that a 
person of reasonable fortitude would not react in the manner in which the claimant did. 
Academic writers642 highlight the reference to the person of reasonable fortitude in this 
case which is a departure from the extension of liability offered to the primary victim 
with the “thin skull” in Page.643 It may be argued that in this case the chain of causation 
was stretched rather far as compared to that of Page. Perhaps the court would have 
reached a different conclusion if the pleural plaques did indeed affect the primary 
victim’s physical health.  
 
In Walker v Northumberland County Council,644 a social services officer suffered a 
nervous breakdown from stress (psychiatric injury not induced by shock) as a result of 
being overburdened with work.645 He took three months leave and before his return to 
work was assured by his employer that assistance would be provided to ease his work 
load. According to the facts he was provided with limited assistance and subsequently 
suffered a second breakdown whereafter he left work. Coleman J646 stated:  
 
“It is clear law that an employer has a duty to provide his employee with a reasonably safe 
system of work and to take reasonable steps to protect him from risks which are reasonably 
foreseeable. Whereas the law on the extent of this duty has developed almost exclusively in 
cases involving physical injury to the employer as distinct from injury to his mental health, there 
is no logical reason why risk of psychiatric damage should be excluded from the scope of an 
employer's duty of care or from the co-extensive implied term in the contract of employment. 
That said, there can be no doubt that the circumstances in which claims based on such damage 
are likely to arise will often give rise to extremely difficult evidential problems of foreseeability 
and causation.”   
 
Coleman J found the employer liable in that such employer owed a duty to take 
reasonable steps to avoid exposing the employee to a workload which endangered 
his health. The duty was not breached at the first nervous breakdown which was 
unforeseeable but at the second breakdown.647 
                                                                                                                                                 
642  See discussion of this case by and Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 133-134, 
Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 503-504 and Steele Tort 308-311. 
643  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155. 
644  1995 PIQR 521.  
645  Hale LJ in Hatton v Sutherland 2002 All ER 1 approved of the approach in Walker v 
Northumberland County Council 1995 PIQR 521 stating that the question to be asked is 
whether a reaction to stress resulting in harm was reasonably foreseeable in the particular 
employee. 
646  Walker v Northumberland County Council 1995 PIQR 521, 532. 
647  See Steele Tort 311-314. See also discussion of cases dealing with stress resulting in 
psychiatric injuries by Lunney and Oliphant Tort 354-362. 
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3.3.2.2 Secondary victims 
 
Lord Steyn in White648 acknowledged that policy considerations have influenced the 
law relating to compensation for pure psychiatric injury649 relevant to secondary victims 
and referred to the following four factors: deciding what falls within the ambit of 
recognisable psychiatric injury is complex and “classification of emotional injury is 
often controversial” requiring expert medical evidence which is time-consuming and 
costly; the opening of the floodgates to potential numerous claims; the risk of “litigation 
is sometimes an unconscious disincentive to rehabilitation”; and the imposition of 
liability for pure psychiatric injury “may result in a burden of liability on defendants 
which may be disproportionate to tortious conduct involving perhaps momentary 
lapses of concentration, e.g. in a motor car accident”.650 
 
A secondary victim will have to meet the following requirements in order to succeed in 
a claim for pure psychiatric injury:651 the claimant must fall within the class of persons 
whose claim should be recognised;652 proximity must be present − “not only proximity 
to the event in time and space, but also proximity of relationship between the primary 
and secondary victim”;653 the psychiatric injury must be induced by shock;654 there 
must be foreseeability of psychiatric injury to the claimant of normal fortitude by the 
defendant and the thin skull rule is not applicable.655  
  
In respect of the proximity requirement of the relationship − there must be a close 
relationship of love and affection between the secondary victim and the endangered 
person. Therefore a bystander with no close relationship of love and affection with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
648  White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455, 493-494. 
649  Where physical injury does not accompany the psychiatric injury. 
650  See Witting Street on tort 129 who is not convinced with Lord Steyn’s reasons referring to 
counter arguments for the four reasons. 
651  See in general Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 134-136; Deakin, Johnston 
and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 129-139. 
652  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 134. 
653  See Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 189. 
654  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 129-130. 
655  See McLoughlin v O'Brian 1983 1 AC 410, 418-419, 422; Alcock v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310, 402, 419-420; Page v Smith 1996 AC 155, 187,189. 
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victim would not have a claim for psychiatric injury.656 The type of relationships are not 
limited to for example familial relationships, it is presumed that there is a close 
relationship of love and affection between spouses, and children and parents, but this 
may be rebutted with evidence to the contrary. Such presumption does not apply to 
other relationships, including siblings.657 There are numerous relationships where 
there is a close relationship of love and affection as explained by Lord Wilberforce in 
McLoughlin v O’Brian:658 
 
“[T]he possible range is between the closest of family ties ‒ of parent and child, or husband and 
wife ‒ and the ordinary bystander. Existing law recognises the claims of the first: it denies that 
of the second, either on the basis that such persons must be assumed to be possessed of 
fortitude sufficient to enable them to endure the calamities of modern life, or that defendants 
cannot be expected to compensate the world at large. … it should follow that other cases 
involving less close relationships must be very carefully scrutinised. I cannot say that they 
should never be admitted. The closer the tie (not merely in relationship, but in care) the greater 
the claim for consideration.” 
 
And by Lord Keith in Alcock:659  
 
“As regards the class of persons to whom a duty may be owed to take reasonable care to avoid 
inflicting psychiatric illness through nervous shock sustained by reason of physical injury or 
peril to another, I think it sufficient that reasonable foreseeability should be the guide. I would 
not seek to limit the class by reference to particular relationships such as husband and wife or 
parent and child. The kinds of relationship which may involve close ties of love and affection 
are numerous, and it is the existence of such ties which leads to mental disturbance when the 
loved one suffers a catastrophe. They may be present in family relationships or those of close 
                                                                                                                                                 
656  For example in Bourhill v Young 1943 AC 92, a woman heard an accident occur and 
immediately went to the scene of the accident subsequently sustaining nervous shock which 
allegedly led to the loss of her baby. On claiming for the loss due to the shock, the court denied 
compensation due to the fact that she was not related to the deceased and that it was not 
reasonably foreseeable that a person with normal susceptibilities would have suffered shock. 
In McFarlane v EE Caledonia Ltd 1994 2 All ER 1, the court denied a claim for psychiatric injury 
sustained by a claimant who was on a vessel, the Tharos that attended to the Piper Alpha oil 
rig where an explosion and fire took place. The claimant alleged that his life was in danger, that 
he witnessed men in distress, on fire, and jumping into the sea. According to the facts, the 
vessel he was on was not in any danger and no one on the vessel sustained personal or 
psychiatric injuries. The court held that the bystander did not meet the criteria pronounced in 
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310 and that harm was not 
reasonably foreseeable to a person of normal susceptibilities. There was insufficient proximity 
with regard to time and place as well the close relationship of love and affection (14). See Jones 
in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 494; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis 
and Deakin’s tort law 134; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 331. 
657  For example, in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310, one of the 
appellants, Harrison who was present at the stadium where he witnessed the tragedy and lost 
two of his brothers did not succeed in a claim for psychiatric injury. The court held that there 
was no evidence of “close ties of love or affection”. Lord Ackner (406) stated “[t]he quality of 
brotherly love is well known to differ widely ‒ from Cain and Abel to David and Jonathan”. See 
Lunney and Oliphant Tort 338-339; Steele Tort 324. 
658  1983 1 AC 410, 422.  
659  Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310, 397. See also Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 134-135. 
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friendship, and may be stronger in the case of engaged couples than in that of persons who 
have been married to each other for many years. It is common knowledge that such ties exist, 
and reasonably foreseeable that those bound by them may in certain circumstances be at real 
risk of psychiatric illness if the loved one is injured or put in peril.”  
 
With regard to sufficient proximity in time and space between the event and the 
resulting psychiatric injury, the limits of this requirement can be gleaned from referring 
to two cases on opposing ends. For example in Taylor v A Novo (UK) Ltd,660 a 
daughter claimed compensation for psychiatric injury sustained as a result of 
witnessing her mother collapse and die. The mother was injured a few weeks prior to 
her death and the court held that the relevant event causing the injury was the accident 
and not the death of the mother. The daughter did not witness the incident which led 
to her mother’s injury nor the immediate aftermath. Therefore the requirement of 
proximity was not satisfied. In McLoughlin v O’Brian,661 the plaintiff heard about the 
accident in which her husband and children were injured. Upon arrival at the hospital, 
approximately two hours after the accident, the plaintiff was informed that her youngest 
daughter had been killed and saw the extent of injuries to her children and husband. 
The proximity requirement was satisfied as the plaintiff’s hearing of and seeing her 
injured children and husband upon arrival at the hospital qualified as the “immediate 
aftermath” of the accident.662 The House of Lords663 held that the nervous shock 
suffered by the plaintiff “had been the reasonably foreseeable result of the injuries to 
her family caused by the defendants’ negligence; that policy considerations should not 
inhibit a decision in her favour; and that, accordingly, she was entitled to recover 
damages”. In Alcock, Lord Jauncey664 held that the act of a relative identifying a body 
in a mortuary approximately nine hours later did not qualify as falling within the ambit 
of the immediate aftermath.665 In W v Essex County Council,666 where claims were 
instituted by parents who took in a foster child who thereupon sexually abused their 
children was denied a claim for psychiatric injury because the parents were informed 
of the sexual abuse and did not witness such abuse or its immediate aftermath. 
                                                                                                                                                 
660  2014 QB 150. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 135; Jones in Jones (gen 
ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 497. 
661  1983 1 AC 410. 
662  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 135-136. 
663  McLoughlin v O’Brian 1983 1 AC 410, 411. 
664  Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310, 423-424. 
665  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 495. 
666  2001 2 AC 592. Lunney and Oliphant Tort 340 submit that on the facts of this case a duty could 
have been more easily recognised by referring to the Council’s assumption of responsibility to 
the parents by placing the foster child (with a history of sexual abuse) in their home “without 
diluting the general requirement of proximity of  perception”. 
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The secondary victim claims in both Alcock667 and White668 arose out of the 
Hillsborough Football Stadium disaster which occurred in Sheffield on 15 April 1989. 
Many people were either physically or psychologically affected. A football match was 
scheduled to take place that day between the Liverpool and Nottingham Forest 
Football clubs. The South Yorkshire Police was in charge of controlling the spectators 
at the match. An excessively large number of spectators were allowed to enter the 
grounds at a certain section causing overcrowding and cramming which subsequently 
resulted in people being crushed. Just under one hundred people were killed and 
hundreds of people were physically injured. Footage of what was taking place at the 
stadium was broadcast live on the television, but the broadcasts did not show injury to 
specific victims as this would have been in breach of applicable broadcasting 
legislation. The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire admitted liability with regard to the 
deaths and physical injuries. Claims for nervous shock resulting in psychiatric injury 
were instituted against the Chief Constable.669 In White,670 the claims were instituted 
by affected police officers who were not in any physical danger, but assisted victims 
at the stadium, while in Alcock671 claims were instituted by family members, and in one 
instance a fiancé of the spectators who were killed or injured.672 The claim by the 
fiancé was allowed, the claim by a grandmother who brought up the child was not 
disbarred, while claims by brothers, brothers-in-law and sisters were denied in 
Alcock.673 In Alcock the limits were tested against a variety of claims, where some 
stemmed from plaintiffs who witnessed the disaster from neighbouring stands, some 
relatives witnessed the events on the television, and some heard of the disaster on 
the radio. One of the plaintiffs saw the events of the disaster on the television and then 
rushed to the stadium to find out whether his son was injured only to find out that his 
son had indeed been injured and killed.674 The claims in both Alcock675 and White,676 
except those claims relating to police officers who were involved in the immediate 
                                                                                                                                                 
667  Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310. 
668  White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455. 
669  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 340; Witting Street on torts 69. 
670  White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455. 
671  Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310. 
672  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 340; Witting Street on torts 69. 
673  See Witting Street on torts 69. 
674  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 340. 
675  Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310. 
676  White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455. 
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vicinity where the deaths and injuries occurred, failed for fear of the floodgates opening 
to potential numerous claims. The reasoning of the court has been criticised by 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis.677 They state that the House of Lords could have 
dealt with the claims differently by: requesting proof of seriousness of the medical 
conditions; considering that the relaying of the news could be considered a novus 
actus interveniens; finding that the damage that occurred was too remote; or that the 
medium of communication via the television applied in “removing the claimant from 
the category of ‘proximate’ persons”. 
 
3.3.2.3 Conclusion  
 
The influence of reasonableness in determining a duty of care relating to claims for 
psychiatric injury in the tort of negligence is explicit. It is evident that psychiatric injury 
or at least general harm must be reasonably foreseeable. Policy considerations play 
a vital role with respect to secondary victim claims for psychiatric injury in limiting 
claims. In other words, the question is whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose 
a duty of care on secondary victims of psychiatric injury based on policy considerations 
(the third element of the three-fold test). Naturally, there may be numerous claims 
emanating from people who watch or hear of an accident or disturbing incident. It 
would be unreasonable for the defendant to be held liable for all such claims, indeed 
liability may be indeterminate. Therefore it would be unreasonable to impose a duty of 
care. Turning to the standard of the reasonable person, it is applied ex post facto 
where specific reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury is required in respect of 
secondary victims and ex ante in respect of primary victims based on the harm which 
would have been foreseen by the reasonable person. A primary victim must sustain 
psychiatric injury from a reasonable fear or belief of harm. The fact that a primary 
victim with inherent susceptibilities is entitled to claim compensation while a secondary 
victim with inherent susceptibilities is not, may seem unreasonable and arbitrary. Also 
the fact that the standard of the reasonable person is applied ex post facto to 
secondary victims while ex ante in respect of primary victims may also seem 
unreasonable, in that the same standard should be applied to all victims. It is evident 
that this does not sit well with a number of academic writers. For example, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
677  Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 132. 
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mentioned678 the decision of Page679 has endured severe criticism by academic writers 
and by Lord Goff in White680 mainly due to: the departure from the requirement of 
reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury in a person of ordinary fortitude on the 
part of  a primary victim; conflation of the different forms of damage; the distinction 
drawn between primary and secondary victims; the misunderstanding of the thin skull 
rule which extends liability to primary victims with inherent infirmities; the ex ante 
approach applied to the primary victim whereas the ex post facto approach applied to 
the secondary victim; and having the effect of limiting the definition of the primary 
victim to one who was in physical danger.681 Nevertheless, the rules of proximity play 
an important role in limiting secondary victims’ claims and these rules seem 
reasonable in respect of imputing liability for psychiatric injury on a defendant.  
 
In the South African law of delict, the rules of proximity as applied in English law to 
determine a duty of care are not applicable but legal causation would sufficiently 
address claims of secondary victims where policy considerations based on 
reasonableness, fairness and justice would apply. If the psychiatric injury is considered 
too remote, in the instance of a secondary victim seeing the incident on television and 
where such victim did not have a close relationship with the primary victim, then it 
would be considered too remote. Therefore it is unfair, unjust and unreasonable for 
the defendant to be held liable for the psychiatric injury sustained by the secondary 
victim.682 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis,683 refer to the possibility of a break in the 
causal link and Lord Steyn in White684 stated: 
 
“the law on the recovery of compensation for pure psychiatric harm is a patchwork quilt of  
distinctions which are difficult to justify. There are two theoretical solutions. The first is to wipe 
out recovery in tort for pure psychiatric injury. … argued by Professor Stapleton. But that would 
be contrary to precedent and, in any event, highly controversial. Only Parliament could take 
such a step. The second solution is to abolish all the special limiting rules applicable to 
psychiatric harm. That appears to be the course advocated by Mullany and Handford, Tort 
                                                                                                                                                 
678  See para 3.3.2.1 above.  
679  Page v Smith 1996 AC 155. 
680  White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455, 474-480. 
681  See Bailey and Nolan 2010 CLJ 495; Mullany 1995 Journal of Law and Medicine 112; Handford 
1996 Tort L Rev 5; Tan 1995 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 649; Trindade 1996 LQR 22; 
Sprince 1995 Professional negligence 124; Witting Street on torts 68; Steele Tort 307-308. 
682  See chapter 3 para 8. 
683  Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 132. 
684  White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 45, 500. 
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Liability for Psychiatric Damage. They would allow claims for pure psychiatric damage by mere 
bystanders: see (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 410, 415. Precedent rules out this course and, in any event, 
there are cogent policy considerations against such a bold innovation. In my view the only 
sensible general strategy for the courts is to say thus far and no further. The only prudent course 
is to treat the pragmatic categories as reflected in authoritative decisions such as … Alcock … 
and Page … as settled for the time being but by and large to leave any expansion or 
development in this corner of the law to Parliament. In reality there are no refined analytical 
tools which will enable the courts to draw lines by way of compromise solution in a way which 
is coherent and morally defensible. It must be left to Parliament to undertake the task of radical 
law reform”.    
 
The Law Commission recommended a third option; to keep the requirement relating 
to secondary victims in respect of the close tie of love and affection and to eliminate 
the rest of the requirements.685 This does indeed seem like a reasonable option which 
would result in a fair outcome with respect to secondary victims claims as the closer 
the relationship between the primary and secondary victim, the more reasonably 
foreseeable the harm would be. 
 
As stated, no legislation has yet been promulgated and in 2007, the government 
rejected the Law Commissions reform proposal686 giving the courts the flexibility to 
develop the law.687 Lunney and Oliphant688 recommend that claims for psychiatric 
injury should be treated in the same manner as physical injury. They argue that 
reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury is sufficient and submit that the special 
proximity requirements should be eliminated.  
 
Lord Oliver in Alcock689 stated “in the end, it has to be accepted that the concept of 
“proximity” is an artificial one which depends more upon the court’s perception of what 
is the reasonable area for the imposition of liability than upon any logical process of 
analogical deduction”.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
685  See Witting Street on torts 75. 
686  In the Department of Constitutional Affairs consultation Paper “The law on Damages” CP 9/07. 
In Australia claims for negligently inflicted psychiatric injury in most jurisdictions are regulated 
by legislation. See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 367-368.  
687  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 367-368. 
688  Tort 363. 
689  Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310, 411. 
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Nevertheless, the influence of reasonableness is explicit in determining a duty of care 
with regard to psychiatric injury. The standard of the reasonable person is applied and 
reasonable foreseeability of harm is applicable to all three elements of the tort of 
negligence, that is, the duty of care, breach and causation. 
 
3.3.3 Pure economic loss  
 
In the tort of negligence, the courts are more reluctant to acknowledge a duty of care 
when dealing with pure economic loss than when dealing with personal injury and 
damage to property.690 Witting691 points out that pure economic loss is not concerned 
with “physical damage or injury to intellectual property rights or reputation”, but loss 
resulting from “such things as money expended and opportunities to profit forgone as 
a result of the defendant’s failure to take care”.692 Different requirements are applied 
when dealing with economic loss caused negligently and intentionally.693 
Consequential or relational economic loss differs from pure economic loss in that 
consequential loss refers to financial loss resulting directly from personal injury or 
damage to property.694 The courts more readily award compensation for consequential 
economic loss than pure economic loss unless economic loss results from negligent 
misstatements (where the Hedley Byrne principle discussed below is applied) or 
“negligent provision of services” (where the extended Hedley Byrne principle 
                                                                                                                                                 
690  See Murphy v Brentwood District Council 1991 1 AC 398, 487; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk 
and Lindsell on torts 511; Witting Street on torts 81; Giliker Tort 89; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 
369. Cf Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 115; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 141.  
691  Street on torts 81. Cf Giliker Tort 89. 
692  See also Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 140-141; Steele 
Tort 333. 
693  There are generally three economic torts where intention is required all with their own specific 
requirements commonly referred to as: breach of contract; causing of economic loss by 
unlawful means; and conspiracy. See Giliker Tort 89, 457-458.  
694  Giliker Tort 90-91 illustrates the difference between the different types of damage by referring 
to Spartan Steel & Co Ltd v Martin 1973 1 QB 27 where the defendants negligently cut a cable 
which supplied the plaintiffs factory with power. As a result of the lost power supply, the plaintiffs 
sustained the following damage: melt metal which was in the furnace at the time of the power 
cut had to be discarded in order to avoid causing damage to the furnace (the metal was 
damaged property);  loss of profits which would have emanated from the future sale of the melt 
(metal) which was discarded (consequential loss); and loss of profits on four other melts which 
would have been processed during the time of the power cut (pure economic loss). The court 
allowed the claims for the damage to the property and consequential loss but not for the pure 
economic loss. See also Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities 1986 QB 507; Candlewood 
Navigation Corp Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd 1986 AC1. Cf Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 116-117; McBride & Bagshaw Tort 175-176; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 372-
373.  
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discussed below is applied).695 Claims for pure economic loss resulting from defective 
products do not usually succeed.696  
 
Some of the reasons for not acknowledging the duty of care in instances of pure 
economic loss or allowing such claims in negligence697 which include policy 
considerations are: the possible indeterminate and disproportionate liability; the 
possible opening of the floodgates to litigation;698 the loss is difficult to ascertain and 
prove;699 and that tort law should not encroach upon the spheres of the law such as 
                                                                                                                                                 
695  In Weller & Co v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute 1966 1 QB 569, the institute had 
allowed a virus to escape which affected cows in the vicinity. The UK Minister of Agriculture 
was forced to order the closure of the cattle markets. The auctioneers lost out on trade on the 
cattle market and sued for pure economic loss. The court held that the institute may be liable 
for the damage to the property (cows) but it could not be held liable to auctioneers who did not 
have a proprietary interest in the cows that were affected (this principle was set out in Cattle v 
Stockton Waterworks 1875 LR 10 QB 453 and followed in Weller, Spartan Steel & Co Ltd v 
Martin 1973 1 QB 27, Leigh and Sullivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd 1986 AC 785, and 
Candlewood Navigation Corp Ltd v Mitsui O.S.K Lines 1986 AC 1). See Jones in Jones (gen 
ed) Clerk and Lindsell Torts 546-549; Deakin Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 165-166; Witting Street on torts 94-96; Giliker Tort 93-94, 106-107; Steele Tort 337-
347; chapter 3 para 5.2. 
696  In Anns v Merton LBC 1978 AC 728, a claim stemming from loss (incorrectly referred to as 
“material physical damage”) resulting from defective buildings was allowed, however, this was 
overturned in Murphy v Brentwood District Council 1991 1 AC 398, dealing with pure economic 
loss resulting from defective buildings. See also Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd 
1986 QB 507, where damage was not recoverable for a defective pump or rather a pump 
unsuitable for the purposes required. Thus the claimant usually has a contractual claim with the 
supplier. The Defective Premises Act 1972 now regulates building work in that statutory claims 
are possible if the work is not conducted in a professional manner which may be stricter than 
the standard of negligence. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 119-121; 
Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 540-542; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 160-162; Steele Tort 349-358; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 377-
392.  
697  In other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, the courts 
have been more liberal in allowing claims for economic loss even where the claimant only has 
a contractual interest in the property that was subsequently damaged (Giliker Tort 129). See 
Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 119 and Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis  
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 142-143, 149-150 who are not convinced with the reasons put 
forward for the reluctance of the courts for allowing claims for pure economic loss. They point 
out that these reasons are not backed by scientific and empirical evidence which should be 
discouraged. 
698  See Spartan Steel & Co Ltd v Martin 1973 1 QB 27, 36, 38-39. 
699  See Witting Street on torts 81.  
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the law of contract700 thereby undermining the principles regulating the law of 
contract701 and the law regulating companies.702  
 
For example, in Caparo,703 the House of Lords excluded liability by stating that 
proximity, in respect of a duty of care, was absent and applied the requirement 
strictly.704 In this case, the plaintiffs’ (Caparo Industries plc) bought shares and 
succeeded in taking over Fidelity plc. The plaintiffs’ alleged that it took this action as a 
result of relying on financial accounts prepared by auditors acting for Fidelity plc which 
showed that the company had made a sizeable pre-tax profit when in fact it made a 
loss. The plaintiffs’ sued the auditors alleging that they were negligent in conducting 
the audit and making the report. The House of Lords, influenced by policy 
considerations,705 found that no duty of care was owed by the auditors to prospective 
investors or to an existing shareholder who would rely on the accounts. Their reasons 
included inter alia that proximity was lacking. Lord Bridge706 stated that in order for 
liability for economic loss to succeed in respect of negligent misstatements, the 
defendant must know “that his statement would be communicated to the plaintiff, either 
as an individual or as a member of an identifiable class, specifically in connection with 
a particular transaction or transactions … and that the plaintiff would be very likely to 
rely on it for the purposes of deciding whether or not to enter upon that transaction”.707  
 
Prior to Hedley Byrne,708 English law did not recognise that a party may be owed a 
duty of care by the maker of a statement to take reasonable care not to cause pure 
                                                                                                                                                 
700  In the law of contract, claims for pure economic loss are not problematic and the recovery 
thereof is not as restrictive as it is in the tort of negligence (Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 115). 
701  See Greater Nottingham Co-operative Society v Cementation Piling Ltd 1989 QB 71; Simaan 
General Contracting v Pilkington Glass Ltd (No 2) 1988 2WLR 761; Pacific Associates v Baxter 
1990 1 QB 993; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 168-173; 
Giliker Tort 91-93, 98-101. 
702  See Williams and Reid v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd and Mistlin 1998 1 WLR 830. 
703  1990 2 AC 605. 
704  See Giliker Tort 122-123. 
705  Some of the policy considerations excluding liability included that accounting firms would 
undertake “defensive accounting”, accountancy firms would cease to operate and there would 
be high “liability insurance premiums” (Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 149).  
706  Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 AC 605, 621. 
707  See Giliker Tort 125-126 who in detail discusses the factors which influence the court in finding 
a duty of care in cases of pure economic loss stemming from Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 
1990 2 AC 605. Cf Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 147-148. 
708  Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners 1964 AC 465. 
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economic loss resulting from such negligent misstatement, where such person relied 
on the statement. A remedy was possible only in the law of contract. In Hedley Byrne, 
the House of Lords recognised liability for pure economic loss based on the premise 
that the maker of the statement had assumed responsibility towards the plaintiff by 
undertaking to deliver a specific performance.709 In this case, a firm of advertising 
agents wanted to check the creditworthiness of one of its client’s as it was placing a 
large order on its client’s behalf and would be responsible for the costs of the order. 
The advertising firm requested its bank to ask the client’s bank (the defendants) about 
the client’s creditworthiness. The defendants replied with a favourable comment via a 
letter which included a disclaimer to liability. The client subsequently went into 
liquidation and the advertising agency lost a large amount of money by placing the 
orders on the client’s behalf. The advertising agency then sued the defendants for the 
negligent misstatement alleging that they had relied on the information. The House of 
Lords dismissed the claim only because of the disclaimer to liability710 but made it clear 
that had there been no disclaimer, the defendants would have owed the advertising 
agency a duty of care not to mislead them about the client’s creditworthiness. The 
court held that the defendants would have assumed responsibility711 towards the 
advertising agency in respect of the statement that was relied upon and thus a duty of 
care was owed.712  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
709  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 108; Steele Tort 358-364. 
710  See Smith v Eric Bush 1990 1 AC 831 where the House of Lords held that the disclaimer was 
invalid under s 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 in that it did not satisfy the requirement 
of “reasonableness” in s11 (3)). It would be unreasonable for the valuer of a property to invoke 
the disclaimer and the valuer assumed responsibility to the buyer. The House of Lords however, 
for fear of opening the floodgates to litigation stated that their decision was limited to buyers of 
private modest houses. The facts of Smith are similar to the facts of Caparo Industries plc v 
Dickman 1990 2 AC 605 except that in Smith, the surveyor’s report was paid for whereas in 
Caparo no fee was paid to the bank for the information. The difference between this case and 
Caparo lies in the relationship between the parties and the nature of the transactions. In Smith, 
the claimant was wealthy, buying the most expensive investment in his life while in Caparo, an 
entrepreneur was taking risks in a commercial context. This decision was followed in Merrett v 
Babb 2001 QB 1174, where the court held that the surveyor had assumed responsibility to the 
claimant for the accuracy of the valuation report. See also Harris v Wyre Forest DC 1990 1 AC 
831; Yianni v Edwin Evans & Sons 1982 QB 438; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis 
and Deakin’s tort law 150-151; Gilker Tort 119-120; Steele Tort 364-367; Lunney and Oliphant 
Tort 407-421. 
711  See Hedley Byrne according to Lord Reid 486, Lord Morris 494, and Lord Devlin 528-530. 
712  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 176-179. 
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Stemming from Hedley Byrne,713 two requirements must be met in order to establish 
a duty of care with respect to negligent misstatements: a special relationship between 
the parties714 where the defendant assumes responsibility;715 and “reasonable 
reliance” by the claimant. The first requirement relates to proximity and these two 
requirements together are commonly referred to as the “Hedley Byrne principle”.716 In 
respect of the assumption of responsibility717 and reliance, it must be determined 
objectively on the facts of the case whether the claimant’s reliance on such advice was 
reasonable or if there was reasonable reliance by the claimant on the defendant to 
exercise reasonable care.718 For example, in Caparo719 the plaintiff’s reliance on the 
auditor’s accounts was considered unreasonable as the reports were not intended to 
be relied upon for the purpose of investment but for complying with other statutory 
requirements.720 In Reeman v Department of Transport,721 the Court of Appeal, 
following Caparo, held that it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on a certificate 
pertaining to the seaworthiness of a boat as evidence of the boat’s financial value. The 
purpose of the certificate was to promote safety at sea.722 A claimant must prove that 
he relied on the advice given “or acts reasonably in assuming” that the statement was 
made by the defendant.723 Lord Reid724 stated: 
 
 “A reasonable man, knowing that he was being trusted or that his skill and judgment were 
 being relied on, would, I think, have three courses open to him. He could keep silent or 
 decline to give the information or advice sought: or he could give an answer with a clear 
 qualification that he accepted no responsibility for it or that it was given without that reflection
 or enquiry which a careful answer would require: or he could simply answer without any such 
 qualification. If he chooses to adopt the last course he must, I think, be held to have accepted 
 some responsibility for his answer being given carefully, or to have accepted a relationship 
 with the enquirer which requires him to exercise such care as the circumstances require.”  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
713  Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners 1964 AC 465. 
714  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 511-512; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 144. 
715  See Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd 1995 2 AC 145,181; Williams v Natural Life Foods Ltd 
1998 1 WLR 830, 835; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 514-515. 
716  Giliker Tort 112. 
717  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 110. 
718  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 525-527.  
719  Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 1990 2 AC 605. 
720  See Giliker Tort 126-127. 
721  1997 2 Lloyd’s Rep 648. 
722  See Giliker Tort 127. 
723  See Customs & Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181(where it was held 
that it could not be said that the customs officials relied on the bank to protect their interests; 
Abbott v Strong 1998 2 BCLC 420; Giliker Tort 126-127. 
724  Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners 1964 AC 465, 486.  
315 
 
Lord Reid725 stated that the special relationship in a business and not a social 
context726 is one where “the party seeking information or advice was trusting the other 
to exercise such a degree of care as the circumstances required, where it was 
reasonable for him to do that, and where the other gave information or advice when 
he knew or ought to have known that the inquirer was relying on him”.   
 
In Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc,727 Lord Goff stated that in instances where the 
“plaintiff entrusts the defendant with the conduct of his affairs to perform a task with 
reasonable care and skill, in general or in particular, the defendant may have assumed 
responsibility to the plaintiff”. Thus the Hedley Byrne principle which was previously 
applied to advice was extended to instances where services are rendered.728 This is 
commonly known as the extended “Hedley Byrne principle”.729 Thus a doctor or dentist 
is expected to treat his patient with the care and skill that a reasonably competent 
doctor or dentist would exercise. This principle applies to all professionals whether a 
legal practitioner, engineer, referee, or accountant etcetera.730 The extended Hedley 
Byrne principle has even been applied to instances where providers of financial 
services provided negligent advice to the deceased regarding pension schemes, 
which adversely affected the dependants.731 A legal practitioner tasked with the 
preparation of a will for the testator must give effect to the testator’s intentions and 
prepare such will timeously, failing which he may be held liable to the beneficiaries for 
financial loss intended to be bequeathed by the testator. A duty of reasonable care 
                                                                                                                                                 
725  Hedley Byrne 534. 
726  Thus reliance on advice given in a social context will not ground liability unless such advisor 
explicitly assures the advisee that his advice can be relied upon, such as in Chaudry v 
Prabhakar 1989 1 WLR 29. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort 
law 145; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 180-181; Giliker Tort 115. 
727  1995 2 AC 296, 318. 
728  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 184; Giliker Tort 116. 
729  The extended Hedley Byrne principle was applied in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd 1995 
2 AC 145, White v Jones 1995 2 AC 207, Welton v North Cornwall DC 1997 1 WLR 570, 
Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd 1998 1 WLR 830 as well as other cases - see Peel 
and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 108-109; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 153-154; Witting Street on torts 88; Giliker Tort 116 fn 82; 
Steele Tort 370-382; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 422-439. Cf McBride and Bagshaw Tort 180, 
188-191, 193-194. 
730  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 185 as well as all the authority referred to. 
731  See Gorham v British Telecommunications Plc 2000 1 WLR 2129. See also Weldon v GRE 
Linked Life Assurance Ltd 2000 2 All ER (Comm) 914; Giliker Tort 117. 
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and skill is owed in ensuring that the will of the testator is affected and a duty of care 
is also owed to the beneficiaries in preventing them from sustaining financial loss.732 
 
There are some instances where claims have succeeded for pure economic loss in 
the tort of negligence, which do not fall under the Hedley Byrne principles but under 
the general principles of recovery following Murphy v Brentwood District Council.733 
For example, in Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp,734 a clerk at a 
local authority registry neglected to charge fees over certain land. The Ministry lost 
financially as a result of not receiving the fees over the property and sued the local 
authority for such loss. The Court of Appeal held that the Ministry was entitled to 
recover compensation for pure economic loss from the local authority.735  
 
To some adjudicators and academic writers,736 “assumption of responsibility is not 
particularly a “helpful or realistic test ... . It can only have real meaning if it is 
understood as referring to the circumstances in which the law will deem the maker of 
the statement to have assumed responsibility to the person who acts upon the 
advice”.737 Lord Slyn738 opined that the “phrase … means simply that the law 
recognises that there is a duty of care. It is not so much that responsibility is assumed 
as that it is recognised or imposed by law”. On the other hand, other adjudicators and 
academic writers,739 like Lord Goff740 and Lord Steyn741 are of the opinion that it is a 
useful concept providing “practical justice”. Lord Bingham742 and Lord Hoffman743 too 
                                                                                                                                                 
732  See Ross v Caunters 1980 Ch 297; White v Jones 1995 2 AC 207 where the House of Lords 
in terms of policy considerations held that the legal practitioners had assumed responsibility to 
the beneficiaries. See also Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 111-114; Deakin, 
Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 154; Witting Street on torts 89-91; 
Giliker Tort 107-110. Cf McBride and Bagshaw Tort 196. 
733  1991 1 AC 398. 
734  1970 2 QB 223. 
735  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 152; Jones in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 520. 
736  See Barker 1993 LQR 461, Hepple 1997 CLP 88 and Cane Tort law and economic interests 
177, 200 who criticise the use of the concept as a fiction used to justify the existence of a duty 
of care; Giliker Tort 118 fn 86. 
737  According to Lord Griffiths in Smith v Eric Bush 1990 1 AC 831, 862. 
738  In Phelps v Hillingdon LBC 2001 2 AC 619, 654.  
739  See McBride & Bagshaw Tort 177-178. 
740  White v Jones 1995 2 AC 207, 268. 
741  In Williams and Reid v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd 1998 1 WLR 830, 837. 
742  Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181 [4]. 
743  Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc 2007 1 AC 181 [35]. See Jones in 
Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 515. 
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are of the opinion that there are instances where one party can assume responsibility 
for another. 
 
In the Australian decision of Perre v Apnand Pty Ltd,744 the defendant negligently 
supplied potato seeds, which when planted produced a diseased crop. A quarantine 
was imposed on all farmers within a twenty kilometre radius of the diseased crop. The 
surrounding farmers, the claimants’, suffered loss as a result of not growing and 
processing crops. McHugh J,745 stated that “reliance and assumption of responsibility 
are merely indicators of the claimant’s vulnerability to harm from the defendant’s 
conduct” and that the concept of “vulnerability” is the “most relevant criterion for 
determining whether a duty of care exists”. In other words vulnerability to harm is the 
most relevant criterion in order to decide whether a duty of care should be imposed. 
He opined that the reasons for economic loss stemmed from indeterminacy, 
autonomy, vulnerability and knowledge. In this case, he found that the claimant was 
vulnerable as he had no remedy in contract law. There was slight risk of indeterminacy. 
The defendant had knowledge of the risks in supplying the seeds and the defendant’s 
autonomy was limited as he was already liable for the physical damage. Thus McHugh 
J suggested that the law should be developed incrementally and the duty of care was 
imposed.  He referred to White v Jones746 where it could be stated that the claimants 
were vulnerable and dependant on the defendant (legal practitioner) who had control 
over their rights and expected inheritance. Jones747 points out that this analysis formed 
part of a “broader thesis that the reasons for upholding or denying a duty in particular 
cases should be regarded as the principles to be applied in determining whether a 
duty exists in cases within that category”. Jones748 refer to examples of vulnerability 
and dependence in the cases of Smith v Bush749 where the purchaser paid for a 
valuation and depended on the report in which any defects should have been detected; 
and Gorham v British Telecommunications Plc750 where the court imposed a duty of 
care on the advisor who negligently advised the deceased about pension schemes 
subsequently adversely affecting the dependants. This policy consideration of 
                                                                                                                                                 
744  164 ALR 606, referred to by Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 550. 
745  Perre v Apnand Pty Ltd 164 ALR 606, 639. 
746  1995 2 AC 207. 
747  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 529. 
748  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 529. 
749  1990 1 AC 831. 
750  2000 1 WLR 2129. 
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vulnerability to risk has also been increasingly used by South African courts with 
regard to claims for pure economic loss.751 
 
3.3.3.1 Conclusion  
 
Academic writers752 have different views under what circumstances claims for pure 
economic loss should be actionable. The courts are influenced by policy 
considerations and although the approach is acceptable, Stapleton753 points out those 
policy considerations were not applied consistently but on a pocket approach to 
liability, dividing case law. She points out that the influence of the policy considerations 
varied unjustifiably between the various pockets.754 The pockets she identified755 
related to negligent misstatements dealing with words;756 defective property757 and 
damage to property of a third party.758 Thus any claim for pure economic loss had to 
fall within one of the pockets. She759 explains that in Smith v Eric S Bush760 concerning 
a defect in property, a pure economic loss claim was allowed where a surveyor 
negligently failed to discover the defect in a property dealt with under the Hedley Byrne 
principle, whereas in D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners,761 a claim for pure 
economic loss was not allowed where a builder was responsible for a defect in property 
because it was dealt with under the principles in Murphy v Brentwood District 
Council.762 In both claims there was no issue of indeterminate liability and neither was 
the amount indeterminable.763 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
751  See chapter 3 para 9. 
752  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 449-452 who refer to the differing approaches of various 
academics such as Beever (who prefers a rights based approach as opposed to the loss-based 
model) and Stapleton and Giliker who accept the policy considerations approach of the court 
but provide their own approaches to dealing with the policy considerations. 
753  1991 LQR 249ff. 
754  Lunney and Oliphant Tort 451. 
755  At the time of writing the contribution. 
756  Stapleton 1991 LQR 259-263 refers to the Hedley Byrne principle and the extended Hedley 
Byrne principal (which now covers actions). 
757  As in Murphy v Brentwood District Council 1991 1 AC 398. See Stapleton 1991 LQR 267-277. 
758  As in Spartan Steel & Co Ltd v Martin 1973 1 QB 27. See Stapleton 1991 LQR 263-266. 
759  Stapleton 1991 LQR 277-283. See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 451. 
760  1990 1 AC 831. 
761  1989 AC 177. 
762  1991 1 AC 398. 
763  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 451. 
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The influence of reasonableness is predominantly explicit with regard to claims for 
pure economic loss. With regard to the duty of care, the influence of reasonableness 
is explicit in respect of the criterion of reasonable foreseeability of pure economic loss. 
In respect of proximity the influence is implicit and proximity serves to limit claims only 
to those instances where there is a special relationship between the parties. The 
principles of proximity however, are criticised as not being applicable in all instances, 
so policy considerations are relied upon. The influence of reasonableness is explicit in 
concluding whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care. In respect 
of the criterion of the reasonable person, the influence of reasonableness is explicit 
whether applied to the conduct of the defendant or the reliance on the statement or 
advice on the part of the plaintiff. If we consider the Hedley Byrne principle or extended 
Hedley Byrne principle, with respect to the plaintiff, the question asked is whether the 
reasonable person would have relied on the statement or advice or if there was 
reasonable reliance on the defendant’s exercise of reasonable care. Thus in judging 
whether the reliance was reasonable under the circumstances and whether the 
plaintiff’s interests, with regard to the pure economic loss, was infringed unreasonably 
‒ objective, subjective, ex ante and ex post facto approaches are applied. From a 
South African perspective this includes the enquiry into wrongfulness and fault. The 
influence of reasonableness is explicit once again in respect of causation, where the 
criterion of reasonable foreseeability of harm is applicable with respect to whether the 
pure economic loss was remote or not.  
 
3.4 Breach of a duty of care 
 
Assuming that a duty of care is owed to the claimant by the defendant, the question 
then is whether “the risk of harm to the claimant was reasonably foreseeable by the 
hypothetical person in the position of the defendant”.764 The conduct of the defendant 
is judged against the conduct of the reasonable person and an ex ante765 approach 
as opposed to an ex post facto approach is applied.766 The focus is now on the content 
of the duty as opposed to whether it exists.767 Thus if a motorist drives recklessly but 
                                                                                                                                                 
764  Witting Street on torts 116. 
765  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 563; Witting Street on torts 116. 
766  See Marks and Spencer Plc v Palmer 2001 EWCA Civ 1528 [27]; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield 
and Jolowicz on tort 155 fn 91. 
767  Lunney and Oliphant Tort 152. 
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does not cause an accident, his conduct is still careless ex ante. In essence, the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is considered.768 Jones769 points out that 
“[n]egligence presupposes unreasonable behaviour in the face of the foreseeable 
likelihood that harm may occur”.770 The question of whether the defendant acted 
reasonably or with reasonable care in the circumstances is said to be a question of 
fact.771 The claimant bears the onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that 
the defendant’s conduct fell short of the required standard.772 
 
The test for whether the defendant has breached his duty of care, and therefore acted 
negligently, towards the claimant was set out by Baron Alderson in Blyth v Birmingham 
Waterworks Co:773 
 
 “Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those 
 considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or doing 
 something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.”  
 
Therefore a defendant will be liable if he takes less care than that of the hypothetical 
reasonable person.774 The concept of reasonableness is flexible, capable of being 
adapted depending on the circumstances of the case and the courts try not to develop 
the required standard into a set of rules.775 What is considered as reasonable and 
unreasonable conduct in specific cases serves merely as useful guidelines.776  
 
Sometimes the standard of care is incorrectly viewed in terms of a legal duty, such as 
a driver’s duty to give a signal when turning.777 Even though there are similar factual 
situations that may arise for adjudication in practice, especially with regard to motor 
vehicle accidents, adjudicators may refer to prior decisions as a guide to establishing 
                                                                                                                                                 
768  Steele Tort 133. 
769  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 563. 
770  Cf Steele Tort 133. 
771  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 156. 
772  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 156; cf Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 215. 
773  1856 11 Ex 781, 784. See also Hazell v British Transport Commission 1958 1 WLP 169,171; 
Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 143; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 551; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 198; 
Witting Street on torts 116; chapter 5 para 3.3. 
774  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 143; Witting Street on torts 116; Steele Tort 
113-114. 
775  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 551-552. 
776  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 552. 
777  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 552.  
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what reasonable conduct is. However, it is not encouraged to refer to the conduct as 
inflexible legal duties.778 The correct approach is to consider what would be 
reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.779 The duty of care relates to 
the relationship between the parties and whether there should be a duty of care in that 
relationship.780 Jones781 submits that both duty of care and the required standard: 
 
  “turn on reasonableness but in the case of duty, the question is whether the nature of the 
 relationship reasonably requires that care be taken; whilst in the case of standard, the 
 question is what conduct is reasonably required in the particular circumstances … . The level 
 of care that will be reasonably required in any particular circumstance is the product of three 
 sets of criteria each of which contains tensions and requires a balancing exercise.”  
 
The three criteria relate to: the objective qualities of the reasonable person, a question 
of law; weighing the cost and benefit, which focus on how much care the reasonable 
person would have taken; and common practices and expectations which set the 
benchmark of conduct. The last criterion is the most problematic. The question is ‒ did 
the defendant take less care then the reasonable person? 782  
 
The standard of care is generally tested objectively against the reasonable person,783 
also referred to as the ordinary man or woman on the “Clapham omnibus”.784 The 
reasonable person is not exceptionally skilled or inexperienced,785 nor is he 
extraordinary careful and vigilant.786 Lord Macmillan in Glasgow Corporation v Muir787 
stated that the standard “eliminates the personal equation and is independent of the 
idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in question”. It should be 
noted that the same standard is applicable in instances of contributory negligence.788  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
778  Witting Street on torts 133. 
779  See Foskett v Mistry 1984 RTR1; Witting Street on torts 133; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk 
and Lindsell on torts 552. 
780  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 552-553. 
781  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 553. 
782  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 144; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 553. 
783  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 143; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 553. 
784  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 198.  
785  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 145, 146.  
786  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 201. 
787  1943 AC 488, 457. 
788  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 562-563. 
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The courts place the reasonable person in the position of the defendant at the time789 
of the alleged breach of duty.790 Therefore, if the defendant is a football player, then 
the question asked is how much care would the reasonable football player have taken 
at the time of the alleged breach of duty?791 Witting792 points out that even though the 
standard is objective, considering the “circumstances” the defendant was in at the time 
of the alleged breach of duty must inevitably be considered. Thus the test is subjective 
as well as objective.  
 
The standard of care varies with certain types of defendants such as inter alia children, 
those that are vulnerable or disabled, as well as professionals. In respect of 
professionals, such as doctors, the standard applied is the reasonable skilled 
competent professional doctor.793 In assessing the standard of reasonableness with 
regard to professionals, unrealistic standards, knowledge or skill must not be expected 
of them.794 Bolam v Friern Hospital795 (hereinafter referred to as “Bolam”) is 
authority796 for the applicable approach applied to professionals, which is the “standard 
of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill”. In this 
case, it was stated that “a doctor who had acted in accordance with a practice 
accepted at the time as proper by a responsible body of medical opinion skilled in the 
particular form of treatment in question was not guilty of negligence merely because 
there was a body of competent professional opinion which might adopt a different 
technique”.797 Therefore, a professional who acts in accordance with the practice 
accepted by a responsible body of persons experienced and skilled in that particular 
profession, may not be held negligent. This is commonly referred to as the “Bolam 
principle”.798 Furthermore, where there are almost equally compelling professional 
                                                                                                                                                 
789  Lord Denning in Roe v Minister of Health 1954 2 QB 66, 84 stated “[w]e must not look at the 
1947 accident with 1954 spectacles”. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 
563; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 175-177. 
790  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 146. 
791  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 146. 
792  Streets on tort 125. 
793  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 198. 
794  Witting Street on torts 136-137. 
795  1957 1 WLR 582, 586. 
796  See Maynard v West Midlands RHA 1984 1 WLR 634; Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital 1985 
AC 871; Steele Tort 127. 
797  Bolam v Friem Hospital 1957 1 WLR 582, 587.  
798  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 205; Peel & Goudkamp 
Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 157. 
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opinions, or where such opinion is divided, the professional will not be held liable.799 
In Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital,800 a patient was not informed of a slight inherent 
risk of one to two percent that an operation could result in damage to the spinal column 
resulting in her being paralysed. The court applied the Bolam principle and confirmed 
that the neurosurgeon, in refraining from informing the patient of the inherent slight 
risks, was indeed following the practice “which in 1974 would have been accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of skilled and experienced neuro-surgeons”.801 The court 
did not find the neurosurgeon negligent for not informing the patient of the risks of the 
operation. Thus according to the Bolam principle, a professional will be judged based 
on the knowledge of the ordinary professional at the time of the alleged tort and not 
on future developments in his field.802 In Bolitho v City and Hackney Health 
Authority,803 Lord Browne-Wilkinson804 stated: 
 
“The use of these adjectives - responsible, reasonable and respectable - all show that the court 
has to be satisfied that the exponents of the body of opinion relied upon can demonstrate that 
such opinion has a logical basis. In particular in cases involving, as they so often do, the 
weighing of risks against benefits, the judge before accepting a body of opinion as being 
responsible, reasonable or respectable, will need to be satisfied that, in forming their views, the 
experts have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and benefits and have 
reached a defensible conclusion on the matter.”  
  
Thus in effect the court has the final say.805  
 
The standard of the reasonable person is adjusted depending on the circumstances. 
For example, in Wells v Cooper,806 the defendant had negligently fitted a door handle 
himself. The plaintiff was injured when the door handle came loose from the door. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
799  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 206; Peel & Goudkamp 
Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 157. In Medi-Clinic Ltd v Vermeulen 2015 (1) SA 241 (SCA) 243-
245, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal when faced with two conflicting medical 
opinions referred to the Bolam principle as well as the two English decisions of Bolitho v City 
Hackney Health Authority 1998 AC 232 (243-244) and Roe v Minister of Health 1954 2 QB 66 
(252) with approval. The court concluded that the hospital was not negligent in failing to ensure 
that a patient did not develop bed sores in the circumstance which lead to him eventually being 
paralysed and wheelchair bound.    
800  1985 AC 871; see Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 206-207; 
Steele Tort 127. 
801  Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital 1985 AC 871, 872. 
802  See Roe v Minister of Health 1954 2 QB 66; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 206. 
803  1998 AC 232. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 207-208; 
Witting Street on torts 136. 
804  Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority 1998 AC 232, 242-242.  
805  Steele Tort 129. 
806  1958 2 QB 265.  
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Court of Appeal was faced with the question of what standard of care should be applied 
in such an instance. The court held that the standard should not be that of the 
reasonable competent carpenter but that of the reasonably skilled amateur 
carpenter.807 In Philips v William Whitely Ltd,808 a jeweller pierced the plaintiff’s ears 
and it appeared that he took steps to disinfect the pierced ears but an abscess 
subsequently developed which could have been avoided had it been done by a 
medical practitioner. The court held that the jeweller took reasonable steps to avoid 
infection and only needed to show the skill required of a jeweller and not a surgeon.809  
 
Objectivity applies to the conduct and not the actor which “gives the reasonable 
expectations of the claimant priority over those of the defendant”.810 In respect of 
defendants with exceptional skills, the subjective level of skill of the defendant is not 
taken into account and all that is required is the standard expected of the reasonably 
skilled person.811 If a defendant however professes to have a particular acquired skill 
or experience, such person will be held to a reasonable degree, to such skill or 
expertise.812  
 
Sometimes the courts do consider the subjective qualities of the defendant.813 For 
example in Goldman v Hargrave,814 a gum tree on the defendant’s land caught fire 
when struck by lightning. The defendant failed to extinguish a fire which subsequently 
spread to neighbouring land. The Privy Council stated that the defendant was able to 
act in extinguishing the fire and was therefore liable. He was aware of the risk of 
danger and failed to act reasonably “in his individual circumstances”.815 In the South 
African law of delict, control over the dangerous object (fire) or prior conduct (starting 
of the fire) would point towards the existence of a legal duty to prevent harm, a 
question of wrongfulness judged ex post facto. In respect of the test for negligence, 
                                                                                                                                                 
807  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 201.  
808  1938 1 All ER 566. 
809  Witting Street on torts 128. 
810  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 553. 
811  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 144; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 556. 
812  Woolridge v Sumner 1963 2 QB 43; Witting Street on Torts 126.  
813  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 146. 
814  1967 1 AC 645. 
815  Goldman v Hargrave 1967 1 AC 645, 663. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on 
tort 146-147; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 213. 
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the question is whether the defendant would have foreseen the harm and taken steps 
to prevent it judged ex ante against the standard of the reasonable person, although 
strictly speaking it is really a subjective-objective approach. The expectation of taking 
steps to prevent the harm by the defendant is relevant to both the test for wrongfulness 
and negligence. Both tests relate to whether the defendant acted reasonably albeit 
objectively ex post facto in terms of wrongfulness or ex ante subjectively-objectively in 
terms of negligence.816 The difference is that with respect to wrongfulness, the 
reasonableness of the conduct is tested against the boni mores, while in respect of 
negligence, the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is judged against the 
standard of the reasonable person. This however assists in understanding that in the 
English tort of negligence, there is no conceptual differentiation between wrongfulness 
and negligence. The reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is judged objectively 
in light of all circumstances also taking subjective factors of the defendant into account 
when tested against the reasonable person. Breach of a duty explicitly refers to the 
whether the defendant acted reasonably which is relevant to wrongfulness and 
negligence in the South African law of delict.817  
 
If a defendant is lacking in experience or skill in comparison to the reasonable person, 
such defendant may still be held liable in spite of his incompetence.818 For example, 
in Nettleship v Weston,819 the Court of Appeal held that a learner driver who collided 
with a lamppost causing injury to her instructor was liable based on the standard of 
the reasonable experienced driver.820 Although it may be argued that the conduct of 
the learner driver was something that could be expected, the court was influenced by 
inter alia the fact that she had previously been convicted of driving without due care 
and had insurance.821   
                                                                                                                                                 
816  See chapter paras 3.1.10-3.1.11, 4.3. 
817  See chapter 3 paras 3 and 4.3. 
818  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 143. 
819  1971 2 QB 691. In Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority 1987 QB 730, the fact that the 
defendant was lacking experience in that he was a junior doctor was not taken into account. 
See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 146-147; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk 
and Lindsell on torts 554; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 
205; Witting Street on torts 135; Steele Tort 126-127.  
820  See Cook v Cook 1986 68 ALR 353 where the High Court of Australia took into account the 
inexperience of the learner driver. However, the same approach was not followed in McNeilly v 
Imbree 2008 HCA 40. See also Steele Tort 116-118. 
821  Nettleship v Weston 1971 2 QB 691, 699. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis 
and Deakin’s tort law 200; Steele Tort 114-116. 
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The courts do take into account the circumstances the defendant was faced with at 
the time, whether it is in an instance of sudden emergency or any other predicament.822 
A few cases may be referred to in order to illustrate what the courts consider as 
reasonable conduct. For example, in Parkinson v Liverpool Corp,823 a bus driver 
suddenly braked in order to avoid hitting a dog which appeared in his path of travel. 
As a result of the driver braking, a passenger fell to the floor of the bus. The court held 
that the driver acted reasonably when faced with an emergency. In Wilks v 
Cheltenham Cycle Club,824 a motorcyclist lost control of his motorcycle which 
subsequently hit a spectator. The court compared the conduct of the motorcyclist with 
that of a reasonable competitor, finding him not negligent. In Wooldridge v Sumner,825 
the Court of Appeal held that a horse rider was not liable with regard to a spectator 
who was injured by the defendant’s horse at a horserace. The Court of Appeal held 
inter alia that the defendant did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had 
accepted the risks involved in being a spectator; and that the participant did not show 
reckless disregard for the spectator’s safety.826 A reasonable participant would be 
expected to concentrate on winning the race and not on the spectator. In the course 
of a competition such as horse racing which is fast-paced, it is expected that a 
participant may make errors of judgment. The horse rider did not cause harm in a 
reckless or deliberate manner. Therefore the court held that there was no breach of a 
duty by the participant and no liability.827  
 
In Condon v Basi,828 as a result of a football tackle, a soccer player (defendant) injured 
another player (claimant) breaking his leg during a match. Even though the tackle was 
considered a dangerous foul and in breach of the rules of the game, the court held 
that that alone may not lead to a conclusion of negligence. However, based on the test 
of reasonableness with respect to sporting activities, the court found the defendant’s 
conduct unreasonable in that he showed “reckless disregard” of his opponent’s safety. 
                                                                                                                                                 
822  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 148. 
823  1950 1 All ER 367. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 556 fn 688. 
824  1971 1 WLR 668. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 558. 
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827  See discussion of this case by Lunney and Oliphant Tort 177-179. 
828  1985 1 WLR 866. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 558; Deakin, 
Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 203; Witting Streets on tort 129. 
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Here again, from a South African perspective, the reasonableness of the player’s 
conduct is relevant to both wrongfulness determined objectively, ex post facto, as well 
as negligence, determined ex ante, with an objective-subjective approach. It refers to 
conduct expected of the defendant as a participant in the course of a game, whether 
the interests of the plaintiff were unreasonably infringed and whether the defendant’s 
conduct strayed from that of the reasonable person under the circumstances. English 
tort law does not distinguish between wrongfulness and negligence but rather in a 
sense combines it when considering the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.  
 
In Harris v Perry,829 parents of triplets were hosting a birthday party and had hired a 
jumping castle. A child was seriously injured while somersaulting in the jumping castle. 
The parents hosting the party were subsequently sued as a result of the injury to the 
child. The court had to decide “whether a reasonably careful parent could have acted 
in the same way as the defendant” with the court placing itself “in the shoes of the 
defendant”. Lord Phillips830 stated that the way in which the defendant “was 
supervising activities on the bouncy castle and the bungee run accorded with the 
demands of reasonable care for the children using them. The accident was a freak 
and tragic accident. It occurred without fault.” The parent was not expected to 
undertake continuous surveillance of the children playing in the bouncy castle.831  
 
In respect of a child defendant, the test is varied to that of the reasonable child of the 
same age.832 It has not been settled in English tort law whether the child’s subjective 
maturity, mental ability or experience should be considered.833 However, in 
exceptional circumstances where a child partakes in activities normally undertaken by 
an adult, the reasonable person test will apply.834   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
829  2009 1 WLR 19, 24.  
830  Harris v Perry 2009 1 WLR 19, 33. See Witting Street on Torts 127. 
831  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 204; Steele Tort 123-
124. 
832  See Mullin v Richards 1998 1 WLR 1304, 1308-1309 where the standard applied was that of 
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Moran835 refers to the Australian decision McHale v Watson836 where a twelve-year-
old boy threw a metal rod which struck a nine-year-old girl’s right eye rendering her 
blind in that eye. The standard applied was that of an ordinary child of a similar age.837 
Moran838 explains how content was given to the standard, that is, whether the young 
boy behaved reasonably in the circumstances? In respect of foreseeability, it was held 
that the child did not have knowledge or appreciation of the risk of throwing the rod;839 
he did not reasonably foresee that when the rod was thrown it would taper off and 
strike the girl.840 The boy’s age limited his ability to foresee harm but also his ability to 
act prudently.841 He was found not culpable because his “capacity for foresight or 
prudence” was “characteristic of humanity at his stage of development and in that 
sense normal”.842 Moran highlights that the court found the boy’s conduct normal, 
natural, and not an idiosyncrasy.843 Kitko J844 concluded “that boys of twelve may 
behave as boys of twelve and that, sometimes, is a risk indeed”. Moran845 submits that 
the majority of judges had empathy for the boy. They referred to the nostalgia of their 
own childhood and they could not find liability for “boyish imprudence”. Moran explains 
that after surveying cases846 involving children almost “all of the child defendants are 
boys”.847 Moran848 refers to Michaud v Dupuis849 where the court found an eleven-
year-old boy who threw a rock at a four-year-old girl rendering her blind in an eye, 
negligent. The court850 found his conduct “reckless … with complete disregard for the 
safety of other people”. Moran851 points out that there was no mutual play, there was 
a larger age difference between them and the boy’s conduct was close to intentional 
infliction of harm. In Pollock v Lipkowitz,852 a thirteen-year-old boy was found liable for 
                                                                                                                                                 
835  Reasonable person 60-83. 
836  1966 115 CLR 199 (Aust HC).  
837  Moran Reasonable person 63, 215.  
838  Moran Reasonable person 64. 
839  McHale v Watson 1966 115 CLR 199 (Aust HC) 214-215. 
840  McHale v Watson 1966 115 CLR 199 (Aust HC) 215-216. 
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his “senseless act of folly”853 when he threw nitric acid at an eleven-year-old girl. Thus 
the latter two cases illustrate abnormal behaviour.854 In Mullin v Richards,855 where 
two fifteen-year-old schoolgirls were playing sword-fighting with rulers, the ruler 
snapped and a fragment of the plastic struck Mullins eye rendering her blind in that 
eye. The appeal court held that both the girls conduct was not excessively or 
inappropriately violent. Their conduct was commonplace in school and neither of them 
foresaw the risk of harm.856 Butler-Sloss LJ concluded that “girls of 15 playing together 
may play as somewhat irresponsible girls of 15”.857 Moran858 submits that the objective 
standard of reasonableness relates to ordinariness and normalcy with regard to the 
commonness of sword-fighting and lack of foreseeability of harm. Moran859 refers to 
the application of the doctrine of allurement. According to this doctrine children are 
often naturally tempted and attracted to play with dangerous things but are unaware 
of the reality of the danger. They are generally not held liable because it is considered 
natural.860    
 
In situations where a person suffers some kind of disability, for example suffers a heart 
attack,861 loss of consciousness as a result of hypoglycaemia862 or a sudden blackout, 
not caused by his own fault, such person will not be held liable. In South African law, 
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and machines were considered “calculated to attract or allure”; Lengyel v Manitoba Power 
Commission 1957 12 DLR (2d) 126 (Man CA) 133 where the court held that the device was 
“calculated to attract small boys, to arouse their curiosity”; Coley v CPR 1906 29 Que SC 285 
where it was held that a turntable was an allurement to children. In this case a nine-year-old 
girl was playing on a turntable and seriously injured resulting in the amputation of her foot. See 
further cases referred to by Moran Reasonable person 104-107. 
861  See Roberts v Ramsbottom 1980 1 WLR 823 where the defendant who was unaware that he 
suffered a stroke resulting in an accident, but admitted to feeling dizzy before driving, was found 
negligent. The court held that the plaintiff continued to drive when he should have been aware 
that he was unfit and would only escape liability if his actions were entirely beyond his control. 
Witting Street on torts 129-130. 
862  In Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd 1998 1 WLR 1263, 1268  Leggat LJ held that the standard of care 
applicable to the driver who suffered from hypoglycaemia of which he was unaware was judged 
according to “that which is to be expected of a reasonably competent driver unaware that he is 
or may be suffering” from such condition. The Appeal Court found the driver not liable. See 
Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 561; Witting Street on torts 130. 
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the elements of conduct and fault may be absent; whereas in English law it is 
considered that the reasonable person with the same condition would have acted the 
way the debilitated person would have.863 English law does not differentiate between 
conduct and fault. If the defendant through fault on his own part forgets to take his 
medication thereby leading to a blackout, the principle of “prior fault” applies and the 
defendant may be held liable.864 
 
The second criterion of determining a breach of a duty focuses firstly on whether the 
defendant foresaw the risk of injury that materialised.865 The courts usually do not 
experience difficulty in finding risks, even if uncommon, which are reasonably 
foreseeable.866 There must at the very least be a reasonable expectation of a risk and 
adjudicators may reach different findings on whether the risk was reasonably 
foreseeable.867 Furthermore, all that is required is the reasonable foreseeability of the 
general risk, not the exact risk of harm that eventuated.868 It can be that at times, it is 
reasonable for the defendant to not act at all, discontinue the conduct, or provide a 
warning of a risk of harm.869 In Haley v London Electricity Board,870 the court held that 
it is reasonably foreseeable that blind people may walk along the streets 
unaccompanied and steps should have been taken to warn blind people of the trench 
dug along the pavement. The risk of harm was thus reasonably foreseeable.871  
 
Secondly how much reasonable care the defendant should take under the 
circumstances is based on the following four factors: magnitude of the risk; gravity or 
seriousness of the risk; the social utility of the defendants conduct; weighed against 
the cost of preventative measures.872 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
863  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 148. 
864  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 149. See chapter 3 para 2. 
865  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 150. 
866  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 150. 
867  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 151. 
868  Alexis v Newham LBC 2009 EWHC 1323 QB 99-100. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 151. 
869  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 151-152. 
870  1965 AC 778. See para 3.2.2.1 above. 
871  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 211. 
872  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 151; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 56.  
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With respect to the magnitude or extent of the risk, it depends on the likelihood of the 
risk of harm occurring. The higher the risk, the more likely the reasonable person would 
be expected to do something. In contrast the lower the risk, the less likely the 
reasonable person would be expected to do something.873 This may be illustrated by 
considering a few contrasting cases. In Bolton v Stone,874 the claimant was struck on 
the head with a ball whilst standing on a road adjacent to the defendant’s cricket 
ground. The court found that it was reasonably foreseeable that a ball would be hit out 
of the ground. According to the facts, balls were hit out of the ground six times over 
the last thirty years, but the court found that the chances of a ball hitting a person in 
the claimant’s position were slight.875 Therefore there was no breach of duty and the 
cricket club need not have taken further precautions.876 In Hilder v Associated Portland 
Cement Manufacturers Ltd,877 a motorcyclist was riding along a road when a ball rolled 
into his path of travel causing him to lose control of his vehicle resulting in an accident. 
The likelihood of harm to passers-by was considered high and the defendants were 
held liable for allowing children to play football on their land without taking further 
precautions.878 In Miller v Jackson,879 balls were hit out of the ground often, up to nine 
times per season, as a result of which the claimant’s property was damaged. The 
defendants were found negligent because the likelihood of harm was great. 
 
In respect of seriousness of the harm or risk thereof, the more serious a consequence, 
the greater the care required.880 In Paris v Stepney BC,881 the claimant, who had sight 
in one eye only, was employed in a garage under conditions where there was some 
risk of injury to the eye. The employers were aware of the claimant’s condition and did 
not provide him with goggles. The claimant was subsequently injured while working, 
rendering him completely blind. The court held that the employer should have taken 
                                                                                                                                                 
873  In Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co (Wagon Mound (No.2)) 1967 1AC 
617, 642 Lord Reid stated in reference to Bolton v Stone 1951 AC 850 that “the risk was so 
small that in the circumstances a reasonable man would have been justified in disregarding it 
and taking no steps to eliminate it”. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 211; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 152. 
874  1951 AC 850.  
875  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 152; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 565; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 153-156. 
876  See Witting Street on torts 118-119. 
877  1961 1 WLR 1434. 
878  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 152. 
879  1977 QB 966. Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk  and Lindsell on torts 565 
880  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 566. 
881  1951 AC 367.  
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reasonable care of the employer by providing him with goggles as the risk of injury to 
him was greater than to that of a person with sight in both eyes doing the same job.882 
It should be noted that the “thin skull rule” is applied after the breach of duty is 
established taking into account the claimant’s inherent infirmities even if they are not 
reasonably foreseeable or known.883 
 
Utility of the defendant’s conduct involves, as Witting884 puts it, “a determination of the 
general public interest so that matters other than merely those in dispute between the 
claimant and defendant can be taken into account in assessing the standard of care 
required of the defendant”. It is submitted that this is a more objective approach to 
determining the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. Taking into account the 
public interest is similar to the approach in determining wrongfulness in delict in South 
African law where the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is tested against the 
boni mores.885  
 
In Watt v Hertfordshire County Council,886 a fireman sustained injury when a jack used 
in cases where people become trapped in motor vehicles during accidents, slipped on 
the back of a lorry. A particular lorry was usually required in order to transport the jack 
but at the time, the lorry was unavailable. A substitute vehicle was used. While on 
route to the scene of the accident in which a woman was trapped, the driver made a 
stop in emergency circumstances resulting in the jack moving forward and injuring the 
fireman. It was found that there was no breach of a duty by the local authority, given 
the emergency and short amount of time within which the fire service had to act.  
Denning LJ stated:887  
 
“in measuring due care you must balance the risk against the measures necessary to eliminate 
the risk. To that proposition there ought to be added this: you must balance the risk against the 
end to be achieved. If this accident had occurred in a commercial enterprise without any 
emergency there could be no doubt that the servant would succeed. But the commercial end 
                                                                                                                                                 
882  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 152-153; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 119; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 164-166. 
883  Lunney and Oliphant Tort 166. 
884  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 119. 
885  See chapter 3 para 3.1.4. 
886  Watt v Hertfordshire County Council 1954 1 WLR 835. See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 169-170. 
887  1954 1 WLR 835, 838. 
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to make profit is very different from the human end to save life or limb. The saving of life or limb 
justifies taking considerable risk”.888 
 
In Tomlinson v Congleton BC,889 the claimant was severely injured when he dived into 
a body of shallow water in a lake. The Council prohibited swimming there, regarding it 
as dangerous and displayed notices. Lord Hoffman referred to utility in the sense of 
social benefit of the activities which would be lost if the required preventative steps 
were taken. That is, preventing people from making a choice in taking risks and placing 
reeds to physically prevent people from reaching the water.890  
 
“[T]he balance between risk on the one hand and individual autonomy on the other is not a 
matter of expert opinion. It is a judgment which the courts must make and which in England 
reflects the individualist values of the common law … local authorities and other occupiers of 
land are ordinarily under no duty to incur such social and financial costs to protect a minority 
(or even a majority) against obvious dangers.” 
 
The House of Lords concluded that there was no breach of duty.   
 
The cost or inconvenience891 of taking preventative measures must be considered in 
determining the standard of care.892 In weighing the cost and benefit, also referred to 
as the cost-benefit analysis, the question is whether it is reasonable for the defendant 
to bear the cost weighed against the benefit to the claimant.893 The courts at times do 
consider whether a party is insured when deciding whether to impose liability on the 
defendant.894 The courts consider what is common practice and this is balanced 
against reasonable expectations.895 According to the “Hand Formula”, discussed in 
the next chapter dealing with negligence in American law,896 the standard of care 
depends on three variables: the likelihood that the defendant’s conduct will lead to 
harm; the magnitude or seriousness of the harm; weighed against the cost of 
                                                                                                                                                 
888  See for example Ward v London County Council 1938 2 All ER 341 where the driver of a fire 
engine was found negligent after driving through a red traffic light. The court stated that taking 
some extra time to stop at the traffic lights will not make a difference in cases of emergency 
and there was no reason to put others in harm’s way. 
889  2004 1 AC 46. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 154-155; Jones in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk  and Lindsell on torts 571-572; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 211; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 170-172. 
890  Tomlinson v Congleton BC 2004 1 AC 46, 85-86. 
891  Yorkshire Traction Co Ltd v Searby 2003 EWCA Civ 1856. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield 
and Jolowicz on tort 154 fn 80. 
892  See Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co 1956 AC 552, 574; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 154. 
893  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 553.  
894  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 200. 
895  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 553. 
896  The Hand Formula is discussed in more detail in chapter 5 para 3.3. 
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preventing such harm. Although the algebraic Hand Formula has been criticised as 
encouraging a mathematical approach which is not followed by the English courts,897 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis898 submit that two of the above-mentioned variables 
are followed by English courts but it is unclear whether the third variable, the “cost of 
prevention” is considered by the English Courts. It is submitted that the above 
mentioned variables are factors often considered by the courts in determining 
negligence as a form of fault, not in a strict mathematical way but in an informal manner 
based on value judgments. Economic concerns are at times considered by 
adjudicators in making value judgments. This is also linked to the economic reasoning 
approach to tort law.899 Lord Denning in Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co 
(Contractors) Ltd opined:900 
 
“The more I think about these cases, the more difficult I find it to put each into its proper pigeon-
hole. Sometimes I say: ‘There was no duty.’ In others I say: ‘The damage was too remote.’ So 
much so that I think the time has come to discard those tests which have proved so elusive. It 
seems to me better to consider the particular relationship in hand, and see whether or not, as 
a matter of policy, economic loss should be recoverable, or not”. 
 
A brief discussion of a few cases will suffice in order to illustrate the courts’ approach 
to determining the factor of or inconvenience of taking preventative measures.  
  
In Latimer v AEC Ltd,901 a factory was flooded. The floor became slippery with water 
and oil. The defendants took steps to clear away the water and damp, but one of the 
workers slipped on the floor resulting in injury. The worker submitted that the factory 
should have been closed to clean out the floor. The court held that the defendants did 
all that they reasonably could and did not need to close the factory.902 The cost of 
closing the factory for both the employer and employees as a result of lost wages 
                                                                                                                                                 
897  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 576; Steele Tort 135-136. Cf Lunney 
and Oliphant Tort 163. 
898  Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 199. The authors refer to Glasgow v Muir 1943 AC 448, 456 
and Paris v Stepney Borough Council 1951 AC 367, 375. Posner Economic analyses of law 
194 refers to the English decision of Blyth v Birmingham Water Works11 Exch 781, 156 Eng 
Rep 1047 (1856) where these factors were considered. See chapter 5 para 3.3 where it is 
discussed in more detail. 
899  Lord Hoffman in Stovin v Wise 1996 AC 923, 943-944 referred to economic reasons in limiting 
a duty of care in cases of omissions. See discussion by Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 32-42.  
900  1973 1 QB 27, 37. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 108. 
901  1953 AC 643. 
902  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 566; Witting Street on torts 121. Cf 
Lunney and Oliphant Tort 166-169. 
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outweighed the possible risk as the plaintiff was the only person who was injured.903 
In B (A Child) v London Borough of Camden,904 a baby sustained serious burns to his 
face when he fell from a bed and became trapped against hot central heating pipes. It 
was submitted that “the pipes were capable of reaching such high temperatures that 
they should have been boxed in, lagged or otherwise protected so as to prevent 
accidental contact causing injury”.905 The claim was dismissed based on inter alia the 
following grounds:  
 
“a local authority could reasonably assume that the parents of a small baby able to crawl would 
take reasonable care to protect that baby from injury from the pipes. … the risk is so slight, 
even though an injury if sustained might be serious, that they need not take the step of 
protecting the pipework in their properties. In addition, they could properly take into account the 
fact the cost of so protecting the pipework would be very substantial indeed compared with their 
annual budget for heating, even if only the pipework itself as opposed to the radiators was to 
be protected. This is a factor which they can properly weigh in the balance.  
In addition, it is proper to take into account the fact that no British Standard or Code of Practice 
required pipes to be protected, nor does any British Standard or Code of Practice made that 
recommendation where the pipework forms part of the useful heating surface in the room”.906 
 
In contrast, in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co907 (hereinafter 
referred to as “the Wagon Mound (No.2)), where a vessel caught fire as a result of oil 
being spilt negligently on the surface of the water, the Privy Council submitted that 
even though a vessel catching fire could happen “in very exceptional circumstances 
… it does not mean that a reasonable man would dismiss such a risk from his mind 
and do nothing when it was so easy to prevent it. If it is clear that the reasonable man 
would have realised or foreseen and prevented the risk, then it must follow that the 
appellant is liable in damages”.908 According to the facts, the initial spillage of oil could 
have been easily prevented. It “involved no disadvantage and required no expense”, 
therefore there was a breach of the duty of care.909 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
903  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 212. 
904  2001 PIQR P143. 
905  B (A Child) v London Borough of Camden 2001 PIQR P 143 [1]. 
906  B (A Child) v London Borough of Camden 2001 PIQR P 143 [96]-[97]. See Jones in Jones (gen 
ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 566-567. 
907  1967 1 AC 617.  
908  Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co (Wagon Mound (No.2)) 1967 1AC 617, 
644.  
909  Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co (Wagon Mound (No.2)) 1967 1AC 617, 
643-644. See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 158-163 who discuss this case in detail. 
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In the private sector, a defendant cannot state that he lacks the resources to minimise 
or limit the potential risk of harm to others, he is expected to stop the conduct if he 
cannot continue conducting it with reasonable care.910  
 
3.4.1 Conclusion  
 
The influence of reasonableness on the element of breach of a duty care is explicit. 
Jones911 states that in the cost-benefit analyses, “fairness between the parties should 
be the overriding criterion; fairness from the perspective of the claimant’s reasonable 
expectations as much as from the cost/benefit of the defendant. The fair and 
reasonable man should reflect the community’s values as much as those of the 
calculating utilitarian. These values will be reflected in both the common practice of 
those engaged in an activity and the expectations of those affected by it.” 
 
Breach of a duty of care as pointed out above, refers to the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s conduct from an objective and subjective point of view. It seems that in 
the tort of negligence, the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is judged 
objectively especially where reasonable expectations of the claimant and the public 
interest are considered. A more subjective approach is taken when the standard of the 
reasonable person is varied taking into account more of the defendant’s qualities. 
Lunney and Oliphant912 refer to Moran’s913 valid arguments inter alia that the idea of 
“reasonable care” in a sense conflates the difference between “proper” and “ordinary” 
behaviour “as the reasonable person is invested with more and more of the 
defendant’s own characteristics and attributes”. Normality is a contested concept.  
 
English tort law does not specifically recognise the element of conduct. However, in 
respect of the test for breach of a duty of care, in Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks 
Co,914 reference is made to negligence as the omission to do something which a 
reasonable man would do, or alternatively do something which a reasonable man 
would not do. In fact the element of conduct is subsumed under the element of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
910  Witting Street on torts 122. 
911  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on Torts 576. 
912  Tort 183. 
913  Reasonable person 301-302. 
914  1856 11 Ex 781, 784. 
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breach of a duty and tested against the standard of the reasonable person both 
objectively and subjectively.  
 
In the South African law of delict, reasonable foreseeability of harm is a factor in 
establishing whether there is a legal duty to prevent harm in cases of omissions. The 
defendant is expected to act positively and reasonably in terms of the boni mores 
tested objectively where the harm is reasonably foreseeable.915 In the English tort of 
negligence, the criterion of reasonable foreseeability of harm is relevant in all the 
elements of determining liability in the tort of negligence. It is relevant in determining 
a duty of care, breach of a duty and whether there is a causal link between the act and 
consequence (which is discussed further on).916 In the tort of negligence, reasonable 
preventability of harm is a criterion applied in determining a breach of a duty. In the 
South African law of delict, reasonable foreseeability of harm as well as reasonable 
preventability of harm are factors in determining both wrongfulness and negligence 
but as stated an ex post facto objective approach is applied in determining 
wrongfulness while an objective-subjective ex ante approach is applied in determining 
negligence. Furthermore reasonable foreseeability of harm may be applied as a 
criterion in determining legal causation.917    
 
3.5 Defences to the tort of negligence 
 
Peel and Goudkamp918 classify the defences to the tort of negligence into “public policy 
defences” and “justifications”. Justifications are generally applicable when the 
defendant’s conduct is deemed reasonable and therefore no liability or limited liability, 
as a result of contributory fault on the part of the claimant, in the tort will ensue. In 
respect of public policy defences, a tort may have been committed on the face of it, 
but is excused by reasons of public policy. For example, the defence of “immunity” 
                                                                                                                                                 
915  See chapter 3 paras 3.1.10- 3.1.11 and para 3.2. 
916  See para 4 below. 
917  See chapter 3 para 4.4. 
918  Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 782. They also refer to another category labelled “denials” where 
consent and volenti non fit iniuria would apply denying an element of the tort and are not really 
considered as defences. Witting Street on torts 316-317 (see para 2.4 above) agrees with this 
different way of categorising the defences from how they were traditionally viewed and 
classified. See contra McBride and Bagshaw Tort 735 fn 1 who do not agree with the usefulness 
of the rigorous classification of all the defences in English tort law.  
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may not lead to liability.919 The defendant’s conduct may result in liability in a number 
of torts and so too may a number of defences be raised.920 Generally, the onus of 
proving the defence rests with the defendant.921 In this section, consent will not be 
discussed as it is more appropriate to discuss it as a defence under the torts of 
trespass to the person.922 Illegality which is applicable to the tort of negligence and 
trespass to the person is discussed as a defence under the torts of trespass to the 
person.923 The influence of reasonableness on the defences, unfair contract terms, 
contributory negligence and volenti non fit iniuria will now be discussed briefly.  
 
3.5.1 Unfair contract terms  
 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 regulates terms in contracts relating to exemption 
or limitation of liability in tort,924 but applies only to “business liability”.925 Business 
liability in this context refers to acting in the course of a business or where one 
occupies a business premises.926 Generally, any term in a contract or notice relating 
to exemption of liability must be reasonable.927 In terms of the Act, a defendant will 
therefore not escape liability in negligence where death or personal injury occurs to a 
claimant, while acting in the course of a business or occupying a business premises, 
in spite of the presence of a notice or contractual term excluding liability.928 Whether 
a term in a contract or notice is reasonable, is not always a simple question.929 In Smith 
v Eric S Bush,930 a disclaimer exempting surveyors from liability relating to the 
accuracy of their report on a property the claimant was intending to purchase, was 
considered unreasonable by the House of Lords. The surveyors were negligent in not 
reporting structural defects resulting in the claimant suffering serious financial loss.931 
                                                                                                                                                 
919  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 783. 
920  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 783. 
921  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 783. 
922  See para 2.4.1 above.  
923  See para 2.4.7 above. 
924  Where contributory fault may be applicable. 
925  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 770. 
926  S 1(3) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
927  S 2(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 786; Witting Street on torts 203.  
928  According to s 2(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield 
and Jolowicz on Tort 786; Witting Street on torts 203. 
929  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 773. 
930  1990 1 AC 831. See fn 711below. 
931  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 771. 
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Lord Griffiths932 considered the following factors in respect of the reasonableness test: 
whether the parties had equal bargaining power; the impact of striking out the 
disclaimer; the practicality of expecting the claimant to get another opinion, advice or 
report; and how difficult the task was in relation to the disclaimer.933 Peel and 
Goudkamp934 submit that entering into a valid contract where the defendant is exempt 
from liability is best considered as a denial of an element in respect of the claimant’s 
cause of action.  
 
The influence of reasonableness on unfair contract terms is explicit. In instances 
where a term or clause is viewed as unreasonable, it may be struck out. In considering 
whether a term or clause is unreasonable and unfair, a number of factors depending 
on the circumstances of the case must be taken into account and weighed. 
 
3.5.2 Contributory negligence 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, contributory negligence will not be discussed in 
detail for the purposes of this thesis,935 save to point out briefly the influence of 
reasonableness, which is explicit in that the claimant’s conduct is judged according to 
the standard of the reasonable person expressed as a percentage serving to reduce 
his award of damages. In practice “contributory negligence” is one of the most 
important defences to the tort of negligence.936 Because it currently937 provides more 
equitable results by limiting liability in apportioning the responsibility for the plaintiff’s 
damages between both parties involved in the matter, it does affect the appeal and 
applicability of the defences such as consent which apply to completely exclude 
liability.938 Contributory negligence refers to the fault on the part of the claimant who 
                                                                                                                                                 
932  Smith v Eric S Bush 1990 1 AC 831, 858-859. 
933  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk  and Lindsell on torts 273-274; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 773; Witting Street on torts 203. 
934  Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 786. 
935  See chapter 3 para 4.3. 
936  See Witting Street on torts 184. 
937  Prior to the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 “contributory negligence” applied 
as a complete defence in English common law. The doctrine of “common employment” 
previously limited liability where an employee was said to have assumed the risk of injury if 
such injuries were caused by the negligence of a co-employee. This doctrine was abolished by 
the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis 
and Deakin’s tort law 749. 
938  Witting Street on torts 197.  
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materially contributed to his own loss or damage.939 Section 1 of the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act940 provides for the claimant’s damages to be reduced 
as the court deems “just and equitable” under the circumstances taking into account 
the claimant’s contributory fault. “Fault” is defined in section 4 as “negligence, breach 
of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or would, 
apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence”. A claimant in 
this context will be negligent “if he failed to take as much care as the reasonable 
person in his position would have taken for his own safety”.941 The defendant need not 
show that the claimant owed him or another person a duty of care.942 The following 
instances are some examples of where the courts found the claimant contributorily 
negligent:943 a passenger failed to wear his seatbelt;944 an employee who had been 
exposed to asbestos leading to him contracting cancer, thereafter materially 
contributed to making his condition worse by smoking cigarettes;945 a motorcyclist 
failed to wear a helmet;946 and where a driver had consumed alcohol knowing that his 
ability to drive carefully was affected.947 The standard of care required of the claimant 
is generally “what is reasonable in the circumstances”948 and is usually the same 
standard as that required by the defendant based on the reasonable person test which 
may be varied according to the circumstances.949 It depends on whether the claimant 
acted reasonably in taking care of himself compared with the conduct of the 
hypothetical reasonable person in similar circumstances.950 Thus wearing a seatbelt 
is a practical sensible thing to do even though the risk of an accident may be slight. 
The potential gravity of the harm that may occur can be great, while the cost of 
                                                                                                                                                 
939  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 749; Steele Tort 271. 
940  1945. 
941  Witting Street on torts 185. Cf Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort 
law 754. 
942  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 754; authority cited by 
Witting Street on torts 185 fn 11.  
943  See Witting Street on torts 186. 
944  See Froom v Butcher 1976 QB 286. 
945  See Badger v Ministry of Defence 2005 EWHC 2941.  
946  O’Connell v Jackson 1972 1 QB 270; Capps v Miller 1989 1 WLR 839. 
947  Owens v Brimmell 1977 QB 859. 
948  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk  and Lindsell on torts 234. 
949  See Yachuck v Oliver Blais Co Ltd 1949 AC 386; Gogh v Thorne 1966 1WLR 1387 (generally 
a child’s conduct will be judged according to the standard of a reasonable child); Daly v 
Liverpool Corporation 1939 2 All ER 142. See also Jones Clerk and Lindsell on Torts 236-239; 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 754; Witting Street on torts 
186-187; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 793; para 3.4 above with regard to the principles applied 
in respect of the standard of the reasonable person as well as in respect of children.  
950  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 755. 
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avoiding such risk by wearing a seatbelt is minimal.951 Furthermore, as Deakin, 
Johnston and Markesinis952 point out, the fact that legislation provides that it is 
compulsory for a person to wear a seatbelt and a helmet is a useful indication but not 
necessarily a conclusive one, that it is “reasonable” to wear a helmet or safety belt. 
 
However, Witting953 submits that the courts seem to be more lenient with the standard 
of the care applied to claimants with inherent infirmities.954 For example, in Condon v 
Condon,955 the claimant, a passenger, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and did 
not wear her seatbelt due to a phobia. It was held that in failing to wear the seatbelt, 
she did not fail to take reasonable care for her own safety. Witting956 submits that it is 
unlikely that the same leniency will be afforded to the defendant. The same goes for 
an insane person, where a defendant will be judged according to the standard of a 
reasonable insane person, but in the context of contributory negligence the claimant’s 
insanity will be considered in establishing how the reasonable person in the position 
would have acted. If a claimant is faced with an emergency due to the defendant’s 
negligent act, it will not necessarily lead to a finding of contributory negligence.957 It all 
depends on whether the claimant acted reasonably in the circumstances. Rescuers 
are also treated more leniently and the courts will not easily find contributory 
negligence on the part of rescuer958 unless such rescuer acted unreasonably959 with 
“reckless disregard” for his own safety.960 A claimant is entitled to assume that other 
persons owe them a duty to take “reasonable precautions for their safety” which would 
include for example, the claimant assuming that another driver will stop at a red 
robot.961 If a claimant intentionally harms himself while of sound mind such as in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
951  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 755. 
952  Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 755. 
953  Street on torts 187-188. 
954  Witting Street on torts 187. 
955  1978 RTR 483. 
956  Street on torts 187. 
957  See Jones v Boyce 171 ER 450; Moore v Hotelplan Ltd 2010 EWHC 276 QB; Witting Street on 
Torts 188. 
958  What risks a rescuer should reasonably take should not be judged too harshly. See Tolley v 
Carr 2010 EWHC 2191 QB [23]; Watt v Hertfordshire CC 1954 1 WLR 835; Jones in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 24. 
959  See Harrison v British Railways Board 1981 3 All ER 679; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 243. 
960  Witting Street on torts 189. 
961  See Granr v Sun Shipping Co Ltd 1948 AC 549. However in Purdue v Devon Fire and Rescue 
Services 2002 EWCA Civ 1538, the claimant was found contributorily negligent in that even 
though the fire engine did not stop at the red robot, the court found that the reasonable person 
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case of Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,962 he may be found 
contributorily negligent.963 The claimant’s fault must be causally connected to the 
damage he suffers.964 If a claimant is deemed solely at fault for the damages he 
sustained, then the issue of contributory negligence should not arise.965 It seems that 
contributory negligence may not be an applicable defence in instances where a 
defendant intended to harm the claimant.966 
 
The influence of reasonableness on contributory negligence is explicit in that the 
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct has an effect on whether his award for proven 
damages should be reduced or not. The reasonableness of both the claimant’s and 
defendant’s conduct is judged according to the standard of the reasonable person. It 
is reasonable to consider both the claimant’s and defendant’s conduct in determining 
the defendant’s liability. It is reasonable to vary the standard of the reasonable person 
applied to the claimant as the standard is also varied in respect of the defendant taking 
into account subjective qualities of the person. In instances where a claimant has 
inherent susceptibilities or some legal disability for example, where the claimant is a 
minor or insane, it is reasonable to vary the standard to the reasonable child or 
reasonable insane person. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
in the claimant’s position would have noticed the fire engine and proceeded with caution. Witting 
Street on torts 189. 
962  2000 1 AC 360. See para 3.3.1 above. 
963  See Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd 2008 1 AC 884 where the House of Lords were divided as to 
whether damages should be reduced due to the contributory negligence on the part of the 
deceased who committed suicide. No reduction was however applied. See also Jones in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 229-230; Witting Street on torts 190; Steele Tort 272. 
964  See Lertora v Finzi 1973 RTR 161 where the defendant was unable to prove that the other 
driver’s injuries would have been less severe had he worn a seatbelt; Condon v Condon 1978 
RTR 483; Stanton v Collinson 2009 EWHC 342 QB. See contra, Jones v Livox Quarries Ltd 
1952 2 QB 608. Cf Witting Street on torts 191. 
965  See Pitts v Hunt 1991 1 QB 24, 28; Anderson v Newham College of Higher Education 2003 
ICR 212, 219; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 757; Witting 
Street on torts 195; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 305 . 
966  See Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (Nos 2 and 4) 2003 1 
AC 959 [45]; Pritchard v Co-operative Group Ltd 2012 QB 320 [62] where Aikens LJ 
disapproved of contributory negligence in principle being used to reduce the claimant’s 
damages in claims relating to battery or assault. See contra Murphy v Culhane 1977 QB 94, 
98-99. See also McBride and Bagshaw Tort 793; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell 
on torts 228-229. 
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3.5.3 Volenti not fit iniuria 
 
Volenti non fit iniuria refers to consent to injury or consent to the risk of injury.967 
Consent to injury is discussed above as a defence to the intentional torts.968 Consent 
to the risk of injury in the tort of negligence may negate the element of breach of a duty 
of care, excluding liability in negligence.969 It would depend though on whether the 
defendant’s conduct is considered reasonable.970 The question is whether the claimant 
had agreed, whether expressly or impliedly, to the risk of injury that materialised as a 
result of the defendant’s lack of reasonable care.971 The elements972 required in 
respect of this defence are: a claimant must have knowledge973 of the nature and 
extent of the risk of injury that ensues, which is a subjective test;974 and the claimant 
must voluntarily975 agree to the risk of injury thereof, whether express or implied.976  
 
Volenti non fit iniuria is rarely successful in excluding liability. It has been severely 
restricted mainly due to the fact that the requirements are applied strictly and that 
contributory negligence is a more appealing defence.977 It seems to apply in extreme 
                                                                                                                                                 
967  No harm is done to one who consents. See Smith v Baker 1891 AC 325, 350; Jones in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 250-251; Witting Street on Torts 196; McBride and Bagshaw 
Tort 744; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 280. 
968  See para 2.4.1 above. 
969  See Thomas v Quartermaine 1887 LR 18 QBD 685, 697-698; Dann v Hamilton 1939 1KB 509, 
512; Geary v JD Wetherspoon Plc 2011 EWHC 1506 QB [46]; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield 
and Jolowicz on tort 787; Witting Street on torts 197 fn 100. 
970  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 787. 
971  Woolridge v Sumner 1963 2 QB 43, 69-70; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 763.  
972  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 253. 
973  Knowledge of the risk “must be full and complete” (Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell 
on torts 260). 
974  In Neeson v Acheson 2008 NIQB 12, the claimant put her face in close proximity to her 
neighbour’s dog who subsequently bit her. The court found that the defence of consent to the 
risk of injury was not applicable because she was unaware that the dog was dangerous and 
did not expect it to bite her, causing injury. In Poppleton v Trustees of the Portsmouth Youth 
Activities Committee 2007 EWHC 1567 QB, the claimant was held not to have consented to 
the risk of injury when he jumped from a height off an artificial climbing wall onto a mat on the 
floor. He broke his neck. It was held that he did not have full knowledge of the harm that could 
occur from his jump and that the flooring gave the false impression that it was safe to jump. 
See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 788-789; Witting Street on torts 198-
199. 
975  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 258-259. 
976  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 788; Witting Street on torts 199. 
977  See Nettleship v Weston 1971 2 QB 691, 701; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on 
tort 788; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 253; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 765-766; Witting Street on torts 197; Steele Tort 
279-281. 
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cases. A few cases will be considered to illustrate that the claimant’s conduct must be 
clearly unreasonable with at least voluntary prior intentional conduct. In Morris v 
Murray,978 the claimant, after having numerous drinks with the defendant, agreed to 
take a joy ride with him on a light aircraft. The defendant had drunk a substantial 
amount of alcohol, approximately seventeen measures of whisky. The defendant 
piloted the aircraft which subsequently crashed soon after take-off. The claimant was 
severely injured and the defendant died. The claimant sued the defendant’s estate in 
negligence and the legal representatives for the estate pleaded volenti non fit iniuria 
which was upheld by the court. The claimant’s conduct of accepting a ride in the light 
aircraft with a pilot who had drunk so much alcohol, was considered dangerous.979 In 
Freeman v Higher Park Farm,980 the claimant, an experienced horse rider, wanted to 
have an exciting ride. She chose the horse and was aware that the horse had a 
tendency to buck but still wanted to ride it. While she was riding the horse, it did indeed 
buck causing her to fall. She sustained serious injuries and sued the owner of the 
stables for damages. The defendant raised voluntary assumption of risk which the 
court upheld.981 In Murray v Harringway Arena Ltd,982 a six-year-old child was injured 
by a puck while watching a game of ice hockey. The owner of the ice rink was not held 
liable in negligence. The court inter alia referred to factors in determining fault such 
as: the impracticality of taking reasonable steps to prevent the pucks from escaping; 
that there was not a huge risk of a person being injured by a puck; and that it was not 
a common occurrence of pucks being hit out of the rink.983 The child was held to have 
assumed the risk of injury. This decision has been criticised due to the court’s 
conflation of the test of breach of a duty and the requirements relating to voluntary 
assumption of risk.984 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
978  1991 2 QB 6.  
979  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 766-767; Witting Street 
on torts 197; Steele Tort 283; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 282-286. 
980  2009 EWCA Civ 1185.  
981  See Witting Street on torts 198. 
982  1951 2 KB 529.  
983  See also Bolton v Stone 1951 AC 850.   
984  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 787-789 who do not agree with the 
court’s reference to the tests of the reasonable person related to fault being conflated with 
“language of voluntary assumption of risk”. They suggest that if the test of the reasonable 
person is employed especially when reference is made to preventative measures, then the 
courts should not refer to voluntary assumption of risk. See also Witting Street on torts 199. 
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The agreement requirement subsumes the knowledge requirement as it is argued that 
a person cannot agree to the risk of injury unless he knows about it.985 For example in 
Dann v Hamilton,986 the plaintiff accepted a lift with the defendant whom she knew was 
intoxicated. An accident occurred, the defendant died and the plaintiff was injured. 
When she sued for damages, the defence of volenti non fit iniuria was raised but the 
court held that she had not voluntarily assumed the risk of harm as she had not 
consented to the risk of injury. One must agree to the risk of injury with full and 
complete knowledge of the risk. In rescue cases it may also be difficult to meet the 
agreement and knowledge element.987 Voluntary assumption of risk is usually not 
applicable in the context of employment as it is difficult to prove that the employee, 
though aware of the risk of injury, agreed to it.988 However, in Imperial Chemical 
Industries Ltd v Shatwell,989 the defence succeeded where the claimant, a miner, with 
his brother agreed to detonate explosives which were deemed dangerous. They did 
not adhere to safety rules and regulations and merely wanted to get the job done 
quicker. It was held that they were fully aware of the risks involved yet deliberately 
disregarded all safety measures.990 Often when volenti non fit iniuria is raised, 
contributory negligence is also raised as a defence.991 Section 149 of the Road Traffic 
Act992 excludes volenti non fit iniuria from being pleaded by a driver who alleges that 
the plaintiff as a passenger consented to the risk of injury.993  
 
It seems that volenti non fit iniuria is applicable when the claimant’s conduct is clearly 
unreasonable. In South African law, consent to injury or to the risk of injury must not 
be contra bonos mores. Thus one cannot consent to murder or serious bodily injury 
                                                                                                                                                 
985  See Bowater v Rowley Regis Corp 1944 KB 476, 479; Slater v Clay Cross Co Ltd 1956; Peel 
and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 788; Witting Street on torts 199; McBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 745. 
986  1939 1 KB 509. 
987  See Haynes v Harwood 1935 1 KB 146; Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd 1959 3 All ER 225; 
Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 790; Witting Street on torts 199-200; McBride 
and Bagshaw Tort 745. 
988  See Smith v Charles Baker & Sons 1891 AC 325, 355; Bowater v Rowley Regis Corp 1944 KB 
476, 480-481; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 1988 764-
765; Witting Street on torts 200-201. 
989  1965 AC 656. 
990  Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell 1965 AC 656, 672. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk  and Lindsell on torts 266-267; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 767; Steele Tort 283-284; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 287-290.  
991  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 790-791. 
992  1988. 
993  See Pitts v Hunt 1991 1 QB 24; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 746. 
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as it would be regarded as contra bonos mores and unreasonable. In such instances 
volenti non fit iniuria cannot succeed as a defence but contributory fault (contributory 
intent or contributory negligence) may be applicable.994 The influence of 
reasonableness on volenti non fit iniuria is partially implicit and partially explicit. The 
influence of reasonableness is explicit with regard to the reasonableness of conduct 
and consciousness of the unreasonableness of conduct. In Murray v Harringway 
Arena Ltd,995 the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct was the deciding factor 
which resulted in the dismissal of the defence. In considering the reasonableness of 
the claimant’s conduct, prior voluntary deliberate or reckless conduct may have a 
bearing. Volenti non fit iniuria may be applied even when the consent to the risk of 
injury may be considered unreasonable as in Morris v Murray,996 Freeman v Higher 
Park Farm,997 and Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell.998 However, even 
though conduct may be considered unreasonable as in Dann v Hamilton,999 the 
requirement of agreeing to the risk of injury or having full and complete knowledge of 
the risk of injury is difficult to prove. This seems to be the main reason why the defence 
has not been successfully applied in many cases. 
 
4. Causation  
 
The inquiry into causation is generally applicable to all torts where the same rules and 
principles apply.1000 The basic question is ‒ did the defendant’s wrongful conduct 
cause harm or loss to the claimant and if so, whether the defendant ought to be held 
liable for the damage sustained.1001 Although causation is relevant to all torts, most of 
the case law dealing with causation concerns the tort of negligence. Therefore for 
convenience, it is discussed here under the tort of negligence. The test for causation 
                                                                                                                                                 
994  See chapter 3 para 3.4.1. 
995  1951 2 KB 529.  
996  1991 2 QB.  
997  2009 EWCA Civ 1185.  
998  1965 AC 656. 
999  1939 1 KB 509. 
1000  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 161; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 56; Witting Street on torts 147; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 284. 
1001  Witting Street on torts 147.  
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is traditionally1002 dependant on two components: “cause in fact” and “cause in law” or 
“remoteness”.  
 
4.1 Factual causation 
 
Firstly, there must be a causal link between the harm or loss suffered by the claimant, 
and the defendant’s conduct. This is referred to as “causation in fact”1003 or “factual 
causation” (commonly used in South African law, from here on the term “factual 
causation” which is preferred will used). Although there are other relevant theories to 
establishing factual causation,1004 the “but for test” ‒ but for the defendant’s conduct 
would the harm or loss have occurred, is generally used by the courts.1005 Thus if 
factual causation is absent, liability in negligence will not follow. 
 
This is illustrated in Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management 
Committee.1006 In this case, the plaintiff’s husband died of arsenic poisoning. He 
experienced vomiting after drinking tea and went to the casualty department of the 
hospital early in the morning, whereafter he was advised to go home without treatment 
and consult his own doctor later on. Although the hospital was in breach of a duty of 
care owed to the deceased, it was not the factual cause of his death as even if further 
examination and treatment were undertaken at the hospital he would have still died. 
In other words, the deceased died irrespective of the defendant’s negligence, the 
defendant’s conduct was not the cause of the claimant’s death.1007 Nield J1008 held that 
the wife failed to establish that the death of her husband was due to the negligence of 
the hospital on a balance of probabilities. The claimant must generally on a balance 
                                                                                                                                                 
1002  Some academic writers are of the view that there is only one question relating to causation, 
whilst others submit that there are more than two questions. The courts enquiry into causation 
however is still generally dependant on finding factual and legal causation. See MacBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 329-327 who refer to some alternative approaches to establishing causation. 
See also Steele Tort 167-172, 217-218. 
1003  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 162. 
1004  See the alternative approaches to the but-for test proposed by other academic writers 
mentioned in MacBride and Bagshaw Tort 329-337.  
1005  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 165; Steele Tort 172.  
1006  1969 1 QB 428. 
1007  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 165; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 223; Witting Street on torts 149; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 
288; Steele Tort 173; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 206-207. 
1008  Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee 1969 1 QB 428, 433-434.  
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of probabilities, “more likely than not” prove that the harm or loss would have occurred 
as a result of the defendant’s conduct.1009  
 
There are indeed instances where the facts are complicated and there is uncertainty 
as to the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and harm suffered by the 
claimant. Jones1010 points out that uncertainty in establishing factual causation may 
broadly be divided into two categories. The first involves trying to establish what 
happened as a matter of “historical fact”, which may be complicated because 
hypothetical conduct of the claimant,1011 defendant1012 or third parties1013 is considered 
                                                                                                                                                 
1009  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 223; Steele Tort 172. 
1010  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 63-64. 
1011  In Chester v Ashfar 2005 1 AC 134, the claimant had suffered back pain for a number of years. 
Her neurosurgeon advised her to have surgery which carried a 1-2% risk of nerve damage. The 
neurosurgeon however, failed to warn her of this risk. The claimant agreed to surgery which 
was carried out with due care and skill but resulted in nerve damage leaving her partially 
paralysed. She sued the neurosurgeon. At the trial, the court found that the neurosurgeon had 
breached his duty of care in not warning her of the risk, even though it was slight. However, the 
question to be considered was − if he would have told her about the risk what would have 
happened? It was established that she would not have had the operation on the day she did 
have it as she would have taken some time to consider the effect of the risks. The court held 
that had she had the surgery on another day it was more likely than not that she would not have 
suffered nerve damage and partial paralysis. The neurosurgeon subsequently appealed to the 
House of Lords submitting that she was likely to have consented to the operation and that even 
if it had been on a different occasion it carried the same risk. Lord Hope (163) stated that “[o]n 
policy grounds therefore I would hold that the test of causation is satisfied in this case. The 
injury was intimately involved with the duty to warn. The duty was owed by the doctor who 
performed the surgery that [the claimant] consented to. It was the product of the very risk that 
she should have been warned about when she gave her consent. So I would hold that it can 
be regarded as having been caused, in the legal sense, by the breach of that duty”. See 
discussion of this case in Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 67-70; Witting 
Street on torts 153-155; MacBride and Bagshaw Tort 294; Steele Tort 173-175.  
1012  For example, in Bolitho v City and Hackney HA 1998 AC 232 a child was suffering from a 
respiratory infection. While in hospital, the attending staff failed to attend to the child who 
thereafter sustained respiratory and cardiac arrest, brain damage, and eventually after a period 
of time died. Even though there was negligence, the issue of causation remained. The relevant 
question was − what would the doctor have done had she attended to the child? The expert 
evidence showed that if the child would have been intubated, cardiac arrest would not have 
occurred. However, the doctor submitted that if she would have attended to the child she would 
not have intubated him. The locus classicus test for the standard of care required of a doctor 
(239-240) enunciated in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee 1957 1 WLR 583, 
587 was considered relevant to causation in asking the question if the doctor did not act, would 
the omission be negligent? That is, in accordance with the practice accepted by a responsible 
body of medical professionals. The view of one particular medical specialist was relied upon in 
concluding that the hypothetical failure not to intubate the child was the correct course of action. 
Intubation would not have been the logical and reasonable choice (243)). Thus the child’s 
parents failed in their claim for compensation. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell 
on torts 73-75; Steele Tort 175-176.      
1013  The court may consider the hypothetical conduct of how a third party would have acted in the 
circumstances in trying to avoid the loss sustained by the claimant − see Allied Maples Group 
Ltd v Simmons (A Firm) 1995 1 WLR 1602 referred to by Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 75 as well as authority referred to by Steele Tort 176-178. 
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and there is “scientific uncertainty about the causal mechanism”.1014 An example of 
where hypothetical conduct was considered is McWilliams v Sir William Arroll & Co 
Ltd.1015 In this case, the deceased employee, a steel erector, fell from a height of 
seventy feet to his death. At the time of the fall he was not wearing a safety harness 
and it transpired that he often did not wear it save on two occasions. The wife claimed 
damages for breach of a duty of care as well as for breach of a statutory provision.1016 
The defendants submitted that even if they would have provided the safety gear, the 
deceased would not have worn it. Thus the claim brought by the wife failed in that she 
was unable to show that but-for the employer’s conduct the deceased would not have 
died because in all probability he would not have worn the safety harness. Hypothetical 
unreasonable conduct of the deceased was inserted, leading to no factual causation 
in respect of a dependant’s claim.1017 
 
In the second category, which mainly deals with claims for personal injury, there is 
evidential uncertainty due to lack of scientific knowledge about the aetiology of a 
medical condition which becomes more complicated where there are multiple causes 
of tortious and non-tortious contributing factors to the claimant’s condition.1018 In such 
instances a strict application of the but-for test is not applied as it would produce unjust 
or absurd results.1019  
 
For example, the but-for test due to policy considerations is varied in instances where 
there is more than one cause to the claimant’s injury or more than one wrongdoer1020 
                                                                                                                                                 
1014  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 63.  
1015  1962 1 WLR 295. 
1016  S 36(2) of the Factories Act 1937 required employers to provide such safety gear. 
1017  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 65; Witting Street on torts 153; McBride 
and Bagshaw Tort 288. 
1018  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 64.  
1019  Steele Tort 175. 
1020  In Fitzgerald v Lane 1987 QB 781, the plaintiff, a pedestrian was struck first by a motor vehicle 
driven by the first defendant and then again by a motor vehicle driven by the second defendant 
travelling in the opposite direction. The plaintiff sustained partial tetraplegia. The Court of 
Appeal held both of the drivers equally liable on the grounds that they both materially increased 
the risk of injury to the plaintiff. In Cook v Lewis 1951 SCR 830 two hunters simultaneously shot 
at the plaintiff. The plaintiff was injured by one of the shots but it could not be proven which of 
the two defendant’s shots caused the injury. It was reasonably foreseeable that both hunters’ 
conduct would result in injury to someone like the plaintiff and they each breached the duty of 
care. The Canadian Supreme Court advised that where the injured person is unable to prove 
which of the two defendants caused his injury the but-for test would result in an unjust outcome. 
The onus falls on the defendants to disprove liability and if they fail, they will both be liable to 
compensate the injured person. In Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services 2003 1 AC 32, Lord 
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who either independently or simultaneously caused harm to the claimant.1021 In 
instances where the harm or loss suffered by the claimant is a result of the defendant’s 
conduct and some other natural or innocent cause, factual causation will be present if 
the defendant’s conduct is considered a “material contribution” to the loss or injury, 
entitling the claimant to recover compensation.1022 This is seen as an exception to the 
but-for test.1023 
 
In cases where the defendant’s breach of duty increased the risk of harm to the 
claimant, factual causation is difficult to prove using the but-for test, but the courts 
have stated that it is sufficient for the claimant only to prove the “material increase” in 
risk of harm in order to establish causation.1024 The courts take into account inter alia 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nicholls (69-70) agreed with the Canadian Supreme Court’s reasoning, stating that “good policy 
reasons exist for departing from the usual threshold ‘but for’ test of causal connection” (70). 
See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 92-93; Deakin Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 224; MacBride and Bagshaw Tort 297. 
1021  There are a number of reported cases dealing with successive torts and successive causes but 
it will suffice for the purpose of this study to mention a few in order to illustrate the strict 
application or variation of the but-for test. In Baker v Willoughby 1970 AC 467, the plaintiff 
sustained an injury to his left leg as a result of being involved in a motor vehicle accident. Before 
his trial, he sustained gunshot wounds to the same leg during a robbery (separate tort) and his 
leg was subsequently amputated (a case of consecutive torts). The amputation superseded the 
initial injury. The defendant submitted that he was liable only for the loss suffered to the plaintiff 
prior to the robbery. The House of Lords rejected the defendant’s argument holding him fully 
liable in respect of the damage caused despite the occurrence of the second incident. Thus a 
strict application of the but-for test would have resulted in the plaintiff only recovering a portion 
of his loss resulting from two independent acts. The House of Lords opined that it would be an 
injustice to the claimant. See however, contra Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd 1982 AC 794 
where the House of Lords held the defendant liable for damages only up to the point of the 
effects of the second independent (non-tortious) incident. A strict application of the but-for test 
was applied. In Grey v Thomas Trains 2009 UKHL 33, the House of Lords followed the 
approach in Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd 1982 AC 794 also taking into account policy 
considerations. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 168-170; Jones in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 132-135; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 234-238; Witting Street on torts 167-168; Steele 178-179; Lunney and 
Oliphant Tort 244-253. 
1022  In Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw 1956 AC 613, the claimant contracted pneumoconiosis 
as a result of inhaling air containing silica while in the course and scope of employment. The 
dust had come from two sources, one “natural” and one deemed “tortious”. There was no 
evidence showing the proportions of the natural and tortious dust inhaled. Thus the but-for test 
could not be applied. Nevertheless, the House of Lords held that the claimant only need prove 
that the tortious dust had made a material contribution to the disease he contracted. See also 
Bailey v Ministry of Defence 2009 1 WLR 1052; Dickins v O2 Plc 2008 EWCA Civ 1144; Peel 
and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 166; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell 
on torts 79-80, 83-84; Witting Street on torts 155-156; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 292 fn 19; 
Steele Tort 219-220, 247-250; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 222-226. 
1023  See Sienkiewicz v Grief (UK) Ltd 2011 2 AC 229, 269-270; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 167 fn 41; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 57; Deakin, 
Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 221. 
1024  For example, in McGhee v National Coal Board 1973 1 WLR 1, the claimant contracted 
dermatitis as a result of brick dust settling on sweaty skin. His job involved working in a brick 
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policy considerations in order to reach a fair and just outcome.1025 MacBride and 
Bagshaw1026 submit that “[i]t seems ... that inquiries into causation are neither 
exclusively a matter of fact nor exhaustively a matter of policy. They are, at base, 
inquiries into questions of fact – but the courts will adjust the outcome of those inquiries 
where they threaten to work injustice, or harm public interest”. 
  
For example, in the well-known case of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd1027 
(hereinafter referred to as “Fairchild”, which dealt with combined appeals), three 
claimants had been exposed to asbestos during their employment at a number of 
different sites and under a number of different employers. They had developed a type 
of lung cancer called mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos. According to 
the evidence, the condition can be caused by a single fibre of asbestos and once 
settled in the lung can lay dormant for up to forty years till a tumour develops and 
symptoms appear. The claimants were unable to prove through medical evidence 
which employer exposed them to the fibre. Lord Bingham, referring to policy 
considerations, stated:1028 
 
“There is a strong policy argument in favour of compensating those who have suffered grave 
harm, at the expense of their employers who owed them a duty to protect them against that 
very harm and failed to do so, when the harm can only have been caused by breach of that 
duty and when science does not permit the victim accurately to attribute, as between several 
                                                                                                                                                 
kiln. The court did not find the defendant in breach of a duty because the plaintiff was exposed 
to such dust but found the defendant in breach of duty for not providing washing facilities which 
would have allowed him to wash off the brick dust immediately after working. Instead he was 
forced to endure the brick dust on his skin until he was able to wash it off at home. Medical 
evidence could only prove that the dermatitis was caused from the brick dust and it was 
uncertain whether the plaintiff would have contracted the dermatitis anyway due to exposure to 
the dust. Causation was thus difficult to prove using the but-for test due to lack of evidence. 
The court held that the claimant only had to prove that the exposure to the dust increased the 
risk of him contracting dermatitis. The principle in McGhee was followed in Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services 2003 1 AC 32 (discussed above) and Barker v Chorus UK Ltd 
2006 2 AC 572 (a case dealing with the increased risk of contracting mesothelioma, the court 
introduced proportional liability between several wrongdoers but the Compensation Act 2006 
negated the effect of this decision reinstating joint and several liability between joint 
wrongdoers). See Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd (Employers’ Liability Insurance ‘Trigger’ 
Litigation) 2012 1 WLR 867 and Sienkiewicz v Grief (UK) Ltd 2011 2 AC 229. See also the 
discussion of the above mentioned cases by Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 
171- 179; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 88-89; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 225-233; Witting Street on torts 156-164; MacBride 
and Bagshaw Tort 297-304; Steele Tort 220-230, 232-242; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 226-244. 
1025  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 230; MacBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 337-339.  
1026  Tort 339. 
1027  2003 1 AC 32. 
1028  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services 2003 1 AC 32, 67. 
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employers, the precise responsibility for the harm he has suffered. I am of opinion that such 
injustice as may be involved in imposing liability on a duty-breaking employer in these 
circumstances is heavily outweighed by the injustice of denying redress to a victim.” 
 
Lord Hoffman1029 opined that “it would be both inconsistent with the policy of the law 
imposing the duty and morally wrong for [the other Lords] to impose causal 
requirements which exclude liability”. Lord Nicholls1030 too stated that “[a]ny other 
outcome would be deeply offensive to instinctive notions of what justice requires and 
fairness demands”.1031 Thus the but-for test was relaxed and the House of Lords held, 
following the principle laid out in McGhee v National Coal Board1032 that the test to be 
applied was whether the defendant had materially increased the risk of harm toward 
the plaintiff.1033 The burden of proof was reversed and the employers were held jointly 
and severally liable.1034 If the loss is divisible, the defendant may only be held liable 
for the portion of loss that he caused.1035 If the loss is indivisible then each wrongdoer 
is in principle fully liable for the damage caused to the claimant save where there is 
contributory fault on the part of the claimant.1036 
 
The “loss of chance” principle has been considered in establishing causation where 
there is evidential uncertainty. However, statistical evidence and hypothetical 
outcomes considered in instances where the claimant was deprived of the chance to 
gain a benefit and or avoid a loss have been debated in a number of jurisdictions.1037 
                                                                                                                                                 
1029  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services 2003 1 AC 32, 75. 
1030  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services 2003 1 AC 32, 59. 
1031  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 172. 
1032  1973 1 WLR 1. 
1033  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 108-112 who discuss in detail under 
which circumstances a claimant may rely on a “material increase” in risk in order to establish 
causation stemming from McGhee and Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services 2003 1 AC 32. 
1034  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 93-98; MacBride and Bagshaw Tort 
297-304. 
1035  In Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd 1984 QB 405, the defendants’ were 
only held liable for the further damage caused by the breach of duty of care in respect of the 
claimant’s hearing and not the initial damage (the claimant’s hearing was initially impaired). In 
Holtby v Brigham Cowan (Hull) Ltd 2000 3 All ER 421, the claimant worked for different 
employees over a period of forty years. He developed asbestosis and sued one of the 
employees for the full damage relying on the principle established in Bonnington Castings Ltd 
v Wardlaw 1956 AC 613. The court held that the defendants’ were liable only for that proportion 
of time that the claimant was exposed to the asbestos dust while employed by them. See Jones 
in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 81-83; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 166; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 291-292; Steele Tort 231-232. 
1036  McGhee v National Coal Board 1973 1 WLR 1 is an example of a situation where the harm 
suffered was indivisible. See also Steele Tort 178; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 292-293. 
  
1037  This is evident in English law and American law (see chapter 5 para 4). However in the French 
law of delict, the loss of chance principle is more readily applied, see chapter 6 para 3.1.  
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English law, like American law, is divided.1038 In Hotson v East Berkshire Area 
Authority,1039 a boy fell from a tree injuring his hip. He was taken to hospital but they 
failed to diagnose a fracture and sent him home. Five days later he was taken back to 
hospital where the x-ray confirmed the fracture. He underwent treatment and suffered 
avascular necrosis due to the failure of blood supply reaching the injured hip. 
According to the evidence, there was a seventy-five percent chance that he would in 
any event have developed the condition and a twenty-five percent chance that it was 
due to the delay in diagnosis. The trial judge held the hospital liable for the loss of the 
twenty-five percent chance that the condition could have been averted. The House of 
Lords subsequently held that the claimant did not establish on a balance of 
probabilities that the hospital’s breach of a duty caused the avascular necrosis, 
because there was a seventy-five percent chance that it was due to the fall. The 
claimant was not entitled to any compensation for loss of chance of recovery. Although 
this decision was criticised,1040 it was followed in Gregg v Scott.1041 However, in Allied 
Maples Group Ltd v Simmons and Simmons,1042 the “loss of chance” succeeded in 
respect of a negligent omission resulting in economic loss. The courts seem generally 
reluctant to allow claims based on the loss of chance of avoiding personal injury.1043 
The courts also seem generally reluctant to rely solely on statistical evidence. 
MacBride and Bagshaw1044 point out that in Sienkiewicz v Grief (UK) Ltd,1045 the 
“Supreme Court Justices … were hostile to the use of general statistical information 
to establish that a particular event actually happened”. 
 
Adjudicators have referred to a common sense approach over the philosophical and 
scientific approach to establishing causation.1046 Alternatively adjudicators use the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1038  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 182-184. 
1039  1987 AC 750. 
1040  See MacBride and Bagshaw Tort 306 fn 65 who refer to academic writers’ views. 
1041  2005 2 AC 176. 
1042  1995 1 WLR 1602. 
1043  For purposes of this study, cases dealing with the “loss of chance” will not be discussed in 
detail, for an in depth discussion on this topic see Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 180-184; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 112-128; Deakin, Johnston 
and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 238-241; Street Tort 150-153, 253-268; 
MacBride and Bagshaw Tort 304-312; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 207-221. 
1044  Tort 296. 
1045  2011 2 AC 229. 
1046  See Alphacell v Woodward 1972 AC 824, 847; Environment Agency v Empress Car Co 
(Abertillery) Ltd 1999 2 AC 22, 29; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts; Steele 
Tort 170; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 253-255. 
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language and terminology relating to causation to decide on questions of policy on for 
example which party should take the loss or which result will lead to preventing future 
loss.1047 Hart and Honoré1048 submit that responsibility for consequences of one’s 
conduct in addition to public policy is considered in many judgments and there is a 
common sense approach to establishing causation.  
 
4.1.1 Conclusion  
 
In respect of factual causation, the but-for test is the general test applied. However, 
as illustrated through the discussion of the English case law where there is a lack of 
evidence, uncertainty as to the facts relating to the causing of harm, or where the test 
produces unjust or absurd results, the test is relaxed or may not apply. To fill in this 
gap or ensure that unjust results are not reached, policy considerations are referred 
to and the principles of fairness and justice are applied. The common sense approach 
in any event relates to reasonableness, fairness and justice.  
 
Where there is a lack of evidence and uncertainty about the cause of harm suffered 
by the claimant or where there are multiple causes to the claimant’s harm or loss 
suffered, it may be reasonable to hold, if applicable, joint wrongdoers jointly liable. 
Finding factual causation by using the test of “material contribution” or that the 
defendant’s conduct materially increased the risk of harm toward the plaintiff, leads to 
a reasonable, fair and just result. If the loss is divisible it is reasonable that the 
defendant should be held liable only for that portion of the loss he caused. Naturally, 
if there is contributory fault on the part of the claimant, it is reasonable that contributory 
fault should be considered in reducing his claim. 
 
The influence of reasonableness of factual causation is implicit in the sense that 
without factual causation in the particular tort, the defendant cannot be held liable. In 
respect of the but-for test, even though references to reasonable and unreasonable 
conduct may occur, it is submitted that the but-for test remains mostly value-neutral 
and that the influence of reasonableness here is usually implicit. In cases such as that 
                                                                                                                                                 
1047  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 219. 
1048  Causation in the law 1 referred to by Steele Tort 170-171. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 219. 
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of Fairchild1049 where the but-for test is relaxed, in actual fact the but-for test is applied 
to the combined conduct of all the defendants.1050 Therefore but-for the combined 
conduct of the defendants’, the harm to the plaintiffs’ would not have occurred. The 
burden of proving the causal link is reversed and is placed upon the defendants, thus 
in terms of policy it is fair and reasonable in such circumstances to find a causal link. 
The claimant as the innocent person should not bear his own loss and be without 
redress. In English law, it is evident that factual causation is not always purely factual 
as in South African law,1051 policy considerations, and the concepts of 
reasonableness, fairness and justice are considered. Where these considerations are 
given effect the influence of reasonableness is explicit. 
 
4.2 Remoteness of damage (legal causation) 
 
Once factual causation has been established, the claimant must then prove that the 
loss suffered is not too remote a consequence of the defendant’s conduct.1052 The 
term “remoteness of damage” is commonly used to refer to what is considered as 
“legal causation” in South African law. In American law the terms “proximate cause” or 
“scope of liability”1053 are commonly used.1054 Peel and Goudkamp1055 refer to the 
question as: “is it within the range of that for which it is just to make the defendant 
responsible”. The question of remoteness of damage in a strict sense1056 deals with 
limiting liability, involving legal policy,1057 and principles of fairness,1058 justice and 
                                                                                                                                                 
1049  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services 2003 1 AC 32. 
1050  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 27 cmt f (2010); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 324; chapter 5 para 4.1. 
1051  See chapter 3 para 5.1. 
1052  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 56.  
1053  See Stapleton 2003 LQR 388. Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 164 also 
prefer the term “scope of liability” in that it “conveys the idea that we are concerned with setting 
limits to the defendant’s responsibility after the first stage has passed” (i.e factual causation has 
been established). Steele Tort 168 points out that although this manner of questing is simpler, 
it can lead to an “open enquiry and many factors could, in principle, be relevant”.   
1054  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 163-164. 
1055  Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 161. See also Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 
58. 
1056  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 156 point out that the notion of remoteness 
of damage does not strictly deal with causation (except when the direct consequences test is 
applied which relates to causation) but rather with attributing liability.  
1057  See Gregg v Scott 2005 AC 176,197 where Lord Hoffmann referred to policy considerations; 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd 2002 All ER 305; Barker v Corus UK Ltd 2006 2 
AC 572. 
1058  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 163; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 5.  
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reasonableness.1059 “Remoteness of damage” deals with “attributing responsibility”1060 
to someone or imputing liability which is a normative enquiry involving a value 
judgment.1061 From here on for the sake of convenience, the term “legal causation” will 
be used as opposed to “remoteness of damage” or “cause in law”. 
 
With respect to the tort of negligence,1062 the criterion applied to establish legal 
causation is currently the reasonable foreseeability of harm. Thus the defendant will 
only be held liable for harm or loss of a kind which a reasonable person should have 
foreseen at the time of the breach.1063 From 1921 stemming from Re Polemis and 
Furness, Withy & Co Ltd1064 up until the decision of the Wagon Mound (No. 1),1065 the 
test for legal causation was based on the direct consequences theory. In the Wagon 
Mound (No.1) the Privy Council dismissed the direct consequences theory stating1066 
that: 
 
“it does not seem consonant with current ideas of justice or morality that for an act of 
negligence, however slight or venial, which results in some trivial foreseeable damage the actor 
should be liable for all consequences however unforeseeable and however grave, so long as 
they can be said to be ‘direct’”.1067   
 
In the Wagon Mound (No. 1), the Privy Council found that the defendants were not 
liable for the damage caused because the type of damage, in that case damage 
caused by fire, was unforeseeable. Thus the Privy Council enunciated that the test for 
                                                                                                                                                 
1059  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 193-194. 
1060  See Environment Agency v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd 1999 2 AC 22, 29 according to 
Lord Hoffmann. Cf Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 164; Witting Street on 
torts 148. 
1061  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 205 in reference to Stapleton 2003 119 LQR 388. 
1062  As well as public nuisance – see Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 160. 
1063  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 162. Steele Tort 187 who points out 
that by adopting foreseeability in this sense illustrates that “remoteness is aligned with duty and 
breach, rather than being guided by ‘causal’ ideas”. 
1064  1921 3 KB 560. 
1065  Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd 1961 AC 388. 
1066  1961 AC 388, 422. 
1067  This reasoning and justification for the preference of using the reasonable foreseeability of harm 
test in establishing remoteness of damage as opposed to the direct consequences tests has 
not convinced some academic writers. For example, Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 187 point out that with regard to negligence there is “unreasonable risk of causing some 
foreseeable” harm to the claimant and that there may be greater injustice in applying the 
reasonable foreseeability of harm test than the direct consequences test. Jones in Jones (gen 
ed) Clerk  and Lindsell on torts 162-163 also point out that the reference to the moral and justice 
basis of the test are not convincing and that in practice the reasonable foreseeability test is not 
that different from the direct consequence test. Steele Tort 187 points out that some harm which 
was not foreseeable will indeed be recovered if it is the right kind of harm. 
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legal causation was the reasonable foreseeability1068 of the type of harm.1069 The 
precise manner in which the harm occurred and the extent of the harm need not be 
foreseeable.1070 The defendant should not be held liable for unforeseeable 
consequences or loss beyond the scope of his responsibility.1071  
 
Witting1072 points out that since the decision of the Wagon Mound (No. 1),1073 courts 
at all levels have followed the principle that “the harm suffered must be of a kind, type, 
or class that was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant’s negligence”. 
The courts have been flexible and with their interpretation of what kind of injury could 
have been reasonably foreseeable depending on the circumstances of the case. At 
times a liberal approach is applied while at times a more narrow approach is applied 
leading to different results in concluding whether there is legal causation. A discussion 
of a few cases1074 will suffice in illustrating this point.  
 
In Hughes v Lord Advocate,1075 a liberal interpretation was applied. A paraffin lamp 
exploded causing injury to a boy. It was unforeseeable that the lamp would explode 
causing injury but the defendant was held liable. The court held that the Post Office 
employees had breached their duty by leaving a manhole unattended where they had 
left the lamps and that the employees should have foreseen inter alia that someone 
like the boy may fall in the manhole or suffer a burn from the lamp. The harm was 
considered not too remote and the type of damage was reasonably foreseeable, 
irrespective of the manner in which the damage occurred or the extent of the harm. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1068  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 185-186; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 221. 
1069  There has been much academic debate over how to interpret the type or kind of harm 
reasonably foreseeable and it seems that a wider interpretation is applied in cases of personal 
injury while a more narrow approach is applied in cases of pure economic loss and damage to 
property (see discussion by Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 
222, 249-250). 
1070  See Jolly v Sutton LBC 2000 1 WLR 1082, 1090; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell 
on torts 162; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 343. 
1071  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 221. 
1072  Street on torts 175. See also cases discussed by Witting Street on torts 175-176. 
1073  Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd 1961 AC 388. 
1074  See discussion of the cases by Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 188, 191; 
Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 164-166; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 250-251; Witting Street on torts 175-177; McBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 343-346; Steele Tort 190-194. 
1075  1963 AC 837. 
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Lord Pearce1076 stated that “to demand too great precision in the test of foreseeability 
would be unfair … since the facets of misadventure are innumerable”. Lord Morris 
stated:1077  
 
“The circumstances that an explosion as such would not have been contemplated does not 
alter the fact that it could reasonably have been foreseen that a boy who played in and about 
the canvas shelter and played with the things that were thereabouts might get hurt and might 
in some way burn himself. That is just what happened. The [boy] did burn himself, though his 
burns were more grave than would have been expected. The fact that the features or 
developments of an accident may not reasonably have been foreseen does not mean that the 
accident itself was not foreseeable. The [boy] was, in my view, injured as a result of the type or 
kind of accident or occurrence that could reasonably have been foreseen.” 1078 
 
In Tremain v Pike1079 a narrow interpretation was applied. A worker contracted Weil’s 
disease as a result of coming into contact with substances which rats had urinated on. 
The court held that the contracting of Weil’s disease was unforeseeable in comparison 
to contracting a disease from a rat bite or food poisoning from food or drink 
contaminated by rats, which was foreseeable. Whilst it was foreseeable that he may 
contract a disease by a rat bite, Weil’s disease did not fall within the foreseeable kind 
or class of diseases that could be contracted.  
 
In Jolley v Sutton LBC,1080 the defendants omitted to remove a boat from their property. 
Two boys worked on the boat in an attempt to repair it but unfortunately one of them 
sustained severe injuries as a result of the rotting boat falling on his back. In the Court 
of Appeal it was held that it was not foreseeable that the boys would try to repair the 
boat and sustain the injury sustained by the injured boy. This decision was appealed 
and the House of Lords took a broad approach in interpreting the reasonable 
foreseeability of the type of harm, holding that the type of harm included injury as a 
result of meddling with an abandoned boat.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1076  Hughes v Lord Advocate 1963 AC 837, 853. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell 
on torts 164. 
1077  Hughes v Lord Advocate 1963 AC 837, 852. 
1078  See contra Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Co Ltd 1964 1 QB 518 where the court did not 
follow the same liberal interpretation as in Hughes v Lord Advocate 1963 AC 837. Quite the 
opposite, the court held that the manner and extent of the injuries suffered by the victim as a 
result of an explosion were not reasonably foreseeable. 
1079  1969 1 WLR 1556. 
1080  2000 1 WLR 1082. 
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In spite of the general notion that the defendant may be held liable for the foreseeable 
harm, it does not necessarily mean as stated by Lord Rodger1081 that the defendant 
will be liable “for all damage that was reasonably foreseeable: depending on the 
circumstances, the defender may not be liable for damage caused by a novus actus 
interveniens or unreasonable conduct on the part of the pursuer, even if it was 
reasonably foreseeable”. At times a court will not attribute liability on a defendant 
based on policy considerations in that it is not reasonable or appropriate to impute 
such liability.1082  
 
The decision of the Wagon Mound (No. 1)1083 has not affected the thin-skull principle, 
thus all that is relevant is that the kind of damage must be reasonably foreseeable, 
once that is established, the magnitude of the loss is irrelevant and the defendant will 
be liable for the full loss, taking his victim as he finds him.1084 For example, in Smith v 
Leech Brain & Co Ltd1085 a fleck of molten metal splashed onto an employee’s lip. The 
employer had not taken adequate steps to protect the employee. The burn on the lip 
caused the tissue to become cancerous resulting in his death. The employee thus had 
a pre-existing condition, that is, pre-malignant cancerous cells in the lip which became 
malignant as a result of the burn he sustained. The burn was a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the defendant’s negligence and it was not necessary to prove that the 
development of cancer was foreseeable or that the ordinary person would not have 
died. The thin-skull rule applied and the defendant was held liable for the employee’s 
death. 1086  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1081  In British Steel Plc v Simmons 2004 ICR 585, 607. See also Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 193. 
1082  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 193-194. 
1083  Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd 1961 AC 388. 
1084  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 247.  
1085  1962 2 QB 405. 
1086  See also Robinson v Post Office 1974 2 All ER 737; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 189-190; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 170-172; Deakin, Johnston 
and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 249; Witting Street on torts 178-180; McBride 
and Bagshaw Tort 346-347; Steele Tort 187-189 who refers to a number of other cases. 
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In respect of the intentional torts,1087 the reasonable foreseeability test in establishing 
legal causation does not seem to apply.1088 Instead, the direct consequences test 
applies − the harm or loss suffered by the claimant will not be considered a remote 
consequence if it was a “direct consequence” of the intended tort.1089  For example, in 
respect of the torts of trespass to the person, the reasonable foreseeability of harm 
test is not applied; the test applied in establishing legal causation is “directness of the 
consequence”.1090 The intention to harm “disposes of any question of remoteness”.1091 
A defendant who intended to harm the claimant may, therefore not only be liable for 
the intended direct consequences but also for the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences,1092 and unforeseeable, consequences.1093 
 
Lord Rodger in Simmons v British Steel plc1094 in summarising the authority with 
respect to the test for remoteness stated: 
  
“the ultimate test is whether the damage was reasonably foreseeable …  once liability is 
established, any question of the remoteness of damage is to be approached along the following 
lines which may, of course, be open to refinement and development. (1) The starting point is 
that a defender is not liable for a consequence of a kind which is not reasonably foreseeable 
… . (2) While a defender is not liable for damage that was not reasonably foreseeable, it does 
not follow that he is liable for all damage that was reasonably foreseeable: depending on the 
circumstances, the defender may not be liable for damage caused by a novus actus 
interveniens or unreasonable conduct on the part of the pursuer, even if it was reasonably 
foreseeable … . (3) Subject to the qualification in (2), if the pursuer's injury is of a kind that was 
foreseeable, the defender is liable, even if the damage is greater in extent than was foreseeable 
or it was caused in a way that could not have been foreseen … . (4) The defender must take 
his victim as he finds him … . (5) Subject again to the qualification in (2), where personal injury 
to the pursuer was reasonably foreseeable, the defender is liable for any personal injury, 
whether physical or psychiatric, which the pursuer suffers as a result of his wrongdoing”. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1087  It seems that the same remoteness principle applicable to intentional torts may be applicable 
to intentionally committed non-intentional torts. See discussion by McBride and Bagshaw Tort 
350-351 as well as the cases referred to. 
1088  For example, in respect of defamation, the question of remoteness of damage is not applicable 
and it rarely arises in cases of breach of a statutory duty. See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk 
and Lindsell on torts 157; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 349-350.  
1089  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 350.   
1090  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 157. 
1091  Quinn v Leathem 1901 AC 495, 537. 
1092  See Scott v Shepherd 1773 2 WBI 892 also referred to by Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 194 and Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 159-160. 
1093  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 194; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 159-160; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 341. 
1094  2004 SC 94, 115. 
361 
 
The novus actus interveniens may manifest itself in: an act of nature;1095 conduct by a 
third party; or conduct by the claimant, and is generally applicable if it was not 
reasonably foreseeable.1096 Reasonable foreseeability of harm however is not the 
decisive test, as common sense1097 fairness, policy considerations and other factors 
1098 pertinent to the case may be considered.1099 Jones1100 points out that although 
“common sense may point the way, the language of causation tends to obscure the 
evaluative nature of the decisions that the courts must inevitably make”.  
 
Depending on the circumstances of the case the act of the claimant could either result 
in a break in the causal link or the claimant may be found contributorily negligent 
resulting in apportionment of liability.1101 It is evident that it depends on whether the 
claimant’s conduct is considered reasonable and in some cases the relationship 
between the claimant and defendant as well as reasonable foreseeability of harm 
where a duty of care has been established. For example, in Reeves v Commissioner 
of Police of the Metropolis,1102 a prisoner committed suicide. He had attempted to 
commit suicide before and had been recognised as a “suicide risk”. The Court of 
Appeal held that the police had a duty to prevent him from committing suicide and that 
his suicide was not a novus actus interveniens as suicide was reasonably 
                                                                                                                                                 
1095  See Carslogie Steamship Co v Royal Norwegian Government 1952 AC 292, where the 
intervening act was a storm at sea which caused damage to the ship. Cf Peel and Goudkamp 
Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 195; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 137; 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 242; Witting Street on torts 
71. 
1096  Witting Street on torts 169.  
1097  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 135-136. 
1098  For example, the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant where there is a duty of 
care may influence whether there is a break in the casual link, see Stansbie v Troman 1948 2 
KB 48 and Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis  2000 1 AC 360.   
1099  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 135; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 242-243, 245.  
1100  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 136. 
1101  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 242. 
1102  2000 1 AC 360.  See paras 3.3.1 and 3.5.2 
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foreseeable.1103 The Commissioner was held liable.1104 In Mckew v Holland & Hannen 
& Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd,1105 the claimant initially sustained an injury to his leg as a 
result of the defendants’ breach of duty. While he was still recovering from the first 
injury he tried to climb down a steep staircase without the aid of a handrail when his 
leg gave way. He subsequently jumped to the bottom of the stairs fracturing his ankle 
which resulted in permanent disability. The court found his act of climbing down the 
stairs unaided knowing that his leg might give way was unreasonable and amounted 
to a novus actus interveniens even though it was foreseeable.1106 Thus the defendants 
were held liable only for the initial injury.1107 If a claimant suffers an initial injury and 
exercises ordinary care but suffers a subsequent injury, such claimant will not usually 
be liable for the subsequent injury as transpired in Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd.1108 
The reason is that the subsequent injury falls within the risk created by the defendant 
in the initial injury and the claimant did not “deliberately or unreasonably” expose 
herself to harm.1109 As Witting1110 points out, establishing which conduct is reasonable 
and unreasonable is not an easy task “where a moral dimension is present”. He1111 
refers to Emeh v Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster AHA,1112 where the claimant 
underwent sterilisation which was not successful leading to her falling pregnant. 
Although the defendant admitted negligence, he denied liability for the cost of 
                                                                                                                                                 
1103  In Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd 2008 AC 884, the defendants were held liable where a person was 
injured in an accident and thereafter suffered depression and committed suicide. The suicide 
was not considered to be a novus actus interveniens, furthermore the thin-skull rule applied. In 
Kirkham v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police 1990 2 QB 283, the court held that 
the suicide of a clinically depressed prisoner was also not considered a novus actus 
interveniens, the police owed a duty to the prisoner to prevent him from committing suicide. 
See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 202; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 154; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 244; 
Witting Street on torts 171; Steele Tort 205; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 261. 
1104  However, the damages were reduced by 50% in terms of the Contributory Negligence Act 1945. 
See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 201; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 154; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 245; 
MacBride and Bagshaw Tort 328. 
1105  1969 3 All ER 1621. 
1106  Mckew v Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd 1969 3 All ER 1621, 1623. 
1107  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 200; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk  and 
Lindsell on torts 146-147; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 
244; Witting Street on torts 171; MacBride and Bagshaw Tort 325-326; Lunney and Oliphant 
Tort 260. 
1108  1969 3 All ER 1006. 
1109  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 147. 
1110  Street on torts 172. 
1111  Street on torts 171-172. Cf Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 201; Jones in 
Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 151-152; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 245. 
1112  1985 QB 1012. 
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maintaining the child. The defendant submitted that her intention to keep the child was 
an unreasonable decision as abortion was an option. The court a quo agreed with the 
defendant but on appeal the Court of Appeal held that it was not unreasonable for her 
to refuse a late abortion as she found out she was pregnant in her second trimester. 
Her refusal to have an abortion did not break the causal link between the child’s birth 
and the negligent conduct of the defendant.1113 In Spencer v Wincanton Holdings 
Ltd,1114 Sedley LJ1115 opined that unreasonable conduct need not constitute a novus 
actus interveniens and it may be fair to apportion the damages in finding the claimant 
contributorily negligent.1116 Sedley LJ discussed at length the influence of 
reasonableness, fairness and justice.  
 
“‘[U]nreasonable’ is a protean adjective. Its nuances run from irrationality to simple incaution or 
unwisdom. It is helpful to locate its correct position on the scale of meanings by recalling that 
its purpose in this context is to determine the point at which the law regards a consequence as 
too remote. … As Lord Bingham … went on to explain … , ‘the rationale of the principle that a 
novus actus interveniens breaks the chain of causation is fairness’ … . Lord Nicholls [stated] 
… the commonly accepted approach that the extent of a defendant’s liability for the plaintiff’s 
loss calls for a twofold inquiry: whether the wrongful conduct causally contributed to the loss 
and, if it did, what is the extent of the loss for which the defendant ought to be held liable. The 
first of these inquiries, widely undertaken as a simple ‘but for’ test, is predominately a factual 
inquiry. …  
 
The second inquiry, although this is not always openly acknowledged by the courts, involves a 
value judgment (‘ought to be held liable’). Written large the second inquiry concerns the extent 
of the loss for which the defendant ought fairly or reasonably or justly to be held liable (the 
epithets are unchangeable). To adapt the language of Jane Stapleton in her article ‘Unpacking 
‘Causation’ in Relating to Responsibility, ed Cane and Gardner (2001), p 168, the inquiry is 
whether the plaintiff’s harm or loss should be within the scope of the defendant’s liability, given 
the reasons why the law has recognised the cause of action in question. The law has to set a 
limit to the causally connected losses for which a defendant is to be held responsible. In the 
ordinary language of lawyers, losses outside the limit may bear one of several labels. They may 
be described as too remote because the wrongful conduct was not a substantial or proximate 
cause or because the loss was the product of an intervening cause. The defendants’ 
responsibility may be excluded because the plaintiff failed to mitigate his loss. Familiar 
principles, such as foreseeability, assist in promoting some consistency of general approach. 
These are guidelines, some more helpful than others, but they are never more than this. 
 
Fairness, baldly stated, might be thought to take things little further than reasonableness. But 
what it does is acknowledge that a succession of consequences which in fact and in logic is 
infinite will be halted by the law when it becomes unfair to let it continue. In relation to tortious 
liability for personal injury, this point is reached when (though not only when) the claimant 
suffers a further injury which, while it would not have happened without the initial injury, has 
been in substance brought about by the claimant and not the tortfeasor”. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1113  See also MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 2 AC 59. 
1114  2010 PIQR P8. See discussion of the case by Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on 
torts 147-149; Steele Tort 205-206; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 260. 
1115  P11-P15. 
1116  In Sayers v Harlow UDC 1958 1 WLR 623 a similar approach was taken. See also Lunney and 
Oliphant Tort 261.  
364 
 
Steele1117 submits that foreseeability is not the most suitable criterion for establishing 
a novus actus interveniens, common sense may be more suitable considering which 
events are “normal” and “abnormal” and a viable alternative may be to consider 
whether there was a novus actus in terms of “the purpose and scope of duty of care”. 
 
Witting1118 submits that with respect to acts of third parties, two concepts are 
influential; reasonableness1119 and foreseeability. When these concepts are combined 
difficulty may arise in considering whether conduct may be considered a novus actus 
interveniens. “[U]nforeseeable and unreasonable premeditated” conduct by a third 
party will be considered a novus actus interveniens.1120 The task is not so simple 
though when dealing with “unforeseeable reasonable acts” and foreseeable 
unreasonable acts”. However, the more unreasonable, deliberate, negligent, 
unforeseeable, positive the conduct is the more likely it will be considered a novus 
actus interveniens.1121 A look at a few cases will illustrate this point. 
 
In The Oropesa1122 a ship named the Oropesa collided at sea with another ship, the 
Manchester Regiment. The captain of the Manchester Regiment boarded a lifeboat 
with some crew members, while the sea was rough, in an attempt to meet with the 
captain of the Oropesa in order to discuss salvaging the ship. Before the lifeboat 
reached the Oropesa, it capsised and a number of the members of the crew on board 
the boat died, one of which was the claimant’s son. The question was whether the 
claimant’s son died as a result of the actions of the captain of the Oropesa, or whether 
the actions of the captain of the Manchester Regiment in ordering the members of the 
crew to board the lifeboat while the sea was rough, constituted a novus actus 
interveniens. The sequence of events was unforeseeable and the court found that the 
order of the captain of the Manchester Regiment to the crew members to board the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1117  Tort 206. 
1118  Street on torts 173. 
1119  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 136 submit that the causation approach 
questions whether the novus actus interveniens was “reasonable” as opposed to the fault 
approach which questions whether the novus actus interveniens was “foreseeable”.  
1120  See Weld-Blundell v Stephens 1920 AC 956, 986 (Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell 
on torts 139). 
1121  See Knightley v Johns 1982 1 WLR 349, 366; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on 
torts 139. 
1122  1943 P32. 
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boat was reasonable, not breaking the chain of causation. Lord Wright1123 stated that 
to constitute a novus actus interveniens, the conduct must be “something … which 
can be described as unreasonable or extraneous or extrinsic”. The defendants in 
charge of the Oropesa were found fully liable for the death of the claimant’s son.1124  
 
In Knightley v Johns,1125 the defendant negligently drove his vehicle causing it to 
overturn in a tunnel. A senior police officer at the scene ordered a constable on his 
motorcycle, the claimant, to ride to the other side of the tunnel against the traffic and 
close the entrance to the tunnel. The constable was subsequently involved in a 
collision with another vehicle. The court held that the senior police officer’s deliberate 
conduct was unreasonable and the defendant was not held liable for the second 
incident causing harm to the claimant. The second incident was considered to be a 
novus actus interveniens.1126 In this case, the intervening act of the third party was not 
readily foreseeable or considered tortious.1127 In reaching a decision, Stephenson 
LJ1128 took a “common sense” approach.  
 
In Lamb v Camden LBC,1129 concerning intervening wilful acts of third parties, the 
defendant allowed the claimant’s house to become damaged and the house was not 
fit for occupation. The defendant did not undertake repairs and squatters subsequently 
occupied the house causing further damage to the house. The claimant eventually 
arranged for repairs herself and billed the defendant for the repairs which included the 
repairs for the damage done by the squatters. The court held that the defendant was 
not liable for the damage done by the squatters even though squatting was reasonably 
foreseeable. Jones1130 points out how the adjudicators struggled to justify their 
reasons with principles in casu where Lord Denning1131 and Lord Oliver1132 referred to 
                                                                                                                                                 
1123  The Oropesa 1943 P32, 37. 
1124  See Philco Radio and Television Corp of Great Britain Ltd v J Spurling Ltd 1949 2 All ER 882; 
Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 196; Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 138. 
1125  1982 1 WLR 349. 
1126  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk  and Lindsell on torts 138; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 243-244; MacBride and Bagshaw Tort 325. 
1127  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 197-198. 
1128  Knightley v Johns 1982 1 WLR 349, 367. See also Lunney and Oliphant Tort 256-259. 
1129  1981 QB 625. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 199. 
1130  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 141. 
1131  Lamb v Camden LBC 1981 QB 625, 637. 
1132  644.  
366 
 
policy,1133 while Watkin LJ1134 referred to his instinct that the squatters’ damage was 
too remote even though it was “reasonably foreseeable”. However in Ward v Cannock 
Chase,1135 the court on similar facts, found the defendants liable for the further damage 
although they deliberately delayed undertaking repairs. In Stansbie v Troman,1136 an 
interior decorator stepped out of the house and did not close the front door. A thief 
entered and stole some items. The interior decorator was under a duty to take care of 
the claimant’s property against the thief’s wilful wrongdoing. The interior decorator was 
held liable for the claimant’s loss. 
 
Cases often come before the courts where an initial injury occurred and the intervening 
medical treatment results in some form of medical malpractice. Here the question 
raised is whether the intervening act breaks the causal link between the initial injury 
and the intervening act. It seems that inappropriate intervening medical treatment may 
break the causal link as was found in Hogan v Bentinck West Hartley Collieries 
(Owners) Ltd.1137 However, intervening negligent advice1138 or treatment may not 
necessarily break the causal link, the reason being that the initial injury may carry 
“some risk that medical treatment might be negligently given”.1139 For example, in 
Rahman v Arearose,1140 the claimant was assaulted and suffered an injury to his eye 
as a result of his employees failing in their duty to take reasonable care in reducing 
the risk of assault at his place of employment. Thereafter a surgeon negligently 
performed an operation on the eye leaving him permanently blind. He developed 
psychiatric injuries which included inter alia depression and post-traumatic stress 
disorder which was partially due to the initial assault and partially as a result of the 
loss of sight in his right eye. Laws LJ1141 held that the second incident of negligence 
                                                                                                                                                 
1133  See also Steele Tort 197-198. 
1134  Lamb v Camden LBC 1981 QB 625, 647. 
1135  DC 1986 Ch 546. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 199. 
1136  1948 2 KB 48. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 199-201; MacBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 328; Steele Tort 196-197. 
1137  1949 1 All ER 588 – referred to by Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 142-143. 
1138  See Webb v Barclays Bank Plc and Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust 2002 PIQR P8 where 
negligent advice was given to amputate the claimant’s knee and not considered a novus actus 
interveniens. In Wright v Cambridge Medical Group 2011 EWCA Civ 669, the defendant was 
responsible for the delay in treatment increasing the risk of her not obtaining treatment which 
did not constitute a novus actus interveniens. See also Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 144; Steele Tort 200. 
1139  Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 144. 
1140  Ltd 2001 QB 351. See criticism of this decision by Weir 2001 CLJ 237. 
1141  Rahman v Arearose Ltd 2001 QB 351, 366. 
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did not extinguish the “causative potency of the earlier tort. According to law every 
wrongdoer “should compensate the … claimant in respect of that loss and damage for 
which he should justly be held responsible”. He1142 preferred to leave aside the thin-
skull rule and novus actus interveniens in favour of a “sensible finding that while the 
second defendant obviously (and exclusively) caused the right-eye blindness, 
thereafter each tort had its part to play in the claimant’s suffering”.1143  
 
Where a person voluntarily acts in a situation of emergency created by the defendant’s 
wrongdoing or attempts a rescue where such reaction is reasonably foreseeable, the 
intervening act will not usually constitute a novus actus interveniens.1144 
 
In South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd1145 (hereinafter 
referred to as “SAAMCO”), involving three joint appeals, the defendants, valuers, 
negligently breached their professional duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in 
supplying estimates of market values of properties. This resulted in the bank lending 
money to clients over and above its real market value. Added to this, the property 
market fell. When the borrowers, the clients of the bank, defaulted on their loans, the 
bank sold the properties in order to recover amounts lent but suffered huge economic 
loss when they were unable to recover the amounts loaned.1146 The question before 
the House of Lords was whether the defendants should be held liable for losses 
resulting from incorrect information with regard to the inflated property valuations, as 
well as the additional losses due to the fall in the property market. The House of Lords 
in determining what the claimants could claim, held that the extent of the defendants’ 
liability was limited to the foreseeable consequences of the incorrect information given 
and not losses resulting from the unforeseeable drop in the property market. The 
principle applied in SAAMCO (hereinafter referred to as the “SAAMCO principle”) 
translates to this: a defendant should be held liable for harm and loss that are not only 
                                                                                                                                                 
1142  368. 
1143  As pointed out by Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 143.  
1144  See Haynes v Harwood 1935 1 KB 146; Baker v TE Hopkins & Sons Ltd 1959 3 All ER 225; 
Videan v BTC 1963 2 QB 650; Scott v Shepherd 1773 3 Wils 403; Jones in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 149-150; Witting Street on torts 169-170; Steele Tort 198-200. 
1145  1997 AC 191. See discussion of this case by Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on 
torts 177-183; Steele Tort 207-214. 
1146  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 354. 
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reasonably foreseeable but also within the scope of the duty owed.1147 Lord 
Hoffman1148 who formulated the SAAMCO principle provided the following hypothetical 
example of how the principle could apply: 
 
“A mountaineer about to undertake a difficult climb is concerned about the fitness of his knee. 
He goes to a doctor who negligently makes a superficial examination and pronounces the knee 
fit. The climber goes on the expedition, which he would not have undertaken if the doctor had 
told him the true state of his knee. He suffers an injury which is an entirely foreseeable 
consequence of mountaineering but has nothing to do with his knee. 
 
On the Court of Appeal’s principle, the doctor is responsible for the injury suffered by the 
mountaineer because it is damage which would not have occurred if he had been given correct 
information about his knee. He would not have gone on the expedition and would have suffered 
no injury. On what I have suggested is the more usual principle, the doctor is not liable. The 
injury has not been caused by the doctor’s bad advice because it would have occurred even if 
the advice had been correct.” 
 
Thus the injury to the mountaineer is not related to the knee; therefore according to 
the SAAMCO principle, the doctor is not liable.1149 In spite of this example, the courts 
have not found it easy to apply the SAAMCO principle in practice.1150 It is also 
important to note that the SAAMCO principle applies to pure economic loss where 
there is an assumption of responsibility, not in cases of personal injury or damage to 
property where there is not usually an assumption of responsibility.1151 
 
4.2.1 Conclusion 
 
Both the concepts of duty of care and causation limit the scope of the tort of 
negligence, where the courts have slowly moved away from general concepts and 
been guided by criteria such as policy.1152 However, it may be argued that even the 
breach of duty limits the scope of the tort of negligence as it is based on what is 
                                                                                                                                                 
1147  See in general Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 202-206; Witting Street on 
torts 180-182; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 273-279. 
1148  1997 AC 191, 213. 
1149  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 355. 
1150  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 354-355 fn 46 who refer to the following two cases where the 
courts experienced difficulty in applying the SAAMCO principle (enunciated in South Australia 
Asset Management Corp v York Montague 1997 AC 191, 213): Platform Home Loans v Oysten 
Shipways Ltd 2000 2 AC 190 and Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgins 
Ltd 2001 UKHL 51. 
1151  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 253-254. Cf Jones in 
Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 176. 
1152  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 255. 
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deemed “reasonable conduct” which is also policy-based. Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis1153 point out that the courts have of late referred to: 
 
 “arguments based on insurability, the deterrent effects of liability, the possibilities of loss 
 shifting, and the dangers of unwelcome or ‘defensive’ reactions to extensions of the duty 
 concept …[t]he overall result is a mixed one, with tort law in general and negligence in 
 particular brimming with antithetic decisions reflecting different philosophies. … On a 
 conceptual level, it is clear that the issues involved in setting boundaries to liability are too 
 complex to be adequately captured by such open-ended terms as ‘proximity’, ‘foreseeability’, 
 and, worst of all, the ‘fair, just and reasonable’ test”.  
 
The direct consequences and reasonable foreseeability of harm theories are the 
predominant theories applied in establishing legal causation. Reasonable 
foreseeability of harm is the criterion used in determining legal causation in the tort of 
negligence. Thus the defendant will generally not be held liable for harm or loss which 
would not have been reasonably foreseen, this would exclude legal causation. It 
seems as though when the courts want to exclude legal causation, they may refer to 
specific harm as in Tremain v Pike1154 as opposed to general harm. Even if harm is 
reasonably foreseeable by a reasonable person, legal causation may still be absent 
or limited if there is a novus actus interveniens whether by an act of nature, act of the 
claimant, or a third party, or if the claimant’s conduct was unreasonable (where there 
is contributory fault). In considering whether conduct by a third party may be 
considered a novus actus interveniens, unforeseeable, unreasonable conduct will be 
considered a novus actus interveniens but not necessarily “unforeseeable reasonable 
acts” and “foreseeable unreasonable acts”. Naturally the more intentional as opposed 
to negligent, positive act as opposed to an omission, foreseeable as opposed to 
unforeseeable and unreasonable as opposed to reasonable the conduct, the more 
likely it will be considered a novus actus interveniens. 
 
Another way of excluding legal causation would be to apply policy considerations in 
light of whether it is fair, just and reasonable to hold the defendant liable for the 
factually caused consequences. This is the flexible approach followed in the South 
African law of delict in determining legal causation where the theories of reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                 
1153  Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 255. 
1154  1969 1 WLR 1556. 
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foreseeability of harm and direct consequences play a subsidiary role in determining 
legal causation.1155 
 
The thin-skull rule may be considered a reasonable rule where the defendant is held 
liable for foreseeable harm to a claimant with inherent susceptibilities. This in effect 
relates to unforeseeable harm as one may not know of the claimants susceptibilities 
at the time of the tort or the effect of such susceptibilities with regard to the final totality 
of the harm. Each person has his own inherent susceptibilities. The question is 
whether it is reasonable to hold the defendant liable for the consequences of his act 
in respect of the particular claimant with inherent susceptibilities. 
 
The direct consequences theory is used in determining legal causation in intentional 
torts. The intention to harm may hold the defendant liable for the intended direct 
consequences whether they are reasonably foreseeable consequences or not. 
Generally causation is not an issue in the intentional torts.  
 
Lunney and Oliphant1156 refer to the problematic use of reasonable foreseeability when 
dealing with the enquiry in the duty of care stage as well as the remoteness stage. 
They refer to Harris, Campbell and Halson,1157 who distinguish between the uses of 
the criteria at the duty and remoteness stage in that it is “based on different sets of 
data” taken at different time periods during the occurrence of the tort. At the duty stage, 
the reasonable foreseeability of harm or loss is in a sense general, non-specific, 
referring to the possible harm or loss before the conduct is evaluated. Foresight is 
required and an ex ante approach is applied. Whereas the reasonable foreseeability 
of consequences at the remoteness stage is tested with hindsight, ex post facto, after 
the conduct, taking into account what transpired and also what consequences are 
foreseeable by the reasonable person in the defendant’s position. As Lunney and 
Oliphant1158 explain the above authors’ views ‒ at the duty stage, the question is: 
whether the “law should impose an obligation on the defendant to act carefully … . But 
at the remoteness stage, the court focuses upon what actually occurred … and … 
                                                                                                                                                 
1155  See chapter 3 para 5.2. 
1156  Tort 269-270. 
1157  Remedies in contract and tort 315-316. 
1158  Tort 270-271. 
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whether injury to the claimant was of a type that was a foreseeable consequence of 
the defendant’s (actual) negligence”. As mentioned, at the breach of duty stage the 
question is whether, judged subjectively and objectively, the defendant acted 
reasonably as well as whether the claimant acted reasonably where contributory fault, 
or other defences, may be applicable. The influence of reasonableness on all the 
elements of the tort of negligence is predominantly explicit in that reasonable 
foreseeability of harm is applicable at all stages as well as the criterion of the 
“reasonable person” albeit they are applied differently at each stage with a different 
focus, except maybe for causation in fact where the but-for test is used. At the duty 
stage reasonableness plays a role in deciding whether the relationship between the 
claimant and defendant is one where a duty of care is required. In other words, does 
the relationship reasonably require a duty of care to be imposed on the defendant? At 
the breach of the duty stage, the reasonableness of the conduct of both the claimant 
and defendant is considered. At the “remoteness” stage, the question is whether the 
defendant should be held liable for the factually caused consequences which were 
reasonably foreseeable; or alternatively, taking all considerations into account, 
whether it is fair, just and reasonable to hold the defendant liable for all the factually 
caused consequences in relation to his conduct. It is submitted that the use of the 
criterion of the reasonable person at all stages applies as an objective criterion. 
However, the criterion at the breach of the duty stage may be varied to take into 
account subjective qualities of the defendant. The way that the objective criterion of 
the reasonable person is used in English tort law is similar to the boni mores or public 
policy which is also reflected in the boni mores in South African law. However, it 
applies subtly and is never highlighted in the way that the South African law of delict 
specifically refers to the boni mores or public policy.  
   
Furthermore, the concept of reasonableness is explicit where other concepts are 
considered simultaneously with fairness and justice. This is more apparent when 
considering whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care as well as 
whether it is fair, just and reasonable to conclude whether the consequences were too 
remote and for which factually caused consequences the defendant should be held 
liable. It is only reasonable to hold the defendant liable in the tort of negligence if legal 
causation is present and harmful consequences are accordingly not too remote. 
 
372 
 
With the tort of negligence, damage is required and will now be discussed in the next 
paragraph. 
 
5. Harm, loss or damage1159 
 
The focus under this paragraph is not on whether the defendant is liable for damages, 
but the type of damages he is entitled to and how the types of damages are assessed. 
It is not necessary to prove damage in all torts, that is, some torts are actionable 
without proof of damage, such as the tort of assault and false imprisonment. The “tort 
itself is regarded as harmful and the plaintiff is always entitled to recover at least 
“nominal damages”.1160 However, in the tort of “negligence” damage must be 
proven.1161 This is a fundamental difference with the South African law of delict where 
some type of harm, loss or damage is required in order to ground delictual liability.1162 
In the torts of trespass to a person even though proof of damage is not required, the 
harm suffered must be serious and not trivial.1163 Thus harm is assumed and not 
explicitly required.  
 
The different possible types of damages recoverable in English law include: 
compensatory damages;1164 nominal damages;1165 punitive or exemplary 
                                                                                                                                                 
1159  Is the main remedy sought in tort law (Giliker Tort 603). 
1160  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 851. 
1161  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 793. 
1162  See chapter 3 para 1. 
1163  See para 2 above. 
1164  Which are the main damages awarded in practice for actionable losses. They include pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary loss. 
1165  The court acknowledges that the claimant’s right has been violated but no real damage has 
occurred. This head of damage is usually awarded (currently for the sum of between £1 and 
£5) where proof of damage is not required such as in cases of trespass and libel. The court 
could deny the claimant his costs and even order him to pay the defendant’s costs. See R on 
the application of WL (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2011 2 WLR 671; 
Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd 2002 1 WLR 3024. See also Peel and Goudkamp 
in Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 690; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 794-795; Witting Street on torts 673; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 769-772; Giliker Tort 
606-607; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 858-859. 
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damages;1166 contemptuous damages;1167 aggravated damages;1168 and gain based 
or restitutionary damages.1169 1170 There is much to be said about damages in general 
in English law. The theories, functions1171 and principles that apply to assessing the 
different heads of damage require a study of its own,1172 but for purposes of this study 
the focus in this section will be on the influence of reasonableness in the general 
assessment of some heads of damages. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1166  Are aimed at punishing the defendant and also serve to deter him and others from participating 
in similar conduct in the future. In Rookes v Barnard 1964 AC 1129 (followed in Cassell & Co 
Ltd v Broome 1972 AC 1027), it was held that punitive damages should be awarded under the 
following instances: where there is arbitrary, oppressive and unconstitutional actions by the 
government servants; where it is expressly authorised by statute; and where the defendant 
committed a tort with the deliberate intention of making a profit from it (frequently occurring in 
libel). See in general Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 693-697; Burrows in 
Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2091-2094; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 797-803; Witting Street on torts 676-679; McBride and 
Bagshaw Tort 814-823; Giliker Tort 608-613; Steele Tort 532-541; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 
848-857. 
1167  This is a derisory award currently one penny (usually awarded in cases of libel). The court 
acknowledges that the claimant does have a claim but is not impressed with the claimant’s 
conduct or it has formed a low opinion of the claimant’s claim. The court could possibly deny 
the claimant his costs and order him to pay his own costs. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield 
and Jolowicz on tort 690; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 
795; Witting Street on torts 673; Giliker Tort 606; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 859. 
1168  Usually awarded as an additional amount to a claimant in respect of offending his dignity, 
hurting his feelings, or causing mental distress in an intentional, high-handed, malicious, 
offensive or repressive manner. The award is made based on the motives of the defendant or 
manner the harm was caused. It is usually awarded for trespass (see Appleton v Garrett 1996 
PIQR P1) and libel (John v MGN Ltd 1997 QB 586, 607) but not in the tort of negligence. See 
in general Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 697-699; Burrows in Jones (gen 
ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2089-2091; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 795-797; Witting Street on torts 674-676; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 808-
813; Giliker Tort 607; Steele Tort 533; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 857-858. 
1169  Are damages awarded with the aim of depriving the defendant of gains he made from the tort 
he committed at the claimants expense (usually awarded in respect of trespass to land and 
goods – “property torts”). There are generally two types of gain based damages. Namely 
“licence-fee damage” which should reflect the reasonable fee for the tortious use of the 
claimant’s property by the defendant, and “disgorgement damages”, where the defendant may 
be ordered to surrender the profit he made as a result of committing the tort. See in general 
Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 699-701; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk 
and Lindsell on torts 2101-2103; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 824-837; Giliker Tort 614; Steele 
Tort 5545-548. 
1170  Although “vindicatory damages” is not recognised as a head of damage in English tort law (see 
R (Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2012 1 AC 245) there is some 
academic support that this may be a head of damage in its own right which is similar to 
“constitutional damages” in other jurisdictions. See discussion by Burrows in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2094; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 837-850; Steele Tort 541-545. 
This head of damage is aimed at making the defendant pay for violating the claimant’s right in 
terms of human rights. 
1171  The function of damages which include punishment compensation, averting wrongful unlawful 
gain and vindicating rights may all be considered as reasonable aims. 
1172  In general see McGregor Damages.  
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In respect of compensatory damages which are, in practice, the main damages 
awarded and are therefore discussed in more detail than the other heads of damages, 
the aim is to put the claimant in the position he would have been in had the tort not 
been committed.1173 The aim is restitutio in integrum, full compensation. However, 
strictly speaking, this may not be possible particularly in respect of non-pecuniary 
loss.1174 Even though it may not be possible to put the claimant in his pre-tort position, 
the idea is “to come up with an amount which is ‘fair, reasonable and just’” in lieu of 
his loss or harm.1175 Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis1176 point out that although the 
principles of fairness, justice and reasonableness are applied in establishing a duty of 
care in the tort of negligence, when applied to quantifying damages, the adjudicators 
are in contrast more precise and strive for certainty by using tariffs and scales. The 
influence of reasonableness in deciding how much the claimant should be awarded 
with respect to compensatory damages is explicit as will be shown. 
 
Compensatory damages are divided into pecuniary loss and non-pecuniary loss.1177 
General damage refers to non-pecuniary loss and future pecuniary loss, whereas 
special damage refers to pre-trial pecuniary loss.1178 In respect of personal injury both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss may be recovered.1179 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
1173  Livingston v Raywards Coal Co 1880 5 App Cas 25,39; Lim v Camden & Islington Area Health 
Authority 1980 AC 174, 187; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort 
law 803; Giliker Tort 604-605; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 847.  
1174  Where compensation is awarded to provide the claimant with some solace (“sorry money”) in 
respect of his misfortunes. See Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2009; 
Steele Tort 489.  
1175  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 803. See also Giliker Tort 
605 
1176  Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 803-804. 
1177  Peel and Goudkamp in Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort 712. 
1178  See Jefford v Gee 1970 2 QB 130 CA, but Lord Bingham in R v Secretary  of State for the 
Home Department Ex parte Greenfield 2005 UKHL 14 [11]-[12] referred to “special damages” 
as “pecuniary loss” and “general damages” as “non-pecuniary loss”. See Burrows in Jones (gen 
ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2009 fn 33. 
1179  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 712. 
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5.1 Pecuniary loss 
 
Pecuniary loss encompasses: loss of earnings up to the date of the trial; loss of future 
earnings; medical expenses; care expenses; and any other out of pocket 
expenses.1180  
 
With regard to future loss of earnings, there is much uncertainty and the courts make 
use of the multiplier method of calculation: the multiplier (number of working years1181 
where the loss will take place)1182 multiplied by the multiplicand (net annual loss after 
deducting income tax and national insurance)1183 equals loss of earnings.1184 
Deductions are then made reducing the award. One of the factors influencing the 
court’s decision in making deductions is that even though the claimant should be 
compensated fully, the defendant should not pay for “more than has been lost”.1185 
Naturally this is only fair and reasonable. The court may adopt any of these 
approaches based on “reasonableness”, “justice” and “public policy”:1186 by making 
the defendant liable only for actual loss suffered by deducting benefits received from 
insurance companies, the state, and the employer; not deducting the benefits and 
making the defendant fully liable; holding the defendant liable for the actual losses 
sustained by the claimant as well as liable to those who supported the claimant prior 
to the hearing of the matter.1187 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1180  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 715; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 827; Witting Street on Torts 704. 
1181  Low multipliers are applied in respect of children. 
1182  The Ogden Tables, prepared by actuaries’, project expected periods of employment till 
retirement. 
1183  In considering the net annual loss of earnings at the time of the accident, promotion prospects 
as well as the likelihood of him having done overtime work will be considered in increasing the 
award. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 715; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2025; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 839; Giliker Tort 619; Steele Tort 490-491. 
1184  See Taylor v O’Connor 1971 AC 115, 144 in respect of the courts preference with regard to the 
multiplier method; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk  and Lindsell on torts 2025; Deakin, 
Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 836-839; Witting Street on torts 705; 
Giliker Tort 619; Steele Tort 490-491. 
1185  Steele Tort 506. See also Parry v Cleaver 1970 AC 1, 30,47; Hussain v New Taplow Mills Ltd 
1988 AC 514, 527; Hunt v Severs 1994 2 AC 350, 357-358; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk 
and Lindsell on tort 2035; Giliker Tort 624. 
1186  See Parry v Cleaver 1970 AC 1, 13. 
1187  Giliker Tort 624. 
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The courts were previously1188 reluctant to consider evidence in the form of actuarial 
calculations in assessing future financial loss but have recently considered the value 
of such evidence in a more favourable light, in that, it should be used as a starting 
point to check values and be referred to.1189 The courts will consider the possibility of 
unemployment and any other factors which may reduce a person’s loss of future 
income.1190 The courts generally deduct collateral benefits received by the claimant as 
a result of the tort except voluntary gratuitous (ex gratia) payments received from third 
parties1191 and insurance payments from policies where it is considered unjust and 
unreasonable to penalise the claimant for being prudent in taking out insurance.1192 
Contributory pension payments which the claimant is entitled to resulting from the tort 
are not deductible from loss of earnings,1193 but other benefits received are deducted, 
such as: any voluntary payments or items received from the defendant1194 and sick 
pay.1195 The state, in terms of policy considerations must not subsidise the defendant’s 
liability in tort as this would be unfair and unreasonable. Thus Section 6 of the Social 
Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act1196 currently provides that certain social security 
                                                                                                                                                 
1188  See Auty v National Coal Board 1985 1 All ER 930, 939; Giliker Tort 618. 
1189  See Wells v Wells 1999 1 AC 345,379. Reference is made to the Ogden Tables (actuarial 
tables) for use in cases of fatal accidents and personal injury. See Burrows in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2029-2030; Giliker Tort 618-619; Steele Tort 492-493. 
1190  Giliker Tort 619. 
1191  See Parry v Cleaver 1970 AC 1, 14 where Lord Reid stated “it would be revolting to the ordinary 
man’s sense of justice, and therefore contrary to public policy” that the claimant’s damages 
should be reduced by benefits received from “his friends or relations or the public at large, and 
that the only gainer would be the wrongdoer”; Hussain v New Taplow Paper Mills Ltd 1988 AC 
514; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 721; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk 
and Lindsell on torts 2036; Giliker Tort 625; Steele Tort 506; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 894-
895. 
1192  See Bradburn v Great Western Rail Co 1874 LR 10 Exch 1, 3; Parry v Cleaver 1970 AC 1, 14; 
Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 721; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk  and 
Lindsell on torts 2036; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 808-
810; Giliker Tort 625; Steele Tort 506-507. 
1193  See Parry v Cleaver 1970 AC 1 and Smoker v London Fire and Civil Defence Authority 1991 2 
AC 502, 543 even where the defendant is a contributor to the pension. A disablement pension 
will be deducted not from loss of earnings but from the part of the award dealing with loss of 
pension (see Longden v British Coal Company 1997 3 WLR 1336). See also Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 722; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on 
torts 2037; Steele Tort 506. 
1194  See Williams v BOC Gases Ltd 2000 1CR 1181; Gaca v Pirelli General plc 2004 1 WLR 2683; 
Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 812; Giliker Tort 625; Steele 
Tort 508. 
1195  See Hussain v New Taplow Paper Mills Ltd 1988 AC 514, 532 where it was held that payment 
by an employer for long-term sickness was deemed sick-pay and therefore deductible from loss 
of earnings; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 722; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2039; Witting Street on torts 711-712; Steele Tort 506. 
1196  1997. 
377 
 
benefits1197 paid out to the claimant for a certain period of time1198 by the state as a 
result of the injury or accident, are recovered in full from the defendant which in most 
instances, is his insurer. The reason is to recompense the Secretary of the State.1199 
There is no double recovery then by the claimant from the state and the defendant1200 
which is also only fair and reasonable. 
 
In assessing future loss of earnings that were made from any unlawful conduct, future 
loss of earnings will generally not be recoverable.1201 This also applies to loss of 
support claims where the claimant was supported by the deceased from proceeds of 
criminal activity.1202 This may be regarded as a reasonable policy decision as criminal 
or illegal activity should not be encouraged. 
 
Loss of life expectancy was abolished by the Administration of Justice Act1203 but 
claimants may claim for loss of earnings for “lost years”.1204 The claimant would have 
been able to work but is unable due to his shortened life resulting from the tort.1205   
 
Where the claimant has incurred medical and similar related expenses, such as 
hospital, nursing costs and so on, or will incur such expenses as a result of the injury; 
such claimant may recover costs that he “has reasonably incurred or will reasonably 
                                                                                                                                                 
1197  Relating to loss of earnings, care costs and loss of mobility. See Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 814. 
1198  Till payment has been made in discharge of the claim or if earlier, a period of five years from 
the date of accident or injury. No reduction is applied stemming from a finding of contributory 
negligence. See Steele Tort 530. 
1199  See Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2032-2035; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 813- 815; Witting Street on torts 710-711; McBride 
and Bagshaw Tort 787; Giliker Tort 627-629. 
1200  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 723-724. 
1201  See Burns v Edman 1970 2 QB 541; Hunter v Butler 1996 RTR 396; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 839. 
1202  See Burns v Edman 1970 2 QB 541; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 869. 
1203  S 1(1)(a) of Administration of Justice Act 1982. 
1204  In assessing this award, the court still looks at the claimant’s life expectancy prior to the accident 
and deducts the amount the claimant would have spent on living expenses as he would not 
have living expenses during the “lost years” (see Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd 1980 AC 
136). In the case of a young child, the court will in all probability not award any damages (Croke 
v Wiseman 1982 1 WLR 71). See Peel and Goudkamp in Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 716; 
Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2026-2027; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 846-847; Giliker Tort 623; Steele Tort 499-501; 
Lunney and Oliphant Tort 880-885.  
1205  See Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd 1980 AC 136; Giliker Tort 623.  
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incur”.1206 Section 2(4) of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act1207 entitles the 
claimant to use either public or private medical service providers and need not choose 
public health care by making use of the National Health Service in order to comply 
with the requirement of incurring reasonable medical and similar related costs.1208 If 
the claimant opts to undergo treatment in a state institution then he cannot claim the 
costs for treatment in a private institution.1209 Undergoing treatment in New York 
instead of in London has been held to be reasonable.1210 Also it has been considered 
reasonable to allow a claimant to be treated at home which would work out cheaper 
than treating the claimant in an institution − it depends on what is necessary to meet 
the reasonable needs of the claimant.1211 If the claimant uses the National Health 
Service, the costs of the treatment in the public institution may be recovered by the 
National Health Service from the defendant if the claimant was injured in a motor 
vehicle accident which occurred on a public road.1212 Reasonable transport costs: to 
and from the hospital or other medical providers; immediate relatives’ travelling costs 
to and from the hospital to visit the claimant; or where it is necessary for a relative to 
accompany the claimant to the hospital or other medical appointments; and increased 
transport costs where due to the injury the claimant needs to use some other form of 
transport such as a taxi instead of public transport if reasonably necessary, may be 
recovered.1213 In the case of disabilities where a claimant’s car or house needs to be 
modified, reasonable necessary costs can be recovered but are limited by what 
assistance may be provided by the government “Mobility Scheme”.1214 Reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                 
1206  Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2020. See also Witting Street on torts 
707; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 716. 
1207  1948.  
1208  See also Godbold v Mahmood 2005 EWHC 1002, 2006 PIQR Q1; Peters v East Midlands 
Strategic Health Authority 2010 QB 48; Peel and Goudkamp in Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort 716-
717; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 829; Steele Tort 490; 
Lunney and Oliphant Tort 886. 
1209  Lunney and Oliphant Tort 886. 
1210  Winkworth v Hubbard 1960 1 Lloyd’s Rep 150; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis 
and Deakin’s tort law 829. 
1211  See Sowden v Lodge 2004 EWCA Civ 1370; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 829. 
1212  In terms of s 157 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the Health and Social Care (Community 
Standards) Act 2003. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 
830; Steele Tort 531-532. 
1213  Proof from medical experts verifying this may be required. See Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 833.  
1214  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 834. 
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costs of a carer,1215 reasonable costs of employing someone to do household tasks, 
garden or handy work around the house which the claimant previously did and is now 
unable to do,1216 as well as any increased living expenses may be claimed.1217  
 
In respect of future medical treatment, the courts will be guided by what treatment in 
the future is reasonably required in respect of the claimant.1218 The claimant must 
prove the future required treatment.1219 Here too, the courts make use of the multiplier-
multiplicand approach in assessing future medical expenses.1220 
 
In English law, loss of a pecuniary benefit commonly referred to as loss of maintenance 
or loss of support in South African law is largely regulated by the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions Act)1221 and the Fatal Accidents Act.1222 A detailed 
discussion of these statutes falls outside the scope of the study but brief mention will 
be made of the influence of reasonableness in finding that there is a pecuniary loss or 
                                                                                                                                                 
1215  A carer in this context refers to family members, spouses or partners etc, non-professional 
carers who should be reasonably compensated. The family or relative does not charge any fee 
for providing the care to the claimant but in many cases they do give up paid employment, even 
if it is temporarily, which leads to a financial loss for them. Any reasonable costs claimed for a 
carer usually falls under the claimant’s claim (see Donnelly v Joyce 1974 QB 454 but in Hunt v 
Severs 1994 2 AC 350 costs of the carer were deemed a loss by the carer and not allowed due 
to the unique circumstances of the case where the carer was also the defendant. The court 
wanted to avoid being unfair to the defendant by making him pay twice by offering the care and 
for paying for it. The Law Commission according to the Consultation Paper on Damages for 
Personal Injury: Medical, Nursing and Other expenses LCCP144, 1996 is of the view that the 
decision of Hunt v Severs should be reversed by legislation). In many instances family members 
assist the claimant out of love and care. The court will then calculate the commercial cost of 
the care and usually applies a 25% discount. See Evans v Pontypridd Roofing Ltd 2001 EWCA 
Civ 1657; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2022-2023; Deakin, Johnston 
and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 831-832; 843-846; Peel and Goudkamp 
Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 718; Giliker Tort 630; Steele Tort 502-504.   
1216  See Daly v General Steam Navigation Co Ltd 1981 1 WLR 120; Shaw v Wirral HA 1993 4 Med. 
LR 275; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk  and Lindsell on torts 2021-2022; Deakin, Johnston 
and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 831; Giliker Tort 631 fn 157. Cf Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 719. 
1217  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 833; Giliker Tort 629. 
1218  In Sowden v Lodge; Crookdale v Drury 2005 1 WLR 2129, the court pointed out that future 
medical treatment in a private institution may be quite costly whereas the reasonable needs of 
the claimant may be met at a provincial institution with the option of a “top up”, but in Peters v 
East Midlands Strategic Health Authority 2009 EWCA Civ 145, the court relayed the general 
principle that a claimant can choose whether he wants to be treated at a private or public 
institution in the future. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 
841; Steele Tort 504-506. 
1219  Woodrup v Nicol 1993 PIQR Q104; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 841. 
1220  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 841. 
1221  1934. 
1222  1976. See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 744; Steele Tort 512. 
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benefit sustained by the dependant entitling them to claim damages.1223 The common 
law rules will of course remain applicable in cases not covered by the statutes 
regulating pecuniary loss by dependants. In terms of the Fatal Accident Act,1224 
dependants1225 of a victim who died as a result of a tort committed by the defendant 
may claim the following from the defendant: pecuniary loss (expected pecuniary 
benefit) sustained by the dependant; bereavement damages where the dependant lost 
a spouse or minor who was the victim of the tort; and funeral costs that were paid by 
the dependant.1226  
 
Loss of support is calculated from date of death.1227 A dependant must show “that 
there was a reasonable prospect that had the deceased not died, the dependant would 
have obtained some kind of financial benefit from the deceased in the future” and such 
“dependant would have obtained that benefit by virtue of the fact that he was a 
dependant of the deceased”.1228 In assessing compensation to be awarded to a widow 
in respect of the death of her husband, remarriage prospects of a widow are not 
considered.1229 Thus the effect of this is that a widow may continue to receive support 
as a result of a deceased husband and may be supported by a second husband.1230 
The period of dependency must be calculated.1231 The multiplier method is also used 
in assessing the dependant’s loss.1232 A discussion of a few cases illustrate the way 
the courts interpret the reasonable prospect of being entitled to support had the 
deceased not died.  
 
For example, in Franklin v South Eastern Railway Company1233 it was held that there 
was a reasonable prospect that the deceased son would have in future assisted his 
                                                                                                                                                 
1223  See in general discussion by Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2054-2077; 
Steele Tort 512-523, 516-523. 
1224  1976. 
1225  See s 1(3) in respect of the list of dependants entitled to claim loss of support. 
1226  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 866. 
1227  Cookson v Knowles 1979 AC 556, Graham v Dodds 1983 1 WLR 808; Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 863. 
1228  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 867.  
1229  S 3(3) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 853-863; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 870-871. 
1230  Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2067; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 862-863. 
1231  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 863. 
1232  See Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2068-2073. 
1233  1853 3 H & N 211. 
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father financially, as he was getting older and weaker. Thus the father was entitled to 
claim loss of support from the defendant.1234 In Taff Vale Railway Co v Jenkins,1235 the 
parents of a sixteen-year-old girl who had almost completed her dressmaker’s 
apprenticeship was also entitled to claim pecuniary loss (loss of support) based on the 
premise that it was reasonable that she would have in future conferred on her parents 
a pecuniary benefit even though she had at the time of her death not yet earned any 
income. In Davies v Taylor,1236 the husband and wife were separated and the husband 
was in the process of divorcing the wife due to her adultery. The husband died as a 
result of the defendant’s negligence stemming from a motor vehicle accident. The wife 
claimed loss of support from the defendant but the claim was dismissed because the 
wife could not show the reasonable prospect that had her husband not died he would 
have continued to spend money on her. If they had reconciled then there was a 
reasonable prospect of the husband supporting her financially.1237 In Berry v Humm1238 
the claimant’s wife was killed due to the defendant’s negligence. The wife had been a 
housewife attending to all domestic chores around the house which equated to a 
financial benefit for the husband. Thus the husband was entitled to claim pecuniary 
loss from the defendant as a result of that lost financial benefit.1239 In Reeves v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,1240 it was held that the claimant’s claim in 
terms of the Fatal Accidents Act1241 was not barred. The House of Lords found the 
police negligent in failing to prevent the suicide but the award of damages was reduced 
by fifty percent. In Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd1242 a wife was entitled to claim loss of 
support under the Fatal Accidents Act1243 where her husband committed suicide 
resulting from severe depression caused by the defendant’s negligence. The court 
held that the suicide was reasonably foreseeable and the chain of causation was not 
broken. In this case the award of damages was not reduced due to contributory 
negligence. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1234  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 868. 
1235  1913 AC1. See Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2065. 
1236  1974 AC 207. 
1237  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort 868; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 
2065. 
1238  1915 1 KB 627. 
1239  McBride and Bagshaw Tort 868. 
1240  2000 1 AC 360. See Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2061. 
1241  1976. 
1242  2008 1 AC 884. See Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2061. 
1243  1976. 
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Compensation may be awarded to a spouse or parent for “bereavement” in respect of 
the loss of a spouse or a parent but the amount is capped.1244 Only reasonable funeral 
expenses may be claimed such as the cost of the headstone.1245  
 
5.2 Non-pecuniary loss 
 
Under non-pecuniary loss, claimants can claim loss of amenities and pain and 
suffering.1246 It is difficult to assess non-pecuniary loss and there is no exact scientific 
or mathematical calculation adhered to in assessing the awards. The award for pain 
and suffering is based on the claimant’s subjective experience,1247 while loss of 
amenities is based on the loss itself, it is partly objectively assessed.1248 Under pain 
and suffering, claims for shock and psychiatric injury may be claimed but not for grief 
and sorrow.1249 The courts make reference to previous awards and tariffs1250 as 
guidelines1251 in ensuring uniformity when assessing non pecuniary loss.1252 The 
guidelines fix a bracket for general damages in respect of many types of injuries but 
cannot provide a bracket for every combination of injury that may occur in practice.1253 
The adjudicator in the end must make an assessment taking all the evidence into 
account and make an award that is reasonable, fair and just.1254  
                                                                                                                                                 
1244  See s (1A) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 851, 860-861. 
1245  In Jones v Royal Devon & Exeter NHS Foundation Trust 2008 EWHC 558 QB only £2000 of 
the £4000 cost of the headstone was recoverable and not the cost of a wake. Also the cost of 
a memorial monument will not be recoverable – see Hart v Griffiths-Jones 1948 2 All ER 729; 
Gammell v Wilson 1982 AC 27. See also Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin’s tort law 855 fn 342. 
1246  In practice these two heads of damages are claimed as a global amount. See Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 699; Witting Street on torts 704; Steele Tort 508.  
1247  See checklist provided by Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 
848. 
1248  Lim Poh Choo v Camden & Islington AHA 1980 AC 174, 188; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield 
and Jolowicz on tort 713; Steele Tort 509; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 870. 
1249  See Hinz v Berry 1970 2 QB 40; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort 
law 848. 
1250  See Heil v Rankin 2001 QB 272; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 847. 
1251  From the Judicial Studies Board entitled Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages 
in Personal Injury Cases (now in its 12 ed last updated in 2013). See Burrows in Jones (gen 
ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2042-2043; Steele Tort 508. 
1252  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 714. 
1253  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 847. 
1254  See Rowley v London and North Western Ry Co 1873 LR 8 Exch 221, 231; Pickett v British 
Rail Engineering Ltd 1980 AC 136, 168; Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington AHA 1980 AC 
174, 187; Heil v Rankin 2001 QB 272 CA; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 
383 
 
 
5.3 Damage to property 
 
In respect of damage to property, the influence of reasonableness is explicit. An 
example of a motor vehicle will be used. In order to illustrate what may be claimed by 
the claimant where the motor vehicle was completely damaged, the market value of 
the vehicle at the time of tort “or soon thereafter as is reasonable” as well as any 
consequential loss may be recovered by the claimant.1255 This may include the 
reasonable costs of hiring a car until such time as the damaged vehicle is replaced.1256 
If the vehicle is not completely damaged and can be reasonably repaired, then usually 
the reasonable costs of repairs may be claimed.1257 Costs of repairs do not mean 
“meticulous restoration”.1258 If the claimant decides to sell the damaged property 
without repairing it, then the claimant will be entitled to the diminution in the value of 
the property.1259 Consequential costs made such as hiring a vehicle while repairs are 
done may be claimed.1260 
 
5.4 Principles applicable to pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss 
 
The “once and for all rule” is generally applicable to claims in tort.1261 Damages are 
usually awarded as a lump sum at the end of the matter,1262 in which case discounting 
                                                                                                                                                 
2009-2010, 2042; Witting Street on torts 713; Giliker Tort 633-634. Cf Deakin, Johnston and 
Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 827; McBride and Bagshaw Tort 778. 
1255  See Liesbosch Dredger v SS Edison 1933 AC 449; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on tort 729; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2077-2078. 
1256  See Moore v DER Ltd 1971 1 WLR 1476; Peel and Goudkamp in Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort 
729; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 869; Giliker Tort 651. 
1257  This is based on the loss of diminution in value and the repair costs are proof of such diminution 
in value of the property. See London Corporation 1935 P 70, 77; Coles v Hetherton 2014 3 All 
ER 377; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 730; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) 
Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2079; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s 
tort law 867; Giliker Tort 651-652. 
1258  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 867; Martindale v 
Duncan 1973 1 WLR 574. 
1259  Giliker Tort 652. 
1260  See Lagden v O’Connor 2004 1 AC 1067 [2]-[171]; W v Veolia Environment Services (UK) Plc 
2011 EWHC 2020 QB; Coles v Hetherton  2013 EWCA Civ 1704 [46]; Peel and Goudkamp 
Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 732 fn 321; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 
2013; Giliker Tort 652. 
1261  See Fetter v Beale 1697 1 Ld Raym 339, 91 ER 1122; Fitter v Veal 1701 12 Mod 542; Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 688; Witting Street on torts 703. 
1262  However in personal injury claims, periodical payments may be made according to s 2(1) of the 
Damages Act 1996. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 726; Giliker Tort 
605; Lunney and Oliphant Tort 859-867. 
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takes place.1263 However, interim payments,1264 provisional damages1265 and 
periodical payments1266 are sometimes awarded.1267 It is also possible for an award to 
be made in terms of currency other than in sterling.1268 Interest on pecuniary and non-
pecuniary loss is usually calculated from date of cause of action till the date of trial and 
awarded to the claimant, or in cases where compensation is paid before judgment, 
then interest will be calculated till the date of payment.1269 
 
There is a general duty1270 upon the claimant to mitigate his loss after the tort1271 which 
he could have reasonably avoided.1272 It is based on an objective test − what the 
reasonable person would have done in the claimant’s position.1273 Again here, the 
reasonable person criterion is used in an objective manner. Thus if the claimant’s loss 
could be reduced by him undergoing reasonable medical treatment which may reduce 
his loss or increase his chances of employment then he will be expected to undergo 
                                                                                                                                                 
1263  When a lump sum is awarded, it is assumed that it will be invested in order to earn interest. 
Discounting refers to a deduction that will take place because future financial loss is paid up 
front. See Wells v Wells 1999 AC 345; Steele Tort 493-497. 
1264  An interim payment is applied for in terms of the Rules of Court (s 32 of the Senior Courts Act 
1981 and s 50 of the County Courts Act 1984): usually when judgment has been obtained 
against the defendant; liability has been admitted by the defendant; or it is likely that the 
claimant would succeed against the defendant at trial. The court may order amounts it deems 
just under the circumstances of the case. See Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on 
torts 2050-2051. 
1265  May be awarded in claims for personal injury where it is proven that at some time in the future, 
the claimant is likely to develop either a serious disease or deterioration in his mental or physical 
condition. The court assesses the claimant’s damages as if the claimant will not suffer the 
disease or experience deterioration in his condition but may award additional damages at a 
future date when the disease or deterioration does occur.  See Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk 
and Lindsell on torts 2007, 2051-2052. 
1266  In respect of future pecuniary loss in cases of personal injury and death claims. See Burrows 
in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2007, 2053-2054. 
1267  In terms of s 32A of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and s 2 of the Damages Act 1996. See McBride 
and Bagshaw Tort 776-777; Steele Tort 524-530. 
1268  For pecuniary loss. Non-pecuniary loss in personal injury claims is awarded in sterling. See 
authority referred to by Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2008 fn 27.  
1269  See in general Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 724-724, Burrows in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2047-2050; Giliker Tort 634-635 with regard to rules 
currently applicable to the award of interest as well as the authority cited therein. 
1270  Although the term duty is used, in a strict sense it is not a legal duty as it cannot be enforced 
but a failure to mitigate one’s loss can lead to a reduction in the damages awarded. See 
Darbishire v Warren 1963 1 WLR 1067, 1075; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on 
torts 2011 fn 50. 
1271  Jamal v Moolla, Dawood Co 1916 AC 175, 179; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell 
on torts 2011. 
1272  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 711; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and 
Lindsell on torts 2011-2012; Witting Street on torts 680; Giliker Tort 605. 
1273  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 711. 
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such treatment.1274 If the proposed medical treatment involves a significant risk then 
the claimant will not be expected to undergo the treatment in order to mitigate his 
loss.1275 He may also be expected to undertake alternative employment in order to 
minimise his loss.1276 It would be prudent for a claimant who tries to find employment 
and is turned down to provide the court with proof of his attempts.1277 According to 
case law it is not expected of a claimant to: undertake litigation against a third party 
where the outcome is uncertain;1278 to undertake any action which results in 
destruction to his property;1279 put his capital at risk;1280 or put his “good public 
relations” at risk.1281 What falls under the ambit of reasonable will depend on the facts 
and circumstances of each case.1282 However, the standard of reasonableness 
required by the court is not high.1283 Costs incurred by the claimant in mitigating his 
loss may be recovered from the defendant.1284 The onus is on the defendant to prove 
that the claimant failed to mitigate his loss.1285    
 
It is possible that a continuing act for example in trespass1286 or nuisance1287 could 
give rise to a new cause of action from day to day.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1274  McAuley v London Transport Executive 1957 2 Lloyd’s Rep 500 CA; Morgan v Wallis 1974 1 
Lloyd’ Rep 165; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2012; Deakin, Johnston 
and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 826. 
1275  See Savage v Wallis 1966 1 Lloyd’s Rep 357; Emeh v Kensington AHA 1985 QB 1012 [28]-
[59] where a mother was not expected to undergo an abortion to mitigate loss; Burrows in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2012. 
1276  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 826. 
1277  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 840. 
1278  See Pilkington v Wood 1953 Ch 770; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 
2012. 
1279  Elliott Steam Tug Co v Shipping Controller 1922 1 KB 127,140; Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk 
and Lindsell on torts 2013. 
1280  In some kind of speculative venture. See Jewelowski v Propp 1944 KB 510; Burrows in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2013. 
1281  See London and South of England Building Society v Stone 1983 1 WLR 1242; Burrows in 
Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2013. 
1282  See Payzu Ltd v Saunders 1919 2 KB 581,588-589; Copley v Lawn 2009 EWCA Civ 580; 
Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2012; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law  826. 
1283  See Banco de Portugal v Waterlow 1932 AC 452, 506; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on tort 711. 
1284  Peel and Goudkamp in Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 711. 
1285  See authority referred to by Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2012 fn 57. 
1286  Hudson v Nicholson 1839 5 M & W 437; Konskier v B Goodman Ltd 1928 1 KB 421; Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 688-689 
1287  Darley Main Colliery Co v Mitchell 1886 11 App Cas 127; Phonographic Performance Ltd v DTI 
2004 1 WLR 2893; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 689; Giliker Tort 605. 
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The influence of reasonableness on harm, loss or damage as demonstrated is explicit 
with respect to a claimant being entitled to damages and the assessment of the award 
of damages as mentioned throughout this section.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In general, English tort law explicitly refers to the influence of reasonableness 
throughout. In the tort of negligence and the torts of trespass to a person, the criterion 
of the reasonable person is specifically and explicitly referred to. Furthermore the 
concepts of reasonableness, fairness and justice are inextricably linked in determining 
whether there is a duty of care, whether there is causation in the tort of negligence 
and generally in determining damages. The English courts do not appear to be 
hesitant to refer to the concept of “reasonableness”. English tort law has influenced 
the South African law of delict to a very large extent and it is envisaged that it will 
continue to do so. The reasonableness of either the claimant’s or the defendant’s 
conduct is vital to determining whether a tort was committed in negligence or the 
intentional torts. There is a balancing and weighing of interests and even though 
specific reference is not made to rights or interests the way it is made in South African 
law, it is implied when reference is made to the reasonableness of conduct. 
Furthermore, although wrongfulness and fault are not differentiated as in South African 
law, both these elements are effectively dealt with under the criterion of the reasonable 
person whether judged objectively, subjectively, ex ante or ex post facto. 
Wrongfulness and fault are, in effect, generally combined when questioning the 
reasonableness of conduct. Where the courts are faced with difficult or novel cases or 
where it is not easy to determine an element of a tort, the concept of reasonableness, 
together with the concepts of fairness and justice are referred to in reaching a fair 
decision. Policy considerations are particularly referred to when the courts want to 
limit, exclude or extend liability. Policy considerations may not seem reasonable to a 
particular party and some policy considerations may indeed be said to work 
unreasonably towards certain parties in certain circumstances. However, in general, if 
all competing interests are weighed and such instances are evaluated holistically and 
not only from the angle of a particular party, policy does not seem to be capable of 
being entirely divorced from reasonableness. The influence of reasonableness also 
leads to an overlap and at times may lead to the conflation of elements, but it serves 
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a different purpose when determining each element and in determining liability in a tort 
as a whole. The influence of reasonableness is indeed predominantly explicit on the 
English torts discussed in this thesis. An important feature is that policy considerations 
are applied in not holding the state liable. The state, unlike in South Africa, enjoys 
preferential treatment and immunity from liability under certain circumstances. This 
was also the position in South Africa prior to the advent of the Constitution.1288 
However, the decisions of the English courts with respect to liability of the state 
especially with regard to omissions may still be influenced by the Human Rights Act 
or if a new Bill is implemented in future. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1288  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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Chapter 5: Law of the United States of America  
  
 “[L]iability must be based upon conduct which is socially unreasonable. The common thread 
 woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable interference with the interests of others. In 
 many cases, of course, what is socially unreasonable will depend upon what is unreasonable 
 from the point of view of the individual. The tort-feasor usually is held liable for acting with an 
 intention that the law treats as unjustified, or acting in a way that departs from the reasonable 
 standard of care. The endeavour to find some standard of intentional interference that others 
 may reasonably be required to endure, of unintentional interference that is reasonable under 
 the circumstances, of the reasonable use of one’s land, of reasonable reliance upon 
 representations made, of risks and inconveniences, associated with the use of land, which 
 others may reasonably be required to endure at the hands of the defendant ‒ in short, to 
 strike some reasonable balance between the plaintiff’s claim to protection against damage 
 and the defendant’s claim to freedom of action for the defendant’s own ends, and those of 
 society, occupies a very large part of the tort opinions. 
 
 But socially unreasonable conduct is broader than this, and the law looks beyond the actor’s 
 own state of mind and the appearances which the actor’s own conduct presented, or should 
 have presented to the actor. Often it measures acts, and the harm an actor has done, by an 
 objective, disinterested and social standard. … Sometimes it must range rather far afield, and 
 look primarily to the social consequences which will follow. … [T]he law of torts is concerned 
 not solely with individually questionable conduct but as well with acts which are unreasonable, 
 or socially harmful, from the point of view of the community as a whole.”1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter the explicit and implicit influence of reasonableness on the elements of 
the tort of negligence and the torts of trespass to the person which includes battery, 
assault and false imprisonment in law of the United States of America will be 
discussed.2 To begin with: the definition of tort law; the basic elements of tort liability; 
and the aims of tort law in the United States of America will be discussed. The role of 
the jury as representatives of the reasonable people will be referred to briefly; the 
concept of a prima facie case; different states, different laws and the Restatement of 
Torts in its various volumes will also be referred to briefly. A more detailed discussion 
on the explicit and implicit influence of reasonableness on the elements of the torts of 
trespass to a person and the tort of negligence will follow. Under the tort of negligence, 
the explicit and implicit influence of reasonableness on some of the expanded 
categories of duties of care relating to: omissions; medical practitioners and health 
care providers; wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims; emotional 
harm or distress; and pure economic loss will be discussed. The influence of 
reasonableness on the defences to the torts of trespass to the person and negligence 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 6-7. 
2  See chapter 1 para 4 as to reasons for choosing the tort of negligence and the torts of trespass 
to the person. 
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will be discussed after the discussions of the torts. Finally the influence of 
reasonableness on causation and harm will be discussed. As will become evident, 
there are fewer comparative remarks referring to South African law in this chapter than 
in the previous chapter where English law is discussed. The different approach 
followed in this chapter is because American tort law is based on English tort law.3 
Therefore many of the comparative remarks made under the discussion of English law 
will apply to American law. The differences between English and American law will 
however be pointed out where possible. 
 
American law is based on English common law. In the United States of America, a 
violation of the common law, legislation, state or federal constitutional provisions and 
in certain circumstances international law,4 may lead to liability in tort.5 American tort 
law like English tort law does not follow a general approach as in South Africa and 
France. There are a number of specific torts which may be varied and even new torts 
may develop.6 
 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick,7 submit that a tort is “conduct that constitutes a legal 
wrong and causes harm for which courts will impose civil liability. The essence of tort 
is the defendant’s potential for civil liability to the plaintiff for harmful wrongdoing and 
the plaintiff’s corresponding potential for compensation or other relief”.8 Torts 
traditionally refer to “wrongdoing in some moral sense”.9 Quite often though, liability in 
tort law is determined by policy considerations.10 For example, for a long time, liability 
for emotional harm was denied for fear of the flood of litigation, a policy consideration 
which was not related to whether the defendant acted in a morally reprehensible 
                                                                                                                                                                            
3  See Schwartz 1981 Yale LJ 1722-1727 with regard to the tort of negligence. Green and Cardi 
in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 431. 
4  For example see Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention 1929 and Montreal conventions - treaties 
(which deal with international air carrier liability); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
3 fn 6. 
5  See authority referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 3 fn 2-3, 5-6. 
6  See Rizzuto v Davidson Ladders Inc 280 Conn 225, 905 A 2d 1165 (2006); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
7  Hornbook on torts 3. See Vigil v Franklin 103 P 3d 322 (Colo 2004). 
8  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 1 submit that “a really satisfactory definition of tort is 
yet to be found”. 
9  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
10  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 23. 
390 
 
manner.11 Another consideration is the fairness of imposing liability on the defendant 
or the class of persons the defendant belongs to.12  
 
It is submitted that even though there are various torts, certain elements of the tort 
must be present in order to ground liability and it is reasonable to find the defendant 
liable if all the elements are present. Even though it is not expressly stated, it will be 
demonstrated that generally the elements of conduct, wrongfulness (subsumed under 
fault), fault (except in instances of strict liability), causation and harm are required to 
ground liability. Cardi and Green13 point out that the element of “act” is based on the 
idea that the actor should make a choice to act voluntarily. The element of 
wrongfulness is subsumed under fault, particularly negligence, which is generally 
judged objectively.14 American law acknowledges fault or culpability which is also 
generally judged objectively.15 The element of fault, either in the form of intention or 
negligence, is important in American tort law as tort is essentially fault-based.16 
However, strict liability, where fault is not required, is applicable for harm caused by 
animals,17 abnormally dangerous activity,18 and the manufacture and distributing of 
defective products.19 Vicarious liability, a form of strict liability,20 is liability of a person 
for the tort of another and is also seen as an exception to the predominantly fault-
based liability in American law.21 “Respondent superior” is a principle applied whereby 
the employer is held jointly and severally liable with the employee for the tort 
committed by the employee, while in the course and scope of employment. It is the 
most common type of vicarious liability.22   
 
The reasons supplied for the application of strict liability are: strict liability of certain 
businesses ventures where harm commonly or recurrently occurs is justified and is 
                                                                                                                                                                            
11  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 24. 
12  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 25. 
13  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 438, 483. 
14  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 432 fn 4. 
15  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 477. 
16  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 753. 
17  See in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 778-784. 
18  See in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 784-791. 
19  See in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 797-848. 
20  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 754. 
21  See in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 753-775 with regard to vicarious 
liability. 
22  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 753. 
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considered economically efficient; business entities can increase their price on 
commodities in order to cover the costs of insurance and are in a good position to take 
out insurance against such loss; it is fair or just to hold the person or entity strictly 
liable as such person or entity bears the burdens and benefits of its operation (the risk 
and profit theory);23 and some activities carry more risk than others.24 In respect of 
abnormally dangerous activity the reason for imposing strict liability are: the risk of 
harm is reduced and the defendant is encouraged to use safer methods or safer 
premises in conducting dangerous activities.25 With regard to vicarious liability of 
employers for the torts committed by employees, the reasons referred to for imposing 
strict liability include: that either the plaintiff or the employer as the innocent person 
must bear the loss; the employer however has control over the employee and benefits 
from the activity of the employee, the employer should therefore bear the loss (the risk 
and profit theory); by imposing liability on the employer, the employer will exercise 
control over his employees deterring tortious conduct.26  
 
It is evident that the risk and profit theory are the main theories advanced for the 
imposition of strict liability. It is reasonable to impose strict liability in instances where 
there is increased, common or recurrent risk of harm. It is reasonable to hold the risk 
creator (for example, the manufacturer, business entity or the employer) strictly liable 
for harm as they create such risk or increase the risk of harm. They also obtain a profit 
or benefit and should therefore bear the burden of potential loss or harm. It is 
reasonable to impose strict liability on the risk creator because they are in a better 
position to take out insurance and in any event in taking out insurance, the loss is 
distributed amongst many and not on the individual risk creator. It is reasonable to 
impose strict liability on risk creators who engage in dangerous activities, such as rock 
blasting, as there are abnormal or unreasonable risks involved which they are aware 
of or should be aware of. Thus the influence of reasonableness on strict liability is 
implicit. Where there is normal, uncommon, non-recurring risk then it is reasonable 
that fault-based liability should be applied. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
23  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 801-802. See also chapter 3 para 1.  
24  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 755-756. 
25  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 790. 
26  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 755-756. 
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American tort law seems to refer to the term “wrong” and “tort” interchangeably. For 
example, an “intentional wrong” is synonymous with the term “intentional tort”.27 In 
respect of intentional torts, intention on the part of the defendant is required where 
such defendant is usually conscious of his “wrongdoing” and if not at the very least he 
is aware of his “act”.28 In respect of negligent wrongs, the defendant deviates from the 
standard of reasonableness whether he is consciously aware of it or not and may at 
times be aware of unreasonable risks that he takes.29 Liability for negligence may be 
excluded if there was no harm or loss, or where the harm was remote or “fortuitous”.30 
Tort law is generally concerned with conduct and the consequences of such conduct.31 
Tort law acknowledges the defendant’s accountability and personal responsibility for 
harm done to the plaintiff.32  
 
There are generally three broad categories of interests that are protected against 
wrongdoing: a person’s interest in security of property, physical security, physical 
liberty and autonomy; intangible interests such as an interest in one’s reputation 
etcetera; and economic interests.33 Greater protection is afforded for physical harm 
and damage to property than to intangible harm such as emotional harm or pure 
economic loss.34 The weighing of various interests in tort law is not easy and the 
courts’ decisions coincide with the community or public opinion. When the community 
is divided the courts’ decisions also reflect the division and uncertainty in the 
community.35   
 
The broader aims of tort law include morality or corrective justice36 and “social utility” 
or “public policy” (based on what is good for society).37 The aims of tort law have been 
debated, with some academic writers advocating the aims of corrective justice, others 
                                                                                                                                                                            
27  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
28  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
29  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
30  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 5. 
31  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 9. 
32  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 12. 
33  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 5. 
34  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 5-6, 28-30. 
35  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 17-18. 
36  Where it is “right” for the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for harm wrongfully caused. 
37  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 16. See chapter 2 paras 1, 2 and 3.2 with regard 
to “corrective justice”. 
393 
 
deterrence and yet others more mixed versions.38 Much has been written about the 
theory of corrective justice.39 The theory is however rarely referred to in practice or in 
decisions and if it is, it is associated with the principle of “fairness”40 that is used to 
explain principles of justice as well as accountability for fault,41 in contrast to decisions 
that are reached based on policy and practicality.42 Corrective justice on the one hand 
entails that the defendant must pay compensation for his morally faulty conduct which 
caused harm or loss to the plaintiff. On the other hand, in terms of corrective justice, it 
would be wrong “to impose liability upon a defendant who is not at fault in causing the 
plaintiff’s harm”. Corrective justice focuses on fairness between the parties.43 
“Community standards” may be embodied in a custom or the views of the jury who 
provide a verdict reflecting the standards for fault as well as liability, which is also 
deemed a factor in considering corrective justice.44 Thus corrective justice takes into 
account the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the community. Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick45 state that usually policy and justice reach the same result but 
not always, in which case either justice or policy prevails or both are “compromised”. 
The other two main subsidiary aims of the broader aims of tort law, compensation and 
deterrence of undesirable behaviour, are often subsumed under the broader aims.46 
With regard to deterrence, the idea is to deter all persons from tortious conduct in 
considering the potential for liability from tortious conduct.47 The primary purpose of 
tort law is to “vindicate” the victim and his rights, to make him whole again and to shift 
the loss onto the person who was at fault for causing the harm.48 The secondary 
purpose is to uphold standards of conduct and behaviour.49  
                                                                                                                                                                            
38  See Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 439. These aims are discussed 
further under the tort of negligence. See para 3.3 below. 
39  See in general Rabin 1996 Yale LJ 2261; Stapleton 2006 Fordham L Rev 1529; Walt 2006 
Virginia LR 1311; Zipursky 2003 Georgetown LJ; Weinrib 1992 Iowa L Rev 403; Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 17 fn 5, 18 fn 10.  
40  Fischer 1999 Tenn L Rev 1127 concludes that when adjudicators are forced to choose between 
fairness and efficiency, fairness prevails. 
41  See United States v Cannons Eng’g Corp 899 F 2d 79, 87 (1st Cir 1990); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 17 fn 7. 
42  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 17. 
43  Beever 2008 OJLS 491.  
44  See Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2348; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 20. 
45  Hornbook on torts 16.  
46  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 15. 
47  See Hubbard 2006 Hofstra L Rev 445-452; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 23. 
48  See Hanks v Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp 276 Conn 314, 885 A 2d 734, 742 (2005); 
Teschendorf v State Farms Ins Companies 293 Wis 2d 123, 717 NW 2d 258, 273 (2006); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 6 fn 19. 
49  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 6. 
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As mentioned in chapter 2,50 the concept of reasonableness developed from the 
concept of justice, which entails treating all parties equally and fairly. Liability will follow 
where there is an unreasonable interference of interests and unreasonable conduct 
which causes harm or loss. Whether the infringement of the interests is unreasonable 
or the conduct is unreasonable depends on the views of the community.51 Infringement 
of interests may be justified and reasonable depending on the circumstances. Where 
interests are infringed in an unreasonable manner, corrective justice requires the 
restoration of the balance, for the plaintiff to be compensated for the wrong done as a 
result of the morally faulty conduct of the defendant. By enforcing compensation for 
harm done, the aim of deterring undesirable behavior is indirectly achieved.52 In 
instances of strict liability where fault is irrelevant corrective justice still requires the 
plaintiff to be compensated for the harm sustained.53 Thus it is evident that fairness, 
justice, equity, policy considerations, the community’s views and reasonableness are 
all intertwined. 
 
1.1 The role of the jury 
 
The jury plays an essential and unique role in tort law in the United States of America. 
The right to a jury is enshrined in the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
and there are similar provisions in all states, conferring such a right on all legal 
subjects.54 The jury represents the community,55 they represent the reasonable 
people.56 As the representatives of the reasonable people, they provide input as to the 
norms of behaviour. The jury determines historical facts and makes value judgments.57 
The adjudicator decides on disputes of law and application of legal principles. As the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
50  Chapter 2 para 1. 
51  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 6-7. 
52  See chapter 2 paras 1, 2 and 3.2 with regard to a number of authors’ views on “corrective 
justice”. 
53  See the rationales for imposing strict liability in chapter 3 para 1, chapter 5 para 1 and chapter 
6 para 1. 
54  See Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 432; Zweigert and Kötz 
Comparative law 274. 
55  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 189. 
56  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 204. 
57  See Gergen 1999 Fordham L Rev 407; Hubbard 2006 Hofstra L Rev 437, 454 fn 67; 
Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 8(b) (2010); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 291 fn 3. 
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trained professional, the adjudicator must maintain certainty in the law. The jury, on 
the other hand as the “trier of facts”, establishes and evaluates facts.58 Both parties, 
the plaintiff and the defendant must present their case, adduce evidence and either 
party may raise defences and cross-examine any witnesses.59 The jury may draw 
inferences from the adduced evidence.60 The plaintiff, defendant or witnesses may 
contradict themselves and there may be uncertainty with regard to the oral evidence. 
It is for the jury to evaluate the witnesses’ testimony and the adjudicator rarely asks 
witnesses any questions.61 The adjudicator may however regulate testimony by 
excluding testimony which he considers prejudicial or irrelevant.62  
 
An adjudicator determines whether a duty of reasonable care exists and if he does 
decide so then he also notifies the jury of the standard of care that must be applied.63 
If the adjudicator finds that there was no duty of care owed, he may grant a “motion to 
dismiss”;64 “summary judgment”65 or a “directed verdict”.66 The jury decides on 
negligence, contributory negligence and the compensation of damages.67 If the 
adjudicator finds that there is insufficient evidence or if the evidence is weak, that 
reasonable people would not consider sufficient to prove the case, then the adjudicator 
may direct a verdict for the defendant.68 Thus in this instance, the adjudicator still 
regulates which claims may be heard by the jury.69 If the adjudicator finds that 
reasonable people would not differ to find the defendant negligent, then he may direct 
a verdict for the defendant.70 If, however, the adjudicator finds that reasonable people 
may differ then it is up to the jury to decide.71  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
58  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 36. 
59  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 33-34. 
60  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 36. 
61  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 36. 
62  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 36. 
63  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 292. 
64  Where the case is dismissed. 
65  Where judgment is given in favour of a party and a trial is not necessary. 
66  A finding is given and there is no need for a jury to decide on the case. See Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 292. Epstein Torts 166. 
67  Zweigert and Kötz Comparative law 274. 
68  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 292. 
69  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) §8(b) (2010); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 36 fn 8. 
70  See Peterson v Eichhorn 344 Mont 540, 189 P 3d 615 (2008) where summary judgment was 
given; Montas v JJC Constr Corp 985 NE 2d 1225 (NY 2013); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 292 fn 6; Epstein Torts 166. 
71  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 292; Epstein Torts 166. 
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The jury provides a verdict and does not give reasons why or justify its verdict.72 A jury 
verdict may be appealed.73 If an adjudicator is of the opinion that there was some 
injustice done by the jury because certain evidence was not considered; or the 
damages awarded were too little or too much; or that the verdict was unjust, the 
adjudicator may grant a “new trial”.74 Similarly if the adjudicator gives the jury an 
incorrect instruction which adversely affects a party or is prejudicial (constituting a 
“reversible error on appeal”) a new trial with the correct instructions may be ordered.75 
Generally a jury trial is available as a given right but the parties may decide not to have 
the jury decide on the facts thereby allowing the adjudicator to decide on the facts. 
This is referred to as a bench trial.76 The use of juries has been declining and in cases 
where there is no jury, the adjudicator establishes and evaluates the facts.77 Green78 
points out however that adjudicators and juries generally reach the same result.   
 
As mentioned above, the jury decides whether the defendant’s or the plaintiff’s conduct 
strayed from the standard of the reasonable person under the circumstances based 
on the facts.79 Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick80 illustrate this aspect of the jury’s role by 
referring to an example where the “trier” establishes that the defendant drove his motor 
vehicle at sixty miles per hour. The adjudicator states that in terms of the law, the 
defendant is expected to “exercise reasonable care under the circumstances”. Thus 
the adjudicator must notify the jury about the applicable law when evaluating conduct. 
Driving at that speed may not be reasonable in an area where there are young children 
playing, while driving at that speed on the highway may be reasonable. Whether the 
defendant’s conduct was reasonable according to the facts of the case is decided by 
                                                                                                                                                                            
72  Gilles 2001 Vand L Rev 814. 
73  Gilles 2001 Vand L Rev 814-815. 
74  See Pocatello Auto Color Inc v Akzo Coatings Inc 127 Idaho 41, 896 P 2d 949 (1995); Botelho 
v Caster’s Inc 970 A 2d 541 (RI 2009); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 292-293. 
75  Epstein Torts 166. 
76  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 35-36. 
77  See Hans and Albertson 2003 Notre Dame L Rev 1497. 
78  See Green Judge and Jury 404. 
79  See Considine v City of Waterbury 279 Conn 830, 905 A 2d 70 (2006); Delmarva Power & Light 
v Stout 380 A 2d 1365 (Del 1977); further cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 292. 
80  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 33-34. 
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the jury. The jury may decide that driving at that speed under the circumstances was 
“unreasonably risky” constituting negligence.81  
 
There are a number of views on the positive role of the jury, that is, the jury: embodies 
democratic and community values because they are members of society randomly 
chosen; is a “meliorator of harshness or dispenser of equity” (they in a sense amend 
law which seems harsh or unfair);82 ensures the separation of powers within the 
judicial system; they contribute “to political stability through citizen-participation”; and 
they cannot be bribed or intimidated.83 The negative view of the role of the jury is that 
they impose undue losses upon on unpopular defendants. Studies have however 
shown that juries actually reach the same outcome as the adjudicator and tend to be 
more sympathetic to the defendant.84  
 
It is submitted that the jury upholds community values similar to the manner the boni 
mores is relied on in South African law. They represent the reasonable people of the 
current time ‒ reflecting changing mores, attitudes and give content to standards of 
reasonableness. They in fact influence standards of reasonableness implicitly. In 
South Africa though, community values are given content by legal professionals 
purportedly interpreting or “finding” the boni mores85 whereas in the United States of 
America, lay members of the public must interpret community values in the given case. 
 
1.2 The concept of a “prima facie case” 
 
When the plaintiff alleges that a tort has been committed against him, all the elements 
of the tort must be present and proven. If not, the case will be dismissed by the 
adjudicator.86 Once the elements have been established, then the plaintiff has made 
a “prima facie case” after which the case may proceed to trial with the jury. When a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
81  See Godfrey v Iverson 559 F 3d 569 (DC Cir 2009); Brooks v Lewin Realty III Inc 378 Md 70, 
835 A 2d 616 (2003); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) 
§8(b) (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 36 fn 4. 
82  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 37-38. 
83  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 37; Epstein Torts 163-164. 
84  See Clermont and Eisenberg 1992 Cornell L Rev 1124; Saks 1998 DePaul L Rev 221; 
Eisenberg et al 2002 Cornell L Rev 743; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 37 fn 
12, 15.  
85  See chapter 3 paras 3.1.4 and 3.1.6. 
86  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 37. 
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prima facie case has been established, defences have not been considered and the 
testimony on all the elements has not been evaluated. The jury has not yet considered 
whether the plaintiff’s version in respect of each material fact is probable or more-
likely-than not. Proving a prima facie case does not mean the plaintiff is automatically 
successful in his claim.87 If for example, the jury does not believe the plaintiff’s version 
on a particular element and does not find in favour of him, then the plaintiff has failed 
to fulfil his burden of proof.88  
 
In some instances, conduct causing harm, deserving compensation, cannot fit into 
neat pigeon-holes or specified torts (such as battery or negligence) and so it may be 
called a non-categorical tort, a prima facie tort. A prima facie tort applies as a safety 
net in not denying relief.89 However, it may overlap with other areas of law and the 
courts may find a lack of guidance in dealing with the dispute and claim in tort law. 90  
 
This concept or rule of evidence reasonably allows a plaintiff’s case to be heard and 
not be denied relief even though he has not proven his case. It reasonably allows the 
possibility of relief even where the facts of the case may not fit into one of the 
categorised torts thus ensuring fairness. On the other hand it ensures that where there 
is an essential element missing the court’s time is not wasted and a jury is not 
appointed unnecessarily. Thus money and time is not wasted. It is reasonable to 
dismiss a case and deny liability where an element of a tort is absent. 
 
1.3 Different states, different laws and the Restatement of Torts 
 
According to the U.S. Constitution, congress has legislative competence only in certain 
areas which include protection of copyright and trade, controlling commerce, 
citizenship and so on, which means that commercial and private law is completely 
regulated by the state laws of the various states.91 Federal courts interpret and enforce 
law stipulated in the federal constitution or federal statute.92 Patent and copyright 
                                                                                                                                                                            
87  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 37-38. 
88  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 41. 
89  National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v Whelan 492 F Supp 1253, 1255 (SDNY 1995). See Shapo 
Tort 89. 
90  Cartelli v Lanier Worldwide Inc 872 F Supp 1253, 1255 (SDNY 1955). See Shapo Tort 89. 
91  Zweigert and Kötz Comparative law 250. 
92  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 44. 
399 
 
claims are tried in federal courts and not state courts. In respect of other claims, they 
may be tried in either court.93 Federal law is supreme and overrides state law. 
Generally tort law is not regulated by federal laws but is regulated by state laws.94 
However, the states cannot impose liability in tort which infringes the U.S. Constitution. 
Private law is regulated by the individual fifty states. Only the legislature of each state 
can pass statutes affecting tort law. Adjudicators in the individual states develop the 
law.95 Nevertheless, American law may be seen as a unitary system due to the efforts 
of the American Law Institute and the publications of the Restatements.96 
 
The Restatement of Torts is referred to throughout this chapter and has particular 
importance in that it is an extensive, successive body of work97 produced by the 
American Law Institute98 that is aimed at gathering and combining black letter law 
applied throughout the different states. The volumes inter alia encapsulate case law, 
restate current existing common law, and also provide guidance on what the rule of 
law should be to the legal community. Where rules and case law are inconsistent in 
the different states the Restatements may reflect the most appropriate positive 
progressive rule even though it is the minority view among the states.99 As will become 
evident, various volumes of the Restatement of Torts will be referred throughout this 
chapter. At times, the First, Second or Third Restatement of Torts may be referred to 
in order to show similarities or changes between the volumes which are often 
highlighted by American academic writers. Although the Restatements are not binding 
on the courts, they are regarded as authoritative and are often referred to in 
judgments.100 In general, tort law solutions, general principles and methods are similar 
in all states.101 
                                                                                                                                                                            
93  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 46. 
94  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 435. 
95  Zweigert and Kötz Comparative law 250. 
96  Zweigert and Kötz Comparative law 250-251. 
97  The first volume of the Restatement First of Torts was published in 1934 and the current version 
is the Restatement Third of Torts. 
98  The American Law Institute is an organisation composed of legal practitioners, adjudicators 
and academics. It was founded by the American Bar Association in 1923. A leading scholar is 
appointed as a reporter for a particular topic. His task is to incorporate existing rules and case 
law in its current positive state. Other advisers, from the ranks of academics, legal practitioners 
and adjudicators, draft the text which must then be endorsed by a committee before official 
publication (Zweigert and Kötz Comparative law 251). 
99  Zweigert and Kötz Comparative law 252. 
100  See in general American Law Institute’s website: https://www.ali.org/about-ali/creation (Date of 
use: 9 September 2017). 
101  Zweigert and Kötz Comparative law 41. 
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Alternative or non-tort compensation systems not necessarily fault-based or relating 
to any wrongdoing, regulate inter alia: social security for medical treatment, benefits 
for persons with physical disabilities, workers’ compensation benefits (for employees 
injured while at work); compensation for injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents 
(no-fault based);102 compensation for persons injured as a result of  dangerous 
products; and mass tort claims for asbestos-related injuries which are regulated by tort 
law principles but are dealt with differently within the law. These systems are aimed at 
public welfare and distributive justice or loss spreading.103 Therefore there may be an 
overlap to some degree between these systems and tort law.104 Dobbs Hayden and 
Bublick105 submit that in United States of America: 
 
 “No one can understand tort law in the United States without recognizing that liability 
 insurance fuels the system, limits its capacity for compensation and deterrence, shapes the 
 litigation, and affects the cost and choices in the system as a whole” 
 
Insurance liability influences tort law as also stated under the discussion of English 
law.106 A full study of its influence falls beyond the scope of this study and will therefore 
only be referred to incidentally. 
 
The explicit and implicit influence of reasonableness on the torts of trespass to the 
person will now be discussed.  
 
2. Torts of trespass to the person 
 
2.1 General requirements for the torts of trespass to a person 
 
Generally, the torts of trespass to a person require some kind of physical act.107 There 
must be intention on the part of the defendant to commit a particular act.108 The torts 
of trespass to a person generally affect the plaintiff’s interests in autonomy. The torts 
                                                                                                                                                                            
102  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 440. 
103  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 11-12. 
104  See Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 440; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 11-12. 
105  Hornbook on torts 47. 
106  See chapter 4 para 1. 
107  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 54.  
108  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 54. 
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are actionable per se, that is, proof of physical harm is not required (in contrast to the 
tort of negligence where proof of harm is required) and the plaintiff is in principle 
entitled to damages.109 It is possible that a defendant may be held liable under a 
number of trespassory torts and a crime simultaneously, depending on the 
circumstances and facts of the case.110 The Restatement Third of Torts111 provides for 
an umbrella rule of liability where a defendant “who intentionally causes physical harm 
is subject to liability for that harm”. Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick112 state that this is 
regarded as a new tort of “purposeful infliction of bodily harm” where actual physical 
contact is not required. This tort is yet to be tested by the courts.  
 
2.1.1 Intent 
 
In the majority of the different states, infancy113 or mental incapacity114 does not negate 
intent. In respect of the element of intent, the defendant acts intentionally if he has a 
“purpose” to bring about a particular result, or alternatively does not have a purpose 
but acknowledges with “substantial certainty” that his conduct will bring about the 
result.115 The element of “intent” encompasses a state of mind about the 
consequences of conduct, having a will or desire to bring about consequences, but 
also believing or having knowledge of the consequences resulting from the conduct.116 
In other words, the defendant “subjectively wants or subjectively foresees that harm 
to another will almost certainly result from his actions”.117 Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick118 explain the idea of “purpose” and “substantial certainty” as follows: if X 
attempts to hit the target and then fires his rifle, he satisfies the purpose test (in South 
African law or doctrine, X has direct intent);119 if X intends to put Y to sleep and in so 
                                                                                                                                                                            
109  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 54. 
110  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 54. 
111  (Liability for Physical Harm) §5 (2005); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 54. 
112  Hornbook on torts 54-55. 
113  Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Ark v Henley 275 Ark 122, 628 SW 2d 301 (1982); Bailey v CS 12 
SW 3d 159 (Tex App 2000); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 58 fn 27.   
114  Polmatier v Russ 206 Conn 229, 537 A 2d 468 (1988); Williams v Kearbey Kan App 2d 564, 
775 P 2d 670 (1989); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 58 fn 28. 
115  See Restatement Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to Persons) §102 cmt (a) (Tentative Draft No. 
1 April 8 2015); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 56, 64. 
116  See Restatement Second of Torts § 8A (1965); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 34. 
117  Curtis v Porter 784 A 2d 18, 23 (Me 2001); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 56 
fn 13. 
118  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 56. 
119  See chapter 3 para 4.2. 
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doing puts sleeping pills in the food served at a cafeteria knowing that the food will be 
eaten by a number of students including Y, then according to the “substantial certainty” 
test he indeed intends to put others to sleep as well (in South African law or doctrine, 
X has indirect intent with regard to putting the other students to sleep and direct intent 
with regard to putting Y to sleep).120 When establishing intent, the subjective state of 
mind of the defendant is in question but the subjective intent is determined from 
“external or objective evidence” by the trier of fact. If X locks Y in a room and disposes 
of the key, the trier of fact can infer that X intended to confine Y to the room.121 A bad 
motive is not indicative of intent but may be considered as an aggravating factor when 
determining liability under certain economic torts or when punitive damages are 
claimed.122 Motive like intent is concerned with the state of mind but deals with the 
reasons for bringing about consequences.123 Similarly a mistake where the defendant 
believes that he is acting rightfully, joke124 or good motive (such as giving a patient an 
injection in order to treat her despite her objection to such treatment)125 on the part of 
the defendant will not negate intention. With trespassory torts, the defendant may be 
held liable for the intended and unintended consequences whether such consequence 
relates to the type of harm, or in instances where X intended to injure Y but instead 
injured Z.126 The same applies if X intends to assault Y by pointing a gun at him but 
does not intend for the bullet to strike Y. If the bullet does strike Y, then X is liable for 
battery even though he did not intend it. This is referred to as transferred intent.127 A 
                                                                                                                                                                            
120  See chapter 3 para 4.2. 
121  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 57. 
122  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 57. 
123  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 35. 
124  See Fuerschbach v Southwest Airlines Co 439 F 3d 1197 (10th Cir 2006); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 58 fn 24.  
125  See Shuler v Garrett 743 F 3d 170 (6th Cir 2014). In South African law a bona fide mistake or 
joke depending on the circumstances may negate intention. See chapter 3 para 4.2. 
126  See Baska v Scherzer 283 Kan 750, 156 P 3d 617 (2007); Davies v White 18 BR 246 (Bkrtcy 
Va 1982); Singer v Marx, 144 Cal App 2d 637, 301 P 2d 440 (1956); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 79. 
127  See Talmadge v Smith 59 NW 656 (Mich 1894); Hall v McBryde 919 P 2d 910 (Colo Ct App 
1996); Manning v Grimsley 643 F 2d 20 (1st Cir 1981); Brown v Martinez 68 NM 271, 361 P 2d 
152 (1961) where shooting was not acceptable for the stealing of water melons on the 
defendant’s property; Restatement Second of Torts § 16(2) and cmt b (1965); Restatement 
Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to Persons) §106 cmt b (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 79-80; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
37. In South African law, it may be said that some of the consequences were actually intended 
in the forms of for example, dolus eventualis or dolus indeterminatus. Thus even though the 
result may not have been desired or a different victim was targeted, the harm that resulted may 
still be regarded as intended because the defendant’s will had been directed at the result, 
although perhaps not in the form of a desire as in dolus directus. For dolus eventualis to 
succeed, the defendant must actually, subjectively have foreseen the result which in American 
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plaintiff who succeeds in his claim of trespass to the person whether in the form of 
battery, assault or false imprisonment is entitled to claim damages,128 including 
punitive damages depending on whether the defendant acted with malice, 
recklessness or oppression.129  
 
The influence of reasonableness on intent is implicit as it is reasonable to hold the 
defendant liable for the tort of trespass to the person if intention is present along with 
the other requirements for the tort. For intention to be present all that is required is the 
aim or acknowledgement with substantial certainty that one’s conduct will bring about 
the consequence whether such consequence is achieved directly or indirectly. The 
relationship between reasonableness and blameworthiness in instances of intention is 
implicit insofar as it is reasonable, in principle, to hold someone liable if he has directed 
his will at attaining a particular harmful result. American law does not have a further 
requirement for intention like in South African law130 where the defendant must be 
conscious of the wrongfulness or unreasonableness of his conduct. Thus infancy, 
mental incapacity, a mistake, joke or good motive does not negate intention. The 
Restatement Third of Torts131  refers to “single intent”, that is, without “culpable intent 
to harm”.132 This may be regarded as reasonable if one looks at it from the point of 
view of the innocent plaintiff who, for example, has suffered harm as a result of the 
intentional conduct of an infant or mentally impaired person. In respect of the 
intentional torts, it may be considered reasonable that the defendant is held liable for 
the direct or indirect consequences as long as the consequences are not too remote. 
This however relates more to the element of legal causation or rather “scope of liability” 
as it is called in American law, and whether it is reasonable to hold the defendant liable 
                                                                                                                                                                            
law may be regarded as negligent conduct. If the defendant did not actually, subjectively 
foresee the result, but the reasonable person would have foreseen and prevented it, a finding 
of negligence will be appropriate in South African law. In American law, dolus eventualis will 
not assist the plaintiff in the instance of intentional torts. See chapter 3 paras 4.2-4.3 with regard 
to the different forms of intention as well as negligence in South African law. 
128  Kennan v Checker Taxi Co Inc 250 III App 3d 155, 897, 620 NE 2d 1208, 1214 (1993); 
Rosenbloom v Flygare 501 NW 2d 597 (Minn 1993); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 82. 
129  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 82-84. 
130  See chapter 3 para 4.2. 
131  (Intentional Torts to Persons) § 101-103 (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015). 
132  See fn 141 below. 
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for the directly or indirectly factually caused consequences. The element of “scope of 
liability” will be discussed in more detail further on.133  
 
2.2 Battery  
 
Battery “vindicates the plaintiff’s rights of autonomy and self-determination”.134 
According to the requirements, there must be a positive (affirmative) act,135 and 
intention resulting in harm or offense to the plaintiff or another that is not privileged or 
consented to.136 In terms of the act, such act must be voluntary.137 Thus involuntary 
acts such as muscle spasms, fits and so forth do not qualify as an act.138 However, an 
instinctive response to an emergency such as grabbing a person’s arm or striking a 
person out of “insane impulses”139 constitutes an act.140  The intention (which need not 
be “hostile”) to touch or come into physical bodily contact with the plaintiff141 or another 
must be in manner which is not wanted, not consented to142 and unjustified (a privilege 
or defence must not be applicable).143 Even in instances where the defendant is 
justified and privileged to make a lawful arrest or touch the plaintiff, such conduct must 
                                                                                                                                                                            
133  See para 4 below.  
134  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 62. See Schloendorff v Society of New York 
Hos 105 NE 92, 93 (NY 1914) in respect of consent and the right to autonomy. 
135  See Restatement Second of Torts § 13 (1965); Restatement Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to 
Persons) § 101cmt c (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 68-69; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 41. 
136  See Restatement Second of Torts § 13 (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
62-64. 
137  See Restatement Second of Torts § 2 (1965). 
138  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 34-35. 
139  Poltmatier v Russ 206 Conn 229, 537 A 2d 468 (1988); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 68. 
140  See Restatement Second of Torts § 2 cmt b (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 68. 
141  See Restatement Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to Persons) § 101-103 (Tentative Draft No. 1 
April 8 2015) where “single intent” is required, that is, without “culpable intent to harm” (in South 
African legal doctrine this would refer to intent in the attenuated form without consciousness of 
wrongfulness). Cf Restatement Second of Torts § 19 (1965) which required the intent to cause 
“harmful or offensive contact”, dual intent, requiring culpable intent to harm. By using the single 
intent rule, it is likely that young children and mentally incapacitated persons may be held liable 
thus generally increasing the scope of liability. See discussion by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick  
Hornbook on torts 65-67. 
142  See Dubbs v Head Start Inc 336 F 3d 1194, 1219 (10th Cir 2003); Cohen v Smith 269 Ill App 
3d 1087, 1090 648 NE 2d 329, 332 (1995); Messina v Matarasso 284 AD 2d 32, 35, 729 NYS 
2d 4, 7 (2001). 
143  Yoder v Cotton 276 Neb 954, 758 NW 2d 630, 632 (2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 55. 
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not be “unnecessary”, “excessively forceful”,144 or beyond the scope of the consent.145 
Contact or touch must be substantial or significant and it is interpreted widely. For 
example, contact is present where: a person drinks poison placed in a cup;146 is 
exposed to dangerous fumes,147 or radiation;148 and smoke from tobacco provided 
there is a “purpose to harm or offend” on the part of the defendant.149 Accidental 
touching which is not intentional is not battery but is construed as negligent conduct 
(there is no negligent battery).150 It is sufficient if the intended bodily contact is 
“offensive”,151 unacceptable to the plaintiff, “violates ordinary social usages”,152 or is 
not permitted by law or a privilege.153 An offensive touch infringes “a reasonable sense 
of personal dignity”.154 Intention to cause physical harm satisfies the requirement of 
intent but it is not necessary.155 Proof of physical harm, emotional harm,156 bad motive, 
or violent conduct is also not necessary. Thus the tort is actionable per se,157 the “tort 
itself is regarded as harmful and the plaintiff is always entitled to recover at least 
                                                                                                                                                                            
144  See Jackson v District of Columbia 412 A 2d 948, 955 (DC 1980); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 61. 
145  For example where a medical practitioner acts beyond the scope of the defence. See for 
example, Mohr v Williams 95 Minn 261, 104 NW 12 (1905) where battery was established 
because consent was given to operate on the right ear but an operation was conducted on the 
left ear. See cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 63 fn 72. 
146  Snouffer v Snouffer 621 NE 2d 879 (Ohio Ct App 1933). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 67. 
147  Swope v Columbian Chems Co 281 F 3d 185 (5th Cir 2002). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 67 fn 95. 
148  Field v Philadelphia Elec Co 388 Pa Super 400, 417, 565 A 2d 1170, 1178 (1989). 
149  See Richardson v Henley 209 Ga App 868, 434 SE 2d 772 (1993), reversed on other grounds 
– 264 Ga 355, 444 SE 2d 317 (1994); Leichtman v WLW Jacor Commc’ns, Inc 92 Ohio App 3d 
232, 634 NE 2d 697 (1994); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 67. 
150  Janelsins v Button 102 Md App 30, 648 A 2d 1039, 1045 (1994). See Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 61. 
151  See Restatement Second of Torts § 19 (1965); Restatement Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to 
Persons) § 101(Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 63. 
152  See Balas v Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc 711 F 3d 401 (4th Cir 2013) where it was held 
that a hug by a supervisor was not offensive (objectively viewed); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 63-64. Cf Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 41 who refer to conduct 
which is contrary to good manners. 
153  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 61. 
154  Restatement Second of Torts § 19. See also Restatement Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to 
Persons) § 101, 103 (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015) which refers to contact which is “highly 
offensive to the other’s unusually sensitive sense of personal dignity”; Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 62-63. 
155  Frey v Kouf 484 NW 2d 864 (SD 1992); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 61. See 
in general Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 5 (2005). 
156  See Harris v Forklift Systems Inc 114 S Ct 367, 371 126 L Ed 2d 295, 510 US 17, 22 (1993); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 63. 
157  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 61; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 40. 
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“nominal damages”.158 Consent is usually established by “custom, socially accepted 
practices, and other non-verbal behaviour”159 which are “reasonably necessary” in 
common daily interaction. For example, a tap on the shoulder to gain a person’s 
attention would be regarded as common daily interaction.160 Examples of battery 
include instances where the defendant: shoots or beats a spouse; 161 spits on the 
plaintiff’s face,162 pushes the plaintiff aggressively even though the person is not 
physically harmed;163 kisses the plaintiff without consent;164 touches the plaintiff’s 
clothing,165 body166 or hair which is unwanted;167 snatches an object from the plaintiff’s 
hand;168 intentionally pulls the chair from underneath the plaintiff as she is about to sit 
resulting in her falling to the floor;169 and where the defendant provides medical 
treatment which involves physical contact without consent, even if the treatment was 
intended to save the patient’s life.170 The plaintiff need not be aware of the contact, 
contact could occur while the plaintiff is asleep or under anaesthetic.171 A claim for 
battery in principle will succeed if the harm was caused directly or indirectly. As soon 
                                                                                                                                                                            
158  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 851. From a South African viewpoint, some form 
of harm manifesting itself in the infringement of an interest of personality, will be required. 
159  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 66. 
160  See Freeman v Wal-Mart Stores East LP, 871 F Supp 2d 665 (ED Tenn 2011); Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 42.  
161  Noble v Noble 761 P 2d 1369 (Utah 1988); Cain v McKinnon 552 So 2d 91 (Miss 1989); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick  Hornbook on torts 61.  
162  See Draper v Baker 1884 61 Wis 450, 21 NW 527; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
41. 
163  Whitley v Anderson 37 Colo App 486, 551 P 2d 1083 (1976), aff’d, 194 Colo 87, 570 P 2d 525 
(1977); Selmeczki v New Mexico Dep’t of Corrections 139 NM 122, 129 P 3d 158 (Ct App 
2006); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 61-62. 
164  Johnson v Ramsey County, 424 NW 2d 800 (Minn Ct App 1988); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 61 fn 54. 
165  Piggly-Wiggly Alabama Co v Rickles 1925 212 Ala 585, 103 So 860 where there was an 
attempted search of the plaintiff’s pockets. See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 39. 
166  Stockett v Tolin 791 F Supp 1536 (SD Fla 1992) where the employer touched the employee’s 
breast and licked her; White v University of Idaho 797 P 2d 108, 109 (Idaho 1990) where the 
piano teacher touched the plaintiff’s back described as a pianist lifting fingers on and off the 
piano; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 62 fn 62. 
167  Rogers v Loews L’Enfant Plaza Hotel 526 F Supp 523 (DDC 1981); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 61 fn 54. 
168  See Fisher v Carrousel Motor Hotel Inc Tex 1967 424 SW 2d 627, 629-630 where a plate was 
snatched from the plaintiff’s hand; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 40. 
169  Garratt v Dailey 46 Wash 2d 197, 279 P 2d 1091 (1995); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 68. 
170  See Taylor v Johnston 985 P 2d 460 (Alaska 1999); Mims v Boland 110 Ga App 477, 138 SE 
2d 902 (1964); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 61 fn 55. 
171  See Hivley v Higgs 1927 120 Or 588, 253 P 363; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 40. 
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as battery is established, the defendant may be held liable for intended and unintended 
harm.172 The consequences however must not be too remote.173  
 
The influence of reasonableness on battery is predominantly implicit. It is reasonable 
to hold the defendant liable if all the elements of battery are present and if one element 
is absent then it is unreasonable to hold the defendant liable. There must be positive 
conduct on the part of the defendant in the form of touching or contact with the plaintiff. 
Contact is interpreted widely to include for example, drinking poison from a cup or 
being exposed to toxic substances. Thus the intentional contact may occur directly or 
indirectly. The conduct must be voluntary, that is, the defendant must be able to 
mentally control his muscular movements when there is contact with the plaintiff. Thus 
if the conduct is involuntary then there is no act and it is unreasonable to hold the 
defendant liable. If the contact is accidental then intention is absent and it is 
unreasonable to hold the defendant liable for battery, the tort of negligence may 
however be applicable. There must be intentional physical infringement of the 
plaintiff’s bodily integrity and his right to autonomy. The infringement must not be 
justified, it must be unreasonable. A defence such as consent or privilege for example, 
to make a lawful arrest must not be applicable. In determining intentional reasonable 
contact that the plaintiff must endure, contact which is socially accepted by the 
community which is similar to the boni mores yardstick used in South African law to 
determine wrongfulness174 is considered.  The harm must not be trivial and if it is trivial 
then naturally it is unreasonable to hold the defendant liable for battery. Furthermore 
it is reasonable that the defendant is held liable for the consequences resulting from 
the defendant’s wrongful contact which may have occurred directly and indirectly, in 
principle, so long as they are not too remote. It seems that in Anglo-American law175 
with regard to the intentional torts, directly and indirectly caused consequences which 
are not too remote coupled with the requirement that the harm must not be trivial is 
considered reasonable to hold the defendant liable for “intended” and “unintended” 
                                                                                                                                                                            
172  See Ware v Garvey DC Mass 1956 139 F Supp 71; Bettel v Yim 20 OR 2d 617, 88 DLR 3d 543 
(Ont Co Ct 1978); Restatement Second of Torts §§ 15, 18, 20 (1965); Restatement Third of 
Torts (Intentional Torts to Persons) §101 (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 61-62, 79; cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 40 fn 22. 
173  See Vosburg v Putney 50 NW 403 (Wis 1891); Restatement Second of Torts §16 illus 1 (1965) 
refers to an offensive touching intended to bother or annoy.  
174  See chapter 3 para 3. 
175  See chapter 4 para 2 and 4. 
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consequences. Here “intended” and “unintended” consequences are equated with 
“direct” and “indirect consequences”.  
 
2.3 Assault 
 
Assault usually occurs before battery and is “an act that is intended to and does place 
the plaintiff in apprehension of an immediate unconsented-to touching that would 
amount to a battery”.176 There is a loss of mental tranquillity as a result of fear of a 
direct threat.177 The Restatement Second of Torts refers to “apprehension”178 while 
the Restatement Third of Torts refers to “anticipation”.179 The courts sometimes refer 
to “fear”.180 Subjective anticipation or apprehension of harm is required on the part of 
the plaintiff.181 A claim for assault (like in English law)182 is based on the lack of 
physical contact or harm. Thus if there is physical contact then it may be regarded as 
a battery.183 The plaintiff must be aware of the impending harm.184 Without such 
awareness there is no assault but if the plaintiff is subsequently harmed then there 
may be a battery.185 It must be proven that the defendant had the will or purpose to 
put the plaintiff in apprehension or anticipation of unconsented-to harmful or offensive 
contact or was aware with substantial certainty that his conduct would result in such 
apprehension.186  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
176  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 69.  
177  Epstein Torts 14. 
178  § 21 and § 32 (1965).  
179  (Intentional Torts to Persons) §105 (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 69. 
180  See Lamb v State 93 Md App 422, 438, 613 A 2d 402, 409 (1993); Restatement Third of Torts 
(Intentional Torts to Persons) §105 illus 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015); Restatement 
Second of Torts § 24 cmt B and illus 1 and 2 (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 70-71. 
181  See Chavez v Thomas & Betts Corp 396 F 3d 1088, 1101 (10th Cir 2005) where comments of 
the plaintiff’s bra followed by a physical touching and reaching over to open her shirt, could 
easily be deemed as apprehension of imminent battery. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 69; Shapo Tort 30 fn 7. 
182  See chapter 4 para 2.2. 
183  See Bowie v Murphy 271 Va 127, 624 SE 2d 74 (2006); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 69-70. 
184  See Restatement Second of Torts § 22; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 44. 
185  See McCraney v Flanagan 47 NC App 498, 267 SE 2d 404 (1980) where the plaintiff awoke 
and found that the defendant had had sexual intercourse with her. Due to the fact that she had 
been unaware of the imminent sexual assault, she was not assaulted.  
186  Shapo Tort 29. 
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An example of assault is where the defendant intends to scare the plaintiff by shooting 
at him but not intending for the bullet to strike him. In Raess v Doescher,187 even 
though there was no attempt to strike the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s belief of an imminent 
strike was reasonable considering that the defendant “aggressively and rapidly 
advanced on the plaintiff with clenched fists, piercing eyes, beet-red face, popping 
veins”, screamed, swore at him, and backed him up against a wall.188 If the plaintiff 
anticipates an imminent battery then there is an assault.189  Other examples of assault 
include shaking a fist under the plaintiff’s nose;190 aiming a weapon at a person;191 and 
chasing a person with intent to harm.192 The courts have submitted that the 
“anticipation” or “apprehension” “must be reasonable or well-founded” and there must 
be an apparent ability to complete the battery on the part of the defendant.193 It was 
previously thought that words without actual physical conduct does not constitute 
assault,194 however, words are now considered in light of all circumstances and may, 
depending on the circumstances, constitute “assault”.195 For example, in Cullison v 
Medley,196 the defendants entered the plaintiff’s home one evening after he retired to 
bed. They accused and berated him while one of the defendant’s repeatedly slapped 
at a gun which was in a holster on his thigh but did not draw it. The court found that in 
light of all the facts, there was an assault.197 A conditional threat, where for example, 
a landowner threatens to forcefully remove a person from his property if he doesn’t 
                                                                                                                                                                            
187  883 NE 2d 790 (Ind 2008). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 72. 
188  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 72. 
189  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 70. 
190  See Stockwell v Gee 1926 121 Okl 207, 249 P 389; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
43. 
191  See Holdorf v Holdorf 1918 185 Iowa 838, 169 NW 737 (threatening with a club); Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 43. 
192  See Townsdin v Nutt 1877 19 Kan 282 where the defendant rode towards the plaintiff intending 
to run her down; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 43. 
193  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 71 refer to Allen v Walker 569 So 2d 350, 351 
(Ala 1990); Espinoza v Thomas 189 Mich App 110, 472 NW 2d 16 (1991); Muslow v AG 
Edwards & Sons Inc 509 So 2d 1012, 1021 (La Ct App 1987); Hawkins v Hawkins 101 NC App 
529, 400 SE 2d 472 (1991) aff’d 331 NC 743, 417 SE 2d 447. 
194  Webbier v Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau Inc 105 RI 605, 614, 254 A 2d 285, 290 
(1969). 
195  See Muslow v AG Edwards & Sons Inc 509 So 2d 1012, 1021 (La Ct App 1987); Johnson v 
Bollinger 86 NC App 1, 356 SE 2d 378 (1987); Restatement Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to 
Persons) §105 cmt g (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015); Restatement Second of Torts § 31 
(1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 71. 
196  570 NE 2d 27 (Ind 1991). 
197  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 71 fn 131. 
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leave of his own accord, does not count as an assault.198 However, if the defendant 
threatens the plaintiff that if things are not done his way, he will beat her, then such 
verbal threats may constitute assault.199 The Restatement Third of Torts200 refers to a 
subjective approach in establishing whether the plaintiff anticipated imminent harm 
unless the claim for assault is based on words or anticipated contact that would not be 
regarded as offensive.201 In respect of the requirement of “imminent” battery, there 
must be an immediate threat.202 For example, threatening telephone calls would not 
qualify as imminent harm for the purpose of battery.203 Fleeing on the part of the 
plaintiff as a reasonable means of escape must not be an option and if there is no 
reason to anticipate imminent harm even though threats were made, then it would also 
not qualify as assault.204 
 
Assault is more of a mental infringement of a person, as opposed to a physical 
infringement and damages are usually awarded for mental harm, fright and physical 
illness resulting from the mental harm.205 
 
The influence of reasonableness on assault is partly implicit and partly explicit. It is 
reasonable to hold the defendant liable for assault if all the elements of assault are 
present. The harm suffered must not be trivial and the conduct must be in the form of 
an intentional, voluntary, positive act. The defendant through his actions or words must 
cause the plaintiff to subjectively fear, anticipate or apprehend an immediate, direct, 
unjustified battery. The plaintiff’s mental tranquillity must be infringed in an unjustified 
and unreasonable manner. Thus there must be no defence or privilege applicable 
whereby the plaintiff should be reasonably expected to endure the infringement of his 
                                                                                                                                                                            
198  Restatement Third of Torts (Intentional Torts to Persons) §105 cmt h (Tentative Draft No. 1 
April 8 2015); Restatement Second of Torts § 30 illus 1(1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 72. 
199  Gouin v Gouin 249 F Supp 2d 62, 70 (D Mass 2003). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 72 fn 137; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 45. 
200  (Intentional Torts to Persons) §105 cmt d (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015). 
201  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 71. 
202  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 44. 
203  See Johnson v Brooks 567 So 2d 34, 35 (Fla Dist Ct App 1990); Dickens v Puryear 302 NC 
437, 276 SE 2d 325 (1981); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 71. 
204  See Vietnamese Fishermen’s Ass’n v Knights of the Ku Klux Klan 518 F Supp 993 (SD Tex 
1981); State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v Siliznoff 38 Cal 2d 330, 240 P 2D 282 (1952); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 71. 
205  See Brown v Crawford 1944, 296 Ky 249, 177 SW 2d 1; Ross v Michael 1923 246 Mass 126, 
140 NE 292; other cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 43 fn 4. 
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rights. Because the approach is subjective and affects the plaintiff’s mind he must be 
aware of the impending harm, but if there is no reason to anticipate imminent harm or 
if the plaintiff was not aware of it, then it is unreasonable to hold the defendant liable 
for assault. Furthermore if the threat is conditional then it is reasonable to hold the 
defendant liable for assault. The influence of reasonableness is explicit on the 
requirement of reasonable fear or anticipation of harm. 
 
2.4 False imprisonment 
 
False imprisonment infringes the plaintiff’s freedom of movement and such restriction 
of movement by the defendant may occur in a direct or indirect manner.206 The 
defendant must intend207 to confine (detain or restrain)208 or instigate the confinement 
of the plaintiff against his will.209 In terms of the Restatement Second of Torts,210 the 
plaintiff must have been aware of his confinement. False arrest is similar to false 
imprisonment except that in false arrest, the arrest is executed by an officer or a person 
authorised to make an arrest.211 Confinement for even the shortest period of time is 
sufficient.212 Confinement of the plaintiff during the investigation of a crime may be 
considered reasonable.213 Consent, immunity or a privilege may negate false 
imprisonment.214 In terms of the requirement of confinement there must be no 
                                                                                                                                                                            
206  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 77. Cf Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
47. 
207  Accidental confinement by the defendant is not construed as intentional confinement. See 
Adams v Wal-Mart Stores Inc 324 F 3d 935, 941 (7th Cir 2003); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 73 fn 150. 
208  See Restatement Second of Torts § 35 (1965) where all these terms may be used with regard 
to false imprisonment. 
209  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 47, 52-53. 
210  § 35(1)(b) and § 42 (1934). See also Douthit v Jones 619 F 2d 527 (5th Cir 1980); Parvi v City 
of Kingston 41 NY 2d 553, 362 NE 2d 960, 394 NYS 2d 161 (1977); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 73; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 48. 
211  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 73. 
212  See Strain v Irwin 1915 195 Ala 414, 70 So 734; Fuerschbach v Southwest Airlines Co 439 F 
3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir 2006); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 74; Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 48. 
213  See Thornhill v Wilson 504 So 2d 1205 (Miss 1987); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 74 fn 159. 
214  See Morgan v Greenwaldt 786 So 2d 1037, 1042-1043 (Miss 2001) where nurses as a result 
of the conduct of a psychiatric patient placed her in seclusion. The patient lashed out at the 
nurses shouting. She appeared out of control and a threat to her safety as well as others. The 
patient submitted that she was falsely imprisoned. Her claim was rejected and the court pointed 
out that she had voluntarily signed a consent form for treatment. Placing her in a secured 
environment is a common method of treatment in such institutions.  
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reasonable means of escape.215 There must be complete confinement or restraint.216 
In order for the escape to be deemed reasonable, it must be “readily knowable” and 
“reasonably safe and appropriate”.217 For example, escaping from a moving motor 
vehicle is not considered “reasonable”.218 Even though a plaintiff may be confined 
against his will, the defendant may be privileged to confine the plaintiff. The 
confinement is usually in the form of a physical restraint219 such as: locking the plaintiff 
in a room;220 detaining the plaintiff’s property whereby he has no choice but to be 
confined if he wants to guard it or regain possession of it;221 blocking the plaintiff’s 
motor vehicle so that he cannot drive in any other direction;222 or withholding the 
plaintiff’s motor vehicle car keys where there is no other means of escape but by using 
the motor vehicle.223 Intimidation224 or verbal threats of harm to the plaintiff, his 
property225 or to another person (such as an immediate family member)226 may be 
used to confine the plaintiff without physical contact. If there is no justification for the 
confinement then it qualifies as false imprisonment.227 Arrest, threats, duress or 
physical force may be used to confine a person.228 The plaintiff must show that he 
reasonably believed that the threat, whether express or implied,229 could have been 
carried out.230 If the plaintiff submits to confinement as a result of a police officer’s 
                                                                                                                                                                            
215  See Restatement Second of Torts § 36 cmt a (1965); Krochalis v Insurance Co of N Am 629 F 
Supp 1360 (ED Pa 1985); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 74. 
216  See Restatement Second of Torts §36(1) (1965); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 47. 
217  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 74 fn 162. See Furlong v German-American 
Press Association Mo 1916, 189 SW 385, 389; other authority referred to by Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts  47 fn 7. 
218  See Noguchi v Nakamura 2 Haw App 655, 638 P 2d 1383 (1982); Sindle v New York City 
Transit Auth 33 NYS 2d 183, 307 NE 2d 245 (1973). 
219  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 49. 
220  Geddes v Daughters of Charity of St Vincent de Paul Inc 348 F 2d 144 (5th Cir 1965). 
221  See Wallace v Stringer 260 Ga App 850, 553 SE 2d 166 (2001); Burrow v K-Mart Corp 166 Ga 
App 284, 304 SE 2d 460 (1983); Ashland Dry Goods Co v Wages 302 Ky 577, 195 SW 2d 312 
(1946); Griffin v Clark 42 P 2d 297, 299 (Idaho 1935); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 75. 
222  Schanafelt v Seaboard Fin Co 108 Cal App 2d 420, 239 P 2d 42 (1951); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 75. 
223  Verstraelen v Kellog 60 Wash 2d 115, 372 P 2d 543 (1962); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 75. 
224  See Collins v Straight Inc 748 F 2d 916 (4th Cir 1984). 
225  See Cassady v Tackett 938 F 2d 693 (6th Cir 1991); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 75. 
226  See Restatement Second of Torts § 40A (1965). 
227  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 49-50.     
228  See Restatement Second of Torts §§ 40 and 41 (1965). 
229  See DeAngelis v Jamesway Department Store 205 NJ Super 519, 501 A 2d 561 (1985); Dupler 
v Seubert 69 Wis 2d 373, 230 NW 2d 626 (1975) where the plaintiff was outnumbered and 
isolated; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 76. 
230  Herbst v Wuennenberg 83 Wis 2d 768, 266 NW 2d 391 (1978); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 75-76. 
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assertion of authority and it turns out that the police officer did not have immunity or a 
privilege to do so, then he may be liable for false arrest.231 
 
Examples of false imprisonment include: a patient being held against her will at an 
institute for substance abuse;232 the driver of a motor vehicle not allowing a passenger 
to get off;233 and a police officer who detains the plaintiff without a warrant or “probable 
cause”. The plaintiff may in addition have a federal civil rights claim.234 
 
There is a duty on a jailer to release a prisoner when he has fulfilled his sentence 
term.235 Failure to release such prisoner when his sentence has been completed may 
result in liability.236 The same principle applies when a patient who is supposed to be 
detained for only a certain period of time, is detained longer than necessary.237 
 
A plaintiff may be entitled to inter alia nominal damages, punitive damages, 
compensation for loss of time, discomfort, harm to his reputation, as well as for 
physical and mental injury.238 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the requirements of false imprisonment is partly 
implicit and partly explicit. In order for the plaintiff to be entitled to damages for false 
imprisonment, there must have been a complete unreasonable restriction of the 
plaintiff’s freedom of movement. The conduct is in the form of the voluntary, intentional, 
confinement of the plaintiff. The restriction of the plaintiff’s freedom of movement may 
be caused directly or indirectly. The plaintiff’s freedom of movement must be infringed 
                                                                                                                                                                            
231  See Martin v Houck 141 NC 317, 54 SE 291 (1906); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 75; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 50. 
232  See Collins v Straight Inc 748 F 2d 916 (4th Cir 1984); Geddes v Daughters of Charity of St 
Vincent de Paul Inc 348 F 2d 144 (5th Cir 1965); authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 74 fn 164. 
233  See Noguchi v Nakamura 2 Haw App 655, 638 P 2d 1383 (1982); Sindle v New York City 
Transit Auth 33 NYS 2d 183, 307 NE 2d 245 (1973); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 74. 
234  See Clark v Cohen 794 F 2d 79, 86-87 (3rd Cir 1986); Gordon v Villagas 1994 WL 86373 (Conn 
Super Ct 1994) (unpublished); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 74, 78. 
235  See Douthit v Jones 619 F 2d 527 (5th Cir 1980); Bennett v Ohio Department of Rehab & 
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236  See Birdsall v Lewis 1936 246 App Div 132 285 NYS 146 aff’d 271 NY 592, 3 NE 2d 200; 
Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 51. 
237  See Kowalski v St Francis Hospital & Health Ctrs 1 NY 3d 480 (2013); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 77; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 51 fn 52. 
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in an unreasonable manner. That is, there should not have been a privilege or ground 
of justification applicable that would make the restriction of movement reasonable 
under the circumstances. For example, confining a person for the purpose of 
investigating a crime may be considered reasonable as it may be necessary and in 
the interests of justice. Or confining a patient to his room may be considered necessary 
for his own safety and well-being under the circumstances. Thus the restriction on the 
freedom of movement may be justified and reasonable. The confinement must be 
complete in the sense that there must be no reasonable means of escaping the 
confinement. However, in order for the escape to be deemed reasonable, the plaintiff 
must be aware of the manner of escape and it must be safe and appropriate to escape 
under the circumstances. If a person is confined unnecessarily longer than he should 
have been then such confinement for that period of time till his release may be 
unreasonable.  
 
2.5 Defences applicable to the intentional torts of trespass to the person 
 
In American tort law, a defence to tortious conduct such as self-defence (where all the 
elements of the tort have been established prima facie) is referred to as a “privilege” 
and known as an affirmative defence.239 If an element such as fault is absent, then the 
plaintiff has failed to satisfy the burden of proof and it is not referred to as an affirmative 
defence or justifications.240 Privileges are referred to with regard to the intentional 
torts.241 There is no numerus clausus with regard to privileges and new privileges may 
be recognised.242 By using a privilege, the defendant in essence “injects issues of 
reasonableness into the case”, that is, in respect of a reasonable belief, reasonable 
expectations or reasonable conduct on his part.243 Justifications relate to the objective 
standards of reasonableness while excuses relate to excusing the actor’s conduct due 
to his “subjective mental or psychological characteristics”. Fletcher244 refers to a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
239  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 108. See Boyer v Waples 206 Cal App 2d 725, 24 
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Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 132. 
240  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 42-43. 
241  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 109. 
242  See Peterson v Sorlien 299 NW 2d 123 (1980); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
41. 
243  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 42. 
244  1985 Harv L Rev 954-955, 958. 
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“justification” as self-defence, consent and so forth and a “justification negates an 
assertion of wrongful conduct”. He refers to excuses such as “insanity, involuntary 
intoxication, duress or mistake of the law” which “negates a charge that a particular 
defendant is personally to blame for the wrongful conduct”. From a South African 
perspective, an excuse may negate blameworthiness of conduct.245 This would include 
if the party committing the tort was a minor or mentally incapacitated person and made 
an error.246 Fletcher247 submits that the “analysis of justification must precede the 
analysis of excuse”, thus from a South African perspective, the enquiry of 
wrongfulness precedes the enquiry of fault. Generally privileges and justifications may 
in principle exclude liability with regard to the intentional torts but not “excuses”. In 
certain instances the defendant may be lacking intent because he: is very young; 
made an honest mistake which would be considered reasonable under the 
circumstances justifying his conduct;248 or his mental condition is such that it cannot 
be said that he had intent to commit battery (the element of intent is lacking in the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case ).249 Liability may also be excluded due to prescription of a 
claim in terms of the “statutes of limitation” (dealing with prescription of claim)250 or 
“immunity” of certain government entities.251 
 
2.5.1 Self-defence 
 
With regard to self-defence a “person is privileged to use reasonable force to defend 
himself against unprivileged acts that he reasonably believes will cause him bodily 
harm, offensive bodily contact, or confinement”.252 Thus if a defendant commits 
                                                                                                                                                                            
245  Fletcher 1985 Harv L Rev 961 with reference to common law and German law refers to the 
finding of wrongfulness before blameworthiness as a matter of logic and “retributive thinking” – 
first whether there is a wrong, if so how grievous and then whether (in mitigation) the defendant 
should be excused or punished for the full extent of the harm or loss. 
246  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 41. 
247  1985 Harv L Rev 958. 
248  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 110. See Adams v National Bank of Detroit 444 Mich 
329, 508 NW 2d 464 (1993); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 42. 
249  White v Muniz 999 P 2d 814 (Colo 2000); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 42 fn 
34. 
250  See in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 427-443. The provisions and 
rules pertaining to prescription fall outside the scope of this study and will not be discussed 
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251  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 42. 
252  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 131. 
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assault, battery or false imprisonment, his conduct may, depending on the 
circumstances, be privileged.253 
 
There are certain requirements that must be met for the attack or impending attack. 
The attack or impending attack must be imminent, requiring immediate, necessary 
action to avoid harm or further harm.254 If the danger seems to be reasonably imminent 
to the defendant, then the defendant need not wait for the attacker to strike first. He 
may act first in self-defence.255 The use of force by the defendant must be reasonable 
according to the circumstances the defendant finds himself in, that is, he must 
subjectively believe that self-defence was necessary due to an imminent attack.256 
Subjective factors relating to the defendant’s state of mind may be considered by the 
jury in reaching a decision as to whether the conduct was reasonable.257 Thus even if 
the defendant believed there was an imminent attack but in actual fact it transpired 
that the plaintiff never intended to attack the defendant, the defendant may still rely on 
self-defence.258 The belief however must be one that a reasonable person would have 
also had under similar circumstances.259 If the defendant knew of the attacker’s 
tendency for violent behaviour or if the attacker was hostile to the defendant on a prior 
occasion and the defendant acts in self-defence reasonably believing an attack is 
imminent, his conduct is privileged even though bystanders may not acknowledge the 
need for the defendant’s conduct. The bystanders naturally do not have the knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                                            
253  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 132. 
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the defendant has.260 Even though the foundation for successful reliance on self-
defence is based on the defendant’s knowledge, it is still judged objectively in that if 
the defendant believed that there was an imminent attack due to his “idiosyncratic 
fears or biases” but there is no evidence to support it, or a reasonable person would 
not have the same belief then the defendant cannot rely on the privilege.261 The courts 
acknowledge that even a reasonable person under the circumstances cannot make a 
perfect judgment with respect to the use of force when faced with such a situation like 
a robbery.262  
 
Deadly force or force which causes serious bodily injury would generally not be 
deemed reasonable unless the defendant reasonably believed he was about to be 
killed or sustain serious bodily injury. In such a case the defendant may retaliate with 
deadly force if it is “the only safe alternative” (reasonable alternative).263 Whether the 
extent of the force is reasonable or not depends largely on the harm that was 
threatening and to some degree on the circumstances of the case, also taking into 
consideration whether there were alternative measures the defendant could have 
taken. If the defendant uses excessive force which is deemed unreasonable then he 
himself will be liable for the harm caused by “the excess” unnecessary force and not 
the “privileged force”.264 If the defendant however causes harm which is indivisible and 
it is not practically possible to separate the “excess force” from the “privileged force”, 
then the defendant will be liable for the full extent of the harm.265 If violence is used 
after the assailant is disarmed or if there is no longer any impending harm, then the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
260  See Martin v Estrella 107 RI 247, 266 A 2d 41 (1970) where the court allowed evidence of the 
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privilege may no longer be used as the conduct will be regarded as unreasonable.266 
The courts are lenient and only expect the defendant to act reasonably and not to 
make a “microscopic analysis” of the circumstances he finds himself in.267 If it is 
possible and safe for the defendant to flee or retreat under the circumstances instead 
of using deadly or excessive force, then it is expected of him to use such reasonable 
alternative conduct under the circumstances.268 However, the defendant is not 
expected to flee from his own dwelling.269 Verbal provocation is not a defence to the 
infliction of physical harm on another although it may have a bearing on mitigating 
damages270 and or avoiding an award of punitive damages.271  
 
The influence of reasonableness on self-defence is explicit. In conclusion with regard 
to the attack, the defendant must reasonably believe that an assault, battery or 
confinement is imminent which requires necessary action in order to avoid harm. The 
reasonable belief is tested against the standard of the reasonable person, that is, for 
example, whether a reasonable person would believe that an attack is imminent and 
it is necessary to act. Thus if for example, the defendant is always paranoid and thinks 
impending harm was imminent when a reasonable person would not believe so, then 
the belief of impending harm would not be reasonable. However, if the defendant is 
aware of the alleged attacker’s violent behaviour and acts in self–defence, his actions 
may be considered reasonable. There must be a reasonable response to the 
impending harm which is judged objectively but based on the facts known to the 
defendant at the time. Deadly force used would be considered reasonable if the 
defendant reasonably believed that his life was in danger or would sustain serious 
bodily injuries, and further if there was no other alternative but to use such deadly 
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force. If excessive, unnecessary, force is used or force used where there is no longer 
a threat of harm, then the act will be deemed unreasonable and not privileged. 
 
It is apparent that the reasonable person standard is used here in an objective manner 
to determine a reasonable belief. There must be a reasonable response to the attack 
or imminent attack from an objective viewpoint, but the facts known to the defendant 
at the time and his subjective belief are considered. The influence of reasonableness 
is apparent from an objective and subjective viewpoint. Analysed from a South African 
perspective, self-defence in American law straddles both the elements of wrongfulness 
and fault. When judging the reasonable reaction from the belief in terms of putative 
defence from an objective point of view, in this manner, it may be argued that the 
reasonable person is regarded as the embodiment of the boni mores from a South 
African perspective.272 The reasonable belief is judged ex ante as well as objectively. 
Thus whether the belief was reasonable as well as whether the reaction stemming 
from the belief was reasonable, ex post facto, ex ante, objective and subjective 
approaches are applied combining the tests for wrongfulness and fault in one enquiry. 
There is however no reason in Anglo-American law to distinguish between putative 
and actual defence.  
 
2.5.1.1 Defending another person 
 
A defendant may rely on self-defence when subjected to any physical threat, in the 
form of assault, battery or false imprisonment.273 A person may defend another from 
an imminent attack as well as himself.274 The same principles that apply to self-
defence will apply in defending another. The influence of reasonableness is also 
explicit. Thus the state of necessity must be immediate and threats or attacks in the 
past or future will not justify infliction of harm in self-defence.275 The intervention on 
the part of the defendant in defending another must appear to be “reasonably 
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necessary”.276 The defendant must believe that the victim would be entitled to the 
“privilege” of self-defence and “reasonable appearances” must justify such belief. 
Reasonable force must be used.277 Any unnecessary force used may result in 
liability.278 It would therefore be reasonable for a person to defend another only if such 
person believed it was reasonably necessary and the defensive force used was 
reasonably necessary.  
 
2.5.1.2 Defence of property 
 
The possessor of land or property may use reasonable force where necessary in order 
to defend possession and enjoyment of his land or property against intrusion or 
harm.279 If the plaintiff technically trespasses without the threat of harm, a verbal 
request for the plaintiff to leave may be sufficient. If however, the plaintiff refuses, then 
the defendant may rely on a privilege if it would normally amount to assault or battery, 
but without inflicting serious bodily harm upon the plaintiff.280 For example, a disruptive 
customer may be forcibly removed if he does not leave voluntarily (even though it 
would normally amount to battery)281 or shooting at a dog that has been killing the 
defendants chickens may be privileged.282 In the former example, the defendant would 
not be held liable for battery and in the latter the defendant would not be held liable for 
damage due to the death of the dog. In determining reasonable force in defending 
possession of land, “it must appear that any force used to defend possession is 
needed, adapted, and proportioned to the protection of the possessor’s interest in 
preventing the intrusion or ousting the intruder”.283 Thus there is a correlation between 
the extent of force used and the interest protected (possession of property). The force 
used must not be excessive when compared to the interest protected in the 
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circumstances in order for such force to be deemed reasonable.284 Whether excessive 
force was used is determined by the jury and depends on the circumstances of the 
case.285 The defendant’s use of excessive force may result in battery or assault. For 
example, firing a rifle some distance away from the plaintiff but at a spot which was 
ten feet away from where the plaintiff was standing was considered excessive in order 
to remove a peaceful trespasser.286 The use of force will be considered unjustified and 
unreasonable where it is apparent that there is no immediate interference with the 
property or if a verbal warning would suffice.287 Threatening to shoot a person may 
also under the circumstances be deemed unnecessary, amounting to excessive use 
of force and therefore unreasonable.288 Most criminal statutes allow the use of deadly 
force which causes serious injury when defending possession of one’s home289 or 
protecting property such as one’s car particularly in car hijacking cases.290 Thus use 
of deadly force in such circumstances is generally considered reasonable, at least in 
terms of criminal law and may be used as a guideline in tort law.291 Generally in 
determining reasonable force, the least force must be used in the circumstances. For 
example, if the intruder is peaceful, then an oral request and chance for him to leave 
may be sufficient292 unless it appears that such a request is not possible or dangerous 
under the circumstances.293 If it reasonably appears to the defendant that the plaintiff 
is breaking into his house but in actual fact it turns out to be a delivery boy delivering 
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132. 
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the paper, the defendant may be justified in using force.294 However, if the plaintiff has 
a “superior privilege”, for example if the plaintiff (a police officer) is authorised to search 
the property, then the defendant cannot rely on a privilege to use force in defending 
his property.295 However, if, for example, the police officer cuts off the power to the 
defendant’s house, appears in plain clothes wearing a ski mask, and the defendant is 
misled and mistaken into believing that the police officer is a violent attacker, then the 
defendant’s use of force may be justified as the police officer misled the defendant 
nullifying the “superior privilege”.296 Only necessary force and no more is considered 
reasonable.297 In instances where tenants or squatters are unlawfully occupying a 
property, the owner of such property must make use of the procedures set out by the 
relevant statutes. The policy behind enacting such legislation is to: reduce the risk of 
violent force used by the owner in evicting the tenant or squatter; to not leave such 
tenant or squatter homeless;298 and to give the tenant or squatter the right to be heard 
as part of a “fair judicial process” especially since the tenant or squatter is in a weaker 
position when compared to the landlord (there is a difference in the bargaining 
power).299 However, at the same time the law provides for a more speedy streamlined 
judicial process to put the owner back in possession of his property.300 This confirms 
the higher value placed on human life and limb over an interest in property. If for 
example, the landlord locks out the tenant from the premises because he did not pay 
the rent, the landlord may be held liable if there is the alternative of a speedy remedy 
through the courts.301 Thus even reasonable force is not permitted to remove a tenant 
or squatter.302 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
294  See Smith v Delery 238 La 180, 114 So 2d 857 (1959); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
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296  See State v White 642 So 2d 842 (Fla App 1994); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
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298  See Gerchick 1994 UCLA L Rev 759; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 149. 
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300  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 149-150. 
301  See Berg v Wiley 264 NW 2d 145 (Minn 1978); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
148. 
302  See Daluiso v Boone 71 Cal 2d 484, 455 P2d 811, 78 Cal Rptr 707 (1969); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 149. 
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Under certain circumstances the use of mechanical traps (spring guns or rigged wire 
traps which fire weapons) may be reasonable if used in self-defence, to protect one’s 
home.303 According to the Restatement Second of Torts304 such mechanical traps are 
allowed if according to the facts of the case, the defendant would have used the same 
force in person. This has been criticised as being “infeasible” or “logically impossible” 
as in reality the defendant would usually give a warning to the intruder, which is not 
possible with the mechanical trap.305 The defendant however who uses a mechanical 
trap must be liable for the consequences when such device injures or kills a wandering 
child306 or a trespasser who commits a minor crime. For example in Katko v Briney,307 
the defendants had experienced a number of break-ins on their property over ten 
years. They boarded the windows and put up signs stating that no trespassing would 
be tolerated. They then set up a spring gun but did not put up signs warning intruders 
of the device. The plaintiff who intruded on their property looking for jars and bottles 
suffered severe injury to his leg when the spring gun was triggered upon opening the 
bedroom door. The plaintiff was fined and sentenced to sixty days in jail but entitled to 
recover damages. The court,308 relying on the Restatement Second of Torts,309 held 
that life and limb is more valuable than an interest in property and in the circumstances 
the defence of using the spring gun to defend the property was rejected.310 In 
McKinsey v Wade,311 a young man who broke into a vending machine was killed when 
a booby-trapped dynamite charge went off. The estate of the young man was entitled 
to damages.312 It seems that in order for it to be reasonable to use a mechanical device 
or “engine of destruction”, warning signs must be provided.313 Property may now be 
covered at a minimal cost by insurance and using devices may be deemed 
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unreasonable.314 Shapo315 summaries a set of rules that may be used in determining 
the reasonableness of conduct. He suggests using an objective reasonableness 
standard. Deadly force may be used where serious property crimes are committed, by 
giving clear notice. However, this may not be relevant to those who are illiterate or do 
not understand the language and if there is no reasonable alternative to protecting the 
property. Reasonable force may be used where the owner has a bona fide belief that 
he is acting reasonably. 
 
The influence of reasonableness in defence of property is explicit. It is apparent that 
in defending one’s property and considering whether reasonable force was used, the 
plaintiff’s property interests are weighed against the value of life and limb. Reasonable 
force used must be: necessary; based on a reasonable belief that one’s property 
interests will be infringed, not excessive; not disproportionate when compared to the 
property interests protected in the circumstances; and there must be no other 
alternatives such as verbal warnings that could have been used in the circumstances. 
As Shapo explains above, deadly force may be used depending on the circumstances, 
where serious property crimes are committed and where clear notice is given.  
 
2.5.2 The merchant’s privilege to detain or arrest another 
 
Over time, shoplifting became more common resulting in large losses for merchants. 
The courts’316 then developed the traditional common law privilege of detaining a 
person for investigation purposes, which was traditionally only applied by public 
entities that were authorised to do so. Currently a merchant who reasonably believes 
that a person has committed a theft or attempted theft is permitted to detain such 
person for a certain period of time for the purposes of investigating whether he did 
indeed commit theft or attempted theft.317 The interests in protection of property are 
weighed against a dignitary interest (freedom from restraint).318 The detention must 
                                                                                                                                                                            
314  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 135. 
315  Tort 97-98. 
316  See Collyer v SH Kress Co 5 Cal 2d 175, 54 P 2d 20 (1936); Jacques v Childs Dining Hall Co 
244 Mass 438 NE 843, 26 ALR 1329 (1923). 
317  See Restatement Second of Torts § 120A (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 153. 
318  Shapo Tort 99. 
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take place for a reasonable period of time319 and in a reasonable manner. If the 
suspected shoplifter is detained for an unreasonable period of time or in an 
unreasonable manner, then the merchant cannot rely on such privilege.320 For 
example, handcuffing the suspected shoplifter and making a spectacle of her in front 
of other shoppers is considered unreasonable conduct and exceeds the privilege.321  
 
There are a number of statutory privileges for merchants, which are beyond the scope 
of this study, but it suffices to state that the influence of reasonableness is explicit, 
requiring a reasonable belief of suspecting a person as well as reasonable conduct in 
detaining the person (that is, for a reasonable period of time as well as in a reasonable 
manner) to prevent theft, or recover property, or turn the suspect over to the police.322 
 
2.5.3 Privileged arrest (lawful arrest) 
 
Under certain circumstances private individuals may make a lawful arrest for criminal 
offenses also known as a “citizen’s arrest” as long as they are made “without 
unreasonable and excessive force”.323 Whether reasonable force was used in the 
circumstances is determined from the facts of the case.324 The use of deadly force 
would not be justified for a misdemeanour but may be justified to prevent a dangerous 
criminal from escaping and causing harm or further harm to others.325 The purpose of 
the arrest is to bring the suspect before a court of law.326 There must at least be a 
reasonable belief that a person committed a felony or “a breach of the peace in the 
presence of the defendant”.327 A police officer may also make an arrest and may rely 
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on the privilege if he reasonably suspects (judged objectively) that a person committed 
a felony even though it may transpire that no felony was committed.328 A private person 
may arrest a person where a felony has been committed and he has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person he is arresting is the one who committed such 
felony.329 If a private person makes a reasonable mistake as to the individual he may 
escape liability but not if he makes a mistake as to the felony.330 A police officer will 
not be held liable for an arrest if he relies on a warrant of arrest which appears valid 
(when in actual fact it is in invalid),331 but will be held liable if the warrant of arrest is 
prima facie invalid.332 If a police officer affects an arrest with a valid warrant but uses 
excessive force; affects an arrest in an unreasonable manner; seizes property when 
authorized to do so but fails to protect such property while under his custody;333 or 
acts beyond the scope of his authority, then such officer may be held liable in tort.334 
It is submitted that his conduct is unreasonable in such instances and unnecessary or 
excessive. 
 
The influence of reasonableness on privileged arrest is explicit. It is explicit with the 
requirements of: a reasonable belief that a person committed an offence; reasonable 
force used in a manner that must not be excessive and unnecessary; that the detention 
must be for a reasonable period of time, the detention must last no longer than is 
necessary; and that deadly force may be used depending on the gravity of the crime 
committed and the potential harm the suspected criminal may cause.  
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2.5.4 Discipline 
 
Parents in some states may not be held liable in tort for disciplining their children; they 
may rely on “immunity” from liability.335 In states where the immunity from liability has 
been limited or abolished, parents are still entitled to discipline their minor children by 
using force and confining them in what they reasonably believe is necessary for 
teaching and regulating their behaviour.336 Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick337 point out 
that due to varying social and cultural differences338 any punishment administered to 
a child must be reasonable. The following factors are considered when determining 
whether the discipline is reasonable: “age and condition of child, the nature of the 
child’s offense, the possibility of an example to other children in the family, whether 
the punishment inflicted is ‘necessary and appropriate’ to compel obedience and 
whether it is disproportionate, unnecessarily degrading or likely to cause serious or 
permanent harm”.339 The same privilege applies to persons in loco parentis,340 
however a parent may specifically prohibit such person supervising their child from 
physically hitting their child.341 In some instances the extent of force used to discipline 
a child may be considered reasonable when administered by a parent but not 
reasonable when administered by the person in loco parentis.342 Teachers in general 
are entitled to discipline children as long as such punishment is within reasonable 
limits.343 “Excessive force, wrongful purpose, or a disproportionate response to the 
problem” by the teacher are indicative of unreasonable conduct and the teacher may 
not rely on the privilege to discipline.344 The influence of reasonableness on discipline 
is explicit in respect of the requirement of a reasonable belief that it is necessary to 
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teach and regulate the child’s behaviour. The method used to discipline the child must 
also be reasonable, that is, it must be within reasonable limits.  
 
2.5.5 Necessity 
 
2.5.5.1 Private necessity 
 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick345 explain that the privilege of necessity can only be 
invoked “when the defendant is threatened, or reasonably appears to be threatened, 
with serious harm and the response is reasonable in light of the threat.”346 There must 
be an imminent threat and some kind of legally recognisable harm.347 In respect of 
necessity, the emergency to which the defendant reacts must be significant to save 
himself or another.348 With respect to the response, such response must be 
reasonable, that is the harm or loss sustained by the plaintiff must not be 
disproportionate to the harm or loss prevented.349 Usually with necessity, the 
defendant causes harm to the plaintiff as a result of a natural event or an act of a third 
party.350 For example, protestors cannot rely on the privilege if they trespass on a clinic 
where legal abortions are carried out claiming that they are acting out of necessity in 
preventing abortions.351  
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The decision in American law which led to the recognition of private necessity, albeit 
not as a complete defence, is Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation Co.352 In this case, 
a steamship was tied to the dock owned by the plaintiff in order to offload cargo. A 
strong storm emerged while the cargo was being offloaded. The master of the 
steamship decided that it was not practical or safe to continue on the journey. He 
called for a tug boat to tow the steamship away from the dock due to the developing 
storm, but a tug boat was not available at the time. The master kept on replacing 
cables in order to ensure that the steamship remained tied to the dock, if not it would 
have drifted off. Due to the storm and waves, the steam ship repeatedly struck the 
plaintiff’s dock damaging it. The court held that the defendant acted prudently in 
protecting his own more valuable property (the value of the damage to the ship was 
more considerable than the damage to the dock) but had to out of fairness pay 
compensation for the damage caused to the plaintiff’s dock.353 The court held that the 
master exercised “good judgment and prudent seamanship”.354 The court faced with 
deliberate conduct which was not unreasonable or unjustified355 in effect established 
private necessity but as an incomplete privilege356 as liability was not excluded.357 This 
decision has been criticized.358 Tamblyn359 points out that a claim in trespass would 
likely have been rejected as the court approved of Ploof v Putnam360 where it was held 
that there was no trespass in an instance where a ship moors at a dock due to bad 
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weather conditions without the owner’s permission. Furthermore the Restatement 
Second of Torts361 confirms that the defendant is not a trespasser.  
 
Coleman,362 with reference to his idea of “wrong” which makes the wrongdoer 
responsible for wrongfulness sustained by the victim, refers to Vincent v Lake Erie 
Transportation Co363 and explains that the defendant by keeping the ship moored to 
the plaintiff’s dock infringed the plaintiff’s right in contract364 and the defendant was 
therefore wrong. The court noted that it was wrong for the plaintiff to exercise that right 
and if the dock owner would have allowed the ship to meet its fate at sea with bad 
weather conditions then the plaintiff may be held liable for the damage to the ship.365 
However, this does not extinguish “the right or the claims to which the right gives right”. 
Thus because it was wrong, in terms of corrective justice, the defendant has a 
responsibility to compensate the plaintiff for the wrongful loss.366 Fletcher,367 with 
reference to Coleman’s368 explanation, states that it was considered a wrong because 
the defendant did not obtain permission to moor his ship to the dock. Fletcher369 
correctly states that the defendant’s conduct was justified and does not require 
consent, there was a state of emergency and the plaintiff’s interests were infringed 
justifiably for the interests of the defendant.  
 
The influence of reasonableness is explicit on the defence of private necessity. A state 
of emergency must exist for the defendant to act in infringing an innocent person’s 
interests. Thus without such state of emergency it would be unjustified and 
unreasonable to cause harm to an innocent person. First of all there must be a 
reasonable appearance of a threat of serious harm and secondly the response to the 
threat must be reasonable, in that, the loss sustained by the plaintiff must be not 
disproportionate to the harm or loss prevented. In Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation 
Co,370 it is clear that the ship-owner’s conduct was reasonable and justified. 
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Furthermore, the infringement of the dock owner’s interests was not unreasonable. It 
is submitted that the court however applied strict liability and in essence found it fair 
and reasonable that the dock owner should be compensated for his loss as the 
innocent party. 
  
2.5.5.2 Public necessity 
 
A defendant who causes harm in the reasonable belief that he is able to avoid 
imminent harm or minimise serious imminent harm to the public371 may rely on public 
necessity as a complete defence.372 In respect of public necessity, the interests of the 
public are considered. The defendant who is usually a public official must have a 
reasonable belief that it was necessary to act and that such act was reasonably 
necessary. The emergency must be significant and the defendant must have acted 
reasonably under the circumstances.373 For example, a defendant may escape liability 
if he causes damage to the plaintiff’s house in order to stop a fire spreading, causing 
further and more serious damage,374 or causes damage to property, such as a herd of 
Elk infected with tuberculosis,375 in order to prevent the spread of disease.376 It would 
not be fair and just for an individual to be held liable for loss “reasonably incurred for 
the benefit of the entire public”. One could add that it is not reasonable for an individual 
to be held liable for the loss. However, if less drastic means may be used, for example 
in apprehending felons without having to burn the plaintiff’s property, then the privilege 
may not apply.377 The plaintiff is not compensated when the loss resulted in protecting 
private individual’s interests for two possible reasons: firstly because his property was 
in any event going to be destroyed and secondly the defendant would be justified in 
damaging property when the property threatens damage to other property. When 
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dealing with public liability, public entities are obliged in terms of constitutional 
provisions to pay owners for any property they damage or seize.378  
 
The influence of reasonableness on public necessity is also explicit. There must be a 
reasonable belief of imminent serious harm to the public; it must be necessary and 
reasonable to act out of necessity under the circumstances; the act must be 
reasonable; and the least drastic measures in order to prevent harm to the public must 
be taken. Thus if there was an alternative safer means of acting out of necessity in the 
public’s interests and such alternative was not taken; then the conduct may be found 
unreasonable. In respect of public necessity, the defence is a complete defence in that 
the defendant is not held strictly liable and does not need to compensate the innocent 
person to whom he caused harm. The interests of the public are held in higher regard 
when compared to the interests of the individual thereby making the infringement of 
the individual’s interests justifiable and reasonable in avoiding greater harm.  
 
2.5.6 Consent 
 
If the plaintiff consents, then in principle, the defendant cannot be held liable in tort. 
Thus there is no wrong done to one who consents.379 Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
submit that generally at a fundamental level, consent negates intent with regard to the 
intentional torts of trespass, thus the plaintiff does not have a prima facie case.380 
Consent applies to a claim for all torts of trespass to the person (battery,381 assault, 
and false imprisonment)382 and trespass to property. Consent may be viewed as an 
affirmative defence or as an element lacking to ground liability in a tort.  Keeton et al 
submit that consent with regard to intentional infringement of the plaintiff’s legally 
protected interests negates the “wrongfulness” of the defendant’s conduct.383 It seems 
that here the authors are not referring to wrongfulness in the sense that it is used in 
South African law as there is no explicit element of wrongfulness in American law. 
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However, it is apparent that if one were to look at the interests in autonomy which is 
intentionally infringed with consent, the infringement may not be unreasonable and 
there is no intentional wrong. If consent cannot be obtained, for example, in instances 
where emergency medical treatment is required to save the patient’s life, the patient 
is unconscious, and the patient’s relatives cannot be found; then the health care 
provider may provide emergency care where time is of the essence. It must reasonably 
appear that a delay in treatment will result in serious risk of injury to the patient and it 
is probable that the patient would consent (substituted consent) or that a reasonable 
person would consent.384 The conduct of the health care provider is no doubt 
necessary, reasonable and justified.385 Some states require convincing evidence 
before terminating life support treatment.386 Some states will allow termination of life 
support if it is shown that it would have been the patient’s choice.387 
 
Consent may be in the form of “actual” or “apparent” consent.388 “Actual consent” is 
where the plaintiff willing and subjectively consents to the occurrence of the act. With 
“apparent consent”, the plaintiff’s conduct or words are reasonably understood by the 
defendant as reflecting consent.389 Thus consent may be given expressly or implied. 
In O’Brien v Cunard S.S Co390 the plaintiff was on board a ship intending to enter the 
country. She stood in line with other immigrants awaiting a vaccination required to 
enter the country. She held up her arm as the other immigrants had done and received 
the vaccination. She subsequently suffered harm from the vaccination and brought an 
action against the defendant. The court held that even though she did not subjectively 
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and illus 3, 892D (1) (1979); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 182; Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 117; Epstein Torts 47-48. 
385  See Miller v HCA Inc 118 SW 3d 758, 767-769 (Tex 2003) where the medical practitioner was 
not held liable for battery as he was acting in an emergency situation in saving a child without 
obtaining the parents’ consent. The father refused to sign a consent form entitling them to 
resuscitate the child after birth.  
386  See Westchester County Medical Center v Hall 531 NE 2d 607 (NY1988); Epstein Torts 48. 
387  Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital Inc 497 NE 2d 626 (Mass 1986); Epstein Torts 48. 
388  See Bell 2010 W LR 1 who refers to different types of consent such as “hypothetical consent”, 
and non-consent besides express and implied consent. 
389  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 165. See Restatement Second of Torts § 892 
(1979); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 113. 
390  154 Mass 272, 28 NE 266 (1891). 
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intend to consent, her conduct “gave the appearance of consent” which the defendant 
reasonably believed reflected consent.391  
 
Consent is determined objectively. Consent on the one hand may be assumed from 
actions or words leading the defendant “reasonably to believe” that the plaintiff 
consented even though the plaintiff did not intend to consent (apparent consent).392 
On the other hand, the plaintiff may actually subjectively consent without outwardly 
showing or expressing.393 Determining consent objectively encourages freedom of 
conduct and autonomy. The defendant may rely on what a reasonable person would 
understand form the plaintiff’s conduct.394 However, appearances can be deceiving or 
misinterpreted.395   
 
Conduct will be deemed tortious when it goes beyond the parameters of consent given 
or where the consent has been revoked.396 For example, if a plaintiff gives consent for 
a particular medical procedure and the medical practitioner performs another or 
different treatment which the plaintiff did not consent to; then the medical practitioner’s 
conduct is beyond the scope of consent given and he may be held liable.397 Consent 
may be revoked orally398 or by conduct reflecting revocation, for example, leaving the 
hospital before an operation.399 If a patient revokes consent just before a procedure 
and the medical practitioner performs the procedure which is successful, he will still 
                                                                                                                                                                            
391  See Restatement Second of Torts § 50, illus 1 (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 166; Epstein Torts 41. 
392  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 113; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 164. 
393  See Restatement Second of Torts § 49 cmt a, illus 2 (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 164. 
394  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 113. 
395  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 168. 
396  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 164; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 118. 
397  For example, if a patient consents to the removal of excess skin and a breast augmentation is 
also performed, then the medical practitioner has gone beyond the scope of consent (see Perry 
v Shaw 88 Cal App 4th 658, 106 Cal Rptr 2d 70 (2001)). The same applies if the plaintiff 
consents to an operation on a particular body part (see Moos v United States (8th Cir 1995) 
255 F 2d 705 where the wrong leg was operated on); See also Conte v Girard Orthopaedic 
Surgeons Medical Group Inc 107 Cal App 4th 1260, 132 Cal Rptr 2d 855 (2003); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 169.  
398  Restatement Second of Torts § 892A (5) & cmt i (1979); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 170. 
399  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 170. 
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be held liable as his conduct is beyond the scope of consent.400 The defendant must 
however be given a reasonable opportunity to discontinue the conduct for which the 
consent has been revoked. In the instance where consent is revoked for a medical 
procedure, the medical practitioner must be given the opportunity to terminate the 
treatment in a medically safe manner.401 A person may refuse medical treatment and 
nutrition.402 A person may not consent to euthanasia.403 
 
Generally consent must be given by a person with capacity,404 but if a person lacks 
capacity due to for example minority or mental impairment, then another may have the 
authority to consent on his behalf. For example, a parent may give consent on behalf 
of a minor for serious medical treatment,405 to discipline the minor,406 or confine the 
minor.407 If a parent unreasonably refuses treatment for a child then the court may 
appoint a custodian for the child who will consent on the child’s behalf where 
necessary.408 If the defendant is aware of the incapacity, for example, if he is aware 
that he is dealing with a child he must be aware of the incapacity and may be held 
liable for torts to the child, even if the child gave consent.409 The courts do however 
accept that a child consents to minor physical contact, such as contact during sporting 
activities,410 or mature minors to some medical procedures.411 A minor is deemed to 
have capacity when he has the ability of that compared with the average person able 
                                                                                                                                                                            
400  Pugsley v Privette 220 Va 892, 263 SE 2d 69 (1980); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 170. 
401  Mims v Boland 110 Ga App 477, 138 SE 2d 902 (1964); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 171. 
402  See Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital Inc 497 NE 2d 115 (Mass 1986); Epstein Torts 46. 
403  See People v Kerkovian 517 NW 2d 293 (Mich 1993) dealing with physician assisted suicide; 
Epstein Torts 46-47. 
404  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 114. 
405  See for example, Roger v Sells 1936 178 Okl, 103, 61 P 2d 1018; Doerr v Movius 154 Mont 
346, 463 P 2d 477 (1970); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 115. 
406  See Houston v Kinder-Care Learning Centers Inc 208 Ga App 235, 239, 430 SE 2d 24, 27 
(1993). 
407  See RJD v Vaughan Clinic PC 572 So 2d 1225 (Ala 1990); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 164-165. 
408  See Brooklyn Hospital v Tores 1965 45 Misc 2d 914, 258 NYS 2d 621; Keeton et al Prosser 
and Keeton on torts 115. 
409  See Reavis v Slominski 250 Neb 711, 551 NW 2d 528 (1996); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 171. 
410  See Hellriegel v Tholl 69 Wash 2d 97, 417 P 2d 362 (1966) – where it was held that a teenager 
gave consent to “rough house play”; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 172. 
411  See re EG 133 II 2d 98, 549 NE 2d 322 (1989) where a minor was found competent to refuse 
life-saving treatment; Ohio v Akron Centre for Reproductive Health 497 US 502, 110 S Ct 2972 
111 LE 2d 405 (1990) where it was held that a female teenager can give consent to an abortion 
(a constitutional right); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 172. 
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to weigh the risks and benefits.412 Court approval may be required for serious 
procedures or treatments such as in instances of organ donation, withdrawing of life 
support, or compelling one to undergo life-saving treatment.413 In respect of 
incapacitated adults, guardians may give consent on their behalf if the treatment is 
generally beneficial for the incapacitated person. The guardian may refuse life-saving 
treatment as long as the guardian follows the “best interest” standard.414 If the 
treatment or procedure is not in the best interests of the minor or the adult, then the 
treatment or procedure is not sanctioned.415 Whether an adult has capacity is often 
determined by considering: whether a person is a threat to himself or others; is able 
to manage his day to day affairs; or is able to understand his rights and consequences 
of his conduct.416 If the incapacity was not known to the defendant, for example, where 
the plaintiff gives the appearance that he has capacity, then the defendant will not be 
held liable.    
 
There is no valid consent in instances where the plaintiff is coerced to consent417 as a 
result of the defendant’s misrepresentation,418 fraud,419 or material mistake which the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
412  See Gulf & Ship Island Railroad v Sullivan 1928, 155 Miss 1, 119 So 501, 62 ALR 191; Keeton 
et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 115. 
413  Even if the proposed life-saving treatment is against the parents’ wishes. See Miller v HCA Inc 
118 SW 3d 758 (Tex 2003); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 174. 
414  See Matter of Gordy 658 A 2d 613 (Del Ch 1994); DeGrella v Elston 858 SW 2d 698 (Ky 1993); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 174. 
415  See for example Curran v Bosze 141 Ill 2d 473, 566 NE 2d 1319, 4 ALR 5th 1163 (1990) where 
it was held that taking bone marrow from a four year child is not in the child’s best interests 
even if it is to save a sibling’s life. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 174 fn 
86. 
416  See Ayuluk v Red Oaks Assisted Living Inc 201 P 3d 1183, 1196 (Alaska 2009); Landmark 
Medical Center v Gauthier 635 A 2d 1145 (RI 1994); re Guardianship of Jackson 61 Mass App 
Ct 768, 814 NE 2d 393 (2004); McCarthy v Volkswagen of America Inc 55 NY 2d 543, 435 NE 
2d 1072, 450 NYS 2d 457 (1982); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 171-172. 
417  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 114. 
418  See for example, Duncan v Scottsdale Med Imaging Ltd 205 Ariz 306, 70 P 3d 435 (2003) 
where it was held that a healthcare provider who obtained consent for medication as a result of 
a misrepresentation would be held liable for battery; Kathleen K v Roni L 164 Cal Rptr 273, 
276, 277 (Ct App 1984) where the court upheld the plaintiff’s claim holding that  the defendant 
misrepresented that he was free from disease; Restatement Second of Torts § 892B (1979); 
Wall v Brim 5th Cir 1943, 138 F 2d 478; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 175 fn 
92; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 120. 
419  See for example, Maharam v Maharam 510 NYS 2d 104 (1986) where incurable genital Herpes 
was not disclosed; Janelsins v Button 102 Md App 30 648 A 2d 1039 (1994); Micari v Mann 
126 Misc 2d 422, 481 NYS 2d 1984 where an acting teacher persuaded students to engage in 
sexual acts which were purportedly required as part of their drama training; Taylor v Johnston 
985 P 2d 460 (Alaska 1999) where it was held that a physician purporting to act with the 
required licence when in fact he did not have the licence, may be held liable for battery when 
performing a medical procedure; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 175 fn 95. 
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defendant knew or should have known of.420 There is no valid consent where the 
defendant abuses his power or authority,421 or obtains consent under duress.422 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the requirements of consent is partially explicit 
and partially implicit. It is explicit where the consent is determined objectively, 
particularly in establishing apparent consent (not actual subjective consent) where the 
criterion of the reasonable person is used in determining the defendant’s reasonable 
belief and act of infringement of the person’s bodily integrity (reasonable reaction). It 
is submitted that the reasonable person used in this sense from a South African 
perspective produces similar results as applying the boni mores criterion in 
determining wrongfulness in South African law. Presuming the consent is valid, the 
plaintiff’s interests must have been reasonably infringed and the defendant must act 
reasonably in exercising his own rights, within the limits of the consent given. The 
infringement of the plaintiff’s right is unreasonable in instances where the defendant 
goes beyond the scope of defence. Consent may not be given for murder or 
euthanasia as it is not permitted by law and therefore unreasonable. Where the 
consent is revoked, the defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to 
discontinue infringing the plaintiff’s rights in a safe manner. A medical practitioner’s 
conduct is justified and reasonable in providing treatment in cases of emergency when 
consent cannot be obtained. Thus it must reasonably appear that a delay in treatment 
would result in serious harm and the standard of the reasonable person is applied in 
determining whether consent would have been given under the circumstances.  It is 
reasonable for a court or another to provide consent for a person who lacks capacity 
as such person lacks the capacity to give the required consent.   
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
420  For example, where the plaintiff consents to manipulation of her body believing that it is a 
therapeutic treatment when in fact it is for the sexual satisfaction of the defendant. The plaintiff 
is mistaken about the nature of the treatment, consent is lacking – see Bartell v State 106 Wis 
342, 82 NW 142 (1900); the Second Restatement of Torts § 55 (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 176; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 119. 
421  Often found in employer-employee, teacher-student, jailer-prisoner, doctor-patient, 
professional-client relationships. See discussion by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 178-180 as well as the cases referred to. 
422  Usually by threats of physical harm or by use of force which interfere with the plaintiff’s free will 
or choice. See Restatement Second of Torts § 58 (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 177-178; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 119-121. 
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3. The tort of negligence 
 
Negligence claims represent the majority of claims brought in tort before the courts in 
the United States of America.423  
 
Green and Cardi424 point out that wrongdoing and fault in the form of negligence are 
combined under the tort of negligence which is determined objectively. 
 
The requirements of the tort of negligence are: duty, breach of a duty, causation and 
harm.425 The Restatement Third of Torts426 states that the tort of negligence requires 
the element of fault in the form of negligence which is a “failure to use reasonable care 
under the circumstances”. The Restatement Second of Torts427 states that negligence 
is conduct which falls below the standard “established by law for the protection of 
others against unreasonable risk of harm”. 
 
A person is negligent if his conduct is perceived as “unreasonably risky” by a 
reasonable person. With regard to negligence the focus is on the conduct not the 
person’s state of mind as with intent.428 If the defendant acknowledges and 
deliberately decides to take a chance anyway without having a “purpose” or 
acknowledges with “substantial or virtual certainty” that his conduct will bring about the 
result, then he does not have tortious intent but negligence. For example, if a 
defendant does not know that he has HIV and infects his wife, he acts negligently and 
not intentionally; therefore he is liable in negligence and not battery.429 Traditionally 
negligence and intention were considered as separate concepts and mutually 
exclusive.430 The courts do recognise another category of fault distinct from intent and 
negligence, referred to as “reckless” or “willful or wanton misconduct” resembling both 
traits of negligence and intention thus blurring the distinction between the two. Two 
                                                                                                                                                                            
423  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 187. 
424  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 432. 
425  Goldberg and Zipursky 2001 Vand L Rev 658; Coleman 2012 Yale LJ 548.  
426  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 3 (2010). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 263. 
427  §282 (1965). 
428  Coleman 2012 Yale LJ 548. 
429  See Endres v Endres 968 A 2d 336, 338 (Vt 2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 58 fn 30. 
430  See District of Columbia v Chinn 839 A 2d 701 (DDC 2003); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 58. 
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elements are usually present. Firstly, besides the conduct creating unreasonable risk 
of harm to others, the conduct must create a high or very serious risk of harm, 
alternatively if there is a “lesser risk or less probable risk, than one that is easily 
avoided”.431 Secondly, the defendant must be aware (conscious) of the risk of harm to 
others but nevertheless proceed with the conduct (this would be referred to as intent 
in the form of dolus eventualis in South African law).432 Thus knowledge and 
appreciation of risk without substantial certainty falls short of intent.433 Classic 
examples demonstrating this third category of fault include drag racing on a highway434 
or driving while intoxicated (where the alcohol was consumed voluntarily prior to the 
driving) which constitutes “wanton misconduct”.435 If the risk of harm is obvious, the 
trier of facts may infer consciousness of the risk of harm.436 In addition, if there is 
“serious risk of substantial harm” then the trier of facts may find: “recklessness”; “willful 
or wanton misconduct”, or “deliberate indifference” usually synonymous with 
“recklessness”, but used more in cases dealing with civil rights.437 Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick438 explain that in respect of recklessness, the form of fault is not intention but 
when the risk of harm is high, reaching “virtual certainty” it becomes a form of intent. 
“Consciousness of risk” or “deliberate indifference” refers to an intention to take a risk 
but falls short of pure intent and does not form the basis of an intentional tort.439 Gross 
negligence generally refers to a higher degree of negligence when compared with 
ordinary negligence, usually where the conduct creates a very high degree of risk or 
where there is a bad state of mind coupled with a high degree of negligence.440 Often 
with regard to injuries sustained during sporting activities, liability in tort with reckless 
or wanton conduct can be shown.441 Certain statutes, for example, the so-called Good 
                                                                                                                                                                            
431  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 59. See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for 
Physical Harm) § 2 cmt e (2005). 
432  See chapter 3 para 4.2. 
433  See Cook v Kinzua Pine Mills Co 1956 207 Or 34, 293 P 2d 717; Restatement Second of Torts 
§ 13 cmt d (1965); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 36. 
434  See Lewis v Miller 374 Pa Super 515, 521 543 A 2d 590, 592 (1998); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 59. 
435  Booker Inc v Morrill 639 NE 2d 358, 361 (Ind Ct App 1994). 
436  See Farmer v Brennan 511 US 825, 114 S Ct 1970, 128 L Ed 2d 811 (1994); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 60. 
437  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 60. 
438  Hornbook on torts 60. 
439  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 60. 
440  See Franklin Corp v Tedford 18 So 3d 215, 240 (Miss 209); U-Haul Int’l Inc v Waldrip 380 SW 
3d 118 (Tex 2012); Cowan v Hospice Support Care Inc 268 Va 482, 603 SE 2d 916 (2004); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 240 fn 291. 
441  See Feld v Borkowski 790 NW 2d 72 (Iowa 2010); Angland v Mountain Creek Resort Inc 213 
NJ 573, 66 A 3d 1252 (2013); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 240 fn 294, 623. 
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Samaritan statutes,442 do not impose liability on health care professionals in instances 
of medical emergencies unless there was gross negligence, “reckless or wanton 
misconduct”.443 The same applies to drivers of emergency rescue vehicles, such as 
fire engines.444 With regard to willful, reckless or wanton conduct, the risk must be high 
and the cost of avoiding harm low, a so-called risk-utility or risk-benefit analysis is 
undertaken. In order for the defendant to be found negligent, he must have “conscious 
indifference” for the safety of others.445 The Restatement Third of Torts446 states that 
recklessness may be present where the actor has reason to know the risk and his 
failure to take precautionary measures shows the indifference to the risk.  
 
The defendant’s state of mind reflecting, for example bad motive, subjective beliefs or 
subjective knowledge, may be relevant in determining reasonableness of conduct but 
is not necessary to ground liability in the tort of negligence.447 Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick448 point out that with the intentional torts, for example battery, the defendant 
must have a “purpose to invade the plaintiff’s legally protected interest or a certainty 
that such an invasion will occur”. This is not to be equated with intentionally taking a 
risk of contact which is considered under the tort of negligence. Such intentional risk 
taking will have to be evaluated in order to determine whether it is indeed negligent by 
considering the seriousness of the risk of harm as well as the reasons for taking such 
risk. The authors refer to the example of a batter who is aware that when he hits a ball, 
it may lead to the breaking of a window outside the park, across the street, but the 
chances of that happening are slight. The batter intentionally takes a risk which falls 
short of the requirement of “substantial certainty”. Even though he intentionally takes 
the risk he is not intentionally causing the ball to land on another’s property. The batter 
                                                                                                                                                                            
442  The reasons for these statutes is to encourage health care providers’ to assist in emergency 
situations and so the standard of reasonable care is lowered from the reasonable profession to 
the reasonable person (see in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 523-524). 
The term “Good Samaritan” is self-explanatory where it is understood in normal usage referring 
to people who assist voluntarily out of good morals. 
443  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 241. 
444  See Saarinen v Kerr 84 NY 2d 494, 644 NE 2d 988, 620 NYS 2d 297 (1994); Estate of Graves 
v City of Circleville 922 NE 2d 201 (Ohio 2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
240 fn 298. 
445  See Estate of Rae v Murphy 956 A 2d 1266 (Del 2008); Morris v Leaf 534 NW 2d 388 (Iowa 
1995); Campbell v City of Elmira 84 NY 2d 505, 644 NE 2d 993, 620 NYS 2d 302 (1994); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 241 fn 303. 
446  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 2 cmt a (2010). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 241-242. 
447  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 200. 
448  Hornbook on torts 200-201. 
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is not liable for an intentional tort and whether he is liable in negligence depends on 
whether the risk is deemed an unreasonable risk. If the house is very close to the park, 
he may be negligent, but if it is some distance away then the risk is slight and the 
batter may not be negligent. 
 
In South African legal doctrine, recklessness would like “gross negligence” generally 
refer to a serious form of negligence but consciousness of the risk of harm to others 
while simultaneously proceeding with the conduct where the actor reconciles himself 
with the consequences of proceeding with the conduct is a form of intent known as 
dolus eventualis.449 However, in South African law, the distinction between a delict 
committed intentionally or negligently plays a much diminished role. As long as fault 
is present in either form it may, with the other established elements, constitute a delict, 
especially in instances where patrimonial loss has been caused.450 It is trite that the 
form of fault has a greater impact in criminal law where it may result in the difference 
between two crimes such as murder and culpable homicide. In American law 
“recklessness” is relevant where punitive damages are claimed.451 
 
As with negligence claims in English law, initially in American law, some kind of 
relationship, whether a special or contractual relationship, between the parties was 
required. With the intentional torts of trespass to the person (stemming from its 
historical development) a special or contractual relationship between the parties was 
not required.452 In the nineteenth century, claims for negligence were found even 
where no special or contractual relationship was present between the parties.453 This 
was the catalyst for the development of the tort of negligence to all kinds of 
circumstances.454 Currently the following elements which make up the prima facie 
case for negligence must be present in principle for a successful claim in the tort of 
negligence: the defendant must owe the plaintiff a duty of “reasonable care under the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
449  See chapter 3 para 4.2. 
450  However, intention plays an important part where the actio iniuriarum is instituted for most forms 
of personality infringement (see Neethling and Potgieter Delict 14). In exceptional instances 
involving patrimonial loss, for example, with regard to interference with contractual relations, 
intention may also be the requisite form of fault (see Neethling and Potgieter 323). 
451  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 60, 62. 
452  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 191. 
453  See Livingston v Adams 8 Cow 175 (NY 1828); Brown v Kendall 60 Mass 292 1850; Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 193-194. 
454  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 194. 
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circumstances”455 (also often referred to as “due care” or “ordinary care”); the 
defendant must breach such duty “by his unreasonably risky conduct” which deviates 
from the standard of the reasonable person;456 the defendant’s conduct must “in fact” 
cause the plaintiff’s harm (factual causation), must  also be the “proximate cause” of 
such harm; and there must be some form of legally recognised harm.457 Even though 
there may be a prima facie case in that all the elements present for the tort of 
negligence, in principle is present, a defence, for example, where an element relating 
to liability is absent (such as no duty is owed to the plaintiff), an affirmative defence 
(such as contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff, assumption of risk, or the 
applicability of the “statute of limitations”) or immunity from liability may exclude or limit 
liability.458 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the elements of the tort of negligence will now be 
considered in more detail. 
 
3.1 The existence of a duty of reasonable care 
 
The duty of care element demarcates the types of harms or risks a defendant may be 
responsible for.459 The Restatement Second of Torts460 provides that such duty should 
be “applicable to a general class of cases” including “categories of actors or patterns 
of conduct”.461 The duty of care owed by the defendant was a standard historically set 
by the community, in other words, “accepted community practices and 
expectations”.462 It depends on what the community considers as proper, a judgment 
on the risks encountered and the precautions to be taken ‒ what the community 
considers as reasonable conduct.463 A practice or custom must be based on the 
custom or practice in the area and it must be so well known that the defendant is aware 
                                                                                                                                                                            
455  See United States v Stevens 994 So 2d 1062 (Fla 2008); Werne v Exec Women’s Golf Ass’n 
158 NH 373, 969 A 2d 346 (2009); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 205.  
456  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 169-170. 
457  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 164-165.  
458  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 198. 
459  Geistfeld 2011 Yale LJ 149. 
460  §289 cmt b (1965).  
461  Geistfeld 2011 Yale LJ 147. 
462  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 191. See also Coburn v Lenox Homes Inc 1982 
186 Conn 370, 441 A 2d 620; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 193. 
463  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 193-194. 
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of it or should be aware of it.464 Epstein465 submits that when a customary practice is 
widely accepted: 
 
 “they enable people to coordinate their activities with greater ease … . Custom organizes 
 human experience into standardized modules that can be reshuffled and recombined, almost 
 at will … [and] are invoked to set the standard of reasonable care in ordinary negligence 
 actions”.466  
 
If a person’s conduct is in accordance with a custom, then it is usually evidence of 
reasonable conduct.467 Conduct that strays from custom is an indication of negligence 
but is not conclusive of negligence. Similarly conduct that conforms to custom is not 
conclusive of a lack of negligence.468 Thus from early on, the standard set for 
professionals such as doctors was the “care of doctors”.469 In Brown v Kendall470 the 
standard of negligence was set to the use of “ordinary care”471 which would vary 
according to the circumstances of the case.472 In this case, the adjudicator left the 
decision with the jury with the following instructions. 
 
 “If the defendant … was doing a necessary act, or one which it was his duty under the 
 circumstances of the case to do, and was doing it in a proper way; then he was not 
 responsible in this action, provided he was using ordinary care at the time … . If it was not a 
 necessary act; if he was not in duty bound to [act] … but might with propriety interfere or not 
 as he chose; the defendant was responsible for the consequences of the [act], unless it 
 appeared that he was in the exercise of extraordinary care, so that the accident was 
 inevitable, using the word inevitable not in a strict but a popular sense. 
 
 If, however, the plaintiff, when he met with the injury, was not in the exercise of ordinary care, 
 he cannot recover …”.473  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
464  See Rhine v Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Railway Co 1941 210 Minn 281, 297 NW 852; Munn 
v Hotchkiss School 24 F Supp 3d 155, 173 (D Conn 2014); Restatement Second of Torts § 290 
(1965); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 195. 
465  Torts 135-136. 
466  See Restatement Second of Torts § 295A (1965).   
467  Terry 1915 Harv L Rev 49. 
468  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) 11(1) and (2) 
(2010); Epstein Torts 136.  
469  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 191. 
470  60 Mass 292 1850. 
471  See Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev  2131ff who supports the use of the term ordinary care. 
472  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 194; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 163. 
473  Brown v Kendall 60 Mass 292 1850 293-294. 
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The plaintiff must prove that he is owed a duty of care by the defendant474 and whether 
he does indeed owe such duty of care is determined by the adjudicator, not the jury.475 
Keeton et al476 explain that the concept of a wrong is still applicable in criminal law and 
intentional torts with regard to transferred intent but when negligence became 
recognised as a separate tort, the idea of “duty” was born and a relationship between 
the plaintiff and the defendant was necessary before liability could ensue. This concept 
of duty is not an essential requirement in continental law and produces confusion in 
American law. 
 
 “Its artificial character is readily apparent; in the ordinary case, if the court should desire to 
 find liability, it would be quite as easy to find the necessary ‘relation’ in the position of the 
 parties toward one another, and hence to extend the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff. The 
 statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question ‒ whether the plaintiff’s 
 interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct.”  
 
Keeton et al477 state that the concept of duty as a result of the influence of English law 
is firmly embedded in American law, it cannot be discarded and a suitable substitute 
for it limiting the defendant’s liability in the manner it is applied has yet to be devised. 
However, duty is “only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the way to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection”. Keeton et al478 with 
regard to Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle, submit that ‒ it is vague and has no value 
as a guide to decisions. The courts in any event generally find a duty where 
“reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that it exists.”  
 
A duty may stem from the common law, legislation, a contract, or where the 
relationship of the parties is of such a nature that the law imposes a duty on the 
defendant to act reasonably in protecting the plaintiff.479 There is no numerus clausus 
of duties and new duties may be created by the courts based on principles or policy 
                                                                                                                                                                            
474  Romain v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co 483 Mich 18, 762 NW 2d 911 (2009); Lahm v Farrington 90 
A 3d 620 (NH 2014); MacGregor v Walker 322 P 3d 706 (Utah 2014); Giggers v Memphis Hous 
Auth 277 SW 3d 359 (Tenn 2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 203-204 fn 
1. 
475  See Beacon Residential Cmty Ass’n v Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP 59 Cal 4th 568, 327 P 
3d 850, 173 Cal Rptr 3d 752 (2014); Commerce Ins Co v Ultimate Livery Serv Inc 452 Mass 
639, 897 NE 2d 50 (2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 204. 
476  Prosser and Keeton on torts 356. See also Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 203-
204. 
477  Prosser and Keeton on torts 358. See also Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 204. 
478  Prosser and Keeton on torts 359. 
479  Lucero v Holbrook 288 P 3d 1228, 1232 (Wyo 2012) (referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 204). 
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considerations.480 In general, if the defendant “creates, maintains or continues” a risk 
of harm, he owes a duty of care.481 The standard of care usually applied by the courts 
is reasonable care under the circumstances482 but academic writers and courts 
sometimes use the term in different ways, with a different meaning483 referring to it as 
a conclusion as to whether conduct should be actionable, instead of referring to it as 
a general standard. For example, it is considered in a narrow sense as a specific duty 
to look before proceeding to the intersection. This relates to the breach of duty. 
Whether such conduct was negligent according to the standard of the reasonable 
person is for the jury and not the adjudicator to decide.484  
 
When courts determine the existence of a duty of care a number of factors have been 
considered, which include inter alia: policy considerations,485 a question of fairness ‒ 
whether reasonable people would agree that a duty of care exists;486 the relationship 
between the plaintiff and defendant;487 and reasonable foreseeability of harm. These 
factors have been criticised for being vague and reflecting opinions of adjudicators in 
particular or value judgments.488 Reasonable foreseeability of harm as a factor for 
determining a duty of care has been severely criticised on the following grounds: it is 
fact-specific and fact-related, it does not coincide with the broad policy assessments 
required for determining categories of duties; it shifts the focus away from policy 
considerations necessary in determining the duty of care; it unnecessarily duplicates 
the foreseeability of harm enquiry at the duty stage when it is already considered in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
480  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7(b) and § 37 cmt g (2010); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 205. 
481  Exceptions apply where a positive duty to act is expected from, for example, health care 
providers. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 204. 
482  See list of cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 205 fn 10-11, academic 
writers who agree and is approved of in the Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical 
and Emotional Harm) § 7 (2010).  
483  See Marshall v Burger King Corp 222 Ill 2d 422, 305 Ill Dec 897 (2006) where this was pointed 
out; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 205. 
484  See authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 206-208 fn 18-33. 
485  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 358; cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 208-209 fn 39. 
486  Casebolt v Cowan 829 P 2d 352, 356 (Co 1992) referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 208). 
487  See Marshall v Burger King Corp 222 Ill 2d 422, 305 Ill Dec 897 (2006); Goldberg and Zipursky 
1998 U Pa LR 1733; cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 209 
fn 40. 
488  See Cohen v Cabrini Med Ctr 94 NY 2d 639, 730 NE 2d 949, 709 NYS 2d 151 (2000); 
Stephenson v Universal Metrics Inc 251 Wis 2d 171, 642 NW 2d 158 (2002); Cardi 2009 Wake 
Forest L Rev 877, 886; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 209 fn 44-46. 
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determining negligence and the scope of liability (legal causation);489 if an adjudicator 
decides that a duty of care does not exist when considering foreseeability of harm as 
a factor, he takes over the role assigned to the jury; if the adjudicator states that the 
foreseeability of harm determined by the court is different from the manner in which it 
is determined by the jury, he inevitably brings about obscurity and confusion; and if 
the adjudicator uses foreseeability to deny a duty of care he uses it as an excuse to 
justify his prejudice or decision.490 Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick491 explain that The 
Restatement Third of Torts suggests that to overcome the use of vague factors three 
principles may be applied. Firstly, all persons owe a duty of care to not “create 
unreasonable risks to others”.492 Secondly, foreseeability of harm must be considered 
as it was traditionally considered under the breach of a duty and not in determining 
whether a duty of care exists.493 Thirdly, courts may consider specific policy factors in 
determining whether to impose a duty of reasonable care in exceptional cases.494 That 
is: if a duty of care would be in conflict with social norms;495 if a duty of care would be 
in conflict with other areas of the application of law;496 if a duty of care would be in 
conflict with the relationship between the parties or with the assertion of the 
defendant’s other legally recognised interests;497 where the determination of a duty of 
care would extend beyond the parameters of the court’s function;498 if a duty of care 
“would fail to defer to another branch of government”.499 The third principle 
                                                                                                                                                                            
489  Cardi 2005 Vand L Rev 739 submits that foreseeability should be left to the breach of duty and 
proximate cause stage. Determining foreseeability at those stages should be left with the jury 
which require “common sense, common experience, and application of the standards and 
behavioural norms of the community” (799-800). Bahadur 2011 No Ky L Rev 61ff submits that 
the foreseeability of harm should only be used to determine negligence at the breach of duty 
stage. 
490  See Cardi 2005 Vand L Rev 790-794. Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 212-213. 
491  Hornbook on torts 210-211. 
492  Except for extraordinary cases of physical harm. See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for 
Physical Harm) § 7(a) (2010). See Zipursky 2015 U Pa LR 2163 who states that the duty is 
universal “regardless of status or prior relationship”. 
493  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt j (2010).  
494  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt a (2010). See Geistfeld 2011 
Yale LJ 154. 
495  For example, imposing liability on hosts for providing alcohol to drunken guests who then drive 
in such drunken state. See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt c 
(2010). 
496  For example, where liability for economic loss should be dealt with in the law of contracts 
instead of tort law. See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt d (2010).  
497  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt e (2010).  
498  For example, where the plaintiff alleges that it is negligent to manufacture motor vehicles. See 
Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt f (2010).  
499  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt g (2010). Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 211.  
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recommended by the Restatement Third of Torts500 no doubt follows the third element 
of the three-fold test in the English tort of negligence in determining a duty which has 
also been adopted in South African law in determining wrongfulness.501 
 
Courts have over time formulated a no-duty rule under instances that commonly occur 
in practice. For example, providers of alcohol do not owe a duty of reasonable care 
towards consumers or third parties where the consumer subsequently causes harm to 
such third party.502 Thus the alcohol provider will not be held liable. On the other hand 
there are recognised categories of duties for omissions, pure economic loss and so 
on.503 Hospitals and prison authorities do have a duty of reasonable care to prevent 
suicide of patients or prisoners.504  
 
The influence of reasonableness on the element of a duty of reasonable care under 
the circumstances is explicit. In summary, reasonable care means ordinary care and 
does depend on under what circumstances the community expects the defendant to 
take reasonable care of the plaintiff’s interests and whether the plaintiff’s interests are 
entitled to protection by the law. Unlike English law, emphasis is not placed on a 
special relationship as a duty of care may be owed to anyone, it depends on whether 
reasonable people would agree and recognise that a duty of care exists. A duty may 
stem from the common law, contract, legislation or a relationship between the parties. 
Factors such as fairness, policy considerations and reasonable foreseeability of harm 
have been used to determine the existence of a duty. The development of American 
law with the Restatement Third of Torts clearly states that a duty may be owed to all 
persons not to create unreasonable risks and policy considerations may be considered 
under certain circumstances in determining whether it is reasonable to impose a duty 
of care on a person. It is apparent that the development of American law seems to 
diverge from English law in the sense that a special relationship is not necessarily 
                                                                                                                                                                            
500  See Gipson v Kasey 214 Ariz 141, 150 P 3d 228 (2007); Green 2008 South Cal L Rev 671, 
678; Twerski 2008 Hastings LJ 1, 22-23 referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 211.  
501  See chapter 3 para 3.2; chapter 4 para 3.2.2.1. 
502  See Rodriguez v Primadonna Co LLC 216 P 3d 793 (Nev 2009); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 371. 
503  See para 3.4 below. 
504  See Joseph v State 26 P 3d 459 (Alaska 2001); Hickey v Zezulka 439 Mich 408, 487 NW 2d 
106 1992; Cowan v Doering 111 NJ 451, 545 A 2d 159 (1988); Parvi v City of Kingston 41 NY 
2d 553, 560, 362 NE 2d 960, 965, 394 NYS 2d 161, 166 (1977); Bexiga v Havir Manufacturing 
Corp 60 NJ 402, 290 A 2d 281 (1972); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 372, 375. 
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required between the parties, reasonable foreseeability of harm is not required in 
determining the existence of a duty of reasonable care, and policy considerations in 
determining the existence of a duty of care are applied under certain circumstances. 
There is a clear trend to be more progressive in recognising a duty of care depending 
on the infringement of the interests of the plaintiff deemed worthy of protection by the 
law and a concerted effort to bring clarity and certainty in the law.  
 
3.2 The standard of reasonable care and capacity 
 
Once it is established that a duty of reasonable care is owed, the conduct of the parties 
is tested against the standard of a reasonable person under the circumstances.505 
Sometimes the standard must be adjusted to that of the reasonable professional, that 
is, the reasonable medical practitioner, etcetera and the adjudicator determines the 
standard that should be applied in the particular circumstances of the case.506 The jury 
must then be instructed of the applicable standard.507 The standard is determined with 
regard to risky behaviour and the defendant is generally liable for the unreasonable 
risks he created in relation to his conduct.508 It depends on whether the defendant’s 
conduct conformed to the “standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent 
risk”.509 The circumstances of the case encompass factors such as whether the danger 
encountered was slight or significant.510 Thus in general, the defendant or the plaintiff 
in cases of contributory fault must use ordinary, reasonable care commensurate with 
the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm under the circumstances.511  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
505  See Lugtu v Cal Highway Patrol 26 Cal 4th 703, 110 Cal Rptr 2d 528, 28 P 3d 249 (2011); 
Gossett v Jackson 249 Va 549, 457 SE 2d 97 (1995); Restatement Second of Torts § 282-283 
(1965); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and emotional Harm) §§ 7, 16(2) 
(2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 214. 
506  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 10(1) (2010). 
507  See Frazier ex rel Frasier v Norton 334 NW 2d 865 (SD 1983); Robinson v Lindsay 92 Wash 
2d 410, 598 P 2d 392 (1979); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 233. 
507  Roberts v Ring 173 NW 437, 438 (Minn 1919); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical 
Harm) § 9 cmt c (2005); Epstein Torts 119. 
508  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 215-216; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 169; Epstein Torts 129. 
509  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 356. 
510  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 216. 
511  See Doe v Andujar 297 Ga App 696,678 SE 2d 163 (2009); Anderson v Nashua Corp 246 Neb 
420, 519 NW 2d 275 (1994); Stewart v Motts 539 Pa 596, 654 A 2d 535 (1995); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 217. 
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A “special danger” is one factor considered when determining reasonableness of 
risks.512 If a defendant is faced with a sudden unforeseeable emergency which he did 
not create himself, the jury may consider such factor when determining the 
reasonableness of conduct.513 However, as of late some states514 disapprove of such 
instruction to the jury finding it unnecessary as the standard of the reasonable person 
applied to the circumstances of the cases is sufficient. The Restatement Third of 
Torts515 refers to an emergency situation as an event preventing reasonable persons 
from exercising the good judgment that will ordinarily be exercised. Although reference 
is often made to the doctrine of sudden emergency, it is strictly speaking not a doctrine 
but an application of the reasonable person test under the circumstances, that is, the 
reasonable person faced with an emergency.516 It is not a defence or an excuse and 
does not shift the burden of proof.517 Sudden unforeseen emergencies can arise in 
just about any context and is commonly referred to in motor vehicle accidents. Some 
emergencies must be anticipated, such as traffic or animals or obstacles suddenly 
appearing during travel on the road or highway.518 For example, a driver is faced with 
a sudden threat where a motor vehicle veers into his lane of travel and in order to 
avoid colliding with the motor vehicle, he swerves to the left or right striking the 
plaintiff’s vehicle or perhaps the plaintiff himself. Thus the defendant has a limited 
amount of time to decide how to react.519 It is common knowledge for example that if 
bees are disturbed they may sting520 or horses which are left on a road without 
supervision may become frightened and run causing harm.521 If the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                                            
512  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 218. 
513  See Willis v Westerfield 839, NE 2d 1179 (Ind 2006); Regenstrief v Phelps 142 SW 3d 1 (Ky 
2004); Kreidt v Burlington NRR 615 NW 2d 153 (ND 2000); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 218. 
514  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 197 point out that Illinois, Florida, Missouri and Kansas 
do not refer the jury to the doctrine while Mississippi has abolished the doctrine. See Knapp v 
Stanford, 329 So2d 196 (Miss 1980); Lyons v Midnight Sun Transp Servs Inc 928 P.2.d 1202 
(Alaska 1996); Wiles v Webb 329 Ark 108, 946 SW 2d 685 (1997); as well as other cases 
referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 221 fn 129.  
515  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 9 cmt b (2010). 
516  See Oberempt v Egri 1979, 176 Conn 652, 410 A 2d 482; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 218-219; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 197. 
517  Vahdat v Holland 274 Va 417, 424, 649 SE 2d 691, 695 (2007). 
518  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 197. 
519  See Petefish ex rel Clancy v Dawe 137 Ariz 570, 672 P 2d 914 (1983); Restatement Third of 
Torts (Liability for Physical and emotional Harm) § 9 (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 220. 
520  See Pehowic v Erie Lackawanna Railroad Co 3rd Cir 1970 430 F 2d 697; Keeton et al Prosser 
and Keeton on torts 198. 
521  See Griggs v Fleckenstein 1869 14 Minn 81, 14 Gil 62; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 198. 
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negligently creates the situation whether wholly or in part, wherefrom the emergency 
arises, he will not escape liability as he behaved unreasonably.522 
 
Certain statutes may in a sense lower the standard of reasonable care. For example 
motor vehicles responding to an emergency such as police motor vehicles, fire 
engines and ambulances etcetera may, according to certain legislation, disobey usual 
traffic rules but must still either drive with reasonable care523 or not recklessly in the 
circumstances.524  
 
The standard of the reasonable person is predominantly objective in that it applies 
generally to cases testing the parties’ conduct against the hypothetical model 
reasonable person. It is an external standard based on “what society demands 
generally of its members rather than upon the actor’s personal morality or individual 
sense of right and wrong”.525 The reasonable person has reasonable prudence;526 is 
cautious;527 has common knowledge (compared with common knowledge in the 
community at the time of the tort); normal perception and memory.528 The subjective 
part of the reasonable person standard relates to “additional intelligence, skill, or 
                                                                                                                                                                            
522  See Howen v Cahoon 236 Va 3, 372 SE 2d 363 (1988); Brown v Spokane Cty Fire Prot Dist 
No 1 100 Wash 2d 188, 668 P 2d 571 (1983); Restatement Second of Torts § 296(2) (1965); 
Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and emotional Harm) § 9 cmt d (2010); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 220 fn 122-123. 
523  See Torres v City of Los Angeles 58 Cal 2d 35, 372 P 2d 906, 22 Cal Rptr 866 (1962); Frazier 
v Common Wealth 845 A 2d 253, 260 (Pa Commw Ct 2004); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 221 fn 134.   
524  See Robins v City of Wichita 285 Kan 455, 172 P 3d 1187 (2007); Lenard v Dilley 805 So 2d 
175 (La 2002); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 221 fn 135. 
525  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 169. See McNeely v M & M Supermarkets Inc 1980 
154 Ga App 675, 269 SE 2d 483; Stewart v Jefferson Plywood Co 1970 255 Or 603, 469 P 2d 
783. 
526  See Trentacoast v Brussel 1980, 82 NJ 214, 412 A 2d 436; Swenson Trucking & Excavating 
Inc v Truckweld Equipment Co Alaska 1980, 604 P 2d 1113; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 174 (referring to the reasonable prudent person). 
527  See Massey v Scripter 1977 401 Mich 385, 258 NW 2d 44; St Mary’s Hosp Inc v Bynum, Ark 
1978, 573 SW 2d 914; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 174 (referring to the reasonably 
careful person). 
528  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 222, 229. See Restatement Second of Torts §§ 
289-290 (1965) which states that an ordinary person has knowledge that matches will burn, 
alcohol induces intoxication, gravity makes weight fall from a high place, a person can get 
electrocuted when coming into contact with a power line. Restatement Third of Torts (Liability 
for Physical and emotional Harm) § 12 (2010). For example, a reasonable person is not 
expected to know that fumes from gasoline are heavier than air (see Blakes v Blakes 517 So 
2d 444 (La Ct App 1987)). See also discussion by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
182-185 with regard to the difficulty with the question of how much knowledge the defendant is 
required to know; Epstein Torts 113- 114. 
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knowledge actually possessed by the individual”529 coupled with his “physical 
attributes” although they are still tested objectively.530 The Restatement Third of 
Torts531 refers to superior skills or knowledge as circumstances to be taken into 
account in determining whether the actor acted reasonably. For example, a race car 
driver who has superior driving abilities would be more skilled at avoiding an accident 
in an emergency situation than an ordinary driver. The race car driver may be held 
negligent for failing to use his superior skill in avoiding an accident.532 A person with a 
disability is judged according to the standard of the reasonable person with such 
disability.533 The Restatement Third of Torts534 with reference to conduct of persons 
with physical disability states that the standard of negligence is that of a “reasonably 
careful person with the same disability”. This standard is usually applied to persons 
who are blind, deaf and where there is a loss of a motor function.535 If a person is 
below average in “judgment knowledge, or skills” such as a learner driver, he is still 
judged according to the reasonable person standard.536 Professionals are expected to 
exercise reasonable care and to possess a minimum standard of knowledge and 
ability. If the professional professes further specialised knowledge or skills, the 
standard is adjusted to the specialised skill and knowledge held to the accepted 
practice, customary and usual standard of the relevant professional (doctor, dentist, 
accountant etcetera).537 A person who is “reasonably unaware” of his own disability or 
physical limitation, for example, where a person suffers a heart attack and was not 
aware of his condition; even though there is conduct, he may not be held liable 
because the heart attack was unforeseeable and he was therefore not negligent.538 
                                                                                                                                                                            
529  See Restatement Second of Torts §§ 289, 290 cmt f, 299 cmt f (1965).   
530  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 222. 
531  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 12 (2010). See Sinai v Polinger Co 498 A 2d 520 
(DC 1985); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 230-231. 
532  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 12 (2010); Green 
and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 484. 
533  See Fink v City of New York 206 Misc 79, 132 NYS 2d 172 (Sup Ct 1954); Restatement Second 
of Torts § 283C (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 223; cases referred to 
Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 176 fn 23 in respect of people with disabilities, who 
are blind and deaf. 
534  (Liability for Physical Harm and Emotional Harm) § 11(a) (2010). 
535  Epstein Torts 121. 
536  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 10 cmt b (2010); 
Epstein Torts 114. 
537  See discussion by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 185-193 as well as the authority 
referred to. See para 3.4.2 below. 
538  See Baker v Joyal 4 AD 3d 596, 771 NYS 2d 269 (2004); Hancock-Underwood v Knight 670 
SE 2d 720 (Va 2009); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 
11(b) (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 224. 
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The same applies where a person sustains a stroke, epileptic fit or faints.539 A person 
who is aware of his condition, disability or physical impairment, or can reasonably 
foresee that he is prone to such impairment, for example, a person prone to seizures 
may be held negligent for not controlling the seizures.540 The portion of the test 
referring to the circumstances of the case “brings flexibility and common sense to the 
standard”.541 
 
Generally children under the age of five are deemed incapable of being negligent.542 
In a few states, children under seven years of age may not be held liable in tort and 
children from seven to fourteen years of age are presumed incapable of negligence 
which may be rebutted.543 The conduct of a minor is not judged according to the 
standard of the reasonable person or the reasonable child of the same age but with 
the care of a reasonable person “of his own age, intelligence, and experience in similar 
circumstances” (a more subjective standard).544 Thus liability in tort will depend on 
whether in view of the child’s own age, experience and intelligence he acted 
reasonably.545 The age of the child, maturity, knowledge, prior experience, whether he 
can understand the consequences of his actions (accountability), as well as other 
                                                                                                                                                                            
539  See Moore v Preenell 1977 38 Md App 243, 379 A 2d 1246 and Frechette v Welch (1st Cir 
1980), 621 F 2d 11 (with regard to an unforeseeable blackout); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 162. 
540  See Goodrich v Blair 132 Ariz 459, 646 P 2d 890 (1982) where a driver was prone to heart 
attacks; Lutzkovitz v Murray 339 A 2d 64, 93 ALR 3d 321 (Del 1975) in respect of the risk of 
having blackouts; Howle v PYA/Monarch Inc 288 SC 586, 344 SE 2d 157 (1986) in respect of 
fatigue and drowsiness due to insulin resistance. Thus where the defendant is aware of his 
condition and continues to drive or operate machinery thereafter causing an accident or harm, 
then such person’s conduct is considered unreasonable. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 225 fn157-159. 
541  See Johnson v Clay 1978 38 NC App 542, 248 SE 2d 382; Restatement Second of Torts § 283 
(1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 223; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 175. 
542  See Mastland Inc v Evans Furniture Inc 498 NW 2d 682 (Iowa 1993); Price v Kitsap Transit 125 
Wash 2d 456, 886 P.2d 556 (1994); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 
10(b) (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 233; Epstein Torts 117.  
543  Georgia has by a statute exempted children under 13 years of age from liability in tort. See 
Horton v Hinley 261 Ga 863, 413 SE 2d 199 (1992); Savage Indus v Duke 598 So 2d 856 (Ala 
1992); Queen Ins v Hammond 374 Mich 655, 132 NW 2d 792 (1965); Steele v Holiday Inns Inc 
626 So 2d 593 (Miss 1993); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 233; authority 
referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 179 fn 58; Epstein Torts 117. 
544  See First Nat’l Bank of Ariz v Dupree 136 Ariz 296, 665 P 2d 1018 (Ct App 1983); Lehmuth v 
Long Beach Unified Sch Dist 53 Cal 2d 544, 348 P 2d 887, 2 Cal Rptr 279 (1960); Restatement 
Second of Torts § 283A (1965); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm) §§ 8 (2), 10 (a) (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 233 fn 224; cases 
referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 179 fn 47. 
545  See cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 233 fn 227-280. 
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surrounding circumstances are taken into consideration.546 A child with a mental 
impairment or incapacity is not expected to act with the care of a child without such 
impairment or incapacity.547 Similarly, a child with the experience and intelligence 
equivalent to that of an adult will be expected to act like the reasonable person.548 A 
child’s conduct may be judged according to the standard of the reasonable person 
when a child undertakes a dangerous activity usually undertaken by adults.549 For 
example, the courts have applied the reasonable person test to children operating a 
motorised vehicle,550 tractor,551 boat,552 and a snowmobile.553 The reasonable person 
standard however does not apply to minors who were involved in hunting accidents 
where guns were involved,554 or where minors ride bicycles.555  
 
With regard to the elderly, if an elderly driver is not able to respond to accidents as a 
result of a decline in his mental or physical abilities then he should not be driving as 
he poses a risk to others.556 
 
A mental impairment, incapacity or disability will generally not lead to the exclusion of 
liability in the tort of negligence or the intentional torts.557 Keeton et al558point out that 
                                                                                                                                                                            
546  See Hudson v Old Guard Ins 3 A 3d 246 (Del 2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 233 fn 236.  
547  See Lafayette Par Sch Bd v Cormier ex rel Cormier 901 So 2d 1197 (La Ct App 2005); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 234.  
548  Dorais v Paquin 113 NH 187, 304 A 2d 369 (1973); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 234.  
549  See Restatement Second of Torts § 283(A) (1965); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm) § 10(c) (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
236; Epstein Torts 118. 
550  See Adams v Lopez 407 P 2d 50 (NM 1965) in respect of a motorized scooter; Pritchard v 
Veterans Cab Co 63 Cal 2d 727, 408 P 2d 360, 47 Cal Rptr 904 (1965); other cases referred 
to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 236 fn 251; Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on torts 179. 
551  See Jackson v McCuiston 448 SW 2d 33 (Ark 1969); Goodfellow v Coggburn 98 Idaho 202, 
203-204, 560 P 2d 873 (1977). 
552  Dellwo v Pearson 259 Minn 452, 107 NW 2d 859, 97 ALR 2d 866 (1961). 
553  See Robinson v Lindsay 92 Wash 2d 410, 598 P 2d 392 (1979); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 236; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 179. 
554  See Purtle v Shelton 474 SW 2d 123 (Ark 1971) where the reasonable person standard was 
not applied, the minors age (a seventeen-year-old child) was considered. 
555  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 8 cmt f (2005); Epstein Torts 119. 
556  Roberts v Ring 173 NW 437, 438 (Minn 1919); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical 
Harm) § 9 cmt c (2005); Epstein Torts 119. 
557  See McGuire v Almy 8 NE 2d 760 (Mass 1936); Polmatier v Russ 537 A 2d 468 (Conn 1988); 
Williams v Kearby 775 P 2d 670 (Kan App 1989); Restatement Second of Torts § 895J (1979); 
Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 11(c) (2010); Epstein 
Torts 50. 
558  Prosser and Keeton on torts 177.    
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this was the way the law developed and the person with a mental impairment or insane 
person is still judged according to the standard of the reasonable person.559 Holding 
insane persons to such a standard that they cannot meet has been criticised.560 The 
reasons for holding them to the reasonable person standard include that it is difficult 
to differentiate between one’s bad judgment and mental incapacity; that it is fair to the 
plaintiff to receive compensation for harm done to him; that it will encourage those who 
are charged with the care of the mentally incapacitated to take care of them and control 
them with more care;561 and that it is costly to determine the capabilities of a person 
with a mental impairment.562 Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick563 refer to two cases that 
have applied as exceptions to the general rule. In one of them a court in Wisconsin564 
held that a person cannot be held liable for conduct as a result of a sudden 
unforeseeable insanity and in the other a court in New York565 found a defendant who 
became insane “as a result of extraordinary efforts to protect the plaintiff” not liable. 
The standard of care applied to a mentally incapacitated person, whether he is 
suffering a mental impairment566 or insanity567 etcetera, remains the standard of the 
reasonable person, not the standard of the reasonable person affected by a mental 
deficiency or insanity etcetera. Where comparative or contributory fault is involved, the 
courts may lower the standard and the plaintiff’s incapacity due to the mental condition 
is considered as a subjective factor in the circumstances in judging his behaviour.568  
 
It is possible that a patient, who for example, suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, may 
not be held liable in negligence for harm sustained by his caregiver as the caregiver 
                                                                                                                                                                            
559  See for example, Kuhn v Zabostsky 1967, 9 Ohio St 2d 129, 224 NE 2d 137; Jolley v Powell 
Fla App 1974 299 So 2d 647; Restatement Second of Torts § 283B cmt b (1965); cases cited 
by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts177 fn 32; Epstein Torts 120. 
560  See Ague 1956 Dick L Rev 211; Curan 1960 Ohio St LJ 52; Alexander & Szasz 1967 Notre 
Dame L Rev 24; Seidelson 1981 Geo Wash L Rev 17; Ellis 1981 Am Bar Found Res J 1079; 
Note 1972 39 Tenn L Rev 705; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 177 fn 33. 
561  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 177. 
562  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 483. 
563  Hornbook on torts 225-226. See also Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 178. 
564  Breunig v American Family Ins 45 Wis 2d 536, 173 NW 2d 619, 49 ALR 3d 179 (1970).  
565  Williams v Hays 157 NY 541, 52 NE 589 (1899).  
566  Vaughan v Menlove 3 Bing NC 468, 132 Eng Rep 490 (CP 1837); Restatement Third of Torts 
(Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 12 cmt b (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 226 fn 168. 
567  See Creasy v Rusk 730 NE 2d 659 (Ind 2000); Restatement Second of Torts §§ 283B cmt b, 
895J (1979); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 226 fn 169. 
568  See for example, Emory University v Lee 1958, 97 Ga App 680 104 SE 2d 234; Restatement 
Second of Torts § 464 cmt g; other cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 178 fn 39. 
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owes a duty of reasonable care to the patient.569 A person who voluntarily consumes 
alcohol570 is still judged according to the standard of the sober reasonable person.571 
The reason for this is that it would be a common excuse for a defendant to raise 
intoxication. Drunkenness is not encouraged in society and a person who consumes 
alcohol should be held accountable for the consequences of consuming alcohol and 
causing harm.572 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the standard of the reasonable person whether it 
is lowered or raised, is explicit. It is reasonable to lower the standard when dealing 
with: younger children; persons with physical disabilities; persons who are unaware of 
their own disability or physical limitation (as the condition was reasonably 
unforeseeable); and persons attending to emergency situations. The reasonable 
person standard refers to care usually expected, common, normal, standard, or 
ordinary. Irrespective of whether the standard is lowered or raised, reasonable care 
must still be applied, even for drivers of emergency vehicles who must drive 
reasonably and not recklessly. Where the standard is raised due to the person’s 
professional skill, knowledge or experience, it is reasonable to judge a person 
according to such raised standard. The standard is objective in that it applies uniformly 
to conduct but is also subjective where a person’s age, knowledge, intelligence, 
experience, skill, physical attributes, and mental capacity is considered in determining 
the standard to be applied and whether the actor acted reasonably according to the 
standard. The anomaly applies to persons with mental illness or mental impairment 
where such subjective illness or impairment is not considered in adjusting the standard 
or nullifying the requirement of conduct. Such persons are in a sense held strictly liable 
and even though many reasons have been provided and holding such person to the 
reasonable person standard has been criticised; the most plausible reason is that it is 
fair and reasonable to compensate the innocent plaintiff. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
569  See Gregory v Cott 59 Cal 4th 996, 1000, 331 P 3d 179, (2014); Berberian v Lynn 179 NJ 290, 
845 A 2d 122 (2004); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 226 fn 172. 
570  A person who is involuntarily intoxicated is not judged according to the reasonable person 
standard. See Davies v Butler 95 Nev 763, 602 P 2d 605 (1979); Restatement Third of Torts 
(Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 12 cmt c (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 231 fn 209.   
571  See for example, Hamilton v Kinsey Ala 1976 337 So 2d 344; Haber v County of Nassau 2nd 
Cir 1977, 577 F 2d 322 in respect of drugs; Restatement Second of Torts § 283C cmt d (1965); 
Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 178; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
232; Epstein Torts 122. 
572  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 178. 
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3.3 Breach of a duty of reasonable care   
 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick573 submit that a violation of a statute574 is deemed 
negligence per se if the violation caused “the type of harm the statute was intended to 
avoid, to a person within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect”.575 
Generally where there is no excuse, the violation of the statute establishes 
negligence.576 An inference of negligence can be rebutted by providing evidence that 
the defendant’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.577 The legislature 
supersedes the common law as long as it meets constitutional standards.578 Violations 
of the various statutes fall beyond the scope of this study and will not be discussed 
further. 
 
The second element of the tort of negligence, breach of a duty of reasonable care, 
relates to determining fault in the form of negligence.579 Negligence is established if 
the defendant fails to exercise reasonable care and protect the plaintiff from risk of 
harm under the circumstances.580 In terms of contributory negligence where the 
plaintiff’s negligence is considered, the standard of reasonable care also applies and 
will be referred to where appropriate. Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick,581 explain that the 
tests used to determine negligence in the United States of America are multifaceted 
                                                                                                                                                                            
573  Hornbook on torts 243. 
574  See Nelson 1999 Buff L Rev 215 who submits that violation of a regulation or ordinance in the 
state of New York was not considered negligence per se but established evidence of 
negligence. 
575  See Martin v Herzog NE 814 (NY 1920) where the rule was laid out and then followed in many 
cases. See for example, Michalek v United States Gypsum Co 16 F Supp 708, 709 (WDNY 
1936); Coe v City of New York 265 NYS 10, 12 (App Div 1935); Wager v State 10 NYS 2d 814 
(App Div 1923); further cases cited by Nelson 1999 Buff L Rev 153 fn 166 with respect to New 
York cases. 
576  See Martin v Herzog 126 NE 814 (NY 1920); Rong Yao Zhou v Jennifer Mall Restaurant Inc 
534 A 2d 1268 (DC 1987); Duphily v Delaware Elec Co-op Inc 662 A.2d 821 (Del 1995); 
Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 14 (2010); Wells 1990 
Mich L Rev 2356-2357; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 243-261; Epstein Torts 
147. For example, the state of Washington follows the negligence per se rule where there is a 
violation of a statute (Wash Rev Code 5.40.050). 
577  See Kalatta v Anheuser-Busch Co Inc 581 NE 2d 656 (Ill 1991); Restatement Third of Torts 
(Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 14 cmt c (2010); Epstein Torts 147. 
578  Thayer, Ezra, Ripley 1914 Harv L Rev 317. See Epstein Torts 147. 
579  See Simons 2008 Loy LA L Rev 1181. 
580  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 3 (2010); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 263. 
581  Hornbook on torts 263. 
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and include: “an unstructured weighing of risks and utilities”;582 the so-called Hand 
formula which follows a “more structured weighing of risks and utilities”; violation of a 
statute, for example, violation of a speed limit may serve as an indication of 
negligence;583 and customs or practices followed in the community.584 Specific 
negligent conduct must be proven or a reasonable inference of negligent conduct from 
the facts must be drawn.585 For example, if the plaintiff was involved in a rear end 
accident and suffered a neck injury where there was no pre-existing neck injury, the 
jury may reasonably infer that the neck injury was caused due to the accident.586 
Compliance with a statute does not automatically mean that there is no negligence 
and the trier of the facts may find that even though there was statutory compliance, 
the defendant should have done more in order to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances.587 For example, although the statute states a speed limit of sixty miles 
per hour, driving at such a speed where small children are present or during bad 
weather will not automatically result in a conclusion of lack of negligence due to driving 
within the speed limit.588  
 
Foreseeability of harm is necessary in establishing negligence but is not sufficient as 
a stand-alone factor. The defendant must actually foresee the risk of harm or a 
reasonable person in a similar position as the defendant would have foreseen the risk 
of harm.589 The defendant’s conduct will be deemed unreasonable and negligent when 
he “knew of the risk of foreseeable harm or should have known” (constructive 
                                                                                                                                                                            
582  Epstein Torts 129 submits that there is a tendency of the appellate courts to resort to the Hand 
Formula but some legal writers point out that many courts do not ‒ see Allen and Rosenberg 
2002 Chi-Kent L Rev 700-719; Wright 2003 TIL 151-152; Kelley and Wendt 2002 Chi-Kent L 
Rev 618-622 who point out that in many courts in the United States of America, the juries are 
not instructed to determine negligence according to the Hand Formula but rather that 
negligence should be determined by the standard of exercising ordinary care according to the 
conduct of the reasonable person. See Porat 2011 Yale LJ 84 fn 1; Geistfeld 2011 Yale LJ 151. 
583  See Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2164. 
584  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 263. 
585  See McQuaig v Tarrant 269 Ga App 236, 603 SE 2d 751 (2004); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 264. 
586  See Foddrill v Crane 894 NE 2d 1070 (Ind Ct App 2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 326. 
587  See Restatement Second of Torts § 288C (1965); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm) § 16 (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 289. 
588  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 289. 
589  See Emanuel v Great Falls Sch Dist 351 Mont 56, 209 P 3d 244 (2009); Miller v David Grace 
Inc 212 P 3d 1223 (Okla 2009); Behrendt v Gulf Underwriters Ins Co 318 Wis 2d 622, 768 NW 
2d 568 (2009); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 265. 
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negligence).590 Reasonable foreseeable harm is harm that is probable or most likely 
to occur, which may justify the need to take precautionary measures to prevent the 
harm occurring.591 At the breach of a duty stage, reasonable foreseeability of harm to 
a person is generally foreseeable while at the proximate cause stage, the question of 
reasonable foreseeability is phrased narrowly ‒ was the type of harm that ensued 
foreseeable.592   
 
Holmes593 emphasised that the standard of determining whether conduct is 
unreasonable or not is objective and that the risk of harm must be reasonably 
foreseeable by the defendant.594 Terry595 proposed the idea of balancing risks of 
conduct against its utility, thus it depended not only on unreasonable conduct but on 
unreasonable risky conduct. He submits that the “essence of negligence is 
unreasonableness; due care is simply reasonable conduct”.596 Terry refers to five 
factors upon which the reasonableness of a given risk may depend upon: the 
magnitude of the risk, the value of the object placed at risk, the value of the collateral 
object for which the risk is undertaken, the benefit of the risk, and the probability that 
the collateral object would not be achieved if the risk was not taken. In order to illustrate 
these factors he refers to Eckert v Long Island R R Co597 where the deceased saw a 
child on a railroad track in danger of being run over by an approaching train. The 
deceased saved the child but was killed by the train. The jury found that the deceased 
was not contributorily negligent. Terry598 submits that the question was whether the 
deceased had exposed himself to the unreasonable risk of death and in determining 
this answer, the following is considered: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
590  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 265. See Wal-Mart Stores Inc v Spates 186 SW 
3d 566 (Tex 2006). 
591  See Edwards v Honeywell Inc 50 F 3d 484, 491 (7th Cir 1995); Ethyl Corp v Johnson 345 Ark 
476, 49 SW 3d 644 (2001); Jutzi-Johnson v United States 263 F 3d 753, 756 (7th Cir 2001); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 265. 
592  See CH v Los Lunas Schools Bd of Educ 852 F Supp 2d 1344 (DNM 2012); BR & CR v West 
275 P 3d 228 (Utah 2012); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 267. 
593  Common law 94, 108; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 195. 
594  See The Nitro-Glycerine Case 82 US 15 Wall 524, 536-537 (1872); Dunnaway v Duquesne 
Light Co 423 F 2d 66, 71 (3rd Cir 1970) where defendants were not held liable for unforeseen 
risks. See discussion of these cases by Shapo Tort 121. 
595  1915 Harv L Rev 40 ff. See Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2151; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 196. 
596  Terry 1915 Harv L Rev 42. 
597  43 NY 502 (1871). 
598  1915 Harv L Rev 43-44. 
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 “(1) The magnitude of the risk was the probability that he would be killed or hurt. That was 
 very great. 
 (2) The principal object was his own life, which was very valuable. 
 (3)The collateral object was the child’s life, which was also very valuable. 
 (4) The utility of the risk was the probability that he could save the child. That must have been 
 fairly great, since he in fact succeeded. Had there been no fair chance of saving the child, the 
 conduct would have been unreasonable and negligent. 
 (5) The necessity of the risk was the probability that the child would not have saved himself by 
 getting off the track in time.  
 
 Here, although the magnitude of the risk was very great and the principal object very 
 valuable, yet the value of the collateral object and the great utility and necessity of the risk 
 counterbalanced those considerations, and made the risk reasonable. The same risk would 
 have been unreasonable, had the creature on the track been a kitten, because the value of 
 the collateral object would have been small.” 
 
Terry599 still generally refers to the standard of the reasonable person and states that 
the test of reasonableness is what the standard man would do in the circumstances 
or the judgment call he would make in a similar position. Thus whatever a standard 
man would do is reasonable and “all the law requires of a man is reasonable conduct”. 
Fletcher600 submits that the reasonableness of a risk determines whether the plaintiff 
is entitled to compensation and whether the defendant should be held liable. 
Reasonableness is determined by weighing costs and benefits which reflects fairness. 
He601 submits that reasonableness involves: “defining the risk, assessing its 
consequences, balancing costs and benefits”. Zipursky602 points out that Terry’s 
analysis focuses on “what is being risked and its value” as well as “at what costs and 
with what prospects”. Gilles603 submits that Terry’s ideas focus on social community 
values and value judgments where conflicting interests are weighed. Terry’s ideas 
were adopted in the First,604 Second605 and Third Restatements.606 The Restatements 
accept an unstructured risk-utility approach in determining negligence as part of the 
reasonable person test.607 The utility of conduct is weighed against the risk of harm.608 
Thus the reasonable person balances risks and benefits in his decision making and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
599  1915 Harv L Rev 47-48. 
600  1972 Harv L Rev 542, 550. 
601  Fletcher 1972 Harv L Rev 573. 
602  2015 U Pa L Rev 2152. 
603  2001 Vand L Rev 828. 
604  See Restatement First of Torts §§ 291-293 (1934) where it is stated that in determining 
negligence there must a balance between the extent of the risk and the utility of the conduct 
creating it. See Schwartz 1997 Tex LR 1819 fn 135.  
605  See Restatement Second of Torts §§ 283, 291 (1965). 
606  Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2151. 
607  Gilles 2001 Vand L Rev 815. 
608  See Barker v Lull Eng’g Co 573 P 2d 443, 456 (Cal 1978); Shapo Tort 125. 
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whether his conduct is unreasonably risky or not.609 Practical reasoning is undertaken 
in avoiding accidents.610 The Restatement Second of Torts611 states that a risk is 
unreasonable and an act negligent “if the risk is of such magnitude” that it outweighs 
“what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is 
done”. The risk-utility analysis suggested in the Restatement Second of Torts depends 
on the “social value which the law attaches to the interest advanced or protected by 
the conduct”, the chances of those interests being advanced or protected and whether 
there was a less risky alternative course of conduct available.612 The Restatement 
Third of Torts613 submits that a person acts negligently if he does not exercise 
reasonable care under the circumstances. The Restatement Third of Torts614 further 
elaborates on the balancing approach, in that the following factors are at least 
informally considered when evaluating whether the conduct is negligent: the 
foreseeable likelihood of the harm as well as the foreseeable extent of the harm ‒ the 
magnitude of the risk (disadvantages) is weighed against the burden (utility or benefit 
of the defendant’s conduct) of reducing or avoiding the risk of harm (advantages). 
Thus conduct is negligent if the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.615 An 
omission in the form of failure to warn of harm may be deemed negligent as giving a 
warning costs little.616 The Hand Formula and the Restatements’ are more concerned 
with the burden of reducing or eliminating the risk.617 
 
The more structured way of evaluating whether conduct is negligent from an economic 
point of view is to weigh the plaintiff’s costs of harm or loss sustained, against the 
defendant’s cost in avoiding or reducing the harm. The more structured approach was 
formulated by Judge Hand in United States v Caroll Towing Co618 and is widely 
                                                                                                                                                                            
609  Gilles 2001 Vand L Rev 824. 
610  Gilles 2001 Vand L Rev 825. 
611  §291 (1965). 
612  Restatement Second of Torts §292 cmt b, cmt d (1965).  
613  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) §3 (2010). See Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic 
questions of tort law 480. 
614  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 3 (2010). See Doe Parent’s No 1 v State Dept of 
Educ 100 Haw 34, 58 P 3d 545 (2002); Dauzat v Curnest Guillot Logging Inc 995 So 2d 1184, 
1186-1187 (La 2008); Gilhooley v Star Mkt Co Inc 400 Mass 205, 508 NE 2d 609 (1987); 
Gaudreau v Clinton Irrigation Dist 30 P3 d 1070, 1074 (Mont 2001); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 268 fn 30. 
615  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 480. 
616  See Happel v Wal-Mart Stores Inc 199 Ill 2d 179, 766 NE 2d 1118, 262 Ill Dec 815 (2002); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 268 fn 33. 
617  Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2152.  
618  159 F 2d 169 (2nd Cir 1947). 
461 
 
referred to as the “Hand formula”.619 In this case, a barge carrying flour owned by the 
United States of America broke loose from a pier. It lost its cargo and sank. At the 
time, no one was on board the barge and the towing company alleged that if there had 
been a care taker (bargee) on board the barge, at all times, the loss or damage could 
have been prevented. Judge Hand stated: 620  
 
 “the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a 
 function of three variables: (1) The probability that [the barge] will break away; (2) the 
 gravity of  the resulting injury, if [the barge] does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. 
 Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the 
 probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is 
 less than L multiplied by P: i. e., whether B ˂ PL”. 
 
Therefore if the burden is less than the probability multiplied by the injury, there may 
be negligence. But if the burden is greater than or equal to the probability multiplied 
by the injury, then there may not be negligence. It was held that in such circumstances 
“it was a fair requirement” that a caretaker should have been aboard the barge during 
day time working hours. The barge broke loose during working day time hours and 
there was no valid excuse for the caretaker’s absence.621 Negligence was present ‒ 
only harm that is reasonably foreseeable, reasonably preventable with reasonable 
care, and within the scope of the duty of care is considered.622 The risk of harm may 
be interpreted as including harm to the defendant as well as others.623  
 
Much has been written on the positive economic theory624 of tort law in general625 and 
the Hand Formula for determining negligence, with academic writers either embracing 
                                                                                                                                                                            
619  Green submits that the First Restatement of Torts may have influenced Judge Hand in 
formulating the algebraic Hand Formula (referred to by Gilles 2001 Vand L Rev 815).  
620  United States v Caroll Towing Co 159 F 2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir 1947). 
621  United States v Caroll Towing Co 159 F 2d 169, 174 (2nd Cir 1947). 
622  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 271-272. 
623  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 3 cmt b (2010); 
 Cooter and Porat 2000 J Leg Stud 19; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 272.  
624  In general Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2361 explains that a positive legal theory establishes the 
standard used to resolve legal problems while a normative legal theory evaluates whether the 
standard is in accordance with standards that should be employed in view of the “larger 
normative metatheory”. 
625  See for example, Cooter and Ulen Law and economics; Landes and Posner The economic 
structure of tort law; Posner Economic analysis of law; Shavell The economic analysis of 
accident law; Kaplow and Shavell 2001 Harv LJ 961; Coase 1960 J Law & Econ1; Pigou The 
economics of welfare; Polinsky An introduction to law and economics. 
462 
 
it fully,626 disagreeing with it627 or at the very least acknowledging its value.628  
Schwartz629 refers to two broad groups of tort academics, those who favour the aim of 
deterrence630 commonly expounded in the economic efficiency approach631 and those 
who support the aim of corrective justice,632 which encompasses deontological 
                                                                                                                                                                            
626  See in general Calabresi The costs of accidents 144-160; Posner 1972 J Leg Stud 29ff; Porat 
2011 Yale LJ 82ff; Levmore 1990 J Leg Stud 691; Tullock 1981 Int’l Rev L & Econ 51. 
627  See for example, Wright 1987 Chi-Kent L Rev 578 who submits that tort law is about rights and 
responsibilities not about efficiency; Calnan Justice and tort law 5 refers to the economic 
approach as a craze which has faded; Epstein 1974 J Leg Stud 169; 1987 Ohio St L J 469;  
Fletcher 1972 Harv L Rev 537-539; Kelley 1990 Clev St L Rev 315; Coleman 2012 Yale L J 
541ff. Coleman Yale LJ  548-549 submits that “[i]n spite of what economists of law would have 
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wrong and of harm. … Harms and wrongs have a normative valence that costs do not. The 
concept of cost may be all that the accountant or the economist needs, but it is not the concept 
the law of torts relies on as a basis of repair or recourse”. See also Schwartz 1997 Tex L Rev 
1806-1807. 
628  See Green and Gilead 2012 Wake Forest Univ Legal Studies Paper No.2014874 2 fn 7; Green 
2008 Cal L Rev 671, 708; Schwartz 1997 Tex L Rev 1801; Gilles 2001 Vand L Rev 813; 
Geistfeld 2011 Yale LJ 152 submits that the algebraic Hand Formula is but one of the tests 
embodied in the standard of reasonable care. When determining whether the actors conduct is 
reasonable, “[t]he jury has a great deal of normative discretion” (Gergen 1999 Fordham L Rev 
434); Simons 2008 Loy LA L Rev 1182-1183 states that the Hand Formula “is both morally 
attractive and a credible interpretation of tort practice”; Owen 1992 GA L Rev 722; Rabin 1996 
Yale LJ 2275.  
629  1997 Tex LRev 1801. See also Geistfeld 2011 Yale LJ 146. 
630  Schwartz 1994 UCLA L Rev 381 analyses the deterrent aim of tort law whereby tortious conduct 
can be deterred by the threat of imposing liability for such conduct. After reviewing inter alia 
motor vehicle liability, product liability, medical practitioner’s liability, and liability of public 
entities he submits that generally in these areas, the possibility of liability does moderately 
reduce negligence and safer practices are undertaken. However, the threat of liability does not 
always lead to avoiding negligence as claimed by the economists (422-423). Schwartz 1994 
UCLA L Rev 381-382 refers to the following academic writers who have disagreed with the 
claims made by economics (such as Shavell 1982 Bell J Econ 120 and Landes and Posner 
The economic structure of tort law 10) regarding the aim of deterrence in tort law; Abel 1990 
UCLA L Rev 785; Cane Atiyah’s accidents, compensation and the law 361-374; Englard The 
philosophy of tort law 31-44; Fleming 1984 LA L Rev 1193, 1198, 1203; Franklin 1967 VA L 
Rev 774; O’Connell The lawsuit lottery 23-27; Pierce 1980 Vand L Rev 1288-1307; Rodgers 
1980 South Cal L Rev 16-23; Sugarman 1985 Cal L Rev 555; White Tort law in America 279.  
631  See for example, Kaplow and Shavell 2001 Harv L Rev 961; Posner 1972 J Leg Stud 29ff; 
Landes and Posner The economic structure of tort law embraced the Hand Formula further 
developing it and explaining the structure of tort law as being economic in nature. See Nelson 
1999 Buff L Rev 120-121. 
632  See for example, Perry 1992 Iowa L Rev 503-512; Fletcher 1972 Harv L Rev 541-548 whose 
idea of “fairness” is mainly based on reciprocity ‒ where a non-reciprocal risk is imposed on the 
victim, such victim must be compensated. Coleman’s (Risks and wrongs 329, 361) idea of 
corrective justice is based on a responsibility to compensate for wrongful losses. Epstein (1974 
J Leg Stud 165; 1973 J Leg Stud 152) submits that a person must be liable for any harm caused 
(corrective justice focusing on causation). Weinrib 1994 Duke LJ 277 is of the view that 
corrective justice is the foundation of tort law. See Nelson 1999 Buff L Rev 119-120. 
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values.633 There is yet another group of academic writers, to which Schwartz634 
belongs, where principles of fairness in the corrective justice approach and efficiency 
in the economic approach both play a part in tort law.635  
 
Academic writers who agree with the economic approach have further analysed and 
elaborated on the approach using more complex mathematical calculations than that 
employed in the Hand Formula.636 Zipursky637 submits that the Hand Formula built on 
Terry’s idea (that negligence involves unreasonably risky behaviour) but made it 
algebraic and utilitarian. Posner638 then turned the “soft utilitarian conception in Hand’s 
Formula into one that appeared rigorous and openly wealth-based rather than welfare-
based”. Zipursky639 submits that Terry’s idea of unreasonable risk shifted the 
negligence question from determining whether the defendant’s conduct strayed from 
the reasonable person.  
 
According to the economic approach of imposing liability for “economically inefficient 
risk taking”, incentives for taking appropriate safety measures are promoted and relate 
to the idea of “efficient deterrence”.640 The reasonable person is regarded as good 
based on efficiency, that is, the reasonable person is the hypothetical efficient 
person.641 Risks worth taking produce more benefits than losses and benefits 
maximize the wealth of society.642 The so-called Coase theorem also follows an 
economic analysis of the law.643 According to Coase’s theory there are no “transaction 
costs” between the parties who are bound in a relationship which leads to injury or 
                                                                                                                                                                            
633  See Zipursky 2003 Geo LJ 699. He states (754) that he joins the corrective justice group and 
that he applies a pragmatic conceptualist approach in analysing wrongs in tort law (748). He 
promotes the idea of “rights, wrongs and recourse” in tort law with a focus on the plaintiff’s right 
of action and the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. He emphasizes (699-
700) that wronged plaintiffs’ have a right to civil recourse for tortious conduct. 
634  Schwartz 1997 Tex L Rev explains that liability in tort law can be seen as a means of deterring 
tortfeasors “from violating moral rights of potential victims” but its main objective is to achieve 
justice or prevent injustice.    
635  See for example, Nelson 1999 Buff L Rev 121 ff; Claybrook Product liability 26-27 who does 
not agree with an economic approach but accepts deterrence as aim of tort law; Abel 1990 
UCLA L Rev 785 also criticises the economic analysis of tort law but accepts deterrence as aim 
of tort law. See Schwartz 1997 Tex L Rev 1829-1831. 
636  For purposes of this study these more complex approaches will not be discussed.   
637  2015 U Pa L Rev 2151. 
638  See Posner 1972 J Leg Stud 29. 
639  2015 U Pa L Rev 2152. 
640  See Gilead and Green 2012 Wake Forest Univ Legal Studies Paper No.2014874 3. 
641  See Shapo Tort 123; Posner Economic analysis of law 209; Coleman 2012 Yale LJ 558. 
642  See Posner 1972 J Leg Stud 29 ff; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 275.  
643  See in general Coase 1960 J Law & Econ 1. See also Pigou The economics of welfare. 
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loss. The parties will then bargain till they reach the same efficient result irrespective 
of which party the law imposes the costs on. Shapo644 comments on Coase’s theory 
with reference to an example that Coase used to illustrate his theory. A rancher’s cattle 
stray onto a farmer’s land. If the law lets the farmer sustain the loss, “the farmer would 
bargain with the rancher to limit his herd to the same number of cattle that the rancher 
would keep if the law held the rancher liable”. A practical consequence of this theory 
is that the costs will fall upon the “least cost avoider”.645 This theory focuses on 
economic efficiency and not on fairness or morality.646 Justice and fairness are not 
economic terms.647 Shapo648 submits that economic approaches to determining 
negligence are used as a convenient way of “expressing the qualitative as well as the 
quantitative balancing that is a central part of judicial application of the standard of 
care in negligence. They are part of a more broad-gauged effort to determine the 
justice of individual cases”. 
 
Posner,649 who is a supporter of the Hand Formula,650 points out that even though the 
Hand Formula was formulated relatively recently, the underlying method has been 
used to determine negligence “ever since negligence was first used as a standard of 
liability in accident cases”. According to Posner651 reasonableness in the tort of 
negligence is “economic rationality”.652 Posner refers to the English decision of Blyth 
v Birmingham Water Works653 where the court was requested to determine whether a 
water company was negligent in failing to bury its pipes deeper underground in order 
to prevent them from bursting due to frost and causing damage to the plaintiff’s house. 
In finding that the water company was not negligent, it reasoned that the probability of 
damage to the plaintiff’s property was low and the frost was unusually severe, it was 
abnormal and unforeseeable. The damage was not so severe as to require a great 
expense just to bury the pipes deeper.654 Posner655 submits that a problem with the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
644  Tort 126.   
645  This was expounded by Calabresi The costs of accidents 135-173. 
646  See Kraus 2007 Va L Rev 357; Geistfeld 2011 Yale LJ 147 fn 8. 
647  See Posner Economic analysis of law 32-34. 
648  Tort 127. 
649  Economic analysis of law 195; Posner 1972 J Leg Stud 29.  
650  See Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2151 ff who rejects the Hand Formula. 
651  1972 J Leg Stud 29. 
652  As stated by Zipursky 2004 Fordahm L Rev 1928-1929. 
653  11 Exch 781, 156 Eng Rep 1047 (1856). 
654  Posner Economic analysis of law 194. 
655  Posner Economic analysis of law 194. 
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Hand formula is that the probability of the harmful event occurring (unless precautions 
were taken) cannot be estimated. The probability was low (P), the loss (L) moderate 
and the burden of taking precautionary steps (B) in preventing harm was high (P times 
L was less than B = no negligence). If the cost of preventing the harm materialising is 
low compared to the risk of harm it is likely that there is negligence.656  
 
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v Zapata Corp657 is an example of a case 
where the Hand Formula was applied. An employee of Zapata Corporation, the 
defendant, forged several cheques. The plaintiff, the bank, paid out on receipt of the 
forged cheques. The defendant did not examine the statements sent by the bank 
where the payments were reflected nor did it find out about the forged cheques for 
some time. When the defendant eventually found out about the forged cheques it 
notified the bank, which thereupon stopped processing the forged cheques. By that 
time an amount of fewer than one hundred and ten thousand dollars had been paid 
out by the bank. The bank sued the defendant, submitting that it was entitled to 
reimbursement for the funds it had paid out in respect of the forged cheques, even 
though the bank was negligent in failing to discover and report the forged cheques. 
The bank was legally obligated by legislation to reimburse the defendant for all 
cheques it cleared for two weeks after the defendant had received the first statement 
showing the forgeries. The question was whether after the two week period the bank 
was still obliged to reimburse the defendant, even though the defendant did not 
exercise reasonable care by promptly examining its statements and detecting the 
forgeries. The bank had provided evidence that it had a practice of checking cheques 
randomly for forgery between $100 and $1000 only upon reasonable suspicion and 
that its practice was consistent with customary practice in the industry. By employing 
this practice, one percent of cheques within the $100-$1000 bracket were checked. 
Their practice was cost effective and there was no significant increase in forgeries. 
Their practice was found to be reasonable. Zipursky658 explains how Breyer J affirmed 
the district court’s judgment in finding the bank not negligent by using the Hand 
                                                                                                                                                                            
656  See Hendricks v Peabody Coal Co 253 NE 2d 56 (Ill App 1969) where it was held that the cost 
of fencing off a body of water was slight ($1200 to $1400) compared to the risk of harm to 
children being seriously injured while swimming in the body of water which was dangerous due 
to a concealed ledge below the surface of the water. In this case a sixteen-year-old boy dived 
in and sustained injuries (see discussion of this case by Posner Economic analysis of law 195). 
657  848 F 2d 291 (1988). 
658  2007 Wm & Mary L Rev 2025-2026. 
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Formula. Thus the aggregate burden of checking every cheque outweighed the 
aggregate benefit of reducing the risk of forgeries. Zipursky659 points out that the 
method employed by the bank was appropriate as the bank’s customers, who included 
the plaintiff, would have had to bear the increased costs for the detection of forgery. 
Zipursky660 states that in this case, the Hand Formula was appropriate to apply as 
there was “little tension between the interests” of the parties. The bank followed a 
practice which was reasonable and according to practices in the industry.  
 
Keating,661 who does not support Posner’s662 view or the Hand Formula, refers to 
competing ideals of the social contract and utilitarian traditions. According to the social 
contract tradition “reasonable risk imposition should be terms of equal freedom and 
mutual benefit”, while the utilitarian tradition is of the view that risk imposition “should 
be terms which maximize overall well-being”. Keating663 submits that reasonableness 
is the central concept of the so-called due care doctrine. He opines that economists 
conceptualise “due care as a matter of rationality” while according to the social 
contract theory, due care is a question of reasonableness which he prefers, drawing 
from Rawls’s idea of reasonableness.664    
 
It has been argued that the Hand formula may be suitable at protecting one’s interests 
and setting limits for those interests. It is considered a useful guide to legal 
practitioners in that they have an idea of the type of evidence to produce. Estimates 
based on similar practical everyday life occurrences are used as opposed to precise 
mathematical calculations.665 It forces adjudicators to explain their reasons for finding 
negligence or not.666 It may however be argued that adjudicators must give reasons 
for finding negligence whether the Hand Formula is applied or not.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
659  2007 Wm & Mary L Rev 2025-2026. 
660  2007 Wm & Mary L Rev 2026. 
661  1996 Stan L R 314 in reference to Fletcher 1972 Harv L Rev 541-551. 
662  Posner 1972 J Leg Stud 29. 
663  1996 Stan L Rev 318. 
664  Keating 1996 Stan L Rev 325. See also Zipursky 2004 Fordham L Rev 1929. See chapter 2 
paras 1, 3.2 and 4 with regard to Rawl’s views. 
665  See Levi v Southwest La Elec Membership Coop 542 So 2d 1081 (La 1989); Owen 1996 U Ill 
L Rev 743; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 276 fn 64. 
666  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 275-276. 
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Zipursky667 states that the Hand Formula defines reasonable care as the taking of 
precautions if the “cost of the precaution is justified by the magnitude of risk it 
diminishes”. Zipursky, like several other academic writers, is cautious of the economic 
approach to determining negligence.668 Some of the main criticisms of the Hand 
formula669 include: it emphasises on what is deemed good for society as a whole too 
much in comparison to what is deemed good for the individual670 or what negligence 
law demands;671 the danger of referring to benefits, costs and risks in a monetary value 
is that disproportionate risks or interests672 may be treated equally; related to this the 
question presents itself of how one values loss of life in monetary terms;673 a 
mathematical formula requires precise relationships between costs of safety, 
probability and extent of harm;674 it cannot be applied in all instances, for example, 
with regard to product liability where the manufacturer may not know the extent of the 
risk of harm;675 in order to make a decision on negligence the damages must be 
assessed fully, whereas the merits and quantum of the case are often separated and 
the courts have to provide judgment on negligence first;676 tort law does not really 
provide incentives for taking appropriate safety measures;677 the Hand Formula is a 
cost-cost test instead of a test weighing risks or costs against benefits or utilities;678 
the “connection between the reasonable person” and a duty of care (an actual duty to 
be reasonably careful whereby members of the community  feel morally bound) “is lost 
in the Hand Formula conception”,679 and it focuses on risks which ought to be taken 
or not instead of a value judgment anchored in a sense by social mores about ordinary 
care owed to others;680 and the Hand formula should be modified.681 
                                                                                                                                                                            
667  2015 U Pa L Rev 2151. 
668  See Zipursky 2000 Legal Theory 457; Zipursky 2004 Fordham L Rev 1933. 
669  See Zipursky 2003 Wm & M L Rev 1999 ff. 
670  See Keating 1996 Stan L Rev 328 ff; Fletcher 1972 Harv L Rev 537; Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 277. 
671  Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2165. 
672  See Geistfeld 2011 Yale LJ 150-151. 
673  See Keating 1996 Stan L Rev 337-342; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 273, 
277. 
674  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 275. 
675  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 278 fn 71. Cf Posner Economic analysis of 
law 210-212. 
676  Shapo Tort 124. 
677  See Shuman 1993 Kan L Rev 115; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 276. 
678  Shapo Tort 126. 
679  Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2163, 2166. 
680  Zipursky 2015 U Pa L Rev 2168-2169. 
681  See Gilles 1994 Va L Rev 1032-1035 who proposes that the jury should be instructed to 
consider whether the defendant should have used the amount of care that an average person 
would have used if the risks created were borne by such average person. Zipursky 2015 U Pa 
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A well-known case in which the risk-benefit or risk-utility approach was rejected by the 
public illustrating its weakness is Grimshaw v Ford Motor Co682 (hereinafter referred 
to as “Grimshaw”). In this case, Ford in 1967 planned the design of a hatch-back motor 
vehicle called the “Pinto”. A design decision was made regarding the placement of the 
fuel tank behind the rear axle to provide more boot space. This design made the tank 
susceptible to rupturing and this made the vehicle prone to catching fire in the instance 
of a rear-end motor vehicle accident. Gray, the driver, and her passenger Grimshaw, 
a thirteen year old boy, were travelling on the freeway in a Pinto when the motor 
vehicle stalled in the middle lane as a result of a carburetor problem. Another motor 
vehicle struck the Pinto from behind. The Pinto caught fire. Gray died and Grimshaw 
was seriously injured. Gray’s family sued Ford for wrongful death and was awarded 
$560 000, while Grimshaw was awarded $2.5 million in compensatory damages and 
a further $125 million in punitive damages. The trial court subsequently reduced the 
punitive award damages to $3.5 million, which was confirmed by the appeal court. This 
case spawned debate on a number of issues,683 but of importance for the current 
purpose, the economic risk-benefit analysis was called into question where a 
manufacturing design defect led to death and serious injury.684 Schwartz685 explains 
that there was a lot of publicity around this case, dealing with legal and ethical issues. 
Six months after the verdict was delivered in Grimshaw, another Pinto was involved in 
a motor vehicle accident where the fuel system of the Pinto contributed to the death 
of three women. The State of Indiana686 charged Ford with reckless homicide in terms 
of a criminal law but Ford was later found not guilty. The jury was indecisive but 
because Ford had begun a recall program of the affected Pinto’s, their conduct was 
found not reckless.687 During discovery of documents in Grimshaw, the plaintiffs 
produced a report from Ford which Schwartz688 explains: 
                                                                                                                                                                            
L Rev 2131 ff submits that negligence is about ordinary moderate care and mutuality with 
regards to others needs; Green 1997 Tex L Rev 1640 fn 167; Grady 1983 Yale LJ 799; Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 276 
682  1 19 Cal App 3d 757, 174 Cal Rptr 348 (1981). 
683  See Schwartz 1991 Rugters L Rev 1036 fn 94 who cites a number of contributions written by 
academic writers relating to aspects of business, sociology, law, religion, and criminology. See 
also Green 1997 Tex L Rev 1640 fn 167 who refers to the views of other academic writers. 
684  See Schwartz 1991 Rutgers L Rev 1013ff. 
685  1991 Rutgers L Rev 1013ff. 
686  State v Ford Motor Co Cause No 11-431 (1980). 
687  See Schwartz 1991 Rugters L Rev 1017-1019. 
688  1991 Rugters L Rev 1020. 
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 “compared the ‘costs and benefits’ of reducing the chances of certain fuel-tank fires. The 
 safety device considered by the document would have cost $11 per vehicle; multiplied by 12.5 
 million vehicles, the total cost would thus have been $137 million. According to the document, 
 the added safety provided by the device would have resulted in the avoidance of 180 deaths 
 and another 180 serious burn injuries. Setting $200,000 as the value of life and $67,000 as 
 the value of injury avoidance, the document calculated the total safety benefit at $49.5 million, 
 much less than its $137 million cost”. 
 
This document was subsequently not admissible at trial, but the public was appalled 
at the value of life being traded off in the interests of Ford saving costs and producing 
a lower cost motor vehicle.689 Schwartz explains in great detail how the document was 
somewhat misunderstood as laying all the blame on Ford, but the fact remains that for 
under $12 per vehicle, design changes could have been made to make the Pinto 
appreciably safer. Ford chose not to make these alternative changes and was aware 
that their decision would increase the chances of loss of life.690 The Hand Formula and 
risk-benefit approach to determining negligence generally excuses the defendant if the 
cost exceeds the benefit. Grimshaw thus illustrates how the public rejected the Hand 
Formula, particularly where human lives are being weighed against profit. The jury as 
the reflection of the reasonable people were made aware of the safer alternative 
design which was not that costly per motor vehicle. The jury found Ford liable for the 
death of Gray and serious injury of Grimshaw. It should be an exercise of judgment 
and not an algebraic calculation. Simons points out that the lesson to be learned from 
this case is that the act of “engaging in cost-benefit analysis displays morally 
reprehensible callousness”.691 The Hand Formula is not an appropriate test to be 
applied in every case where answers to normative questions or the making of intuitive 
judgments are called for. Wells692 points out with the well-known English decision of 
Butterfield v Forrester693 how the jury is expected to answer normative questions and 
make intuitive judgments. In this case, Forrester had created an obstruction on the 
road while conducting repairs to his house. Butterfield was riding his horse and collided 
with the obstruction. A witness stated that had Butterfield been riding slower, he could 
have avoided the accident. The adjudicator instructed the jury to use the standard of 
“ordinary care”. The jury then had to conclude, from the facts: who was responsible: 
                                                                                                                                                                            
689  See Green 1997 Tex L Rev 1641; Schwartz 1991 Rugters L Rev 1035. 
690  Schwartz 1991 Rugters L Rev 1035. 
691  2008 Loy LA Law Rev 1180. 
692  Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2385. 
693  103 Eng Rep 926 (1809). 
470 
 
at what speed was Butterfield riding?; taking surrounding circumstances into account, 
was the speed reasonable?; and in respect of Forester placing the obstruction on the 
road, should there have been warning signs or should the obstruction have been 
removed? Thus the jury had no option but to “to apply its own sense of responsibility 
to a situation whose elements are so common as to be within the ready imagination of 
each juror”. The jury must make a decision on the complex set of facts and answer 
normative questions. The legal rules must eventually be decided with intuitive 
judgments.694  
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the criticism of the application of the Hand formula in 
determining negligence, it is often applied informally.695 Jury instructions rarely refer 
to the Hand Formula,696 and the Hand Formula is only occasionally referred to by 
adjudicators in appellate decisions.697 Most jurisdictions instruct juries to apply the 
standard of reasonable care under the circumstances.698 There is a moral element 
considered where the reasonable person is required to make decisions about the risks 
and benefits.699 Even though the Hand Formula may not be an appropriate method for 
determining negligence in all cases, it is still useful in determining whether conduct is 
reasonable.700 The element of breach is usually a question for the jury to decide. The 
jury may decide that the conduct of the defendant is not risky enough to attract 
negligence as the defendant could reasonably expect others to contribute to safety, 
for example, where a driver can reasonably expect other drivers to also keep a proper 
look-out.701 Small risks may be considered unreasonable if they could be avoided with 
little effort (such as a warning) while significant risks (such as the risk of death during 
an operation to remove a tumour) may be justified if there is a possibility of a greater 
advantage (saving a person’s life by removing the tumour).702 
 
The risk-benefit assessment is not the only or most appropriate test for determining 
negligence. For example, in cases of professional negligence claims or negligently 
                                                                                                                                                                            
694  Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2389. 
695  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 278. 
696  Except with cases involving product liability (Simons 2008 Loy LA L Rev 1183). 
697  Gilles 2001 Vand L Rev 843. 
698  Simons 2008 Loy L A L Rev 1183. 
699  See Gilles 2001 Vand L Rev 832; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 278-279.  
700  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 278-279 as well as the authority cited. 
701  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 279-280. 
702  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 280-281. 
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inflicted sports injuries, the risk-benefit assessment is not the most suitable test and 
the test for determining negligence falls on customary conduct.703 Customary conduct 
is not usually regarded as negligent conduct;704 it may also reflect the balance between 
risks and utilities.705 Thus procedures with a high risk of harm may be customarily 
performed by medical practitioners.706 Evidence showing alignment with customary 
conduct or not may assist in establishing whether there is a breach of a duty of 
reasonable care or not. A plaintiff may provide proof of customary conduct, for 
example, customary precautionary practices usually undertaken to prove that the 
defendant’s conduct fell short of the reasonable person standard under the 
circumstances.707 Similarly, the defendant may rely on customary conduct to prove 
that he acted like a reasonable person under the circumstances. Evidence of custom 
need not be well-known, widely used, or uniform.708 At times, the defendant’s own 
custom and practices (for example, if in the form of a written manual) may be used to 
establish that the defendant had a duty to use reasonable care. For example, where 
a landlord provided a security guard in the past and then subsequently stopped 
providing security, the practice impliedly set the duty to exercise reasonable care with 
regard to the tenant’s safety. The removal of the security guard may be considered a 
breach of the duty of reasonable care.709  
 
The application of what is known as the “firefighter’s rule” or “professional rescuer’s 
doctrine” must be noted.710 Certain professionals such as police officers711 and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
703  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 2821-282. 
704  See Texas & Pac Ry v Behymer 189 US 468, 23 S Ct 622 (1903); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 282. 
705  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 282. 
706  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 275. 
707  For example, in McComish v DeSoi 42 NJ 274, 200 A 2d 116 (1964) where testimony of safety 
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709  See Kline v 1500 Massachusetts Ave Apt Corp 439 F 2d 477, 43 ALR 3d 311 (DC Cir 1970); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 287. 
710  See Fordham v Oldroyd 171 P 3d 411 (Utah 2007); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 605. 
711  See Moody v Delta Western Inc 38 P 3d 1139 (Alaska 2002); White v State 419 Md 265, 19 A 
3d 369 (2011); cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 605 fn 27. 
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firefighters712 who are injured after being exposed to harm that has been negligently 
created by the defendant generally do not have a claim against the defendant. 
According to this rule, no duty of reasonable care is owed to the professional rescuer 
where it is part of his job to render assistance and confront risk of harm.713 It has been 
argued that the reason for this rule is based on public policy,714 in that the firefighters 
or professional rescuers are paid to face such risks, it is inherent in their job and that 
they are entitled to benefits from workers compensation schemes or similar benefits.715 
Thus they would be overcompensated if the defendant were also required to 
compensate them,716 which may depending on the circumstances be considered fair 
and reasonable. Some states such as Oregon and New York717 have abolished this 
rule, some did not accept it to begin with, such as South Carolina,718 while others limit 
the rule, or apply it with caution.719 Courts limit the application of the rule by holding 
that the professional risk taker is barred from recovery when the injuries result from 
“the negligently created risk that was the very reason for his presence on the scene”.720 
For example, in Wiley v Redd,721 a firefighter could not recover compensation for 
injuries resulting from a fire but could recover damages as a result of being attacked 
by dogs. This is not always followed as there are instances where the courts did not 
entitle a professional rescuer to claim compensation for a risk that did not necessitate 
his presence. For example, in White v State,722 police officer was barred from recovery 
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721  110 Nev 1310, 885 P 2d 592 (1994). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 609. 
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when he slipped and fell on a floor soiled with oil while he was searching the premises 
for a suspected burglary.723 In Flowers v Rock Creek Terrace Ltd P’ship,724 a firefighter 
who was injured when he fell in an unguarded elevator shaft was also not entitled to 
claim compensation. The reason for the bar to recovery was because the risks were 
associated with the specific operation.725  
 
The influence of reasonableness on the breach of a duty of reasonable care or fault in 
the form of negligence is predominantly explicit. The influence of reasonableness is 
implicit in the application of the Hand Formula. In summary, negligence is present 
when the conduct is considered unreasonable when tested against the particular 
standard of reasonable care to be applied in the case. Unreasonable conduct may be 
in the form of: taking unreasonable risks, whether a structured or unstructured 
balancing of risks and utilities is applied; a violation of a statute without justification; 
and where conduct is contra to customs or practices followed in the community. A 
weighing of risks and utilities really comes down to a weighing of the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s interests (protected and advanced) and whether harm to the plaintiff could 
have been prevented by less risky alternative measures that could have been taken 
under the circumstances.726 Whether the unstructured approach or the Hand Formula 
is followed, the reasonable foreseeable likelihood of the harm materialising as well as 
the extent of the harm is weighed against the burden of reducing or avoiding the harm. 
If the cost of preventing the harm materialising is low compared to the likelihood of the 
harm materialising as well as the extent of the harm, then there is negligence.727 The 
Hand Formula which is based on the idea that negligence is not present when the 
costs exceed the benefits was appropriate to apply in a case such as Rhode Island 
Hospital Trust National Bank v Zapata Corp.728 Zipursky729 explains that there was 
“little tension between the interests” of the parties and the bank’s practice was 
considered reasonable under the circumstances. In Grimshaw, the Hand Formula 
would not have been appropriate to apply as it may be considered unreasonable to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
723  See also  Lee v Luigi Inc 696 A 2d 1371 (DC 1997); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 609. 
724  308 Md 432, 520 A 2d 361 (1987). 
725  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 609. 
726  See Restatement Second of Torts §292 cmt b, cmt d (1965).  
727  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 3 (2010); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 268 fn 30. 
728  848 F 2d 291 (1988). 
729  2007 Wm & Mary L Rev 2026. 
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weigh human lives against profit and where the preventive costs to avoiding harm are 
low or could have been easily shifted onto the consumers. Thus in the end it should 
come down to an exercise of judgment and not be based on mathematical 
calculations. The element of breach is usually a question for the jury to decide as the 
representatives of the reasonable people in the community. American law does not 
make a conceptual difference between wrongfulness and fault but in determining 
unreasonableness of conduct and breach of a duty of reasonable care, the interests 
of the parties are weighed, community values are considered, and the conduct is 
generally tested against standards of reasonableness. 
 
3.4. Specific categories of duties of care 
 
3.4.1 Omissions 
 
There is generally no duty to act in cases or pure omission (nonfeasance) even if harm 
is foreseeable.730 In terms of negligence, the question is whether the reasonable 
person would have acted under the circumstances.731 Thus if the defendant observes 
a blind person about to cross the road while there is a motor vehicle approaching, he 
will not be held liable for failing to act even though he could easily warn the blind 
person of danger, verbally or by touching, without any inconvenience or putting himself 
in harm’s way.732 The courts have for example found that there was no duty to save a 
neighbour from drowning;733 to warn against dangerous approaching traffic;734 to take 
a gun away from a person with suicidal tendencies;735 or to render emergency 
assistance to a person who has been injured.736  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
730  See for example, Williams v Southern Calif Gas Co 176 Cal App 4th 591, 98 Cal Rptr 3d 258 
(2009); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 615. 
731  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 618. 
732  See Restatement Second of Torts § 314 Illus 1 (1965); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm) §§ 37-38 (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
615. 
733  See Yania v Bigan 307 Pa 316, 155 A 2d 343 (1959); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 615 fn 4. 
734  Long v Patterson 198 Miss 554, 22 So 2d 490 (1945); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 615 fn 4. 
735  Krieg v Massey 239 Mont 469, 781 P 2d 277 (1989); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 615 fn 4. 
736  See Cilley v Lane 985 A 2d 418 (Me 2009); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 615 
fn 4. 
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There are exceptions to the general rule whereby a duty “of reasonable assistance to 
a plaintiff” is required.737 These exceptions include: where the defendant causes harm 
or creates a risk of harm for the plaintiff (prior conduct); there is a special relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant whereby a duty to act positively is created; the 
defendant by his promise or conduct assumes a duty to act positively; and the 
defendant commences offering assistance.738 The duty to act positively has however 
in recent times grown due to public sentiment and social policy.739 The plaintiff is 
typically vulnerable and dependant on the defendant who has power over the plaintiff’s 
welfare.740 With liability for nonfeasance there must be a relationship between the 
plaintiff and defendant of such a nature that “social policy justifies the imposition of a 
duty to act”.741  
 
Where there is a special relationship between the parties, there may be a duty on the 
defendant to use reasonable care even if he didn’t cause the initial risk of harm or 
independently undertook to protect the plaintiff from harm, or rescue the plaintiff.742 
The Restatement Third of Torts743 provides that the first person in all the following 
relationships owes a duty of reasonable care: carrier to a passenger, to protect the 
passenger from harm;744 innkeeper to his guest;745 staff on a ship, to assist a person 
who has fallen overboard;746 inviter to the person invited, the invitee;747 a shopkeeper 
to his customer;748 “possessor of land which is open to the public to a lawful entrant” 
(for example, to protect visitors from foreseeable negligent acts or criminal acts of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
737  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 616. 
738  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 616. Cf Terry 1915 Harv L Rev 52-54. 
739  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 374. 
740  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 374. 
741  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 374. 
742  See Delgado v Trax Bar & Grill 36 Cal 4th 224, 113 P 3d 1159, 30 Cal Rptr 3d 145 (2005); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 620. 
743  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) §§ 19, 24, 40. See Restatement Second of Torts 
§§314A & 314B (1965). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 620. 
744  See for example, Todd v Mass Transit Admin 373 Md 149, 816 A 2d 930 (2003); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 638 fn 41; cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 376 fn 32. 
745  See for example, Dove v Lowden WD Mo 1942, 47 F Supp 546; Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on torts 376. 
746  See for example, Abbott v United States Lines Inc (4th Cir 1975) 512 F 2d 118; cases referred 
to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts   376 fn 34. 
747  See Olivo v Owens-Illinois Inc 186 NJ 394, 895 A 2d 1143 (2006) with regard to asbestos 
exposure on the land; cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 650 
fn 162-166, 653; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 376. 
748  See for example, Harold’s Club v Sanchez 1954, 70 Nev 518, 275 P2d 384; other cases 
referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 376 fn 36. 
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others);749 employer to his employee;750 institute to a student;751 landlord to a tenant, 
to maintain the premises so that it is in a safe condition minimising the risk of harm;752 
and a custodian to protect the person in his custody from foreseeable harm.753 A 
custodian may be a: jailer who owes a prisoner a duty of reasonable care to ensure 
that he is protected from harm, such as an attack from another inmate754 or from 
committing suicide;755 a hospital who owes a patient a duty of reasonable care to 
protect the patient from harm;756 a parent who owes their child a duty of reasonable 
care to protect them from harm, which even applies to an emancipated minor still in 
their custody;757 and a school who owes a duty of reasonable care in respect of 
supervision and protection of a student.758 There is no numerus clausus with regard 
to the list of relationships and a duty of care may be applicable in instances where the 
defendant creates an unreasonable risk or assumes a duty of care.759 Keeton et al760 
point out that extending liability for omissions has been slow but may continue till a 
general duty is applicable where a defendant may prevent harm to another with little 
inconvenience.    
 
Where a duty to come to another’s aid is required, the defendant must act with 
reasonable care under the circumstances.761 For example, he is seldom required to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
749  See Marshall v Burger King Corp 222 Ill 2d 422, 856 NE 2d 1048, 305 Ill Dec 897 (2006); Nallan 
v Helmsley-Spear Inc 50 NY 2d 507, 429 NYS 2d 606, 407 NE 2d 451 (1980); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 638-639 and the cases referred to in fn 51-55 in respect of rape, 
robberies, shootings, beatings and killings. 
750  See Didier v Ash Grove Cement Co 272 Neb 28, 718 NW 2d 484 (2006); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 650; cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
376 fn 35. 
751  See Stanton v University of Maine System 773 A 2d 1045 (Me 2001); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 638 fn 43. 
752  The landlord’s duty may arise from his undertakings, foreseeability of harm and powers in terms 
of the lease agreement. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 643-645. 
753  See Restatement Second of Torts §314A (4 (1965)); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 645. 
754  See Giraldo v California Dep’t of Corrections and Rehabilitation 168 Cal App 4th 231, 85 Cal 
Rptr 3d 371 (2008) where a number of cases from other jurisdictions were cited. 
755  Joseph v State 26 P 3d 459 (Alaska 2001); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 645. 
756  See cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 646 fn 110-112. 
757  See Hite v Brown 100 Ohio App 3d 606, 654 NE 2d 452 (1995); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 646. 
758  See Eric M Cajon Valley Union School Dist 174 Cal App 4th 285, 95 Cal Rptr 3d 428 (2009); 
Jerkins v Anderson 191 NJ 285, 922 A 2d 1279 (2007); cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 646 fn 119-137. 
759  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 621. 
760  Prosser and Keeton on torts 377. 
761  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 377. 
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do more than provide first aid if possible, call for assistance, or to leave such person 
in the care of another.762 
 
It is not always easy to distinguish between active and passive conduct. For example, 
a failure to repair a gas pipe is regarded as negligent distribution of the gas.763 
Sometimes the defendant, such as a medical practitioner begins treating the plaintiff 
and then neglects him. Keeton et al764  submit that the question seems to be whether 
the defendant’s conduct has gone so far that there is a relationship between him and 
the plaintiff and his conduct has begun affecting the plaintiff’s interests in an adverse 
manner. 
 
A duty may arise from negligent entrustment of property, such as entrusting a 
dangerous weapon to a person who the defendant knows or should have known that 
it will be used in a dangerous manner.765 For example, in Kitchen v K-Mart 
Corporation,766 a firearm was sold to an intoxicated man who subsequently used it to 
shoot his girlfriend. The court confirmed that an action for negligent entrustment was 
in line with Florida’s public policy in protecting its citizens from harm with regard to 
negligent entrustment of a dangerous weapon. Thus selling a dangerous weapon to 
an intoxicated person satisfied the requirement and was sufficient enough to bring the 
cause of action before a jury.767  
 
The list of factors whereby a duty of care may be present in cases of omissions is not 
exhaustive and the courts may find a duty to act positively especially where little effort 
was required on the part of the defendant and the failure to act was deadly.768 For 
example, in Soldono v O’Daniels769 the court held that there was a duty owed to the 
deceased by a bartender to call the police for help or allow a patron from a saloon 
across the street to call the police for help when requested to do so. The court found 
                                                                                                                                                                            
762  See Owl Drug Co v Crandall 1938 52 Ariz 322, 80 P 2d 952; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 377. 
763  See Consolidated Gas Co v Connor 1911 114 Md 140, 78 A 725; Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on torts 374. 
764  Prosser and Keeton on torts 375.    
765  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 653. 
766  697 So 2d 1200 (Fla 1997). 
767  Cf Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 653-656. 
768  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 616. 
769  141 Cal App 3d 443, 190 Cal Rptr 310, 37 ALR 4th 1183 (1983). 
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such omission morally wrong and under the circumstances there was a duty on the 
bartender to allow the patron to use the phone. There was a close connection between 
the omission and the resulting death.770 In Podias v Marais771 an eighteen year old 
boy who had been drinking, lost control of the motor vehicle he was driving and struck 
a motorcyclist. The young boy and his two friends, who were passengers in the motor 
vehicle and who had also been drinking, made a number of calls but failed to contact 
the police for assistance. They left the motorcyclist injured on the road. Another driver 
subsequently ran over the motorcyclist and the motorcyclist died. The motorcyclist’s 
widow sued inter alia the three young boys. The driver of the motor vehicle settled 
before the trial and the trial court found that no duty of care was owed by the 
passengers. However on appeal,772 the court found that the two friends and the driver 
acted together in creating the risk of harm to the motorcyclist. They could have 
prevented the reasonably foreseeable risk of serious injury to the motorcyclist and in 
the circumstances imposing a duty to act positively “does not offend notions of fairness 
and common decency”.773 In Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California,774 a 
patient confided in a psychologist and informed him of his intention to murder his 
former girlfriend, Tarasoff. The psychologist notified the campus police who briefly 
detained the patient but then released him. The patient subsequently killed Tarasoff 
and her parents sued the police and the psychologist employed by the University of 
California, for the wrongful death of their daughter. The parents alleged that the 
defendants failed to detain the patient and failed to warn either Tarasoff or her parents. 
The court held that a mental health professional owes a duty of reasonable care to 
those specifically being threatened by the patient. The court held that in terms of public 
policy the protection afforded to confidentiality between patient and therapist must be 
yielded “to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The 
protective privilege ends where the public peril begins”.775 A number of states have 
since adopted the mental health professional’s duty of reasonable care.776 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
770  451-452. 
771  394 NJ Super 338, 926 A 2d 859 (App Div 2007). 
772  Podias v Mairs 394 NJ Super 338, A 2d 859 (App Div 2007); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 617. 
773  Podias v Mairs 394 NJ Super 338, 351-352 A 2d 859, 866-867 (App Div 2007). 
774  17 Cal 3d 425, 131 Cal Rptr 14, 551 P 2d 334 (1976). 
775  442. 
776  See Eisel v Board of Educ of Montgomery County 324 Md 376, 597 A 2d 447 (1991); authority 
referred to Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 658-659 
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A few states have statutes whereby a failure to assist or rescue a person in peril may 
lead to a criminal sanction. Rhode Island,777 Vermont778 and Minnesota779 require 
“reasonable assistance”, generally when the defendant is in a position to assist without 
danger to himself or others and when he knows that another has been exposed to 
grave harm or risk of harm.780 “Reasonable assistance” takes into account the 
rescuer’s efforts to render aid.781  
 
Where a defendant acting innocently knows or should know that he has caused harm 
to the plaintiff, he owes the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care to prevent further harm 
by taking reasonable steps.782 He may be held liable for the further harm caused or 
for the full extent of the harm if he was negligent to begin with.783 For example, in 
Maldonado v Southern Pacific Transport Company784 the appellant tried to board a 
freight train but the train jerked, causing the appellant to fall while he was trying to 
board it. The appellant fell under the wheels of the train, his arm was severed, and he 
sustained severe bodily injury. The employees of the freight train refused to assist the 
appellant. The court held that the railroad company had a duty to render reasonable 
aid and assistance. The railroad company breached such duty and was held liable. In 
Pacht v Morris,785 Pacht’s motor vehicle struck and killed a horse. He continued 
driving, leaving the horse on the road. Another motorist subsequently drove into the 
horse. The court found Pacht liable for the failure to take positive action by either 
warning motorists or removing the horse. He failed to exercise reasonable care. Thus 
the defendant may be held liable if he knows or should have known that he created a 
risk of harm and he had an opportunity to minimise the risk of harm under the 
circumstances.786 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
777  RI Gen Laws §11-56-1. 
778  Vt Stat Ann tit 12 §519(a). 
779  Minn Stat § 604A.01. 
780  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 618. 
781  See Hardingham v United Counseling Service of Bennington 164 Vt 158, 667 A 2d 289 (1995); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 616 fn 20. 
782  See Restatement Second of Torts § 322 (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
619. 
783  See South National Railroad Passenger Corp 290 NW 2d (ND 1980) where railroad employees 
were held liable for failing to assist a victim of rail road crossing accident. 
784  129 Ariz 165, 629 P 2d 1001 (Ct App 1981). 
785  107 Ariz 392, 489 P 2d 29 (1971). 
786  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 620. 
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The Restatement Third of Torts787 provides that where assistance or rescue efforts 
have already commenced, the rescuer must act with reasonable care and should aid 
or assistance be discontinued, then the plaintiff must not be left in a worse off state 
than had the rescue effort not begun. The “rescuer must not unreasonably discontinue 
aid” and when aid is discontinued, reasonable care must be applied.788 When the 
plaintiff is no longer in danger, the rescuer cannot return the plaintiff to danger even if 
the danger would not be greater than he would have been in had rescue efforts not 
begun.789 If the rescue attempt results in prevention or interference of rescue by other 
means, then the rescuer may be held liable. Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick790 refer to 
the following examples from case law. In Zelenko v Gimbel Bros,791 a customer fell ill 
in a department store. The employees left her in the infirmary for six hours without 
providing further medical assistance. The court held that a good-hearted person would 
not have left her and would have called for an ambulance. The plaintiff was thus denied 
further medical attention and once the defendant began to assist, a duty arose to use 
reasonable care. In United States v De Vane,792 a coast guard misread a message 
and wrongly informed others that a distressed ship had reached safety when it had 
not. The court was of the opinion that had the coast guard not been negligent, the 
search for the ship would have continued and the ship would have been found. 
 
Where a person voluntarily undertakes a duty whether express or implied, then the 
duty must be performed with reasonable care as the line has been crossed from 
nonfeasance to misfeasance.793 For example, in Lokey v Breuner794 a truck driver 
signalled an approaching motorist from the opposite direction by gesturing his hand 
that it was safe for the motorist to turn left, but the lane was not clear and the motorist 
collided with a cyclist. The court held that the truck driver had assumed a duty and 
should have acted with reasonable care in ensuring that the lane was clear.795 Where 
a person undertakes conduct that would enhance the plaintiff’s safety, such person 
                                                                                                                                                                            
787  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 44 (b) (2010). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 622. 
788  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 622. 
789  Third Restatement (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 44 cmt h (2010). 
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791  158 Misc 904, 287 NYS 134 (1935). 
792  306 F 2d 182 (5th Cir 1962). 
793  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 624; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 378. 
794  2010 MT 216, 358 Mont 8, 243 P 3d 384 (2010). 
795  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 624 fn 77. 
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has a duty to use reasonable care only if the plaintiff relied on such undertaking and if 
the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of harm to the 
plaintiff. This limits liability to harm that occurs from the risk that “the undertaking was 
intended or reasonably expected to protect against”.796  
 
A defendant who undertakes to do something for X may be under a duty of reasonable 
care towards X as well as other third parties. This in principle applies if the defendant 
knows or should have known that his failure to act according to the undertaking would 
increase the risk of physical harm to others and where the defendant’s breach of the 
duty puts the plaintiff in a worse off condition than when he did not undertake to do 
something for the plaintiff. The plaintiff or other individuals thus rely on the promise or 
undertaking and the defendant’s undertaking replaces a duty owed by another.797 For 
example, where the defendant is contracted by the landowner to clear ice and snow 
on the walkway, he assumes the duty of the landowner. If the plaintiff slips on the 
pavement because the ice and snow was not cleared, then the defendant may be held 
liable in negligence.798 The premises must be in a condition deemed “reasonably safe 
for purposes for which it was accustomed to be used” but not for every “unexpected 
or unheard of event, or … every possible accident which might occur”.799 Whether a 
duty of care, based on such undertaking is owed, is predominantly based on justice 
and policy considerations.800 Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick801 refer to Anderson v Fox 
Hill Village Homeowners Corp802 as an example where a tenant promised the landlord 
to clear the ice and snow on the property. The plaintiff was employed on the property, 
but not by the tenant and slipped on the ice sustaining injury. As there was no common 
law duty upon the tenant to clear the snow and ice, the plaintiff referred to the tenant’s 
promise to the landlord. The court accepted that the undertaking by the tenant was to 
the landlord and not for the benefit of others. The court did not consider the tenant’s 
promise as creating a duty of care to others. In Massachusetts, duties of clearing snow 
                                                                                                                                                                            
796  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 625.  
797  See Restatement Second of Torts § 324(A) (1965); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm) § 43 (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 628. 
798  See Gazo v City of Stamford 255 Conn 245, 765 A 2d 505 (2001); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
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are as a matter of policy, not easily imposed. There are a growing number of decisions 
where a voluntary promise to do something such as: calling for help;803 passing on a 
message (for example, that one’s wife has gone into labour);804 or confining a cat805 
has resulted in harm and the recognition of a duty to act with reasonable care.806 
 
There is a general no-duty rule in respect of control over other persons but exceptions 
apply in the following instances: where a statute specifically imposes a duty of care, 
for example, to investigate reports of child abuse;807 where there is a special 
relationship between the parties that requires the defendant to use reasonable care in 
protecting the plaintiff from harm; where there is a special relationship between the 
parties and the defendant has control over a person who is dangerous or at the very 
last has the means to minimise risk of harm to a plaintiff in some manner; and where 
the defendant’s conduct actively creates an unreasonable risk of harm to third parties 
‒ for example, signalling a motorist that it is safe to overtake or turn when in actual 
fact there is traffic which leads to harm to the motorist as well as others.    
 
In 1947, the Federal Tort Claims Act (hereinafter referred to as the “FTCA”) became 
applicable and in effect generally abolished government immunity from tort liability. 
Thus the government may be held liable under the relevant state law in instances 
where a private person would also have been liable under similar circumstances.808  
 
The general rule is that public entities will not be held liable for failure to provide fire 
or police protection services even if their failure is negligent, unless there is a special 
relationship between the person and the entity whereby the entity undertook to protect 
the person and then negligently failed to do so.809 For example, if the police respond 
                                                                                                                                                                            
803  See DeLong v County of Erie 1982 89 AD 2d 376, 455 NYS 2d 887 where an emergency call 
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to a 911 emergency call but the police vehicle goes to the wrong address, the police 
may be held liable as a duty of reasonable care was undertaken. Thus reasonable 
rescue measures should have been undertaken.810 A fire department may be held 
liable for failing to use adequate methods of putting out fires or for using dangerous 
methods when they respond to a call for assistance.811 However, if the police fail to 
make a phone call that could have saved a victim’s life after finding out that she had 
been kidnapped,812 or fail to arrest a dangerous person once a warrant has been 
issued; then the police will not be held liable as the special relationship is absent.813 
Similarly, a fire department that fails to respond to an emergency call or fails to follow 
safety regulations may not be held liable.814 There are cases where the public entity 
was held liable for negligently allowing a prisoner to escape815 or where a dangerous 
person was negligently released.816 Courts are also reluctant to hold a public entity 
liable for the negligent release of a dangerous person, such as, a patient in a mental 
institution or a prisoner who subsequently harms another. The courts either apply 
discretionary immunity or the so-called public duty rule, which entails that a duty to all 
is a duty to no one.817 The Restatement Second of Torts818 acknowledges a duty to 
control dangerous persons under the defendant’s care or where the defendant has the 
authority to control such dangerous person.819 A prison has a duty of reasonable care 
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(1977); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 576. 
817  See for example, State Dep’t of Corrections v Cowles 151 P 3d 353 (Alaska 2006); Parkulo v 
West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole 199 W Va 161, 483 SE 2d 507 (1996); Leonard v 
State 491 NW 2d 508 (Iowa 1992). There are statutes that provide that such entity is immune 
from liability, see for example NJ Stats Ann §59:5-2; 51 Okla St Ann §15-78-60; Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 570, 575-576. 
818  § 318 (1965). See also Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) 
§ 41 (2010). 
819  See Osborn v Mason County 157 Wash 2d 18, 134 P 3d 197 (2006); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 652. 
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to ensure that its prisoners do not escape and cause harm to others.820 Custodians of 
dangerous persons have been held liable for the reasonable foreseeable death and 
harm caused by the dangerous person.821 
 
Off-duty police officers who rescue others from peril have been regarded as private 
persons where the firefighters rule does not apply.822 But some courts have held that 
police officers in particular even if they are off-duty are in a sense always on duty and 
may be barred from claiming.823 The firefighter’s rule has in certain cases been applied 
to paramedics and in some cases not.824 
 
The influence of reasonableness on omissions is partially implicit and partially explicit. 
It is implicit in deciding whether there is a duty to act in a given case insofar as it often 
depends on factors including whether a positive intervention has begun or not, whether 
the right kind of relationship exists, or whether there was prior conduct etcetera. The 
influence of reasonableness is explicit in determining the content of the duty insofar 
as determining whether a duty to take reasonable steps or to act with reasonable care 
was required under the circumstances. The defendant may be held liable for omitting 
to provide reasonable assistance or reasonable care owed to a plaintiff under the 
circumstances. The duty to prevent harm and act positively in providing reasonable 
assistance or reasonable care has grown as a result of public policy.825 A duty to 
provide reasonable assistance or reasonable care may be recognised where the 
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is of such a nature that public policy 
“justifies the imposition of a duty to act”826 or where it “does not offend notions of 
fairness and common decency”.827 This echoes from English law in respect of 
determining a duty of care and has recently been applied in South African law in order 
                                                                                                                                                                            
820  See Raas v State 729 NW 2d 444 (Iowa); Marceaux v Gibbs 699 So 2d 1065 (La 1997); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 656. 
821  See for example DeJesus v US Dep’t of Veterans Affairs 384 F Supp 2d 780 (ED Pa 2005); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 656. 
822  See Espinoza v Schulenburg 212 Ariz 215, 129 P 3d 937 (2006); Alessio v Fire & Ice Inc 197 
NJ Super 22, 484 A 2d 24 (1984); Wadler v City of New York 14 NY 3d 192, 899 NYS 2d 73, 
925 NE 2d 875 (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 611. 
823  See Hodges v Yarian 53 Cal App 4th 973, 62 Cal Rptr 2d 130 (1997); Levine v Chemical Bank 
221 AD 2d 175, 633 NYS 2d 296 (1995); Trammel v Bradberry 256 Ga App 412, 568 SE 2d 
715 (2002); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 611. 
824  See Conder 1992 89 ALR 4th 1072; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 612 fn 84. 
825  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 374. 
826  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 374. 
827  Podias v Marais 394 NJ Super 338, 926 A 2d 859, 866-867 (App Div 2007). 
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to determine wrongfulness. The main factors which are considered in determining 
whether positive conduct in the form of reasonable care or reasonable assistance is 
required are: prior conduct; a special relationship between the parties; a promise or 
undertaking to act positively;828 entrustment or control over a dangerous object829 or 
person;830 and where a person voluntarily undertakes a duty whether express or 
implied.831 These factors are similar to the factors indicating a duty to act positively in 
preventing harm in English and South African law.832 It is submitted that although these 
factors may be indicative in cases of omissions of a duty to provide reasonable 
assistance or reasonable care in preventing harm, what needs to be determined in 
order to ground liability is whether the defendant’s failure to act in the circumstances 
was unreasonable. The courts may find a duty to act positively especially where little 
effort is required on the part of the defendant to prevent reasonable foreseeable 
harm.833 Thus a failure to provide assistance where little effort or inconvenience is 
required may be considered unreasonable. American law has developed in a different 
direction from that of English law834 in so far as the state may be held liable for 
omissions. For example, in the case where the police respond to a 911 emergency 
call but the police response vehicle then goes to the incorrect address, the police may 
be held liable as a duty of reasonable care was undertaken and reasonable rescue 
measures should have been undertaken.835 In United States v De Vane,836 where 
coasts guard made an error and rescue efforts to find a lost ship were terminated, the 
coast guard was found negligent. The FTCA has also abolished the rule of state 
immunity from liability. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
828  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 616. Cf Terry 1915 Harv L Rev 52-54. 
829  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 653. 
830  See for example DeJesus v US Dep’t of Veterans Affairs 384 F Supp 2d 780 (ED Pa 2005); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 656. 
831  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 624; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 378. 
832  See chapter 3 paras 3.1.10-3.1.11. 
833  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 616. 
834  See chapter 4 para 3.3.1. 
835  See De Long v County of Erie 60 NY 2d 296, 496 NYS 2d 611, 457 NE 2d 717 (1983); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 574. 
836  306 F 2d 182 (5th Cir 1962). 
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3.4.2 A duty of reasonable care owed by medical practitioners and health care 
providers  
 
Medical malpractice claims straddle both the tort of battery where there is a lack of 
consent and the tort of negligence.837 The reasonable level of conduct required by 
medical practitioners is controversial and the incidence of medical malpractice claims 
in the United States of America has been high.838  
 
The standard of care of medical practitioners is applied to inter alia: the requirement 
of continuing education of medical practitioners in order to keep abreast of new 
developments; the practitioner’s diagnosis and choice of treatment; the practitioner’s 
duty to inform the patient of the material risks and benefits of treatment including 
alternative treatment; the practitioner’s conduct in performing procedures or 
operations; referral to other specialists where required as well as after-care and follow-
ups on patients.839 
 
In respect of medical malpractice claims, the usual elements required for the tort of 
negligence are applicable except that the standard of care is tested differently. The 
standard of care is determined by either customs or practices of the medical 
community840 in a similar locality, state or nation841 and by relevant expert 
testimony.842 For example, in Robinson v Okla Nephrology Associates Inc,843 the 
expert testimony that a medical practitioner’s conduct strayed from the standard, was 
that he violated the acceptable standard by not immediately hospitalising the patient 
                                                                                                                                                                            
837  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 514-516. 
838  Shapo Tort 167. 
839  See Shapo Tort 168. 
840  See David MacLeod Regional Med Ctr 367 SC 242, 247-248, 626 SE 2d 1, 4 (2006). 
841  In a country like the United States of America with 50 states applying their own rules relating to 
negligence including state courts and federal courts, the question has been asked whether the 
reasonable standard of care should be a local or national one. A national standard has more 
support. Courts do however acknowledge that certain areas may not have the same resources 
available as others and this is considered under the circumstances of the case. See Hall v 
Hilbun 466 So 2d 856, 872-875 (Miss1985); Purtill v Hess 111 Ill 2d 229, 489 NE 2d 867, 95 Ill 
Dec 305 (1986); Keebler v Winfield Carraway Hosp 531 So 2d 841 (Ala 1988); cases referred 
to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 509 fn 133-135. 
842  Expert testimony is not required where: it is obvious that negligence is present; cases of non-
medical negligence where the ordinary standard of reasonable care is applied; and cases 
where there is informed consent. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 494, 503 
fn 84.   
843  154 P 3d 1250 (2007). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 504 fn 93. 
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upon learning that her sodium levels were dangerously low. In Bitar v Rahman,844 the 
expert opinion of one medical practitioner that was accepted and considered, was that 
Dr Bitar prior to an abdominoplasty marked and pre-determined the amount of tissue 
to be removed, thereby deviating from the standard of care. Instead he should have 
removed the tissue as he deemed fit during the operation. Such breach was 
considered the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The medical standard 
requires the medical practitioner to exercise professional care in inter alia providing 
advice, diagnosis, treatment, when referring a patient to an appropriate specialist, and 
keeping medical records.845 The jury is instructed to consider whether the medical 
practitioner exercised the care, skill and knowledge normally exercised by other 
members of a school of practice within the relevant medical community.846 For 
example, a chiropractor will be held to a similar standard of other chiropractors in the 
chiropractic community.847  
 
To begin with, in medical malpractice claims, there should be a doctor-patient 
relationship whereby the medical practitioner undertakes to treat the plaintiff for his 
benefit and with the required consent.848 In an instance where a patient’s medical 
practitioner consults another medical practitioner merely for advice without employing 
him, there is no doctor-patient relationship between the patient and the advising 
medical practitioner.849 However, modern methods of providing advice and treatment 
are changing and in instances where a medical practitioner provides advice over the 
telephone850 or where a team of medical practitioners provide advice or treatment to 
a patient without necessarily physically seeing the patient, a doctor-patient relationship 
may be recognised.851 The medical practitioner’s duty is limited to the scope of his 
                                                                                                                                                                            
844  272 Va 130, 630 SE 2d 319. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 504 fn 93.  
845  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 505. 
846  See Keebler v Winfield Carraway Hosp 531 So 2d 841 (Ala 1988); Purtill v Hess 111 Ill 2d 229, 
489 NE 2d 867, 95 Ill Dec 305 (1986); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 504. 
847  See Felton v Lovett 388 SW 3d 656 (Tex 2012); Kinney 2001 J L Med & Ethics 323 in respect 
of the medical standards of care; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 494 fn 4. 
848  See for example Kelley v Middle Tennessee Emergency Physicians PC 133 SW 3d 587, 593 
(Tenn 2004); Didato v Strehler 262 Va 617, 554 SE 2d 42 (2001); cases referred to by Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 497 fn 34-35. 
849  See for example Jennings v Badget 230 P 3d 861 (Okla 2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 497-498. 
850  See for example, Adams v Via Christi Regional Medical Center 270 Kan 824, 19 P 3d 132 
(2001); cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 498 fn 42. 
851  See for example, Mead v Legacy Health System 352 Or 267, 283 P 3d 904 (2012); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 498 fn 41. 
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undertaking.852 A medical practitioner may still be under a duty of reasonable care to 
non-patients when he is not acting in a professional capacity where the ordinary 
standard of care is applied;853 he creates unreasonable risks by his negligent 
conduct.854 For example, where the medical practitioner fails to warn a patient with 
epilepsy against driving and thus risking harm to others855 or when he verbally or tacitly 
undertakes to provide advice or treatment to a person that was not previously treated 
by him.856  
 
The medical standard deviates from the ordinary standard of reasonable care. It has 
even been criticised for giving too much reverence for the profession and for the fact 
that there is often no “standard” practice.857 Some courts858 have dismissed the 
medical standard and applied the ordinary standard of reasonable care under the 
circumstances. When the ordinary standard is applied, there is not so much emphasis 
on expert testimony in establishing the customs and practices, which paves the way 
for any other relevant evidence to be provided in order to determine whether the 
medical practitioner’s conduct was appropriate and reasonable.859 In respect of the 
medical standard, expert testimony must be specific in order to establish if the 
standard of the medical community was met or not.860 Where there are two different 
accepted schools of thought in respect of the treatment and procedure that should 
have been followed, the defendant may not be held liable provided that his conduct 
                                                                                                                                                                            
852  See Garcia v Lifemark Hospitals of Fla 754 So 2d 48 (Fla Dist Ct App 1999) where it was held 
that an emergency room’s medical practitioner’s duties was to treat emergency conditions, not 
whether the plaintiff had a mental condition that my lead to suicide; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 497 fn 36. 
853  See MCG Health Inc v Cassey 269 Ga App 125, 603 SE 2d 438 (2004); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 498. 
854  See Healthone v Rodriguez  50 P 3d 879 (Colo 2002); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 498. 
855  See Duvall v Goldin 139 Mich App 342, 362 NW 2d 275 (1984); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 500-503. 
856  Nold ex rel Nold v Binyon 272 Kan 87, 31 P 3d 274 (2001); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 498. 
857  See Peters 2000 Wash & Lee L Rev 163; Cramm, Hartz and Green 2002 Wake Forest L Rev 
699; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 507. 
858  See Helling v Carey 83 Wash 2d 514, 519 P 2d 981 (1974); Harris v Groth 99 Wash 2d 438, 
663 P 2d 113 (1983); Advincula v United Blood Services 176 Ill 2d 1, 678 NE 2d 1009, 223 Ill 
Dec 1 (1996); cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 507 fn 123 
as well as some statutes following the ordinary standard fn 124.  
859  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 507. 
860  See Murray v UNMC Physicians 282 Neb 260, 806 NW 2d 118 (2011); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 509. 
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falls within one of the schools of thought.861 The plaintiff must prove by expert 
testimony that that there was a breach of the standard of care and at least factual 
causation.862  
 
In terms of a patient’s autonomy he has the right to be informed about the risks of 
treatment or procedures, whether there are other alternative procedures and the 
necessity of the procedure.863 Just over half the states in the United States of America 
require a “medical standard of disclosure” ‒ information disclosed according to medical 
custom, in other words, what the reasonable medical practitioner would have disclosed 
under similar circumstances.864 The rest of the states require the material risks to be 
disclosed.865 According to the “medical standard of disclosure” expert evidence is 
required to show the standard866 while the “materiality standard of disclosure” does 
not require expert evidence relating to the medical custom but depends on what 
information a reasonable patient would want to know in order to make a decision as 
to whether to continue with the treatment or not.867 Generally, the medical practitioner 
should inform the patient of the diagnosis, general nature of the proposed procedure, 
the material risks involved in the procedure, the probability of success, the prognosis 
should the procedure not be performed, and any alternative treatment.868 A medical 
practitioner is generally required to inform the patient of expected or material risks and 
not all risks, this requirement applies as a limitation. For Example, in Harrison v United 
States869 the plaintiff’s child was injured during birth and the plaintiff alleged that the 
obstetrician was negligent in delivering a baby normally (vaginally) without informing 
her of the option of a caesarean section as well as the risks involved. The court held 
                                                                                                                                                                            
861  See Hood v Phillips 554 SW 2d 160 (Tex 1977); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
494; Epstein Torts 142. 
862  See Milliun v New Mildford Hospital 310 Conn 711, 80 A 3d 887 (2013); Beckles v Madden 160 
NH 118, 993 A 2d 209, 214 (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 512. 
863  See Fox v Smith 594 So 2d 596, 604 (Miss 1992); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 513; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 190. 
864  See Aiken v Clary 396 SW 2d 668, 675 (Mo 1965); Bronneke v Rutherford 89 P 3d 40, 45-46 
(Nev 2004) in respect of the standard of a reasonable chiropractor. 
865  See authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 516 fn 203. 
866  See Woolley v Henderson 418 A 2d 1123 (Me 1980); Tashman v Gibbs 263 Va 65, 556 SE 2d 
772 (2002); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 516. 
867  See Logan v Greenwich Hosp Ass’n 465 A 2d 294, 299-300 (Cal 1980); Acuna v Turkish 192 
NJ 399, 930 A2d 416 (2007); Moure v Raeuchle 529 Pa 394, 405, 604 A 2d 1003, 1008 (1992); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 517-518; Epstein Torts. 
868  See Vasa v Compass Medical PC 456 Mass 175, 921 NE 2d 963 (2010); Felton v Lovett 388 
SW 3d 656 (Tex 2012); cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 519 fn 
229. 
869  284 F 3d 293, 301 (1st Cir 2002). 
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that if the risks to either the mother or child were material to the reasonable patient in 
the mother’s position, then the defendant had a duty to inform her.870  
 
The requirement of disclosing material risks may be dispensed with where there is an 
emergency; the patient is incapacitated; the patient waives his right to be informed; if 
informing the patient would be harmful to him, the doctor may withhold the information 
as a “therapeutic privilege”; where the risks are commonly known; or if the patient is 
already aware of the risks.871 A “material risk” is a risk which may be severe and likely 
to occur,872 or relevant medical information.873 Most courts hold that in instances where 
the plaintiff was not informed of the risks, his claim lies in negligence and not in 
battery.874 The negligence does not lie in performing the operation which may have 
been performed without negligence, but lies in failing to inform the patient of any risks, 
alternative treatment and other required relevant information (this relates to negligent 
non-disclosure).875 Traditionally the scope of the duty to inform was based on whether 
the reasonable medical practitioner would inform the patient under the 
circumstances876 but Keeton et al877 point out that this left the right of choice to the 
medical community “in derogation of the patient’s right of self-determination”. There 
has thus been a shift and it now depends on whether “the reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s position would attach significance to the information”.878 The wrong done, 
lies in contravening the plaintiff’s right of autonomy.879 The plaintiff must prove that 
there was non-disclosure of the required information; harm which resulted from the 
risks the plaintiff was not informed of; factual causation – the plaintiff would have not 
                                                                                                                                                                            
870  301-302.   
871  See Meisel 1979 Wis L Rev 413; authority referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 192 fn 75-81. 
872  See Feeley v Baer 424 Mass 875, 876, 679 NE 2d 180, 181 (1997); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 519. 
873  See Acuna v Turkish 192 NJ 399, 930 A 2d 416 (2007); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 520.  
874  See Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal 3d 229, 502 P 2d 1, 104 Cal Rptr 505 (1972); Kennis v Mercy Hosp 
Medical Center 491 NW 2d 161 (Iowa 1992); Howard v Univ of Med & Dentistry of New Jersey 
172 NJ 537, 800 A2d 73 (2002); cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 515 fn 194. 
875  See Hayes v Camel 283 Conn 475, 927 A 2d 880 (2007); Spencer v Goodill 17 A 3d 552 (Del 
2011); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 515. 
876  See Canterbury v Spence 464 F 2d 772 (DC Cir 1972); Epstein Torts 144. 
877  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 191. 
878  See Cobbs v Grant 1972 8 Cal 3d 229, 104 Cal Rptr 505, 502 P 2d 1, 10; Sard v Hardy 1977 
281 Md 432, 379 A 2d 1014, 1022-1024; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 191.  
879  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 515. 
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continued with the procedure or treatment if he was aware of the risks;880 and that 
“reasonable persons, if properly informed, would have rejected the proposed 
treatment”.881 Here the requirement relating to reasonable persons follows an 
objective approach. Keeton et al882 recommend a fairer objective-subjective test 
whereby the ordinary patient is substituted for the “reasonable patient” and the 
plaintiff’s subjective fears and beliefs may be considered.883 However, a claim in 
battery is still possible in instances where the patient did not consent or where the 
treatment the plaintiff consented to was different from the treatment he received.884 
Where a patient fails to comply with the health care provider’s instructions,885 for 
example to return for follow-up care or to report symptoms or medical history 
accurately; the medical practitioner may not be negligent or the plaintiff’s claim may 
be reduced as a result of his contributory fault.886  
 
Keeton et al887 explain that during the 1960s and 1970s, the United States of America 
experienced a medical malpractice crisis as a result of an increase in medical 
malpractice claims. Most states thereafter passed legislation in an effort to control the 
crisis and litigation. Reform took place: in the statute of limitations; limitations or caps 
were applied to damages claimed, the “collateral source rule” was modified; emphasis 
was placed on pre-litigation efforts such as screening and arbitration, regulation or 
abolition of contingency fee agreements; adaptations to the so-called Good Samaritan 
statutes; changes in the law relating to the standard of reasonable care in terms of the 
doctrine of informed consent; and the rules relating to civil procedure and evidence.888 
All states have “Good Samaritan Statutes”, which initially began in California, where 
the duty or care is lowered to take into account the fact that a health care provider 
                                                                                                                                                                            
880  See Tashman v Gibbs 263 Va 65, 556 SE 2d 772 (2202); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 515. 
881  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 515. See Aronson v Harriman 321 Ark 359, 901 
SW 2d 832 (1995); Ashe v Radiation Oncology Assocs  9 SW 3d 119 (1999); Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts  191. 
882  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 192. 
883  See Kinikin v Heupel Minn 1981, 305 NW 2d 589, 595 referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on torts 192. 
884  See Shuler v Garret 743 F 3d 170 (6th Cir 2014) (Tenn Law) as well as other cases cited by 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 515 fn 196. 
885  See Harlow v Chin 405 Mass 697, 545 NE 2d 602 (1989). 
886  See Hall v Carter 825 A 2d 954 (DC 2003); authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 528 fn 306-308. 
887  Prosser and Keeton on torts 192-193. 
888  See Probert 1975 Fla L Rev 56; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 193. 
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renders assistance in emergency situations which occur beyond his regular 
professional practice.889 It encourages health care providers to render assistance 
where applicable and the health care provider may depending on the circumstances, 
not be held liable in negligence.890 
 
There is a duty on health care institutions, such as hospitals owed towards its patients 
to act with reasonable care.891 Traditionally health care institutions enjoyed immunity 
from liability; however, over time stemming from Darling v Charleston Community 
Memorial Hospital,892 the courts have held health care institutions liable.893 In Darling, 
a doctor’s treatment of a patient’s broken leg in hospital subsequently resulted in 
gangrene. The leg had to be amputated. The patient sued the hospital for failing to 
provide trained nurses who could have recognised the early onset of gangrene and 
for failing to oversee or supervise the doctor’s treatment. The court found the hospital 
liable. Health care institutions may be held liable for failing to: provide adequate 
facilities, staff or equipment;894 looking after patients;895 or supervising or reviewing 
medical practitioners who use the hospitals resources.896 
 
As can be gleaned from the above discussion with regard to medical malpractice 
claims, all the elements of the tort of negligence must be present. The influence of 
reasonableness on medical malpractice is predominantly explicit. The influence of 
reasonableness may be considered implicit when the duty of care is established from 
the doctor-patient relationship. It is explicit in respect of whether a duty of reasonable 
care is owed by the medical practitioner, the ordinary standard of care owed as well 
as the breach of the reasonable duty of care. The duty of reasonable care owed stems 
from the doctor-patient relationship. There are reciprocal duties in that a medical 
practitioner undertakes to treat the patient to the best of his abilities while the patient 
                                                                                                                                                                            
889  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 523. 
890  See discussion by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 523-524. 
891  See Duling v Bluefield Sanitarium Inc 149 W Va 567, 142 SE 2d 754 (1965); Johnson v Hilcrest 
Health Ctr Inc 70 P 3d 811 (Okla 2003); cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
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892  33 Ill 2d 326, 211 NE 253 (1965). 
893  See in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 529-531. 
894  See Douglas v Freeman 117 Wash 2d 242, 814 P2d 1160 (1991); cases referred to by Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 531 fn 341. 
895  See Johnson v Hilcrest Health Ctr Inc 70 P 3d 811 (Okla 2003); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
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consents to such treatment897 and must follow the advice of the medical practitioner 
with regard to treatment. There must be a breach of a duty of reasonable care owed 
to the patient and the harm must result from the negligent conduct, for a successful 
claim in negligence. In respect of the required duty of care placed on the medical 
practitioner, professional reasonable conduct is expected from the medical practitioner 
in all aspects of treatment: whether it deals with providing information to the patient; 
treatment; conduct during operations; follow-up treatment; and so forth. In order to 
establish whether a medical practitioner or health care provider’s conduct was 
reasonable and appropriate, either expert testimony of acceptable customs or 
practices of the medical community is considered, where it will depend on whether the 
medical practitioner applied the care and skill normally exercised by other medical 
practitioners in similar circumstances,898 or any other relevant evidence may be 
considered.899 With regard to disclosing information, a medical practitioner’s conduct 
may be found unreasonable when tested either against the medical standard of 
disclosure, that is, tested against what information a reasonable medical practitioner 
would have disclosed under similar circumstances where expert evidence relating to 
medical custom and practice must be provided;900 or the material risks that a 
reasonable patient would want to know in order to make an informed decision as to 
whether to continue with the treatment or not.901 The focus has shifted from the 
medical practitioner to the patient and his right of autonomy.902 It is submitted that in 
the end it still comes down to whether the medical practitioner acted reasonably or not 
in providing the patient with the required information. It is reasonable that not all risks 
need to be explained, but rather only the material risks.903 The test is still objective, in 
that in order for the plaintiff to succeed in proving negligence, the plaintiff must prove 
that if a reasonable patient under similar circumstances would have been informed of 
the risks he would have refused the treatment.904 It is reasonable that the requirement 
of disclosing material risks may be dispensed with: in cases of emergency; where the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
897  See cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 497 fn 34-35. 
898  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 504. 
899  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 507. 
900  See Aiken v Clary 396 SW 2d 668, 675 (Mo1965). 
901  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 517-518. 
902  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 515; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 191.  
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patient is incapacitated; if depending on the circumstances informing the patient would 
be harmful to him; where the patient has waived his rights to be informed; where the 
risks are commonly known; or if the patient is aware of the risks.905 It is reasonable 
that in instances where the patient acts unreasonably and fails to heed the advice of 
the medical practitioner or follow his instructions with regard to treatment and so on,906 
then depending on the circumstances, the medical practitioner may not be held liable 
or the plaintiff’s claim may be reduced as a result of his contributory fault.907 It is 
reasonable that the standard of care is lowered for persons who provide emergency 
medical treatment in terms of the Good Samaritan Statutes. These statutes encourage 
health care providers to freely render assistance where possible in such an emergency 
situation without having to face a claim in negligence.908 The United States of America 
legislature had to control the crisis through legislation as a result of the high medical 
malpractice claims.909 It is common knowledge that South Africa is experiencing a 
similar crisis and the legislature must inevitably intervene to control the crisis. 
 
3.4.3 Wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims  
 
In wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, an action is usually 
brought against the medical practitioner.910 The plaintiff must prove that the medical 
practitioner was negligent in breaching either a medical standard or a statute.911 In a 
wrongful life claim, the child sues the medical practitioner for harm suffered as a result 
of a birth defect or disability. The allegation is usually that the medical practitioner 
negligently allowed the child to be born with such birth defect or disability and the child 
claims for the suffering he must endure.912 Most courts do not allow such a claim due 
to a number of policy factors such as the view that “life itself cannot be considered as 
harm, or that compensation cannot be determined “for the harm of living as compared 
                                                                                                                                                                            
905  See authority referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 192 fn 75-81. 
906  See Harlow v Chin 405 Mass 697, 545 NE 2d 602 (1989). 
907  See authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 528 fn 306-308. 
908  See discussion by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 523-524. 
909  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 192-193. 
910  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 677. 
911  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 677. 
912  See Rogers 1982 S C L Rev 713; Trotzig 1980 Fam L Q 15; comprehensive authority cited by 
Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 370 fn 33.  
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to never having lived at all”.913 In Gleitman v Cosgrove,914 a child sustained birth 
defects as a result of a mother contracting German measles during pregnancy. The 
medical practitioner was sued for negligently assuring the mother that the child would 
not be affected. The mother alleged that had she been aware of the risks she would 
have terminated the pregnancy. The court presented with a number of factors to 
consider which included: calculating damages for harm; the view that the child should 
not have been born; the benefit of parenthood rule; and the effect of sanctioning 
abortion denied a wrongful life and wrongful birth claim. Following this decision most 
courts deny wrongful life claims.915 If claims are allowed, general damages are not 
usually awarded but claims for special damages relating to medical and similar related 
expenses have been allowed.916 
 
Wrongful birth claims are usually instituted by the mother based on the negligence of 
the medical practitioner in failing to pick up genetic defects which, had the mother 
known of, would have terminated the pregnancy.917 The wrongful birth claim is “viewed 
as a species of an informed consent claim” in that it protects the right to autonomy, the 
choice to terminate the pregnancy.918 Some states919 have denied wrongful life 
claims920 or have anti-abortion legislation in place.921 Some states allow recovery for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
913  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 677 fn 61-62. See Willis v Wu 362 SC 146, 607 
SE 2d 63 (2004); Walker v Mart 164 Ariz 37, 790 P 2d 735 (1990); Kassama v Magat 368 Md 
113, 792 A 2d 1102 (2002); Cowe v Forum Group Inc 575 NE 2d 630 (Ind 1991); BDH ex rel 
SKL v Mickelson 792 NW 2d 169 (ND 2010) – statute denied a wrongful life claim. 
914  1967 49 NJ 22, 227 A 2d 689. 
915  See Berman v Allan 404 A 2d 8 (New Jersey 1979); Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic 
questions of tort law 463. 
916  See Turpin v Sortini 31 Cal 3d 220, 182 Cal Rptr 337, 643 P 2d 954 (1982); Harbeson v Parke-
Davis Inc 1983 98 Wn 2d 460, 656 P 2d 483; Johnson v Superior Court 101 Cal App 4th 869, 
124 Cal Rptr 2d 650 (2002); cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 677 fn 63; cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 371 fn 45. 
917  See Galvez v Frields 88 Cal App 4th 1410, 107 Cal Rptr 2d 50 (2001); Arche v United States 
247 Kan 276, 798 P 2d 477 (1990); Ditato v Strehler 554 SE 2d 42 (Va 2001); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 678. 
918  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 679. 
919  Such as Georgia holding that the legislature must recognise such claims. See Etkind v Suarez 
271 Ga 352, 519 SE 2d 210 (1999); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 679 fn 76-
77. 
920  See Szekeres v Robinson 715 P 2d 1076 954 (California 1982); Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) 
Basic questions of tort law 463. 
921  See for example, Idaho Code § 145.424; Minn Stat Ann §5-334; cf authority cited by Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 679 fn 79-81; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
371.  
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wrongful birth claims by applying the “benefit rule”, whereby the costs of raising a child 
are offset by the benefit of the joy and companionship of the child to the parents.922 
 
Wrongful conception claims assert that the medical practitioner was negligent in 
providing advice or failing to prevent conception, resulting in the mother giving birth to 
a healthy child but being burdened with the expenses of raising the child.923 In 
instances of failed sterilisation, most courts do not allow compensation related to the 
cost of raising a healthy child.924 Some courts have allowed juries to award child-
raising costs where the parents wanted to avoid having children for financial or 
economic reasons.925 However, courts have allowed damages relating to inter alia: 
medical costs incurred during pregnancy and delivery of the child;926 lost wages from 
taking time off from work due to the pregnancy and delivery of the baby;927 and 
emotional distress from having an unplanned child.928 The limitations on the damages 
recovered are based on the idea that the economic or emotional harm suffered by the 
parents as a result of an unwanted or unplanned child are offset by the benefit of 
having the child.929 Damages are generally not allowed for child-raising costs where 
the child is born normal,930 but some courts do award such damages. When the courts 
allow recovery for child raising costs, the award may be reduced by taking into account 
the benefit of parenthood rule.931 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
922  See Johnson v University Hospital of Cleveland 540 NE 2d 1370, 1378 (Ohio 1989); Jones v 
Malinowski 473 A 2d 429 Maryland 1984; Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of 
tort law 463. 
923  See Etkind v Suarez 271 Ga 352, 519 SE 2d 210 (1999); Jackson v Bumgardner 318 NC 172, 
347 SE 2d 743 (1986); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 680. 
924  See Chaffee v Seslar 786 NE 2d 705 (Ind 2003); Schork v Huber 648 SW 2d 861 (Ky 1983); 
authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 681 fn 100.  
925  See University of Ariz Health Scis Ctr v Superior Court 136 Ariz 579, 667 P 2d 1294 (1983); 
Burke v Rivo 406 Mass 764, 551 NE 2d 1 (1990); authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 682 fn 103. 
926  See Pitre v Opelousas Gen Hosp 530 So 2d 1151 (La 1988); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 682. 
927  See Smith v Gore 728 SW 2d 738, 751 (Tenn 1987); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 682.  
928  See Pitre v Opelousas Gen Hosp 530 So 2d 1151 (La 1988); cases referred to by Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 372 fn 57; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 682. 
929  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 682. 
930  See Ramey v Fassoulas Fla App 1982 414 So 2d 198 where special damages were allowed 
for raising a child with significant impairment. See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
372. 
931  See Ochs v Borrelli 1982 187 Conn 253, 445 A2d 883; Phillips v United States DSC 1981 508 
F Supp 544; Sherlock v Stillwater Clinic Minn 1977 260 NW 2d 169; Hartke v McKelway DC Cir 
1983, 707 F 2d 1544; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 372. 
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The influence of reasonableness on wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful 
life claims is partly implicit and partly explicit. The duty of care stems from the doctor-
patient relationship. With wrongful conception and wrongful birth claims, the parents’ 
interests in autonomy are infringed in an unreasonable manner. In terms of negligence 
it must be proven that the provision of the statute was infringed unreasonably and 
unjustifiably or that the medical practitioner breached the medical standard and his 
conduct was unreasonable. Thus it would be reasonable to hold the medical 
practitioner liable for the damages sustained where the medical standard or statute is 
breached. The birth of a healthy child results in costs of upbringing of the child; or the 
birth of a child born with disabilities results in costs of raising the child and medical 
expenses which may not have occurred had the medical practitioner acted reasonably.     
 
3.4.4 Emotional harm or distress 
 
Recovering damages for emotional harm is not problematic when it is claimed with 
other damages under a tort such as assault, battery, physical injury from negligent 
conduct and so on. So-called parasitic damages are awarded in these instances.932 
Stand-alone claims for emotional distress (pure emotional harm) as a separate tort 
itself (whether the emotional harm was caused negligently or intentionally), is however 
subject to specific limitations.933 The policy concerns for being cautious in awarding 
damages for stand-alone emotional harm934 include: the anticipated flood of 
litigation;935 the difficulty of proving and quantifying damages for such harm, which 
impacts negatively on consistency in awards and the dispensing of justice;936 the 
subjectivity of how much emotional harm a person sustains;937 and an award for 
emotional harm may not result in a person no longer suffering such harm.938 It is 
                                                                                                                                                                            
932  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 363. 
933  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 55 fn 1 who refer to a number of articles 
explaining the development of claims for emotional harm and how the limits are still to be 
determined; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 700.  
934  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm and Emotional Harm) ch 8 scope 
note 2 (Tentative Draft No. 5 2007); Geistfeld 2011 Yale L J 155. 
935  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 56.    
936  See Bohlen 1902 Am L Reg NS 141, 143; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 55. 
937  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 55. 
938  See Thing v La Chusa 771 P 2d 814, 828-829 (Cal 1989); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 700-703 and in particular the authority cited in fn 7-10. 
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possible, however, to claim emotional harm under one tort such as battery as well as 
a stand-alone emotional distress claim where the facts may give rise to both claims.939  
 
The Restatement Third of Torts940 recognises liability for severe emotional harm 
caused intentionally941 or recklessly.942 With regard to intentionally inflicted harm, there 
must be proof of severe emotional harm suffered (not trivial harm);943 “extreme” or 
“outrageous” conduct on the part of the defendant which has passed the limit of 
reasonable bounds of decency and is “intolerable” in a civilised community;944 intention 
to cause such harm, where proof that the harm is certain to occur is sufficient,945 or 
“recklessness”, or a “willful attitude”.946 Courts in reference to extreme or outrageous 
conduct articulate conduct which is clearly beyond human decency and social 
norms.947 The notion of “outrageousness” requires the adjudicator to evaluate the 
complaints, evidence, conduct, and estimate whether the community would consider 
such conduct as outrageous.948 For example, conduct which results in the defendant 
abusing his position or power;949 taking advantage of or emotionally harming the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
939  See for example, KM v Ala Dep’t of Youth Servs 360 F Supp 2d 1253 (MD Ala 2005); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 705. 
940  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 46 (2012). See also Restatement Second of Torts 
§ 46 (1965). 
941  See Prosser 1939 Mich L Rev 874; Givelber 1982 Colum L Rev 42, 46-49.  
942  See Russell v Salve Regina College 649 F Supp 391, 401 (DR 1 1986); Shapo Tort 68. 
943  In Braski v Ah-Ne-Pee Dimensional Hardwood Inc 630 F Supp 862, 866 (WD Wis 1986) the 
court denied recovery for emotional distress to a plaintiff who had not visited a medical 
practitioner after the incident stemming from the termination of her employment and had only 
seen a psychiatrist before the trial. The psychiatrist noted temporary and limited distress for 
seven months. The court held that the employers conduct was not outrageous and that her 
claim was frivolous. See also Eckenrode v Life of America Insurance Co (7th Cir 1972) 470 F 
2d 1; Fletcher v Western National Insurance Co 1970 10 Cal App 3d 376, 89 Cal Rptr 78; 
Magruder 1936 Harv L Rev 1033, 1035; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 59, 60 fn 54; 
Shapo Tort 70-71. 
944  See for example, Boswell v Barnum & Bailey 1916 135 Tenn 35, 185 SW 692 where the insult 
and abuse of circus seats was considered outrageous; Interstate Amusement Co v Martin 1913 
8 Ala App 481, 62 So 404 where the plaintiff was called on stage and humiliated; Restatement 
Second of Torts § 46 comment d (1965); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 59. 
945  See Chamberlain v Chandler CC Mass 1823 3 Mason 242, 5 Fed Cas No.2, 575; Prosser 1939 
Mich L Rev 874;Vold 1939 Neb L B 222; Borda 1939 Geo L J 55; Seitz 1940 Ky L J 411; Smith 
1957 Drake L Rev 53; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 57. 
946  See Blakely v Shortfal’s Estate 1945 236 Iowa 787, 20 NW 2d 28; Restatement Third of Torts 
(Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 46 cmt h; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 707. 
947  See Mahnke v Moore 1951, 197 Md 61, 77 A 2d 923; McCulloh v Drake 24 P 3d 1162, 1169-
1170 (Wyo 2001); White v Brommer 747 F Supp 2d 447 (ED Pa 2010); Valadez v Emmis 
Commc’ns 229 P 3d 389 (Kan 2010); Rabin 2009 Wake Forest L Rev 1197; Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 707. 
948  See Shapo Tort 78. 
949  See for example, District of Columbia v Tulin 994 A 2d 788 (DC 2010) where a police officer 
was a cause of an accident but instead allowed another motorist to be falsely arrested for 
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plaintiff who is vulnerable;950 continuing or repeating unacceptable conduct;951 threats 
or acts of violence to the plaintiff, person or his property952 where the plaintiff has a 
special relationship with the person or special interest in the property;953 and sexual 
harassment in the place of employment;954 may be deemed as outrageous conduct.955 
The emotional distress endured by the plaintiff must be severe in that either a 
reasonable person should not be expected to tolerate it (an objective test)956 or the 
plaintiff may show that he endured severe emotional distress.957 Hurt feelings,958 mere 
profanity or abuse, obscenity, threats and so on that are considered as annoyances 
will not lead to recovery of compensation for mental harm.959 Fright, shock, rage, 
anxiety, grief and so on are considered as “physical” injuries.960 Therefore the brain 
and nervous system is considered just as much as part of the body as for example an 
arm or a leg.961 In general, if a reasonable person would not suffer serious emotional 
harm, then the plaintiff may not be entitled to compensation.962 However, if a plaintiff 
                                                                                                                                                                            
reckless driving; Brandon v Cnty of Richardson  261 Neb 636, 624 NW 2d 604 (2001) where a 
sheriff interrogated a transsexual victim of rape in a cruel manner soon after the rape occurred; 
Grager v Schudar  770 NW 2d 692 (ND 2009) where a jailer had intercourse with a prisoner; 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 708 fn 54. 
950  See for example Doe v Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
141 Wash App 407, 167 P 3d 1193 (2007) where a bishop told a teenager who was sexually 
abused that if she reported the abuse, she would be blamed for the break-up of her family 
(Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 708 fn 55). 
951  See for example Gleason v Smolinski 88 A 3d 589 (Conn 2014) where the defendants 
continued hanging posters close to the plaintiff’s house purely to intimidate her; Contreras v 
Crown Zellerbach Corp 88 Was 2d 735, 565 P 2d 1173 (1977) (harassment at place of 
employment); other cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 708 fn 
56. 
952  See Plotnik v Meihaus 208 Cal App 4th 1590, 146 Cal Rptr 3d 585 (2012) where threats were 
made to harm the homeowners dog and wife; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
709. 
953  See for example, Nims v Harrison 768 So 2d 1198 (Fla Dist Ct App 2000) where the plaintiff 
was threatened with harm to her children; cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 709 fn 59-61. 
954  See Shaffer v National Can Corp 565 F Supp 909, 915 (ED Pa 1983). 
955  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 708-709. 
956  See McQuay v Guntharp 331 Ark 466, 963 SW 2d 583 (1998); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 710. 
957  See State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Campbell 538 US 408, 123 S Ct 1513, 155 L Ed 2d 585 
(2003); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 710-711. 
958  See Wallace v Shoreham Hotel Corp App DC 1946 49 A 2d 81; Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on torts 60.   
959  See for example, Taft v Taft 1867 40 Vt 229; Johnson v General Motors Acceptance Corp 5th 
Cir 1955, 228 F 2d 104; Slocum v Food Fair Stores of Florida Inc Fla 1958 100 So 2d 396; 
other cases cited by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 59 fn 42-44.   
960  See Goodrich 1922 Mich L Rev 497; Tibbets 1904 Cent LJ 83; as well as other authority cited 
by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 56 fn 9 
961  See chapter 3 para 8. 
962  See for example Williamson v Bennett 251 NC 498, 112 SE 2d 48 (1960) where the plaintiff 
went into such an emotional state imagining that she had struck down a child – she was not 
entitled to compensation for emotional harm as the reasonable person would not have suffered 
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has an inherent infirmity or pre-existing condition which results in the plaintiff 
sustaining more harm than a normal person without a pre-existing condition, then the 
thin-skull rule applies whereby the plaintiff is in principle entitled to full compensation 
for the emotional harm suffered.963 
 
Secondary victims of intentionally inflicted emotional distress may be entitled to claim. 
However, the Restatement Third of Torts964 limits recovery for emotional harm to close 
family members965 and where the defendant acts with a purpose, or substantial 
certainty, or is reckless in harming the secondary victim. For example, where a child 
witnesses the battery of the mother, the mother (as the primary victim) and the child 
(secondary victim) may claim for emotional distress.966 Compensation for emotional 
harm to a large group of persons such as secondary victims who witness a disturbing 
event will generally not be entitled to claim as liability may be unlimited.967 Claims by 
secondary victims have been limited by requiring that the mental harm must have been 
reasonably foreseen or anticipated.968  
 
In terms of negligently inflicted harm, claims for emotional harm have succeed in 
instances of, for example: negligently informing a person that someone has died when 
in fact they had not and where it is likely to result in serious mental harm;969 or 
negligent mishandling of corpses resulting in mental harm.970  
                                                                                                                                                                            
such emotional harm; cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 732 
fn 257. 
963  See for example, Brackett v Peters 11 F 3d 78 (7th Cir 1993); Steinhauser v Hertz Corp 421 F 
2d 1169 (2nd Cir 1970); cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
732 fn 256. 
964  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 46 cmt m (2012). See also Restatement Second 
of Torts § 46(2) (1965).   
965  See however, Hill v Kimball 1890 76 Tex 210, 13 SW 59; Rogers v Williard 1920 144 Ark 587, 
223 SW 15 where the family members were not immediate family members. 
966  See Courtney v Courtney 413 SE 2d 418, 424 (W Va 1991); Bevan v Fix 42 P 3d 1013, 1022-
1024 (Wyo 2002); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 712. 
967  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 46 cmt i (2012). See 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 712. 
968  See for example, Goddard v Watters 1914 14 Ga App 722, 82 SE 304; as well as other cases 
referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 65 fn 4-6. 
969  See Russ v Western Union Telegraph Co 1943 222 NC 504, 23 SE 2d 681 where the company 
negligently transmitted a message that a person had died; Johnston v State of New York 1975 
37 NY 2d 378, 372 NYS 2d 638, 334 NE 2d 590 where a hospital negligently misinformed the 
plaintiff that her mother had died; Prosser and Keeton on torts 362. 
970  See Chisum v Behrens SD 1979 283 NW 2d 235; Chelini v Nieri 1948 32 Cal 2d 480, 196 P 2d 
915 (negligent embalming); Torres v State 1962 34 Misc 2d 488, 288 NYS 2d 1005 dealing 
with unauthorised burial and autopsy; other cases referred to by Prosser and Keeton on torts 
362. 
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Physical contact or injury971 in a claim for emotional shock is no longer a 
requirement.972 Evidence of any medically recognisable harm, which need not be 
severe,973 manifesting the emotional shock or fright sustained from a sudden event or 
threat of harm, is generally required. The emotional harm must result in an illness or 
injury to the mind, injury to personality, or the nervous system.974 However, the 
Restatement Third of Torts975 and some states allow a plaintiff to recover 
compensation for negligently inflicted emotional harm if on a preponderance of 
evidence it is shown that the plaintiff suffered serious emotional harm, without proving 
physical contact or physical manifestations of the emotional harm.976 In Tennessee, 
the special requirements for emotional harm have been abolished and reliance is 
placed on a foreseeability of emotional harm test requiring medical or scientific 
proof.977   
 
Emotional harm may result from: sudden shock or fright;978 physical harm or the threat 
thereof;979 fear of future harm from toxic exposure; receiving incorrect information, for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
971  In Mitchell v Rochester Railway Co 45 NE 354 (NY 1896) the plaintiff had sustained a 
miscarriage and suffered shock when the defendant’s horses came close to contact with her. 
There was no physical contact and the court denied compensation for shock alone. In Battalla 
v State 176 NE 2d 729 (NY 1961) the requirement of physical contact was abandoned. See 
Restatement Second of Torts § § 436, 436A; other cases referred to by Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 364 fn 55. 
972  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 715. 
973  See Armstrong v Paoli Mem’l Hosp 430 Pa Super 36, 633 A 2d 605 (1993) where the plaintiff 
lost control of his bowel and bladder after sustaining shock. This evidence was considered 
sufficient. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 722. 
974  See for example Paz v Brush Engineered Materials Inc 949 So 2d 1 (Miss 2007); cases referred 
to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 722 fn 191. 
975  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 47 cmt j and § 48 cmt i (2012). All that is required 
is “serious emotional disturbance”. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 723. 
976  See Camper v Minor 915 SW 2d 437 (Tenn 1996); Hagel v McMahon 136 Wash 2d 122, 134, 
960 P 2d 424, 431 (1998); Bowen v Lumbermens Mut Cas Co 183 Wis 2d 627, 517 NW 2d 432 
(1994); Gates v Richardson 719 P 2d 193 (Wyo 1986); Johnson v State 37 NY 2d 378, 334 NE 
2d 590, 372 NYS 2d 638 (1975); further cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 723 fn 196. 
977  See Camper v Minor 915 SW 2d 437 (Tenn 1996); Ramsey v Beavers 931 SW 2d 527 (Tenn 
1996); Flax v DaimlerChrysler Corp 272 SW 3d 521 (Tenn 2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 724. 
978  See Sundquist v Madison Ry 221 NW 2d 63 (Wisc 1960). 
979  See Orlo v Connecticut Co 21 A 2d 402 (Conn 1941). 
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example, that a person has a condition;980 or that a person died but is in fact alive;981  
and where the “defendant is under a duty of care for the plaintiff’s well-being”.982 In 
instances where a plaintiff is exposed to something harmful such as asbestos or 
excessive x-rays and then develops emotional harm from fear of future harm such as 
cancer, the plaintiff may be entitled to compensation for the emotional harm 
sustained.983 The emotional harm usually forms part of other damages claimed 
stemming from the injury, referred to as “parasitic damages”, but the courts have 
awarded compensation for stand-alone emotional harm where there is fear of future 
harm. An example of a stand-alone claim for emotional harm is where a medical 
practitioner negligently fails to detect a condition due to a negligent reading of test 
results, but later finds out that the plaintiff requires treatment. The delay results in the 
likelihood of future cancer and the plaintiff subsequently suffers emotional harm.984 
There must however be a reasonable fear of future harm in that an ordinary person in 
society would have a similar fear. The plaintiff may prove the reasonable fear by 
providing evidence, for example, that he was exposed to a virus (such as AIDS) or 
injected with a possible contaminated needle.985 
 
Negligently inflicted emotional harm may occur directly to the plaintiff (from here 
referred to as the “primary victim”) or to a third person (from here referred to as the 
“secondary victim”).986 Limitations do however apply to claims for primary and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
980  See Moolien v Kaiser Foundation Hospitals 616 P 3d 813, 816-817 (Cal 1980) where a woman 
was told she had syphilis which was infectious and that she should inform her husband. This 
caused distrust between the couple leading to the breakdown of the marriage. The court 
allowed the husband’s claim for emotional distress stating that it was reasonably foreseeable 
and predictable that a wrong diagnosis would result in marital discord and emotional distress 
(820). 
981  See for example, Russ v W Union Tel Co 222 NC 504, 23 SE 2d 681 (1943); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 726. 
982  For example, where a medical practitioner’s negligent conduct results in the loss of a foetus. 
The mother may claim for emotional harm sustained as there is a doctor-patient relationship, 
see Broadnax v Gonzalez 2 NY 3d 148, 809 NE 2d 645, 777 NYS 2d 416 (2004); Toney v 
Chester Cnty Hosp 36 A 3d 83 (Pa 2011). See also Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 728-731; Dobbs 2008 Ariz L Rev 49; Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm) § 47(b) (2012). 
983  See for example, Ferrara v Galluchio 5 NY 2d 16, 152 NE 2d 249, 176 NYS 2d 996 (1958); 
CSX Transp Inc v Hensley 556 US 838, 129 S Ct 2139, 173 L Ed 2d 1184 (2009); Norfolk & 
Western Railway Co v Ayers, 538 US 135, 123 S Ct 1210, 155 L Ed 2d 261 (2003); cases 
referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 725 fn 208-211. 
984  See for example Gilliam v Roche Biomedical Labs Inc 989 F 2d 278 (8th Cir 1993). 
985  See Faya v Almaraz 329 Md 435, 620 A 2d 327 (1993); Madrid v Lincoln Cnty Med Ctr 923 P 
2d 1134 (NM 1996). Cf cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 723 
fn 214-220. 
986  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) §§ 47-48 (2012). 
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secondary emotional harm sustained. In the case of primary victims, they must have 
been in a position of “immediate danger of bodily harm”,987  or the harm must occur 
“within the confines of particular undertakings or special relationships”.988 The plaintiff 
must have suffered severe emotional stress which may be proven by providing 
medical evidence or evidence relating to the physical manifestation of the emotional 
stress.989 Generally only serious emotional harm that a normal person would sustain 
or that a reasonable person would foresee is compensable.990 Where the defendant 
negligently causes emotional harm which was foreseeable, the defendant will be held 
liable.991 Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick992 however state that it is “fair to say that these 
rules are not about foreseeability but about pragmatic limits on liability, which are 
endemic to this area”.   
 
In respect of secondary victims, only close family members are entitled to claim where 
they also “contemporaneously perceived the harm-causing event”.993 Where 
emotional harm results from negligent harm or threat to property including one’s pet, 
the courts will not award compensation.994 Claims for negligently inflicted secondary 
emotional harm are more likely to succeed where the victim: was a bystander who 
witnesses injury or threat of harm to a close relative;995 was in the zone of danger 
where the victim fears for his own safety;996 or where the emotional harm was 
                                                                                                                                                                            
987  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 47 cmt a (2012). 
988  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 714. See Hedgepeth v Whitman Walker Clinic 
22 A 3d 789 (DC 2011); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) 
§ 47 (2012). 
989  See Feller v First Interstate Bancsystem Inc 299 P 3d 338 (Mont 2013); Camper v Minor 915 
SW 2d 437 (Tenn 1996); other cases referred to Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
714 fn 112. 
990  See Perodeau v City of Hartford 259 Conn 729, 754, 792 A 2d 752, 767 (2002); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 714. 
991  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) §§ 47-48 (2012); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 713 fn 101. Most states award compensation for stand-
alone emotional harm sustained but a small number of states do not. See Dowty v Riggs 385 
SW 3d 117 (Ark 2010). 
992  Hornbook on torts 714. 
993  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 714. See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability 
for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 48 (2012). 
994  See McDougall v Lamm 211 NJ 203, 48 A 3d 312 (2012); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 714. 
995  See Consolidated Rail Corp v Gottshall 512 US 532, 546-47, 114 S Ct 2396, 129 L Ed 2d 427 
(1994); Thing v La Chusa 48 Cal 3d 644, 257 Cal Rptr 865, 771 P 2d 814 (1989); cases referred 
to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 718 fn 151-153.  
996  See Stadler v Cross Minn 1980 295 NW 2d 552; Corso v Merrill 119 NH 647, 650, 406 A 2d 
300 (1979); Jelley v Laflame, 108 NH 471, 238 A 2d 728 (1968); Cote v Litawa, 96 NH 174, 71 
A 2d 792 (1950); Keck v Jackson 122 Ariz 114, 593 P 2d 668 (1979); Bovsun v Sanperi 61 NY 
2d 219, 461 NE 2d 843, 473 NYS 2d 357 (1984); Restatement Second of Torts § 313(2) (1965); 
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foreseeable.997 Emotional harm will generally be deemed foreseeable if the victim: was 
closely related to the primary victim;998 was close to the scene where the primary victim 
was injured; or was aware of the injury or threat of harm to the primary victim. In 
respect of foreseeability of harm, the secondary victim need not witness the initial 
injury of the primary victim but should see the primary victim soon after the incident, 
before his condition changes significantly.999 A close relationship between the primary 
and secondary victim is required and it may be interpreted by courts restrictively to 
exclude non-family members such as a fiancé,1000 or family members not deemed 
close enough (such as a son-in-law1001 or aunt who raised a child).1002 On the other 
hand a close enough relationship may be interpreted widely not limiting the 
relationship to blood or marriage, to include a partner,1003 fiancé1004 and even distant 
relatives depending on how close the relationship is.1005 In determining whether there 
is a close relationship between the primary and secondary victim, the following factors 
may be considered:  
 
 “(1) the duration of the relationship; (2) the degree of mutual dependence; (3) the extent of 
 common contributions to a life together; (4) the extent and quality of shared experience; (5) 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 715; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
365.   
997  This test was enunciated in Dillon v Legg 68 Cal 2d 728, 69 Cal Rptr 72, 441 P2d 912 (1968) 
where a mother witnessed her child run over and killed even though she was safe from harm. 
See also Catron v Lewis 271 Neb 416, 712 NW 2d 245 (2006); Restatement Third of Torts 
(Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) §§ 47-48 (2012); cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 715 fn 125; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 366. 
998  Parents and siblings are most likely to be successful in their claims. See for example, Carter v 
Williams 792 A2d 1093, 1099 (Me 2002) where a five-year-old child witnessed her sister being 
fatally injured. Courts are reluctant to award compensation for emotional harm sustained by 
fiancés, see for example, Smith v Toney 862 NE 2d 656 (Ind 2007). However, a step-
grandmother (as a secondary victim) was entitled to compensation, see Leong v Takasaki 520 
P 2d 758, 766 (Haw 1974).  
999  See for example Gabaldon v Jay-Bi Property Mgmt Inc 925 P 2d 510 (NM 1996); other cases 
referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 716 fn 130-131. In Cohen v 
McDonnell Douglas Corp 450 NE 2D 581, 589 (Mass 1983) the mother in Massachusetts heard 
about the death of her son seven hours after he died in a plane crash in Chicago. The mother 
upon hearing the news suffered angina attacks and died of a heart attack two days later. The 
court denied recovery.   
1000  See for example, Zimmerman v Dane Cnty 329 Wis 2d 270, 789 NW 2d 754 (Ct App 2010); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 717. 
1001  See Moon v Guardian Postacute Servs Inc 95 Cal App 4th 1005, 116 Cal Rptr 2d 218, 98 ALR 
5th 767 (2002); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 717. 
1002  Trombetta v Conkling 82 NY 2d 549, 626 NE 2d 653, 605 NE 2d 653, 605 NYS 2d 678 (1993); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 717. 
1003  See Cal Civ Code § 1714.01; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 717. 
1004  See for example, Graves v Estabrook, 818 A 2d 1255 (NH 2003); cases referred to by Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 717 fn 144. 
1005  See Eskin v Bartee 262 SW 3d 727 (Tenn 2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 717. 
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 whether the plaintiff and the injured person were members of the same household; (6) their 
 emotional reliance upon each other; (7) the particulars of their day-to-day relationship; and (8) 
 the manner in which they related to each other in attending to life's mundane requirements, 
 the nature, duration, and quality of experiences shared in the relationship are considered”.1006 
 
The influence of reasonableness on claims for emotional harm or distress is 
predominantly explicit. Emotional harm or distress may be caused negligently or 
intentionally. With both intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional harm, there 
must be proof of severe emotional harm suffered1007 as it would be unreasonable to 
hold the defendant liable for trivial harm suffered such as threats and so on deemed 
mere annoyances. In gauging whether the emotional harm or distress endured by the 
plaintiff is severe, the standard of the reasonable person is applied in that a reasonable 
person should not be expected to tolerate such emotional harm or stress,1008 or 
alternatively proof of severe emotional harm or distress endured the plaintiff may be 
provided.1009 The defendant’s conduct must be “extreme” or “outrageous” in respect 
of intentionally inflicted emotional harm and here the community’s views are important 
in gauging whether the defendant’s conduct is reasonable. Conduct is unreasonable 
if it is beyond human decency and not acceptable by the community.1010 In respect of 
primary victims the harm must be foreseeable in that the plaintiff must have been in a 
position of immediate danger of harm,1011 or within the scope of an undertaking or 
special relationship.1012 Claims for secondary emotional harm or distress are also 
limited to what is reasonably foreseeable. The harm will be considered foreseeable if 
the secondary victim was a bystander witnessing the injury or threat of harm to a close 
relative,1013 or within the zone of danger fearing for his own safety,1014 or where the 
harm is anticipated.1015 Where a person fears future harm and sustained emotional 
harm or distress as a result of such fear, there must be a reasonable fear of future 
harm. The reasonable person must have a similar fear under similar 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1006  See St Onge v MacDonald 154 NH 768, 917 A 2d 233, 236 (2007) referred to by Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 717. 
1007  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 59-60; Shapo Tort 70-71. 
1008  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 710. 
1009  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 710-711. 
1010  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 707; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 59. 
1011  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 47 cmt a (2012). 
1012  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 47 (2012); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 714. 
1013  See cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 718 fn 151-153.  
1014  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 715; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 365.   
1015  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 65. 
506 
 
circumstances.1016 In terms of closeness with regard to the relationship between the 
primary and secondary victim, the courts are at liberty to decide and make use of a 
number of factors.1017 It is apparent that the standard of the reasonable person is 
applied in determining both intentional and negligent inflicted emotional harm. 
Reasonable foreseeability of harm is used to limit claims and liability. 
 
3.4.5 Pure economic loss 
 
Pure economic loss is loss which does not stem from physical harm to the plaintiff’s 
property or person.1018 The general rule is that a person owes no duty of reasonable 
care to prevent “unintentional infliction of economic loss to another”.1019 The courts are 
reluctant to award compensation for pure economic loss whether caused negligently, 
with malice or with intention and this is often referred to as the economic loss rule.1020 
The Restatement Third of Torts1021 generally denies liability for negligently inflicted 
economic loss. There are exceptions to this rule where liability is not denied. 
 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick1022 identify five commonly occurring factual settings where 
economic torts are applicable: 
 
 “(1) The defendant’s improper communications to third persons cause the plaintiff financial 
 harm. [1023] 
 (2) The defendant’s false statements to the plaintiff herself induce the plaintiff to enter into an 
 economically damaging transaction [1024]   
 (3) The defendant appropriates some intangible value belonging to the plaintiff, a trade secret 
 for example. 
 (4) The defendant provides a defective tangible product or services, causing pure economic 
 harm such as losses in production or added costs without physical harm to other property. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1016  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 723. 
1017  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 717. 
1018  See Bayer CropScience LP v Schafer 385 SW 3d 822 (Ark 2011); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 1064. 
1019  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Economic Harms) § 1 (2012). 
1020  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1061. 
1021  (Liability for Economic Harms) § 1 (2012). 
1022  Hornbook on torts 1063. 
1023  For example, where the defendant tells the plaintiff’s customers that there is a defect with the 
products he is selling and if customers stop buying the products form the  plaintiff, the plaintiff 
may have a claim for economic loss resulting from intentional interference with business 
relations or contracts. See in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1113-1142 
with regard to either intentional or negligent misrepresentations causing economic loss. 
1024  These claims occur mainly as a result of misrepresentation, deceit or fraud. Where the plaintiff 
relies on a statement made, one of the questions asked is whether the plaintiff was justified in 
relying on the statement. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1064. 
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 (5) The defendant causes physical harm to person or property of another person which in turn 
 causes pure economic harm to the plaintiff. [1025]”  
 
In instances where A negligently causes physical harm to B or his property, 
subsequently resulting in C sustaining economic loss; A will not be held liable for the 
economic loss sustained by C. C is considered a stranger. This rule is referred to as 
the “stranger rule” and this rule denying liability for pure economic loss was confirmed 
in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co v Flint.1026 In this case, the plaintiff hired a steam boat 
from third parties, the owners. The boat’s propeller broke and the owners hired the 
defendant to replace the propeller. The defendant’s employee negligently dropped the 
propeller and a new one was ordered. There was a two-week delay, during which the 
plaintiff was unable to use the boat resulting in him sustaining pure economic loss. 
The plaintiff sued the defendant for his loss and the Supreme Court held that the 
defendant did not owe a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff as the plaintiff did not 
own the boat. He therefore had no proprietary interest in the boat.1027 The Restatement 
Third of Torts sanctions the rule.1028 This rule where no duty is owed applies to 
instances where a factory loses power supply due to another’s negligence and ceases 
production and sale of products to third parties. Thus no duty of reasonable care is 
owed to the third parties who suffer pure economic loss.1029 The same principle applies 
where roadways are blocked due to the negligent conduct of the defendant 
subsequently affecting the plaintiff’s business resulting in pure economic loss.1030 
 
Some of the reasons advanced for denying liability for pure economic loss include:  
liability could hinder economic freedom and competition;1031 indeterminate liability1032 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1025  For example, where a defendant cuts the power supply to a manufacturing plant resulting in 
loss of production and in turn loss of sales – a claim for such loss will most likely be barred. 
See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1065. 
1026  275 US 303, 48 S Ct 134, 72 L Ed 290 (1927). 
1027  See Epstein Torts 607-608. 
1028  (Liability for Economic Harms) § 7 (2014). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
1066. 
1029  See Kaiser Aluminium & Chem Corp v Marshland Dredging Co 455 F2d 957 (5th Cir 1972) as 
well as other cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1067 fn 47. 
1030  See 532 Madison Ave Gourmet Foods Inc v Finlandia Ctr Inc 96 NY 2d 280, 750 NE 2d 1097, 
727 NYS 2d 49 (2001); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1067. 
1031  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1071. 
1032  Where A’s loss results in B’s loss and C’s loss causing a domino effect. There may be liability 
to indeterminate persons, for an indeterminate time and an indeterminate sum. See Louisiana 
ex rel Guste v M/V Testbank 752 F 2d 1019 (5th Cir 1985); Ultrameres Corp v Touche 255 NY 
170, 174 NE 441 (1931); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1071-1072. 
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is unfair and unjust;1033 the law of contract may be applicable as opposed to tort law 
and should not be undermined;1034 and the plaintiff should assess his risk which 
includes economic loss he may sustain and should either insure against such loss or 
contract with another for protection, especially where the cost of insurance is relatively 
low.1035 Some courts bar economic loss claims when the parties are considered 
“sophisticated business entities”1036 or the plaintiff is the “sophisticated party”.1037 If the 
plaintiff is however lacking bargaining power he may be entitled to an economic loss 
claim in tort and need not be limited to a claim in contract.1038 For the duty in tort to be 
actionable it must not be intertwined with a contract (known as the “contract rule”).1039 
The “stranger rule” and the “contract rule” limit liability for pure economic loss in 
general whether in the tort of negligence or the intentional torts such as deceit and 
fraud where there is a contractual or semi-contractual relationship.1040  
 
Exceptions apply to the general rule where there is a special relationship between the 
parties and a duty of care to prevent economic loss or protect economic interests exists 
is recognised. A special relationship exists in instances where it would be equitable to 
impose such a duty.1041 Examples of special relationships which may lead to liability 
for pure economic loss apply to professionals, such as accountants,1042 insurance 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1033  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1072-1073. 
1034  See eToll Inc v Elias/ Savion Advertising Inc 811 A 2d 10 (Pa Super Ct 2002); Heath v Palmer 
181 Vt 545, 915 A 2d 1290 (2006); Smith Mar Inc v L/B Kaitlyn Eymard 710 F 3d 560 (5th Cir 
2013); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1079, 1081. 
1035  Below v Norton 751 NW 2d 351 (Wis 2008). 
1036  See Cumberland Valley Contractors v Bell County Coal Corp 238 SW 3d 644, 652 (Ky 2007); 
PTI Assocs LLC v Carolina Int’l Sales Co Inc 2010 WL 363 330 (D Conn 2010); 425 Beecher 
LLC v Unizan Bank Nat’l Ass’n 186 Ohio App 3d 214, 927 NE 2d 46 (2010); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1083. 
1037  Desert Healthcare District v PacifiCare FHP Inc 94 Cal App 4th 781, 793, 114 Cal Rptr 2d 623, 
632 (2001); Rissler & McMurry Co v Sheridan Area Water Supply 929 P 2d 1228, 1235 (Wyo 
1996); Palmetto Linen Servs Inc v UNX Inc 205 F 3d 126, 129-30 (4th Cir 2000); Grynberg v 
Questar Pipeline Co 70 P 3d 1 (Utah 2003); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
1083-1084. 
1038  See Alloway v General Marine Indus LP 149 NJ 620, 628, 695 A 2d 264, 268 (1997); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1083. 
1039  Huron Tool & Eng’g Co v Precision Consulting Servs Inc 209 Mich App 365, 532 NW 2d 541 
(1995). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1084. 
1040  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1088. 
1041  See Blahd v Richard B Smith Inc 141 Idaho 296, 301, 108 P 3d 996, 1001 (2005); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1073. 
1042  See for example, Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v Touche Ross & Co 159 
Ill 2d 137, 161, 636 NE 2d 503, 514, 201 Ill Dec 71, 82 (1994). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 1074. 
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brokers,1043 attorneys,1044 and so forth. In an instance where a termite inspector 
negligently reports that the property is free of termites allowing the property to be sold 
at full price, the inspector may be held liable to a subsequent buyer. The loss is 
referred to as transferred loss; it is transferred to the next buyer and is not 
indeterminate.1045 In People Express Airlines Inc v Consolidated Rail Corp,1046 due to 
the defendant’s negligent handling of dangerous chemicals, the plaintiff’s offices had 
to be evacuated, resulting in pure economic loss. The court held that a duty of 
reasonable care was owed to prevent economic loss to an identifiable class of 
plaintiffs, as long as the defendant knew or ought to have known of the harm.1047  
 
Intentionally inducing breach of a contract and interference with the plaintiff’s contract 
or economic interests may result in pure economic loss whereby liability for the pure 
economic loss may follow. Usually as a result of the defendant’s conduct, a third party 
breaches the contract with the plaintiff or causes economic loss in the form of a 
reasonably likely gain or profit.1048  
 
A duty of reasonable care not to be negligent in supplying information is seen as an 
exception where liability is allowed. The defendant undertakes the duty or it exists as 
a result of a special relationship. The plaintiff relies on the inaccurate or incorrect 
information and is led to reasonably expect reasonable care of his interests.1049 There 
must be justified reliance (in other words, reasonable reliance) on the statements 
made. That is, would the reasonable person attach significance to the statement 
made?1050 The statement must be materially factual and not, for example, a mere 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1043  See for example, Graff v Robert M Swendra Agency Inc 800 NW 2d 112 (Min 2011); other 
cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1074 fn 95 as well as other 
special relationships where a duty to prevent pure economic loss may be owed. 
1044  See Collins v Reynard 154 Ill 2d 48, 607 NE 2d 1185 (1992); Clark v Rowe 428 Mass 339, 701 
NE 2d 624 (1998); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1074. 
1045  See Barrie v VP Exterminators Inc 625 So 2d 1007 (La 1993); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 1076. 
1046  100 NJ 246, 495 A 2d 107 (1985). 
1047  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1076.  
1048  Economic loss caused intentionally or the economic intentional torts will not be discussed 
further but see in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1089-1112; Keeton et 
al Prosser and Keeton on torts 978-1005. 
1049  See in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1123-1127. 
1050  See Restatement Second of Torts § 538(2)(b) (1965); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
753. 
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opinion on future uncertain projections or statements about a product amounting to 
mere “puffing” or “exaggeration”.1051  
 
The influence of reasonableness on the requirements for a claim for pure economic 
loss is partially explicit and partially implicit. The influence of reasonableness is implicit 
where policy considerations are considered. It is apparent that there is a reluctance to 
award compensation for pure economic loss and in order to limit liability, the courts 
may make use of a number of rules or policy considerations. It is submitted that 
compensation for economic loss is awarded where it is generally reasonable and fair 
depending on the circumstances of the case. For example, the “stranger rule” negates 
the element of a duty to prevent economic loss. From the outset, a court may state 
that there is no duty of reasonable care to prevent pure economic loss. Some of the 
other reasons advanced for denying liability for pure economic loss such as that 
liability is indeterminate and therefore the defendant should not be held liable,1052 that 
it is unfair and unjust to hold the defendant liable,1053 the law of contract may be 
applicable as opposed to tort law,1054 that the plaintiff should bear the loss because he 
should protect himself from loss by obtaining insurance where the cost of insurance is 
relatively low,1055 or that the plaintiff is the “sophisticated party”,1056 are all reasons 
which lend to the reasonableness of not holding the defendant liable for the economic 
loss. Compensation for pure economic loss is awarded where a special relationship 
exists and according to the circumstances of the case, it would be equitable to impose 
a duty of care to prevent economic loss.1057 In respect of negligent misrepresentations, 
the defendant may have a duty of care to prevent the economic loss if a special 
relationship exists between the parties, for example, that of the accountant and the 
client. The influence of reasonableness is explicit with regard to the requirement of 
reasonable reliance on the negligent misrepresentation which leads the plaintiff to 
reasonably expect that reasonable care is applied to looking after his interests.1058 In 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1051  See Ruff v Charter Behaviour Health Sys of Nw Ind Inc 699 NE 2d 1171 (Ind Ct App1998); 
Sales v Kecoughtan Housing Co Ltd 279 Va 475,690 SE 2d 91 (2010); Restatement Second 
of Torts § 537 (1965); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1131-1132; Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 749-750; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 755-758. 
1052  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1071-1072. 
1053  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1072-1073. 
1054  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1079, 1081. 
1055  See Below v Norton 751 NW 2d 351 (Wis 2008).  
1056  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1083-1084. 
1057  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1073. 
1058  See in general Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1123-1127. 
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terms of reasonable reliance, the reasonable person standard is applied, in that the 
question asked is whether the reasonable person would attach significance to the 
statement made.1059 The statement itself must be materially factual.1060   
 
3.5 Defences to the tort of negligence 
 
The two common defences against negligence are contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk.1061 These two defences will be discussed briefly and the influence 
of reasonableness on these defences will be referred to. 
 
3.5.1 Contributory fault and comparative fault 
 
In American law “comparative fault” and “comparative negligence” are terms 
commonly used to refer to the plaintiff’s fault and negligence respectively. For the sake 
of convenience the term “contributory negligence” and “contributory fault” will be used 
to refer to the plaintiff’s fault and negligence as is referred to in the Restatement Third 
of Torts.1062 The plaintiff has a duty to take reasonable care of himself and should the 
reasonable plaintiff have foreseen the risk of harm and taken steps to prevent such 
harm under similar circumstances, then the plaintiff may be found contributorily 
negligent.1063 There are two comparative fault systems where according to one of the 
systems, if the plaintiff’s negligence is of certain degree, he may be barred from 
recovery. This will be discussed further shortly.1064 In general, a plaintiff’s award for 
compensation may be reduced depending on his contributory negligence. The 
weighing of risks and utilities is also applied in determining the plaintiff’s fault.1065 The 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1059  See Restatement Second of Torts § 538(2)(b) (1965); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
753. 
1060  See Restatement Second of Torts § 537; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 1131-
1132; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 749-750; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 755-758. 
1061  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 451. 
1062  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 3 (2010). 
1063  See Basham v Hunt 332 Ill App 3d 980, 773 NE 2d 1213 (2002); Pleiss v Barnes 260 Neb 770 
619 NW 2d 825 (2000); Sawyer v Comerci 264 Va 68, 563 SE 2d 748 (2002); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 381. 
1064  See Restatement Third of Torts (Apportionment of liability) § 7 reporters note to cmt a (2000); 
Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 496 fn 318. 
1065  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 3 cmt b (2010); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 381; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 
453.  
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same tests applied in finding negligence on the part of the defendant are applied to 
the plaintiff, such as, the reasonable person standard, negligence per se rules1066 or 
no duty rules.1067 However, the same conduct expected from the defendant is not 
expected from the plaintiff in the same situation as the defendant may inter alia have 
more knowledge of the risks of harm, and may be in a better position to prevent the 
harm.1068 The same rules applicable to defendants in respect of factual causation1069 
and the scope of liability1070 are applicable to plaintiffs.1071 Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick1072 refer to the example where a plaintiff negligently mounts a slippery platform 
and the defendant subsequently negligently causes a brick to fall on the plaintiff. Even 
though the plaintiff creates the risks of slipping and falling, it does not materialise. 
Therefore the plaintiff’s fault is not within the scope of liability and the plaintiff will not 
be barred from recovery. At times the plaintiff’s negligent conduct may be regarded as 
a superseding cause excluding liability on the part of the defendant.1073 Generally, if 
the plaintiff cannot foresee harm or does indeed foresee harm but takes steps to avoid 
the harm, or if his negligence is not the factual cause of his harm or within the scope 
of liability, then such plaintiff is not negligent. His award for damages will not be 
reduced.1074 Under certain circumstances, courts have held that contributory fault 
cannot apply as a defence, for example, where a minor fails to protect herself against 
sexual abuse.1075 There are instances where it may be held that the plaintiff does not 
owe a duty of reasonable care based on principles or policy.1076 These include 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1066  See for example, Russell v Mathis 686 So 2d 241 (Ala 1996) in respect of a violation of a 
statutory rule; Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 14 
(2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 382. 
1067  See Epstein Torts 192-193. See paras 3.1-3.3 above. 
1068  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 454-455. 
1069  See for example Rascher v Friend 279 Va 370, 689 SE 2d 661 (2010); Restatement Third of 
Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 26 cmt m (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 382; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 456. 
1070  See Norfolk Southern Railway Co v Sorrell 549 US 158, 166 (2007); Restatement Third of Torts 
(Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 29 cmt m (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 382; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 457-458. 
1071  Restatement Third of Torts (Apportionment of Liability) § 4 (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 390. 
1072  Hornbook on torts 390. 
1073  See Exxon Co USA v Sofec Inc 517 US 830 116 S Ct 1813, 135 L Ed 2d 113 (1996); Wright v 
NYC Transit Auth 633 NYS 2d 393 (App Div 1995); Green 2002 S C L Rev 1103; Hayden 2000 
Loyola LA L Rev 887; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 391. See para 4 above 
with regard to causation and superseding causes. 
1074  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 391. 
1075  See for example, Christensen v Royal Sch Dist No 160, 124 P 3d 283 (Wash 2005); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 391. 
1076  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 7 cmt h (2010); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 391. 
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instances: where the plaintiff is very young or old; where there is a special relationship 
between the parties, such as that between parent and child, jailer and prisoner,1077 
employer and employee1078 etcetera; and where the defendant due to his control, 
superior knowledge, or experience is expected to take better reasonable care of the 
plaintiff’s interests than the plaintiff himself. The Restatement Third of Torts1079 
provides a rule that a child under the age of five cannot be held to be contributorily 
negligent. This rule has also been applied to an institutionalised elderly person.1080 
 
Generally an employer owes a duty of reasonable care to provide his employees with 
a safe working environment.1081 The employer must warn or remove any danger of 
which the employer knows of or should have known.1082  
 
There are currently two types of comparative fault systems applied in the United States 
of America. The first system is referred to as the “complete” or “pure comparative fault 
system” in which the plaintiff is not completely barred from obtaining compensation 
due to his contributory negligence. Comparative fault applies to all plaintiffs in all 
negligence cases.1083 Fifteen to twenty states as well as the major federal statutes 
have adopted this system.1084 Dobbs Hayden and Bublick1085 refer to a hypothetical 
example where the jury finds the plaintiff sixty percent negligent and the defendant 
forty percent negligent; the plaintiff will be entitled to forty percent of his proven 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1077  See for example, Sandborg v Blue Earth Cty 615 NW 2d 61 (Minn 2000) where the prisoner 
committed suicide; Gregoire v City of Oak Harbour 244 P 3d 924 (Wash 2010) where an inmate 
committed suicide; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 395. 
1078  See for example, Vendetto v Sonat Offshore Drilling Co 725 So 2d 474, 479 (La 1999); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 394. 
1079  (Apportionment of Liability) § 10 cmt e (2000). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 392. 
1080  See Fields v Senior Citizens Ctr Inc 528 So 2d 573, 581 (La Ct App 1988); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 392. 
1081  See Hastings v Mechalske 336 Md 663, 650 A 2d 274 (1994); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 603. 
1082  See Bennett v Trevecca Nazarene Univ 216 SW 3d 293 (Tenn 2007); Brewster v Colgate-
Palmolive Co 279 SW 3d 142 (Ky 2009) in respect of unknown asbestos; Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 603 fn 2. 
1083  See Restatement Third of Torts (Apportionment of liability) § 7 reporters note to cmt a (2000); 
Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 496 fn 318. 
1084  Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Michigan, New 
Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Washington. See Restatement Third of Torts (Apportionment 
of Liability) § 17 151-159 (2000); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 385 fn 52; 
Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 472; Epstein Torts 211. 
1085  Hornbook on torts 385. 
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damages.1086 The second system is referred to as the incomplete or “modified 
comparative fault system”1087 where the plaintiff may be barred from claiming 
compensation. The plaintiff will be barred from claiming compensation where his fault 
is equal to that of the defendant’s or exceeds the fault of the defendant.1088 Therefore 
if the plaintiff’s fault is equal to or greater than the defendants (“greater fault bar”), the 
plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation.1089 In the example given above, the 
plaintiff’s fault is greater than the defendant’s fault and will therefore be barred from 
claiming compensation. A plaintiff who is found to be forty-nine percent negligent is 
entitled to recover fifty-one percent of his proven damages, while a plaintiff who is 
found to be fifty-one percent negligent is not entitled to any compensation.1090 The 
“equal fault bar system” has been criticised.1091 The “pure comparative fault system” 
is preferred by a number of courts,1092 legal writers1093 and federal statutes such as 
FELA.1094  
 
The unjustified risks taken by the plaintiff are compared with those of the defendant 
under the circumstances.1095 The Restatement Third of Torts1096 states that the 
negligence compared is based on the conduct “relevant for determining percentage 
shares of responsibility only when it caused the harm and when the harm is within the 
scope of the person’s liability”. Subjective factors such as a person’s state of mind are 
considered relevant in judging the unreasonable risks created by his conduct “when 
his state of mind bears upon the utility of his conduct”.1097 For example, where the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1086  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 385. 
1087  There are five states that apply the complete bar to recovery. See Restatement Third of Torts 
(Apportionment of Liability) § 7 reporters note to cmt a (2000); Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) 
Basic questions of tort law 497 fn 318. 
1088  Followed in Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See for example, NH Stats Ann § 
507:7-d; Ark Code Ann § 16-64-122. See Epstein Torts 211. 
1089  See cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 385 fn 55; Keeton et 
al Prosser and Keeton on torts 473. 
1090  See Restatement Third of Torts (Apportionment of Liability) § 7.  
1091  See Campbell 1956 Wis L Rev 4, 21; Keeton 1968 Vand L Rev 906, 911. Wisconsin in 1971 
amended the 50% bar from recovery to the 51% bar. See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 473 fn 42. 
1092  See authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 386 fn 57. 
1093  See Prosser 1953 Cal L Rev 25; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 386. 
1094  45 USC A § 53. 
1095  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 386. 
1096  (Apportionment of Liability) § 8 cmt b (2000). 
1097  See Smith v Fiber Controls Corp 268 SE 2d 504, 507-509 (NC 1980); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 388. 
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defendant exceeds the speed limit while rushing his child to hospital in order to save 
his life; his reason for speeding has utility. The Restatement Third of Torts1098 suggests 
taking into consideration a “person’s actual awareness, intent, or indifference with 
respect to the risks created by the conduct”.1099 
 
In assessing relative negligence, Drowota J in Eaton v McLain1100 stated that the 
following factors should be considered:1101 
 
 “(1) the relative closeness of the causal relationship between the conduct of the defendant 
 and the injury to the plaintiff; (2) the reasonableness of the party's conduct in confronting a 
 risk, such as whether the party knew of the risk, or should have known of it; (3) the extent to 
 which the defendant failed to reasonably utilize an existing opportunity to avoid the injury to 
 the plaintiff; (4) the existence of a sudden emergency requiring a hasty decision; (5) the 
 significance of what the party was attempting to accomplish by the conduct, such as an 
 attempt to save another's life; and (6) the party's particular capacities, such as age, maturity, 
 training, education, and so forth”. 
 
In instances where a defendant acts intentionally in causing harm to the plaintiff, 
contributory negligence on the part of the defendant will generally not be applied as a 
defence.1102 The same applies where the plaintiff acts intentionally and the defendant 
negligently; the plaintiff will be barred from recovery.1103 In respect of provocation, if a 
plaintiff taunts the defendant who then strikes him, the plaintiff’s negligent taunting will 
not apply in reducing his award for compensation.1104 However, if the plaintiff’s conduct 
is deemed intentional then his award for compensation may be reduced (as 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1098  (Apportionment of Liability) § 8(b) (2000). 
1099  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 388. 
1100  891 SW 2d 587, 592 (Tenn 1994). 
1101  See also Purvis v Grant Parish Sch Bd 144 So 3d 922 (La 2014) where four of the five factors 
were considered; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 388. 
1102  The defence is not extended to intentional torts such as battery or assault (see Jackson v 
Brantley Ala App 1979, 378 So 2d 1109; Peterson v Campbell 1982, 105 Ill App 3d 992, 61 Ill 
Dec 572, 434 NE 2d 1169). See for example, Wightman v Consolidated Rail Corp 86 Ohio St 
3d 431, 715 NE 2d 546 (1999) where the defendant acted with malice; Christensen v Royal 
Sch Dist No 160, 124 P 3d 283 (Wash 2005) where a thirteen-year-old student’s sexual contact 
could not be considered as consensual or fall within the ambit of comparative fault; authority 
cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 399 fn 154; Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on torts 462. Some statutes codify this common law rule ‒see Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 399 fn 155. 
1103  See Ardis v Griffin 1962 239 SC 529, 123 SE 2d 876; Restatement Second of Torts §§ 482(2) 
and 503(3); authority cited by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 462 fn 10.  
1104  See Withlock v Smith 297 Ark 399, 762 SW 2d 782 (1989); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 399. 
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provocation is not a complete defence).1105 The Restatement Third of Torts1106 
recommends that a no-duty rule could be applied to the plaintiff in order to eliminate 
his carelessness from consideration “in a suit against an intentional tortfeasor”.1107 In 
instances where the plaintiffs acts negligently and the defendant recklessly or with 
wanton misconduct according to the Uniform Comparative Responsibility Act,1108 the 
plaintiff’s award may be reduced. Some courts have allowed recovery as long as the 
“reckless” conduct is not construed as intentional conduct1109 but some have not 
allowed the plaintiff to recover in full, his proven damages.1110 Where a plaintiff suffers 
harm as a result of his own seriously immoral or illegal act1111 he may not be entitled 
to compensation, based on the idea that one cannot profit for one’s own wrong, even 
though the defendant owes him a duty of care. For example, in Barker v Kallash1112 
where the plaintiff (a fifteen-year- old child) made a bomb from ingredients supplied by 
the defendant (a nine-year-old child) whereafter the bomb exploded causing injury to 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff was barred from claiming.1113 In Orzel v Scott Drug Co1114 
where the plaintiff obtained drugs from a pharmacist without a prescription and was 
subsequently harmed by taking the drugs, the court held that the plaintiff had no claim 
against the pharmacist. 
 
The Restatement Third of Torts1115 provides that in instances where the defendant 
causes harm to the plaintiff and the plaintiff subsequently fails to mitigate the injury, 
apportionment may be applied based on comparative fault instead of the “rules of 
avoidable consequences”. For example, if the plaintiff’s leg was injured in a motor 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1105  See Landry v Bellanger 851 So 2d 943 (La 2003); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 399 fn 156. 
1106  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 7 cmt h (2010). See Restatement Third of Torts 
(Apportionment of Liability) § 3 cmt d (2000); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
399. 
1107  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 399. 
1108  Of 2002 §1.  
1109  See Yerkes v Asberry 938 SW 2d 307 (Mo Ct App 1997); Cartwright v Equitable Life Assurance 
Soc’y 276 Mont 1, 914 P 2d 976 (1996); Weaver v Lentz 348 SC 672, 561 SE 2d 360 (Ct App 
2002); authority referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 400 fn 162-163. 
1110  See Davies v Butler 95 Nev 763, 602 P 2d 605 (1979); Zeroulias v Hamilton Am Legion Assocs 
Inc 705 NE 2d 1164 (Mass App Ct 1999); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 400 
fn 164. 
1111  See Winschel v Brown 171 P 3d 142 (Alaska 2007); Ardringer v Hummell 982 P 2d 727 (Alaska 
1999); cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 402 fn 177-180. 
1112  63 NY 2d 19, 468 NE 2d 39 (1984). 
1113  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 402. 
1114  449 Mich 550, 537 NW 2d 208 (1995). 
1115  (Apportionment of Liability) §3 cmt b (2000). 
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vehicle accident as a result of the defendant’s negligent conduct and thereafter the 
plaintiff suffers further harm as a result of not taking prescribed antibiotics, the further 
harm sustained is a result of the combined conduct of both parties. The defendant is 
liable in full for the first injury. Apportionment is applied to the further harm.1116 Where 
a plaintiff fails to wear a seatbelt, his damages may be reduced as a result of his 
contributory negligence1117 but a number of states have barred this defence.1118 Where 
a statute prohibits the defence of contributory negligence, the plaintiff’s claim for 
compensation may be reduced by using the mitigation of damage rule in order to 
deduct that portion of the damage that the plaintiff could have reasonably avoided by 
wearing a seatbelt.1119 Some statutes allow a reduction of the plaintiff’s claim but then 
limit it to a capped amount (such as five percent) or limit damages for pain and 
suffering.1120 
 
The influence of reasonableness on contributory negligence is explicit. It is 
unreasonable to hold the defendant fully liable for the harm suffered by the plaintiff 
when the plaintiff had a duty to take reasonable care of himself, and where the 
reasonable person in a similar situation would have foreseen the risk of harm and 
would have taken steps to prevent the harm. Similarly it is reasonable for the defendant 
to compensate the plaintiff for harm resulting from his unreasonable conduct. The rules 
relating to comparative fault lend to justice and fairness between the parties. The 
applicable standard of the reasonable person or its equivalent is used to judge both 
parties’ conduct and the plaintiff is compensated depending on the contribution of his 
unreasonable conduct. In instances where either party acts intentionally and the other 
negligently, intention as a form of fault is more serious than negligent conduct. It is 
therefore reasonable in cases where the plaintiff acts intentionally that he should be 
barred from recovery. Where the defendant acts intentionally, then it is reasonable 
that contributory negligence should not be considered as a defence.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1116  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 406. 
1117  See Hutchins v Schwartz 724 P2d 1194 (Ala 1986); Ridley v Safety Kleen Corp 693 So 2d 934 
(Fla 1996); cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 407 fn 216. 
1118  About 30 statutes follow this approach, see Ala Code § 32-5B-7; 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann §4581 
(e); authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 408 fn 220. 
1119  See Spier v Barker 35 NY 2d 444, 323 NE 2d 164 (1974) failure to wear a seatbelt; Halvorson 
v Voeller 336 NW 2d 118 (NS 1983) cyclist’s failure to wear a helmet; Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 407. 
1120  See authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 407 fn 217-218. 
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3.5.2 Assumption of risk 
 
Generally assumption of risk is not a frequently upheld defence and whether there is 
assumption of risk is usually decided by the jury.1121 In the 1950s, courts were 
prepared to discard this defence.1122 However, it is still available as a defence whether 
the assumption of risk was given expressly or implied.1123 A plaintiff may agree in terms 
of a contract to assume the risk of harm (express consent) and the defendant will not 
be held liable in tort unless such agreement is unenforceable as a result of overriding 
provisions of a statute or law of contract1124 or if it is against public policy. That is, 
generally if the terms of the contract are unfair, oppressive or if the plaintiff is in a weak 
bargaining position when compared to the defendant who may be in a better position 
to guard against risk and absorb or spread costs through insurance, the contract will 
be unenforceable.1125 In terms of a contractual waiver of liability, where the plaintiff for 
example takes part in a dangerous activity such as sky-diving; the defendant will not 
be held liable in tort if the plaintiff is injured while partaking in such activity. The loss is 
contractually shifted from the defendant to the plaintiff.1126 Epstein1127 submits that the 
question asked is, was “there a meeting of the minds between the two parties, 
objectively manifested, over the risks [the plaintiff] assumed as part of the transaction? 
And assuming its terms are clear, do any background conditions justify allowing [the 
plaintiff] to disregard the contract and to sue in tort?” Liability in tort will generally not 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1121  See for example Phelps v Firebird Raceway Inc 210 Ariz 403, 111 P3d 1003 (2005). However, 
some courts may find that whether there is assumption of risk must be determined by the 
adjudicator – see for example, Tucker v ADG, Inc, 102 P 3d 660 (Okla 2004); authority cited by 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 421 fn 91. 
1122  See Meistrich v Casino Arena Attractions Inc 31 NJ 44, 155 A 2d 90, 82 ALR 2d 1208 (1959); 
Gilson v Drees Bros 19 Wis 2d 252, 120 NW 2d 63 (1963); Williamson v Smith 83 NM 336, 491 
P 2d 1147 (1971); Arnold v City Cedar Rapids Iowa 443 NW 2d 332 (Iowa 1989). See authority 
cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 418 fn 70-72, 421 fn 92-93. 
1123  See for example Boyle v Revici 961 F 2d 1060 (2nd Cir 1992); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 409. 
1124  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 409. 
1125  See for example, Bagley v Mt Bachelor Inc 340 P 3d 27, 43-45 (Ore 2014); Hughes v Warman 
Steel Casting Co 1917, 174 Cal 556, 163 P 885; Restatement Second of Torts § 496B, cmt f 
(1965); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 482, 483 fn 34; Epstein Torts 201. 
1126  See for example Schutkowski v Carey 725 P 2d 1057 (Wyo 1986) where the exculpatory clause 
was enforced; Jones v Dressel 623 P 2d 370 (Colo 1981); Wyoming Johnson Inc v Stag 
Industries, Inc Wyo 662 P 2d 96 (1983); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 410, 
420 fn 84; Epstein Torts 200-201. 
1127  Torts 200.     
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be waived in instances of gross negligence, recklessness or intentional conduct on the 
part of the defendant.1128 
 
In respect of “implied assumption of risk” which is also referred to as primary 
assumption of risk1129 (as opposed to secondary assumption of risk, which is 
considered a variation of contributory negligence),1130 liability may be excluded if the 
plaintiff: knew of the risk; appreciated the nature of the risk; subjectively consented to 
the risk of harm;1131 and voluntary proceeded to encounter it nevertheless.1132 Through 
consensual relations between the parties, the loss is shifted from the defendant to the 
plaintiff.1133 The plaintiff must with the knowledge and awareness “act unreasonably in 
choosing to confront the risk”, in order for the defence to succeed - this element is 
common to establishing fault in the form of negligence.1134 In instances where the 
danger is so obvious such as diving into a clearly visible shallow body of water, the 
plaintiff should have known and appreciated the risk of diving into the shallow water. 
The plaintiff clearly acts unreasonably in assuming the risk of harm.1135 For the plaintiff 
to have voluntarily confronted the risk means that the plaintiff had to have some other 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1128  See Tayar v Camelback Ski Corp Inc 47 A 3d 1190 (Pa 2012); Laeroc Waikiki Parkside LLC v 
KSK (Oahu) Ltd P’Ship 115 Haw 201, 166 P 3d 961 (2007); City of Santa Barbara v Superior 
Court 41 Cal Rptr 3d 527 (2007). See contra Murphy v North Am River Runners Inc 186 W Va 
310, 412 SE 2d 504 (1991); Restatement Second of Torts § 496 B & cmt b (1965); Restatement 
Third of Torts (Apportionment  of Liability) § 2 cmts g & f (2000) where express waivers may be 
allowed for intentional, reckless conduct as long there is no gross “unequal bargaining power” 
and it is clearly expressed (Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 410); Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 484. 
1129  As formulated by Fleming 1952 Yale LJ 141 and followed by the courts, see for example, 
Mestrich v Casino Area Attractions Inc 155 A 2d 90 (NJ 1959). Primary assumption of risks 
covers instances where there is no duty of reasonable care owed, or where the plaintiff 
expressly assumed the risk by contract. This would apply to sporting injuries. See Epstein Torts 
207-208. 
1130  Secondary assumption of risk is where there is breach of a duty of reasonable care by the 
defendant and the plaintiff assumes the risk of harm created by the defendant when it is 
reasonable to do so under the circumstances. For example, if the defendant leaves an obstacle 
on a private walkway and the plaintiff instead of stepping aside from the walkway as the simple 
risk free alternative comes into contact with the obstacle, then he acts unreasonably and 
contributorily negligent (Epstein Torts 197, 209).    
1131  See Poole v Coakley & Williams Constr Inc 423 Md 91, 31 A 3d 212 (2011); Duda v Phatty 
McGees 758 NW 2d 754 (S.D 2008); Jay v Moog Auto Inc 264 Neb 875, 652 NW 2d 872 (2002); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 417. 
1132  See Myers v Boleman 151 Ga App 506, 260 SE 2d 359 (1979); Duda v Phatty McGees 758 
NW 2d 754 (SD 2008); cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 415 
fn 49-54. 
1133  Epstein Torts 203. 
1134  See Shapo Tort 203. 
1135  See Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational Indus Inc 462 NW 2d 348, 359 (Mich 1990); 
Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational Indus. Inc 491 NW 2d 208, 215 (Mich 1992 on rehearing); 
Shapo Tort 203-204. 
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reasonable course of action available to him.1136 For example, a passenger in a car 
who discovers that the driver is dangerous but cannot find an alternative way home 
because it is dark, cold and unfamiliar outside, does not voluntarily expose himself to 
the risk of harm.1137 Keeton et al1138 point out that a plaintiff who is aware of the risk 
but decides to take such risk anyway may be negligent but it is rare that it could be 
said that the defendant reasonably understands the plaintiff’s conduct to mean that he 
subjectively consented to the risk of harm. For example, a jaywalker does encounter 
a risk but it cannot be said that the driver of a motor vehicle reasonably believes that 
the jaywalker consents to the driver’s negligence ‒ the jaywalker is negligent.1139 
Some states however still follow the complete bar to a claim rule.1140 The Restatement 
Third of Torts1141 has done away with the defence of implied assumption of risk but 
kept the defence of express assumption of risk.1142 In many instances the court may 
circumvent the harsh effect of the defence of implied assumption of risk by finding no 
negligence on the part of the defendant;1143 no duty of reasonable care owed;1144 or 
that the plaintiff acted contributorily negligent by acting unreasonably in making his 
choice.1145 The defence of contributory fault is considered to be less harsh and is 
favoured more by the courts. It is based on an objective test of the reasonable person 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1136  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 418. 
1137  See Ridgway v Yenny 223 Ind 16, 57 NE 2d 581 (1944); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 417. 
1138  Prosser and Keeton on torts 485, 490.  
1139  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 418. 
1140  See for example, Thomas v Panco Management of Maryland LLC 423 Md 387, 31 A 3d 583 
(2011); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 415. 
1141  (Apportionment of Liability) § 2 cmt l (2000). 
1142  Some states have abolished the defence in instances of liability of the employer to his employee 
or driver to his passenger. New Jersey has completely abolished it in all instances and other 
states have followed this ‒ see Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 494 fn 40. 
1143  See for example Kirsch v Plovidba 971 F 2d 1026, 1033-1034 (3rd Cir 1992); discussion of this 
case by Shapo Tort 205-206. 
1144  See for example, Beninati v Black Rock City LLC 175 Cal App 4th 650, 96 Cal Rptr 3d 105 
(2009) where it was held that a festival promoter owed no duty to a person who walked into 
burning embers as the risk of harm was obvious; Gulfway Gen’l Hosp Inc v Pursley 397 SW 2d 
93, 94 (Tex Civ App 1965) where the court denied liability where the plaintiff slipped on icy 
steps of the hospital. The court held that there was no duty on the defendant since the danger 
the plaintiff encountered was obvious and she was aware and appreciated the risks; Turcotte v 
Fell 68 NY 2d 432, 510 NYS 2d 49, 502 NE 2d 964 (1986); King v Kayak Mfg Corp 182 W Va 
276, 378 SE 2d 511 (1989); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 416, 419-420; 
Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 481. 
1145  See for example Rountree v Boise Baseball LLC 296 P 3d 373 (Idaho 2013) where it was held 
that assumption of risk is no longer a valid defence; Simons v Porter 312 P 3d 345 (Kan 2013) 
where it was held that assumption of risk is not viable anymore after the advent of comparative 
fault; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 419 fn 77; cf Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on torts 495. 
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as opposed to the subjective test associated with assumption of risk.1146 Statutes have 
abolished the defence of implied assumption of risk in the context of employment1147 
and some states have also completely abolished the general application of the 
defence.1148 
 
Assumption of risk is often raised with regard to sporting injuries. Professional sport 
players may be presumed to act more voluntarily because they have more knowledge 
as opposed to amateurs who partake in activities for recreation.1149 In respect of 
spectators, before comparative negligence was applicable, courts often found that 
spectators assumed the risk of harm when struck by errant balls and so on. Nowadays 
courts may hold that the managers of the sports events do not owe a duty of 
reasonable care to the spectators for inherent risks of the game.1150 Thus organisers 
and managers of sports events do no owe a duty of reasonable care to spectators to 
protect them from ordinary risks inherent in sporting activities or to protect them 
“against inherent risks that remain after due care is exercised”.1151 For example, in an 
instance where a hot dog was thrown into the stands by a mascot,1152 or a spectator 
in a sports bar injured another spectator after diving for a souvenir, were not 
considered inherent risks of watching a sports match.1153 
 
Participants also assume the ordinary risks inherent in the sporting activity they 
partake in. Participants may be expected to endure negligently caused injuries which 
are ordinarily encountered. However, a defendant will not escape liability where 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1146  See for example Simons v Frazier 277 Ark 452, 642 SW 2d 314 (1982) where it was held that 
a hitchhiker who falls asleep near the edge of the highway does not assume the risk of being 
struck by a negligent driver, he is just negligent; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 495. 
1147  See Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) with regard to railroad employees 45 USC A § 53; 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 417. 
1148  See Ind Code § 34-6-2-45 where fault may include assumption of risk; Mass Gen L Ann Ch 
231, §85 where the defence was abolished; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 418 
fn 73. 
1149  See Turcotte v Fell 502 NE 2d 969; Shapo Tort 212. 
1150  See Edward C v City of Albuquerque 148 NM 646, 241 P 3d 1086 (2010); Creel v L & L Inc 287 
P 3d 729 (Wyo 2012); Mc Garry v Sax 158 Cal App 4th 983, 70 Cal Rptr 3d 519 (2008); cases 
referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 422 fn 94. 
1151  Hurst v East Coast Hockey League Inc 371 SC 33 637 SE 2d 560 (2006). See also King v 
Kayak Mfg Corp 182 W Va 276, 387 SE 2d 511 (1989); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 422. 
1152  See Coomer v Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp 437 SW 3d 184 (Mo 2014); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 422 fn 100. 
1153  FCH1, LLC v Rodriguez 335 P 3d 183 (Nev 2014); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 422 fn 100. 
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through his negligence he adds new risks to the sporting activity or increases the risks 
inherent in the activity.1154 Courts often state that the duty of the participants is to avoid 
reckless or intentional harm1155 and a few states have statutes also sanctioning this 
approach.1156 A violation of a rule of a game does not necessarily ground liability, but 
usually grounds liability where the defendant performs a serious foul act, or acts 
recklessly or intentionally. In such instances, the conduct exceeds the rules of the 
game and customary practices.1157 The limited duty rule stems from the plaintiff’s 
“limited expectations of safety”1158 and has been applied to professional sporting 
activities as well as recreational sporting activities.1159 If assumption of risk is framed 
in terms of consent, the reasonable expectations of the parties as to their conduct 
must be considered.1160 For example in Feld v Borkowski1161 where it was held that a 
batter who allowed the bat to fly from his hand resulting in the bat striking and injuring 
the plaintiff; such conduct was not expected and was considered reckless. A hunter 
who is generally aware of risks of harm is not expected to consent to being shot by a 
fellow hunter.1162 Players must act with reasonable care and expect fellow players to 
exercise reasonable care. It comes down to reasonableness of conduct and may also 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1154  See for example, Cohen v Five Brooks Stable 159 Cal App 4th 1476, 72 Cal Rptr 3d 471 (2008) 
where it was held that the reckless conduct of the trail guide was not an inherent risk of horse 
riding; Luna v Vela 169 Cal App 4th 102, 86 Cal Rptr 3d 588 (2008) where it was held that the 
host of the match owed a duty of reasonable care to not increase the risks of the sporting 
activity; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 423. 
1155  See for example, Knight v Jewett 3 Cal 4th 296, 11 Cal Rptr 2d 2, 834 P 2d 696 (1992) where 
it was held that reckless conduct must be completely outside the range of ordinary sporting 
activity; Nabozny v Barnhill 31 Ill App 3d 212, 334 NE 2d 258, 77 ALR 3d 1294 (1975) where it 
was held that a prohibited and intentional kick in a soccer match could be actionable; cases 
cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 424 fn 106.  
1156  See Noffke v Bakke 315 Wis 2d 350, 760 NW 2d 156 (2009) which applied Wisc Stat Ann § 
895.525 (4m)(a). California however has held that an intentional tort (in respect of battery) may 
be an inherent risk of the sporting activity – see Avila v Citrus Cmty Coll Dist 38 Cal 4th 148, 
162, 131 P 3d 383, 392, 41 Cal Rptr 3d 299, 309 (2006); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 424. 
1157  See Nabozny v Barnhill 334 NE 2d 258 (Ill App1975) where a soccer player deliberately kicked 
the goalie in the head in the penalty area; Hackbart v Cincinnati Bengals Inc 601 F 2d 516 (10th 
Cir 1979) in respect of a serious foul; Gauvin v Clark 404 Mass 450, 537 NE 2d 94 (1989) 
where a player butt ended another with the wrong end of a hockey stick resulting in internal 
injuries; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 424; Epstein Torts 10. 
1158  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 424. See Turcotte v Fell 68 NY 2d 432, 510 
NYS 2d 49, 502 NE 2d 964 (1986). 
1159  See cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 424-425 fn 112-121. 
1160  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 425. 
1161  790 NW 2d 72 (Iowa 2010). 
1162  See Hendriks v Broderick 284 NW 2d 209 (Iowa 1979). 
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depend on awareness of risks that are obvious.1163 Some courts1164 have applied the 
standard of ordinary care based on breach of negligence instead of assumption of risk, 
but Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick1165 point out that it is possible that the results would 
be the same, because determining reasonable care under the circumstances also 
takes into account the customs, practices and reasonable expectations of the parties. 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the defence of assumption of risk is explicit. It is 
apparent that it is not a favoured defence when compared with contributory 
negligence, which is less harsh and perhaps a more fair defence to apply where both 
parties’ conduct is tested against the standard of reasonableness. Furthermore liability 
may be limited instead of excluded. At the heart of succeeding with the defence is still 
reasonableness of conduct coupled with the knowledge of reasonableness of taking 
the risk and then nevertheless freely and voluntarily choosing to take the risk.1166 
Naturally where the risk of harm is obvious it is unreasonable to hold the defendant 
liable but reasonable to hold the defendant liable in instances of gross negligence, 
recklessness or intentional conduct on the part of the defendant.1167 In respect of 
sporting activities, reasonableness of conduct depends on whether the participants 
followed the rules of the game, practices or custom. Thus if the rules, practices or 
customs are not followed then the defence will fail and it is reasonable to hold the 
defendant liable.1168 Shapo1169 suggests that a general reasonableness test would 
suffice as the doctrine of assumption of risk adds a layer of complexity. In terms of the 
plaintiff’s knowledge with regard to assumption of risk, the test is more subjective, the 
plaintiff must not only act unreasonably but voluntary confront a known risk, while with 
contributory negligence the test is objective.1170 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
1163  See Jagger v Mohawk Mountain Ski Area Inc 269 Conn 672, 849 A 2d 813 (2004); as well as 
cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 425 fn 122-126. 
1164  See Pfenning v Lineman 947 NE 2d 392 (Ind 2011); Allen v Dover Co-Recreational Softball 
League 148 NH 407, 807 A 2d 1274 (2002); as well as other cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 426 fn 129. 
1165  Hornbook on torts 426. 
1166  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 415. 
1167  See Restatement Third of Torts (Apportionment of Liability) § 2 cmts g & f (2000); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 410; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 484. 
1168  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 424; Epstein Torts 10. 
1169  Shapo Tort 211-212. 
1170  See Shapo Tort 167, 233. 
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4. Causation 
 
Causation is required for intentional torts, strict liability as well as the tort of 
negligence.1171 The defendant’s negligent conduct which created unreasonable risks 
must be the cause of the plaintiff’s harm.1172 Factual causation and scope of liability 
(more or less equivalent to legal causation in South African law are required). The 
Restatement Third of Torts1173 refers to “factual cause” (hereinafter referred to as 
“factual causation” for the sake of convenience) and “scope of liability”.  
 
4.1 Factual causation 
 
Factual causation is determined from the facts. In most instances “common 
knowledge” and “experience” are sufficient for the trier of the facts to conclude that 
there is a causal link between the harm and negligent conduct.1174 Where it is not easy 
to find a causal link, scientific or medical evidence may be relied on. For example, 
where the plaintiff has to prove that a certain drug taken during pregnancy caused 
harm to the foetus,1175 the plaintiff must show that the drug can cause such harm and 
that the baby suffered the harm.1176 Where expert testimony is required, the 
admissibility of the evidence and whether it is sufficiently reliable is important.1177  
 
In respect of factual causation, the but-for test is usually applied.1178 In cases of 
omission, relevant hypothetical or so-called counter-factual conduct is inserted.1179 For 
example, in Salinetro v Nystrom,1180 the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1171  Epstein Torts 248. 
1172  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 26 (2010); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 312. 
1173  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 26 cmt a and chapter 6 Special Note on Proximate 
Cause (2010). See Oliphant 2011 William Mitchell L Rev 1599ff. 
1174  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 314. 
1175  See Turpin v Merrell Dow Pharms Inc 959 F 2d 1349 (6th Cir 1992); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 313. 
1176  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 313. 
1177  See Coombs v Curnow 219 P 3d 453 (Idaho 2010); further cases referred to by Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 314 fn 21. 
1178  See for example, Garr v City of Ottumwa 846 NW 2d 865 (Iowa 2014); Robinson v Washington 
Metro Transit Auth 774 F 3d 33 (DC Cir 2014); Friedrich v Fetterman & Assocs PA 137 S 3d 
362 (Fla 2013); Berte v Bode 692 NW 2d 368 (Iowa 2005); City of Jackson v Spann 4 So 3d 
1029 (Miss 2009); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 26 
(2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 317; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 266. 
1179  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 265. 
1180  341 So 2d 1059 (Fla Dist Ct App 1977). 
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accident. When the medical practitioner attended to her, he took x-rays of her lower 
back and abdomen without asking her if she was pregnant. She subsequently learned 
that she was pregnant and underwent an abortion after her doctor advised her to 
terminate the pregnancy due to the foetus’s exposure to the x-rays. The pathology 
report stated that the foetus was not alive at the time of the abortion. The plaintiff sued 
for medical malpractice. The court held that even though the medical practitioner had 
failed to check whether the plaintiff was pregnant, there was no causation. If 
hypothetical conduct was inserted, in other words if the medical practitioner would 
have asked the plaintiff if she was pregnant, she would have replied “no” as she in fact 
testified when asked what her response would have been. The x-rays would have in 
any event been taken. The court found that the negligent omission was not the but-for 
cause of the foetus’s death.1181 Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick1182 point out that it is not 
always clear what sort of positive hypothetical counter fact should be inserted. For 
example, the medical practitioner could have insisted on further tests to determine 
whether she was pregnant thereby avoiding taking x-rays. Or if the plaintiff was asked 
if she was pregnant at the time, she could have questioned why it is important and 
once notified of the importance, could have gone for a pregnancy test to confirm 
whether she was pregnant or not.  
 
In some instances, the but-for test cannot be applied as the causal link is weak and 
inferences cannot easily be made from the facts. Alternative tests are applied. In 
Landers v East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company,1183 two defendants acting 
independently caused excessive salt and oil to flow into the plaintiff’s lake which led 
to the death of the plaintiff’s fish. In this case, the joint wrongdoers were both held 
liable for the indivisible loss sustained by the plaintiff. Each defendant’s conduct on its 
own was sufficient in causing the plaintiff’s loss. The Restatement Third of Torts1184 
recommends that in such instances where two or more causes sufficiently cause the 
plaintiff’s harm, each cause is regarded as a factual cause, and the but-for test is not 
applied, because if it were applied it would absolve each defendant from liability. The 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1181  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 319. 
1182  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 319-320. 
1183  151 Tex 251, 248 SW 2d 731 (1952). 
1184  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) §27 (2010). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 322. 
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“substantial factor” test is applied.1185 The First Restatement of Torts1186 states that all 
defendants “who are substantial factors in the harm are factual causes”.1187  
 
In instances where a defendant’s conduct is not sufficient on its own to cause harm, 
but when combined with multiple defendants’ conduct causes harm to the plaintiff, the 
but-for test is applied to the collective conduct of all the defendants.1188 
 
Where it cannot be ascertained which of the defendants caused the plaintiff harm or 
loss, the Restatement Third of Torts1189 recommends the reversal of the burden of 
proving the causal link on the defendants. This rule was initially applied in Summers v 
Tice,1190 where two hunters negligently fired a shot independently and one of the shots 
struck the plaintiff’s eye. The court held that only one of the defendant’s shot caused 
the harm. The court shifted the burden requesting each defendant to prove that his 
shot did not cause the injury to the plaintiff. If either were unable to prove that they did 
not cause the harm, then they would be held jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff. 
Thus in terms of policy and what is fair and just in the circumstances, the plaintiff as 
the innocent person should not bear his own loss and be without redress. Each 
defendant created a doubt with respect to causation and in a sense denied the plaintiff 
of the opportunity to present evidence that would have been available to him.1191 In 
order to shift the burden, all the defendants must have acted negligently.1192 The courts 
have adopted this principle.1193 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1185  See Anderson v Minneapolis St Paul & Sault Ste Marie Railway Co 1920 146 Minn 430, 179 
NW 45; Carney v Goodman 1954, 38 Tenn App 55, 270 SW 2d 572; Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on torts 267. 
1186  § 432(2) (1934). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 322. 
1187  See for example, Glover ex rel Glover v Jackson State Univ 968 So 2d 1267, 1277 (Miss 2007); 
Mitchell v Gonzales 54 Cal 3d 1041, 1 Cal Rptr 2d 872 (1991); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 322. 
1188  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 27 cmt f (2010). See 
Spaur v Owens-Corning Fibreglass Corp 510 NW 2d 854, 858 (Iowa 1994); Green 2011 Tex L 
Rev 41; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 324; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 268. 
1189  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 28 cmt b, f, g (2010); 
1190  33 Cal 2d 80, 199 P 2d 1 (1948). 
1191  See Hellums v Raber 853 NE 2d 143 (Ind Ct App 2006); Gardner v National Bulk Carriers Inc 
310 F 2d 284, 91 ALR 2d 1023 (4th Cir 1962); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
328; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 271. 
1192  See Cunzo v Shore 958 A 2d 840 (Del 2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
329. 
1193  See for example, Murphy v Taxicabs of Louisville Inc Ky 1959 330 SW 2d 395 where the plaintiff 
was injured by more than one negligently driven motor vehicle and was unable to prove which 
driver caused his injuries; Huston v Konieczny 52 Ohio St 3d 214, 556 NE 2d 505 (1990) in 
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In the DES cases,1194 prescription drugs to prevent miscarriages were manufactured 
by numerous companies and it was uncertain which of the manufacturers’ drugs 
caused cancers to the particular plaintiffs. Because it took some time before the cause 
of the drug was discovered, it was not possible to pinpoint the manufacturers and 
many did not even exist at the time when the cancers manifested. The “market share 
liability” principle was proposed “in a law review comment” dealing with the Des 
cases.1195 According to this principle, if a manufacturer sold for example fifty percent 
of all DES marketed, then such manufacturer should be held fifty percent liable for the 
plaintiff’s claim. Thus the manufacturer should be held liable for a percentage of 
damage based on the manufacturer’s market share of DES. Some courts adopted this 
principle1196 while others rejected it.1197 The Restatement Third of Torts1198 has not 
pronounced whether the rule should be adopted. 
 
Due to the fact that there must be a causal link between the harm suffered and the 
negligent conduct, legal practitioners will specify conduct which, but for the plaintiff’s 
conduct, whether in the form of an omission of a commission, would not have occurred 
or by specifying the harm where it is actual harm or the loss of chance.1199 
                                                                                                                                                                            
respect of several possible suppliers of alcohol to an underage drinker; Stapleton 2002 Tort LJ 
276; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 329 fn 105; Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on torts 271-272. 
1194  See Sindell v Abbott Labs 26 Cal 3d 588, 163 Cal Rptr 132, 607 P 2d 924 (1980); Conley v 
Doyle Drug Co 570 So 2d 275 (Fla 1990); Smith v Cutter Biological Inc 72 Haw 416, 823 P 2d 
717 (1991); Hymowitz v Eli Lily & Co 73 NY 2d 487, 541 NYS 2d 941, 539 NE 2d 1069 (1989); 
Martin Abbott Labs 102 Wash 2d 581, 689 P 2d 368 (1984); Collins v Eli Lily Co 116 Wis 2d 
166, 342 NW 2d 37 (1984); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 330 fn 108. See 
chapter 6 para 3.  
1195  Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability 46 Fordham L Rev 963 (1978). 
See Porat 2011 Yale L J 110; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 330. 
1196  See Porat and Stein Tort liability under uncertainty 59-67 who refer to different jurisdictions and 
the courts’ mind-sets towards the market share principle; Porat 2011 Yale L J 111 fn 83; 
Geistfeld 2007 U Pa L Rev 451; and Rostron 2004 UCLA L Rev 153 who submits that this 
principle was applied by the courts as a result of the unusual circumstances surrounding the 
DES drugs instead of being applied generally. 
1197  See Smith v Eli Lily & Co 137 Ill 2d 222, 560 NE 2d 324 (1990); Zafft v Eli Lily & Co 676 SW 2d 
241 (Mo 1984); Gorman v Abbott Labs 599 A 2d 1364 (R1 1991); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 330 fn 110. 
1198  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 28 cmt p (2010). 
1199  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 324-325. 
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Apportionment may be applied to causation, for example where one person causes 
injury to the plaintiff’s leg and the other acting independently causes injury to the 
plaintiff’s arm.1200 
 
The lost chance of recovery principle, commonly applied in medical malpractice 
claims, has been rejected in sixteen states but accepted in twenty-two states.1201 In 
some instances where the plaintiff proves a loss of chance of fifty percent or more,1202 
the courts allow the jury to find causation and then award damages for all harm or 
loss,1203 while in other instances the courts acknowledge that the medical practitioner’s 
conduct may not have caused the plaintiff’s death but the loss of the plaintiff’s chance 
of a more beneficial medical outcome,1204 life expectancy1205 or the chance to live.1206 
The plaintiff may recover the amount reflecting the percentage of the chance lost that 
was caused by the negligent conduct.1207   
 
The influence of reasonableness on factual causation is implicit. It reasonable to hold 
the defendant liable in negligence only if he factually caused harm to the plaintiff. If a 
factual causal link cannot be found between the conduct and the consequences then 
factual causation is absent and so is liability in negligence. In respect of omissions and 
the but-for test, hypothetical non-negligent, reasonable conduct must be inserted in 
order to determine a factual causal link, thus the influence of reasonableness is 
evident here. Alternative tests are used besides the but-for test in order to bring about 
a reasonable and fair outcome. Where there are a number of defendants who 
independently cause harm to the plaintiff, the substantial factor test may be used to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1200  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 316. 
1201  According to the recent contribution by Koch 2010 NCL Rev 595 (referred to by Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 332). 
1202  In Connecticut the loss of chance is allowed only if the plaintiff proves a 50% or more loss of 
chance. See Boone v William W Backus Hosp 272 Conn 551, 574, 864 A2d 1, 18 2005; Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 333 fn 132. 
1203  See Thompson v Sun City Cmty Hosp Inc 141 Ariz 597, 688 P 2d 605 (1984); Mayhue v 
Sparksman 653 NE 2d 1384 (Ind 1995); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 332. 
1204  See for example, Lord v Lovett 770 A 2d 1103 (NH 2001). See also King 1998 Mem L Rev 492; 
King 1981 Yale LJ 1353;  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 332;  
1205  See for example, Alexander v Scheid 726 NE 2d 272 (Ind 2000); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 332. 
1206  Where a patient dies as a result of the medical practitioner’s negligence, then the claim is 
regulated by Wrongful life statutes. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 333 fn 
133. 
1207  See authority referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 333-334 fn 134-
139. 
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establish factual causation.1208 In instances where a defendant’s conduct is not 
sufficient on its own to cause harm but when combined with other defendants’ conduct 
causes harm to the plaintiff, then the but-for test is applied to the aggregate conduct 
of all the defendants.1209 Where it cannot be ascertained which of the defendants 
caused the plaintiff harm or loss, the burden of proving the causal link is reversed and 
each defendant must prove that his negligent conduct did not cause the harm.1210 
Alternative methods applied in finding factual causation lends to the reasonableness 
of finding factual causation in instances where the strict application of the but-for test 
would lead to unjust results. In certain cases where the plaintiff is able to prove a loss 
of chance of a more beneficial medical outcome, life expectancy or the chance to live, 
then the plaintiff may be entitled to recover a percentage of the damage sustained as 
a result of such damage sustained due to the defendant’s negligent, unreasonable 
conduct.1211 Thus in such instances involving a loss of chance it may be reasonable 
and fair to hold the defendant liable for the loss of chance.  
 
4.2 Scope of liability (proximate cause, legal causation) 
 
The plaintiff must prove that the harm he suffered was “within the defendant’s scope 
of liability”.1212 The scope of liability is a “policy orientated doctrine designed to be a 
method for limiting liability after cause-in-fact has been established”.1213 In respect of 
the tort of negligence, it deals with the “policy or justice issue” and in terms of the tort 
of negligence, “limiting liability to the risks the defendant negligently created”.1214 In 
reference to proximate cause rules it would be unjust and impractical to impose liability 
on a defendant for harm resulting from his negligent conduct which falls outside the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1208  See the Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) §27 (2010). See 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 322. 
1209  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 27 cmt f (2010); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 324. 
1210  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 28 (2010).  
1211  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 333-334. 
1212  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 29 (2010); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 337. 
1213  Pittway Corp v Collins 409 Md 218, 973 A 2d 771, 772 (2009). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 338 fn 7. 
1214  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 344. 
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scope of risks he created.1215 The Restatement Third of Torts1216 has pronounced a 
preference for the term “scope of liability” over the terms “legal causation” or 
“proximate cause”, and calls for value-based judgments which is determined by the 
jury.1217 According to the Restatement Third of Torts,1218 the “scope of liability” limits 
liability to harm arising from risks created by the defendant’s tortious conduct. Thus 
harm that ensues from reasonable and unforeseeable risks is excluded from the scope 
of liability.1219 Furthermore the defendant cannot be held liable for unknown risks or 
risks not reasonably known due to administrative costs or out of fairness.1220 Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick, in their book, follow the Second and Third Restatements use of 
the term “scope of liability” where it aids in understanding but fall back “on the still-
commonly used term proximate cause where use of a different term would itself 
produce confusion”. Hence in this paragraph, where possible the term “scope of 
liability” will be referred to, but the term proximate cause will also be used. 
 
There is no uniform test to determine the scope of liability and instead it is determined 
with different theories depending on the type of situation encountered.1221 It depends 
on whether the consequence was reasonably foreseeable or directly caused by the 
defendant’s conduct and where an intervening, abnormal, unforeseeable act breaks 
the chain of causation. Thus the courts refer to directness, reasonable foreseeability, 
or natural and probable consequences of the defendant’s conduct.1222 The theory of 
adequate causation is foreign to American law.1223 The reasonable foreseeability of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1215  See McCain v Florida Power Corp 593 So 2d 500 (Fla 1992); Goldberg v Florida Power & Light 
Co 899 So 2d 1105 (Fla 2005); Staelens v Dobert 318 F 3d 77 (1st Cir 2003); Poskus v 
Lombardo’s of Randolph Inc 670 NE 2d 383, 423 Mass 637 (1996); Zaza v Marquess and Nell 
Inc 144 NJ 34 675 A 2d 620 (1996); Caputzal v Lindsay Co 48 NJ 69 222 A 2d 513 (1966); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 338-340. 
1216  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 26 and chapter 6, Special note on Proximate 
Cause (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 338. 
1217  See Rascher v Friend 279 Va 370, 689 SE 2d 661 (2010); Anselemo v Tuck 325 Ark 211, 924 
SW 2d 798 (1996); Cramer v Slater, 146 Idaho 868 204 P 3d 508 (2009). However, some states 
prefer the scope of liability to be determined by the court and not the jury – see for example, 
Kim v Budget Rent A Car Systems Inc. 143 Wash 2d 190 15 P 3d 1283 (2001); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 341 fn 23. 
1218  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 29 (2010). 
1219  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § § 3 cmt g and cmt 
j (2010); Green and Gilead Wake Forest Univ Legal Studies Paper No. 2014874 6. 
1220  Green and Gilead Wake Forest Univ Legal Studies Paper No. 2014874 8 with reference to 
Holmes Common law 94-96. 
1221  See Prosser 1950 Cal L Rev 369; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 279. 
1222  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 610. 
1223  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 500. 
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the general type of harm1224 is the predominant test applied in establishing the scope 
of liability.1225 The precise manner in which the harm occurs, or the time when the 
harm occurs, need not be foreseeable. All that is required is the foreseeability of the 
general type of harm.1226 For example, in Derdiarian v Felix Contracting Corp1227 the 
plaintiff was employed by a construction company. He was posted to work at a 
construction site where he was exposed to traffic and not adequately protected from 
traffic. A driver suffered a seizure, lost control of the motor vehicle and struck the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the construction company (for failing to maintain a safe 
working environment) as well as the driver who did not take his anti-seizure 
medication. The plaintiff succeeded with his claim in the lower court. The construction 
company appealed, alleging that the driver’s conduct was an intervening cause. The 
court held that it was not an intervening cause as harm to the plaintiff by oncoming 
traffic was foreseeable in light of the construction company negligently failing to 
provide a safe work site. Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick1228 point out that in this case 
harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable, if however, the plaintiff was struck by a falling 
aircraft then harm by an aircraft is not foreseeable. 
 
The English Wagon Mound No. 11229 decision where liability on the part of the 
defendant was excluded for the unforeseeable harm caused by fire, serves as the 
authority for the reasonable foreseeability of harm theory applied in determining the 
scope of liability.1230 The American decision, Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co1231 
(hereinafter referred to as “Palsgraf”) is the locus classicus case for finding that liability 
must be limited only to the risks created by the defendant’s negligent conduct.1232 In 
this case, a passenger was attempting to get on a moving train owned by the 
defendant. Employees of the defendant tried to assist the passenger whereby one 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1224  See Craig v Driscoll 262 Conn 312, 813 A 2d 1003 (2003); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 356-357. 
1225  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 339. 
1226  See Johnson v Kosmos Portland Cement Co 64 F 2d 193 (6th Cir 1933) where harm by 
explosion was reasonably foreseeable even though it occurred as a result of a lightning strike. 
See discussion by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 356-360. Cf Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 273, 316-317. 
1227  51 NY 2d 308, 434 NYS 2d 166, 414 NE 2d 666 (1980). 
1228  Hornbook on torts 358. 
1229  Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd 1961 AC 388. See chapter 4 
para 4.2. 
1230  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 347-348. 
1231  248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99 (1928). 
1232  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 348. 
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employee tried to help him on while the other pushed him in. In trying to assist the 
passenger, the employees caused him to drop a parcel covered in newspaper he was 
holding which contained fireworks. When the parcel hit the ground, the fireworks 
exploded and knocked down some scales at the other end of the platform which struck 
and injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the railroad company, the defendant, and 
was successful at the trial and first appeal (Appellate Division). The Defendant 
appealed. Cardozo CJ stated that the employees did not know of the contents of the 
parcel and could not have reasonably foreseen the ensuing harm. Even though a 
wrong was done to the passenger, there was no wrong done to plaintiff, there was no 
violation of her bodily security, and no negligence.1233 Cardozo CJ held that even the 
“most cautious mind” would not have expected the ensuing harm.1234 If the harm is 
unintended, the plaintiff must show that “the act had possibilities of danger so many 
and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the [harm]”.1235 Cardozo CJ 
found that there was no proximate cause. Thus judgment was reversed and the 
defendant was found not liable.1236 Andrews J, dissenting, stated that everyone owes 
a duty to the public at large to refrain from acts that may unreasonably threaten the 
safety of others. Thus if such acts occur, the defendant injures not only those that are 
reasonably expected to be harmed but also others outside of the danger zone, those 
not reasonably expected to be harmed.1237 He further stated1238 that what is meant by 
“‘proximate’ is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of 
justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. 
This is not logic. It is practical politics”. He opined1239 that the defendant should have 
been held liable for the proximate causes which were not remote in time or space and 
were the direct consequences of the original negligent act.1240 There is still some 
support for finding liability for “all harms directly caused” as opposed to only 
reasonable foreseeable harm.1241  
                                                                                                                                                                            
1233  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99 (1928).   
1234  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99, 100 (1928). 
1235  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99,101 (1928). 
1236  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99, 101 (1928). 
1237  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99, 103 (1928). 
1238  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99, 103 (1928). 
1239  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99, 105 (1928). 
1240  According to re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co Ltd 1921 3 K B 560, the English decision. 
See chapter 4 para 4.2. 
1241  See for example, Busta v Columbus Hosp Corp 276 Mont 342, 916 P 2d 122 (1996); Rockweit 
v Senecal 197 Wis 2d 409, 541 NW 2d 742 (1995); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 350. Cf Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 273-274, 295-297. 
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In respect of intervening causes, the defendant is not held liable because the risk is 
not within the scope of risk negligently created by the defendant. For example, in 
Sheehan v City of New York,1242 a bus stopped at an intersection to let passengers on 
or off the bus instead of stopping at a designated stop. While the bus was stationary 
at the intersection, it was struck from the rear by a sanitation truck. It transpired that 
the driver of the sanitation truck lost control of the truck because the breaks had failed. 
The plaintiff, a passenger in the bus, was injured and sued the owner of the sanitation 
truck as well as the owner of the bus. It was held that the conduct of the sanitation 
truck driver was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries and the owner of the bus 
was not held liable as vehicles do frequently stop at intersections. Thus the failing 
brakes of the sanitation truck were considered a supervening cause.1243  
 
In instances where the defendant negligently creates an opportunity for a subsequent 
intervening (reasonably unforeseeable, intentional1244 or criminal) act to cause harm 
to the plaintiff, the defendant may escape liability. For example, if the defendant leaves 
his keys in the car and a thief steals it causing an accident as well as injury to the 
plaintiff; the defendant may not be held liable because the defendant’s act is not the 
proximate cause of the harm. Furthermore, there may also be no negligence on the 
part of the defendant as the theft or negligence of the thief is not foreseeable.1245 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick1246 however point out that depending on the 
circumstances of the case, the courts may find criminal or intentional intervening 
conduct as foreseeable. For example, it is possible to find that a crime was foreseeable 
and that the defendant had a duty of reasonable care to protect the plaintiff from being 
a victim of crime.1247  
  
The thin-skull rule applies and the defendant upon finding his conduct negligent and 
the factual cause of the plaintiff’s harm must take the victim as he finds him. In such 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1242  40 NY 2d 496, 387 NYS 2d 92, 354 NE 2d 832 (1976). 
1243  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 370. 
1244  See Wiener v Southcoast Childcare Centers Inc 32 Cal 4th 1138, 88 P 3d 517, 12 Cal Rptr 3d 
615 2004; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 364. 
1245  See Ross v Nutt 177 Ohio St 113, 203 NE 2d 118 (1964); authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 363 fn 159. Cf Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 314. 
1246  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 364. 
1247  See re September 11 Litig 280 F Supp 2d 279 (SDNY 2003); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 364. 
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an instance, the defendant is liable for a greater extent of harm than that suffered by 
a normal person.1248 The defendant is liable for foreseeable harm as well as 
unforeseeable harm due to the plaintiff’s infirmities.1249 
 
In the well-known decision of Wagner v International Railway,1250 a man fell from a 
train into a gorge. His cousin, the plaintiff, went in search of him and also fell. The trial 
court held that even though the defendant’s conduct was negligent vis-a-vis the man 
who first fell off the train, such initial negligent act could not support the claim by the 
plaintiff as rescuer. However, on appeal Cardozo CJ held that the plaintiff was entitled 
to a claim and the chain of causation was not broken as a result of the cousin’s rescue 
attempt. Whether the cousin’s fall was as a result of the defendant’s negligence and 
whether the rescue attempt was unreasonable in the circumstances, were to be 
decided by the jury.1251 It is accepted that the defendant is liable to a rescuer where 
there is a reasonable rescue attempt1252 and the rescuer reasonably believes that a 
person is in peril.1253 The rescue attempt does not need to be immediate or 
spontaneous and may be an attempt to save the defendant himself from peril.1254 
Rescuing a person in peril is a natural human response.1255 If the rescuer acts in an 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1248  See for example, Rowe v Munye 702 NW 2d 729 (Minn 2005); Vaughn v Nissan Motor 
Corporation in USA Inc 77 F 3d 736, 738 (4th Cir 1996); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability 
for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 31 (2010); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
356. 
1249  See for example Chicago City Ry Co v Saxby 213 Ill 274 72 NE 755 (1904); Hammerstein v 
Jean Development West 111 Nev 1471 907 P 2d 975 (1995); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 355. Cf Rowe v Munye 702 NW 2d 729 (Minn 2005) – the defendant is liable 
for the unforeseeable aggravation of the plaintiff’s pre-exiting condition. 
1250  232 NY 176, 133 NE 437 (1921). 
1251  Wagner v International Railway 232 NY 176, 133 NE 437 (1921) 438. See Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 348-349. 
1252  See Espinoza v Schulenburg 212 Ariz 215, 109 P 3d 937 (2006); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 366. 
1253  See Rasmussen v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co 278 Neb 289, 770 NW 2d 619 (2009); Solomon 
v Shuell 435 Mich 104, 457 NW 2d 669 (1990); Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical 
and Emotional Harm) § 32 cmt b (2010); cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 349 fn 61-66. 
1254  See Wagner International Railway Co 1921, 232 NY 176, 133 NE 2d 437; Parks v Starks 1955, 
342 Mich 443, 70 NW 2d 805; Hollingsworth v Schminkey 553 NW 2d 591, 598 (Iowa 1996); 
contra Star Transport Inc v Byard 891 NE 2d 1099 (Ind App 2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 349; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 308. 
1255  See Ruth v Ruth 1963, 213 Tenn 82, 372 SW 2d 285; Provenzo v Sam 1968, 23 NY 2d 256, 
296 NYS 2d 322, 244 NE 2d 26; Sears v Morrison 76 Cal App 4th 577, 90 Cal Rptr 2d 528 
(1998); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 349; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 308. 
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unreasonable manner, that is, completely foolish or in an extraordinary manner,1256 
his award for damages may be reduced as a result of his contributory negligence.1257  
 
The question of scope of liability is not determined before fault in the form of 
negligence. Reasonable foreseeability of harm plays a role in determining a duty of 
care, fault in the form of negligence and the scope of liability. In respect of negligence, 
the defendant should have foreseen some kind of harm to the plaintiff or his property 
and should have taken steps to prevent harm if the reasonable person in a similar 
position would have done so. In terms of the scope of liability, the question is whether 
the defendant should have foreseen the type of harm that ensued and whether the 
plaintiff “was within the class of persons to whom such harm might foreseeably 
befall”.1258 Thus a duty of reasonable care is owed only to reasonably foreseeable 
plaintiffs.1259 Liability is limited in various ways by the different elements in the tort of 
negligence. What must be determined inter alia is whether the defendant had a legal 
duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances and whether the defendants 
conduct was the proximate cause of the harm sustained by the plaintiff.1260 Green and 
Cardi1261 state that there is an anomaly in American law with regard to the limiting of 
liability stemming from Palsgraf.1262 Cardozo CJ opined that duty and negligence were 
both limited by harm that could be reasonably foreseen at the time of the negligent 
conduct. Cardozo CJ was of the opinion that there was no duty owed to the plaintiff 
and that the enquiry into causation was not even necessary.1263 To him duty was a 
relational concept.1264 As a result of this, in establishing the scope of liability, the 
question has shifted from the jury (a factual enquiry) to the court (a question of law to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1256  See for example, Robinson v Butler 1948, 226 Minn 491, 33 NW 2d 821 where an excited 
passenger seized the wheel; Cone v Inter County Telephone & Telegraph Co Fla 1949, 40 So 
2d 148 where the plaintiff foolishly exposed himself to danger; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on torts 309 fn 79. 
1257  See for example, Illinois Central Railway Co v Oswald 1930, 338 Ill 270, 170 NE 247; Wolfinger 
v Shaw 1940 138 Neb 229,292 NW 731; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 308. 
1258  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 342. 
1259  See for example, Splendorio v Bilray Demolition Co 682 A 2d 461 (RI 1996); Fisher v Swift 
Transport Co 342 Mont 335 181 P 3d 601 (2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 347 fn 49. 
1260  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 344. 
1261  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 499. 
1262  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99 (1928). 
1263  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99,101 (1928). 
1264  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 499. 
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be determined by the adjudicator).1265 As already mentioned,1266 a number of 
academic writers1267 prefer the question of reasonable foreseeability of harm not to be 
a question at the duty stage and blame the confusion for its role at the duty stage due 
to the decision of  Palsgraf where risk of harm to a certain class of persons was not 
reasonably foreseen. The issue of reasonable foreseeability of harm was dealt with by 
Cardozo CJ at the duty stage. Andrew J in the dissenting judgment dealt with 
reasonable foreseeability of harm at the proximate cause stage.1268  
 
It is submitted that a recent contribution written by Cardi1269 is important as he 
extensively researched the law, provides a succinct summary, and illustrates the 
uncertainty found in the American tort of negligence, where inter alia the use of the 
concept of reasonableness (particularly reasonable foreseeability of harm and 
preventability of harm), fairness, justice, morality, policy considerations and 
community values lend to the confusion. He illustrates the many factors that are used 
to determine a duty of reasonable care, which include the factors used in determining 
fault in the form of negligence as well as “proximate cause”. It is submitted that this 
problem is common in the English tort of negligence as well as in the South African 
law of delict, specifically with the elements of wrongfulness, negligence and legal 
causation which require value judgments and are policy laden. This has in all 
probability occurred as a result of the influence of English tort law principles on 
American and South African law.  
 
Cardi’s contribution is intended to provide clarity in American law. In analysing 
Palsgraf,1270 he looks at the following three questions: “(1) [w]hat is the nature of duty 
– is it relational or act-centered? (2) Is plaintiff-foreseeability a duty inquiry or an aspect 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1265  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 499. 
1266  See para 3.1 above. 
1267  See Green 1930 Col L Rev 789; Goodhart 1930 Yale LJ 449; Campbell 1938 Wis L Rev 402; 
Cowan 1938  Minn L Rev 46; Gregory 1938 U Chi L Rev 36; Eldredge 1952 Pa B A Q 158; 
James 1953 Nev U L Rev 778; Dias 1955 Camb L J 198; Dias 1956 Tulane L Rev 377; Fleming 
1961 Can Bar Rev 489; Green 1961 Col L Rev 1401; Goodhart 1960 L Q Rev 567; Payne 1962 
Mod L Rev 1; Wilson and Slade 1952 Mod L Rev 458; Prosser 1953 Mich L Rev 1; Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 344; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 274-275, 
280-281, 284-290.  
1268  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99, 103 (1928). 
1269  2011 B U L Rev 1873ff. 
1270  Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99 (1928). 
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of proximate cause? (3) Is a court or a jury the proper arbiter of foreseeability?”1271 
Cardozo J writing for the majority of the court found that duty is relational and that is a 
matter of law determined by the adjudicator. Cardi1272 explains that after researching 
“hundreds of duty cases”, the current state of the element of duty is “frustratingly 
inconsistent, unfocused, and often nonsensical”. This is due to the common law being 
developed by adjudicators who are human beings and not perfect. After examining 
“fifty-one jurisdictions (the fifty states and the District of Columbia)” he concludes that 
no court considers the key aspect of duty as one of “relation” but that it is “articulated 
as a multi-factorial policy decision”.1273 The main factors considered in establishing a 
duty according to Biakanja v Irving1274 and Rowland v Christian1275 include:  
 
 “(1) the  foreseeability  of  harm  to  the plaintiff, (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
 suffered injury, (3) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the 
 injury suffered, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, (5) the policy of 
 preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to 
 the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and (7) 
 the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved”.1276  
 
Cardi1277 refers to eight jurisdictions that embraced the factors verbatim and a further 
five that have adapted them. The above-mentioned cases where these factors were 
enunciated, not surprisingly dealt with cases involving economic harm and liability of 
a landowner. The above-mentioned jurisdictions currently use these factors in 
imposing a duty in all cases. Cardi1278 extensively refers to cases in another thirty 
jurisdictions which refer to other factors including:  
 
 “(1) the foreseeability of some general risk of harm, (2) the foreseeability of the harm that in 
 fact materialized, (3) the relationship between the parties, (4) the nature of the activity in 
 which the defendant engaged, (5) the type of injury risked by the defendant’s conduct, (6) the 
 nature of the plaintiff’s injured interest, (7) the social utility of the defendant’s conduct, (8) the 
 burden on the defendant of taking precautions against the risk, (9) the defendant’s ability to 
 exercise due care, (10) the consequences on society of imposing the burden on the 
 defendant, (11) public policy, (12) the normal expectations of participants in the defendant’s 
 activity, (13) the expectations of the  parties  and  of  society,  (14)  the  goal  of  preventing  
 future  injuries  by deterring conduct in which the defendant engaged, (15) the desire to avoid 
 an increase in litigation, (16) the decisions of other jurisdictions, (17) the balance of the 
 foreseeable risk of injury versus the burden of preventing it (i.e., the Learned Hand formula), 
 (18) fairness, (19) logic and science, (20) the desire to limit the consequences of wrongs 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1271  Cardi 2011 B U L Rev 1874. 
1272  Cardi 2011 B U L Rev 1875. 
1273  Cardi 2011 B U L Rev 1878. 
1274  320 P 2d 16, 19 (Cal 1958). 
1275  443 P 2d 561, 564 (Cal 1968). 
1276  Cardi 2011 B U L Rev 1878. 
1277  2011 B U L Rev 1879. 
1278  2011 B U L Rev 1879-1883. 
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 (expressed in New York as the desire to curb the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like 
 liability), (21) the hand of history, (22) ideals of morality and justice, (23) the convenience of 
 administration of the resulting rule, (24) social ideas about where the plaintiff’s loss should 
 fall, (25) whether there is social consensus that the plaintiff’s asserted interest is worthy of 
 protection, (26) community mores, (27) whether the injury is too remote from the defendant’s 
 conduct, (28) whether the injury is out of proportion to the defendant’s wrong, (29) whether 
 the imposition of a duty would open the way to fraudulent claims, (30) whether the recognition 
 of a duty would enter a field with no sensible stopping point, (31) the cost and ability to spread 
 the risk of loss, (32) the court’s experience, (33) the desire for a reliable, predictable, and  
 consistent  body  of  law, (34)  public  policies regarding the expansion or limitation of new 
 channels of liability, (35) the potential for disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, (36) 
 whether one party had superior knowledge of the relevant risks, (37) whether either party had 
 the right to control or had actual control over the instrumentality of harm, (38) the degree of 
 certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (39) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s 
 conduct, (40) the foreseeability of the plaintiff, (41) economic factors, and (42) a consideration 
 of which party could better bear the loss”.1279  
 
Thus reasonable foreseeability is almost always referred to as the prevalent factor in 
establishing a duty.1280 The second most cited factor is “public policy”,1281 and the third 
factor referred to by fifteen jurisdictions is “the relationship between the parties”.1282 In 
respect of whether the foreseeable plaintiff falls under the enquiry of duty or the scope 
of liability, thirty three jurisdictions deal with it under the duty stage while four states 
deal with it under the scope of liability.1283 The rest of the jurisdictions are uncertain of 
the doctrinal place for the foreseeable plaintiff.1284 Cardi1285 submits that a duty of 
reasonable care is determined by the adjudicator using an ex ante approach taking 
into account moral and policy considerations while “proximate cause” is determined 
firstly by the jury using an ex post facto approach with a focus on limiting liability 
according to the specific facts of the case. Cardi1286 concludes that forty-seven 
jurisdictions hold that the foreseeability of the plaintiff falls within the context of duty; 
twenty of the jurisdictions favour the jury deciding on the foreseeability of the plaintiff 
while sixteen favour the court deciding on foreseeability of the plaintiff. Eleven 
jurisdictions are either divided or have not addressed whether the jury or the court 
should decide on foreseeability of the plaintiff. Furthermore four jurisdictions are in 
favour of the foreseeability of the plaintiff being decided within the context of proximate 
cause. Turning to Palsgraf, Cardi concludes with regard to duty that neither Cardozo 
CJ nor Andrew J’s dictum were adopted but rather the courts have encompassed 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1279  Cardi 2011 B U L Rev 1883-1884. 
1280  Cardi 2011 B U L Rev 1884-1886. 
1281  Cardi 2011 B U L Rev 1887. 
1282  Cardi 2011 B U L Rev 1887. 
1283  Cardi 2011 B U L Rev 1890-1892. 
1284  Cardi 2011 B U L Rev 1893-1894. 
1285  2011 B U L Rev 1897-1898. 
1286  2011 B U L Rev 1901-1912. 
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Prosser’s “aphorism that duty ‘is only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to 
protection’”.1287 Geistfeld1288 states that there are two facets of foreseeability in 
Palsgraf. One, where “the question of whether duty should ever be limited by the 
foreseeability of the plaintiff” is a question to be determined by the adjudicator as a 
matter of law. The other, depending on the facts of the case, “whether the plaintiff was, 
in fact, foreseeable” which is a question for the jury to be dealt with under the element 
of duty or proximate cause. 
 
Whether a cause was direct or indirect may be dispensed with by the courts as all that 
needs to be determined is whether “the injury that occurred was within the risk created 
by the defendant”.1289 Adjudicators typically instruct juries by stating that a defendant 
is liable for the “natural and probable consequences” of his conduct or that the 
proximate cause of the harm occurs where there is a “natural and continuous 
sequence, without any efficient intervening cause”.1290 Thus a new or intervening 
cause, also referred to as a superseding cause, which occurs after the defendant’s 
negligent conduct may depending on the circumstances result in an exclusion of 
liability, for example, where an abnormal consequence such as drowning occurs as a 
result of the weight of a plaster cast on an arm when the deceased falls out of a 
boat.1291 In instances of suicide, proximate cause may be present if the suicide is 
foreseeable and within the ambit of the risks created by the defendant.1292 Therefore 
suicide would be deemed an intervening cause only if it was unforeseeable and 
outside the scope of the risk created by the defendant.1293 For example, in Perez v 
Lopez,1294 a locksmith picked a trigger lock of a rifle as requested by a minor. The 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1287  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 358. 
1288  2011 Yale LJ 154 fn 32. 
1289  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 345.  
1290  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 346. See Milwaukee & St PR Co v Kellogg 94 
US 469, 24 L Ed 256 (1876); CSX Transp Inc v Continental Ins Co 343 Md 216, 680 A 2d 1082 
(1996); Gilmore v Shell Oil Co 613 So 2d 1272 (Ala 1993). 
1291  See for example, Linder v City of Payette 1943, 64 Idaho 656, 135 P 2d 440; Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 346; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 310. 
1292  See Young v Swiney 23 F Supp 3D 596, 619 (D Md 2014) where the defendant was denied 
summary judgment. The court found that there was a sufficient link between the act and the 
(consequence) suicide which was committed two years after an accident. 
1293  See Rains v Bend of the River 124 SW 3d 580 (Tenn App 2003); Jutzi-Johnson v United States 
263 F 3d 753 (7th Cir 2001); cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 372 
fn 221-224. 
1294  74 SW 3d 60 (Tex App 2002). 
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locksmith was aware that the request was made by a minor and efforts were made to 
contact the parents but to no avail. The minor was jovial with the locksmith and when 
asked what he was going to do with it, replied that he was just going hunting. The 
locksmith then gave the rifle back to the minor who subsequently used it to commit 
suicide. The court found that suicide was not foreseeable according to the 
circumstances of the case and the locksmith was not held liable. The defendant will 
also not be held liable for abnormal and unforeseeable events of nature such as an 
unpredictable flood.1295 The plaintiff’s own conduct may qualify as an intervening 
cause or the proximate cause of his own harm where liability is excluded.1296 However, 
in most instances the plaintiff’s claim will be reduced due to his contributory fault.1297 
Comparative fault, where apportionment of liability is applied in respect of the plaintiff’s 
and the defendant’s fault, as well as joint and several liability, relating to joint 
defendants, are an option to temper the all or nothing proximate cause rule  or scope 
of liability rule excluding liability.1298 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the scope of liability is partly explicit and partly 
implicit depending on which theory or tests are applied. It would be unreasonable and 
unjust to impose liability on a defendant for harm resulting from his negligent conduct 
which falls outside the scope of risks he created. The scope of liability is determined 
from the facts and is a value-based judgment determined by the jury. It is generally 
unreasonable to impose liability on the defendant for reasonably unforeseeable 
risks1299 and risks not reasonably known as a matter of fairness.1300 In order to 
determine legal causation, the courts refer to the direct consequences theory, the 
reasonable foreseeability theory, or if the consequences are a natural and probable 
consequences of the defendant’s conduct without any intervening cause.1301 An 
intervening cause breaks the chain of causation and it would be unreasonable to hold 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1295  See for example, Gerber v McCall 1953 175 Kan 433, 264 P 2d 490; other examples referred 
to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 312. 
1296  See Exxon Co USA v Sofec Inc 517 US 830 116 S Ct 1813, 135 L Ed 2d 113 (1996); Komlodi 
v Picciano 217 NJ 387, 89 A 3d 1234 (2014); cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 373 fn 232. 
1297  See Gunnell v Arizona Public Service Co 202 Ariz 388 46 P 3d 399 (2002); Soto v New York 
City Transit Authority 6 NY 3d 487, 846 NE 2d 1211, 813 NYS 2d 701 (2006); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 375. 
1298  See discussion by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 375-377. 
1299  See Gilead and Green Wake Forest Univ Legal Studies Paper No. 2014874 6. 
1300  See Gilead and Green Wake Forest Univ Legal Studies Paper No. 2014874 8. 
1301  Zweigert and Kӧtz Comparative law 610. 
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the defendant liable for the consequences of a superseding or intervening cause. The 
defendant may be held liable for harm caused to a rescuer where there is a reasonable 
rescue attempt1302 and the rescuer reasonably believes that a person is in peril.1303 It 
is reasonable to hold a defendant liable in instances of suicide if the suicide is 
reasonably foreseeable and within the ambit of the risks created by the defendant.1304 
It is unreasonable to hold a defendant liable for abnormal and unforeseeable acts of 
nature.1305 Cardi inter alia has pointed out the confusion surrounding the use of 
reasonable foreseeability of harm and the foreseeable plaintiff in determining the 
element of duty and scope of liability. Even the factors for determining a breach of a 
duty is used to determine the existence of a duty. This is indeed a common problem 
in English and South African law mainly because the elements of duty (in English law), 
fault in the form of negligence, legal causation, and wrongfulness (in the South African 
law of delict) are based on value judgments. These value judgments involve policy 
considerations, community values and the concepts of reasonableness, fairness and 
justice. In no system is the difference between the various elements quite as clear as 
one would have wished for. 
 
5. Harm, loss or damage 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the award of damages is predominantly explicit 
and partly implicit. The influence of reasonableness with regard to some of the different 
heads of damages will now be discussed. 
 
Compensation is generally awarded for harm, loss or damage sustained.1306 The aim 
of compensation is traditionally to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been 
in, had the tort not occurred. In this sense tort law has a restorative function.1307 It is 
not possible in a strict sense in all instances to put the plaintiff in the position he would 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1302  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 366. 
1303  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 349 fn 61-66. 
1304  See Young v Swiney 23 F Supp 3D 596, 619 (D Md 2014). 
1305  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 312. 
1306  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4, 5. 
1307  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 442. 
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have been in had the tort not occurred. For example, where a person is disabled, has 
a loss of a bodily function, or dies, a price cannot be put on the loss of life or bodily 
function.1308 Compensation encompasses the idea of corrective justice in that out of 
fairness, the defendant who caused harm or loss to the plaintiff should pay for such 
loss or damage.1309 Compensation also encompasses a reparation function, based on 
the idea of balancing the moral scales whereby the defendant pays for the wrong done 
to the plaintiff.1310 Punitive damages are awarded with the aim of deterring further 
misconduct, thus there is a deterrent function too.1311 It is submitted that all these 
functions are aimed at fairness and justice between the parties, and are 
reasonableness aims in tort law in bringing about such fairness and justice. 
 
Restitution and injunctions as remedies in tort law are distinct from the award of 
damages. Restitution is a remedy whereby the defendant must restore or return any 
gains “wrongfully obtained by tort”.1312 An injunction is applied in order to prevent or 
stop the defendant from continuing the tortious conduct.1313 The defendant is forbidden 
to act in a manner causing harm or loss.1314 In American tort law, the general rule is 
that the successful party in a case is not entitled to recover his legal fees from the 
other party. Each party must pay their own attorney’s fees. There are, however, 
exceptions to this rule.1315 
 
Generally, the plaintiff may recover all damages that are reasonably foreseeable.1316 
There must be some form of harm or loss1317 and nominal damages are generally not 
awarded in respect of the tort of negligence.1318 With regard to the intentional torts 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1308  Shapo Tort 531, 533. 
1309  Fischer 1999 Tenn L Rev 1136. 
1310  Shapo Tort 532-533. 
1311  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
1312  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
1313  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
1314  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 851. 
1315  Specific statutes may entitle parties to recover reasonable fees as well as in cases dealing with 
civil rights. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 43. 
1316  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 190. 
1317  See Reardon v Larkin 3 A 3d 376 (Me 2010) where the claim failed as the harm was not caused 
by the defendant’s conduct; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 189 fn 14. 
1318  See Right v Breen 277 Conn 364, 890 A 2d 1287 (2006); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 189. 
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however, nominal damages may be awarded.1319 Shapo1320 explains that the value of 
nominal damages (currently one dollar) lies in the “normative signal sent by the award 
‒ its power in providing a vindication for the violation of rights”. Proof of loss is 
generally not required for intentional torts.1321 Compensatory damages are awarded 
for all past and prospective loss.1322 Jury awards are supervised by adjudicators and 
an award may be increased (additur – where the plaintiff challenges the award, 
alleging it is inadequate) or decreased (remitter – where the defendant challenges the 
award, alleging it is excessive).1323  
 
Compensation may be awarded for non-pecuniary loss consisting of pain and 
suffering; emotional harm or distress; loss of enjoyment of life; loss of consortium; and 
dignitary harm (relating to infringement of personality rights). Pecuniary loss may be 
claimed for loss of earnings; hospital and medical costs; or damage to property 
including consequential loss.1324  
 
Damages stemming from personal injury and damage to property (tangible property) 
falling within the ambit of “physical harm”,1325 are readily awarded in the United States 
of America when compared to damages resulting from “pure economic loss” or 
“emotional harm” (intangible harm).1326 Bodily harm includes “physical injury, illness, 
disease, impairment of bodily function, and death”.1327 There are wrongful death 
statutes that generally regulate compensation to family members of the deceased as 
a result of death of the deceased caused by “a wrongful act, neglect or default of 
another”.1328 The study of these statutes falls beyond the scope of this study and will 
not be discussed further, suffice it to say that damages for wrongful death are awarded 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1319  See Gross v Capital Elec Line Builders Inc 253 Kan 798, 861 P 2d 1326 (1993) where nominal 
damages were awarded for trespass to land; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
189. 
1320  Tort 535.      
1321  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 851. 
1322  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 852.  
1323  Epstein Torts 441. 
1324  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 442. 
1325  See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 4 (2010) where 
physical harm relates to “physical impairment of the human body (‘bodily harm’) or of real 
property or tangible (‘property damage’)”. 
1326  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 189. 
1327  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 311-312. 
1328  See for example NM Stat Ann §41-2-1 (1996 Repl); in general Wex 1965 Stan L Rev 1043 with 
regard to the development of these claims; Shapo Tort 537. 
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where it is deemed reasonable and fair.1329 In contrast survival statutes generally 
regulate compensation for injury sustained by the deceased between the time of injury 
and death.1330 
 
5.2 Compensatory damages for personal injury (pecuniary loss)1331 
 
The influence of reasonableness on past and future loss of earnings is explicit in that 
it is reasonable that the plaintiff should be entitled to recover reasonably incurred past 
earnings and future earnings which are reasonably likely to occur. The plaintiff would 
not have sustained such loss as well as expected loss had the tort not occurred. The 
defendant should also only pay for past and future loss that is proven.  
 
Where a plaintiff is entitled to compensation and is unable wholly or in part to work, 
the plaintiff may recover actual lost wages and fringe benefits1332 as well as future loss 
of earnings.1333 The plaintiff must provide proof of his earning before and after the tort 
as well as prove that the tort was the proximate cause of the loss.1334 If an increase in 
salary in the future is reasonably expected and has been lost, such loss may also be 
recovered.1335 Loss of earning capacity “reflects the value of work the plaintiff could 
have done but for the injury”.1336 The injury reduces the future earning capacity even 
though there is no actual lost income.1337 Projections of future loss of earnings take 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1329  See for example NM Stat Ann §41-2-3 (1996 Repl) referred to by Shapo Tort 537 fn 32; Epstein 
Torts 453. 
1330  See Shapo Tort 538-539. 
1331  Compensatory damages for personal injury includes what is called patrimonial or pecuniary 
loss and non-patrimonial or non-pecuniary loss referred to in other jurisdictions discussed in 
this thesis. 
1332  See for example Rivera v Philadelphia Theological Seminary of St Charles Borromeo Inc 510 
Pa 1, 507 A 2d 1 (1986); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 852. 
1333  See for example, Fuqua v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co 542 So 2d 1129 (La Ct App 1989); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 852. 
1334  Robinson v Greeley & Hansen 114 Ill App 3d 720, 725, 70 Ill Dec 376, 380, 449 NE 2d 250, 
254 (1983); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 852. 
1335  See Felder v Physiotherapy Assocs 215 Ariz 154, 158 P 3d 877 (Ct App 2007); Henry v National 
Union Fire Ins Co 542 So 2d 102, 107 (La Ct App 1989); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 852. 
1336  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 852. 
1337  See for example, American Nat’l Watermattress Corp v Manville 642 P 2d 1330 (Alaska 1982) 
where a 72 year old woman as a result of injury was unable to work and had been working for 
48 hours a week in a family business. She was only paid a nominal salary but was entitled to 
full lost earning capacity. In Rubio v Davis 231 Ga App 425, 500 SE 2d 367 (1990) where a 3 
year old child’s arm was  amputated and entitled to loss of earning capacity (Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 853 fn 17). 
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into account factors such as the age of the plaintiff, education, life expectancy, job 
status, etcetera.1338 Compensation for household services may also be awarded. 
These costs relate to instances where for example the injured spouse was the home 
maker who cooked, cleaned etcetera and the loss is reflected as a lost financial 
contribution.1339 Damages may also be awarded to injured persons who are family 
members and perform tasks such as gardening services or other handy work.1340 
 
The influence of reasonableness on claims for medical and related expenses is explicit 
in that generally only reasonable past and probable future medical and related 
costs1341 “proximately resulting from the tortious injury” may be recovered.1342 This 
may apply to costs relating to inter alia surgery, hospital and medical bills, other aids 
relating to rehabilitation and recovery, medical practitioner’s fees, medication, devices 
or artificial limbs1343 required, diagnostic tests (medical monitoring) etcetera.1344 The 
reasonable value of the services and or appliances required are recoverable and only 
if the services are reasonably required.1345 In instances where a plaintiff has been 
exposed to a toxic substance such as asbestos where a disease (such as cancer) may 
develop after a prolonged period, the logical way to minimise harm is to undergo 
regular check-ups. In such instances “reasonable monitoring expenses” may be 
recovered.1346  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
1338  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 853; Epstein Torts 443-445. 
1339  See Epstein Torts 445. 
1340  See McKinney v California Portland Cement Co 96 Cal App 4th 1214, 117 Cal Rptr 2d 849, 
858-859 (2002). 
1341  See Donovan v Philip Morris USA 455 Mass 215, 914 NE 2d 891 (2009). 
1342  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 853. 
1343  See for example Haudrich v Howmedica Inc 169 Ill 2d 525, 662 NE 2d 1248, 215 Ill Dec 108 
(1996) in respect of a knee replacement; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 853. 
1344  See Epstein Torts 441-442. 
1345  See Pexa v Auto Owners Ins Co 686 NW 2d 150 (Iowa 2004); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 854. 
1346  See Ayers v Jackson Township 525 A 2d 287, 312-314 (1987); Potter v Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co 863 P 2d 795 (Cal 1993); Hagerty v L & L Marine Servs Inc 788 F 2d 315 (5th Cir 1986); 
Donovan v Philip Morris USA 455 Mass  215, 914 NE 2d 891 (2009); contra Metro-North 
Commuter Railway v Buckley 521 US 424 (1997) where medical monitoring costs were not 
allowed; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 854; Epstein Torts 442. 
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5.3 Mental and physical pain and suffering1347 (non-pecuniary loss)1348 
 
The influence of reasonableness on claims for non-pecuniary loss is implicit, the claim 
is based on the pain and suffering subjectively felt by the plaintiff. It is therefore 
reasonable to consider subjective factors such as duration of pain and the plaintiff’s 
age etcetera in order to quantify the damages as each person deals with pain and 
suffering differently. Damages for pain and suffering are referred to as non-objective 
awards as pain suffered is subjective, because no one knows the pain suffered by 
another.1349 Damages for pain and suffering whether experienced mentally, 
emotionally1350 or physically,1351 which was proximately caused as a result of tortious 
conduct may be recovered. Expert testimony may be provided but is not necessary 
where the injury itself and the treatment required are sufficient to award damages for 
pain and suffering.1352 Awards for pain and suffering are not easy to quantify and prior 
comparable awards may be referred to as a guide in conjunction with subjective 
factors (such as the duration of the pain, age of person etcetera).1353 Pain and suffering 
includes pain and suffering experienced as a result of inter alia losing a body part1354 
or bodily function,1355 or sustaining disfigurement. Damages may also be claimed for: 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1347  See Shapo Tort 541 who refers to noneconomic damages 541. 
1348  Damages for mental and physical pain and suffering would be regarded as non-pecuniary or 
non-patrimonial loss in the other jurisdictions discussed in this thesis. 
1349  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 43. 
1350  See or example, Wood v Mobil Chem Co 50 Ill App 3d 465, 8 Ill Dec 701, 365 NE 2d 1087 
(1977) where pain and suffering was found recoverable for depression and anxiety after a brain 
injury; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 854. 
1351  See for example, Black v Comer 38 So 3d 16 (Ala 2009) where the plaintiff was entitled to 
damages for physical pain and suffering after tissue was removed from the plaintiff’s abdomen. 
The plaintiff sustained internal bleeding; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 854. 
1352  See for example, Choi v Anvil 32 P 3d 1 (Ala 2001); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 855. 
1353  See for example, Meyers v Wal-Mart Stores, East Inc 257 F 3d 625 (6th Cir 2001) where 
comparable awards were considered to reduce an award for pain and suffering; Bissell v Town 
of Amherst 56 AD 3d 1144, 867 NYS 2d 582 (2008) where prior cases were considered in order 
to determine reasonable compensation; contra Ritter v Stanton 745 NE 2d 828 (Ind Ct App 
2001) where an Indiana court held that prior awards should not be considered in that each 
person is entitled to their own award by the jury. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
torts 855. 
1354  Such as an eye, see for example, Mileski v Long Island Rail Road 499 F 2d 1169 (2nd Cir 
1974); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 855. 
1355  Such as one’s excretory or sexual functions, see for example Kenton v Hyatt Hotels Corp 693 
SW 2d 83 (Mo 1985); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 855. 
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loss of enjoyment of life;1356 fear for one’s own death, mental anguish1357 or fear of 
developing a disease (such as cancer);1358 consortium;1359 and bereavement.1360 
Generally various forms of non-pecuniary loss are claimed together as a global 
amount and are determined by the jury.1361 Awards for non-pecuniary loss try to 
quantify personal subjective experiences.  
 
5.4 Damage to property   
 
In respect of damage to property, the diminished value rule (the difference between 
the value of the property immediately before and after the tort)1362 or the cost rule (cost 
of repair or replacement of the property) is applied.1363 If the cost of repair is higher 
than the diminished value of the property, the diminished value may be imposed.1364 
It is submitted that this is reasonable as it makes economic sense and the defendant 
should generally not pay more than required. However, even if the cost of repair is 
high, it may be imposed where the property is important to the plaintiff such as lost 
shade from trees or vegetation1365 or injury to one’s beloved pet. It is submitted that 
this may be justified too and reasonable as the subjective value of the loss to the 
plaintiff such as his pet is taken into account. The courts have awarded damages for 
the medical treatment of the pet even though it exceeds the fair market value of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1356  See for example Averyt v Wal-Mart Stores Inc 265 P 3d 456 (Colo 2011) where personality 
changes, depression, difficulty in sleeping and concentrating affected the plaintiff’s loss of 
enjoyment of life; Flannery v United States 297 SE 2d 433, 437-438 (W Va 1982); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 856. In some states such loss can be claimed even 
where the victim is in a coma, see Holston v Sisters of the Third Order of St Francis 618 NE 2d 
334 (Ill App 1993) where it was allowed but not in McDougald v Garber 536 NE 2d 372 (NY 
1989). See also Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 460 fn 133. 
1357  See Haley v Pan American World Airways 746 F 2d 311, 317 (5th Cir 1984). 
1358  See Ferrara v Galluchio 5 NY 2d 16, 176 NYS 2d 996, 152 NE 2d 249, 71 ALR 2d 331 (1958); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 856. 
1359  Loss of companionship usually awarded to spouses as a result of marital relations but has been 
extended to children for injuries sustained by their parents (see Frank v Superior Court 722 P 
2d 955, 960 (Ariz 1986)) and even siblings (see Dubaniewicz v Houman 910 A 2d 897, 902 (Vt 
2006)). See Shapo Tort 545. 
1360  Emotional distress as a result of the death of another, see Eliott v Willis 442 NE 2d 163, 167-
168 (Ill. 1982); Shapo Tort 545. 
1361  Shapo Tort 545. 
1362  See for example, Ross v A Betterway Rent-A-Car Inc 213 Ga App 288, 444 SE 2d 604 (1994); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 857. 
1363  See for example, Halpin v Schultz 917 NE 2d 436 (Ill 2009); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 857.  
1364  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 857. 
1365  See Andersen v Edwards 625 P 2d 282, 288 (Alaska 1981); Weitz v Green 230 P 3d (Idaho 
2010); Restatement Second of Torts § 929 cmt b (1979); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 857.  
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particular animal.1366 Again reasonable and necessary costs relating to the medical 
treatment of the pet may be recovered.1367 Where the property has been 
contaminated, the plaintiff may be entitled to the costs of cleaning up the property even 
if it exceeds the diminished value of the property.1368 It is submitted that this is fair and 
reasonable as the idea is to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had 
the delict not occurred. Part of restoring the position as it was before requires the 
cleaning up of the property. Consequential loss flowing from inability to use one’s 
property, such as a motor vehicle, while it is being repaired or is still to be replaced, is 
recoverable. The existence of the lost use and amount “must be proven with 
reasonable certainty”.1369 Reasonable expenses incurred in order to minimise 
damages are also recoverable.1370 The influence of reasonableness on damage to 
property is explicit. 
 
5.5 Punitive damages 
 
Punitive damages (exemplary damages) are usually awarded in instances where the 
plaintiff has suffered a legally recognisable harm and the defendant has acted 
reprehensibly,1371 deliberately, or with intention to harm coupled with some form of 
outrageous behaviour.1372 Malice,1373 fraudulent conduct,1374 bad motive,1375 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1366  See Kimes v Grosser 195 Cal App. 4th 1556, 126 Cal Rptr 3d 581 (2011); Burgess v 
Shampooch Pet Indus Inc 35 Kan App 2d 458, 131 P 3d 1248 (2006); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 857. 
1367  See Zager v Dimilia 138 Misc 2d 448, 524 NYS 2d 968 (J Ct 1988); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 857. 
1368  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 858. 
1369  See Nichols v Sukaro Kennels 555 NW 2d 689, 61 ALR 5th 883 (Iowa 1996); Scheele v Dustin 
998 A 2d 697 (Vt 2010) 
1370  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 858. 
1371  Day v Woodworth 54 US 363, 371 (1851). See Epstein Torts 459. 
1372  See for example, Battle v Kilcrease 1936 54 Ga App 808, 189 SE 573 with regard to a hit-and-
run claim; Miller v Blanton 1948 213 Ark 246, 210 SW 2d 293 with regard to an intoxicated 
defendant; Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 908 (2005); Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 9; Epstein Torts 459. 
1373  See Jones v West Side Buick Co 1936, 231 Mo App 187, 93 SW 2d 1083; Owens-Illinois Inc v 
Zenobia 325 Md 420, 601 A 2d 633 (1992); Ross v Louise Wise Servs Inc 8 NY 3d 478, 836 
NYS 2d 509, 868 NE 2d 189 (2007); authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 862 fn 100-107; cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 10 fn 
24. 
1374  See Augusta Bank & Trust v Broom-Field 1982, 231 Kan 52, 643 P 2d 100; Keeton et al Prosser 
and Keeton on torts 10 fn 25. 
1375  See Hintz v Roberts 1923 98 NJL 768 121 A 711 as well as other cases referred to by Keeton 
et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 10 fn 26. 
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deliberate concealment of facts,1376 “grossly unreasonable”,1377 “wanton misconduct” 
or acting “with a conscious indifference to risk” may also result in award of punitive 
damages.1378 Punitive damages have been awarded in a number of tort cases1379 
involving inter alia1380 assault and battery,1381 trespass1382 child molestation,1383 
fraud,1384 intentional infliction of severe mental harm,1385 and repeated misconduct.1386 
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter future misconduct. The point 
is to send a message to the community that such conduct is not acceptable.1387 
Awarding of punitive damages has been criticised for inter alia it resembling criminal 
fines or civil damages, and for the award of damages being unpredictable and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1376  As in Philip Morris USA v Williams 549 US 346, 127 S Ct 1057, 166 L Ed 2d 940 (2007) where 
the manufacturer sold cancer causing cigarettes stating that they were safe, and BMW of North 
America v Gore 517 US 559, 116 S Ct 1589, 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996) where BMW sold a 
repainted vehicle as a new vehicle without disclosing the repaint as a result of minor damage 
prior to delivery which reduced the resale value of the vehicle. The jury awarded compensatory 
damages $4000 and punitive damages of $4 000 000 later reduced to $2 000 000. The punitive 
award was reversed and Stevens J stated that there was no deliberate false statements made 
(576-579), the ratio was excessive 500 to 1(582-583). 
1377  Jones v Fletcher 166 NW 2d 175, 180 (Wis 1969). 
1378  See for example, Wangen v Ford Motor Co 294 NW 2d 437,462 (Wis 1980); Leichtamer v 
American Motors Corp 424 NE 2d 568, 580 (Ohio 1981); Sebastain v Wood 1954 246 Iowa 94, 
66 NW 2d 841 (in respect of drunken driving); Toole v Richardson-Merrell Inc 1967, 251 Cal 
App 2d 689, 60 Cal Rptr 398 where vital information regarding sale of drugs was withheld; 
Pouzanova v Morton 327 P 3d 865 (Ala 2014); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 
862; cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 10 fn 27, 31. 
1379  See cases cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 863 fn 111-121. 
1380  Punitive damages has also been awarded in cases of libel, slander, deceit, seduction, malicious 
prosecution, conversion, private nuisance, alienation of affections – see Keeton et al Prosser 
and Keeton on torts 10-11. 
1381  See Maxa v Neidlein 1932, 163 Md 366, 163 A  202; Hough v Mooningham 139 Ill App 3d 1018, 
487 NE 2d 1281, 94 Ill Dec 404 (1986) where the plaintiff was hit with a shovel; Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on torts 863; cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
torts 10 fn 33. 
1382  To land. See for example, Oden v Russell 1952 207 Okl 570, 251 P 2d 184; Cox v Stolworthy 
1972 94 Idaho 683, 496 P 2d 682; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 11. 
1383  See Hutchinson v Luddy 896 A 2d 1260 (Pa Super Ct 2006) with regard to child molestation by 
a clergyman; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 863. 
1384  See Talent Tree Personnel Services v Fleenor 703 So 2d 917 (Ala 1997); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 863. 
1385  See Fletcher v Western National Life Insurance Co 1970, 10 Cal App 3D 376, 89 Cal App 3d 
376, 89 Cal Rptr 78; Amsden v Grinnel Mutual Reinsurance Co Iowa 1972 203 NW 2d 252; 
Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 11. 
1386  See West v Western Casualty & Surety Co 846 F 2d 387 (7th Cir 1988); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 863. 
1387  See BMW of North America v Gore 517 US 559, 116 S Ct 1589, 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996) and 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v Campbell 538 US 408, 123 S Ct 1513, 
155 L Ed 2d 585 (2003) where the United States Supreme Court set aside a punitive award as 
being constitutionally excessive; Exxon Shipping Co v Baker 554 US 471, 492, 128 S Ct 2605, 
2621, 171 L Ed 2d 570 (2008); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 863, 868-873; 
Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 9. 
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potentially excessive,1388 but they are still awarded.1389 Generally, the punitive award 
should have some kind of reasonable relationship or there must be a reasonable 
proportion between “the potential for harm created by the defendant’s conduct” or the 
“actual damages suffered by the plaintiff”.1390 The influence of reasonableness is 
explicit with regard to this requirement. Some courts have found that there need not 
be a relationship with the actual damages.1391 The reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct is an important factor “of the reasonableness of a punitive damages 
award”.1392 The defendant’s financial status may be considered in order for the court 
to determine an appropriate amount of punitive damages as an award of a certain sum 
may bankrupt one person, but merely cause annoyance to another.1393 There are a 
number of states which allow punitive damages for particular torts such as 
trespass.1394 
 
5.6 General principles applicable to compensatory damages for personal injury 
(pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss) 
 
Damages for future loss may be discounted to their present day value and adjusted to 
take into account inflation.1395 The collateral source rule whereby the defendant is not 
entitled to deduct from the plaintiff’s claim, payments the plaintiff has received from 
third parties is applied, making the defendant fully liable even though the plaintiff gains 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1388  See Exxon Shipping Co v Baker 554 US 471, 499, 128 S Ct 2605, 2625, 171 L Ed 2d 570 
(2008); Owen 1982 U Chi L Rev 1; Ellis 1982 South Cal L Rev 103; Wheeler 1983 Va L Rev 
269; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 11fn 47-48, 14 fn 68; as well as books and 
articles referred to by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 864 fn 129-130. 
1389  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 12. 
1390  See Palmer v Ted Stevens Honda Inc 193 Cal App 3d 530, 238 Cal Rptr 363 (1987); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 866. However this is not always the case, see for 
example, Toomey v Farley 1956 2 NY 2d 71, 156 NYS 2d 840, 138 NE 2d 221 dealing with 
libel where 6 cents was awarded as actual damages and an additional $5000 awarded as 
punitive damages; Livesay v Stock 1929, 208 Cal 315, 281 P 70 in regard to a battery claim 
where the actual damages amounted to $750 and $10 000 punitive damages (see Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 14-15). 
1391  See for example, Malco Inc v Mid-West Aluminium Sales Inc 1961, 14 Wis 2d 57, 109 NW 2d 
516 as well as other cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 15 fn 75 
1392  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 870. 
1393  See TXO Production Corp v Alliance Resources Corp 509 US 443, 462-464 (1993); Zarcone v 
Perry 572 F 2d 52, 56 (2nd Cir 1978); Phelan v Beswick 1958 213 Or 612, 326 P 2d 1034; 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 866; cases referred to by Keeton et al Prosser 
and Keeton on torts 15 fn 76 . 
1394  Which is beyond the scope of this study and will not be discussed further. See Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on torts 11. 
1395  See Schleier v Kaiser Found Health Plan 876 F 2d 174 (DC Cir 1989); Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 859; Epstein Torts 445-447. 
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an advantage or saving from collateral sources such as his own insurance or 
donations etcetera.1396 Lump sum awards are usually made for future loss but 
structured settlements may be agreed to.1397 However, in line with tort law reform 
approximately half of the states have either limited or abolished the collateral source 
rule for certain claims. These claims relate mainly to those against public entities and 
for medical malpractice claims.1398 Some statutes allow evidence of collateral 
benefits,1399 while others require the trier to deduct the collateral benefits.1400 The 
plaintiff whose award has been reduced as a result of deducting collateral benefits 
may be entitled to add back into the calculation of the award amounts expended for 
insurance premiums.1401 Some courts have found the statutes unconstitutional1402 
while others have upheld them.1403 It is submitted that where the legislature as a matter 
of policy provides legislation limiting or capping damages due to increased or 
excessive litigation, such as with medical malpractice claims, it may not be reasonable 
when only the plaintiff’s interests are considered but reasonable when considering all 
parties interests. Furthermore not all plaintiffs will have taken out insurance for 
whatever reasons and it may be unfair and unreasonable to deduct insurance pay-
outs where a person is prudent enough to take out insurance. Furthermore it is trite 
that once a person claims from insurance, his premiums may be affected and should 
he require insurance in future, the history of claims affects the premiums making it 
higher. Nonetheless, the legal position created by such legislation may be viewed as 
an attempt to find a reasonable balance between the interests of the plaintiff and other 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1396  See for example, Helfend v Southern Cal Rapid Transit Dist 2 Cal 3d 1, 84 Cal Rptr 173, 465 
P 2d 61, 77 ALR 3d 398 (1970); Willis v Foster 229 Ill 2d 393, 3233 Ill Dec 26, 892 NE 2d 10 
18 (2008); Restatement Second of Torts §§ 920A & 920 (1979); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 859. 
1397  See Nguyen v Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center 48 Cal Rptr 2d 301 (Cal App 
1995); Epstein Torts 447. 
1398  See for example, Mont Code Ann § 27-1-308; NY CPLR § 4545; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on torts 860-861. 
1399  See for example, Ala Code § 12-21-45. 
1400  See for example, NY CPLR § 4545; Colo Rev Stat § 13-21-116.6; Idaho Code Ann § 6-1606. 
1401  See for example, Mont Code Ann § 27-1-308 covering the period of 5 years before the injury, 
premiums paid from date of injury to judgment and those to be paid within the next 3 years; 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 860 fn 88. 
1402  See for example, Thompson v KFB Ins Co 252 Kan 1010, 850 P 2d 773 (1993) where 
discrimination against greater harm was alleged; Farley v Engelken, 241 Kan 663, 740 P 2d 
1058, 74 ALR 4th 1 (1987) where discrimination against medical malpractice victims was 
alleged; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 861. See Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on torts 9 fn 20 with references to cases where the courts rejected an award of punitive 
damages.  
1403  See Easton v Broomfield 116 Ariz 576, 570 P 2d 744 (1977); authority referred to by Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 861 fn 91. 
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interests, such as the policy-based interest of the state to keep medical malpractice 
litigation within reasonable bounds. Opinions will always diverge on how reasonable 
the end result of such attempts is.    
  
The duty to mitigate loss or damage caused by the defendants tortious conduct is 
generally applicable.1404 Thus it is only reasonable, fair and just that the plaintiff should 
mitigate the loss in so far as possible not to make the defendant pay for loss the plaintiff 
could have avoided with ease. 
 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick1405 point out that there has been a move towards limiting 
tort liability as part of “tort reform”. Reform legislation has been aimed at regulating 
damages by modifying the collateral source rule, capping awards and limiting punitive 
damages awards.1406 Over half the states have capped recovery on damages. Some 
caps apply to particular tort claims such as professional malpractice claims,1407 claims 
against public entities1408 and claims against suppliers of alcohol.1409 Some statutes 
impose a cap on all recoverable damages1410 and some on non-pecuniary loss1411 
such as for “pain and suffering”.1412 It is submitted that by limiting damages it may not 
be fair and reasonable in respect of the plaintiff’s interests but for reasons of policy 
there is a need to address the award of damages. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As is evident from the previous chapter on English law, American law is based on 
English law. Separate torts are recognised each with their own specific requirements 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1404  See McGinley v United States 329 F Supp 62 (ED pa1971); Epstein Torts 447. 
1405  Hornbook on torts 873. 
1406  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 432.  
1407  For example, in California for professional negligence claims (Cal Civ Code § 3333.2).  
1408  See Boiter v South Carolina Dept of Transport 393 SC 123, 712 SE 2d 401 (2011); further 
authority cited by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 873 fn 193. 
1409  In Utah, (Utah Code Ann § 32A-14-101(5)) the cap applied to liability of alcohol suppliers is 
$500 000. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 874. 
1410  See Colorado code – Colo Rev Stat § 13-64-302; Va Code § 8.01-581.15 where a million dollar 
cap is placed on all damages claimed from a health care provider. See Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on torts 873 fn 199. 
1411  See http://www.atra.org/issues/noneconimc-damages-reform (Date of use: 9 September 
2017); Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 461. 
1412  California has placed a cap of $250 000 on damages for pain and suffering (Cal Civ Code § 
3333.2). See King Jr 2004 SMU L Rev 205; Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of 
tort law 461; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 874. 
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and applicable defences. The influence of reasonableness is generally referred to 
explicitly on the tort of negligence and the torts of trespass to the person discussed in 
this chapter. In respect of the torts of trespass to a person as well as the tort of 
negligence, the elements of the tort must be present in order to ground liability and it 
is only reasonable to find the defendant liable if all the elements are present.  
 
Conduct although not explicitly referred to as a requirement, is required for the torts of 
trespass to the person and the tort of negligence. At the very least the requirement of 
conduct refers to making a voluntary choice to act or not.1413 If the actor makes a 
choice to act and such act leads to the causing of harm, then his act is judged 
according to the standard of the reasonable person or its equivalent. If the actor 
chooses not to act, his failure to act under the circumstances may also be judged 
according to the standard of the reasonable person or its equivalent. American law 
does not make a conceptual difference between wrongfulness and fault as in South 
African law but wrongfulness is generally subsumed under fault. The various interests 
of the plaintiff, the defendant and those of the community are weighed in reaching 
decisions in tort law. Generally, the courts’ decisions coincide with the community or 
public opinion.1414 Ultimately infringement of any interests must be reasonable in light 
of all circumstances whether with the torts of trespass to a person, or the tort of 
negligence. Whether the infringement of the interests is unjustified and unreasonable 
or the conduct is unreasonable, depends on the views of the community.1415 Justice 
requires the plaintiff to be compensated for harm he sustained as a result of the 
unreasonable infringement of his interests. The role of the jury in American tort law is 
unique and they reflect the reasonable people. With the mix of different people, 
reasonable value judgements are made based on the particular circumstances of the 
case. Where a defence is applicable, the infringement of the interests, as well as the 
conduct in respect of infringing those interests is deemed reasonable. In respect of the 
tort of negligence, reasonableness is a central concept in that a duty of reasonable 
care must exist to begin with, the conduct is tested against the standard of the 
reasonable person or its equivalent and the breach of the duty of reasonable care 
must be unreasonable for the conduct to be considered negligent. The influence of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1413  See Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 438, 483 
1414  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 17-18 
1415  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 6-7. 
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reasonableness on factual causation is implicit. The influence of reasonableness on 
the scope of liability may be explicit or implicit depending on which test is applied. 
Reasonable foreseeability of harm plays a role in determining a duty of reasonable 
care, fault in the form of negligence and in determining the proximate cause or scope 
of liability. Due to the influence of policy considerations and the concept of 
reasonableness common in these elements uncertainty and confusion is often 
prevalent. This is in fact a common problem in South African, English and American 
law. However, the influence of reasonableness taking into account the purpose and 
function of each element can be differentiated. In this way the nature and function of 
each element may not be undermined. In terms of the award of compensation for harm 
or loss sustained, the influence of reasonableness is predominantly explicit, in that it 
is fair and reasonable to award compensation for reasonably incurred costs sustained 
by the plaintiff as well as future loss which is reasonably likely to occur. As a matter of 
policy, damages are capped and limited in terms of tort law reform in the United States 
of America. On the one hand it may seem unfair and unreasonable to deny the plaintiff 
his full compensation but on the other hand there may have been a justifiable and in 
that sense a reasonable need to address the crisis of litigation with particular claims 
such as for medical malpractice. 
 
Thus it is evident also in American law that fairness, justice, equity, policy 
considerations, the community’s views and reasonableness are all intertwined.  
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Chapter 6: Law of France 
 
 “French courts traditionally refer to the bonus pater familias (bon père de famille), mentioned 
 in several articles of the Civil Code. The good family father represents ˃˃the normally prudent 
 and diligent person, who is neither extremely vigilant, nor abnormally negligent, neither a hero 
 nor a coward, neither a pure egoist nor an exceptional altruist, but between the two: an 
 ordinary human being.˂˂”1  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, numerous French concepts or terms are referred to in their original 
language. As far as possible an analogous concept or definition in English will be 
provided (as the French terms are introduced into the text), but in truth some French 
terms or concepts cannot be translated meaningfully or with precision in English. In 
most of the literature written in English on French “extra-contractual civil liability”, the 
phrase “tort law” is used as opposed to the “law of delict”. However, the use of either 
of the phrases is acceptable. The terms “delict” and the “law of delict” will be referred 
to in this chapter instead of “tort law” or “extra contractual civil liability”. In France, the 
term “victim” is synonymous with the term “plaintiff” or “claimant” used in other 
jurisdictions.2 For the sake of convenience, where appropriate, the term “plaintiff” and 
“defendant” (instead of “tortfeasor”) will be used. 
  
To begin with: the aim of the law of delict in France; sources of the French law of delict; 
procedural characteristics unique to the French legal system in dealing with delictual 
liability; other influences on the development of the law of delict in France; as well as 
a general background relating to French law and principles held dear by the French 
will be discussed briefly. A more detailed discussion of the implicit and explicit 
influence of reasonableness on liability for one’s own personal conduct; acts of things 
under one’s custody; and acts of others for whom one is responsible will follow. 
Thereafter a brief discussion of liability of public entities, liability for: pure economic 
loss; mental harm; wrongful conception, wrongful birth, and wrongful life claims will 
follow, highlighting the influence of reasonableness. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 63. 
2  Borghetti 2012 JETL 173 fn 48. 
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The aim of the law of delict in France is simply to protect the plaintiff from harm and to 
compensate the plaintiff for harm or damage suffered as fully as possible as if the 
delict had not occurred.3 The French law of delict, as will be shown, is more favourable 
to the plaintiff encouraging a floodgate approach to litigation, but this has unpredictably 
not occurred in France.4 The aim of compensating the plaintiff5 has been the catalyst 
for the development of strict liability rules and the sharing of risk through social 
security, various compensation schemes and insurance.6 French social security is 
quite well developed, covering inter alia health care related costs.7 There are also a 
number of compensation funds which compensate victims of inter alia asbestos-
related injuries and harm resulting from motor vehicle accidents where the state 
provides for compensation over and above social security.8 Besides social security 
and compensation funds regulated by the state, private insurance taken out by people 
living in France plays a major role in providing additional cover.9 Moréteau10 points out 
that “strict liability is often coupled with insurance, making the tortfeasor easily liable 
but mitigating the consequences by compulsory insurance coverage, whereas fault-
based liability keeps developing in areas of higher risk that may not be insured or 
uninsurable”. All these various sources of compensation reduce the role of fault-based 
liability in delict. Social security and the private insurance industry are however the 
catalyst behind developing the French law of delict as the state and private insurance 
companies endeavour to recover payments made to the plaintiff. Naturally it is only 
fair and reasonable for the insurance companies or state (in respect of social security) 
to have a right of recourse under certain circumstances against a defendant in 
mitigating their loss.11 In turn, most defendants have civil liability insurance.12 It is 
compulsory for certain professionals (such as medical practitioners and building 
contractors) to take out insurance, as well as all motor vehicle owners. Furthermore 
                                                                                                                                                                            
3  See Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 238, 242; Borghetti 2012 JETL 173. 
4  Borghetti 2012 JETL 158ff. 
5  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 4 explains that prior to the current victim 
favoured approach; the notion that the victim must bear his own loss (except where harm or 
loss was caused by another) was applicable. 
6  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 4; Moréteau 2013 JCLS 761. 
7  See Borghetti 2012 JETL 164. 
8  Also providing compensation for non-pecuniary or non-patrimonial loss. See Borghetti 2012 
JETL 164. 
9  Borghetti 2012 JETL 164. 
10  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 23. 
11  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 5-7. 
12  Borghetti 2012 JETL 165-166. 
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most household insurance contracts cover civil liability incurred by anyone residing on 
the property “in the ordinary course of life”.13 Article L 124-3 of the French Insurance 
Code (Code des assurances) provides for compensation to be paid out directly to the 
victim.14  
 
The law of delict in France generally does not elicit noticeable political debate or media 
attention. This is evident based on the fact that the French Civil Code (hereinafter 
referred to as the “CC”) has not yet been reformed, at least not significantly, since its 
inception in 1804. The media’s interest falls more on criminal law and is prominent in 
cases of medical malpractice or liability of pharmaceutical companies.15 
 
Under the instruction of the French Minister of Justice, a commission of experts of 
which Professor Viney16 was the appointed law of delict expert, were requested to 
draft a new law of obligations. This included the law of delict. The commission 
published the “Rapport Catala” in 2005 which included a draft bill for delictual liability 
(responsabilité civile).17 This draft proposed a “strong pro-victim stance” expanding the 
law of delict further as part of a broader reform of the law of obligations with a 
preference for a general approach and “a reluctance to define concepts precisely for 
fear of being overly restrictive”.18 In 200819 and 201120 proposals were put forward by 
a commission chaired by Professor Terré to reform the law of delict but no further 
action has been taken.21 This reform project aimed to “strike a balance between 
interests of various stakeholders” and to “limit judicial discretion” with a preference for 
definitions. 22  
                                                                                                                                                                            
13  Borghetti 2012 JETL 158 fn 22 states that it costs less the €30 per annum for civil liability 
insurance in France (at the time of writing the contribution). Civil liability insurance is quite 
affordable. 
14  Borghetti 2012 JETL 168. 
15  Borghetti 2012 JETL 170. 
16  Referred to as the most “famous and influential tort law scholar in France in the last thirty years” 
by Borghetti 2012 JETL 174. 
17  Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligation et du droit de la prescription 22 September 
2005. See Moréteau 2005 European tort law yearbook 2005 270ff; Van Dam European tort law 
53. 
18  Borghetti 2012 JETL 176, 178. This draft will not be discussed further in this thesis. 
19  Terré Pour une réforme du droit des contrats 2008. 
20  Terré Pour une réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile 2011. See Moréteau 2011 European 
tort law yearbook 216-221; Moréteau and On 2012 European tort law yearbook 229-237. 
21  See discussion by Moréteau 2005 European tort law yearbook 270-274. Cf Van Dam European 
tort law 53. 
22  Borghetti 2012 JETL 176, 178. 
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Recently, under the instruction of the French Minister of Justice, a draft Bill dealing 
with the reform of civil liability which includes delictual liability was published on 13 
March 2017.23 This Bill refers to the aim of full reparation24 and also has a preference 
for definitions. Chapter II refers to requirements for liability and Section 125 refers to 
provisions “on contractual and extra-contractual liability” where the concepts of 
“reparable harm or damage”26 and “the causal link”27 are defined. Section 2(1)28 
(dealing with delictual liability), Article 1241 in reference to faute (literally translated as 
“fault” but includes wrongfulness and fault)29 states that one is responsible for the 
damage caused by one’s faute and Article 1242 states that a “violation of a statutory 
requirement or the failure in a general duty of care or diligence constitutes a faute”.30 
Article 1243 refers to liability stemming from the “act of things”.31 Section 2(2) deals 
with the attribution of  harm or damage caused by others referring to inter alia the acts 
of minors.32 Chapter III refers to “grounds for exoneration”33 where the scope of force 
                                                                                                                                                                            
23  Projet de réforme de la responsabilité civile Mars 2017. See 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/Projet_de_reforme_de_la_responsabilite_civile_130320
17.pdf (date of use: 28 December 2017). 
24  Article 1258 states that “the aim of reparation is to put the victim as far as possible in the position 
he would have been had the harmful act not occurred. The victim should not take a loss nor 
gain an advantage” (own translation). 
25  Of Chapter II. 
26  Article 1235 states that “[a]ny damage which is certain is reparable as long as it results from 
harm and consists of a harm to a lawful interest, whether patrimonial or non-patrimonial” and 
Article 1236 states that “[f]uture damage is reparable where it is the certain and direct 
continuation of an existing state of affairs”. Article 1237 states that the “[e]xpenses incurred by 
a claimant in order to prevent the imminent occurrence of harm or to prevent its deterioration, 
is recoverable loss provided it was reasonably incurred”. Article 1238 states that loss of a 
chance is compensable “only where the claimant is deprived of a favourable possibility that was 
present and certain. Article 1238 further states that in determining the lost chance, such loss 
“cannot be equal to the advantage that would have been obtained had it been realised” (own 
translations). 
27  Article 1239 states that “[l]iability presumes the existence of a causal link between the conduct 
of the defendant and the harm. A causal link may be proven by any means”. Article 1240 states 
that “[w]here a bodily injury is caused by an unidentified person among a group of identified 
persons acting in concert or have similar motives, each person is responsible for the whole, 
unless he proves that he could not have caused it” (own translation). 
28  Of Chapter II. 
29  See para 2.2 below. 
30  Own translation.  
31  And provides that a person “is strictly liable for harm caused by the act of the corporeal things 
under one’s custody. The act of the thing is presumed while it is in motion and harms when it 
comes into contact. In other cases, the victim must prove the act of the thing, by establishing 
either the abnormality of its position, its state or conduct. The custodian of the thing is the one 
who has the use, control and direction of the thing at the time of the damaging act or event. 
The owner of the thing is presumed to have custody” (own translation). 
32  Articles 1246-1247. 
33  Articles 1253-1256. 
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majeure34 is outlined and Article 1255 specifically states that a faute committed by a 
person who lacks discernment is not exonerated from liability. Article 1257 refers to 
exclusion of liability and states that a damaging act or event does not lead to liability 
when one finds oneself in one of the situations mentioned in Articles 122-4 to 122-7 of 
the Penal Code (Code pénal). These situations refer to instances of necessity, self-
defence, and legitimate authority. The damaging act or event which infringes an 
interest of which the victim has the power to dispose of, will not lead to liability, if the 
victim consented to the infringement.35 
 
Chapter IV refers to reparation either “in kind” or reparation for damage sustained. In 
respect of reparation in kind,36 the aim is to suppress, mitigate, or compensate the 
damage. Reparation in kind cannot be imposed on the victim nor can it be “ordered in 
the case of impossibility”, or if it would lead to a disproportionate cost for the 
responsible person when weighed against the victim’s interest.37 Chapter IV (2) 
provides that damages are assessed at the time of judgment and includes past 
damage as well as its “reasonably foreseeable progression”.38 If the plaintiff suffers 
further damage (aggravated damages) after the date of judgment, the plaintiff may 
request further compensation.39 Chapter IV (4), Article 1266 makes provision for courts 
to award a civil fine where the wrongdoer deliberately committed a faute when it 
generated a gain or economic saving for the wrongdoer. The fine must be in proportion 
to the “seriousness of the faute committed, to the ability of the defendant to pay or to 
the profit he obtained from it”.40 A maximum amount is prescribed. Articles 1267 to 
1277 refer to rules applicable to compensation for damages resulting from bodily harm 
while Articles 1278 to 1279 refer to rules applicable to compensation for “material 
damage” (damage to property). 
 
It is submitted that this draft legislation reflects the current principles applied in 
determining delictual liability in France as will become apparent from the discussion 
                                                                                                                                                                            
34  “[F]orce majeure is an event whereby the occurrence and consequences could not have been 
prevented by the taking of appropriate measures by the defendant or the person for whom he 
is responsible” (Article 1253 ‒ own translation). 
35  Article 1257-1 (own translation). 
36  Articles 1260-1261. 
37  Article 1261 (own translation). 
38  Own translation.  
39  See Article 1262. 
40  Own translation. 
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below. It is evident though that there has been a reluctance in the past to reform the 
CC and we have yet to see whether the CC will be reformed. These reform projects 
will not be discussed further. 
 
The purpose of criminal law in France is to deter and punish the offender.41 Even 
though criminal law and the law of delict refer to two different branches of the law in 
France, there is some common ground in that a victim who suffers harm from a criminal 
infraction may be entitled to redress in terms of a civil action. The victim has the option 
of lodging his claim for compensation with either the criminal or civil courts.42 If the 
victim opts to claim through the criminal court, he has the right to appear as a party to 
the criminal proceedings. The highest civil court in France, the Cour de Cassation (the 
“Supreme Court” in France for both civil and criminal matters)43 does not focus on facts 
but rather on the whether the lower courts applied the law correctly based on 
established facts.44 The Cour de Cassation simultaneously confers on the victim the 
right to request the public prosecutor to begin an action and control the development 
of the criminal trial.45 It is possible for the victim to institute an action through the civil 
court but in such instances, the criminal nature of the origin of the loss or harm will not 
be considered. In practice this in not the usual route the victim will take because of the 
principle of supremacy of criminal matters over civil. When an adjudicator is faced with 
a case where delictual liability is alleged and a criminal prosecution has already begun 
based on the same facts; the adjudicator of the civil court must suspend the civil 
proceedings and await the outcome of the criminal proceedings.46  
 
French civil law provides for two main branches of civil liability: a contractual and an 
extra-contractual (delictual) system of liability.47 French law upholds the rule of “non-
concurrence” (non-cumul) whereby if the requirements are met to sue in contract, the 
plaintiff cannot sue in delict.48 There is an overlap though between rules in contract 
and the law of delict especially in respect of medical malpractice claims where the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
41  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 239. 
42  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 239. 
43  Galand-Carval in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: liability for damage caused by others 85. 
44  Borghetti 2012 JETL 179-180. 
45  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 239. 
46  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 240; Viney Introduction á la responsabilité 490.  
47  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 241. 
48  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 7. 
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Cour de Cassation initially regarded such liability as falling within the domain of the 
law of contract but has recently been dealing with such claims within the law of delict.49  
 
French law is rather unique in that: there is an overlap between civil and criminal law; 
there is an overlap between the law of contract and the law of delict; there is a 
dominance of strict liability over fault-based liability in the law of delict; different courts 
have jurisdiction to hear matters depending on whether the matter involves a state or 
a private entity; the state compensation schemes and private insurance has a great 
impact on delictual liability; and the most important source of the law of delict is the 
CC.  
 
French decisions are different from other jurisdictions discussed in this thesis, in that 
their judgments may range from a paragraph to no more than a few pages in length 
and the parties names are seldom referred to. Van Dam50 explains that the: 
 
 “main features of the Cour de cassation’s decisions are its concise wording, its apodictic way 
 of reasoning, and often the lack of reasoning at all. Decisions are usually not much more than 
 one page long, rather abstract, and therefore are not always immediately clear. The courts do 
 not discuss opinions of legal writers (as in the case in Germany), nor does it make any 
 reference to its earlier decisions (as in the case in England, German, and European cases). 
 French civil procedure law maintains a strict principle of anonymity that prohibits disclosing 
 individual diverging or dissenting opinions. … A single judgment focusing on a narrowly 
 formulated ratio and containing no obiter dicta is considered essential for ensuring uniform 
 interpretation and coherence of the law”. 
 
The French law of procedure does not follow the precedent system.51 The courts are 
not bound by their own decisions or that of the Cour de Cassation.52 The appeal courts 
can make findings on facts on the same basis as the court a quo.53 In practice though, 
decisions seldom digress from previous decisions of the Cour de Cassation.54 French 
legal writers are held in high regard and their contributions are considered important 
                                                                                                                                                                            
49  See cases cited by Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 7 fn 13. 
50  European tort law 54. See also Borghetti 2012 JETL 180 who states that the Cour de 
Cassations’ judgments are usually one page and does not “state the considerations underlying 
its conclusions”; neither will it explain its interpretations. Judgments are rarely longer than five 
pages and some may even be a paragraph or a few lines long.  
51  Followed in other jurisdictions such as in the United Kingdom, United States of America and 
South Africa. 
52  Borghetti 2012 JETL 180; Van Dam European tort law 55. 
53  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 693 fn 13. 
54  Van Dam European tort law 55. 
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by adjudicators in developing the law.55 Moréteau56 points out that compared with 
other jurisdictions “in Europe, French doctrine is not dogmatic but rather pragmatic”. 
What is characteristic about the French civil liability system is that it is not rigid but 
open and readily able to change according to society’s needs. Furthermore an all-or-
nothing approach to liability is not favoured but rather apportionment of liability (which 
may apply to the element of fault or causation).57 
 
The French law of delict is regulated by the much celebrated CC58 which was 
commissioned by Napoleon Bonaparte after the French Revolution.59 The CC did 
away with specific delicts in favour of a more general approach. According to the 
general approach, certain elements, namely: a damaging act or event; faute (except 
in cases of strict liability where fault is not required); a causal link; and damage must 
be present in order to ground liability. There is no definition of a delict, wrong, 
damaging act or event, faute, causal link or damage in the CC. At the heart of the CC 
is the law of obligations.60 It contains a general clause for delictual liability found in 
Article 1382 which states that “[a]nyone who, through his fault, commits an act which 
causes harm to another is responsible to compensate that other person for the harm 
that occurred”.61 French delictual liability generally stems from five provisions (Articles 
1382-1386) contained in the CC which has as mentioned remained almost unchanged 
for over 200 years. Moréteau62 explains that four out of the five articles remain 
unchanged. Slight amendments were made to Article 1384(2) and even though Article 
1384(1) of the CC remained in its original draft, it was further developed into “an 
overarching doctrine of strict liability for damage caused by the act of a thing”. Articles 
1382 to 1386 contained under the heading “CHAPTER II. DELICTS AND QUASI-
DELICTS” in the CC are referred to throughout the chapter. For ease of reference, the 
translated provisions are provided hereunder:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
55  Van Dam European tort law 55. 
56  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 8. 
57  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 7. 
58  The CC was the basis for civil law in a number of countries such as Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Portugal and some African countries. See Van Dam European tort 
law 52; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 5. 
59  See Van Dam European tort law 51; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 2. 
60  See Van Dam European tort law 51; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 2. 
61  Translated by Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 239. See also Van Gerven, Lever 
and Larouche Tort 2. 
62  2013 JCLS 760-761. 
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 “Article 1382 
 Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it 
 occurred to repair it. 
  
 Article 1383 
 We are responsible not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but also by our 
 own negligence or imprudence. 
  
 Article 1384 
 [1] We are responsible not only for the damage caused by our own act, but also for that 
 which is caused by the acts of persons for whom we are responsible, or by things that are 
 in our custody. 
 [2] Nevertheless, a person who possesses, regardless of the basis thereof, all or part of an 
 immovable or movable things in which a fire has originated is not liable towards third parties 
 for the damages caused by that fire unless it is proven that the fire must be attributed to his 
 fault or to the fault of persons for whom he is responsible. 
 [3] This provision does not apply to the relationships between owners and lessees which are 
governed by Articles 1733 and 1734 of the Civil Code. 
 [4] The father and the mother, in so far as they exercise parental authority, are solidary 
 liable for the damage caused by their minor children who reside with them. 
 [5] Masters and employers, for the damage occasioned by their servants and employees in 
 the exercise of the functions in which they are employed; 
 [6] Teachers and artisans, for the damage caused by their pupils and apprentices during the 
time when they are under their supervision. 
[7] The liability outlined above occurs, unless the father and mother or the artisans prove that 
they could not have prevented the act that gives rise to that liability. 
 [8] As to teachers, the fault, imprudence, or negligence invoked against them as having 
 caused the damaging act will have to be proven by the plaintiff at the trial in accordance 
 with the general law. 
  
 Article 1385 
 The owner of an animal, or the person using it, while he uses it, is liable for the damage the 
 animal has caused either because the animal was in his custody or because the animal 
 strayed or escaped. 
  
 Article 1386 
 The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is 
 caused by a failure to maintain it or by a defect in its construction.”63 
 
These five articles relating to delictual liability are as important today as they were 
when they were formulated. They are interpreted by the courts, in particular, the Cour 
de Cassation64 which has led to the significant development of case law.65 Viney66 
refers to “the liability trilogy” in reference to three categories of civil liability: liability for 
one’s own personal acts based on faute (la responsabilité du fait personnel); strict 
                                                                                                                                                                            
63  French Civil Code as at 1st July 2013 translated by Professor Gruning, Professor of Law, Loyola 
University, School of Law, New Orleans Revision: Juriscope Expert Committee: Prof 
Levasseur, Moyse, SR and Professor Plauché, Dart Professor of Law; Director, European 
Studies Program; Louisiana State University Paul M Hebert Law Center; Fondation Pour Le 
Droit Continental, Conseil Scientifique, and Professor Trahan, Professor of Law, Louisiana 
State University, Law Center, Baton Rouge and available  at 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations (date of use: 6 
April 2017) − hereinafter referred to as “Legifrance-translations”. 
64  Van Dam European tort law 52. 
65  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 237. 
66  In Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 254. See also Van Dam European tort law 52. 
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liability for the acts of things under one’s custody (la responsabilité du fait des choses); 
and strict liability for the acts of other persons (la responsabilité du fait d’autrui)”. In 
addition “special liability regimes” stemming from case law namely, the “abuse of 
right”67 and “abnormal or excessive disturbance of neighbourhood”68 was 
established.69  
 
Articles 1382 and 1383 relate to liability for one’s personal conduct where faute (which 
includes wrongfulness and fault in the form of either intention or negligence is 
required).70 They are known as the general clauses, referring to the obligation to 
compensate the plaintiff fully for the damage caused by some form of faute.71 These 
two Articles do not apply exclusively but apply generally and are considered as “safety 
net” provisions.72 The general clauses are supplemented by the strict liability rules 
contained in Articles 1384 to 1386 relating to liability for: things under one’s custody; 
buildings; animals; persons for whom one is responsible (such as employees and 
children); personal injury, damage to property, and loss emanating from the death of 
a person.73 Fault liability is nowadays seen as an exception to the numerous strict 
liability rules.74 Strict liability in French law refers to: liability without faute 
(responsabilité sans faute); or “objective liability” (responsabilité objective).  
 
The French courts’ have been able to interpret these five articles relating to delictual 
liability throughout time, keeping in step with society’s changing views.75 In developing 
strict liability compensation regimes and rules, the delictual function of compensation 
is encouraged as opposed to the function of deterrence applicable in criminal law.76 
Thus all kinds of socially unacceptable, wrongful conduct causing injury or loss, 
whether to primary or secondary victims, can in principle lead to delictual liability and 
compensation as long as the interest is not “illicit”.77 According to Josserand and other 
                                                                                                                                                                            
67  See para 2.2.4 below.  
68  Which deals with neighbour law based on strict liability. For purposes of this study neighbour 
law will not be discussed further. See Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 254. 
69  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 254. 
70  Van Dam European tort law 52, 297. 
71  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 237. 
72  Van Dam European tort law 56-57. 
73  See Van Dam European tort law 52; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 3.  
74  Van Dam European tort law 52. 
75  Van Dam European tort law 52. 
76  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 19. 
77  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 3. 
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legal writers, civil liability is based on two pillars, faute and risk. It is about opposing 
and balancing rights, the right to act on the one hand, and the right to security which 
belongs to all, on the other hand.78 In addition to the provisions relating to delictual 
liability in the CC, the legislator may provide guidelines.79 The French value the notion 
of solidarity80 whereby all “members agree to share and equalise the burden of risk”.81 
As Moréteau82 puts it “you share the road, you share the risk”. The CC’s primary aim 
was to assert the notions of liberty, equality and fraternity, stemming from the French 
revolution.83  
 
In cases of liability of public entities (such as state hospitals, state departments 
etcetera), the administrative courts must hear the matters and not the civil courts.84 
The highest administrative court is the Counseil d’État (State Council). Having different 
courts with the jurisdiction to hear certain matters depending on whether it involves 
private or public civil liability, has resulted in different decisions. Thus different rules 
may for example apply to private and state hospitals dealing with claims for medical 
malpractice.85   
 
Troper86 explains that France’s current Constitution of 1958, known as the Constitution 
of the Fifth Republic, is really just a document regulating government. The CC is still 
the important text that shapes French society. In France there was initially no single 
constitution but different constitutions developed over time which may be amended.87 
The different constitutions dealt with regulating government and the separation of 
powers.88 The “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen”89 (hereinafter referred 
                                                                                                                                                                            
78  See Starck, Roland and Boyer Obligations volume 1: responsabilité délictuelle 19, 41 referred 
to in Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 14. 
79  Van Dam European tort law 52. 
80  Cited in the preamble of the French Constitutions’ of 1946 and 1958. See Moréteau in Koziol 
(ed) Basic questions of tort 19. 
81  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 4. 
82  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 71. 
83  Van Dam European tort law 51. 
84  Van Dam European tort law 55. 
85  Van Dam European tort law 55. See para 6 below. 
86  In Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 1. 
87  Depending on how they are counted, up until now there have been 12 or 15 Constitutions from 
1791. See Troper in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 1. 
88  Troper in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 2-3. 
89  Of 1789. 
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to as the “Declaration”)90 relate to human rights. The Declaration was initially regarded 
as a “political document expressing the ideology of the Enlightenment” and not legally 
binding.91 However, in 1971 the Constitutional Council in a landmark decision92 
(dealing with the freedom of association) referred to the preamble of the Constitution93 
and the Declaration in rejecting legislation. From this decision, the Declaration became 
legally binding.94 From 1971, legislation as well as administrative acts has been 
subject to the Declaration and fundamental rights are protected from infringements.95 
Statutes are regarded as an “expression of the general will”.96 The courts must apply 
the Constitution of 1958 and protect fundamental rights.97 Rights include inter alia the 
right to: equality;98 liberty;99 property,100 security,101 and freedom of speech.102  
 
France is a member state of the European Union. European Union law, applied and 
interpreted by the European Court of Justice, takes precedence over French domestic 
law.103 Even though the French courts were initially reluctant to conform to European 
Union law, they have embraced it and it has resulted in an evolution of French law.104 
Article 55 of the Constitution of 1958 stipulates that international conventions (provided 
the conventions are also applied by other member parties) take precedence over 
French domestic law,105 except constitutional norms.106 In the well-known decision 
                                                                                                                                                                            
90  The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 was influenced by the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence drafted by Thomas Jefferson who worked closely with Lafayette 
in designing a bill of rights for France. 
91  Troper in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 13-14. 
92  71-44 DC 1971. 
93  Which states that: “[t]he French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man 
and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and 
complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946” (Troper in Bermann and Picard 
(eds) French law 15). 
94  Troper in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 15. 
95  Troper in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 15. 
96  Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. 
97  Troper in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 14. 
98  Article 1 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. 
99  See Articles 2 and 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789.  
100  See Articles 2 and 17 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. 
101  Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. 
102  Article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. 
103  Dutheil de la Rochére in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 43-44. 
104  Dutheil de la Rochére in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 43. 
105  Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 74. 
106  Article 88-1 of the Constitution of 1958 stipulates that European Community law takes 
precedence over French domestic statutes but not constitutional norms. See CÉ Ass 30 
October 1998 200286 200287, GAJA 106; CÉ Ass 8 February 2007 (Societé Arcelor Atlantique 
et Lorraine) 287110; Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 74-75. 
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referred to as Francovich,107 the European Court of Justice held that member states 
are responsible for harmful consequences as a result of not complying with European 
Union law.108 The administrative courts have in any event been holding public 
authorities liable for damage caused by their conduct whether based on faute or by 
breach of the principle of “equality”. Furthermore, administrative courts apply a rule 
(stemming from previous case law) whereby the state in principle must compensate 
for harm caused by a statute.109 Generally in respect of liability of the state, French 
decisions conform closely with the European Court of Justice decisions.110 The 
European Convention of Human Rights has also had an impact on the protection of 
individual’s rights.111  
 
French administrative law is an “autonomous body of law” which generally regulates 
administrative entities and officials with regard to inter alia their powers, functions, 
conduct, and their liability.112 It has been described as non-written law and academic 
writing initially greatly influenced this branch of law. Over time, though, legislation in 
administrative law has been enacted and there is now a substantial body of case 
law.113 Delictual liability of a state entity (that is between the state and individuals) falls 
within the domain of the administrative courts, not the civil courts.114 The Constitutional 
Council is not the only authority charged with the task of enforcing constitutional 
norms. The administrative courts may also enforce constitutional norms when 
reviewing administrative acts.115 It may happen that when a statute has been 
promulgated, even though it is unconstitutional, it may have to be enforced by the 
administrative authorities and courts. The administrative courts do not have the 
authority to review the constitutionality of legislation prior to promulgation.116 Only the 
Constitutional Council has the authority to declare a provision in a statute as 
                                                                                                                                                                            
107  Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v Italy 1991 ECR I-5357 (19 November 1991 joined 
cases C-6/90 and C-9/90). 
108  Dutheil de la Rochére in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 48. 
109  Where “the damage is especially important and specific” and in instances where the “legislature 
has not explicitly or implicitly excluded compensation” (Dutheil de la Rochére in Bermann and 
Picard (eds) French law 49). 
110  Dutheil de la Rochére in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 49. 
111  Dutheil de la Rochére in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 50-51. 
112  Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds)  French law 58-60. 
113  Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 60. 
114  See CÉ 6 December (Rothschild) Rec 1855 707; TC 8 February 1873 Blanco, GAJA 1; 
Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 62. 
115  Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 72-73. 
116  Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 73.  
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unconstitutional.117 Administrative courts have the power to “neutralize statutes that 
impair supranational norms, which often enshrine the same rights or principles as 
those laid down by the Constitution”.118 The European Convention on Human Rights 
has affected French Administrative law with regard to limitations on liberties and rights. 
Seven out of ten French statutes and regulations apply European norms.119  The 
general principles of liberty and equality apply to all law.120 
 
1.1 Conclusion 
 
The explicit aim of the law of delict in France is simply to protect and compensate the 
plaintiff for harm or loss suffered. Compensation is awarded either reflecting a 
monetary value or in kind which is a reasonable and practical solution depending on 
the circumstances of the case. However, as will be shown, such compensation is not 
awarded without reasonable limits. Certain principles or doctrines are applied in 
limiting or excluding delictual liability. Other purposes of the law of delict in France 
include: deterrence and punishment (where for example criminal sanctions and fines 
may be imposed); vindication (where there is an infringement of a legitimate interest); 
and justice, where the principles of liberty (or freedom to act within reasonable limits), 
solidarity (distribution of loss where reasonable) and equality (where it is reasonable 
and fair to impose delictual liability) are applied. The influence of reasonableness on 
these aims or purposes is implicit. Even though on the one hand it is reasonable to 
protect and compensate the plaintiff for harm or loss suffered, or in instances where 
he has been unduly burdened, or sustained an infringement of his interest; the plaintiff 
may also be reasonably expected to share or take the loss, act reasonably, and 
withstand reasonable infringements of his interests. The aim of punishment where a 
fine or criminal sanction is imposed may be reasonable under the circumstances in 
deterring socially unacceptable or wrongful conduct. Justice is served through 
applying the principles of equality, solidarity and liberty where reasonable and 
appropriate.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
117  Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 78. 
118  Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 78. 
119  Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 75. 
120  Bermann and Picard in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 77. 
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In terms of procedural law, French law is rather pragmatic and reasonable. The non- 
concurrence rule and the option to sue either in delict or in terms of criminal law, 
ensures that the procedure is simplified for all parties and that there is no over-
compensation or duplication of claims. There may not be uniformity with compensation 
when dealing with private and public entities, but this is reasonable and justified in that 
the administrative courts have the opportunity to regulate the behaviour of state 
employees and pay out compensation within their budgets and constraints. At the very 
least, the state is held accountable and liable in France. The fact that French courts 
are not expected to follow the precedent system gives them the freedom to take note 
of society’s changing views and values, ultimately reaching a reasonable and fair 
outcome. It is also commendable that French law upholds its commitment to following 
principles of European Union law and upholds the protection of fundamental rights 
within reasonable limits. French decisions are in line with the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice, which shows that as a nation it is willing to be held 
accountable to its citizens as well as to others. 
 
Even though under certain circumstances where there is intentional or serious fault, 
the state or private insurance companies has a right to recover funds paid out to the 
plaintiff from the defendant. The defendant may not be affected by this because he 
would be covered by insurance. Here the result is reasonable though, in that the 
plaintiff is generally compensated no matter what, but at the same time the defendant 
who may be a man of straw does not suffer financially.   
 
The influence of reasonableness on liability for one’s personal conduct, for the act of 
the thing and for the acts of others will now be discussed. 
 
2. Articles 1382 to 1383 relating to liability for one’s own personal conduct where 
fault is required  
 
2.1 Fait générateur (relating to the requirement of conduct) 
 
According to the requirements of delictual liability under French law, there must be: a 
“fait générateur”, a generating, triggering, wrongful act or event; “faute”, which includes 
wrongfulness and fault, either in the form of negligence or intention, where fault is 
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required; “lien de causalité”, a causal link; and “dommage”, damage, harm or loss.121 
There is no precise definition of “fait générateur” in the CC but it is a requirement for 
liability for one’s own conduct (where fault is required) as well as for strict liability 
(where fault is not required) for the act of things or acts of other persons for whom one 
is responsible.122 The elements are also usually established in that order.123 The term 
“conduct” is not explicitly referred to as a requirement for delictual liability in French 
legal doctrine, but some form of conduct falling within the requirement of fait 
générateur is necessary to ground delictual liability.  
 
In order to ground liability under Articles 1382 to 1383 of the CC, it does not matter 
whether the conduct was voluntary or not. Thus an involuntary act by the defendant 
causing injury to the plaintiff will not negate liability. For example, in Lignon v Avril,124 
an inexperienced volleyball player, accidentally fell down during the course of the 
game coincidentally kicking another player and injuring him. The injured player sued 
the inexperienced player. The Cour de Cassation held that the inexperienced player 
was liable even though his conduct was involuntary, not in breach of any rules of the 
game, nor wrongful. The Cour de Cassation found that the inexperienced player could 
not judge distances and should have warned the other player of his lack of judging 
distances. He was found to be negligent in not informing the injured player.125 
 
Article 1382 generally relates to liability for conduct while Article 1383 specifically 
provides that “everyone is responsible for the damage caused not only by his act but 
also by his negligence or carelessness”.126 Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche127 point 
out that this clause refers to liability not only for a positive act, but also for an 
omission.128 In French law not only a failure to act with regard to a statutory rule, but 
also “a failure to act in accordance with a non-legally-binding rule of proper social 
conduct can also entail liability”.129 An obligation to act positively in respect of delictual 
                                                                                                                                                                            
121  Galand-Carval in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: causation 53. 
122  See Van Dam European tort law 57; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 555-556. 
123  Although this is the traditional order of establishing the elements, some academic writers begin 
with the study of damage, then causation and refer to fault and strict liability in separate 
chapters. See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 36. 
124  Cass civ 2 3 July 1991 90-13158, Bull civ 1991 II 210 111.  
125  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 339. 
126  Translated by Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 2. 
127  Tort 2 fn 4. 
128  See also Van Dam European tort law 56. 
129  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 281. 
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liability may stem from an “obligation of safety” (obligation de sécurité).130 However, 
French law does not place particular importance on the positive legal duty to act. 
Furthermore the requirement of conduct, whether in the form of an omission or 
commission, in cases of fault liability is subsumed under the enquiry into faute.131 This 
is illustrated below with a few examples from case law. 
 
In Branly v Turpain,132 a historian, Professor Turpain, omitted to refer to the research 
on wireless telegraphy written by another historian, Professor Branly. The successor 
in title to Professor Branly alleged that Professor Turpain failed in his duty to provide 
accurate information of the discovery made by Professor Branly and that such failure 
constituted a faute for which he should be held liable. The court a quo and the appeal 
court dismissed the claim, but the Cour de Cassation held that an omission committed 
negligently could ground liability and referred the case back to the appeal court. The 
Cour de Cassation referred to Articles 1382 to 1383, stating that faute referred to either 
intention or negligence and the conduct may be in the form of a positive act or an 
omission. Furthermore “not only omissions consisting in a failure to abide by legal or 
contractual obligations, but also those residing in failures to comply with an-unwritten-
general duty” to act positively may lead to liability.133 Thus the historian did not act as 
the thoughtful cautious historian should have. The requirement of conduct was 
subsumed under fault.134 However, in 1994 after much criticism, the Cour de 
Cassation135 held that liability for omissions stemming from a publication would occur 
if: the presentation of the information was falsified; it resulted in distortion; there was 
gross negligence; or it was a blatant rejection of the truth.136 It is submitted that finding 
delictual liability in instances where the presentation of the information is deliberately 
falsified or distorted, or there is gross negligence, or a blatant rejection of the truth, is 
reasonable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
130  This is deemed an obligation of result (obligation de résultat) as opposed to an obligation of 
means (obligation de moyens). See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 29. 
131  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 298. 
132  Cass civ 27 February 1951, D 1951 329 note Desbois. See also discussion of this case by 
Moréteau and Grenier in Digest of European tort law volume 1: essential cases on natural 
causation 114-115; Van Dam European tort law 252; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 
282. 
133  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 283. 
134  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 283. 
135  Cass civ 2 15 June 1994, Bull civ 1994 II 218. 
136  Van Dam European tort law 253.  
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In Coopérative agricole de Limours v Volinetz,137 a farmer was held liable to 
compensate a bee keeper when the farmer sprayed insecticide on his crop 
contaminating the flowers which the bees then visited. The farmer knew that the 
insecticide was toxic and failed to warn his neighbour whom he knew to be a bee-
keeper, even though he did not breach any statutory regulations. The bees that 
gathered the pollen from the contaminated flowers then died. The court a quo awarded 
damages to the bee-keeper. The appeal court confirmed the decision of the court a 
quo and the Cour de Cassation confirmed that even though the farmer abided by the 
legislation, he could not be excused for the consequences of his faute. Thus the 
defendant violated a general obligation of prudence and diligence required by Article 
1382 of the CC and further omitted to warn the bee-keeper that the insecticide which 
was applied would eventually affect the bees. Thus the requirement of conduct was 
subsumed under faute. 
 
In L’Olympique Lyonnais v Fuster,138 a young man, while watching a football match in 
a stadium, sustained severe injury which subsequently led to his death as a result of 
another unidentified spectator throwing a lit flare into the stadium. The parents and 
siblings of the deceased sued the football club as well as the organiser of the football 
match for failing to provide adequate security. The appeal court held that it had to be 
proven that the managers of the football club and the organiser “failed to fulfil their 
obligation de moyens” (“obligations of means” − a contractual obligation to ensure the 
safety of the spectators who paid for the tickets). According to the facts, right from the 
outset of the match, various acts of violence were committed by spectators and the 
managers were well aware of the likelihood of incidents occurring. Article 20 of the 
Rules of the National Football League provides that persons in possession of items 
that may cause injury (such as fireworks and rockets etcetera) are not allowed to enter 
the stadium. In order to identify whether people are in possession of such items, 
inspections should take place and there should be adequate supervision. The required 
supervision and inspection was not carried out adequately or satisfactorily. The 
requirement of conduct was subsumed under faute. The parents’ and siblings’ were 
                                                                                                                                                                            
137  Cass civ 2 14 June 1972 71-11318, Bull civ 1972 II 180 146, 1973 Jur 423 note Lepointe. See 
discussion of this case in Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 308-309. 
138  See CA Lyon 16 December 1988, JCP 1990 II 21510 observations Collomb. 
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awarded compensation for the grief they suffered as well as for material loss 
sustained.139 
 
In C v Clinique du Parc,140 a patient underwent a surgical operation on her spine 
whereafter she sustained thrombosis of the cavernous sinus (a known complication) 
and subsequently lost permanent sight in one eye. The medical practitioner, on 
hearing that the patient was having trouble with her eye after the operation, 
immediately changed her treatment and examined her eye where thrombosis of the 
cavernous sinus was diagnosed. The patient submitted inter alia that the medical 
practitioner failed in his duty to inform her of the risk involved in the operation. A 
medical practitioner is “bound to give the patient faithful, clear and appropriate 
information about any serious risks associated with the proposed course of 
examination and treatment. He is not relieved from this obligation by the mere fact that 
those risks materialise only exceptionally”.141 The Cour de Cassation142 differentiated 
between minor and serious risks, stating that minor risks are “inconveniences” which 
may be foreseeable.143 Factors considered in determining the scope of the duty to 
inform depend on the statistic of risk and the severity of the consequences. The claim 
was dismissed as it was held that even though the complication was known, it occurs 
very rarely and was not a normal foreseeable risk. The medical practitioner need only 
provide information with regard to normally foreseeable risks, thus he need not warn 
the patient of rare risks. A patient must, however, be informed of serious risks even if 
they occur rarely. The only instances where a medical practitioner is excused from 
informing the patient of the serious or grave risks (risques graves)144 of treatment is in 
cases of emergency, impossibility, or where the patient refuses to be informed.145 The 
                                                                                                                                                                            
139  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 284-285. 
140  Cass civ 1 7 October 1998 97-10267, Bull civ 1998 I 291 202, JCP 1988 II 10179. See 
discussion of this case in Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 309-312. 
141  See Cass civ 1 14 October 1977 95-19609, Bull civ 1997 I 278 188. 
142  Cass civ 1 17 February 1988 95-21715, Bull civ 1988 I 67 45. 
143  And the duty to inform of minor risks applies in cases of cosmetic surgery (Van Gerven, Lever 
and Larouche Tort 311). 
144  These risks refer to “fatal, invalidating or even serious aesthetic consequences, in the light of 
their psychological and social repercussions” − Cass civ 1 14 October 1997, JCP 1997 II 22942 
report by Sargos. See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 311 fn 143. 
145  See Cass civ 1 7 October 1998 97-10267, Bull civ 1998 I 291 202, JCP 1998 II 10179; Cass 
civ 1 27 May 1998 96-19161, Bull civ 1998 I 187 126, D 1998 Jur 530 observations Laroche-
Gisserot; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 311 fn 142. 
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breach of the duty to inform146 deals with a breach of a contractual obligation whereby 
one “must perform and achieve the promised result”.147  
 
In French law, an accountant or an auditor who negligently certifies reports or 
statements, which are relied upon by a shareholder who then increases his 
shareholding capital based on the certified documents (which in reality are inaccurate), 
may be held liable.148 Professionals are usually easily held liable in the law of delict 
for their acts and omissions. For example, a notary was held liable in delict for failing 
to advise his client (the sellers) on how to secure payment of the unpaid portion of the 
purchase price even though the sellers had been advised by a third party and the 
notary acted in accordance with his client’s instructions. French law emphasises the 
obligations of professionals to not only follow their client’s instructions, but also to 
provide effective advice.149  
 
A distinction is made between an omission where an affirmative duty may be owed 
(where the defendant played a part in the activity or caused the risk of harm) and a 
pure omission (where the defendant was not part of any activity or did not create the 
risk of harm, such as a rescuer).150 A relationship with a place, object, the plaintiff or 
the defendant may be an indication of a duty to act positively. For example, the owner 
of a property owes various (legal) duties (relating to security and safety etcetera) 
towards his tenant, neighbour, visitor or passer-by.151 Strict liability rules apply to 
omissions as well in respect of damage caused by the act of things or acts of others 
one is responsible for.152 Where there is a relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, for example parent-child, school-pupil, and employer-employee, there is a 
strong indication of a duty to act positively.153 A look at two examples from case law 
will suffice in order to illustrate how a relationship with a place, object, the plaintiff or 
                                                                                                                                                                            
146  Obligation de résultat (obligation of result). 
147  Such as the duty to deliver goods etcetera; an obligation de moyens refers to the contractual 
obligation to “act with due care”. See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 29. 
148  See for example Cass comm 17 October 1984 83-12414, Bull com 1984 IV 269, JCP 1985 II 
20458 note Viandier. The Cour de Cassation found faute (in terms of Article 1382 of the CC), 
damage and causation. See also Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 241-242.  
149  See Cass civ 1 21 February 1995 93-10058, Bull civ 1995 I 95 68; Van Gerven, Lever and 
Larouche Tort 242-243. 
150  Van Dam European tort law 248. 
151  Van Dam European tort law 249. 
152  See Van Dam European tort law 249-250. 
153  See Van Dam European tort law 250. 
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the defendant may be an indication of a duty to act positively. In one case154 a mother 
had an argument with her son and left him in a trance-like state while in possession of 
a dangerous weapon. While in such state, he thereafter killed a young boy. The court 
found faute on the part of the mother. In another case,155 a resident of a building was 
held liable for failing to maintain the area of his pavement where ice had built up (in 
that he did not apply ash, sand or salt), resulting in injury to another as a result of 
slipping on the ice. The resident failed to grit or salt the icy area of the pavement he 
was supposed to maintain. 
 
2.1.1 Conclusion 
 
French law is unique in that conduct need not be in the form of a voluntary human act 
or omission, or accompanied by faute (in cases of strict liability). For example, in South 
African law, delictual liability would most likely not follow in Lignon v Avril,156 as it is 
possible that conduct, wrongfulness and fault would be absent. The inexperienced 
volleyball player’s conduct would most likely not be considered unreasonable. French 
law in general is more favourable to the plaintiff than other legal systems. In respect 
of the element of conduct (as it is known to the South African lawyer) French law really 
requires just a factual enquiry as to whether a generating act or event is present or 
not. Furthermore the source of the generating act or event may stem from a so-called 
“act of a thing” or another person (where one is responsible for such person). But the 
custodian of the thing, or person responsible for another that caused the harm or loss, 
may be held strictly liable. However, it is unreasonable for delictual liability to follow in 
France if a generating act or event is absent. The requirement of conduct being 
“voluntary” involves a normative inquiry (as opposed to the factual inquiry as to 
whether or not there was conduct) which may lead to the negation of liability on the 
part of the defendant where his actions are essentially mechanical (as the mental 
ability to control his muscular movements is absent). It is submitted that in the French 
law of delict, the element of conduct is a requirement for delictual liability but in an 
                                                                                                                                                                            
154  Cass civ 2 8 October 1967, Bull civ 1967 II 288. See discussion of this case by Moréteau and 
Grenier in Digest of European tort law volume 1: essential cases on natural causation 115.  
155  See Cass civ 1 18 April 2000 98-15770, Bull civ 2000 I 117 78. See discussion of this case by 
Moréteau and Grenier in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law volume 1: essential cases 
on natural causation 115. 
156  Cass civ 2 3 July 1991 90-13158, Bull civ 1991 II 210 111. 
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attenuated form. This may be justified and reasonable. In French law, strict liability is 
more the norm and the aim is to protect and compensate the plaintiff. Defendants are 
in any case generally insured against delictual liability. If we take the hypothetical 
example of X, while sleepwalking shoots at Y, injuring him, Y as the innocent victim 
sustains injury and harm. It may therefore be reasonable and justified if the plaintiff 
receives compensation for his injury or loss. In South African law, X would not be held 
delictually liable as his conduct was involuntary (fault is also absent). The only instance 
in South African law where the voluntariness of conduct is ineffectual in negating 
delictual liability is if there was some prior negligent or intentional conduct on the part 
of the defendant that subsequently led to his involuntary conduct.157  
 
In respect of omissions, a failure to act positively, for example by warning a bee-keeper 
that he is spraying insecticide which will affect the bees;158 or failing to provide 
adequate supervision and inspection at a stadium resulting in the death of a 
spectator,159 is unreasonable. Furthermore such omissions violate: the general 
obligation of prudence and diligence; and an unwritten legal duty to act positively which 
may also be deemed as socially unacceptable conduct according to Articles 1382 and 
1383 of the CC. It is submitted that these general obligations and unwritten legal duties 
to act positively in French law echo the boni mores and also relate to the standard of 
the reasonable person in South African law. They relate to the elements of 
wrongfulness and fault (in the form of negligence) in South African law which questions 
the reasonableness of conduct. 
 
In respect of the duty of the medical practitioner to inform the patient of the risks 
involved with medical treatments and procedures; it is only reasonable that the medical 
practitioner informs the patient of risks involved taking into account the possibility of a 
risk materialising. A patient who is informed of such risks therefore has the option of 
deciding whether to continue with the procedure or not. The patient may then give his 
informed consent. Thus the patient’s right to autonomy is not violated and the medical 
practitioner’s infringement of the plaintiff’s right to life, bodily integrity etcetera is 
                                                                                                                                                                            
157  See chapter 3 para 2. 
158  See Cass civ 2 14 June 1972 71-11318, Bull civ 1972 II 180 146, 1973 Jur 423 note Lepointe. 
See discussion of this case in Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 308-309. 
159  See CA Lyon 16 December 1988, JCP 1990 II 21510 observations Collomb. 
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justified. In determining the scope of the duty to inform, it is reasonable to expect the 
medical practitioner to inform the patient of reasonably foreseeable risks. French law 
refers to “normal” foreseeable risks as opposed to reasonably foreseeable risks, 
“normal” does not necessarily mean “reasonable”. However, in this instance “normal  
foreseeable risks” may be regarded as synonymous with the phrase “reasonably 
foreseeable risks” as referred to in other jurisdictions discussed in this thesis.  
 
Professionals are judged against the standard of a reasonable profession and where 
a professional acts unprofessionally and without due care and diligence, by for 
example, not providing important advice to a client,160 or ensuring that reports are 
correct161 which results in harm or loss to the plaintiff, then they too violate the general 
obligation of prudence and diligence or unwritten legal duties (according to Articles 
1382 and 1383 of the CC). Such violation is unreasonable, wrongful and negligent as 
faute encompasses wrongfulness and negligence. 
 
It is submitted that in instances where there is a strong indication of a legal duty to act 
positively such as in the case162 where the mother left her son in a precarious state 
and in possession of a dangerous weapon whereafter the son killed a person; or in 
the case163 where the resident failed to maintain the pavement resulting in injury to 
another, the mother’s and the resident’s omission was unreasonable, wrongful and 
negligent. It was in violation of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the CC.  
 
The influence of reasonableness on the requirement of a generating act or event is 
therefore implicit. There is an intertwined link between all the requirements relating to 
delictual liability and the concept of “reasonableness”.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
160  See Cass civ 1 21 February 1995 93-10058, Bull civ 1995 I 95 68; Van Gerven, Lever and 
Larouche Tort 242-243. 
161  See for example Cass comm 17 October 1984 83-12414, Bull com 1984 IV 269, JCP 1985 II 
20458 note Viandier.   
162  Cass civ 2 8 October 1967, Bull civ 1967 II 288. See discussion of this case by Moréteau and 
Grenier in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law volume 1: essential cases on natural 
causation 115.  
163  See Cass civ 1 18 April 2000 98-15770, Bull civ 2000 I 117 78. See discussion of this case by 
Moréteau and Grenier in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law volume 1: essential cases 
on natural causation 115. 
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2.2 “Faute” (relating to wrongfulness and fault)  
 
2.2.1 Wrongfulness (illicéite) 
 
Initially when the CC became applicable in 1804, faute played a major role in respect 
of delictual liability with a “strong moral value” but over time strict liability rules 
developed164 and the concept of faute changed reducing the “strong moral value”.165 
In 1897 the Cour de Cassation166 interpreted Article 1384(1) of the CC as covering 
liability caused by the “act of a thing”. Thus liability is based on the fact that a thing 
caused harm, irrespective of whether the thing was dangerous or not, or used as an 
instrument by a human. Currently the role of faute is limited depending on the type of 
harm or loss sustained.167 Nevertheless, faute is still required within the ambit of 
Articles 1382 and 1383 of the CC, whether it relates to the infringement of personality 
interests, economic interests and so on.168 
 
The CC does not contain a definition of faute.169 Wrongfulness is considered an 
important component of fault-based liability and no-fault liability (albeit in an indirect 
manner in terms of Article 1384(1)).170 As Galand-Carval171 points out, the element of 
“wrongfulness” is found in French law and even though it is not clearly and explicitly 
identified, it forms part of the faute enquiry. To begin with, in considering faute, legal 
writers traditionally refer to an objective element (illicéite referring to wrongfulness or 
unlawfulness) and a subjective one (imputabilité or discernment in this context in 
French law, referring to “[f]ull consciousness, together with the capacity of 
understanding what is being done”).172 Van Dam173 points out that in 1948 Rabut174 
                                                                                                                                                                            
164  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 89 points out that the change 
occurred during the latter part of the 19th Century when France experienced industrialisation, 
mechanisation and an increase in accident related claims. 
165  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 89-90. 
166  Cass civ 16 June 1896, D 1897 433 conclusions Sarrut, note Saleilles. See Galand-Carval in 
Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 89 fn 2. 
167  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 90. 
168  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 91. 
169  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 90. 
170  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 60. 
171  In Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 89-90 
172  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 59-60, 64; Van Gerven, Lever and 
Larouche Tort 301. 
173  European tort law 58. 
174  De la notion de faute en droit privé (Paris: Libr Gén de Droit et de jurspr 1948) 199-200; Van 
Dam European tort law 58. 
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had found twenty-three different definitions of faute in French legal literature. 
Numerous legal writers have tried to define faute and even though Planiol175 came the 
closest to defining faute as a “violation of a pre-existing duty” and “an act contrary to 
law (illicit)”,176 the definition was still criticised. Planiol’s definition was criticised for 
being vague in that there can be no limit to the “range of pre-existing duties” 
acknowledged by law.177 Moréteau178 submits that the idea of wrongfulness of conduct 
is similar to the breach of a “duty of care” concept found in other jurisdictions (such as 
in Anglo-American law relating to the tort of negligence). It should be noted however, 
that a duty of care is not required in French law, and any kind of relationship can in 
principle lead to liability.179 It is submitted that in French law, in a strict sense, a duty 
is defined more broadly than a duty of care in Anglo-American law or a legal duty in 
South African law. For example, in English law (with regard to the tort of negligence), 
a duty of care exists where there is some kind of relationship between the parties. In 
South African law the application of the breach of a legal duty to prevent harm is 
generally limited to establishing, for example, whether an omission was wrongful or a 
legal duty to prevent economic loss was wrongful. A breach of a legal duty in French 
law can range from a breach of a statutory duty to an infringement of a general duty 
“such as the duty to behave, in all circumstances, in a careful and diligent way (le 
devoir general de prudence et de diligence)”.180 Legal writers who support the 
objective approach to determining fault favour the risk theory as opposed to fault as a 
foundation of the law of delict. A person (natural or juristic) “is answerable for the risk 
created” or “for the risk one benefits from”.181 There has however been a fair amount 
of debate around these concepts and there is still uncertainty.182  
 
Generally, wrongfulness is present if there is: a breach of a statutory rule; commission 
of a non-intentional fault which by default is deemed a civil fault; infringement of a right 
or “abuse de droit”, abuse of a right whether a property right or personality right is 
                                                                                                                                                                            
175  Traité élémentaire de droit civil volume II/1 referred to by Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic 
questions of tort law 3. 
176  See Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 92. 
177  See Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 92. 
178  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 72. 
179  Van Dam European tort law 57. 
180  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 92. 
181  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 65. 
182  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 60. Cf Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche 
Tort 301. 
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infringed;183 breach of an unwritten duty stemming from “regulations, morals, customs, 
and technical standard”;184 or if the defendant’s conduct deviated from the general 
norm of behaviour (une norm general de comportment).185 The norm of behaviour is 
interpreted widely by the courts and it may be interpreted in a way that the defendant 
acted in a socially unacceptable way or breached the duty of acting carefully and 
skilfully under the circumstances.186 
 
It is apparent that faute may consist of wrongfulness (from a South African 
perspective) when dealing with the infringement of property or personality interests or 
where only so-called objective fault, is required (that is, faute without discernment). 
Faute has a broader application where wrongfulness and fault is required for the 
residual of any cases based on Articles 1382 to 1383.187 There is no need for a 
weighing of interests in French law as in South African law. What is important though 
is whether or not an infringement of a legitimate interest occurred.188 If an infringement 
of a fundamental right takes place, it is wrongful and a faute has been committed. The 
investigation stops there, in other words without having to further prove fault in the 
form of negligence of intention. Moréteau189 finds this “reasonable given the priority 
accorded to such rights”. It is submitted that even though the weighing of interests is 
not required in French law it does indeed in a sense occur where certain interests are 
held in a higher regard in the circumstances of the case when compared with others. 
Ultimately a weighing of interests does take place taking into consideration whether 
the infringement of the interest was reasonable. A look at two examples referred to by 
Moréteau190 assist in illustrating this point. There may be no infringement of privacy 
when harmless facts for example, relating to the birth of the fourth child of the Princess 
of Monaco are published,191 but facts published relating to the extramarital relations of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
183  The violation of rights may be considered wrongful either as a faute in terms of Article 1382 or 
a violation of a subjective right, such as privacy (Article 9) or ownership (Article 544). See 
Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 61. 
184  Van Dam European tort law 57, 233.  
185  See Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 247. 
186  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 92. See also Moréteau in Koziol (ed) 
Basic questions of tort law 60; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 336. 
187  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 66, 72. 
188  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 62. 
189  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 61. 
190  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 62. 
191  See Cass civ 1 3 April 2002 99-19852, Bull civ 2002 I 110 85, D 2002 3164 note Bigot; Moréteau 
in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 62. 
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a French President may be an infringement of privacy as it is “regarded as a strictly 
private matter”. It is submitted that a weighing of interests does take place in order to 
reach a decision as to whether the plaintiffs’ privacy is infringed. In both examples the 
interests in freedom of speech and privacy are weighed against each other. In the 
former case, the interest in freedom of speech may be valued more than the interest 
in privacy while in the latter case the interest in privacy may be valued more than the 
interest in freedom of speech. The difference between the two outcomes may be 
justified though where in the former case, the publication of the facts are harmless and 
reasonable while in the latter case, the publication of the facts are not harmless. In 
general some rights such as the right to life, are automatically valued more highly than 
others.192  
 
If it is established that there is a breach of a statutory rule, then the investigation also 
stops there, there is no need to further prove fault in the form of negligence or 
intention.193 For example, if a driver exceeds the speed limit on an urban road making 
him unable to avoid hitting a pedestrian, there is a breach of a statutory rule which is 
wrongful and the driver has committed a faute (without having to establish fault in the 
form of negligence or intention).194 In the majority of cases, the breach of these rules 
would amount to a faute but not always. For example, a breach of a professional code 
of ethics need not be regarded as a civil faute while on the other hand compliance with 
the rules does not necessarily mean that faute must not be proven.195  
 
2.2.1.1 Conclusion 
 
In French law, from a South African perspective, the distinction between wrongfulness 
and fault is somewhat blurred to a certain extent because the concept of faute is wide, 
encompassing wrongfulness and fault. The tests for determining whether the 
defendant’s conduct constituted a faute is similar to the tests for determining both 
wrongfulness and fault in South African law. Generally in French law, wrongfulness is 
present when there is a violation of a statutory rule; violation of an unwritten legal duty; 
                                                                                                                                                                            
192  Van Dam European tort law 226. 
193  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 92. 
194  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 98. 
195  See Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 91, 94. 
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or infringement of a legitimate interest. In South African law wrongfulness is 
established where there is a breach of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss; or where 
there is an infringement of a right. In South African law reference is made specifically 
to the boni mores yardstick in determining wrongfulness while French law interprets 
the norm of behaviour widely in a way that the defendant acted in a socially 
unacceptable way or breached the duty of acting carefully and skilfully under the 
circumstances. When looking at such wide norms in French law, it is apparent to a 
South African lawyer that wrongfulness and fault elements are often dealt with in 
combination and usually without clear differentiation. In South African law 
reasonableness is explicitly referred to in determining wrongfulness while it is implicit 
in French law. It may be concluded that the influence of reasonableness on illicéite 
(wrongfulness) in the French law of delict is therefore implicit.  
 
2.2.2 Discernment (discernement) or imputability (imputabilité) 
 
Moréteau196 explains that from a French perspective in respect of fault-based liability; 
wrongfulness (illicéite as the objective element), discernment or “imputability” in its 
attenuated form (the subjective element) and fault in the form of negligence or intention 
may be required. Moréteau197 points out that the scope of imputability has been 
reduced and is presumed as soon as wrongfulness is established.  
 
The concept of faute has retained its objective component but not much of the 
subjective component imputabilité (imputability), except in respect of intentional 
conduct.198 The terms “imputability”, “discernment” (discernement), or “culpability” in 
French law are used interchangeably and are somewhat similar to the concept, 
“capacity” in Anglo-American law and “accountability” in South African law. 
“Imputability” refers to an element of blameworthiness and whether the defendant was 
aware that his conduct was wrongful which could lead to harmful consequences.199  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
196  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 66. 
197  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 66. 
198  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 90, 93. 
199  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort law 332, 354. 
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The relinquishment of “imputability” as a requirement for liability has affected mainly 
minors and mentally impaired persons.200  
 
Previously, mentally impaired persons could not be held liable on the ground that such 
person lacked “imputability”. In Buguel v Morin,201 a mentally impaired person had just 
been released form a psychiatric institution. He had not fully recovered but was in a 
state of “sufficient awareness and free will”. It was expected of him to take care of 
himself but instead he drank heavily for two days. While in the intoxicated state he 
shot and seriously injured the plaintiff. Criminal proceedings could not be instituted 
against him due to the mental state he was in when he shot the plaintiff. However, the 
Cour de Cassation confirmed that he committed a faute and that his “mental deficiency 
which continued to exist, did not deprive him of all awareness and free will”. He was 
thus held delictually liable.202 Following this decision, Article 489-2203 was incorporated 
in the CC (now Article 414-3)204 which states that “[h]e who has caused harm to 
another while under the control of a mental disturbance is nevertheless obligated to 
provide reparation”.205 The intention behind the insertion of this new article was to 
remove (subjective) “imputability” as a requirement for liability. Mental disturbance is 
defined in a strict sense for purposes of this Article and it does not cover brief intervals 
of lapse of consciousness.206 After the implementation of Article 489-2, the Cour de 
Cassation207 in 1976 held that the article applied to all mentally impaired person’s 
                                                                                                                                                                            
200  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort law 332-333. 
201  Cass civ 2 15 December 1965, D 1966 Jur 397. See discussion of this case in Van Gerven, 
Lever and Larouche Tort law 313-314. 
202  In Cass Ass plén 9 May 1984 (80-93481, Bull crim 1984 164, JCP 1984 II 20255 note Dejean 
de la Bathie, D 1984 525 note Chabas, RTDciv 1984 509 observations Huet) a five-year-old 
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203  Law no 68-5 of 3 January 1968 inserted Article 489-2. 
204  Now Article 414-3 by Law no 2007-308 of 5 March 2007. 
205  Légifrance-translations. See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 65. 
206  Where for example a person suffers a heart attack and fall’s unconscious (Cass civ 2 4 February 
1981 79-11243, Bull civ 1981 II 21, JCP 1981 IV 136). See Van Dam European tort law 272; 
Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 334. 
207  Cass civ 1 20 July 1976 74-10238, Bull civ 1976 I 270 218. See discussion of this case in Van 
Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 336. 
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whether they were minors or majors. The principles applied in Buguel v Morin are still 
valid in that: they apply in instances where the parent or person responsible for the 
minor cannot be held liable; and where a person who is ill has a duty to take care of 
himself which includes taking necessary precautions with regard to his condition.208 
The Cour de Cassation thereafter, in 1984, extended the principle of dispensing with 
the requirement of imputability to very young children.209 Prior to 1968, children could 
only be held delictually liable when they had reached the “âge de raison” (age of 
reason or discernment), typically from seven years onwards. The courts210 had to 
establish in each case whether the child had reached the age of discernment. The aim 
of dispensing with the requirement of discernment was to benefit the plaintiff and 
protect his rights.211  
 
In the landmark decision of SAMDA v Molina,212 a seven year old schoolboy violently 
pushed his classmate. The classmate fell and struck a bench which subsequently led 
to the bursting of his spleen causing a haemorrhage. It was held that the schoolboy 
committed a faute and that it was not necessary to prove that he was able to 
“appreciate the consequences of his actions” or that he had sufficient discernment to 
appreciate the consequences of his actions. Discernment however remains a 
requirement in criminal law in terms of the French Penal Code (Code Pénal).213 This 
confirms that faute in French law is a social concept and a moral element is not 
required for liability under Article 1382 and 1383 of the CC. A minor in French law is a 
child under the age of eighteen years and in order for a minor or infant to be at fault it 
must be shown that he did not act like a “good family father”. Previously the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
208  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 314. 
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Gaz Pal 1976 109 where it was held that a fourteen-year-old child was old enough to appreciate 
the consequences of using an air rifle (Ferreira Fundamental rights and private law in Europe 
142-143). See also Van Dam European tort law 272. 
211  Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 90. 
212  Cass civ 2 12 December 1984 82-12627, Bull civ 1984 II 193. See discussion of this case in 
Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 335-337. 
213  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 302. 
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“reasonable child” test was applied to children and age as a subjective factor was 
considered. A similar approach was applied in assessing the conduct of an elderly 
person (usually over seventy years of age).214 In 1984 a number of decisions215 
dealing with minors were considered culminating in the decision of SAMDA v Molina 
where the Cour de cassation showed a clear shift in determining faute in an objective 
manner relinquishing the requirement of “imputability” in the French law of delict.  
 
Viney and Jourdain216 criticise the courts’ approach pointing out that by finding a minor 
liable is of little value as the plaintiff will still be compensated by turning to the 
guardians or parents of the minor and that such a finding of liability could have a 
negative, psychologically damaging impact on a minor that goes against the notion of 
protecting children, which is contrary to the spirit of French law. They state that the 
liability of minors must relate to the liability of their parents or person responsible for 
the minor under Article 1384(4). In France parents take out insurance which covers 
damage caused by children for whom they are responsible when they take out home 
insurance or insurance over rental property.217 
 
2.2.2.1 Conclusion 
 
It seems that imputability (similar to the concept of capacity or accountability) is not 
relevant in French law.218 This seems to go hand in hand with an objective standard 
to determing faute. However, the outcome reached in Buguel v Morin,219 is probably 
the same outcome that would have been reached by the South African courts. In this 
case where the defendant did not take care of himself but drank heavily whereafter he 
shot and seriously injured the plaintiff, the South African courts would have in all 
probability found that the defendant negligently or intentionally created the situation in 
which he claimed to act involuntary. It is reasonable that the defendant was held 
                                                                                                                                                                            
214  See Galand-Carval in Widmer (ed) Unification of tort law: fault 92; Van Dam European tort law 
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delictually liable. This then brings us to instances where there is no prior conduct to 
consider, or where a minor or mentally impaired person commits a delict. It is clear 
that in French law a minor (no matter what his age) and a mentally impaired person is 
not excused from liability. This is where South African law and French law diverge. In 
South African law, generally a child under seven years of age and a mentally impaired 
person will not be held liable (as accountability and fault are absent). This may be 
justified in South African law as it may be considered unreasonable to hold a young 
child or mentally impaired person liable. Furthermore not all South Africans take out 
insurance to cover delictual liability. On the other hand, the fact that the innocent 
plaintiff is left without redress or compensation may be considered unreasonable. 
Holding such minor or mentally impaired person delictually liable can be justified and 
considered reasonable, especially since most French people take out insurance to 
cover delictual liability. Again the French approach to reasonableness is more 
claimant-biased than, for instance, the South African approach. 
 
2.2.3 Negligence 
 
Faute is now (as mentioned above) a “social concept” and not a moral concept (as it 
does not refer to morals or culpability) and is applied objectively to all persons whether 
they are minors, mentally impaired and so on.220  
 
French law recognises different degrees of fault ranging from slight or simple fault 
(which may manifest itself in a mistake, “error of judgment”, technical fault or a natural 
reflex) to more serious fault such as recklessness, “faute grave” (grave fault) (which is 
not deemed intentional nor fraudulent) and intention.221 “Faute inexcusable” 
(inexcusable faute) which does contain a subjective element as it takes account of a 
“certain degree of wilful blindness to injury”, is also recognised. “Wilful blindness” 
encompasses not only actual knowledge of risk but also “constructive knowledge of 
risk” which is an assessment in abstracto (abstract).222 With regard to delictual liability, 
the degree of fault is normally irrelevant in accordance with the general faute principle 
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(principe de l’unité de la faute civile) except when dealing with liability for “abuse of 
rights” and  liability of employees (in respect of harm or loss caused to employers).223  
 
In French law when considering fault beyond the infringement of a legitimate interest, 
or violation of an unwritten legal duty, the standard of “the good family father” is 
applied. This standard is the equivalent to the standard of the reasonable person or 
its equivalent (applied in South African and Anglo-American law in determining 
negligence). “The good family father” or reasonable person hypothetically acts like the 
ordinary, just and cautious man under the circumstances, that is, he acts reasonably 
under the circumstances.  
 
When negligence is determined, the adjudicator must consider whether the risk was 
known at the time of the delict. For example, the effect of the HIV virus became known 
around 1983-1984, but only in 1985 was it essential to check whether donor blood was 
clear of the virus. In such cases there may be a duty to warn others of the potential 
risks and the impossibility of preventing the risk from materialising.224  
 
In reaching a conclusion as to whether the defendant’s conduct deviated from that of 
“the good family father”, the following factors may inter alia be considered: the 
reasonable foreseeability of harm; the magnitude of the risk of harm; the probability of 
the harm materialising;225 the cost and effort of taking precautionary measures;226 
customs; professional rules, practices or codes of ethics; technical rules; and private 
regulations.227 The defendant’s conduct may be deemed wrongful and encompass 
faute if it deviates even slightly from the standard of the good family father.228  
 
French law assesses the defendant’s conduct in abstacto (as compared to in concreto) 
not considering internal circumstances (subjective factors including inter alia: age; 
                                                                                                                                                                            
223  See Cass soc 19 May 1958, Bull civ 1958 V 612 where the Cour de Cassation held that 
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cultural and social characteristics of a person; and physical, psychological, or other 
inherent infirmities of a person) but considering external circumstances (the nature of 
the conduct as well as time and place where the delict occurred). Certain  so-called 
inferior internal circumstances, such as physical disabilities, or so-called superior 
factors, such as professional experience or skill, are considered when assessing the 
degree of caution or diligence required.229 Statutory provisions may adjust the 
standard of the “good family father”. For example, in respect of road accidents where 
the loi Badinter is applicable,230 contributory negligence on the part of: a child under 
sixteen years of age; a person older than seventy years; and a person more than 
eighty percent incapacitated can no longer apply as a  defence in limiting liability. 
However, drivers may still be held to be contributorily negligent.231 
 
The standard is adjusted when it comes to professionals like medical practitioners. 
Good examples of how the adjusted standard of reasonable conduct is assessed are 
found in cases dealing with medical practitioners. In private hospitals, medical 
practitioners including staff at clinics may generally be held contractually liable. The 
patient must still prove faute, causation and damage as with delictual liability. The 
medical practitioner is the debtor in terms of the contractual obligations who must treat 
the patient with all possible means.232 In respect of a contractual obligation, obligation 
de moyens, the defences that may be raised are contributory fault on the part of the 
plaintiff or some extraneous cause which cannot be attributed to the conduct of the 
defendant.233 In some instances, an obligation may be to do the best one can do under 
the circumstances. For example, a medical practitioner has an obligation to use his 
best efforts to cure his patient.234  
 
In one case235 where a medical practitioner employed at a clinic was negligent in taking 
care of the patient who lost blood and developed hemiplegia and in another case236 
                                                                                                                                                                            
229  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 353.  
230  Law no 85-677 of 5 July 1985 hereinafter referred to as “loi Badinter”. 
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232  See Cass civ 1 20 May 1936 (Mercier), DP I 88; Brun 2002 European tort law yearbook 180. 
233  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 285. 
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where a child sustained cerebral palsy due to a difficult birth caused by the lack of care 
and supervision by the midwife, the lower courts held the clinics, the medical 
practitioner and the midwife solidarily liable. However, the Cour de Cassation 
overturned these rulings, finding that the medical practitioner and midwife were acting 
like reasonable professionals in the course and scope of their functions and were 
therefore not liable because there was no faute on their part. Currently employees may 
only be held liable if they “wilfully commit a criminal offence” or “act outside the scope 
of their functions”. 
  
In a case237 where a patient’s intestine was perforated during a colonoscopy, the 
patient sued the medical practitioner for damages. The medical practitioner argued 
that the risk was inherent in the technique and that there was no faute on his part. The 
Cour de Cassation confirmed the decision of the lower court in finding that the 
perforation resulted from the inept conduct of the medical practitioner in that his 
conduct strayed from that of the reasonable medical practitioner and was thus 
unreasonable. The purpose of the colonoscopy was to examine the intestinal walls 
and harm to the intestinal wall was not included. The damages claimed were awarded 
to the patient. Thus generally, if there is a risk inherent in the medical procedure, then 
it is likely that there is no faute on the part of the medical practitioner. In one case,238 
a medical practitioner was not held liable when he performed an operation on the 
carpal tunnel of the plaintiff’s left hand. During the operation he severed the median 
nerve of the plaintiff’s hand. The operation was performed under endoscopy using 
specific instruments and the procedure itself carries risks, because every individual’s 
hand is anatomically different. The Cour de Cassation found that the medical 
practitioner’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances; he took necessary 
precautions, was not careless or negligent, and did not commit an error and that there 
was no faute on his part. In another case,239 while operating on a patient’s Achilles 
tendon, a surgeon damaged the patient’s tibial nerve even though it was five 
centimetres away from the tendon. The appeal court held that such a lesion was a risk 
inherent in such a procedure. The Cour de Cassation agreed and liability was 
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excluded. Moréteau,240 points out that liability on the part of the medical practitioner 
may still be found even though the medical procedures carry inherent risks. 
 
2.2.3.1 Conclusion 
 
It is apparent that in determing whether a person’s conduct strayed from that of the 
“good family father”, reasonable  foreseeability and reasonable preventability of harm 
are considered (although the word reasonable is not referred to in French law). In 
terms of a professional, whether his conduct deviated from that of the reasonable 
professional depends on whether the professional acted within the scope of his 
functions, with the necessary care, skill, and diligence expected of the professional 
under the same circumstances. In making a careless error, for example, perforating 
an intestinal wall while undertaking a routine scope, a professional’s conduct is 
considered unreasonable, constituting a faute. Wrongfulness and fault in French law 
are also presumed if the defendant’s conduct deviates even slightly from that of the 
good family father. Thus unreasonable conduct relates to both wrongfulness and 
negligence. In French law, the test for determining negligence is very similar to the 
test for determining negligence in both South African and Anglo-American law. The 
influence of reasonableness on negligence is therefore explicit. 
 
2.2.4 Intention and “abuse of rights” 
 
There are no specific rules requiring intention for delictual liability. In most instances 
negligence is sufficient, while in others strict liability is applicable.241 Liability for 
intentional conduct is however relevant with respect to “abuse of rights”.242 Case law 
and legal writers provide two different views on the theory of “abuse of rights”. The 
one is referred to as the objective theory of “abuse of rights”, based on society’s 
perception of subjective rights.243 The other is referred to as the subjective theory of 
abuse of rights, which takes into consideration the defendant’s motive for exercising a 
right or promoting his interests. Thus the defendant abuses a right if, for example, he 
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has intention to harm.244 It seems that the Cour de Cassation prefers the subjective 
theory where the courts often refer to the defendant’s mental state in terms of intention 
to harm (intention de nuire);245 fraudulent fault (faute dolosive);246 or attenuated forms 
of intention such as bad faith (mauvaise foi)247 or légèreté blamable (“culpable levity 
of conduct”).248   
 
The CC does not make mention of any “absolutely protected and unprotected rights”, 
however, any type of damage is in principle compensable.249 There is no numerus 
clausus in respect of legitimate interests.250 Ownership is referred to as an absolute 
right, and property and personality rights are protected.251 In French law, in principle 
all interests as long as they legitimate are protected.252  
 
Galand-Carval253 explains that the abuse of rights theory was formulated by Josserand 
and Saleilles in order to reconcile Article 544 (which states that “[o]wnership is the 
right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are 
not used in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations”)254 with Article 1382 of the CC. 
According to Josserand and Saleilles, the use of any rights falls within the ambit of 
faute where there is an intention to harm. In modern French law, “abuse” is defined 
with reference to a number of criteria which take into account the nature of the right.255 
The abuse of rights theory is flexible and is applicable in a number of situations.256 
Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche257 explain that an abuse of a right: 
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“occurs when the exercise of a right by its holder, even if lawful, results in harm to a third party, 
in circumstances, such as where that exercise was not useful to the holder of the right, where 
the holder of the right could have chosen a less harmful way of exercising his or her right or 
where the advantages brought to the holder of the right by the exercise of that right are out-
weighed by the harm done to the third party. The abuse of right doctrine evolved out of the field 
of disputes between neighbours and is now used throughout the civil law of the Continental 
countries.” 
 
In French law, the concept of “subjective rights” does not apply to limit rights but to 
assist the plaintiff. A violation of a subjective right satisfies the requirements of faute 
and damage for purposes of liability under Article 1382 of the CC.258 The concept of 
subjective rights is not found in English law,259 but in South African law.260 In South 
African law, where there is an infringement of a subjective right (generally relating to 
positive conduct), wrongfulness is present but all the other elements of a delict such 
as conduct, fault, causation and harm must generally also be present for liability to 
follow.261  
 
Viney262 confirms that the doctrine of abuse of rights falls under “liability for fault”. It 
stemmed from case law pertaining to the “abuse of freedoms” (abus des libertés) 
based on Article 4 of the Declaration,263 which states “[f]reedom means to be able to 
do all that does not harm others”. In accordance with the Declaration, law is “the 
expression of the general will”.264 Fundamental liberties (which include inter alia 
freedom of expression, etcetera) or the exercise of rights are thereby limited by Article 
4.265 Exercising a subjective right, such as “property rights, personality rights, voting 
rights in a shareholders meeting, the right to break off contract negotiations or an 
engagement, the right to compete, the right to criticize or the right to sue”266 in a 
manner which is deemed an abuse of a right may lead to liability.267 Fault in the form 
of intention is required intention de nuire – intention to harm.268  
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2.2.4.1 Conclusion 
 
In determining intention in French law, subjective factors are considered (for example, 
bad faith and motive). Thus intention is a more serious form of fault when compared 
to negligence. Delictual liability will in principle follow provided there is faute. Faute 
may include, from a South African perspective, wrongfulness, negligence or intention. 
It is submitted that wrongfulness, negligence and intention are determined by 
considering whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable. With regard to the 
abuse of rights, French law generally allows a person to act freely while exercising his 
rights. However, the moment such person harms another while exercising his rights, 
he crosses a line. Whether his exercise of his right is deemed an abuse of a right when 
harming another (crossing the line), depends on inter alia as Van Gerven, Lever and 
Larouche point out above, whether the defendant could have found a less harmful way 
of exercising his right, or the benefit from exercising his right outweighs the harm done 
to the plaintiff. Thus a balancing of interests, as mentioned, takes place. The influence 
of reasonableness on intention and abuse of rights is implicit in French law. 
 
2.3 Grounds of justification (fait justificatif) and defences  
 
The following defences are available to a defendant: necessity (l’état de nécessité); 
consent and acceptance or assumption of risk (le consentement ou l’acceptation des 
risques), legitimate or self-defence (la légitime défense); the order of law and lawful 
authority (l’ordre de la loi et le commandement de l’authorité); and force majeure.269 
All these defences except for force majeure are defined and applied narrowly.270  
 
2.3.1 Necessity, legitimate defence (self-defence) and lawful authority 
 
The term legitimate defence as opposed to self-defence is used in French law and is 
mainly applied in French criminal law. Necessity and legitimate defence are referred 
to in the French Penal Code271 and are no longer considered as grounds of justification 
but rather as a “bar to liability”, excluding civil and criminal liability, whether based on 
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faute or on the “act of the thing”.272 As mentioned, French law is unique in that 
depending on the facts of the case, the victim has the option of bringing his claim 
before the criminal or civil courts, but in practice his claim will most likely be dealt with 
in the criminal courts. Article 122-4 to 122-7 of the French Penal Code states: 
 
 “ARTICLE 122-4 
A person is not criminally liable who performs an action commanded by a lawful authority, 
unless the action is manifestly unlawful. 
  
 ARTICLE 122-5  
A person is not criminally liable if, confronted with an unjustified attack upon himself or upon 
another, he performs at that moment an action compelled by the necessity of self-defence or 
the defence of another person, except where the means of defence used are not proportionate 
to the seriousness of the attack. 
 
A person is not criminally liable if, to interrupt the commission of a felony or a misdemeanour 
against property, he performs an act of defence other than willful murder, where the act is 
strictly necessary for the intended objective the means used are proportionate to the gravity of 
the offence. 
  
 ARTICLE 122-6 
A person is presumed to have acted in a state of self-defence if he performs an action 
1° to repulse at night an entry to an inhabited place committed by breaking in, violence or 
deception; 
2° to defend himself against the perpetrators of theft or pillage carried out with violence. 
  
 ARTICLE 122-7 
A person is not criminally liable if confronted with a present or imminent danger to himself, 
another person or property, he performs an act necessary to ensure the safety of the person or 
property, except where the means used are disproportionate to the seriousness of the 
threat.”273 
 
There is not much written on lawful authority, self-defence and necessity in English on 
the French law of delict. As will be shown, other defences such as force majeure, 
voluntary assumption of risk and contributory fault feature more prominently in the 
French law of delict.  
 
Whether in the context of civil or criminal law, the influence of reasonabless on these 
defences is implicit. In respect of lawful authority, a person in principle will not be held 
liable for infringing the interest of another while acting under lawful authority “unless 
the action is manifestly unlawful”. It is submitted that a manifestly unlawful action is 
therefore an unreasonable action and such action will not negate liability. 
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A person may rely on the defences of necessity and self-defence when such person 
reacts at that moment to an unjustified attack upon himself or another thereby causing 
harm to the attacker. Such retaliatory conduct must be: immediate (while he or another 
is in imminent danger); necessary (there should be no alternative to avoiding the 
attack, such as fleeing in the circumstances); and most importantly not out of 
proportion when compared with “the seriousness of the attack” according to Article 
122-5. It is submitted that the fact that the conduct must be immediate, necessary and 
not disproportionate when compared with the attack, all point to gauging whether the 
conduct was reasonable and whether the infringement of the attacker’s interests was 
reasonable. Therefore if for example, the retaliatory conduct was performed the 
following day, it was possible for the defendant or other person to flee, or if the 
defendant beat the victim with a stick till he fell unconscious, then such retaliatory 
conduct may be considered unreasonable and unjustified (not excluding liability). 
Article 122-6 specifically states that “a person is presumed to have acted in a state of 
self-defence if he performs an action” to stop unauthorised entry (whether the break-
in or attempted break-in was accompanied by theft, violence or dishonest conduct on 
the part of the perpetrator) to an inhabited place during the night.274 Thus causing of 
harm to the perpetrator in protecting one’s property when the perpetrator tries to gain 
access and commit theft at night is therefore presumed to be reasonable and justified. 
Article 122-7 specifically states that a person may act out of necessity in protecting 
“himself, another person or property” when faced with an imminent threat of danger. 
Thus a person may be justified in infringing the interests of another by harming him in 
order to protect property as long as the means used are not “disproportionate to the 
seriousness of the threat”. If for example, the defendant uses excessive force by 
breaking the plaintiff’s arm over a pencil ‒ then the means used is disproportionate, 
the infringement of the plaintiff’s interests and conduct is unreasonable and unjustified. 
Liability will not be excluded. If a faute is present on the part of the person relying on 
the defence then there generally is no ground of justification.275  
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2.3.2 Force majeure 
 
Force majeure is referred to in Article 1148 of the CC276 in relation to contractual 
liability. However, in practice it is also used as a defence with regard to delictual 
liability. Force majeure in French law, as will be shown, is not limited to natural forces 
and has a much wider application than in other jurisdictions such as in South African 
and Anglo-American law. It has been incorporated in the theory of “extraneous causes” 
(causes étrangères).277 An extraneous cause refers to a cause which is: beyond the 
control of the defendant whether it stems from an act of nature, conduct of the third 
party over whom the defendant had no control, or conduct of the plaintiff; “unavoidable” 
and “unforeseeable” by the defendant that is, the defendant could not have done 
anything to prevent the harm.278 The last two factors may negate causation as well as 
fault in French law.279 A look at a few examples from case law which though not 
intentionally but coincidentally happen to deal with cases involving the national rail 
carrier of France will suffice in order to illustrate how the courts determine the lack of 
causation or fault as well as the influence of reasonableness on the defence of force 
majeure.  
 
In a case280 where a woman’s body was found in a Paris underground station between 
the platform and the rails, there were no witnesses that could explain how the woman 
died and an investigation into the circumstances of her death remained inconclusive. 
The widower sued the transportation company (Reggie Autonomy des Transports 
Parisiens - Autonomous Operator of Parisian Transport – “RATP”) for damages in his 
own name and on behalf of his children in terms of Article 1384(1) of the CC. The 
Plenary Assembly found faute on the part of the deceased and the sole cause of her 
own death. According to the witnesses’ statements, she had not seemed lucid and did 
not board the train even though she held a ticket in her hand. Liability on the part of 
the RATP was excluded based on force majeure. Faute  on the part of the deceased 
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was at the time of the incident unforeseeable and unavoidable. The RATP had 
adhered to all security requirements and the deceased’s conduct was found 
unpredictable. It is submitted that the outcome in this case was fair and reasonable as 
the RATP’s conduct was reasonable in that they adhered to all safety requirements. 
They had not committed a faute (that is, there was no wrongfulness or fault on their 
part). Furthermore the woman’s conduct was reasonably unforeseeable and could not 
reasonably have been prevented.  
 
In another case,281 a young man jumped off a train because he wanted to get off at a 
station where the train was not supposed to stop and subsequently died. According to 
the facts, the young man had forced a sealed lever close to the door which caused a 
siren to go off and release an “automatic blockage system” designed to secure 
passengers while in motion. He opened the door and jumped off the train while it was 
travelling at a speed of one hundred and sixty kilometres an hour. He died as a result 
of his conduct. The Cour de Cassation held that this was not an unforeseeable or 
unavoidable event and found that the young man’s family was entitled to 
compensation. Thus force majeure did not succeed as a defence. It is submitted that 
perhaps this was not a fair and reasonable result as there was at the very least 
contributory fault on the part of passenger, especially since he forced the doors open 
and jumped out of the train while it was travelling at a speed. He could have avoided 
his own death easily by getting off the train at a stop when it was safe to do so. The 
passenger committed a faute and his conduct was clearly unreasonable. This example 
may be characterised as more claimant-biased. As is evident from the other cases 
referred to below, the French courts do not easily exclude liability on the part of the 
national transport carriers.  
 
In another case,282 a fifteen-year-old boy opened the carriage door of the train while it 
was in motion and spun around the bar in the middle of the step which was wet at the 
time from rain. He then fell off the train, sustained fatal injuries and died. His relatives 
sued the French national rail carrier (Société nationale des chemins de fer français - 
                                                                                                                                                                            
281  Cass civ 2 13 July 2006 05-10250, Bull civ 2006 II 216 204, JCP 2006 1735 note Terré. See 
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National society of French railways or French National Railway Corporation, 
hereinafter referred to as the “SNCF”) for patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss. The 
Court of Appeal (of Amiens) found the SNCF partly liable. The appeal court held that 
even though the passenger’s conduct was foolish, it was not unpredictable or 
impossible to prevent. The SNCF appealed this decision, stating that liability should 
have been excluded based on force majeure. The Cour de Cassation held that there 
is a contractual obligation of safety owed to passengers and that due to the lack of 
adequate systems to keep the doors closed while in motion (the train was built before 
the 1970’s and could easily be opened by turning the handle 45 degrees), the national 
rail carrier should have foreseen foolish behaviour by passengers, especially children. 
The presence of staff on the train could have prevented the doors from being opened 
by passengers. The Cour de Cassation upheld the appeal court’s judgement, 
reaffirming that the plaintiff’s faute must constitute force majeure in order to exclude 
liability. It may be argued that the outcome in this case was fair and reasonable since 
it was easy to open the door, even to a child. Both the national rail carrier and the child 
committed a faute (wrongfulness and negligence). Thus there was unreasonable 
conduct on the part of the national rail carrier as well as the child and the national rail 
carrier was held partly liable. 
 
In a case283 where a passenger was stabbed on a train, liability on the part of the 
SNCF was excluded. The Cour de Cassation held that the assailant’s conduct was 
sudden and irrational. There was no verbal or physical warning. Damage could not 
have been prevented, even if railway staff were present in the carriage. The assault 
was considered unforeseeable and unavoidable. The faute of the third party 
constituted force majeure. It is submitted that this is a textbook example of the 
application of force majeure in excluding liability. The result is undoubtedly fair and 
reasonable as there was no wrongfulness or fault on the part of the national rail carrier. 
There was no unreasonable conduct on the part of the national rail carrier and the 
conduct in fact stemmed from a third party, which was unforeseeable and unavoidable 
(negating wrongfulness, fault and causation).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
283  Cass civ 1 23 June 2011 10-15811, Bull civ 2011 I 123. See discussion of this case by Moréteau 
2011 European tort law yearbook 235-236. 
   599 
 
The influence of reasonableness on the defence of force majeure is implicit. 
Reasonable foreseeability of harm and reasonable preventability of harm play a key 
role in the application of the defence of force majeure (although the French do not 
explicitly refer to the word reasonable). In effect if the court deems the harm to the 
plaintiff as reasonably foreseeable and reasonably preventable, then the defendant 
cannot escape delictual liability.  
 
2.3.3 Voluntary assumption of risk 
 
Voluntary assumption of risk is usually raised as a defence with regard to medical 
procedures and sporting activities.284 The unlawful act must stem from simple fault 
(also referred to as a technical fault) and does not apply where there is grave fault 
(such as recklessness) or intentional conduct. The risk of harm must be a normal risk 
encountered, for example, in sporting activities where the rules of the game are 
adhered to or medical operations.285 A look at few cases will assist in illustrating the 
application of the defence as well as the influence of reasonableness on the defence. 
 
In Malherbe v Amar,286 a squash player was struck on the face with a racquet and 
injured by a fellow player. The court held that even if Amar’s conduct constituted a 
technical breach of the rules of the game, there was no evidence that he acted 
negligently, intentionally or with unfair brutality; nor did he create any abnormal risk for 
the plaintiff. The Cour de Cassation noted that squash is a fast-paced game, intense, 
and not without certain risks. In another case,287 it was held that a sporting club cannot 
be held liable for the conduct of its member if the member’s conduct was “normal”. 
The plaintiff, a rugby player, was injured during a training session. He was in the midst 
of the tackle and fell when another player evaded him. The plaintiff sued the sporting 
club as well as its insurers in terms of Article 1384(1). The appeal court found liability 
on the part of the sporting club, but the Cour de Cassation held that there was no fault 
on the part of other player and there was no violation of the rules of the game. It is 
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submitted that these are good examples of when the defence should apply as the 
defendant’s conduct was reasonable, not wrongful or negligent. The risks of harm 
which materialised are normal risks encountered and expected in sporting activities. 
An abnormal risk (risque anormal) such as the risk of death will not lead to the 
applicability of the defence.288 This is no doubt reasonable. If a player intentionally 
injures another or breaches the rules of the game, it is deemed that he committed a 
“fault against the game” (faute contre le jeu).289 It is considered an abnormal risk which 
the plaintiff did not accept.290 The defendant will be held liable in terms of Article 1382 
and 1383 of the CC.291 Thus it may be reasonable to allow the application of the 
defence where normal risks are encountered and to deny the defence where abnormal 
risks are encountered. French, South African and Anglo-American law is similar in that 
reasonable conduct on the part of the player (the defendant), where the rules and 
conventions of the sport are followed, will lead to the successful application of the 
defence. In such instances the plaintiff’s infringement of his interests in bodily integrity 
is reasonable and justified. 
 
The defence is often raised in rescue cases but rarely leads to the exclusion of liability 
on the part of the defendant. In the French law of delict, liability for omissions is 
acknowledged, but only in exceptional circumstances. Liability on the part of the 
defendant for a pure omission in an emergency rescue case is based on Article 223-
6 of the Penal Code (Code pénal)292 which provides: 
 
“‘[A]nyone who, through immediate action and without risk to himself or to third parties, could 
prevent criminal, or delictual violation of bodily integrity and wilfully refrains from doing so’ as 
well as ‘anyone who wilfully refrains from helping and assisting a person in danger, when he 
could have done so or caused others to do so without risk of harm to himself or third parties’ 
[may be punished and or held delictually liable].”293  
 
For example, a bystander may be held criminally and delictually liable if he does not 
assist a person in peril, when he is in a position to do so without risking harm to himself 
or other persons.294 A penalty of five years imprisonment may be imposed or a fine of 
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seventy-five thousand euros under Article 223-6 of the French Penal Code.295 A 
criminal offence is, however, regarded as a civil faute in terms of Article 1382 of the 
CC. Therefore, by violating Article 223-6 of the French Penal Code, Article 1382 of the 
CC provides for civil liability for damage caused.296 The Cour de Cassation297 has, 
however, held that a bystander will be held liable only if the bystander intentionally 
refused to help when he was in a position to do so. Naturally if he was not aware of 
the situation requiring action or if he was unable to assist, he will not be held liable. A 
subjective test is applied to the bystander, taking into account his “personal knowledge 
and abilities”.298 It is not expected of children to assist in emergency situations.299 For 
example, in a case, a son-in-law fell through thin ice into a deep canal. The father-in-
law refused to help the son-in-law but another bystander came to the son-in-law’s aid. 
The father-in-law was held liable to pay three thousand eight hindered euros to his 
son-in-law (in damages).300 If there is “serious fault” that is, not slight or simple fault 
on the part of the rescuer then it is possible that the defendant’s liability will be limited, 
based on the contributory fault on the part of the rescuer. A rescuer will be 
compensated even if there was no fault on the part of the defendant.301 It is apparent 
that in French law, there is a legal duty to act positively by attempting to rescue a 
person in peril. The breach of this legal duty to prevent harm, where possible under 
the circumstances, could be considered unreasonable and constitute a civil faute 
(where wrongfulness and fault is present) as well as a crime. This is also reasonable 
taking into consideration the value placed on a human life. What is interesting, though, 
is the use of a subjective test taking into consideration subjective factors such as the 
bystander’s personal knowledge, capabilities and age. The application of a subjective 
test is reasonable when taking into account the possible repercussions (a fine and or 
imprisonment) of not assisting when able to do so. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
295  Van Dam European tort law 522. 
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In instances where an inexperienced or drunken driver, or pilot raises voluntary 
assumption of risk as a defence, it is rare that it will apply in excluding liability but may 
apply in limiting liability based on contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff.302  
 
Currently the defence can no longer be raised in transportation cases and the scope 
of its application has been restricted in sporting activities. It has also been excluded 
when liability is based on the “act of thing” in terms of Article 1384(1).303 For example, 
the defence was denied with respect to participants in an ocean regatta where it was 
held that they did not accept the abnormal risk of death.304 In this case, the owner of 
the sailing boat as well as the six team mates drowned and died. French courts were 
in any event, as shown above, reluctant to uphold this defence. From 2010305 it is no 
longer considered as a partial or complete defence in transportation cases. In a 
landmark decision given in 2010,306 two motorcyclists were practising on a race track 
before an event. One of the motorcyclists injured the other. The injured motorcyclist 
sued the other, based inter alia on Article 1384(1). As the race occurred on a track, 
the legislation dealing with road traffic accidents was not applicable. The Cour de 
Cassation held that voluntary assumption of risk could not be raised by the custodian 
of the motorcycle. This was confirmed in a later judgment by the Cour de Cassation307 
where a driver was killed and the co-driver (the plaintiff) of a racing car at an 
automobile rally was seriously injured. The plaintiff sued the organisers’ of the event 
based on Article 1384(1) of the CC and based on the conduct of the motor vehicle. 
The organiser’s insurer raised the defence of voluntary assumption of risk but the Cour 
de Cassation rejected the defence, holding that the victim who is injured by the act of 
a thing may rely on Article 1384(1) of the CC, without assumption of risk being 
raised.308 Thus it can no longer be raised based on the so-called “act of a thing”. 
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Moréteau309 explains how this decision had a negative impact in France, in that 
insurance companies stopped providing insurance for mortobike, bicycle and go-
karting competitions. A new provision was inserted in the Sport’s Code (Article L 321-
3-1 Code du sport) by the Act of 12 March 2012 excluding the application of Article 
1384(1) of the CC in sporting activities, whether for training or competition purposes. 
However, this provision applies only to damage to property, dommage matériel, that 
is loss, destruction or damage of things and not to bodily injury.  
 
In a case310 where a drunken pedestrian lay in the middle of the street and was then 
hit by a motor vehicle and died, the appeal court held that the pedestrian voluntarily 
exposed himself to risk of harm without any justification. His faute was “inexcusable”. 
Therefore the pedestrian’s sister, who claimed damages, was not entitled to 
compensation in terms of the legislation dealing with road accidents, the loi 
Badinter.311 However, the Cour de Cassation held that inexcusable faute must be 
voluntary and exceptionally serious, thus exposing the victim without justification to a 
danger of which he should have been aware. The Cour de Cassation held that the 
pedestrian’s conduct did not fall within the scope of inexcusable faute and overturned 
the judgment of the appeal court. An “inexcusable” faute is regarded by the Cour de 
Cassation as intentional fault of such a magnitude that it “without valid reason, has 
exposed the victim to a danger which he should have realized”.312 Van Dam313 points 
out that the courts expect suicidal or reckless behaviour in this regard, for example 
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where a drunken person lies in the middle of the street late at night;314 a drunken 
person crosses the road in the dark at a blind spot;315 or a person sits on the top of a 
stationary bus.316  
 
In another case,317 a manager of a leisure resort voluntarily climbed onto the rear 
bumper of motor vehicle while one of her colleagues drove the vehicle. When the 
vehicle came to a stop, she fell off the bumper and was seriously injured. In view of 
the manager’s experience and level of education it was clear that she could not have 
thought that her conduct was safe or even necessary. The Cour de Cassation found 
contributory fault of a serious magnitude on her part and that she could not have 
ignored the risks involved purely for “amusement”. She had a duty to observe the rules 
of safety and security and she should have been conscious of the danger she exposed 
herself to. But the Cour de Cassation held that the woman’s actions did not amount to 
inexcusable faute and that there was faute on the part of the driver. However, in a 
case318 where a man tried to jump onto a fork-lift that was lifting his car in order to stop 
it (as it had been illegally parked) and was severely injured; the Cour de Cassation 
confirmed that the man was of sound mind, would have been aware of the risk of harm, 
and that his faute was “inexcusable”. Inexcusable faute seems to be applicable in 
cases of extreme recklessness or where a person intentionally tries to commit 
suicide.319 
 
The influence of reasonableness on voluntary assumption of risk is implicit. Ultimately 
it depends on whether the plaintiff’s or defendant’s conduct was reasonable under the 
circumstances. Voluntary assumption of risk does not apply easily where a person is 
seriously injured or loses his life. In cases of sporting activities; whether or not the 
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conduct was reasonable depends on whether the rules and conventions of the sport 
were followed, as well as whether the risk of harm encountered was a reasonable 
normal risk. In rescue cases voluntary assumption of risk would only apply (but not as 
a complete defence) where the rescuer acted beyond simple fault in terms of French 
law, for example, if the rescuer acted recklessly and unreasonably in endangering his 
life or that of another. The defence is applicable if “inexcusable” faute is present but 
“inexcusable” faute generally relates to unreasonable conduct such as recklessness 
or in cases of suicide.  
 
2.3.4 Consent 
 
A medical practitioner has a duty to inform a patient with “honest, educated and 
appropriate information” relating to “serious risks” of proposed treatment. If the patient 
is informed of the risks then he is able to make an informed decision. The medical 
practitioner need not, however, convince the patient of the danger of proposed medical 
treatment.320 If the medical practitioner does not inform the patient of such risks, then 
there may a breach of the duty to inform which could lead to liability.321 The Cour de 
Cassation322 has held that the patient in such instances is not, however, entitled to full 
compensation, but to a portion based on the lost chance of making a choice of avoiding 
the risk of harm that subsequently occurred. There is no loss of chance when it is clear 
that the patient would in any event (even if informed of the risks) have continued with 
the medical treatment. For example, in a case323 where a patient underwent carotid 
surgery, the surgeon forgot to inform the patient about the possible risks which were 
known but rare, as well as complications associated with the procedure. The operation 
was not urgent. A complication did in fact materialise and the patient suffered 
hemiplegia, subsequently deteriorated in health and died three years later. His rightful 
heirs then sued the surgeon in their personal capacity for their own harm or loss (non-
patrimonial) as well as in their representative capacity on behalf of the patient, 
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submitting that there was a loss of chance to postpone the operation and not suffer 
harm. The appeal court held that the patient would in any event have consented to the 
surgery, even if he had been informed of the possibility of the rare risks materialising. 
The Cour de Cassation324 confirmed this part of the appeal court’s judgement, that is, 
there was no loss of chance. There was no causal link between the alleged loss of 
chance and the medical practitioner’s fault. If the risks of the medical treatment are not 
life-threatening, and the medical practitioner fails to inform the patient of inherent risks 
of the operation which then materialise, the medical practitioner may be held liable. 
Thus had the patient been informed of such inherent risks, he would have had a 
chance to decide whether or not to continue with the proposed treatment. The National 
Office for Compensation for Medical Accidents in conjunction with the National 
Solidarity Fund currently provides compensation for non-negligent medical conduct 
(such as in cases where the patient has not been informed of the risks) resulting in 
abnormal or extraordinary consequences.325 In a case326 where a surgeon failed to 
inform a patient about the risk of impotence before performing a successful prostate 
adenomectomy; the Cour de Cassation found the surgeon liable when the patient 
became impotent based on Article 16-3 (referring to consent of the patient before 
medical treatment) and 1382 of the CC. The surgeon had breached his duty to inform 
the patient of the risks. The patient was also entitled to compensation for non-
patrimonial loss.  
 
In instances where a patient unreasonably refuses treatment, for example, where a 
patient on grounds of religious beliefs refuses a blood transfusion and subsequently 
dies, it is regarded as a faute as a result of voluntarily rejecting a chance of survival, 
culminating in a reduction of the award of compensation.327 However, the CC was 
amended in 1994 and Article 16-3 was inserted, which in essence states that the bodily 
integrity may only be infringed in instances of therapeutic medical treatment that is 
deemed necessary for the patient. The patient’s consent must be obtained beforehand 
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unless therapeutic medical treatment is necessary and consent cannot be obtained 
from the patient.328  
 
Moréteau329 points out that during the past seventy-five years and since the decision 
of Mercier,330 medical malpractice claims fell within the realm of the law of contracts,331 
where the test applied was whether the medical practitioner acted with “due care 
according to established scientific knowledge”.332 However, there has been a shift 
which is evident from recent case law to liability for medical malpractice falling within 
the realm of the law of delict.333 Article 1147 of the CC334 and the Code of Public 
Health335 refer to a “legal” obligation instead of a contractual obligation.336 In 2010 the 
Cour de Cassation337 confirmed the shift when a medical practitioner failed to look 
after a patient who had been diagnosed with a dangerous form of the influenza virus. 
The shift does not affect prescription periods and the test applied in Mercier (which is 
in any event enshrined in the Code of Public Health)338 is still used to determine 
negligence.339 It should be noted that in French law, when dealing with either 
contractual or delictual liability, the same interests are protected and in principle the 
same type of awards are awarded.340 In addition, a medical practitioner has a duty to 
inform the patient of any risks and provide advice in order for the patient to make an 
informed decision.341 The Cour de Cassation342 has held in a recent decision that 
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liability for non-disclosure of information only applies where the risk did actually 
materialise after the medical procedure. 
 
To begin with, the French government is generous in providing compensation to 
patients who were not informed of the risks even if there was no negligent conduct on 
the part of the medical practitioner. This goes hand in hand with the idea of national 
solidarity, distribution of loss, and a pro-victim attitude. The influence of 
reasonableness on the defence of consent is also implicit. It is reasonable that a 
patient should be informed of risks. This is in accordance with the right to autonomy 
and self-determination. If a patient is not informed of the risks, it may be regarded as 
an unreasonable infringement of his interests in bodily integrity. Naturally, if the 
medical practitioner is unable to obtain consent and in instances of emergency 
performs a procedure without the patient’s consent, his conduct is reasonable and 
justified. It is also reasonable that compensation may be denied or reduced where a 
patient unreasonably refuses necessary therapeutic medical treatment. 
 
2.3.5 Contributory fault 
 
The CC does not contain any provisions regulating apportionment of liability and 
neither is apportionment of liability regulated by any statute in France. However, the 
Cour de Cassation has the authority to take into consideration the plaintiff’s 
contributory fault (faute de la victim) and decide on the reduction of his claim. The 
courts,343 when reaching a decision, must take into account Articles 1381 to 1384. 
Generally, the plaintiff’s contributory fault serves to reduce his claim but in certain 
circumstances his claim may be excluded if the defendant can prove that the plaintiff’s 
conduct constituted an “extraneous cause” (cause étrangère) and was the sole cause 
of his harm or loss.344 In order for conduct to be deemed an extraneous cause, the 
damage “must have been unforeseeable and unavoidable (inprévisible et 
irresistible)”.345 The gravity of both parties’ fault, as well as the “causal impact” of both 
                                                                                                                                                                            
343  See Cass civ 28 February 1910 (Nourrigat v Pech), DP 1913 I 43, S 1911 I 329; Cass civ 2 16 
July 1953 (Suter v Sté Le Berry), JCP 1954 II 7792; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 691. 
344  Van Dam European tort law 376. 
345  See Cass civ 2 2 April 1997 95-16531, Bull civ 1997 II 109 62; Cass civ 1 6 October 1998 96-
12540, Bull civ 1998 I 269 188; Cass civ 2 27 May 1999 97-16200, Bull civ 1999 II 104 75; Van 
Dam European tort law 376; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 697 fn 45. 
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parties’ conduct, is considered.346 Liability may also be excluded in certain exceptional 
instances where there is contributory intent on the part of the plaintiff or where the 
defendant was provoked.347 An objective test is applied even to children (l’appreciation 
in abstracto). For example, in Lemaire v Declerq,348 due to the mistake of an 
electrician, a thirteen year old child was electrocuted while fitting a light bulb and 
subsequently died. Had a circuit-breaker been disengaged at the time when the child 
fitted the light bulb, the child would not have been electrocuted. The appeal court found 
the electrician fifty percent liable for the claim brought by the child’s parents as the 
child was also found to be at fault. Whether the child understood the consequences of 
his negligent conduct was not considered by the courts as it was considered 
irrelevant.349 Thus fault on the part of both the child and the electrician was assessed 
objectively.  
 
The plaintiff’s compensation is reduced when: he infringes “a rule of conduct imposed 
by law”; he breaches a general duty to look after himself; in instances where there is 
faute on the part of another person for whom he is responsible; or for the act of things 
for which he is the custodian.350 For example, in Bardèche v Joiner,351 the defendant 
(Joiner) was felling trees with a chain-saw on his property. The plaintiff (Bardèche) 
entered the defendant’s property. The defendant on several occasions requested the 
plaintiff to leave because of the risk of harm from the falling branches, but he did not 
heed the defendant’s warning. He stayed on the property and was subsequently 
injured by a falling branch. The plaintiff sued the defendant relying on Article 1384(1) 
of the CC as the custodian of the chain-saw. The Cour de Cassation held that the 
custodian of the thing could be exonerated from liability in part if he could prove that 
the plaintiff contributed to his loss or damage. In this instance, the plaintiff’s conduct 
did not constitute an “extraneous cause” that was unforeseeable and unavoidable and 
would have resulted in the exclusion of the claim altogether, and therefore a reduction 
was applicable. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
346  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 692. 
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In instances where two or more wrongdoers cause harm to the plaintiff (who is not at 
fault), they are considered as joint wrongdoers and may be held jointly and severally 
liable. For example, in Séguier v Sfolcinin,352 the plaintiff (Sfolcinin) was a passenger 
on a motorcycle driven by another person (Cavelier). The defendant (Séguier) tried to 
avoid driving into a parked motor vehicle in front of him but unfortunately collided with 
it. The driver of the motorcycle (Cavelier) who was driving behind the defendant then 
collided with the defendant’s motor vehicle. The plaintiff sustained injuries and sued 
the driver of the motorcycle on which he was a passenger as well as the defendant 
(the driver of the motor vehicle). The court a quo, as well as the court of appeal, held 
both drivers jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. In Scaglia v 
Ferricelli,353 the plaintiff (Scaglia) was a passenger in the defendant’s motor vehicle 
when it collided with another motor vehicle driven by Sellier. The plaintiff sued the 
driver of the motor vehicle in which she was a passenger (Ferricelli) but not the other 
driver. The court of appeal agreed with the court a quo that both drivers were equally 
at fault when causing injury to the plaintiff. The appeal court then took into account 
that the plaintiff only sued one of the drivers and concluded that the driver that had 
been sued was liable to the plaintiff for half of the proven damages, thereby 
contravening Article 1382 of the CC. It must be noted, though, that these cases were 
decided before the loi Badinter was applicable.354  
 
If a plaintiff refuses to undergo even a minor operation, contributory negligence as a 
defence will not be applicable.355 Contributory negligence is generally not applicable 
to passengers, unless the passenger was at fault in not wearing a seatbelt,356 or his 
fault was the sole cause of the accident and inexcusable.357 A dependant’s claim can 
in certain instances be reduced due to the fault on the part of the deceased. The 
defendant must prove that the deceased was at fault and contributed to the occurrence 
of the loss. For example, in Mandin v Foubert,358 Foubert (the deceased) was travelling 
                                                                                                                                                                            
352  Cass civ 2 4 March 1970 67-11136, Bull civ 1970 II 76 59. 
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in a motor vehicle with his wife and children when they were involved in an accident. 
Foubert died as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. The wife and children 
sued the other driver for damages in respect of personal injury they sustained as well 
as for damages resulting from the death of the deceased (loss of support). The Cour 
de Cassation confirmed that there was no fault on the part of the wife and children; 
therefore they were entitled to full compensation in respect of their personal injury. 
However, the claim for loss of support resulting from the deceased’s death was 
reduced based on the deceased’s contributory fault.   
 
The influence of reasonableness on contributory fault is implicit in that the 
unreasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff plays a role in the reduction of his 
award for compensation as occurred in Lemaire v Declerq359 and Bardèche v Jonier.360 
If there is no unreasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff, it is reasonable that he 
is entitled to full compensation. Similarly if there is unreasonable conduct on the part 
of the plaintiff that may be deemed an “extraneous cause” (reasonably unforeseebale 
and unavoidable) or the sole cause of his harm or loss, then it is reasonable that 
liability on the part of the defendant should be excluded, as in the above-mentioned 
case361 where a woman’s body was found in a Paris underground station. Also 
contributory intent or provocation of a certain degree on the part of the plaintiff may be 
considered an “extraneous cause” (reasonably unforeseeable and unavoidable) 
leading to the exclusion of liability. It is fair and reasonable that the gravity of both 
parties’ fault as well as the “causal impact” of both parties’ conduct is considered in 
reaching a conclusion as to whether and how much the plaintiff’s award may be 
reduced. 
 
2.3.6 Illegality 
 
Loss of income obtained illegally is generally not recoverable.362 In French law the 
defence was often raised against delictual claims brought by concubines (as 
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secondary victims) claiming compensation as a result of the death of their 
companions. However, the Cour de Cassation disallowed the raising of this 
defence.363 Currently this defence can only be raised if compensation itself would lead 
to “an illicit or immoral result”.364 This may be regarded as a fair and reasonable 
principle to apply.  
 
3. Causation  
 
Causation is an essential element in the French law of delict365 and limitation of liability 
predominately occurs with the element of causation.366 Neither the CC nor the Cour 
de Cassation has provided a specific definition of “causation” and whether causation 
is present is often determined in a pragmatic manner.367 Causation is referred to in 
Articles 1382 to 1386 of the CC, which state that the damage must have been caused 
by the faute of the defendant or act of an animal or thing in his custody.368 Once it is 
established that the defendant’s conduct “was a necessary cause of the damage”, 
then he is generally liable for the full extent of the damage.369  
 
According to French doctrine, factual and legal causation is not explicitly referred to 
but is considered implicitly in determining causation. In this regard, Moréteau370 
provides the following insight on causation in the French law of delict”: 
 
 “French doctrine did not feel the need to conceptualise a distinction between natural and legal 
 causation, though authors are well aware that equivalence is more on the factual side and 
 adequacy on the legal side. 
  
 The French view the chain of causation as a continuum. As a rule, the addition of new acts 
 will cause liability to be split, unless such new acts interrupt the causal chain. When the 
 >>novus actus<< is less serious than the original fault, liability will be split. When the 
 subsequent act of the victim or of a third party is at least as serious as the act of the 
 original perpetrator, the  causal link is interrupted. This implies a value judgement. An 
 example of the interruption of the causal link by the victim is where the victim of an 
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 accident caused by negligence runs at full speed to catch the tortfeasor and dies of a heart 
 attack: the author of the accident is not liable for the death of the victim. A recent case 
 provides an example of interruption by a third party.[371] During a celebration that took 
 place at a private home, the hostess had lit candles downstairs. She later went to bed 
 without giving advice regarding the burning candles, thereby acting negligently. One of the 
 guests subsequently brought the burning candles upstairs where the party went on all 
 night, one of the candles causing a deadly fire in the early morning. In the opinion of the lower 
 court, the original negligence of the hostess was held to have contributed to the final 
 disaster, but the Court of Cassation considered that the fault of the third party in bringing the 
 candles upstairs without making sure they would be extinguished in due course interrupted 
 the causal chain. The original fault was no longer the direct cause, and we must conclude … 
 that the subsequent fault constituted adequate cause.” 
 
There is no desire among French legal writers or the French courts to refer to or 
develop theories of causation.372 A number of theories were put forth by legal writers373 
such as the “equivalence of conditions” (equivalence des conditions, where all acts 
leading to harm or loss are considered as causal facts)374 or but-for test, the adequate 
causation theory where the “wrongful act” must have resulted from what is to be 
expected “in the normal course of things”,375 and the proximate cause theory (“la 
proximité temporelle”) which takes into account “only the cause that is closest in 
time”.376 The courts have rejected the proximate cause theory377 as it is considered a 
“rough” and “unfair” approach to determining causation.378 However, the courts tend 
to use the “equivalence of conditions” for fault liability regimes or where intention is 
present, in order to determine whether causation in fact exists.379 The courts apply the 
adequate cause theory for no-fault liability regimes or in instances of non-intentional 
fault in “areas of objective liability in order to ensure that damages are kept in 
reasonable bounds”.380 The adequate cause theory and the but-for theory are not 
considered as complementary theories, but rather as polar opposite theories. The but-
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for test is considered to lead to “excesses” while the adequate cause theory is 
considered ambiguous and less logical than the but-for test.381 Galand-Carval382 states 
that adjudicators freely apply the two contradictory theories (the but-for test and 
adequate cause theory) and “it is not infrequent to see cases reaching opposite results 
on very similar facts”. Galand-Carval383 refers to a case384 where a bank sent a cheque 
book to a client using ordinary mail. The bank was subsequently held liable for the 
consequences of the stolen cheque book. In another case,385 the owner of a motor 
vehicle did not lock it and when the vehicle was stolen, the court did not hold the owner 
liable for the consequences of an accident caused by the thief. 
 
Where required, as will be shown below inter alia: the adequate cause theory; direct 
consequences theory; reasonable foreseeability of harm; reasonable preventability of 
harm; fault in the form of negligence or intention; the efficient cause theory; probability 
of harm; presumptions; and policy considerations are all factors that may be applied 
in determining causation.386 It is rare for the courts not to find a causal link.387 It is 
submitted that because French law makes use of a number of theories and factors 
which are considerd appropriate and practical depending on the circumstances of the 
case, they do follow a somewhat flexible approach in keeping liability within 
reasonable limits. A look at some examples from case law is necessary in order to 
highlight the influence of reasonableness on the different theories and principles 
applied in determing causation in French law. 
 
In an instance where the consequence would have occurred whether or not the 
defendant acted wrongfully or with fault, it is possible that liability on the part of the 
defendant may be excluded or limited. This may be illustrated by considering the 
following hypothetical example. A cyclist is injured by the negligent driving of a motor 
vehicle. The harm would nevertheless have occurred even if the motor vehicle driver 
was not negligent, as the cyclist was drunk and did not keep to his side. Thus in such 
a case (without considering the applicability of the loi Badinter), the motor vehicle 
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driver would be liable but the victim’s faute would also be considered and may either 
exclude liability (due to force majeure if the cyclist’s faute was unforeseeable and the 
accident unavoidable) or limited (if the cyclist’s faute was foreseeable and 
avoidable).388 It is apparent here that reasonable foreseeability and preventability of 
harm are factors considered in determining causation. These are the same factors 
considered in determining negligence. The defendant is thus liable for those 
consequences which he should have reasonably foreseen and prevented.  
 
Causation is often determined using the direct consequences theory in that only the 
direct and certain consequences of the delict may be recovered.389 However, in 
practice it is not easy to differentiate between causes that are certain, uncertain, direct 
and indirect.390 The reason for requiring the causation of damage to be certain and 
direct is a policy reason, ensuring that the defendant’s burden is confined within 
reasonable limits.391 Loss was considered to be certain and direct where a tram 
company sustained loss of income as a result of an accident which blocked the tram 
lines.392 In another case,393 a twelve-year-old child entered a construction site. He was 
holding a metal bar which came into contact with an electricity cable suspended above. 
The child was electrocuted and died. The parents sued the contractor, contracting 
authority and the building surveyor based on Article 1382 of the CC. The Cour de 
Cassation found the building surveyor liable, stating that there was a direct causal link 
between the building surveyor’s negligence and the conduct of the child that resulted 
in the child’s death. Liability was shared between the main contracting authority and 
the child. The court implicitly relied on equivalence des conditions (the but-for test).394 
It is submitted that it is reasonable to impute liability upon the defendants in both of 
the above-mentioned cases. In the case where the tram company sustained loss, the 
consequences were not too remote ‒ the loss of income from ticket sales was a certain 
and direct result of the defendant’s conduct. It was also reasonable to impute partial 
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liability for the death of the child on the contracting authority as a result of the direct 
negligent conduct of the building surveyor.  
 
The loss was not considered “direct” in X v Gan395 where a father voluntarily left his 
well-paid job in Saudi Arabia to live with his son in France after his mother was killed 
in a motor vehicle accident. The son tried to live with his father in Saudi Arabia but 
could not adapt to living there, hence the father returned to France with his son. The 
father sued the person who was responsible for causing the accident in which the 
mother died. He claimed loss of earnings resulting from him having to leave Saudi 
Arabia where he had a well-paid job. The Cour de Cassation confirmed the appeal 
court’s ruling that the loss of employment was not caused directly by the accident, 
there was no causal link.396 It may be argued that it would not be reasonable to impute 
liability on the defendant in this case because the loss of earnings may be considered 
as too remote and not direct.  
 
In another case,397 where a widow claimed life insurance benefits from an employer 
who wrongfully dismissed the deceased prior to their marriage and the husband’s 
death, the Cour de Cassation held that there was no causal link between the loss 
sustained by the widow and the wrongful dismissal. It transpired that the husband was 
wrongfully dismissed. After five months of the dismissal, the employee got married and 
then died the day after he got married. There was factual causation, but the dismissal 
was not regarded as the “adequate cause” of the widow’s loss. In Pagane v 
Zucchelli,398 a child stole explosives from the defendant’s shack and subsequently 
injured himself while playing with them. The shack was not in a good condition and it 
was not locked, therefore anyone could enter the shack. It was not established who 
entered the shack and how the explosives found their way there. The plaintiff (the 
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parent) sued the owners (defendants) of the shack for not looking after the shack and 
securing it. According to the but-for test, the harm to the child would not have occurred 
had the shack been locked. The explosives would also not have been placed their had 
the shack been locked, but the Cour de Cassation held that the owners of the shack 
did not commit a faute as there was no causal link between the faute and the harm 
based on the adequate cause theory. Once again, it is submitted that in both these 
cases it would not be reasonable to impute liability on the defendants, as it may be 
argued that there was not a close enough relationship between the defendants’ 
conduct and the harm or loss sustained by the plaintiffs. An adequate connection 
between the defendants’ conduct and the plaintiffs’ harm is lacking. The resultant harm 
was not the reasonably expected consequence of the conduct.  
 
In another case,399 the deceased had been a smoker for twenty-five years and 
eventually died of lung cancer. The deceased’s husband and children sued the 
tobacco company on the basis that it failed to notify the deceased of the harm resulting 
from smoking. The Cour de Cassation dismissed the claim, stating that the deceased’s 
conduct was the legal cause of her own death and not the tobacco company which 
was “less efficient”. According to the “efficient causation” theory, the courts weigh the 
various factors in determining legal causation.400 The question may be asked if it is 
reasonable to impute liability on the tobacco company for the death of the smoker. If 
the tobacco company would be have been found liable, it is possible that it would open 
the floodgates to litigation. There could be an indeterminate number of plaintiffs and 
indeterminate harm or loss. In terms of policy considerations, it may not have been 
reasonable and fair to hold the tobacco company liable. 
 
In some cases, the probability of damage is the deciding factor in establishing 
causation, even in cases of strict liability. Van Dam401 points out that in general, 
causation and negligence are closely related in that they both involve probability but 
from different perspectives. With respect to negligence an ex ante approach to 
probability is applied while in respect of causation an ex post facto approach to 
probability is applied. In respect of negligence the question is “how likely it is that harm 
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would be caused by the negligent conduct …, whereas in causation the question is 
how likely it is that the damage was caused by the negligent conduct or by the cause 
for which the defendant is liable”.  
 
In a landmark decision402 where the plaintiff alleged that he developed multiple 
sclerosis as a result of a Hepatitis B vaccine, the Cour de Cassation found that there 
was a probability that the condition was caused due to the defective vaccine and held 
the private institute liable, the decision of the court a quo was reversed. There was no 
scientific and statistical evidence confirming that the vaccine could cause the disease. 
This however, did not affect the court’s decision in confirming liability and other proof 
based on the circumstances of the case. Presumptions were thus relied upon. In a 
later case,403 with similar facts where a woman had received thirteen shots of the 
Hepatitis B vaccine (a rather high number of vaccines) over a period of seven years 
and was subsequently diagnosed with multiple sclerosis; she sued the manufacturers 
of the vaccine. The appeal court denied her claim for damages. The court held that 
the appellant’s condition “could be presumably attributable to the vaccine” but there 
was no proof that the vaccine was defective. The Cour de Cassation upheld the 
judgment in part. It held that the appeal court was correct in holding that the appellant’s 
condition could be attributed to the vaccine but stated that the appellate judges should 
have verified whether “the very same reasons why the damage was presumed to be 
attributable to the vaccine could support the presumption that the vaccine was also 
defective”. Séjean404 explains that with regard to liability for defective products, what 
must be established is proof of the damage, the defect, and a causal relationship 
between the defect and the damage. When the product is a health-related product, a 
further requirement is required, that is, that the “damage is attributable (imputable) to 
the administration of the product”. “Attributability” refers to the relationship between 
the damage and the administration of the medical product (vaccine) while causation 
refers to the link between the damage and defect of the product. Séjean explains “[i]n 
other words, damage to a patient can be attributed to the vaccine because it was 
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administered to him or her, but it is only if the vaccine is furthermore defective that the 
conditions of liability are met”. If there is a lack of scientific evidence that the condition 
is attributable to the administration of the product, the trial courts can determine proof 
of attributability by presumptions under Article 1353 which provides: 
 
[t]he presumptions which are not established by statute are left to the insight and carefulness 
of the judges, who shall only admit serious, precise and concurrent presumptions…”.405 
 
The Cour de cassation did not provide a definition of a defect in the vaccine, which 
may mean that different courts may reach different results with regard to whether a 
health product is defective.406 It is submitted that in the end, the courts reach a decision 
on whether it is fair and reasonable to impute liability on the defendant based on 
whether the harm or loss was probably caused or presumably caused by the 
administration of the defective product.  
 
In certain instances, such as where accidents occur at work,407 in cases of nuclear 
accidents and in cases where transfusion of contaminated blood occurs, causation is 
presumed.408   
 
Where there are successive causes, that is where a second event causes the same 
damage as the first, the first defendant may be held liable.409 In the hypothetical 
example where a plumber negligently causes a fire in the claimant’s house and before 
any repair can take place an earthquake completely destroys the house, the plumber 
would still be held liable for the damages. In terms of English law the plumber would 
not be held liable but in terms of French law, the plumber caused the damage 
(destruction of home) before the earthquake and the plaintiff’s right to compensation 
arises at the time of the delict. The earthquake is not considered as a novus actus 
                                                                                                                                                                            
405  Translated by Séjean in European tort law yearbook 2013 240. 
406  Séjean 2013 European tort law yearbook 241. 
407  Accidents that take place during the course and scope of employment or at the workplace are 
considered as “industrial accidents” which are regulated by legislation. Causation is presumed 
but may be rebutted by the employer. See Galand-Carval in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: 
causation 55; Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 258 fn 65.  
408  In instances where a person contracts HIV due to a contaminated blood transfusion, Act 91-
1406 of 31 December 1991 provides for compensation by the state. Prior to the enactment of 
the act, compensation could be claimed in delict. See cases referred to by Viney in Bermann 
and Picard (eds) French law 258 fn 67; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 122-125. 
409  Van Dam European tort law 335. 
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interveniens. French and South African law would thus reach the same result, which 
is different from the result reached in English law.410  
 
Where the second event increased the damage caused by the first event, the first and 
second defendants would generally be held jointly and severally liable.411 For example, 
a plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and hospitalised. While in hospital 
he was then seriously injured as a result of fire that broke out. However, the injury 
resulting from the fire (his burns) were deemed to be a consequence of the initial 
accident (there is no novus actus interveniens).412 The chain of causation is not broken 
and continues as the injury resulting from the novus actus (fire) is not more serious 
than the injury resulting from the initial accident. This is indeed a pragmatic way of 
imputing liability on two separate wrongdoers and the outcome is indeed reasonable 
and fair where each wrongdoer is liable for his share of the harm or loss sustained by 
the plaintiff.  
 
A second event could however be considered too remote and the second defendant 
may then be held solely liable.413 For example, a woman was injured in a motor vehicle 
accident as a result of a motorist’s conduct. The motorist was not aware that the 
woman’s condition was serious and that her life was in danger. She was transported 
to one hospital where that hospital thought it more appropriate to transfer her to 
another hospital for treatment. On her way to the second hospital, the ambulance 
transporting her caused an accident resulting in the death of the woman. The Cour de 
Cassation414 confirmed that the ambulance driver was responsible for the harm 
emanating from the death of the woman. Even though the first accident affected the 
woman’s chance of survival there were no objective medical reasons for concluding 
that it would have led to her death. In respect of holding the ambulance driver fully 
liable, the Cour de Cassation applied the thin-skull rule (the ambulance driver must 
                                                                                                                                                                            
410  See Spier in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: causation 142, 148 who refers to the English 
report by Rogers, the South African report by Neethling and the French report by Galand-
Carval. 
411  Van Dam European tort law 336. 
412  Cass civ 2 6 March 2003, RTDciv 2003 310 observations Jourdain. See Lafay, Moréteau and 
Pellerin-Rugliano 2003 European tort law yearbook 163; Van Dam European tort law 336. 
413  Van Dam European tort law 336. 
414  Cass crim 14 June 1990 89-85234, Bull crim 244 627. See Moréteau, Pellerin-Rugliano and 
Rey in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law volume 1: essential cases on natural causation 
599-600. See also Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 50; Van Dam European 
tort law 345. 
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take the victim as he finds her with her pre-existing condition). This is precisely what 
Moréteau415 was referring to in respect of the rule that when the novus actus “is less 
serious than the original fault, liability will be split” but when “the subsequent act … is 
at least as serious as the act of the original perpetrator, the causal link is interrupted”. 
This, as Moréteau points out, involves a value judgement. Thus the value judgment 
depends on whether the novus actus had a bearing on the resultant harm to such an 
extent that the resultant harm can be imputed to the second wrongdoer (in respect of 
the second event) which from a South African perspective may be based on public 
policy, reasonableness, fairness and justice. 
 
The courts often make use of the concept “cause étrangère” which refers to a cause 
which was external (out of the defendant’s control), unforeseeable and unavoidable 
(externe, imprévisible et insurmontable).416 In respect of the intervening event, the 
consequences of the conduct causing the harm are deemed unforeseeable and 
unavoidable, the defendant may not be held liable.417 Viney and Jourdain418 point out 
that the exclusion of liability based on a cause étrangère is a “manifestation of the 
adequacy theory”. A cause étrangère may negate causation and fault in French law.419 
Thus the adequate cause theory and a measure of foreseeability are acknowledged 
when the defence of an external cause is raised. The external cause could manifest 
itself in force majeure, contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff, an act by a third 
party, a chance occurrence, or conduct of the state.420 In rescue cases, where the 
rescuer attempts to assist the victim, his conduct is not usually regarded as a novus 
actus interveniens. For example: X causes injury to Y as a result of an accident and Y 
is left in a position of peril, Z tries to rescue Y and in so doing is also injured. Galand-
Carval421 explains that it is most likely that the French courts would find that X created 
a situation of danger where Z found he had a moral duty to intervene and rescue X. 
Z’s conduct would not be regarded as breaking the chain of causation but a “normal 
consequence of the dangerous situation” created by X. It is submitted that in such 
                                                                                                                                                                            
415  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 82-83. 
416  Van Dam European tort law 320. 
417  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 421. 
418  Conditions 247-249 (referred to by Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 454). 
419  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 455.  
420  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 259. 
421  In Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: causation 59.  
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context the “normal consequence” may be considered a “reasonable consequence” of 
the dangerous situation.  
 
Where there is uncertainty about causation where there are multiple possible 
defendants, the but-for test is applied in the sense that all the defendants may be held 
liable for the plaintiff’s harm or loss that was directly caused by them all. The burden 
of proof is also reversed. The principle benefits the plaintiff in shifting the risk onto one 
or more defendants. The only instance where a defendant may not be held fully liable 
is where the plaintiff contributed to his harm or loss by his own fault.422 Thus it is 
apparent that inter alia: the but-for test; the direct consequences theory; policy 
considerations; whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impute liability on the 
defendants’; and fault (in the form of intention or negligence) are applied where there 
are multiple possible defendants.  
 
Galand-Carval423 states that in the example where a plaintiff contracts a disease from 
inhaling asbestos dust while employed by different employers (where the disease is 
contracted only once a certain threshold of dust is inhaled and the threshold is reached 
at the place of his last employment), the but-for test would apply and all the employers 
may be held liable on the basis that it is a direct cause of the employee’s illness. The 
same would apply in Anglo-American law.424 In English law, as in Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd,425 it would be fair, reasonable and just to impose 
liability on the defendants and the burden of proof would be reversed. The question 
that would be asked is whether the defendant materially increased the risk of harm 
towards the plaintiff.  
 
A few cases will now be considered illustrating the approach followed by the French 
courts. A plaintiff alleged that she developed cervical cancer as a result of her mother 
taking a DES drug while preganant. The plaintiff was unable to prove which of the two 
manufacturers manufactured the drug her mother took during pregnancy. The drug 
was taken by women between the 1940s-1960s in order to avoid the premature birth 
                                                                                                                                                                            
422  Galand-Carval in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: causation 53-54. 
423  In Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: causation 56. 
424  See chapter 5 para 4. 
425  2003 1 AC 32. 
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of their babies. One of the effects of the drug was that daughters of mothers who took 
DES had a high risk of cervical cancer. The court a quo dismissed the claim but the 
Cour de Cassation held that each of the manufacturers had to prove that their drug 
did not cause the cervical cancer. Thus a presumption was created that each 
manufacturer is jointly and severally liable.426 
 
In Lizinger v Kintzler,427 the plaintiff participated in deer hunting with seven other 
hunters. Towards the end of the day the plaintiff left the defendants to return home. 
The defendants then simultaneously fired shots to mark the end of the hunting day. 
One of the shots fired hit the plaintiff who almost lost his eye. The plaintiff sued all the 
other hunters as it was not possible to determine whose shot injured him. The Cour 
de Cassation held that the firing of the shots did not amount to a normal act of hunting 
and that all the defendants were negligent. The hunters had collective custody of the 
guns and bullets. They had faute commune (common fault) in terms of Article 1384(1) 
that caused injury. All the defendants were held jointly and severally liable in solidum 
towards the plaintiff. The result is reasonable as the victim is relieved of the burden of 
identifying the actual wrongdoer. There is a presumption of causation applicable to all 
the defendants and if a defendant wants to escape liability, he must prove that he did 
not cause the harm.428 However, Galand-Carval429 explains that in a scenario where 
another person hunts separately from the group and fires a shot simultaneously while 
other members of the hunting group fired shots and it is uncertain who fired the shot 
that injured the victim; then the theory of faute commune cannot apply as causation 
cannot be proven. There is a legal obligation to take out insurance for hunting and the 
practice of dangerous sports by certain professionals and persons involved in “profit-
making activities”, which is supplemented by a “guarantee fund” in instances where 
the wrongdoer is unidentified or uninsured. If a person, particularly a professional, 
does not take out insurance as required, the courts may find such person at fault and 
negligent in not taking out insurance.430 If the defendant cannot be identified with 
                                                                                                                                                                            
426  Cass civ 1 24 September 2009 08-16305, Bull civ 2009 I 187. See also case law referred to by 
Van Dam European tort law 334 fn 132; Moréteau 2010 European tort law yearbook 185-188; 
Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 53. 
427  Cass civ 2 5 June 1957, D 1957 Jur 493. See also Cass civ 2 13 March 1975 73-13961, Bull 
civ 1975 II 88 73. 
428  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 442-444.  
429  In Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: causation 61. 
430  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 23. 
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regard to a hunting accident or if he is insolvent or uninsured, then compensation is 
awarded by a compensation fund.431 
 
In one case, a gang432 armed with rifles and ammunition had a confrontation with a 
rival gang. When a brawl broke out, a young member of the rival gang was shot and 
killed. The young member’s parents sued five assailants for the harm and loss 
sustained. The appeal court found that in terms of Article 1382 and 1383 (personal 
responsibility for one’s own conduct) all the assailants were liable. One of the 
assailants appealed, arguing that there was a lack of causation between his conduct 
and the death of the young member. The Cour de Cassation dismissed the appeal, 
holding that even though it was not possible to identify whose shot killed the deceased, 
there was a shared will with an aggressive intention to harm. Furthermore, the 
appellant took part in the brawl with full knowledge and the death of the deceased was 
due to their collective conduct, which was “objectively foreseeable”. Fault in the form 
of intention and causation was established. Thus the defendants were held liable for 
the intended consequences. Intention was used as a criterion to establish causation 
and the court relied on the idea that intended consequences cannot be too remote. 
 
It may be argued that by shifting the burden of proof a reasonable result is reached as 
the victim does not go empty-handed because he cannot identify the wrongdoer. He 
is relieved of this burden of proof as a matter of policy. The question may be asked 
(as in South African law) whether there is a close enough relationship between the 
wrongdoers’ joint conduct and the harm for such consequences to be imputed to the 
wrongdoers in terms of policy considerations based on reasonableness, fairness and 
justice.  
 
3.1 Loss of chance 
 
In French law, the plaintiff can claim compensation for the loss of chance (la perte 
d’une chance) of preventing harm or loss he sufferred, as long as faute is present on 
                                                                                                                                                                            
431  Law of 11 July 1966. See Moréteau in Basic questions of tort law 52. 
432  Cass civ 2 2 April 1997 95-14428, Bull civ 1997 II 112 65. See discussion of this case by 
Moréteau and Pellerin-Rugliano in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law volume 1: essential 
cases on natural causation 366-367. 
   625 
 
the part of the defendant and there is a clear causal link between the defendant’s 
conduct and the loss of chance. The principle of “loss of chance” is used to fill in the 
gap where there is uncertainty in causation433 or when it is uncertain whether or not 
the proven fault of the defendant caused the harm.434 Loss of chance is one of the 
heads of damages that may be claimed but because it relates to causation as well it 
will discussed here under “causation” as well as under “harm, loss or damage”.435 
 
For example, in cases of failure to provide medical treatment, or failure to inform the 
patient of risks involved in medical treatment which could have benfited the plaintiff; 
the loss of chance (the advantage the plaintiff was denied of) which is expressed as a 
percentage436 “of the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff”437 or “advantage that was 
denied as a result of the loss of chance” may be claimed.438 Thus liability is 
apportioned in cases of causal uncertainty.439  
 
The loss of chance is considered a head of damage and compensation can never be 
one hundred percent but anything between one percent and ninety-nine percent.440  
Compensation for loss of chance was initially applied to cases of professional 
negligence and later to medical malpractice claims.441 Prior to 2014, in order to 
succeed with a claim for loss of chance, such loss of chance must have been “real 
and serious”.442 In 2014, the Cour de Cassation443 held that the loss of chance must 
be “a certain and direct harm resulting from the loss of a reasonable chance”. This 
requirement serves as a limitation to claims in general.444 It is only in 2014 that the 
word “reasonable” was introduced and we have yet to see how adjudicators will apply 
the concept of “reasonable chance”.445 
                                                                                                                                                                            
433  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 113-114. 
434  See Séjean and Knetsch 2014 European tort law yearbook 204. 
435  See para 4 above. 
436  See Req 17 July 1889, S 1891 I 399; Cass civ 1 14 December 1965, JCP 1966 II 14753 note 
Savatier; Cass civ 1 17 November 1982, JCP 1983 II 20056, D 1984 305; civ 1 8 January 1985 
83-14852, Bull civ 1985 I 10 10, D 1986 390 note Penneau; Cass civ 10 June 1986 85-10127, 
Bull civ 1986 I 163 164; Van Dam European tort law 338. 
437  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 460. 
438  Séjean and Knetsch 2014 European tort law yearbook 204. 
439  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 460. 
440  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 9. 
441  Séjean and Knetsch 2014 European tort law yearbook 204-205. 
442  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 113. 
443  Cass civ 1 30 April 2014 13-16380, Bull civ 2014 I 76. 
444  Séjean and Knetsch 2014 European tort law yearbook 205. 
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The loss of chance principle supports proportional liability when determining either 
causation or damages and is seen as a reasonable alternative to the all-or-nothing 
approach.446 In principle, the plaintiff will succeed if he establishes with “reasonable 
certainty” a causal link between the harm or loss sustained and the defendant’s 
wrongful conduct.447 Generally, the author of the damage must be established. 
Compensation will not be awarded if the damages are “hypothetical, doubtful, or 
uncertain”.448 There is a distinction between “virtual” and “hypothetical” loss. “Virtual 
loss”, as Moréteau449 puts it, exists potentially as a result of some blameworthy 
conduct, that is “all the conditions for its existence in the future already exist … much 
like an embryo contains all the elements necessary for the development of human life”. 
In respect of “hypothetical loss”,  “the existence depends on events that may or may 
not occur, much like the eventuality of a human being coming to exist where two 
persons of the opposite sex and able to procreate have intimate intercourse”. 
Hypothetical loss is not compensable but virtual loss may be. In cases of personal 
injury resulting in a disability (for example, injury resulting in loss of vision in an eye, 
the loss of the ability to procreate, or loss of use of a limb) there is harm but the scope 
of the future loss is uncertain (virtual) and may be remedied by compensating for the 
loss of chance.450 Thus a virtual loss may be regarded as a loss of a reasonable 
chance and it is reasonable to compensate such loss. 
 
A look at some examples as to how the courts establish the loss of chance is 
necessary.  In one case, a young woman claimed compensation for the lost chance of 
becoming a pharmacist as a result of injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle 
accident. The Cour de Cassation451 confirmed that if the loss of chance is hypothetical 
and uncertain then damages cannot be awarded. At the time of the delict, the young 
woman had just failed her baccalauréat and she had not yet undertaken studies to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
446  See Moréteau in Basic questions of tort law 56; Borghetti in Winiger (ed) Digest of European 
tort law volume 2: essential cases on damage 434-435. 
447  Van Dam European tort law 338. 
448  Galand-Carval in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: causation 60. 
449  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 56-57. 
450  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 57-58. 
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become a pharmacist. Thus in this case there was no reasonable loss of chance, 
therefore she was not entitled to compensation.  
 
Loss of chance is frequently applied in cases of medical malpractice.452 If, for example, 
a medical practitioner fails to diagnose a patient with cancer or fails to inform the 
patient about material risks and the patient subsequently suffers harm, the medical 
practitioner may be held liable for the percentage of the patient’s loss of chance of 
preventing harm or loss of chance to recover.453 Often the plaintiff cannot prove with 
sufficient certainty that the harm or loss would not have occurred but for the medical 
practitioner’s negligence. The courts award compensation on the basis that the 
medical practitioner’s negligence had deprived him of the chance of recovery.454 For 
example, in one case,455 a patient underwent an operation to remove his appendices 
but thereafter died as a result of uraemia (acute renal failure). The widow sued the 
medical practitioner for damages. The Cour de Cassation confirmed that the medical 
practitioner was negligent in not conducting pre-operative tests. Even if it cannot be 
concluded with certainty that the medical practitioner’s faute had been the cause of 
the patient’s death, his faute denied the patient a chance of survival. The courts thus 
substitute the damage, loss of chance of survival as opposed to death, in order to 
facilitate establishing causation. For example, if a doctor failed to diagnose cancer in 
the patient, and had he been diagnosed correctly there was a forty percent chance of 
recovery (whereas due to the lack of diagnosis there is no chance of recovery) the 
patient may recover forty percent for the lost chance.456 If statistical evidence is 
provided to the court, causation must be established with sufficient certainty.457  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
452  See Cass civ 1 16 July 1991 90-14645, Bull civ 1991 I 248 162; Van Gerven, Lever and 
Larouche Tort 111-113. 
453  See Cass civ 1 12 November 1985 84-12759, Bull civ 1985 I 298 264; Cass civ 1 7 February 
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French tort law has been applying the loss of chance principle for some time.458 In 
French law, it has been applied to loss of a chance of profit (such as winning a prize)459 
and to preventing a loss (such as in cases of recovering from an illness). It is applied 
to damage resulting from personal injury, damage to property and pure economic 
loss.460  
 
For example, in one case,461 a horse breeder was unable to train his mare for two 
races as a result of an accident for which the defendant was liable. The mare was 
unable to take part in the two races. The Cour de Cassation concluded that the mare’s 
lost chance to win the races was “certain” and “direct”, not hypothetical. The matter 
was referred to the lower court to determine compensation for the loss of chance. In 
another case,462 a plaintiff was injured by another skier. The plaintiff was not in a 
position to identify the other skier but the instructor was and had failed to identify the 
skier. Thus the plaintiff lost the chance of suing the other skier for the harm she 
sustained. The Cour de Cassation allowed the plaintiff’s claim against the instructor 
for the loss of chance to recover compensation from the other skier. 
  
If it is uncertain as to who or what caused the damage (such as whether it was caused 
by an act of nature) then it is possible that the claim may be dismissed. For example, 
a child was born with a number of disabilities and there were two possible causes. The 
one possible cause was due to the mother’s pre-existing condition where it was likely 
that the child would suffer a neurological disorder, and the other possible cause was 
due to the hospital’s negligence during the mother’s pregnancy and birth of the child. 
The appeal court found a seventy-five percent loss of chance due to the hospital’s 
negligence but the Cour de Cassation463 dismissed the appeal as a result of the 
uncertainty.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
458  See Van Dam European tort law 337. 
459  See Cass Civ 2 3 March 1988 86-17550, Bull civ 1988 II 57 31; Van Gerven, Lever and 
Larouche Tort 201. 
460  See Van Dam European tort law 337-338. 
461  Cass Crim 6 June 1990 89-83703, Bull crim 1990 224 573. See also Cass civ 1 4 June 2007 
05-20213, Bull civ 2007 I 217 (with regard to the loss of chance in selling a house which was 
of an advantage to the plaintiffs). See Moréteau 2007 European tort law yearbook 276; Van 
Dam European tort law 338; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 200-201. 
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463  Cass civ 1 28 January 2010 08-20755 08-21692, Bull civ 2010 I 19, D 2010 947 note Maitre 
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In one case464 a couple got married in terms of “universal community of property” and 
then got divorced. After the divorce, the couple realised that their property would be 
shared between them. The husband, who was dissatisfied with the loss he would 
sustain, sued the notary who assisted in drafting the marriage contract. He alleged 
that the notary did not fulfil his professional duty in advising the couple, especially 
taking into consideration the disparate contributions between them. The husband 
claimed for the loss of chance of choosing a different matrimonial property regime. 
The Cour de Cassation found that the husband did not establish loss which was  
certain and direct as a result of a reasonable chance to implement a different 
matrimonial property regime.  
 
The influence of reasonableness on the loss of chance is explicit in that the Cour de 
Cassation465 has expressly stated that the loss of chance must be “a certain and direct 
harm resulting from the loss of a reasonable chance”. Generally with claims for loss of 
chance, the defendant fails to act positively (omission) in preventing the loss of a 
reasonable chance to gain a benefit. The plaintiff must establish with “reasonable 
certainty” a causal link between the harm or loss sustained and the defendant’s 
unreasonable conduct in the form of a faute.  
 
3.2 Conclusion 
 
In French law, causation is indeed determined pragmatically taking into consideration 
numerous principles and theories. The influence of reasonableness in determining 
causation is mostly implicit. Van Dam466 correctly states that in many instances the 
courts reach decisions based on policy considerations as to what is fair, just and 
reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case. However, their 
decisions’ are provided using the “language the national law provides. For example, 
the court decides whether the consequences were foreseeable or not, whether they 
                                                                                                                                                                            
European tort law yearbook 182; Van Dam European tort law 338; Moréteau in Koziol (ed) 
Basic questions of tort law 55-56. 
464  Cass civ 1 30 April 2014 13-16380, Bull civ 2014 I 76. See Séjean and Knetsch 2014 European 
tort law yearbook 203-205. 
465  Cass civ 1 30 April 2014 13-16380, Bull civ 2014 I 76. 
466  Van Dam European tort law 343.  
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were very unlikely or not so unlikely, whether they were direct or indirect, or whether 
they were within or outside the prospective scope of the rule”.   
 
4. Harm, loss or damage 
 
Damage, like causation and the generating act or event in French law, is referred to 
as one of les constantes de la responsabilité (the requirements for liability).467 The 
founders of the CC left the interpretation of these concepts to the courts.468 The aim 
of compensation for damages is to compensate the paintiff for his loss as a “result of 
the defendant’s wrong” and to “restore the equilibrium which has been broken by the 
damage (rétablir l’équilibrium détruit par le dommage)”.469 The deterrent function of 
the law of delict is secondary to the compensatory function.470 An economic analysis 
is generally disregarded in the French law of delict,471 but it is submitted that it is still 
implicitly considered, for example in determining whether there is a faute and even in 
determining causation according to the efficient cause theory. Compensation is the 
main remedy available to a victim of a delict in French law and harm or loss is the “sole 
criterion” in assessing damages.472 A franc symbolique is awarded where the courts’ 
recognise a violation of the plaintiff’s right. Importance is attached to the recognition 
of the violation of the right instead of compensation. This is usually awarded where the 
plaintiff has not suffered any significant harm473 which is similar to the award of nominal 
damages in Anglo-American law.474 For example, in the case commonly known as the 
Benetton case,475 the appeal court awarded the franc symbolique to an association 
defending the interests of AIDS patients and some AIDS patients (who were in addition 
awarded compensation of fifty thousand francs each). Benetton had advertised their 
products related to AIDS in a manner resulting in the abuse of “freedom of expression 
and opinion”.476 
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Punitive or exemplary damages are generally not awarded in France but there is a 
possibility that in future “disgorgement of illicit benefits” and the award of punitive 
damages may be awarded.477 The Cour de Cassation generally does not vary the 
amount of compensation awarded based on the gravity of the faute or profit made by 
the defendant.478 In the assessment of damages the “seriousness of the wrong” or 
“degree of culpability” is not taken into account but rather the seriousness of the loss 
or harm.479 By not considering the “degree of culpability”, the Cour de Cassation has 
implicitly dismissed the private law penal function of an award aimed at deterring 
wrongful conduct and instead placed precedence on compensating the plaintiff. Thus 
in French law, the amount of the award for damages must reflect the amount of 
harm.480 For example, in SA Cogedipresse v C,481 a magazine printed a photograph 
of a famous musician on his death bed. The photograph was taken without permission 
(a “paparazzi” photograph). The wife of the musician had taken precautionary 
measures to secure the room where the mortal remains of her husband lay. She 
subsequently sued the publisher of the magazine and claimed damages for herself 
and her children. The appeal court confirmed the decision and award of the court a 
quo in awarding fifty thousand francs to the wife and twenty-five thousand francs to 
each child. The court also ordered the magazine to publish the judgment. On appeal, 
the publishers alleged that the order to publish the judgment was punitive. The appeal 
court held that the publication of the photograph was wrongful and the damages were 
awarded in order to remedy the harm sustained. Furthermore, by ordering the 
publication of the judgment, it in fact makes good the harm sustained and 
acknowledges that the wife did not want nor allow the publication of the photograph of 
her husband. The appeal court confirmed that the court a quo’s award was correct in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
477  See discussion by Moréteau 2011 European tort law year 216 stemming from a case where 
the Cour de Cassation recognised and enforced a foreign judgment (Cass civ 1 1 December 
2010 09-13303, Bull civ 2010 I no 248) where punitive damages where awarded. Moréteau 
also traces references to punitive damages in the Catala draft (reform on the law of obligations) 
and the Terré’s proposals with regard to reform on the law of delict. See also Moréteau in Koziol 
(ed) Basic questions of tort law 7 fn 14. 
478  A statute may regulate the compensation of damages. See Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) 
Unification of tort law: damages 77.  
479  See Harang-Martin v Bonneau Cass civ 2 8 May 1964, JCP 1965 II 14140; Van Gerven, Lever 
and Larouche Tort 765. 
480  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 766.  
481  Cour d’appel de Paris 26 April 1983, D 1983 Jur 376. See discussion of this case in Van Gerven, 
Lever and Larouche Tort 766-769. 
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evaluating the harm sustained and that the award was fair. It has been suggested that 
the award made may seem disproportionate to the profits made by the magazine and 
perhaps the quantification of the harm could have been established based on the 
circulation of the magazine. This would serve the compensatory and deterrent function 
of the law of delict.482 
 
Damages may be recovered for all types of harm or loss, whether for: personal bodily 
injury (dommage corporel); damage to property; moral injuries (préjudice moral ‒ a 
form of non-patrimonial loss);483 loss of affection; loss of profit; loss of a chance; loss 
emanating from environmental damage; and economic loss (prejudice économique ‒ 
either consequential loss or pure economic loss).484 Damages as a remedy, an 
injunction485 by a civil procedure486 to prevent wrongful conduct (supprimer la situation 
illicéite), and compensation in kind is also possible.487 Compensation in kind may entail 
replacing a damaged item, restoring an item to its original state, retracting a statement 
made, disclosing information that was previously unavailable, re-concluding a legal 
instrument which was defective or correcting incorrect information that was 
misleading.488 Thus “reparation of harm” as opposed to punishing the defendant is the 
main aim in French law.489 There is no de minimis rule in the CC as the full reparation 
principle applies (principe de réparation intégrale). The denial of compensation or an 
injunction (interdict) is however regarded by some as an application of the de minimus 
rule.490 In applying the full reparation principle, the plaintiff must be compensated for 
the full loss, whether patrimonial or non-patrimonial, but no more.491 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
482  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 767. 
483  In respect of, for example, defamation and infringement of privacy. 
484  See Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 257. Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) 
Unification of tort law: damages 78; Borghetti 2012 JETL 158. 
485  Preventative or reparative injunctions are aimed at preventing infringements of rights. See in 
general Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 11-14. 
486  See Articles 808-809 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic 
questions of tort 13. 
487  See Van Dam European tort law 348; Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 260; 
Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 78-79. 
488  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 260. 
489  Van Dam European tort law 352. 
490  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 73. 
491  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 78. See also Van Gerven, Lever 
and Larouche Tort 62. 
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Article 1382 of the CC only makes reference to reparation for the harm done. The 
courts have also not provided a definition for “damage” and French legal writers 
adhere to a wide definition of “damage” as “any interference with a legitimate 
interest”.492 The courts have provided guidelines on the concept of damage and the 
assessment of damage.493 There must be proof of harm and there is generally no 
specific importance attached to the type of harm or interest affected.494 However, most 
of the no-fault liability regimes cover personal injury, damage to property and 
consequential damage flowing from personal injury or damage to property.495 
Infringement of a subjective right is not required but it is sufficient if there was “injury 
to a legitimate interest” and a “legitimate interest” is interpreted widely.496 Identifying 
the different heads of damages is not crucial in French law since any type of damage 
is compensable.497  
 
The only requirements with respect to damage according to the case law is that 
damage must be “legitimate”, that is, damage must be sustained as a result of an 
interference with a “legitimate interest”, it must be certain (not hypothetical), personal 
(to the plaintiff, not collective or public) and direct.498 For example, prohibited activity, 
such as a criminal infraction or loss of income for undeclared activity499 may be 
regarded as an illegitimate interest.500 Generally only loss of legal income is 
compensated. If the interest is illicit then compensation will not be awarded for such 
illicit income.501 The Cour de Cassation502 has held that a passenger travelling illegally 
(in that he did not pay his fare) was entitled to compensation for injuries he sustained. 
Furthermore, if there is no legitimate interest in the success of a claim, Article 30 of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
492  Borghetti in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law volume 2: essential cases on damage 24-
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493  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 803.  
494  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 256-257. 
495  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 257. 
496  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 257. 
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yearbook 195; Van Dam European tort law 355. 
500  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 80. 
501  Cass civ 2 24 January 2002 99-16576, Bull civ 2002 II 5 4. See Brun 2002 European tort law 
yearbook 195-196. 
502  17 November 1994 RTDciv 115 observations Jourdain (discussed by Brun 2002 European tort 
law yearbook 196. 
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the Code de Procedure Civile (Code of Civil Procedure) will apply in barring the 
claim.503 The concept of “certainty” relates to proof of the existence and extent of the 
loss.504 The concept of “directness” relates to causation.505 The reason why the loss 
must be “personal” is to ensure that the plaintiff does not claim for damages suffered 
by another person. A third party who has suffered harm, for example as a result of 
witnessing an accident, a secondary victim, known as a “rebound victim” (un victim 
par ricochet) may be entitled to damages in his own right.506 Damages considered 
damages by ricochet are not necessarily considered as indirect damages. The courts 
distinguish between harm or loss sustained by the plaintiff’s family, where the damage 
is regarded as direct damage, and loss suffered by other persons such as client’s, 
employee’s etcetera where the damage is regarded as indirect damage.507 Although 
the rule that the damage must be personal seems reasonable, Galand-Carval508 points 
out that it precludes private entities or trade unions from suing the defendant on behalf 
of its members or of the community they represent. However, it is now subject to a 
number of statutory exceptions. The French courts have relied on Articles 1146 to 
1155 of the CC which are applied to contractual or non-contractual liability.509 In 
respect of the requirement that the damage needs to be “certain”, a liberal 
interpretation is applied and damages must be “very likely”. This is also applied to the 
“loss of chance”, however, only if the opportunity was genuine (not hypothetical)510 
and only in respect of the percentage of the likelihood that a beneficial event has been 
lost.511  
 
The Cour de Cassation does not determine the quantification of damages as it 
considers it a factual enquiry dealt with by the lower courts (court a quo and courts of 
appeal), the triers of fact who have “pouvoir souverian” – sovereign power. The lower 
courts are at liberty to assess damages and their decisions are not subject to review 
                                                                                                                                                                            
503  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 86. 
504  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 80. 
505  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 80. 
506  See Van Dam European tort law 353. 
507  Spier in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: causation 132. 
508  In Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 80. 
509  Van Dam European tort law 353; Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 
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510  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 257. 
511  See Cass crim 6 June 1990 89-83703, Bull crim 1990 224 573, RTDciv 1991 121 observations 
Jourdain; Van Dam European tort law 353. 
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by the Cour de Cassation.512 However, there is a noticeable lack of transparency and 
inconsistency by the lower courts.513 
 
There is a distinction between patrimonial (dommage patrimonial) and non-patrimonial 
loss (extra-patrimonial or dommage moral).514 Patrimonial loss is generally claimed for 
damage to property or for pure economic loss, while non-patrimonial loss is claimed 
for the “diminution of the victim’s well-being”.515 Patrimonial loss is referred to as loss 
of “assets” (avoirs) while non-patrimonial loss is referred to as loss of “being” (être).516  
 
It is clear that in French law the purpose is to compensate the plaintiff as fully as 
possible so as to place him as far as possible in the position he would have been in 
had the delict not occurred. The idea behind focusing on compensating the plaintiff as 
opposed to penalising the defendant is a reasonable aim with respect to the purpose 
and function of the law of delict. It is reasonable that in assessing damages the 
seriousness of the loss or harm is of paramount importance, and that the amount of 
the award for damages should reflect the amount of the harm or loss. French law is 
very liberal in that any type of harm or loss is compensable. The limitations applied to 
compensating any loss or harm as long as the harm sustained results from an 
interference with a “legitimate interest”, and that the damage must be certain, personal 
and direct are also reasonable. 
 
4.1 Patrimonial loss 
 
Loss of maintenance or support in cases of injury or death of another may be claimed 
by inter alia heterosexual partners, same-sex partners517 or unmarried partners.518 A 
surviving partner has a “legitimate interest” in claiming loss of support, provided there 
                                                                                                                                                                            
512  See Cass civ 2 9 July 1981 80-12142, Bull civ 1981 II 156, Gaz Pal 1982, Jur 109 note Chabas; 
Cass civ 2 20 January 1993, Gaz Pal 1993 2 491 note Evadé; Van Dam European tort law 354; 
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514  Van Dam European tort law 354; Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 
81. 
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516  Van Dam European tort law 363. 
517  A civil partnership may be entered into known as the Pacte civil de solidarité in articles 515-518 
of the CC. See Van Dam European tort law 367. 
518  Van Dam European tort law 369. 
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is “certainty”, which refers to a stable relationship of a continuous nature.519 An 
obligation to provide support on the part of the deceased need not be established and 
it is sufficient if the deceased indeed supported the dependant.520 In a case521 where 
a mother had lost her son in an accident, she claimed possible financial loss of support 
she could have obtained based on the premise that in her old age he would have 
possibly supported her. The Cour de Cassation held that whether the son would have 
financially supported his mother in her old age was uncertain, since he was 
unemployed at the time. Thus the loss of the possibility, the loss of chance to financial 
support was not considered “real or serious”. This requirement is a limiting factor to 
prevent a potential opening of the floodgates to claims of this nature. In a case522 
where a step-father supported a minor, the Cour de Cassation confirmed that the 
minor was entitled to the financial loss the minor would have sustained as a result of 
the step-father’s death, even though the biological father of the child was alive and 
could possibly have been required to provide for the minor. An employer or business 
partner may be held liable for loss caused as a result of the death of the deceased 
employee or business partner.523 Again French law is very pragmatic with regard to 
assessment and freedom in awarding damages. The principle of compensating the 
plaintiff is paramount and this is evident from the liberal way in which damages are 
awarded. 
 
Direct and consequential loss can be claimed. In a case,524 a shop owner had lost 
business for a total of four hundred and thirty-three working days as a result of his 
shop remaining closed for such time due to damage caused by a motor vehicle driven 
into the shop. The insurance company paid out for loss of profits as a result of the 
shop remaining closed for two hundred days from the driver. The owner of the shop 
                                                                                                                                                                            
519  Cass ch mixte 27 February 1970 68-10276, Bull ch mixte 82 183, D 1970 note Combaldieu, 
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sought to recover the loss of profits for the remaining two hundred and thirty-three 
days that it had been closed. The Cour de Cassation confirmed the appeal court’s 
decision in awarding compensation to the shop owner for loss of profit for the 
remaining two hundred and thirty-three days. The Cour de Cassation found that there 
was a direct causal link between the accident and the consequential loss. It is 
submitted that the award by the Cour de Cassation was reasonable in that the plaintiff 
was compensated fully for his actual loss. 
 
Loss that may be recovered include hospital and medical related costs.525 Damages 
may be recovered for the modification of a house or vehicle where for example, a 
person was rendered disabled and such modification is required.526  
 
In respect of damage to property, the cost of reparation of the property or replacement 
cost may be claimed by the owner as well as compensation for the “loss of exploitation” 
of the property. Damages are usually not based on the diminution of value of the 
property but on repair or replacement costs.527 In one particular case,528 where a motor 
vehicle (that was not even six months old and in good condition prior to the accident) 
was damaged, the Cour de Cassation held that the owner of the motor vehicle was 
entitled to the reparation cost as well as the loss of the value of the motor vehicle 
because it had been involved in an accident. If the property was used for professional 
purposes and deemed a profit-earning item, damages may be awarded for loss of 
profit while the property is being repaired or replaced. Loss of enjoyment may be 
claimed if the property was used privately or by the family.529 The cost of hiring is also 
recoverable, provided it is reasonable.530 If the plaintiff keeps the car, he can recover 
the costs of repair, provided it is lower than the cost of replacement. In respect of 
compensation for reparation or replacement costs, the market value is usually not 
awarded as it is considered lower and is contra to the principle of full reparation which 
                                                                                                                                                                            
525  See Article 29 of loi Badinter and Article 376-1 of the Code de la sécurité social; Moréteau in 
Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 20 fn 66-67. 
526  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 84. 
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is to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the motor vehicle been 
replaced.531 If the car is unique and cannot be replaced, then the plaintiff can claim 
the cost of repair, whatever it amounts to.532 Damages may be awarded for loss of use 
or “inconveniences”.533 Once again the awards made are reasonable in upholding the 
full reparation principle in France, where awards are even made for loss of enjoyment, 
loss of use and replacement costs as opposed to the market value of the property. 
The limitation sometimes applied is that the cost must be reasonable, such as in 
respect of the cost of hiring a car. 
 
In a case534 where the defendant had completed some earthworks endangering his 
neighbour’s property; the neighbour subsequently incurred costs (after the defendant’s 
earthworks caused unstable masses of earth), requiring drainage and the construction 
of a wall to prevent risk of a landslide. The Cour de Cassation confirmed that the 
plaintiff was entitled to the costs of the preventative works which were deemed 
reasonable by the appeal court.  
 
In Houillères du Bassin du Centre et du Midi v Chabalier,535 the plaintiff’s house was 
damaged as a result of subterranean works that had been conducted in the 
defendant’s coal mine. The appeal court allowed the plaintiff to commence repairing 
the damage with a contractor of his own choice. The final award of damages was to 
be determined by an independent expert for foreseen and unforeseen work, and in the 
interim the court ordered the defendant to make a payment in advance to the plaintiff 
in order to restore the property as it was before the delict. This decision serves as an 
example of the court ordering “reparation in kind” (reparation en nature) instead of 
monetary compensation (par équivalent) in a broad sense. Monetary compensation 
would have resulted in the defendant paying the cost of repair assessed at the date of 
judgment. The Cour de Cassation upheld the decision and confirmed the appeal 
court’s sovereign power in that regard (not subject to review by the Cour de 
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Cassation). It is submitted that it is reasonable that the courts have the leeway to order 
reperation in kind as well as consisting of a monetary value. The French courts 
certainly make it more convenient and practical for the plaintiff. 
 
There is no distinction in French law between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans 
and no legal meaning is attached to these concepts.536 In a case537 where two 
business partners had initially set up a company and the one partner had extricated 
the other partner, the extricated partner sued the other partner for loss. The Cour de 
Cassation held that the extricated partner was entitled to damages. He had financially 
contributed to the setting up of the business and sustained loss of profit from the 
business. He was entitled to the loss of chance from benefiting from the future 
business, not calculated in terms of expected loss but based on the probability of the 
business being obtained. The court held that there was faute on the part of the 
defendant in the way in which he behaved towards the other partner. Thus the 
distinction between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans is not a formal one. In a 
case538 where a hotel and restaurant were forced to shut down as a result of an 
administrative order (for the risk of debris falling from a cliff above); the owners of the 
hotel and restaurant were entitled to compensation for loss of profits from the owner 
(the custodian) of the land as a result of being closed and not earning profits. The Cour 
de Cassation held that the hotel and restaurant had to close as a result of the “conduct 
of the cliff” and the owner as the custodian was liable in terms of Article 1384(1) of the 
CC. In a case539 where a woman was sent a letter in error by a mail order company 
that she had won a prize of sixty thousand francs, the Cour de Cassation held that the 
letter had “legitimately” convinced the plaintiff that she had won the prize. The mail 
order company was at fault in terms of Article 1382 of the CC, and was held liable to 
pay the plaintiff sixty thousand francs.   
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Future loss may be paid out by a lump sum (capital) or periodically by way of periodical 
payments (rente).540 French lower courts prefer to award lump sums541 and lump sums 
awards are sometimes considered as a penalty.542 A once-and-for-all award generally 
puts an end to the matter and there is no dwelling on the past, but a disadvantage is 
that there may be over-compensation or under-compensation.543  
 
Future loss may be claimed as long as it is deemed a “certain and direct result of a 
current state of affairs and capable of immediate assessment”.544 In assessing 
damages the underlying principle is to compensate the plaintiff in full, there must be 
“equivalence between harm and compensation” to restore the equilibrium or put the 
victim in the position he would have been in had the delict not occurred.545 In reality it 
is sometimes not possible to restore the equilibrium or put the plaintiff in the position 
he would have been in had the delict not occurred, especially with regard to personal 
injury.546 Damages must be assessed as close as possible to the date of trial.547 Thus 
factors such as inflation or change in the severity of harm suffered by the plaintiff are 
taken into account before the date of the decision.548 If there are changes in the 
plaintiff’s condition after the date of judgment, where for example his condition gets 
worse or the plaintiff proves the “occurrence of a new harm”, further compensation 
may be awarded. The res judicata rule549 does not affect the plaintiff claiming 
compensation when his condition deteriorates.550 If the plaintiff’s condition improves, 
then the defendant cannot generally recover any compensation unless the 
compensation was paid out periodically with a “revision clause” where the possibility 
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of the plaintiff’s position improving was foreseen.551 Revision of an award is only 
possible if there is a change in the physical condition of the plaintiff. A change in one’s 
economic circumstances is irrelevant for this purpose, except for index-linked 
periodical payment awards, as it is concerned with the monetary assessment of the 
award where the res judicata rule would apply.552 A lump sum or periodical payments 
may be awarded without the plaintiff requesting which form of payment553 and both 
types of awards may be revised. The only limitation in revising periodical or lump sum 
payments is the res judicata rule.554 There are no detailed rules or guidelines on the 
assessment of future loss and the courts rarely provide reasons or assumptions in 
respect of their calculations. Thus in French law, the debate on whether a 
mathematical calculation should be followed, or a gut-feel approach, has not arisen.555 
 
Future loss of income is recognised as one of the heads of damages that may be 
claimed.556 The calculation of the award is not based on a mathematical assessment, 
but on the adjudicator’s discretion based on the circumstances of the case (leaning 
more towards the gut-feel approach). No reasons or mathematical justifications are 
provided.557 Loss of income is usually based on the plaintiff’s annual income (concrete 
element) and life expectancy (based on statistics). In French law, future loss of income 
is awarded “without any discount for contingencies”.558 Compensation is, as a rule, not 
awarded for “loss of earning capacity”, only for loss of income. If the plaintiff is a child, 
retired person or vagabond, then he will not be entitled to loss of chance to earn an 
income. However, if the plaintiff was temporarily unemployed at the time of the delict, 
he could then recover compensation for the loss of a chance to earn an income.559 A 
housewife who cannot perform housework as she used to before the delict, is entitled 
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to patrimonial loss in respect of employing someone, which is deemed “loss of working 
capacity” and is not synonymous with loss of earning capacity.560 For example, a 
twenty-three-year-old woman without a profession was injured in a motor vehicle 
accident. She claimed damages for loss of “working capacity” and was awarded the 
damages by the appeal court. However, the defendant stated that the claim for loss of 
working capacity was hypothetical, as there was no proof of her pursuing any 
professional activity in the future. The Cour de Cassation confirmed that she was 
entitled to loss of working capacity.561 The Cour de Cassation has held that an injured 
plaintiff is entitled to damages in spite of voluntary generous assistance from family 
members and whether or not expenses were in fact incurred. The reason behind 
providing the injured with compensation is to ensure that he is able to pay for 
professional assistance, as gratuitous assistance may cease at any time.562  
 
In a case563 where a woman was involved in a motor vehicle accident and became 
permanently disabled, her chances of being promoted and obtaining a higher pension 
were affected. She sued the driver of the motor vehicle that caused her injuries for 
loss of a chance to receive a higher pension. The Cour de Cassation held that even 
though it was uncertain whether the promotion would have materialised, the damage 
was direct and certain. The defendant’s faute had eliminated the probability of the 
positive event happening. She was therefore entitled to compensation for the loss of 
chance of being promoted and obtaining a higher pension. 
 
In respect of personal injury or other loss, the plaintiff is not expected to mitigate his 
loss564 and his compensation may not be reduced for failure to mitigate his injury for 
the benefit of the defendant.565 In Pourpour v Reynaud,566 the plaintiff was injured in a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
560  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 82. 
561  Cass civ 2 28 April 1966, Bull civ 1996 II 498. See discussion of this case by Borghetti in Winiger 
(ed) Digest of European tort law volume 2: essential cases on damage 176. 
562  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 886. 
563  Cass crim 4 December 1996 96-81163, Bull crim 1996 445 1301. See discussion of this case 
by Borghetti in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law volume 2: essential cases on damage 
1084-1085. 
564  See Cass civ 1 2 July 2014 13-17599 which dealt with monetary loss. See Séjean and Knetsch 
2014 European tort law yearbook 206-207.  
565  Cass civ 2 19 June 2003 00-22302, Bull civ 2003 II 203 171. See Moréteau 2003 European tort 
law yearbook 171; Van Dam European tort law 379; Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French 
law 261. 
566  Cass crim 3 July 1969, JCP 1970 II 16447. See discussion of this case in Van Gerven, Lever 
and Larouche Tort 809-810. 
   643 
 
motor vehicle accident caused by the defendant and refused to undergo surgery which 
could have improved his condition according to an expert opinion. The Cour de 
Cassation confirmed that the plaintiff did not need to mitigate his loss by undergoing 
surgery. Thus his damages could not be reduced, as the surgery carried a real risk of 
harm.567 Lafay, Moréteau and Pellerin-Rugliano568 point out that this approach is 
applied generally even where surgical operations are not involved and this may not be 
in line with the principle of fairness between the defendant and the plaintiff, in the 
sense that the plaintiff is free to act contrary to the standard of the reasonable person. 
The plaintiff’s refusal to undergo treatment, which may result in increased 
compensation that the defendant must pay to the plaintiff, may be considered 
unreasonable, depending on the circumstances. It is submitted though that in such a 
case, the plaintiff is simply exercising a choice that he is by law entitled to make. Lafay, 
Moréteau and Pellerin-Rugliano569 state that such unreasonable conduct may 
however be deemed a faute, breach of a legal duty or standard. Thus the plaintiff’s 
faute should be considered, where present in the circumstances, otherwise it seems 
unfair to compensate the plaintiff. Another view is that it may result in the plaintiff being 
overcompensated which is also contrary to the full reparation principle and increases 
the costs of social solidarity. The principle of “equivalence between the harm and 
compensation” entails that the plaintiff must not be unduly enriched.570  
 
The principle of “equivalence” prevents recovery of compensation exceeding the real 
value of the damages by combining all benefits received, whether from private 
insurance benefits, social security benefits, or “guarantee or indemnification funds”, 
with the damages payable by the defendant.571 Naturally, this does not mean that the 
defendant pays less as various statutes entitle the insurer, employer and the state to 
subrogation claims against the defendant.572 Benefits which replace a person’s 
income, in terms of an employment contract or social security scheme may be 
                                                                                                                                                                            
567  See also Cass civ 2 19 June 2003 00-22302, Bull civ 2003 II 203 171 (where the Cour de 
Cassation held that the plaintiff need not mitigate his loss by undergoing psychological 
treatment); Van Dam European tort law 379; Lafay, Moréteau and Pellerin-Rugliano 2003 
European Tort law yearbook 171-174. 
568  Lafay, Moréteau and Pellerin-Rugliano 2003 European Tort law yearbook 171-174. 
569  Lafay, Moréteau and Pellerin-Rugliano 2003 European Tort law yearbook 171-174. 
570  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 261. 
571  See Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 261; Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) 
Unification of tort law: damages 78. 
572  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 78. 
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deducted from the award.573 Donations, as well as monies received from private 
accident insurance schemes in respect of loss of income, are non-deductible.574 The 
purpose of disability pensions is considered to render assistance and not compensate 
the plaintiff. Therefore it is not deducted.575   
 
South African, Anglo-American and French law seem to take a similar approach in 
avoiding overcompensating the plaintiff by deducting certain benefits received by the 
plaintiff as a result of the delict or tort.576 
 
4.2 Non-patrimonial loss 
 
In France, compensation for non-patrimonial loss is not readily awarded because the 
idea behind obtaining money out of one’s tears is considered perturbing.577 
Nevertheless it is awarded and recently the Cour de Cassation has even held that it is 
possible for a juristic person to be entitled to non-patrimonial loss.578  
 
Non-patrimonial loss is claimed for the diminution in a person’s well-being, which is 
interpreted widely and includes a claim for: mental and moral harm which includes 
grief and sorrow (prejudice physiologique);579 mental and physical harm (souffrances 
morales ou physiques); infringement of personality rights; injury consequential to the 
infringement of bodily integrity which includes pain and suffering (pretium doloris); pain 
and suffering suffered by persons affected by the injury or death of the primary victim 
(prejudice d’affection)580 or due to the death of a beloved animal;581 “aesthetic 
damage” (prejudice esthétique); loss of amenities or enjoyment (prejudice 
                                                                                                                                                                            
573  See Cass civ 2 9 November 1976 75-11737, Bull civ 1976 II 302 238; Cass civ 2 17 April 1975 
73-14042; Bull civ 1975 II 110 90; Van Dam European tort law 373. 
574  Van Dam European tort law 374. 
575  Van Dam European tort law 374. 
576  See chapter 3 para 6.5; chapter 4 para 5.4; chapter 5 para 5.6; Van Dam European tort law 
373. 
577  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 24-25. 
578  See Cass com 15 May 2012 11-10278, Bull com 2012 IV 101, D2012 2285 note Dondero, JCP 
2012 1224; Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 25. 
579  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 81. 
580  See Van Dam European tort law 352; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 62. 
581  See Cass civ 1 16 January 1962, D 1962 199, JCP 1962 II 12577 note Esmein: € 230 in respect 
of a mare; Caen 30 October 1962, D 1962 92, JCP 1962 II 12954, RTDciv 1963 93 observations 
Tunc: € 135 in respect of a dachshund; Van Dam European tort law 354. 
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d’agrément);582 and “sexual injury” (prejudice sexuel)583 which is separate from loss of 
amenities.584 There is a list, called the “Nomenclature Dintilhac” which is rather long 
and generally refers to the “possible miseries of our human condition”.585 There is a 
difference between dommage and prejudice. Dommage refers to the harm while 
prejudice refers to the consequence of harm. However, even though there is a 
distinction, the two terms are used synonymously by the courts and in the CC.586  
 
Compensation for non-patrimonial loss often encompasses a punitive element. For 
example, in an instance of infringement of privacy, substantial compensation is often 
awarded in order to punish the defendant.587 In the French law of delict, there is no 
specific method or rule in respect of assessing non-patrimonial loss and it is in the 
discretion of the courts. However the French courts have established “judicial tariffs” 
(barèmes d’indemnisation) or rely on publications published periodically by the 
Jurisclasseur (such as the “tableaux de jurisprudence des cours d’appel”), and special 
publications by the Gazette du Palais (Indemnités). Even though these publications 
are commonly referred to in particular with regard to personal injuries, the Cour de 
Cassation has emphasised that they should only be used as guidelines. The rule of 
thumb is to take a prior award and adjust it, taking into account inflation and the 
“personal, individual and concrete situation of the victim”.588  
 
In French law, a plaintiff who is in a coma, completely unconscious or in a vegetative 
state, may be entitled to claim for non-patrimonial loss.589 The Cour de Cassation590 
adopted an objective approach in assessing damage. It is perceived that even though 
a victim is in an unconscious or vegetative state, such person may feel pain and the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
582  Van Dam European tort law 364. See also Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 257; 
Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 121. 
583  Sexual injury as one of the separate heads of damages refers to loss of sexual capacities to 
have children. See CA Lyon 2 February 2006, CT 0030 discussed by Borghetti in Winiger (ed) 
Digest of European tort law volume 2: essential cases on damage 525.  
584  Cass civ 2 6 January 1993 91-15391, Bull civ 1993 II 6 3. See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche 
Tort 121 fn 168. 
585  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 41. 
586  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 37. 
587  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 77. 
588  Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 81. 
589  See Van Dam European tort law 365; Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: 
damages; Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort 40. 
590  Cass crim 5 January 1994 93-83050, Bull Crim 1994 5 8, JCP 1995 IV 862. See Moréteau in 
Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 40 fn 187. 
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victim’s failure to communicate or move is considered a harm. By excluding 
compensation for non-patrimonial loss, it would be the same as saying the person was 
dead which is contrary to human dignity.591 In one particular case,592 the plaintiff was 
involved in a motor vehicle accident, as a result of which he suffered a brain injury and 
was in a prolonged coma. The plaintiff sustained temporary incapacity for almost three 
years, followed by permanent incapacity and considerable aesthetic damage. He was 
unable to enjoy any recreations or leisure activities. The appeal court found it 
reasonable to award the plaintiff compensation for: infringement of his bodily integrity; 
costs relating to medical and hospital expenses; non-patrimonial loss for the plaintiff 
as well as for his mother, father and siblings (considered as secondary victims).593 The 
Cour de Cassation594 held that even a person in a vegetative state is in principle 
entitled to any of the heads of damages and all of the plaintiff’s loss, in full, may be 
claimed. The principal of “reparation intégrale” is applied liberally finding that 
compensation for non-patrimonial loss is not irrecoverable merely because the victim 
cannot feel and because he is in a vegetative state.595  
 
French law does not limit the type of persons entitled to claim non-patrimonial loss for 
grief596 or loss of affection (perte d’affection) stemming from the injury597 or death of a 
loved one. Thus a fiancé,598 registered or unregistered partner, is entitled to claim.599 
Blood relatives or relatives related by marriage are entitled to claim non-patrimonial 
loss (prejudice d’affection). It is presumed (but may be rebutted) that there is an 
“affectionate relationship between the relative and deceased” and the plaintiff must 
                                                                                                                                                                            
591  See Cass crim 5 October 2010 D 2010 353; Cass crim 26 March 2013, JCP 2013 675 referred 
to by Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 40. 
592  CA Paris 10 November 1983. 
593  See also Cass civ 1 29 November 1989 88-10075, Bull civ 1989 I 369 248; Moréteau in Koziol 
(ed) Basic questions of tort law 41 fn 190. Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 118-119 
594  Cass civ 2 22 February 1995 92-18731, Bull civ 1995 II 61 34; Cass civ 2 28 June 1995 93-
18465, Bull civ 1995 II 224 129. See Van Dam European tort law 365; Van Gerven, Lever and 
Larouche Tort 118-120. 
595  Generally, compensation for patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss are transmissible to the heirs 
on the death of the injured (who was in an unconscious or vegetative state) - see Cass ch mixte 
30 April 1976 74-90280, Bull ch mixte 1976 3 2; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 122. 
596  See Cass civ 13 February 1923, DP 1923 1 52 note Lalou. See discussion of this case by 
Borghetti in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law volume 2: essential cases on damage 
523-524. 
597  Cass crim 9 February 1989 87-81359, Bull crim 1989 63 173, D 1989 614 note Bruneau. See 
Van Dam European tort law 371. 
598  Cass crim 5 January 1956, D 1956 216. See Van Dam European tort law 371. 
599  See authority cited by Van Dam European tort law 371 fn 129. 
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prove that he was affected by the deceased’s death.600 The relative’s injury need not 
be exceptionally serious but there must be certainty.601  
 
For example, in a case602 where a race horse was electrocuted and died in a stable, 
the owner and trainer of the race horse were entitled to compensation for non-
patrimonial  loss and loss of affection for the horse. The owner was also entitled to 
patrimonial loss (for loss of the value of the animal as well as financial loss). In a 
case603 where an author was entrusted with photos which he required in order to write 
a book, he sent the photographs back to the owner via the normal postal service and 
they got lost. The owner then sued the author. The appeal court found the author 
negligent and he was ordered to pay compensation for “sentimental and financial 
harm” (prejudice affectif et financier). Although this case dealt with contracts, there is 
no reason why compensation for sentimental harm cannot be claimed in delict.604 
 
Even though there are publications and prior awards which provide objective guidance 
on the award for non-patrimonial loss, the courts take into account inflation and the 
subjective factors relating to the personal circumstances of the plaintiff. This relates to 
the fair and reasonable approach applied in South African and Anglo-American law. 
The principal of “reparation intégrale” is applied very liberally in France (when 
compared to other jurisdictions such as South Africa), in so far as even a person in a 
vegetative state is in principle entitled to non-patrimonial loss. Furthermore, French 
law does not limit the type of persons entitled to claim non-patrimonial loss to only 
family members, which is reasonable as not only a relationship between relatives is 
deemed to be a close relationship and this is arguably more in step with reality. The 
plaintiff need only prove that he was affected by the deceased’s death and that the 
harm is certain. The fact that the harm must be certain and direct applies as limiting 
factors, which are reasonable.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
600  Van Dam European tort law 371. 
601  Cass civ 2 23 May 1977 75-15627, Bull civ 1977 II 139 96, JCP 1977 IV 187. See Van Dam 
European tort law 371; Galand-Carval in Magnus (ed) Unification of tort law: damages 83. 
602  Cass civ 1 16 January 1962, JCP 1962 II 12557 note Esmein, RTDciv 1962 316 observations 
Tunc. See discussion of this case by Borghetti in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law 
volume 2: essential cases on damage 729-730.  
603  CA Lyon 27 January 2005 03/06422. 
604  See discussion of this case by Borghetti in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law volume 2: 
essential cases on damage 730. 
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4.3 Conclusion  
 
Cousy605 points out that with the principle of full reparation, the award focuses on the 
extent of the loss and does not focus on “the gravity of the reprehensible nature of the 
behaviour which caused the damage”. French law definitely follows a pro-victim 
approach and the fact that courts may easily award reparation in kind (which includes 
a retraction of a statement or apology) as well as reparation in terms of monetary 
value, with the right to award periodical or lump sum payments shows that it employs 
a practical, flexible method in terms of reparation. Any kind of loss is compensable 
and a mathematical approach is not always followed. Instead, the courts are at liberty 
to make an award based on the circumstances of the case. Naturally, the full 
reparation principle encourages compensating the plaintiff in full but not more than he 
should be entitled to. This is reasonable and fair. 
 
What is interesting to note in French law, is that if a plaintiff’s condition deteriorates, 
he may still provide proof of further harm after the date of judgment which means that 
the once-and-for-all rule as applied in South African and Anglo-American law is not 
adhered to in France. However, it seems that this rule in France applies to personal 
injury. This may be justified and reasonable, as in other jurisdictions it is a possibility 
that a person’s condition may deteriorate in a manner that was not foreseeable at the 
time of judgment. On the other hand not strictly adhering to the once-and-for-all rule 
may be considered unreasonable from the defendant’s point of view, because he may 
never have certainty that his liability has been satisfied, it also does not promote legal 
certainty and may cause a relative proliferation of litigation. However, with a strong 
victim bias in France, it may still as a whole be considered to be reasonable. To 
conclude, though, the influence of reasonableness on the element of damage in 
French law is mainly implicit. France follows a rather strong pro-victim approach and 
pro-compensation bias.  
 
The influence of reasonableness on liability for one’s own personal conduct in terms 
of Article 1382 and 1383 of the CC is generally implicit. French law does not 
specifically refer to the concept of reasonableness in determing the elements of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
605  2001 European tort law yearbook 32. 
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personal liability for one’s own conduct but it is certainly implied. French law is similar 
to South African law in respect of the elements required for liability and the generalising 
approach followed. In French law, a fait générateur, a generating or triggering act or 
event is required. This is similar to the requirement of conduct in South African law. 
This element is implied and the courts do not theorise about the element or have an 
issue establishing whether the element is present. Because the conduct does not need 
to be voluntary in French law, whether there was a generating act or event is purely a 
factual question. Nevertheless the influence of reasonableness on “fait générateur” is 
implicit as it is in principle reasonable to hold a defendant liable in delict only if a “fait 
générateur” is present with the remaining requirements. A failure to act (omission) 
even in French law may be considered wrongful and unreasonable in the 
circumstances of the case if there was a general duty to act positively in order to 
prevent harm. The concept of faute in French law is wide enough to encompass 
wrongfulness and fault in the form of either negligence or intention. There is a 
difference between these implicit elements. The influence of reasonableness on 
wrongfulness and intention is mostly implicit but more explicit on negligence. 
Wrongfulness lies in the infringement of a right (abuse of a right), breach of a statutory 
rule (which is considered unreasonable) or general duty to act reasonably. Negligence 
is established even if there is a slight deviation from the standard of the “good family 
father”. The deviation relates to unreasonable conduct. French law requires simple 
fault (simple negligence) in certain instances, for example in medical malpractice 
claims and more serious forms of fault such as intention to harm in respect of 
infringements of rights. French law is pragmatic and all that is required is a faute, 
whether it is in the form of wrongfulness, negligence or intention. There are different 
forms of fault, but the French have not found the need to theorise about the forms of 
fault. Thus if there is intention, whether in the form of intention to harm or in its 
attenuated form such as bad faith, then it is implicitly unreasonable and a faute is 
present. Wrongfulness, negligence and intention all relate to unreasonable conduct. 
The influence of reasonableness in determing causation is implicit. The French courts 
make use of different theories and factors but in the end reach a decision based on 
whether it is reasonable, to impute liability on the defendant. In determining damages, 
the aim is to compensate the plaintiff fully for his loss, but no more than is necessary 
which is reasonable. Any damage is compensable as long as it is not for loss of illegal 
income, which is also reasonable. The courts then award damages based on a fair 
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and reasonable approach. In the interest of compensating the plaintiff fully, the plaintiff 
is even entitled to damages after the date of judgment, provided the damages are 
personal, certain and direct. Thus the influence of reasonableness on the element of 
damage is mainly implicit. 
 
5. Strict liability 
 
French law is rather unique in that fault liability is seen as the exception. For example, 
there is specific legislation regulating inter alia: loss or injury due to an accident at 
work;606 loss caused by dangerous installations;607 loss or injury resulting from road 
accidents;608 loss or injury resulting from defects in construction of buildings;609 and 
loss or injury sustained by receiving contaminated blood.610 For the purposes of this 
study, only strict liability relating to the so-called “act of a thing” and the act of another 
for whom one is responsible will be discussed.   
 
5.1 Strict liability for the act of a thing in one’s custody in terms of Article 1384(1) of 
the CC 
 
A thing can be an animate or inanimate object, moveable or immovable, but not a live 
person’s body or snow.611 Liability for the “act of a thing” can ensue if there was: 
physical contact between the plaintiff or his property and a moveable thing (such as a 
falling rock); physical contact between the plaintiff or his property and a non-moveable 
thing (the thing is usually defective or not in a state that is normally expected);612 and 
even if there was no physical contact between the plaintiff or his property and the thing. 
In this latter instance, the plaintiff must still prove that the thing caused harm, for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
606  Act of 9 April 1898. 
607  Act of 10 December 1917. 
608  Loi Badinter. 
609  Law no 78-12 of 4 January 1978 (as amended). See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 
552. 
610  Law no 93-5 of January 1993 (as amended).  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 553. 
611  Van Dam European tort law 62. 
612  For example, see Cass civ 2 15 March 1978 77-10342, Bull civ 1978 II 85 67, D 1978 IR 406 
where the Cour de Cassation held that if a person slips on stairs in a ski resort where it is 
normal to find snow on the steps, there is no “act of a thing” and therefore the custodian of the 
stairs is not liable. See Van Dam European tort law 63. 
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example, where the plaintiff swerves his vehicle in order to avoid colliding with another 
stationary vehicle.613 
 
The custodian of the thing (gardien de la chose) is therefore the person who is liable 
for the act of the thing which caused harm to the plaintiff. Even though the owner of 
the thing is presumed to be the custodian of the thing, this presumption may be 
rebutted by providing proof that at the time when the harm was caused, another person 
had obtained “‘effective and independent power of use, direction and control’ over the 
thing”.614 In Connot v Franck,615 a thief who was unidentified had stolen a motor vehicle 
and thereafter caused an accident, in which a person died. The plaintiff, the wife of the 
deceased, sued the owner of the motor vehicle and the owner submitted that he was 
not the custodian of the motor vehicle at the time of the delict. The Cour de Cassation 
confirmed that at the time he was not in possession of the thing and could not use, 
direct, or control it. Therefore he was not liable under Article 1384(1). A defence that 
may be applied is transfer of custodianship where the defendant must prove that at 
the time the thing caused damage, he was not the custodian of the thing.616 However, 
such transfer of custodianship “often implies a duty on the defendant to inform the 
recipient of custodianship of the risks of handling the thing and involves the ability of 
the new custodian to prevent damage”.617 It is submitted that whether a person is the 
custodian of a thing at the time of the delict is a factual question. The rule that one 
must be the custodian of the thing at the time of the delict is a reasonable rule. It would 
be unreasonable if, for example, an owner is liable for damages caused by his motor 
vehicle in an accident, where such motor vehicle was under the “effective and 
independent power of use, direction and control” by another person.  
 
The custodian of the thing may escape liability, or liability may be limited, by proving 
an external or extraneous cause, (cause étrangère) which must have been “an 
                                                                                                                                                                            
613  Van Dam European tort law 63. 
614  See Cass Ch réun 2 December 1941 (Franck v Connot), DC 1942 25, S1941 I 217, JCP 1942 
II 1766. See Van Dam European tort law 64; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 565; Viney 
in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 250. 
615  Cass Ch réun 2 December 1941 DC 1942 25, S 1941 I 217, JCP 1942 II 1766. See Van Gerven, 
Lever and Larouche Tort 565. 
616  See Cass civ 2 22 January 1970 68-12064, Bull civ 1970 II 24 17, D 1970 228, RTD civ 1971 
150 observations Durry; Van Dam European tort law 66. 
617  See Cass civ 1 9 June 1993 91-10608 91-11216, Bull civ 1993 I 213 148, JCP 1994 II 
22202;Van Dam European tort law 66. 
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unforeseeable and unavoidable external cause of the damage”.618 This may be due to 
an act of nature (force majeure); act of a third party; the act of the plaintiff, where 
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff (faute de la victime) may be raised; 
an “accidental event (les cas fortuit); or by an act of the state (le fait du prince)”.619  
 
A minor620 or mentally incapacitated person can be a custodian of a thing, even if it is 
for a moment.621 Article 1384(1) does not apply to damage caused by public things.622 
There is a distinction between the structure and composition of a thing (garde de la 
structure), and the act of a thing (garde du comportement) in that transporters or 
holders of things can be held liable for the act of things while the owner is the custodian 
of the structure and composition of the thing. Furthermore the manufacturer of a thing 
is also the custodian of the composition and structure of the thing. In this way, if the 
thing is defective, the manufacture may be held liable.623 In France there is specific 
legislation regulating product liability.624 It is possible that a number of persons may 
be custodians of a thing at the same time. This is referred to as common custodianship 
and each co-custodian can be held liable in full for damage caused by the thing.625  
 
Saleilles and Josserand626 proposed the application of the “risk theory” in the French 
law of delict. According to this theory, a person who acquires an advantage from an 
activity that involves risk should bear the loss caused by such risk. Van Dam627 opines 
that the “risk theory” and “la théorie de la garantie” whereby an insured person should 
bear the risk and loss emanating from an accident, had a hand in creating strict liability 
                                                                                                                                                                            
618  Van Dam European tort law 61. See Ass plén 14 April 2006 04-18902, Bull Ass plén 2006 6 
12, D 2006 1577. 
619  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 250. See also Van Dam European tort law 60-
61, 465; Galand-Carval in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: liability for damage caused by others 
87. 
620  See Ass plén 9 May 1984 80-93481, Bull crim 1984 164, JCP 1984 II 20255 note Dejean de la 
Bathie, D 1984 525 note Chabas, RTDciv 1984 509 observations Huet; Van Dam European 
tort law 64. 
621  Van Dam European tort law 64. 
622  Van Dam European tort law 64. 
623  Van Dam European tort law 64-65. 
624  Act 98-389 of 19 May 1998. See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 553. For purposes of 
this study, this legislation will not be discussed further. 
625  See Cass civ 2 7 November 1988 87-11008 87-17552, Bull civ 1988 II 214 116; Van Dam 
European tort law 65. 
626  Referred to in Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 554. 
627  European tort law 61. 
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rules.628 These strict liability rules reflect solidarity which is linked to fraternity.629 
Viney630 explains that Article 1384(1) to which the founders of the CC had not intended 
to provide any specific meaning, was used as a basis to introduce liability for the acts 
of things under one’s custody. Thus all that is required in addition to the act of the 
thing, is a causal link between the thing and the harm. Faute is not required.631 In 
1896, the Cour de Cassation632 applied this form of strict liability in the well-known 
decision of Teffaine. In this case, damage was caused by an explosion as a result of 
a defective engine of a tugboat and liability was extended for the act of a thing. 
Stemming from Teffaine, the Cour de Cassation liberally applied Article 1384(1) to 
include holding a defendant liable for damage caused by acts of the person he was 
responsible for, or things (moveable or immoveable) he was responsible for.633 The 
Article was applied whether or not the thing was dangerous, had a latent defect, or 
was controlled by a human being.634 In Jand’heur II,635 where a child was hit by a lorry, 
rebuttable faute for damage caused by the act of a thing became strict liability for the 
act of a thing.636 This case paved the way for the courts to use this provision for general 
liability as a result of damage caused by a thing. Where a thing causes harm while in 
motion or explodes, an active role of the thing is presumed as well as a causal link. 
The plaintiff need not provide evidence pertaining to the casual link.637 For example, 
the court first applied Article 1384(1) where damage was caused by a lift,638 a falling 
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European tort law 464. See also Cass civ 2 29 May 1996 94-18129, Bull Civ 1996 II 117 72, D 
1996 IR 156. See Van Dam European tort law 464 fn 14 
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tree,639 landslide,640 burst dyke641 and an escalator.642 However, if the thing was 
stationary or if there was no contact between the thing and another person or his 
property, then the plaintiff must provide proof of the active role of the thing ‒ that is, 
proof that the thing caused the harm.643 This is usually proved by showing that the 
thing was defective, “behaved abnormally” or “put in the wrong place”. 644 
 
It is common to refer to the thing as manifesting abnormal behaviour; that it was 
“subject to some internal defect”;645 or “that it was not maintained properly”.646 
However, Moréteau647 points out that the Cour de Cassation has been departing from 
this approach, finding the active role in stationary things just from contact between the 
victim and the thing. He states that this approach is a step back towards the orthodox 
approach requiring contact. Moréteau648 refers to two examples from case law: one 
where a woman was injured after walking into a transparent glass door;649 and another 
where a young man was injured while intending to spring into a pond by using a 
springboard but slipped and fell in the shallow water.650 The Cour de Cassation held 
the owner of the apartment where the glass door was situated liable, based on the 
premise that the glass door was fragile and therefore it was abnormal, causing 
damage. However, the Cour de Cassation held that the presence of the springboard 
at the nautical club was not abnormal and the young man was aware and knew the 
terrain yet knowingly misused the spring board. The springboard, if used normally, is 
not dangerous. Moréteau questions why the outcome with the woman walking into the 
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646  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 70. 
647  2005 European tort law yearbook 278-280. 
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649  Cass civ 2 24 February 2005 03-13536, Bull civ 2005 II 5. 
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glass door is any different from the springboard case. He questions whether there was 
anything abnormal about the transparent glass door. 
 
Examples from case law may be referred to in order to illustrate how the courts 
interpret whether the thing “behaved abnormally” (comportement anormal de la 
chose). In one instance the plaintiff fell through the door of a lift shaft. The court held 
that the damage was caused by “the fact of the thing”.651 In another case, the plaintiff 
suffered a fit in a changing room of a swimming pool. She fell and her arm rested on 
a heating pipe, causing injury. The Cour de Cassation held that the swimming pool did 
not commit a faute and the plaintiff was also unable to claim based on Article 1384(1). 
The Cour de Cassation found that the heating was installed in the usual manner.652 In 
a case, the custodian of stairs that were slippery from snow at a ski resort was found 
not liable as there was no act of a thing.653 In a case where a child fell from an 
escalator, the Cour de Cassation held that the custodian of the escalator in a hotel 
was liable for the damage.654  
 
In “Liebrand 2”655 a shopper walked into a glass panel in a shopping mall. The Cour 
de Cassation confirmed that that the shopping mall and its insurer were liable to the 
shopper but the damages were reduced by one-third due to the shopper’s own fault of 
failing to pay adequate attention. The glass was the direct cause of the shopper’s 
injury. The Cour de Cassation656 has denied the applicability of the defence volenti 
non fit iniuria with regard to Article 1384(1) of CC. In a case657 where a plaintiff tripped 
in a church which was not well lit. The court held that due to the particular character 
of the church, the fact that it was semi-lit was justifiable and not abnormal. People 
visiting the church should be more careful. Thus the church was not held liable. 
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If an unauthorised person disregards a notice or warning not to enter a premises and 
trespasses, his conduct could be regarded as one hundred percent contributorily 
negligent.658 The notice or warning to enter must be clear and visible so that the 
reasonable visitor will not make a mistake.659 If any damage occurs on roads in France, 
a distinction is made between public and private roads. Most roads are public roads 
and in such instances, claims are dealt with by the administrative courts. The 
administrative courts have developed a liability regime relating to public authorities 
based on fault liability or strict liability (which will be discussed further below).660  
 
In respect of a private road, Article 1384(1) may be used to claim damages.661 The 
public authority must warn road users of dangerous areas or circumstances, such as 
a bend in a road or where there is construction work.662 However, the public authority 
need not warn users of for example, heavy rains or oil on the road, unless an accident 
occurs and the authority is aware of the circumstances. In such instances it is expected 
of the public authority to as soon as reasonably possible, take measures to avoid 
further damage.663 For example, the Counseil d’État664 did not find the public authority 
liable for damage where a manhole cover came loose and an accident was caused by 
it during that same night. The public authority was, however, held liable when the 
plaintiff fell on icy steps of a pedestrian pass at 10h15. The Counseil d’État665 held that 
by that hour the public authority should have attended to clearing the steps, as by that 
time pedestrians would be using the pedestrian pass. If a road sign falls on the road, 
the public authority may be held strictly liable for the damage caused by the road sign 
(the thing).666 The average road user is considered as a reasonable road user.667 
 
In respect of strict liability rules, the burden of proof lies with the defendant, whereas 
in terms of fault liability, the burden of proof generally lies with the plaintiff.668  
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5.1.1 Conclusion 
 
The influence of reasonableness on liability for the act of a thing is predominantly 
implicit. Firstly the thing must be in a state or behave in a manner that is normally 
expected. A thing that is defective is considered abnormal and not in a state normally 
expected or not working as normally expected. Liability will also follow for the act of a 
thing if it is not put in a place normally expected. Thus it is reasonable to limit liability 
only to what would normally have been expected. Liability for the act of thing may be 
excluded if there was an cause étrangère that is if damage to the thing was 
unforeseeable and unavoidable as a result of an act of nature (force majeure), act of 
a third party, act of the plaintiff, an accidental event, or an act of the state. Again, it is 
reasonable to exclude liability where there is a cause étrangère. Liability for the act of 
a thing may be limited due to the contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff as in 
Liebrand 2669 where liability was reduced due to the shopper’s own negligence. Thus 
the unreasonable conduct of the shopper led to the reduction of her claim for 
compensation. For example in the case of the church670  which was not adequately lit, 
liability of the church did not follow because of the plaintiff’s contributory fault. If a 
person disregards a notice of warning, such notice of warning (the thing) must be 
visible and clear to the reasonable visitor and if so the reasonable visitor would heed 
the warning. Should a person disregard the warning then he acts unreasonably and 
liability is excluded as a result of his contributory fault.671 Thus if there is a faute on the 
part of the plaintiff, then liability may be reduced or excluded as a result of the plaintiff’s 
unreasonable conduct. 
 
5.2 Strict liability for acts of a person for whom one is responsible in terms of Article 
1384(1) of the CC 
 
The French concept of liability for the act of another is somewhat similar to vicarious 
liability in other jurisdictions, but in French law fault on the part of the person who 
committed the delict is not a requirement. Common to both concepts is the 
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differentiation between personal liability and liability for the act of another.672 Article 
1384 of the CC provides for inter alia strict liability of parents for the acts of their 
children who are still living with them; a teacher or artisan for the acts of their students 
or apprentices under their supervision; and employers for the act of their employees.673 
However, legislation enacted and applicable from 5 April 1997 states that a teacher is 
no longer held liable for the acts of the student, unless personal fault on the part of the 
teacher is proven.674 In this paragraph, the liability of the employer for the acts of its 
employee will not be discussed.  
 
For a long period of time it was understood that Article 1384 related to a confined list 
of instances of strict liability. The liability of the parents and artisans was based on a 
“rebuttable presumption of fault” while the liability of the employer for the act of his 
employee was vicarious and strict.675 However, stemming from Teffaine676 and 
thereafter the landmark decision referred to as “Blieck”,677 the Cour de Cassation held 
that the general provision in Article 1384(1) permitted it to develop further heads of 
delictual liability. In Blieck, a mentally impaired boy was placed in an institution 
(Employment Help Centre). He was entrusted to do some unsupervised work outside 
the centre during the day. One day while working outside the centre, he set fire to the 
plaintiff’s wood. The damages could not be recovered from the boy. The plaintiff 
claimed from the institution and the Cour de Cassation held that the institution could 
be held strictly liable in terms of Article 1384(1), as the institution had control and 
supervision of a permanent nature over the boy. Since this decision, a number of 
institutions were held liable for acts of persons over which they had permanent or 
temporary control.678 The justification for the liability of the public institution is based 
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on the premise that the public institution takes a “special risk” in running such institution 
and providing such service (according to the risk theory).679 Thus Article 1384(1) 
allows a plaintiff to claim compensation from the person who cares for, supervises, or 
has control over the person who caused the damage.680 Article 1384(1) may be 
applied where one is supervising an adult of unsound mind. Liability may be found if 
the harmful conduct was committed when the defendant had the power to “organize, 
direct and control the wrongdoer’s way of life”.681 In a case,682 an adult who was 
mentally impaired and living with his father, attended a specialised institution during 
the day. On one particular day, he set fire to a building while on his way home from 
the institution. The plaintiff sued the institution as well as the father, who was his 
administrateur legal (legal guardian). The Cour de Cassation held that the claim 
against the institution failed because, at the time of the delict, he was not under the 
supervision of the institution. The claim against the father also failed because the child 
was not a minor. The Cour de Cassation has also applied Article 1384(1) in holding 
amateur sports clubs liable for delicts committed by their players during the course of 
a game, based on the premise that sports clubs “organize, direct and control activities 
of their members”.683 Even though liability based on Article 1384(1) has been 
developed and extended, the Cour de Cassation has not extended liability under 
Article 1384(1) to: school teachers as they are covered by Article 1384(6); extended 
family members such as grandparents and aunts;684 or the legal guardian of a mentally 
impaired adult, as mentioned above. The Cour de Cassation is hesitant to hold natural 
persons liable under Article 1384(1).685 
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In terms of Article 1384(4), the parents of a minor (under eighteen years of age) may 
be held liable jointly and severally686 for damage caused by their minor child if at the 
time they exercised “parental authority” over such child, that is, if the child still usually 
lives with them.687 Thus if a child commits a delict while in another person’s care, the 
parents will not escape liability. All that needs to be established is that the child is liable 
to the plaintiff. Fault on the part of the child is not a requirement.688 The parents may 
still be held liable if the child causes harm to another while at school or on a school 
outing.689 It is not necessary to establish that the child directly caused the harm or 
loss.690 Liability is strict, in that the parents cannot raise a defence that “they did not 
contribute to the child’s harmful act by a lack of supervision or a defective 
education”.691 Previously parents were generally not held liable for conduct of older 
children if they could establish that there was no faute on their part; that is, if they could 
prove that there was no failure on their part in supervising the child, or no failure on 
their part in respect of the manner in which the child was brought up.692 In most 
instances, the parents were personally at fault but their liability still fell under 
“responsabilité du fait d’autrui” (liability for the act of another).693 But since 1977, 
stemming from Bertrand v Domingues,694 lack of supervision as a requirement was 
discarded.695 In this case a twelve-year-old boy caused an accident while riding his 
bicycle, the Cour de Cassation held the boy’s parents strictly liable and lack of 
supervision as a requirement was discarded. Fault-based liability was changed to so-
called objective liability.696 Furthermore, stemming from this decision, the only 
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defences a parent can rely on is contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, or 
if there was some external cause to the damage.697 Article 1384(4) only applies to the 
parents, not for example to grandparents and there is still uncertainty as to whether it 
applies to guardians.698 In one case,699 the parents of a ten-year-old child left him in 
the care of his grandparents and the child set a canister of petrol alight in a shed. The 
child sustained burns and the parents sued the grandparents for negligent lack of 
supervision. The Cour de Cassation in terms of Article 1382 of the CC (dealing with 
personal liability as opposed to strict liability of the parents) dismissed the parents’ 
claim, holding that the child had been staying with his grandparents for over three 
weeks and was not particularly reckless or undisciplined  and therefore did not require 
special supervision from the grandparents. 
  
The strict liability rule holding the parents liable may apply in instances: where the child 
committed a faute where even an unlawful or wrongful act is sufficient, an “acte 
objectivement illicite” (the child need not be aware of the unlawfulness of his 
conduct);700 if the damage occurred as a result of a “thing” and the child was the 
custodian of the thing;701 and where the child directly caused the damage suffered by 
the plaintiff.702 For example, in one case,703 a child injured another child during a rugby 
game. The child’s parents were held liable for the direct causing of injury, even though 
the child had not committed a faute. Article 1384(7) of the CC, however, states that 
the parents may not be held liable if they could not have prevented the harmful act. 
This relates to, for example, instances such as force majeure704 or where there is 
contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff.705 In Lacouture v Société Pyrotechnique 
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Industrielle et agricole,706 a nine-year-old child picked up a discarded firework on the 
beach which exploded. The parents of the child sued the person looking after the child, 
the “caretaker”. The caretaker then submitted that there was faute on the part of the 
child, but the Cour de Cassation confirmed that there was faute on the part of the 
caretaker and not the child. The Cour de Cassation held that the child had not been 
warned by the caretaker that the firework he picked up was dangerous and that the 
child could not have been aware that it could explode as the fuses for the firework 
were already used.  
 
 
5.2.1 Conclusion 
 
Although the strict liability rule that applies to parents may seem harsh, it is tempered 
by the fact that almost all French families are protected by liability insurance cover at 
a minimal cost.707 Furthermore most social institutions are insured against civil 
liability.708 It may be argued though that this rule is not really tempered as the parents 
or institutions have to pay for the insurance but it may be understood and regarded as 
reasonable where it is apparent that France follows a pro-victim approach ensuring 
that the plaintiff receives compensation. 
 
The justification for the liability of the acts of the person for whom one is responsible 
is based on the risk theory. For example, institutions such as medical and rehabilitation 
institutions, social services, educational institutions and sports clubs take a “special 
risk” in running such institutions and providing such services. Sports clubs organise, 
control and direct their member’s activities. Parents who have children living with them 
have the power and control over their children while raising them. Parents and most 
institutions therefore have insurance for such potential liability. The responsible parties 
may, however, not be held liable if there was an extraneous or external cause to the 
harm sustained. Thus it would not be reasonable to impute liability on the person who 
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is responsible for the one who committed a delict if there was an external cause to the 
harm. Liability may also be limited or excluded due to contributory fault on the part of 
plaintiff. Thus the unreasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff can either limit or 
exclude liability. The influence of reasonableness on strict liability for acts of a person 
for whom one is responsible in terms of Article 1384(1) of the CC is implicit especially 
since the word “reasonable” is hardly encountered in French law. 
 
6. Liability of public entities 
 
In respect of liability of public entities, both the law of delict and administrative law 
(droit administrative) may be applicable.709 Under French administrative law, there are 
two liability regimes applicable to public entities. The one is fault-based in instances 
where an administrative action is deemed unlawful (and is governed by Articles 1382 
to 1386 of the CC) and the other is based on a no-fault liability system.710 
 
With regard to delictual liability of state entities, it will be shown that the influence of 
reasonableness on the requirements is predominately implicit. There must be: a 
liability-generating act or omission (un fait dommageable); loss or harm suffered by 
the alleged victim which must be “certain”; an infringement of a “legitimate interest”; 
and a sufficient causal link between the conduct and the loss or harm.711 A faute is 
usually required, but not in all instances.712 Loss or injury will usually be deemed 
“certain” if “it is reasonably certain that a loss will occur”.713 The loss or harm must also 
be “abnormal” which applies as a limitation. If the loss or harm is shared by a 
substantial portion of society, then the loss or harm will not be considered “abnormal”. 
The plaintiff must be identified.714 In respect of the requirement that the loss or harm 
suffered must be deemed “abnormal” “it must exceed the normal disadvantages to 
which one can reasonably expect to be exposed in society”.715 The consequence must 
be a normal foreseeable and expected consequence of administrative actions.716 This 
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requirement would be fulfilled if a faute was present, as loss or harm accompanied by 
a faute is deemed “abnormal”. Damages may also be claimed for the “loss of chance”. 
In respect of an interest, if an interest is deemed “deeply unworthy under contemporary 
notions of law and morals”, then damages may not be recovered.717 Loss or harm must 
be “reasonably quantifiable” as a monetary value.718 The full reparation principle is 
followed and monetary compensation is awarded (not reparation in kind).719 Both 
patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss may be claimed and assessed at the date of 
judgment.720 The adequate causation theory is applied, which provides that an act or 
omission is the cause of the harm or loss only if it would have in the ordinary course 
of events produced the normally expected consequences. In terms of this theory, the 
fact that an act or omission is the but-for cause of the harm is not regarded as sufficient 
to “justify the imposition of liability”. Thus administrative law does not apply the “theory 
of equivalent causal conditions”.721 If, however, the injury is due wholly or in part to an 
extraneous cause (force majeure, voluntary assumption of risk, conduct of a third 
party, contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff or an unknown cause), liability on the 
part of the state may be limited or excluded.722 However, an unknown cause or faute 
of a third party will not lead to the exclusion of liability. The “liability-generating act” 
(fait dommageable) by the state must generally be accompanied by a faute; however 
there are exceptions where a faute is not required.723 A faute may take the form of a 
physical or legal act.724 For example, injuries to the plaintiff may occur as a result of 
medical treatment at state hospitals or injuries to users of “public works”.725 Generally 
simple fault is adequate, but at times “serious fault” is required where the public service 
rendered is “difficult and/or delicate”.726 In terms of state hospitals, liability is regulated 
by the Public Health Code Article 1142-1. Simple fault relating to medical conduct is 
required, with a general prescription period of ten years for claims. The aim of the 
Public Health Code is to compensate plaintiffs based on the notion of national 
solidarity. The method and procedure relating to compensation are prescribed in the 
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code.727 Serious fault is required, for example, for liability of the postal service and the 
civil and criminal justice systems.728 The courts have recognised a concurrence of 
faute where there is faute on the part of an official and the state simultaneously. For 
example, where there is inadequate supervision of the official by the supervisor.729  
 
In certain instances fault is not required and the theory of “liability for risk” or “liability 
for breach of equality in the shouldering of public burdens” may be applicable.730 In 
respect of the “liability for risk” theory, objects (such as explosives and ammunition) or 
“methods” (such as administration of mental health institutions, performance in state 
hospitals or juvenile delinquency institutions) employed by public entities are deemed 
dangerous and the state should bear the risk of harm caused.731 Even persons who 
assist in the administration of a public service (such as persons who assist in 
extinguishing a fire, apprehending a criminal or providing first aid) may claim 
compensation from the state where fault is not required. However, the assistance 
rendered must be necessary and justified in the circumstances.732     
  
The no-fault liability system is based on the principle of “equality before public 
burdens”.733 Thus public entities may be held liable for negligent conduct or strictly 
liable for lawful acts.734 In France “complete immunity of a public official from liability 
is unconstitutional”.735 However, the liability of public entities is regulated mainly by 
administrative law and the administrative courts.736 The administrative courts play a 
significant role in protecting fundamental rights of citizens when such rights are 
violated by public entities which is also based on the principle of “equality”.737  
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A look at a few examples from case law illustrates how public entities may be held 
liable. In Ville de Paris v Driancourt,738 (dealing with liability based on fault) the owner 
of gaming machines was ordered by a police order to stop the operating of the 
machines on his premises. The order was found to be ultra vires due to an error and 
unlawful by the Paris Administrative Court. The City of Paris was ordered to pay the 
owner of the gaming machines for his direct and certain loss as a result of enforcing 
the unlawful order. The gaming owner was entitled to compensation for: loss of profit 
which he would have made had he not been forced to stop operating the gaming 
machines; loss from reselling the machines; and loss for disrupting the owner’s life 
(troubles dans les conditions d’existence). The City of Paris appealed against the 
judgment but the Conseil d’État upheld the Paris Administrative Court’s decision. It is 
submitted that it was reasonable to impute liability on the public entity for the plaintiff’s 
loss as the state’s conduct in forcing the plaintiff to stop operating his gaming machines 
was unreasonable, a faute, including wrongfulness and fault, was present. 
Furthermore, it was reasonable to compensate the plaintiff as it was in fact the (certain) 
actual losses he sustained. In Legoff,739 (dealing with liability based on fault) a student 
had failed examinations for a business management degree at a university. The 
decision to fail the student was found to be incorrect as they had not taken his previous 
marks into account. As a result of the delay in the review process, the student 
graduated in 1982 instead of in 1978. He claimed for the chance he lost of earning an 
income due to his obtaining the business management degree later instead of earlier. 
The Conseil d’État granted him one hundred thousand francs as compensation for the 
loss of chance. It is submitted that, in the circumstances, it was reasonable, to impute 
liability on the University as their conduct was unreasonable, it constituted a faute and 
the plaintiff indeed sustained the loss of chance of graduating and earning income 
earlier. He lost a reasonable chance of earning an income earlier due to the error of 
the university. 
 
Whether the harm or loss was caused as a result of an omission or commission by the 
public entity, is not of significant importance in French law. The Conseil d’État readily 
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awards damages where there is an omission or failure on the part of a public entity 
that has not properly exercised its authority or function. For example, in Société 
Linie,740 ship owners were entitled to claim compensation for loss sustained as a result 
of the port authorities failing to stop blockaders. In Giraud,741 franc symbolique 
damages were awarded to a father whose child was not taught a main subject. The 
Communauté de Lille was held liable for failing to rescue a child timeously from a 
burning house.742 In Kechichian,743 (ten percent) compensation was awarded to clients 
who had deposited funds and sustained loss because the state failed to supervise the 
bank employees’ conduct effectively. The bank became insolvent due to fraudulent 
conduct by the managers of the Bank. The French postal service was held liable when 
a letter allowing the recipient to sit for an examination, did not reach the intended 
recipient in time.744 
 
In the asbestos-injury related decisions,745 compensation was awarded to employees 
exposed to the asbestos dust, based on the omission of the public entities to “evaluate 
the risk of asbestos” and take suitable action. The conduct of the relevant public 
entities constituted a faute. Rebhahn746 points out that in instances like the English 
decisions of Stovin v Wise747 and Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire,748 
compensation in France would be awarded only where serious fault is present, but in 
cases similar to the English decision of X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council,749 
compensation would be awarded where simple fault is present.  
 
French administrative law is mainly based on case law and there is not much 
legislation regulating public entities.750 The Counseil d’Etat (the “Supreme Court” for 
administrative matters in France) is guided and bound by decisions of the Counseil 
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Constitutionnel.751 The Counseil d’Etat also considers decisions of the Cour de 
Cassation and, in bringing about legal certainty, often aligns its decisions with those 
of the Cour de Cassation.752 Therefore, it is common for the Counseil d’Etat to impose 
private tort law principles in administrative law. For example, Van Dam753 refers to the 
possibility of a plaintiff claiming compensation for “injury to feelings”,754 the 
“assignment of a victim’s action in tort to his inheritor’s”,755 “and the possibility for a 
person to sue in respect of the death of her unmarried partner”.756 However, the 
Counseil d’Etat imposes private tort law principles on an “ad hoc” or “discretionary” 
basis.757 Liabilty of public entities may be fault-based stemming from the application 
of the principle of “equality” applied where there is a breach of a statutory rule and 
entitles a plaintiff to compensation.758 In respect of liability based on fault (usually faute 
de service, failure to perform a duty associated with wrongfulness) that applies even 
to objectively unforeseeable and unavoidable harm,759 the administrative system is 
similar to the system of civil liability in terms of Article 1382 of the CC. Harm and 
causation are still required.760 A distinction is made between a “personal faute” and 
“public service-related faute”. A personal faute “can be attributed personally to the 
administrator”, whereas a public service-related faute is “a faute linked with public 
service”. Generally a claim relating to a “personal faute”761 must be lodged with the 
civil court, while a claim relating to a “public service-related faute” must be lodged with 
an administrative court.762 A plaintiff need not refer to the identity of a specific public 
official and it is sufficient to prove that the public service was not operating properly. 
For example, it is sufficient to prove that there was a lack of staff at the public 
hospital.763 However, it is possible that a public official’s conduct could simultaneously 
be considered a personal faute as well as a public service-related faute.764 For 
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example, a petrol tank driver made a detour to his home village where he crashed into 
the wall of a house. It was held that the driver committed a personal faute as well as 
public service-related faute (thus the state was held liable).765 With regard to a public 
service-related faute, all that is required is some connection with the public service.766 
However, in a case767 where an off-duty customs officer killed a person with a revolver, 
it was regarded as a personal faute and the state was not held liable. Where a personal 
faute is committed by a policeman while on duty, the state will be held liable.768 Where 
a policeman is off-duty and commits a personal faute, the link with the service may still 
be established leading to liability, depending on the circumstances of the case. The 
Conseil d’Etat769 found the state liable for the death of a policeman where a fellow off-
duty policeman was showing him his service weapon and accidentally shot him. A 
sufficient link with the service was established. It is submitted that this relates to 
causation where once again borrowing from South African law, the question asked is 
whether there is a close enough relationship between the policeman’s conduct and 
the death of the fellow policeman. If the relationship is close enough, that is if a link 
with the service is established, then it is reasonable fair, and just to impute liability on 
the state for the harm or loss suffered as a result of the death of the policeman.  
 
In another case,770 the plaintiff (a visitor of the post office) left via the staff entrance 
instead of the main public entrance because the post office was closed earlier than 
usual. Two post office employees did not enquire from the plaintiff why he was exiting 
via the staff entrance and instead assaulted him and broke his leg. The Conseil d’Etat 
held that the closing of the post office earlier than usual was a public service-related 
faute and the post office employee’s conduct was unnecessary and regarded as a 
personal faute. Thus the plaintiff was able to recover compensation for all his damages 
from the state. The liability of a public entity (in respect of fault liability) must generally 
stem from an “abnormal generating fact” (fait générateur anormal).771 In a number of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
765  CÉ 19 November 1949 (Mimeur, Defaux, Besthelsemer); Van Dam European tort law 536. 
766  Galand-Carval in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: liability for damage caused by others 99. 
767  See CÉ 23 June 1954 (Litzler); Van Dam European tort law 536. 
768  See CÉ 10 October 1954, Rec 505 arrêt Sadoudi, Rec 603 (referred to by Galand-Carval in 
Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: liability for damage caused by others 99). 
769  CÉ 26 October 1973 81977. 
770  CÉ 3 February 1911 (Anguet) referred to by Van Dam European tort law 536.  
771  Van Dam European tort law 537. 
   670 
 
cases, though, where the police,772 tax entities773 and regulatory or supervisory 
banking entities774 are concerned, the standard of faute required is “gross negligence” 
(faute lourde), which is considered equal to intentional fault.775 An exception applies 
to public hospitals where ordinary negligence (simple fault) is sufficient to ground 
liability.776  
 
The Conseil d’Etat has found the state liable in instances where prisoners had been 
released on certain licenses and then went on to commit further crimes such as 
robbery. The courts reasoned that even though the “policy of licensing prisoners” is 
socially useful, the risk created is high and justifies the imposition of liability.777  
 
In respect of administrative law, strict liability is based on “’equality before public 
burdens’ (égalité devant les charges publiques) in Article 13 of the Declaration.778 The 
notion behind the principle of “equality” is that the public burdens must be shared 
equally amongst all the citizens and when a citizen bears more than his share of the 
burden, that is, if a plaintiff has sustained “abnormal damage” or “disproportionate 
damage” then he should be compensated. That is, public burdens should not weigh 
heavily on the claimant, whether the plaintiff is a natural or juristic person.779 The 
principle of “equality” expresses the thoughts and “solidarity” of the community (which 
are similar to the concept of the boni mores in South African law).780  
 
Van Dam781 points out that there are a number of instances where the state is liable 
to compensate the plaintiff. For example: when being exposed to unusual danger of 
risk; extraordinary participation in a public service; or where the impact of public works 
is extraordinary.782 The first instance applies where a plaintiff suffers damages 
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resulting from dangerous activities carried out or authorised by the state. For example, 
in 1915, grenades which were stored by the state in the outskirts of a residential area 
in Paris exploded. The state was held liable for damage caused from the explosion, 
where people died and property was damaged. The Counseil d’Etat held the state 
liable, not on faute but on the “abnormal risk” it posed by storing such grenades in a 
residential area.783 It is submitted that due to the abnormal risk, which resulted in 
unnecessary damage and death, it was reasonable to impose liability upon the state. 
The same principles apply when an innocent person is shot while police are trying to 
apprehend a criminal784 or where a prisoner escapes after committing a crime.785 The 
second instance where the state can be held liable is where the public takes on a duty 
that is normally undertaken by persons employed by the state. For example, in a case 
where a child was carried out to sea and there was no lifeguard on duty, the plaintiff’s 
husband tried to rescue the child, but drowned. The state was held strictly liable for 
the damages claimed by the deceased’s wife. It did not matter that the deceased tried 
to rescue the child on a voluntary basis. All the court required, was that assistance 
was urgently required, that is was appropriate and beneficial.786 The third instance 
where abnormal burdens are suffered by a plaintiff in the public interest is where the 
state due to policy reasons elects not to enforce the law.787 Van Dam788 refers to the 
first well-known case where a Mr Couitéas789 was notified that he was the owner of a 
piece of land in Tunisia. He requested assistance from the police to remove nomadic 
people living on the land, but his request was denied as the police were afraid of the 
consequences of doing so. The Counseil d’Etat held that Mr Couitéas suffered an 
“abnormal burden in the public interest” and was compensated for his sacrifice, based 
on the principle of equality. The same principle was followed where there was an illegal 
blockade at the French port of Calais. The authorities failed to remove the blockade 
and a British ferry company, Sealink, which was unable to ferry people to Britain over 
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a bank holiday, suffered loss. Sealink was able to recover damages.790 Van Dam791 
points out that it would indeed be unlikely that a French company would be able to 
recover its loss in similar circumstances in English law. In the fourth instance, the state 
can be held liable for damages resulting from legislation that imposes a 
disproportionate sacrifice on a natural or juristic person.792 Van Dam793 refers to the 
case known as Fleurette,794 where a statute stated that the word “cream” could only 
be used in products that contained real cream. La Fleurette, a diary company which 
manufactured artificial cream, was unable to market its product. The company claimed 
damages from the state and the Conseil d’Etat awarded the damages, even though it 
was not the legislator’s intention to impose a “disproportionate burden” on the 
company. La Fleurette went out of business and the court held that the company 
suffered a disproportionate sacrifice. It is submitted that the dairy company suffered 
an unreasonable loss as a result of the sacrifice imposed on it. Therefore it was 
reasonable to impose liability on the state for the diary company’s loss. Currently it 
must be determined whether the legislator excluded the possibility of compensation 
(whether explicitly or implicitly).795 However, in most instances the legislator makes 
provision for compensation, ensuring that the equality principle need not be applied 
directly.796 
 
The principle of “equality” in French law is based on the premise that natural or juristic 
persons who “disproportionately suffer from measures taken in the general interest 
may have a right to compensation for damage that is not deemed part of the daily risk 
of business of life”.797 This strict liability rule does not focus on whether the conduct of 
the public body was correct or not but whether “citizens are treated equally”, so the 
loss of the individual is shifted to the “collective taxpayers”.798 
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In instances where employees sustain harm due to asbestos intoxication, if the illness 
is deemed a “professional illness”, limited lump sum compensation is awarded by the 
National Health to victims or their dependants. The victim maybe entitled to further 
compensation (which could not be obtained from the National Health) if “unforgiveable 
fault” is proven. The unforgivable fault has a wide application and is linked to the 
contractual obligation of the employers to ensure the safety and security of the 
employees. The breach of the obligation is deemed an “unforgivable fault” in terms of 
Article L 452-1 of the Code de la sécurité sociale if the “the employer knew or should 
have known the danger the employee was going to be exposed to, and when he did, 
did not take appropriate measures to protect him”.799  
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
The influence of reasonableness on liability of state entities is implicit. In respect of 
liability of the state entity based on fault, it is reasonable that all the elements must be 
present in order to ground delictual liability. Thus a generating act or event must be 
present, as well as faute, which encompasses wrongfulness and fault relating to 
unreasonable conduct on the part of the state. It must be established whether there is 
a close enough relationship (which must be certain and direct) between the 
unreasonable conduct and the harm or loss suffered by the plaintiff. If there was such 
a close enough relationship then it may be reasonable to impose liability on the state 
entity. Unreasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff may result in the limitation or 
exclusion of liability. Furthermore if an extraneous cause is present, it may not be 
reasonable to impute liability on the state entity for the reasonably unforeseeable and 
unavoidable harm or loss suffered by the plaintiff. In respect of strict liability based on 
the risk theory, the focus is not on the parties unreasonable conduct as a faute is not 
required but on whether the plaintiff suffered a disproportionate and therefore 
unreasonable burden (according to the thoughts of community) placed on him by the 
state. If the burden was unreasonable then it is only fair and reasonable that he be 
compensated for the “abnormal”, and hence unreasonable, loss he sustained.  
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7. Wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims 
 
In wrongful birth or conception claims, an unplanned or unwanted child is born as a 
result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.800 The unwanted pregnancy may result 
due to for example, defective contraceptives, where the claim may lie against the 
manufacturer, failed sterilisation or abortion, where the claim may lie against a medical 
practitioner or institution, or as a result of rape.801 In France, the wrongful conception 
leading to the birth of a healthy child cannot be considered as damage. It goes against 
the dignity of the child. The Cour de Cassation802 held that the existence of the child 
itself cannot constitute “a legally reparable loss”. The interests in autonomy and self-
determination of the mother to not have the child must be weighed against financial 
implications of the unplanned child as well as the disruption to the family life.803 Even 
though it is argued that the damage may be set off against the benefit and joy of having 
the child, not all parents may agree with that and the costs are tangible whereas joy is 
intangible.804 Courts award damages relating to the pregnancy and birth, but not for 
the upbringing of the child.805 Raising the unwillingness or election of the plaintiff to 
undergo an abortion as a defence by the defendant in minimising damages on the part 
of the mother, is not allowed.806 In French law, a mother cannot claim non-patrimonial 
loss, unless the child was born disabled,807 in which case the parents are entitled to 
claim for “financial and moral losses”, while the disabled child can claim for his 
handicap.808 In a case809 where a physically handicapped man consulted a professor 
on whether there was a chance that the handicap could be passed on to his children, 
the professor made an error and told the man that the handicap could not be passed 
onto to his children. Five years later the man’s wife gave birth to a child with the same 
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essential cases on damage 910-911. 
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handicap. The parents sued the professor for damages as a result of the birth of the 
handicapped child due to the negligent prognosis. The Cour de Cassation held that 
the parents were entitled to such damages.810  
 
Wrongful life claims refer to claims where the conduct of the defendant resulted in a 
child being born with a disability.811 The disability usually occurs during pregnancy 
(prior to birth and may even occur prior to conception) where the mother may sustain 
injury or illness or is not given proper advice by a medical practitioner about the risks 
that the child will not be born healthy (due to for example a possible genetic defect or 
hereditary condition).812 The child’s bodily health and integrity is violated.813 In the case 
of a child that has been affected in a mother’s womb, where the mother was not 
informed of the risks, the basis of liability is generally in contract, but the child, as a 
third party, has a claim in delict. 814  
 
 In a case815 of an unsuccessful abortion where the child was born with serious 
disabilities, the defendant, a public hospital, was ordered to pay: six hundred thousand 
francs to the child as a “reasonable assessment of the physical suffering and aesthetic 
loss thereby suffered, and the interference with his quality of life”;816 fifty thousand 
francs to the mother for non-material damage as a “reasonable assessment of the 
adverse effect on her quality of life, due to the disability suffered by her son”;817 and 
four hundred thousand francs for medical expenses as a result of the medical 
practitioner’s conduct. Even though the abortion was performed correctly, it was not 
successful and the medical practitioner failed to check whether or not the abortion was 
successful, resulting in the child being born with a serious handicap. The unsuccessful 
abortion caused injury to the foetus. In Quarez,818 the Conseil d’État held that the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
810  In MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board 2000 2 AC 59 it was held that it was not fair, just and 
reasonable to award damages for the upbringing of a healthy child. See Van Dam European 
tort law 197; chapter 4 para 3.2.2.1. 
811  Van Dam European tort law 198. 
812  Van Dam European tort law 199. 
813  Van Dam European tort law 199. 
814  Massot in European tort law yearbook 2001 203.  
815  CÉ 27 September 1989, D 1991 80 note Verpeaux. See Van Dam European tort law 199; Van 
Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 115. 
816  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 116. 
817  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 116. 
818  CÉ 14 February 1997 133238, JCP 1997 II 22828. See Moréteau 2006 European tort law 
yearbook 199-200.  
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parents of a child born with severe disabilities were entitled to damages related to the 
cost of raising a disabled child due to the medical negligence of the public hospital and 
staff employed by the hospital, in not noticing the disability. In the landmark decision 
of Perruché,819 a mother contracted rubella during her pregnancy. Although the 
medical practitioner (in the private sector) advised the mother that she had been 
immunised, the child was born with “neurological and sensory problems suggestive of 
congenital rubella”.820 The Cour de Cassation allowed the child’s claim for damages 
stemming from the disability. From 2002, wongful life claims in France are no longer 
allowed as a result of legislation821 on the premise that “no one can be indemnified for 
his birth, even if handicapped”.822 Compensation is awarded for handicaps or 
disabilities, but are limited and not based on liability in delict but national solidarity. In 
terms of causation, the damage is regarded as caused not by medical negligence, but 
by a pre-existing condition of the mother or child.823 This legislation has been criticised 
inter alia for shifting the burden of liability to “national solidarity” where the act made 
provision for a special fund to compensate parents for the costs of growing up the 
disabled child, and for going too far as the Cour de Cassation was aiming to 
compensate for the disabled life of the child, but not for the disability.824 This legislation 
curtails medical malpractice claims and Moréteau825 points out that in electing for 
national solidarity as opposed to liability, France gives a clear message that “no life is 
ever wrongful”. Compensation is awarded to the parents and not the child, as awarding 
compensation to the child means acknowledging the right of the child not to be born.826 
 
The influence of reasonableness on determining whether liability should be imposed 
for the wrongful birth, wrongful conception and wrongful life claims (before the 
legislation denied wrongful life claims) is  predominantly implicit. The reasonableness 
of the conduct of the medical practitioners and staff of the institutions are called into 
question. Whether the infringement of the interests in autonomy and bodily integrity is 
                                                                                                                                                                            
819  Ass plén 17 November 2000 (Perruche) 99-1370, Bull Ass plén 2000 9 15, D 2001 332 note 
Mozeaud and Jourdain. See Ass plén 13 July 2001 97-19282, Bull Ass plén 2001 10 21; Van 
Dam European tort law 201. 
820  Van Dam European tort law 201.  
821  Law No 2002-303 of 4 March 2002. 
822  Van Dam European tort law 201. 
823  See Moréteau 2006 European tort law yearbook 200.  
824  See Van Dam European tort law 201-202. 
825  2006 European tort law yearbook 200-201. 
826  See Van Dam European tort law 201-202  fn 145 who points out that most European countries 
do not entertain wrongful life claims brought by the child except in Spain and Netherlands. 
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unreasonable under the circumstances is also considered. If the infringement of the 
interests and conduct causing harm or loss to the parents or child are considered 
unreasonable, then it may be considered reasonable to impose liability on the medical 
practitoner or institution. The courts also assess the damages following a fair and 
reasonable approach. They make a reasonable assessment on the heads of damages 
relating to inter alia physical suffering, aesthetic loss suffered, and loss suffered as a 
result of disrupting the quality of life.827  
 
8. Mental harm (psychiatric injury) 
 
All kinds of mental harm are in principle compensable and the mental harm need not 
result in some form of recognised medical psychological or psychiatric injury.828  As a 
starting point, the mental harm must result in some damage in terms of Articles 1382 
and 1384 of the CC. Any “negative impact on someone’s feelings can amount to 
mental harm”.829 Even grief is in principle compensable.830 All that is required is a faute 
which immediately, directly and certainly causes the mental harm.831 There are no 
other specific requirements such as “reasonable foreseeability of harm” and the test 
is not objective.832 The courts assess the subjective mental harm of the plaintiff in each 
case.833  
 
A look at some examples from case law illustrates how the courts determine liability 
for mental harm. For example, there was a certain model of pacemaker that was found 
to be defective. The manufacturer of the pacemakers stopped selling them and 
recommended that anyone with that particular pacemaker should undergo regular 
check-ups. A patient, who was aware of the possibility of the pacemaker being 
defective, had it surgically removed while undergoing an operation she had to 
undergo. The pacemaker was in fact not defective, but the patient sued the 
manufacturer for compensation resulting from stress and shock after learning of the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
827  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 116. 
828  See Cass civ 2 22 February 1995 92-18731 93-12644; Chartier and CA Paris 10 November 
1983, D 1984 214; Van Dam European tort law 175. 
829  Van Dam European tort law 175. 
830  Van Dam European tort law 183. 
831  Van Dam European tort law 176. 
832  Van Dam European tort law 174. 
833  Van Dam European tort law 176. 
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possibility that the pacemaker was defective. The Cour de Cassation834 held that 
generally damages for non-patrimonial loss could be awarded for stress and anxiety 
in such instances, but found that in this case, the patient had to undergo surgery in 
any event and that the pacemaker was not defective, therefore damage had not 
occurred and was in fact hypothetical. It is submitted that harm in this case (stress and 
shock) was reasonably foreseeable (as some pacemakers were found to be defective) 
and preventable (by removing it). The costs involved in removing the pacemaker may 
be considered minimal when compared to the gravity of harm that may ensue if at any 
time the pacemaker malfunctions. The patient has to live with the constant fear that 
this may occur thus affecting her mental state. It would be reasonable to compensate 
the patient for the mental harm.835  
 
The Cour de Cassation836 awarded compensation to employees who had suffered 
anxiety and fear of developing an asbestos-related disease in the future. The 
employees had been exposed to asbestos for a prolonged period of time and had not 
yet developed any diseases relating to the exposure. It is trite that after inhaling 
asbestos, symptoms or a disease may only develop after twenty years. In over fifty 
asbestos-related cases, the Cour de Cassation had to deal with various ex-employees 
who sued their employers for “prejudice of anxiety” of developing lung cancer at a later 
stage as a result of being exposed to asbestos. Some of the employees had initially 
worked on industrial sites that had been recognised as “asbestos-contaminated” sites 
in an official list of Act 98-1194 of 23 December 1998, entitling them to an early 
retirement. In some cases, the Cour d’appel (appeal court) denied compensation on 
the ground that anxiety alone of developing a disease could not be compensated and 
on the ground that the sites where the employees were exposed to asbestos had not 
been recognised as “asbestos-contaminated” sites. This has been viewed as 
discriminatory.837 It is submitted that policy considerations played a role in the courts 
reaching a decision not to compensate the victim. In some cases, damages were 
awarded to employees who worked on sites which were not officially recognised as 
                                                                                                                                                                            
834  Cass civ 1 19 December 2006, JCP 2007 II 10052, note Hocquet-Berg, RTDCiv 2007 352 
observations Jourdain. See Moréteau 2006 European tort law yearbook 282; Van Dam 
European tort law 181-182. 
835  See Van Dam European tort law 182-183. 
836  Cass Soc 11 May 2010 09-42241, Bull soc 2010 V 206. See Moréteau 2010 European tort law 
yearbook 188-190; Van Dam European tort law 182. 
837  See authority cited by Séjean and Knetsch 2015 European tort Law yearbook 210 fn 12. 
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asbestos-contaminated sites. The Cour de Cassation did, however, rule that damages 
may be claimed for “prejudice of anxiety” in respect of all mental harm connected with 
asbestos exposure including loss of “life expectancy” and “disruption of living 
conditions”.838  
 
Generally, in terms of French labour law, when an employee sustains injury or illness 
while in the course and scope of employment, he is entitled to social security benefits 
(which are limited). However, if he is able to prove an inexcusable fault on the part of 
the employer, that is, a deliberate breach of the safety and hygiene regulations, or 
gross negligence on the part of the employer, the employee is in principle entitled to 
compensation of all heads of damages. Since the landmark decisions of the Cour de 
Cassation839 delivered on 28 February 2002, where it was held that an employer has 
a strict duty to provide a safe work environment, an employer may be held liable 
whenever an asbestos-related illness can be linked to the working conditions of the 
employee. An allegation of inexcusable fault is common in claims for workers 
compensation benefits in asbestos-injury related cases.  
 
In a case where an employee, who had undergone a number of disciplinary 
procedures, had suffered anxiety and tension fearing dismissal, the Paris Labour 
Tribunal held that he was entitled to compensation for the “prejudice of anxiety” he 
had suffered.840 Criticism has been raised against this decision, as the employee did 
not provide proof of the “prejudice of anxiety” he allegedly sustained.841  
 
Both primary and secondary victims (the latter referred to as a “victim par ricochet” or 
“rebound victim”) are in principle entitled to claim for mental harm.842 A secondary 
victim is usually a family relative who suffers what is commonly referred to as “affection 
injury” (prejudice d’affection). Such victim may also claim damages for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
838  See Cass soc 3 March 2015 13-21832, 13-20474, 13-20486, 13-26175; Cass soc 11 May 2010 
09-42241 to 09-42257; Jourdain  Les préjudices d’angoisse, La Semaine Juridique Édition 
Générale (JCP G) 2015 739; Lemaire 2016 JETL 27; Séjean and Knetsch 2015 European tort 
law yearbook 208-209.  
839  See Cass soc 28 February 2002 00-10051, 99-18389, 00-11793, 99-21255, 99-17201 and 00-
13172; Séjean and Knetsch 2015 European tort law yearbook 210 fn 10.  
840  Paris Labour Tribunal (Conseil des prud’hommes Paris), 16 January 2015 F 12/10198.  
841  See also CÉ 27 May 2015 371697 where the Conseil d’État confirmed the decision of the lower 
court in awarding €1 500 to a victim as a result of sustaining “moral distress” from the time he 
was informed of a blood-related hepatitis infection, till his recovery over a year later. 
842  Van Dam European tort law 176. 
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bereavement.843 A secondary victim may sustain loss of income, emotional shock, 
grief and so on.844 Thus any kind of mental harm suffered by the secondary victim is 
compensable.845 The courts are lenient and have, for instance, awarded compensation 
for emotional distress as a result of losing a prized pet.846 The secondary victim need 
not be a relative and what must be proven is a “material or sentimental link” with the 
primary victim.847 In respect of unmarried couples, the relationship between them must 
have been stable and continuous.848 If the secondary victim is family of or related to 
the primary victim, then there is a presumption of a “link of affection” between them.849 
At the very least there must be some kind of personal relationship between the primary 
and secondary victim.850 In French law, dependants are considered as the par ricochet 
victims – secondary victims.851 
 
The influence of reasonablenss on determining whether liability should be imposed for 
the mental harm is implicit. What is generally considered is whether the conduct of the 
defendant in infringing the plaintiff’s interests in bodily integrity, which includes mental 
harm, is unreasonable under the circumstances. Policy considerations also seem to 
play a role and this is evident in the asbestos-injury related cases, where in some 
cases the courts awarded compensation, while declining it in others. In the French law 
of delict, the element of causation is used to limit claims, in that the damage must be 
direct and certain.852 At times the courts may find that the damage was hypothetical 
and exclude liability. French law is however generally liberal in awarding compensation 
for harm which may manifest itself in grief, sorrow or some form of psychological harm.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
843  Cass crim 22 March 1877, Bull crim 1877 86; Van Dam European tort law 176. 
844  Van Dam European tort law 176. 
845  Van Dam European tort law 176-177. 
846  See Cass civ 1 16 January 1962 D, 1962 199 note Rodière, JCP 1962 12577 note Esmein. 
See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 39; Van Dam European tort law 177. 
847  See Cass ch mixte 27 February 1970, D 1970 Jur 201 note Combaldieu, JCP 1970 II 16305; 
Crim 17 October 2000 99-86157, Bull crim 2000 297 874; Van Dam European tort law 176. 
848  See Cass ch mixte 27 February 1970, D 1970 Jur 201 note Combaldieu, JCP 1970 II 16305; 
Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 126. 
849  Van Dam European tort law 176; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 127. 
850  Van Dam European tort law 176. 
851  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 127. 
852  Cass civ 2 22 February 1995 92-18731 93-12644; Chartier and CA Paris 10 November 1983, 
D 1984 214; Van Dam European tort law 175, 183. 
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9. Pure economic loss  
 
French law generally does not deny compensation for damage to moveable or 
immoveable property and there is no differentiation for the purpose of compensation 
between damage to property and pure economic loss.853 The idea of “pure economic 
loss” is generally unfamiliar in French law.854 Van Dam855 points out that in French law 
pure economic loss as a topic does not even exist. All that is required, is the 
infringement of a legitimate interest (an interest deemed worthy of protection by 
society), then damages may be recovered and that there must be damage which is 
direct and certain.856 Liability for pure economic loss is controlled by all three elements 
of faute (encompassing wrongfulness and fault), causation and damage, but more 
specifically by the elements of damage and causation.857 Damages for pure economic 
loss are awarded in the same way that damages are awarded for any other loss.858 
The idea of an indeterminate number of plaintiffs is resolved with the element of 
causation859 and the floodgates idea is not found in so many words in French legal 
doctrine.860   
 
Moréteau861 refers to a hypothetical example of a motor vehicle running out of fuel and 
being immobilised in a tunnel, causing a huge traffic jam during peak traffic time. 
Thousands of people are delayed and miss business opportunities, flights, 
examinations etcetera. The courts would either find that the damage due to missed 
opportunities is not the direct consequence of the driver’s negligence; or if causation 
is admitted, “that it simply caused a loss of chance thus minimising compensation”; or 
that driving in a busy tunnel is considered voluntary assumption of risk (where liability 
may be excluded). The element of causation is essentially used to control 
“unreasonable or excessive claims”.862  However, in dealing with the elements with 
regard to pure economic loss as compared to personal injury or damage to property 
                                                                                                                                                                            
853  Van Dam European tort law 203. 
854  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 75; Van Dam European tort law 354. 
855  European tort law 210. 
856  Van Dam European tort law 203. 
857  Van Dam European tort law 209. 
858  Van Dam European tort law 210. 
859  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 75. 
860  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 76. 
861  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 75. 
862  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 76. 
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different standards may be applied. In respect of faute, the “good family father” is not 
applied but “whether one has complied with the principles of loyauté, honnêteté, et 
bonne foi (loyalty, honesty, and good faith)”.863 The damage must be “directly caused”, 
“personal, certain and legal”.864 Generally the courts use the concepts of “direct” and 
“indirect” causing of damage to allow or disallow a claim for pure economic loss. 
However, in most instances a direct cause is easily established.865 Compensation for 
pure economic loss is awarded in cases of non-performance of a contractual obligation 
(loss of anticipated profit).866  
 
A look at a few examples from case law illustrate under what circumstances damages 
may be awarded for pure economic loss. In a hypothetical example where a factory 
plant loses its supply of electricity due to the negligent act of a building company and 
suffers a chain of loss, the loss suffered by the customers of the plant and their 
customers, in French law are considered damages by ricochet (dommages par 
ricochet). The factory plant’s loss is considered to be a direct consequence of the 
building company’s act and damages for such loss are easily awarded (damage to 
property as well as consequential loss). In principle, damages by ricochet are 
recoverable and may be considered direct but are not easily awarded by the courts.867 
In the example, the plaintiffs would have to prove that their damage was due to the 
damage that occurred to the factory plant and not other economic factors. 
Furthermore, they would have to prove that the loss was unavoidable. If for instance 
they could have contracted with another supplier which, it is submitted, really refers to 
mitigation of loss or limiting loss to a reasonable loss, then the loss is not 
unavoidable.868  
 
 A plaintiff who owned buses was able to recover bus fares as a result of an accident 
that delayed the buses from their routes, causing loss of revenue in bus fares. The 
                                                                                                                                                                            
863  Van Dam European tort law 210. 
864  Van Dam European tort law 210. 
865  Van Dam European tort law 210-211. 
866  See Article 1149 of the CC; Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 34. 
867  The hypothetical example can be compared with the English case, Spartan Steel & Co Ltd v 
Martin 1973 1 QB 27 discussed in chapter 4 para 3.3.3. 
868  See Galand-Carval in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: causation 58. 
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court held that the loss was neither hypothetical nor indirect.869 In a case870 where the 
defendant caused the suspension of gas to a factory so that it was unable to continue 
with production, the defendant was held liable for economic loss. The Cour de 
Cassation held that the loss suffered by the plaintiff “was a direct consequence of the 
cutting of the gas main and that the damage was recoverable”. Therefore, it was 
reasonable to compensate the plaintiff for the loss sustained. Where a power supply 
cable was damaged causing the plaintiff’s factory to suspend activities for one hour 
and ten minutes, the court awarded the plaintiff damages in respect of salaries paid to 
his employees for the one hour and ten minutes where they remained idle. It was thus 
reasonable to compensate the plaintiff for the loss sustained.871 In all three cases 
mentioned above the loss was considered a “direct consequence” of the defendant’s 
conduct.  
 
Pure economic loss was not recoverable from the defendant in the following instances: 
where the defendant caused an accident preventing a singer from performing at a 
concert, resulting in loss as a result of cancelling the concert;872 and where the 
defendant caused an accident, resulting in the plaintiff (creditor) being unable to 
recover the debt from the deceased’s estate.873 In both instances, the Cour de 
Cassation found the damages to be indirect. Thus it is apparent that it was considered 
unfair and unreasonable to compensate the plaintiff under the circumstances as the 
loss was considered too remote.874 In a case875 where a couple gave funds to a bank 
employee to buy and manage stocks, the employee used the funds for herself and did 
not buy any stocks. Upon the couple finding this out, they sued the employee. The 
Cour de Cassation confirmed that the couple were entitled to damages, but not for 
loss of profits expected from the stocks portfolio. The Cour de Cassation held that 
profits that were expected from any rise in the stock price were hypothetical and not 
certain. Therefore where the loss cannot be established with certainty, it may be 
                                                                                                                                                                            
869  Cass civ 2 28 April 1965, D 1965 777 note Esmein. See Van Dam European tort law 211; Van 
Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 197-198. 
870  Cass civ 2 8 May 1970 69-11446, Bull civ 1970 II 60 122. See also CÉ 2 June 1972, AJDA 
1972 356 where economic loss was recoverable due to the defendant breaking a high tension 
cable (Van Dam European tort law 211). 
871  CÉ 2 June 1972. See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 198-199. 
872  Cass civ 2 14 November 1958, Gaz Pal 1959 31. See Van Dam European tort law 211. 
873  Cass civ 2 21 February 1979 77-13951, Bull civ 1979 II 56 42, D 1979 IR 344, JCP 1979 IV 
145. See Van Dam European tort law 211. 
874  Van Dam European tort law 210-211. 
875  Cass crim 19 February 1975 74-90694, Bull crim 59 161. 
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unreasonable to compensate the plaintiff for such uncertain loss. There is no doubt 
that assessing and quantifying the pure economic loss in this case would have been 
difficult. In a case,876 an art collector purchased a Van Gogh painting (jardin á Auvert) 
at a New York Gallery in 1955 for one hundred and fifty thousand francs. In 1981, the 
collector applied for an export licence with the intention of taking the painting to 
Geneva. The license was refused. He sued the French government, as they classified 
the painting as a national heritage. He was unable to sell the painting to a foreign 
purchaser and the loss was valuated at two hundred and fifty million Francs. The state 
was held liable and was ordered to pay the collector one hundred and forty five million 
Francs. This decision was criticised and Moréteau877 opines that it should have 
perhaps been dealt with by the administrative courts and under the doctrine of 
unjustified enrichment.   
 
An expected loss in French law can be compensated, the loss of chance to obtain the 
expected benefit is compensable provided the “expectation is reasonable and serious 
enough”.878 In French law even though it is apparent that compensation is generally 
easily awarded, with regard to compensation for pure economic loss; the loss must be 
certain and direct. These requirements apply as limitations to liability. In South African 
law, the elements of wrongfulness and legal causation linked with public policy 
considerations, the concepts of fairness, reasonableness and justice apply as limiting 
factors, while in Anglo-American law, the duty of care concept, remoteness of damage 
or the scope of liability linked with public policy considerations, the concepts of 
fairness, reasonableness and justice, limit liability for pure economic loss.879  
 
The influence of reasonableness on determining whether liability should be imposed 
for the pure economic loss sustained by the plaintiff is implicit. It is implicit because of 
the various degrees of the influence of reasonableness on the different elements of 
delictual liability for pure economic loss. There must be an infringement of a legitimate 
interest and the damages must be certain and direct. It seems that the “good family 
                                                                                                                                                                            
876  CA Paris 6 July 1994, D 1995 245 note Edelman. See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions 
of tort law 87.  
877  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 88. 
878  See discussion of this case by Borghetti in Winiger (ed) Digest of European tort law volume 2: 
essential cases on damage 434-435. 
879  See chapter 7 para 2.9.4. 
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father” in respect of determining fault is not required but whether one has complied 
with the principles of loyalty, honesty, and good faith.880 The requirement that the 
damages must be certain and direct limits liability to instances where the damage can 
be ascertained and is not indeterminate. This lends to the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of imposing liability for pure economic loss. 
 
10. Conclusion  
 
The beauty of French law of delict is that there is no need to over-theorise and develop 
theories relating to liability. The courts follow a flexible pragmatic approach based on 
only five provisions from the CC, which have predominantly remained unchanged for 
over 200 years. The fact that the courts’ decisions are unanimous and generally not 
more than one page in length emphasises the simple pragmatic, flexible approach 
followed. It is truly remarkable that in trying to reach the objective of compensating the 
victim as fully as possible for the harm or loss suffered, there has not been a significant 
increase in litigation. Even the strict liability regimes have been a success thanks to 
the principle of solidarity which relates to reasonableness and equality. In respect of 
the principle of solidarity, the burden placed either on the individual (in relation to the 
loss he sustains) or on all the citizens or inhabitants of the state (in relation to the loss 
sustained by all) must be reasonable. The courts are generally liberal in recognising 
all types of conduct (generating act or event) that lead to any type of harm. Any 
infringement of an interest is recognised, provided it is “legitimate”, not unlawful or 
illegal. In limiting or excluding delictual liability, the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s conduct is considered. Whether the defendant’s conduct was 
reasonable in infringing the plaintiff’s interests and whether the infringement of the 
plaintiff’s interests was reasonable under the circumstances is considered at least 
implicitly. The concept of faute is wide and includes wrongfulness, intention and 
negligence. Therefore a faute may be present whether there is wrongfulness, intention 
or negligence. In determining faute, the reasonableness of conduct is questioned. 
Faute is generally required for personal liability of one’s acts. In respect of fault-based 
liability as well as strict liability, the damage must be certain and there must be a direct 
causal link between the generating act or event and the harm or loss suffered. In 
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respect of certainty of damage there must either be proof of damage, a certain 
reasonable loss of chance, or some kind of certain expected future loss. The damages 
are assessed generally using a practical, flexible, fair and reasonable approach. In 
respect of causation, various theories and principles are applied but in the end it is 
submitted that the courts determine whether or not the harm or loss is too remote and 
whether it is fair and reasonable to impute liability on the defendant. The unreasonable 
conduct of the plaintiff in the form of contributory fault may limit or exclude liability. An 
extraneous cause may also depending on the circumstances exclude or limit liability. 
Naturally it would be unreasonable to impute liability in full on the defendant if the harm 
or loss was caused wholly or in part due to an extraneous factor. It may be concluded 
that the influence of reasonableness on the French law of delict is certainly evident 
and predominantly implicit. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 “[Tort law] strikes a balance between the respective interests of the victim and the 
 injurer, taking into account broader social interests as well. The victim is primarily 
 interested in the protection of his or her physical integrity and property but also, where 
 feasible, of his or her economic interests and prospects. The injurer, in turn is interested in his 
 or her freedom to engage in certain activities without being obstructed by the threat of 
 potential liability. Lastly, society is interested in achieving distributive justice in a cost-efficient 
 way, without stifling economic initiative … the balancing of these interests is reflected in the 
 way in which a legal system arranges three basic elements of tort law: sanctioned behaviour 
 on the part of the perpetrator of the harm, protected interests on the part of the injured person 
 and corrective remedies for damage caused by the perpetrator of harm to the injured 
 person”.1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This final chapter will provide a summary of the findings as well as recommendations, 
taking into account insights from jurisprudence and the comparative studies done in 
respect of the influence of reasonableness in determining delictual liability or liability 
in tort law. Closing thoughts will also be provided at the close of the study. In the 
different jurisdictions discussed in this study, reference to the implicit and explicit 
influence of reasonableness on the elements of delictual liability in South Africa and 
France, and on tort liability in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 
especially for the torts of negligence and trespass to the person, have already been 
pointed out. Those aspects will not be repeated here. The summary in this chapter will 
focus broadly on some of the main similarities and differences between the different 
jurisdictions, focusing on the influence of reasonableness and the different 
understandings of reasonableness which may have been encountered. 
 
2. Summary and discussion 
 
2.1 Different legal systems 
 
To begin with, South African and French law follow a more generalising approach to 
determining delictual liability when compared with Anglo-American law, which has the 
tort of negligence and many other torts.2 For example, English law has approximately 
                                                                                                                                                                            
1  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 13 with reference to American tort law. 
2  See chapter 1 paras 3-4. 
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seventy torts.3 The South African, English and American tort law or the law of delict is 
based on common law while the French law of delict is based on five provisions of the 
CC.4 South African law and American law have been greatly influenced by English 
common law.5 In South Africa, legislation, customary law and constitutional provisions 
may affect common law principles.6 In the United States of America, legislation and 
constitutional provisions may affect the common law. Even though it is up to the 
different states in the United States of America to develop tort law, there is much 
common ground. This is apparent in the various volumes of the influential Restatement 
of Torts.7  
 
Unique among all the jurisdictions that were discussed, is that in the United States of 
America, the jury as the embodiment of the reasonable people is the trier of facts. The 
jury does not need to provide reasons for its decisions. A jury may not be appointed in 
all cases but there is evidence that the adjudicator and jury often reach similar 
conclusions in similar cases.8 The jury as the embodiment of the reasonable people 
of the United States of America actually plays a part in shaping tort law. Wells9 submits 
that each person’s moral response is not the same; we can all see “the clock on the 
tower reads four o’clock, but not everyone agrees that a particular action is cruel and 
deplorable”. Wells10 explains that when an adjudicator instructs the jury that a person’s 
conduct must be “reasonable”, deliberation and discourse take place among the jury. 
Different opinions, arguments and perspectives will be identified, but in the end a 
collective decision is reached, reflecting a group norm and overriding individual 
views.11 “Jury consensus suggests a justificatory norm” and they usually “include a 
cross section of normative viewpoints”.12  
 
A fundamental difference between the United Kingdom and the other jurisdictions 
discussed is that the United Kingdom does not have a constitution. However, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
3  See Koziol in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 697. 
4  See chapter 1 para 3; chapter 6 para 1. 
5  See chapter 1 para 3. 
6  See chapter 1 para 3. 
7  See chapter 5 para 1. 
8  See chapter 5 para 1.1. 
9  1990 Mich L Rev 2397. 
10  1990 Mich L Rev 2400. 
11  Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2407. 
12  Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2409. 
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legislation such as the Human Rights Act13 and other instruments may affect the 
common law. 14  In the United Kingdom, the notion of parliamentary supremacy 
applies.15 The principles relating to delictual liability in the CC may be affected by 
legislation, constitutional provisions, the Declaration 16  and other international 
instruments.17 Of all the jurisdictions discussed, France does not follow the precedent 
system. The adjudicators do not always provide reasons for their decisions and their 
decisions are uniform in that no majority or dissenting decisions are provided. French 
decisions are more or less a page in length.18 Griss19 sheds some light on the judicial 
culture in France by pointing out that the Cour de Cassation delivers about twenty 
thousand judgments a year in comparison to the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom that delivers about eighty judgments per year. France furthermore prefers 
strict liability and this is based on the principles of solidarity and equality.20 With these 
basic similarities and differences in mind, it is possible to continue with the summary 
and discussion. 
 
Even though Anglo-American law does not follow a generalising approach as in South 
Africa and France, in all the jurisdictions discussed, as will be demonstrated below, 
generally, the elements of: conduct; causation; fault (except in instances of strict 
liability) under which wrongfulness may be subsumed; and harm are required.  
  
In terms of the concept “reasonableness”, generally South African, English and 
American law explicitly refer to it in considering a number of elements of delictual or 
tort liability. In France, the concept is not explicitly referred to, but the concepts of 
solidarity, liberty and equality are. “Reasonableness” is however considered implicitly, 
where other terms or phrases, reflecting reasonableness values or standards are 
used. Fletcher21 correctly points out that while jurisdictions such as England and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
13  Of 1988. 
14  See chapter 4 para 1. 
15  See Starr 1984 Marquette L Rev 679; chapter 2 para 1. 
16  Of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. 
17  See chapter 6 para 1. 
18  See chapter 6 para 1. 
19  2013 JETL 255.  
20  See chapter 6 paras 1 and 6. In South African customary law, the emphasis is on solidarity, 
group interests or rights, duties and obligations. It is also encompassed in the concept of ubuntu 
(see chapter 2 para 1). 
21  1985 Harv L Rev 949-953. 
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America, following common law, easily refer to the concept “reasonableness”, other 
jurisdictions like France rarely do but that does not mean that lawyers of the different 
jurisdictions think differently, it just means that they speak differently. It is clear that 
reasonableness pervades all elements of delict or tort in all the studied legal systems. 
It plays different roles and is utilised in different ways, depending on which element 
and which legal system one is looking at.  
 
2.2 Conduct, capacity, accountability, discernment or imputability and the standard of 
the reasonable person  
 
To begin with, in all the jurisdictions discussed in this thesis, some form of conduct, 
whether in the form of an omission or a commission, is required for liability in delict or 
tort law. Naturally, it is unreasonable to hold a person liable without conduct which 
results in the causing of harm or loss. The requirement of conduct is explicitly referred 
to in South African law22 and is recognised as a separate element of liability.  In French 
law, this requirement goes beyond human behaviour to encompass a generating act 
or event.23 In Anglo-American law too, even though conduct is not explicitly referred 
to as a requirement with the torts of trespass to a person and the tort of negligence, it 
must be present in order to ground liability.  
 
As shown below, in South African, English and American law, the conduct must be 
voluntary. If the conduct is involuntary, for example, where the conduct is considered 
mechanical, then there is no conduct and it is unreasonable to hold the wrongdoer 
liable. In situations where a person suffers some kind of disability, for example, a 
sudden heart attack, or a sudden blackout etcetera, not caused by his own fault, then 
the conduct is not voluntary and fault is absent. If the defendant forgets to take his 
medication or deliberately does not take it thereby leading to a blackout, the principle 
of “prior fault” applies and the defendant may be held liable. 24  Thus it may be 
considered unreasonable to hold the person with such condition liable, whether the 
element of conduct or fault is found to be absent. French law on the other hand, does 
                                                                                                                                                                            
22  See chapter 3 para 2. 
23  See chapter 6 para 2.1 
24  See for example, chapter 3 para 2; chapter 4 paras 1.2, 2 and 3.4; chapter 5 paras 1, 2.2, and 
3.2. 
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not require the conduct to be voluntary in order to ground liability under Articles 1382 
to 1383 of the CC. Even though the reasonableness of this may be questioned, it may 
be understood in light of the French pro-victim stance with the aim of compensating 
the victim and the tendency of preferring strict liability over fault liability.25  
 
There are anomalies which apply to liability of children and mentally impaired persons 
in the different jurisdictions considered in this thesis which require further discussion. 
 
In South African law,26 accountability is a pre-requisite for fault. A person cannot be 
held accountable or at fault if he is unable to understand the difference between what 
is right and wrong and thereafter act in accordance with such understanding. Thus in 
instances where a mentally impaired person or child voluntarily causes harm but 
cannot be held accountable, such person or child will not be held liable in delict. In 
English27 law there must be a voluntary act on the part of the mentally disordered 
person and he must have the “requisite state of mind for liability in the particular tort 
with which he is charged”. 28  For example, in the English decision of Morris v 
Marsden,29 dealing with the tort of battery, intention with the purpose to commit battery 
was sufficient even though the mentally impaired person could not tell the difference 
between right or wrong. Thus intention with the purpose to commit battery was 
sufficient without the requirement for consciousness of wrongfulness as required in 
South African law.30 In American law,31 infancy and mental incapacity generally does 
not negate intention. The conduct must be voluntary though, that is, the defendant 
must be able to mentally control his muscular movements when there is contact with 
the plaintiff. The Restatement Third of Torts32 with regard to the tort of battery, makes 
reference to “single intent”, that is intent without “culpable intent to harm” but the 
Restatement Second of Torts33 refers to dual intent requiring culpable intent to harm. 
Thus in using the single intent rule, young children and mentally incapacitated persons 
                                                                                                                                                                            
25  See chapter 6 para 2.1. 
26  See chapter 3 paras 2 and 4.1. 
27  See chapter 4 para 1.2 
28  Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on tort 778. See also Witting Street on torts 658. 
29  1952 All ER 925. 
30  See chapter 3 para 4.2. 
31  See chapter 5 para 2.1.1. 
32  (Intentional Torts to Persons) § 101-103 (Tentative Draft No. 1 April 8 2015). 
33  § 19 (1965). 
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may be held liable.34 Similarly with the tort of negligence in Anglo-American law, a 
mental impairment or mental incapacity will generally not lead to exclusion of liability 
in negligence. Furthermore in the tort of negligence, the mentally impaired person is 
still judged according to the standard of the reasonable person.35  
 
In French law,36 as a result of the pro-victim stance and the support of strict liability, 
discernment or imputability, which is somewhat similar to the concept of accountability 
and capacity, is no longer a requirement for liability where a child or mentally impaired 
person causes harm to the plaintiff. Thus a mentally impaired person is held strictly 
liable and the parents of the child may be held strictly liable for the conduct of the child. 
The parent may, however, not be held strictly liable in instances of force majeure 
where the harmful consequences were generally unforeseeable and unavoidable.37 
Article 489-2,38 which was incorporated in the CC,39 states that “[h]e who has caused 
harm to another while under the control of a mental disturbance is nevertheless 
obligated to provide reparation”.40 There is no doubt that the most plausible reason for 
the application of strict liability is that it may be considered fair and reasonable to 
compensate the person who sustained harm as a result of the defendant’s risk-
creating or harm-producing conduct. Koziol41 is not convinced of the French approach 
to holding the mentally impaired strictly liable and the parents of the children strictly 
liable. He42 submits that children may pose “a special source of danger” due to their 
inability “to recognise dangers and behave appropriately”, 43  while the mentally 
impaired persons are more vulnerable with a special need to protect them.44 It is 
submitted that even children may be regarded as more vulnerable and the mentally 
impaired persons may pose a special risk. Koziol45 submits that even though most 
parents are insured for liability stemming from the conduct of the children, there may 
                                                                                                                                                                            
34  See discussion by Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 65-67; chapter 5 para 2.2. 
35  See chapter 2 para 4; chapter 5 para 3.2. 
36  See chapter 6 para 2.2.2. 
37  See chapter 6 para 5.2. 
38  Law no 68-5 of 3 January 1968 inserted Article 489-2. 
39  Now Article 414-3 by Law no 2007-308 of 5 March 2007. 
40  Légifrance-translations. See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 65; chapter 6 
para 2.2.2. 
41  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort 800-801. 
42  Koziol in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 792. 
43  Koziol in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 799. 
44  Koziol in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 793. 
45  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 801. 
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be rare instances where there is no insurance cover or the full amount claimed is not 
covered. Therefore, it is rather harsh that the parents would have to pay for the 
damages. There is also the possibility that the parents are unable to pay for damages. 
In such an instance, strict liability of the child may be applicable.46 Koziol,47 when 
focusing on the positive side of the French approach, proposes that society as a whole 
should bear the risk and burden in the form “social liability insurance” for harm or loss 
caused by the conduct of the mentally impaired and children. 
  
Here there are different views on reasonableness, with South African law taking a 
different approach to the other studied jurisdictions. In South African law, if a child or 
mentally impaired person cannot be held accountable, fault is absent and it would be 
unreasonable to hold the child or mentally impaired person liable. 48  Under the 
discussion of Anglo-American law,49 even though a number of reasons are provided 
for holding a mentally impaired person to the standard of the reasonable person and 
holding him liable, it is submitted that the main reason is that it is unfair and 
unreasonable not to compensate the plaintiff for the harm done to him. French law 
follows the approach of holding the mentally impaired liable, albeit strictly, because it 
is fair and reasonable to compensate the plaintiff. 
 
With regard to the standard for determining negligence of children, whether the 
reasonable person as in South African law,50 the reasonable child in English law51 or 
the standard of care of a reasonable person “of his own age, intelligence, and 
experience in similar circumstances”52 in American law is applied, subjective factors 
relating to the particular child are considered. Previously, South African law used a 
“reasonable child” test which took into account the youthfulness of the child but 
currently a more objective reasonable person test is applied to the child. When 
considering the accountability of a child, subjective factors relating to the child’s 
intelligence, maturity and so on are considered.53 Thus it may be argued that in South 
                                                                                                                                                                            
46  Koziol in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 791. 
47  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 793. 
48  See chapter 3 para 4.1. 
49  See chapter 4 para 1.2 and chapter 5 para 3.2. 
50  See chapter 3 para 4.3. 
51  See chapter 4 para 3.4. 
52  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 233; chapter 5 para 3.2-3.3 
53  See chapter 3 para 4.1 and 4.3. 
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African, English, American and French law54 the child’s age plays a part, directly or 
indirectly, in excluding or limiting liability when the subjective factors relating to his 
intelligence, maturity, experience and so on are considered. For example, liability may 
be excluded where the child is very young, such as a two-year-old child. The child 
does not have capacity or accountability. 55  Liability may be limited where the 
contributory fault of the child, based on the reasonableness of his conduct, is 
considered.56 The subjective factors may have an effect of lowering the standard 
applied to children, in the sense that they are generally not held to what may be called 
the base standard of the “reasonable person”. The base standard of the “reasonable 
person”, used in this sense for convenience and understanding the comparisons 
applied, refers to the standard that is applied to a gender neutral adult, over eighteen 
years of age, without any physical or mental disabilities. Thus Moran’s57 observations 
with regard to the generally more lenient standard applied to children where subjective 
factors are considered; and the base standard of the “reasonable person” applied to 
the mentally impaired person where his subjective cognitive disability is not 
considered, is evident in English, American and French law.58 Subjecting the mentally 
impaired person to the base standard of the reasonable person may be considered 
harsh from the viewpoint of the defendant,59 but fair and reasonable towards the 
innocent victim.  
 
Moran60 also refers to the more lenient standard called for the elderly. In France, the 
age of a person applies as a subjective factor in assessing the conduct of an elderly 
                                                                                                                                                                            
54  See chapter 6 para 2.2.3 where the loi Badinter excludes the defence of contributory negligence 
on the part of a child under sixteen years of age and a person older than seventy years of age, 
however, drivers may still be held contributorily negligent. 
55  See chapter 3 para 4.1 relating to the accountability of children in South African law where a 
child under seven is presumed unaccountable, a rebuttable presumption applies to a child 
between seven and fourteen years of age, and a child between the age of fourteen and eighteen 
may depending on the circumstances be held accountable; chapter 4 para 1.2 where very 
young children cannot be held to have capacity, however, English law does not refer to a 
specific age; chapter 5 para 3.2 where generally a child either under five or seven may not be 
held to have capacity, while a rebuttable presumption applies to children between the age of 
seven and fourteen years.  
56  See chapter 3 paras 4.1 and 4.3; chapter 4 paras 1.2 and 3.5.2; chapter 5 paras 3.2, 3.3 and 
3.5.1; chapter 6 para 2.3.5. 
57  Reasonable person. See discussion of Moran’s observations in chapter 2 para 4. 
58  See chapter 6 para 2.2.2 and para 5.1.  
59  See Koziol in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 793 who refers to this harsher liability rule. 
60  See discussion of Moran’s observations in chapter 2 para 4. 
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person.61 It may be argued that in respect of children and the elderly, depending on 
their age as mentioned above, this subjective factor generally lends to lowering the 
standard of judging the reasonableness of the conduct below the base standard. In 
respect of persons with physical disabilities, the disability has the effect of lowering the 
standard from the base standard.62 American law specifically refers to the standard of 
the reasonable person with a similar disability.63 It is reasonable to lower the standard 
from the base standard to take account of the person’s physical disability. While on 
the other end, when judging the conduct of the professional and applying the standard 
of, for example, the reasonable doctor, then the conduct is judged at a higher level 
above the base standard. Thus it is reasonable to lower the standard when dealing 
with, for example, children, the elderly and persons who offer emergency aid or rescue 
services.64 It is reasonable to raise the standard of judging the reasonableness of 
conduct when dealing with the conduct of professionals.65 Moran66 also argues that a 
different standard applies to judging the reasonableness of conduct of girls and boys 
as well as men and women. Girls and women may be held to a harsher standard 
generally because of the perception that girls and women are more attentive with their 
own safety as well as that of other’s. Moran no doubt has valid arguments when she 
highlights the inequality applied to different standards of reasonableness depending 
on inter alia a person’s age, gender, cognitive shortcomings and physical disabilities. 
It is submitted that the different standards of reasonableness are applied as a result 
of subjective factors, which may not excuse the inequality prevalent, but lend to the 
understanding of the different standards of reasonableness applied and provide a 
logical departure point for law reform.  
 
2.3. The duty of care concept in the tort of negligence in Anglo-American law 
 
In Anglo-American law, in order to succeed with a claim in the tort of negligence, the 
requirements include: a duty of care; breach of the duty, which relates to finding fault 
                                                                                                                                                                            
61  A more lenient standard is applied to a person over seventy years of age. See chapter 6 para 
2.2.2. 
62  See chapter 2 para 4; chapter 5 para 3.2. 
63  See chapter 5 para 3.2. 
64  See for example chapter 5 para 3.2 where in American law, a person involved in providing 
emergency aid or rescue services is not held to the base standard in order to encourage them 
to provide such aid or assistance. 
65  See chapter 3 para 3 4.3; chapter 4 para 3.4; chapter 5 para 3.2; chapter 6 para 2.2.3. 
66  See discussion of Moran’s views in chapter 2 para 4. 
696 
 
in the form of negligence; causation; and harm.67 The breach of the duty of care, 
causation and harm will be discussed further on. Here, the focus is on whether a duty 
of care exists to begin with, which is a preliminary question. Even though there is 
common ground in Anglo-American law in establishing whether a duty of care exists, 
they offer different approaches to determining a duty of care.  
 
In English law, the duty of care question is considered as a preliminary question of 
law, demarcating “the range of people, relationships and interests that receive the 
protection of the law” against negligent conduct.68 It relates to whether liability will 
ensue in the type of situation encountered and whether the defendant owes the 
claimant a duty of care.69 There are three different approaches applied in determining 
a duty of care in English law:70 the three-fold test; the incremental approach which 
relates to developing the law incrementally; and assumption of responsibility which 
relates to proximity. Of all the approaches, the three-fold test is the most common and 
in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc71 the court confirmed that 
the three-fold test may be combined with the incremental approach and the 
assumption of responsibility approach. 
 
The required elements of the three-fold test are: foreseeability of harm; proximity; and 
whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care. With regard to 
foreseeability of harm, specific harm to the claimant need not be foreseeable and all 
that is required is that the claimant falls within the category of persons that could be 
reasonably foreseen to be injured as a result of the defendant’s negligence.72 The 
element of proximity takes into consideration positive fact-based elements of the 
relationship between the parties, but may also involve policy considerations. Proximity 
encompasses different forms of closeness including physical, assumed, causal and 
circumstantial closeness. Its use varies depending on the particular case and source 
of harm.73 The last element, whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
67  See chapter 4 para 3.1; chapter 5 para 3. 
68  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 102. See also Witting Street 
on torts 36. 
69  See chapter 4 para 3.1. 
70  See chapter 4 para 3.2.2. 
71  2007 1 AC 181,189-192.  
72  See chapter 4 para 3.2.2.1. 
73  See chapter 4 para 3.2.2.1.  
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care as referred to by Jones74 is a test of common sense, ordinary reason, and 
whether it is right for the court to impose a duty of care in a given case. This last 
element is also policy-based and has the effect of either excluding a duty of care or 
recognising a duty of care in terms of policy. It is useful in determining whether a duty 
of care exists in borderline, novel or difficult cases. Thus it plays a prominent role in 
inter alia cases of omissions; wrongful conception, wrongful birth, and wrongful life 
claims; psychiatric injury; and pure economic loss.75 It is an objective, flexible test 
enabling a value judgment as to whether the defendant owes the claimant a duty of 
care and allows the courts to rely on policy as well principles of fairness, justice and 
reasonableness in deciding whether to exclude or extend a category of duty of care in 
the tort of negligence.  
 
In American law,76 the question of whether a duty of care is owed to the plaintiff is 
determined by the adjudicator, not the jury. The concept of a duty of care produces 
confusion in American law. It is considered artificial in character and if a court would 
so wish to find liability “it would be quite as easy to find the necessary ‘relation’ in the 
position of the parties toward one another, and hence to extend the defendant’s duty 
to the plaintiff”. Keeton et al77 submit simply that whether or not there is a duty “begs 
the essential question ‒ whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection 
against the defendant’s conduct”. Keeton et al78 state nevertheless, that the concept 
of duty is firmly embedded in American law and cannot be discarded. Duty is “only an 
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the way to say 
that the plaintiff is entitled to protection”. In American law, a duty may stem from the 
common law, legislation, a contract, or where the relationship of the parties is of such 
a nature that the law imposes a duty on the defendant to act reasonably in protecting 
the plaintiff.79 The following factors are inter alia considered in determining a duty of 
care: policy considerations, whether reasonable people would agree that a duty of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
74  In Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 450. 
75  See chapter 4 para 3.3. 
76  See chapter 5 para 3.1. 
77  Prosser and Keeton on torts 356. See also Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 203-
204. 
78  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on torts 358. See also Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook 
on torts 204. 
79  See chapter 5 para 3.1. 
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care exists; the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant; and reasonable 
foreseeability of harm.80  
 
Reasonable foreseeability of harm as a factor in determining a duty of care has been 
severely criticised. One important reason for the criticism is that it unnecessarily 
duplicates the foreseeability of harm enquiry at the duty stage when it is already 
considered in determining negligence and the proximate cause or scope of liability. 
Another important reason for the criticism is that if an adjudicator decides that a duty 
of care does not exist when considering foreseeability of harm as a factor, he in effect 
takes over the role assigned to the jury.81 The Restatement Third of Torts recommends 
that, to begin with, all persons owe a duty of care not to “create unreasonable risks to 
others”.82 Foreseeability of harm must not be considered in determining the existence 
of a duty of care.83 Courts may consider specific policy factors in determining whether 
to impose a duty of reasonable care in exceptional cases, such as:84 where a duty of 
care would be in conflict with social norms;85 if a duty of care would be in conflict with 
other areas of the application of law, such as the law of contract;86 if a duty of care 
would be in conflict with the relationship between the parties or with the assertion of 
the defendant’s other legally recognised interests;87 where the determination of a duty 
of care would extend beyond the parameters of the function of the courts, such as in 
cases of defective products relating to the manufacture of motor vehicles.88  
 
The consideration of specific policy factors in determining whether to impose a duty of 
reasonable care in exceptional cases in American law no doubt follows the third 
element of the English three-fold test and corresponds with the recent approach 
adopted in determining wrongfulness in South Africa law.89 All three jurisdictions have 
this test in common now. Furthermore this test is similar to the test for determining 
                                                                                                                                                                            
80  See chapter 5 para 3.1. 
81  See chapter 5 para 3.1. 
82  Except for extraordinary cases of physical harm. See Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for 
Physical Harm) § 7(a) (2010).  
83  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt j (2010).  
84  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt a (2010).  
85  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt c (2010). 
86  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt d (2010).  
87  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt e (2010).  
88  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical Harm) § 7 cmt f (2010).  
89  See chapter 3 paras 3.2-3.3.; chapter 4 para 3.2.2.1. 
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legal causation in South African law, although the latter test relates to whether or not 
the consequences and the conduct are remote or not.90 This test is also close to the 
test for determining causation in English 91  and American tort law under certain 
circumstances. 92  These tests are indeed very similar; they involve normative 
questions based on policy, and the common normative concept is reasonableness. In 
turn, reasonableness is closely linked to the normative concepts of “justice” and 
“fairness”. However, even though the ways in which the concept of reasonableness is 
used in the above-mentioned tests are similar, the tests serve to determine different 
elements in the different legal systems.  
 
It is submitted that the adoption of the elements required for a duty of care in English 
law, namely, foreseeability of harm, a relationship of proximity between the parties and 
whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care, in American and South 
African law causes confusion with the duplication of the requirements in other 
elements of tort or delictual liability.  
 
The Restatement Third of Torts, as discussed above, recommends a sound approach 
which is different from the English approach in that: a duty of care may be owed to all 
persons; policy considerations may be considered under exceptional circumstances 
in determining whether it is reasonable to impose a duty of care; and the test of 
foreseeability of harm should be excluded from determining a duty of care. In South 
African law, it is has been suggested that the existence of a duty of care is similar to 
the element of wrongfulness and similar to the concept of a legal duty to prevent harm 
or loss as one of the tests for establishing wrongfulness.93 South African courts have 
however stated that the duty of care concept is not part of South African law.94 In South 
African law, in determining wrongfulness, reasonable foreseeability of harm may be 
considered as a factor in determining whether there was a legal duty to prevent harm, 
but its role is small and controversial.95 Even the relationship between the parties 
under the idea of proximity plays a role in determining whether there was a legal duty 
                                                                                                                                                                            
90  See chapter 3 para 5.2. 
91  See chapter 4 para 4. 
92  See chapter 5 para 4. 
93  According to Fagan 2000 Acta Juridica 65 a legal duty to prevent harm and a duty of care are 
almost identical. See chapter 3 para 3.3.2. 
94  See chapter 3 para 4.4. 
95  See chapter 3 para 4.4. 
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to prevent harm, but again the role is small.96 However, South African law has just 
adopted the third element of the English three-fold test (in determining a duty of care) 
in determining wrongfulness.97 The influence of reasonableness in determining the 
existence of a duty of care in Anglo-American law is clearly apparent.  
 
2.4 Protection of interests or rights   
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed in this thesis, tort law and the law of delict implicitly or 
explicitly considers the protection of interests deemed worthy of protection. Thus it 
may be argued that all jurisdictions take into consideration whether an interest is 
infringed in a reasonable or unreasonable manner whether implicitly or explicitly. 
Furthermore, in judging whether the interest was infringed in a reasonable or 
unreasonable manner, a balancing of interests takes place where the plaintiff’s 
interests, the defendant’s interests and the interests of society are considered.  
 
South African law98  makes specific reference to the doctrine of subjective rights. 
Wrongfulness lies in the infringement of a right or breach of a legal duty to prevent 
harm or loss. In the former, the infringement of the right is referred to explicitly while 
implicitly considered in the latter. In respect of breaching a legal duty to prevent harm 
or loss, ultimately a right must be infringed whether it relates to privacy, bodily integrity 
etcetera, although such a specific right may not yet have been identified 
jurisprudentially.99 In South African law,100 the protection of interests or rights is dealt 
with specifically under the element of wrongfulness, where the reasonableness of the 
infringement of the interests is considered (according to the traditional approach to 
determining wrongfulness) and whether it is reasonable to impose liability (according 
to the recent approach to determining wrongfulness). A balancing of the plaintiff’s 
interests which may require protection and redress from the law, for the alleged 
unreasonable infringement of such interests; and the defendant’s promotion of his own 
interests which may result in the infringement of the plaintiff’s interests are weighed. 
Ultimately society’s interests are considered in determining whether the infringement 
                                                                                                                                                                            
96  See chapter 3 para 3.1.10. 
97  See chapter 3 para 3.2. 
98  See chapter 3 paras 3.1, 3.1.8-3.1.9. 
99  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 51-52. 
100  See chapter 3 paras 3.1, 3.2. 
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is reasonable or not by having regard to the boni mores and constitutional values. The 
infringement of interests or rights dealt with under the element of wrongfulness is 
judged objectively and ex post facto.101 
 
English law with its specific torts (approximately seventy individual torts) 102  and 
specific rules relating to each particular tort protect numerous interests, and 
relationships against “unacceptable conduct”.103 English tort law focuses on remedies 
rather than rights, as a result of its historical development where writs were required 
in order to obtain remedies.104 Even though the courts according to the Human Rights 
Act must acknowledge the European Convention on Human Rights, they are still 
hesitant to state that a person has a right.105 Protected interests are at the very least 
implicitly acknowledged and the values of the interests are considered. 106  The 
claimant’s interests are weighed against the “defendant’s freedom to act”.107 However, 
there are glimpses of recognitions of rights, for instance, with regard to the patient’s 
right of autonomy in respect of treatment and the right to family life.108 English law 
focuses on the conduct and the way a person should behave. 109  In the tort of 
negligence, the emphasis is on the duty of care but within the idea of the duty of care, 
the interests or rights of the claimant are considered.110 With respect to personal injury 
or damage to property, a duty of care is more easily established than a duty of care 
for pure economic loss.111 However, where the intentional torts of trespass to the 
person are considered, English law acknowledges infringements of the claimant’s right 
(of bodily integrity, liberty and so on) but may not explicitly refer to the rights.112  
 
Therefore, it may be argued that in English law within the specific torts where the focus 
is on conduct and remedies, there must be a weighing of interests of the plaintiff, the 
defendant and society. In such weighing process, the infringement of interests is 
                                                                                                                                                                            
101  See chapter 3 para 3.1.1. 
102  See Koziol in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 697. 
103  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 71.  
104  Van Dam European tort law 142.  
105  Van Dam European tort law 142.  
106  Van Dam European tort law 220. 
107  Van Dam European tort law 220. 
108  Van Dam European tort law 143. 
109  Van Dam European tort law 146. 
110  Van Dam European tort law 169. 
111  Van Dam European tort law 169. 
112  Van Dam European tort law 169. 
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considered in an objective manner. In considering the tort of battery for example,113 if 
the defendant intentionally commits battery, he is promoting his freedom to act, while 
the claimant’s bodily integrity may be infringed if such physical contact was unlawful, 
non-consensual, and undesired. It seems as though acceptable and unacceptable 
infringement of one’s interests in Anglo-American law is similar to the reasonable or 
unreasonable infringement of interests in South African law. In determining whether 
the infringement occurred in an unreasonable manner under the circumstances, it is 
considered objectively, whether such contact may be regarded as acceptable or not. 
Thus if it is unacceptable, then the defendant has infringed the claimant’s interests 
unreasonably but if it is acceptable, then the plaintiff’s interests have not been infringed 
unreasonably.  
 
In American law, the infringement of a legally protected interest is in principle wrongful 
requiring redress with regard to the intentional torts. In the tort of negligence, if the 
defendant did not act in a blameworthy manner, then the loss should not be shifted on 
the defendant, in light of the principle that the loss lies where it falls.114 In modern 
American doctrine, rights are recognised but may be overridden in that they are not 
absolute but relative. For example, there is a “prima facie” right to free speech115 which 
may however be overridden by “clear and present danger”, limiting the freedom of 
speech. For example, shouting “a bomb” in a public train is not protected as free 
speech because it poses clear and present danger. It poses danger because people 
would react adversely.116 Thus here too, the interests of all parties are weighed, that 
is the interests of the defendant in promoting his freedom of speech, the interests of 
the plaintiffs’, that is, all those affected by the statement as well as society’s interests. 
It is submitted that in determining whether the infringement of the interests were 
infringed in reasonable or unreasonable manner, the competing interests are weighed 
and are ultimately judged objectively. This objective weighing process is not 
necessarily explicitly identified as a wrongfulness or unlawfulness issue, as it would 
be in South African law.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
113  See chapter 4 para 2.1. 
114  See Epstein Torts 87-88. 
115  First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
116  Fletcher 1985 Harv L Rev 978-979. 
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French law117 in general protects any interests as long as they are legitimate, that is, 
as long as the law deems them worthy of protection. It is submitted that faute, when 
pertaining to infringements of property or personality rights or where only so-called 
objective fault is required, is closer to the South African concept of wrongfulness than 
the South African concept of fault.118 Objective fault in this sense means fault without 
imputabilité or discernment (similar to accountability from a South African perspective) 
referring to consciousness of wrongdoing.119 Faute has a broader application beyond 
wrongfulness, which includes fault, for the residual of any cases based on Articles 
1382 to 1383.120 Interests or rights are generally not specifically referred to in French 
law in the manner in which it is specifically referred to in South African law, but they 
are implicitly considered by the courts when interpreting the CC.121 Most of the strict 
liability rules encompasses the right to safety and security.122 “Equality before public 
burdens” refers to equal treatment of all. The right to privacy is also codified in Article 
9 of the CC.123 Reference is made to legitimate interests as well as the abuse of 
rights. 124  In French legal doctrine, even though the balancing of interests is not 
specifically referred to, it is submitted that it does take place. This is illustrated by the 
examples referred to by Moréteau125 with regard to the publication of facts that are 
considered harmless relating to the birth of the fourth child of the Princess of Monaco, 
but facts published relating to the extramarital relations of a French President may be 
considered harmful. In both examples, the defendant’s interest in promoting his 
speech and the plaintiff’s interest in privacy are weighed against each other where in 
the former, the infringement is not unreasonable because it is harmless while in the 
latter instance, the infringement is considered unreasonable because it is harmful. 
With the idea of balancing the various interests, it is submitted that the question of 
whether the legitimate interests are infringed in an unreasonable manner or not, and 
thus how the boundaries of conflicting rights are drawn, an objective approach is 
applied. In French law it is apparent that an objective ex post facto approach is applied 
when faute consists of mainly wrongfulness when dealing with the infringements of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
117  See chapter 6 para 2.2.4. 
118  See chapter 6 para 2.2.1. 
119  See chapter 6 para 2.2.1. 
120  See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 66, 72. 
121  Van Dam European tort law 143. 
122  Van Dam European tort law 143. 
123  Van Dam European tort law 143, 169. 
124  See chapter 6 paras 2.2.1 and 2.2.4. 
125  In Koziol (ed) Basic question of tort law 62. See chapter 6 para 2.2.1. 
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property or personality rights or where only objective fault is required. If it is decided 
that an infringement of a fundamental right has taken place, it is wrongful and a faute 
has been committed. The investigation stops there and then. In other words, without 
having to further prove fault in the form of negligence of intention.126 
 
Thus in all the jurisdictions mentioned, the protection of interests or rights is 
recognised. Within the law of delict or tort law, most interests or rights are protected in 
terms of common law in South African and Anglo-American law, whereas they are 
protected by the application and interpretation of civil law in a codified form in French 
law. Additional and enhanced protection is afforded to certain rights such as the right 
to life, etcetera by constitutional provisions in South Africa,127 France128 and the United 
States of America,129 while statutes protecting particular rights, such as the Human 
Rights Act, in the United Kingdom apply in further protecting certain rights. Depending 
on the source of the protection of the interest or rights, a balancing of the interests 
takes place and those rights that have been afforded enhanced protection may carry 
more weight when compared to others as submitted by Costa Neto.130 In respect of 
whether interests or rights have been infringed, the influence of reasonableness is 
apparent in all jurisdictions. 
 
2.5 The concepts of wrongfulness and fault 
 
Because out of the studied jurisdictions, only South African law recognises 
wrongfulness clearly as a distinct element separate from fault, it is not possible to 
neatly organise the comparative discussions. English, American and to an extent 
French law may, from a South African perspective, be said to combine the elements 
of wrongfulness and fault into one enquiry. In discussing the comparisons it is not an 
easy task to clearly distinguish wrongfulness from fault, and therefore an overlap and 
repetition of some information discussed under this paragraph and others is 
unavoidable. Where there is a clear difference, such as between negligence and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
126  See chapter 6 para 2.2.1. 
127  See chapter 3 para 3.1.3. 
128  See chapter 6 paras 1 and 2.2.4 with regard to the preamble to the Constitution of 1946 and 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789. 
129  See chapter 5 para 1.3. 
130  2015 Rev Direito GV 159 ff. See chapter 2 para 1. 
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intention, it will be discussed under a separate heading where comparative 
conclusions are more easily made.  
  
The concept of wrongful conduct or unlawful conduct is arguably at the centre of fault 
liability systems, but in several systems in Europe and in English tort law it is not 
explicitly referred to, with German law and Dutch law constituting notable 
exceptions.131 The South African law of delict (which has been influenced by Dutch 
law) 132  and German legal dogma recognises the concept of wrongfulness as a 
separate requirement for delictual liability.133 In South African law, wrongfulness lies 
in the infringement of a right or breach of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss, in light 
of the boni mores, constitutional provisions and surrounding circumstances. 
Wrongfulness may also be present where it is reasonable to hold the wrongdoer liable 
in terms of public policy.134 Wrongfulness from the South African perspective is judged 
objectively ex post facto and fault where the blameworthy state of mind and 
blameworthiness of conduct comes into play is judged more subjectively in 
comparison to wrongfulness with an ex ante approach.135  
 
French law also recognises wrongfulness as an element of delictual liability more 
directly when dealing with fault-based liability and indirectly when dealing with strict 
liability.136 Wrongfulness is specifically referred to as the objective component of fault-
based liability.137 In the French law of delict, wrongfulness may be present if there is: 
a breach of a statutory rule; commission of non-intentional fault which by default is 
deemed civil fault; infringement of a right or “abuse de droit” (abuse of a right);138 
breach of an unwritten duty stemming from “regulations, morals, customs, and 
technical standard”;139 or if the defendant’s conduct deviated from the general norm of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
131  See Van Dam European tort law 138; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 8-9. 
132  See chapter 1 para 3. 
133  See Knobel in Potgieter, Knobel and Jansen (eds) Essays in honour of Johann Neethling 236 
and the further authority cited in fn 41.   
134  See chapter 3 para 3. 
135  See chapter 3 paras 3.1.1 and para 4.  
136  See chapter 6 para 2.2.1. 
137  See chapter 6 para 2.2.1. 
138  The violation of rights may be considered wrongful either as a faute in terms of Article 1382 or 
a violation of a protected subjective right such as privacy (Article 9) or ownership (Article 544). 
See Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic question of tort law 61. 
139  Van Dam European tort law 57, 233.  
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behaviour.140 It is evident that in determining wrongfulness in French law, an objective 
ex post facto approach may be applied as well as a subjective ex ante approach. As 
stated above,141 an objective ex post facto approach may be applied where there is 
an infringement of a property or personality right or where only objective fault is 
required. The concept of wrongfulness in French law is however wider than the 
concept of wrongfulness in South African law and when wrongfulness is established 
by considering whether the defendant acted in a socially unacceptable way or 
breached the duty of acting carefully and skilfully under the circumstances, then from 
a South African perspective, the elements of wrongfulness and fault are combined. 
 
Anglo-American law which is based on English common law, do not make the 
conceptual difference between wrongfulness and fault, but rather combine them into 
one enquiry thereby using objective, subjective, ex ante and ex post facto 
approaches.142 Holmes143 submits that “fault” refers to wrongful conduct or moral 
shortcomings in that the actor had “the power of avoiding the evil complained of” and 
failed to avoid such evil. Holmes was, however referring, to fault in the form of 
negligence where wrongfulness is subsumed. 
 
The standard of the reasonable person, as will be shown, is not applied solely in 
determining fault in the form of negligence where a partly objective and partly 
subjective ex ante approach is applied. In English law, there are instances where 
specific reference is made to the criterion of the reasonable person applied not only to 
the tort of negligence but also to the intentional torts. This is evident when dealing with 
the defences of trespass to the person. In the tort of negligence reasonable 
foreseeability and preventability play a role while in the intentional torts, foreseeability 
may play a role in the sense that the judgment of the hypothetical reasonable person 
at the time of the tort and the circumstances prevalent at the time of the tort may be 
considered, but not necessarily foreseeability of harm where with the intentional torts, 
proof of harm is not required,144 nor reasonable preventability of harm. The reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                                            
140  See Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 247. 
141  In para 2.4. 
142  See chapter 5 para 1.  
143  Common law 95. See Wells 1990 Mich L Rev 2356. 
144  Where proof of harm is not required, the torts are actionable per se ‒ this will be discussed 
under par 2.7 below. 
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person test may in fact, in instances have a wider application encompassing the 
reasonable views of the community. For example,145 when trying to establish the 
existence of consent,146 the question may be asked whether the reasonable person 
could conclude under the circumstances that the claimant consented. In respect of 
informed consent, a reasonable amount of information must be provided to the patient 
which would influence the judgment of the reasonable patient. In respect of 
necessity 147  where it is impractical to communicate with the patient, it may be 
necessary to take action which a reasonable person would if it is in the best interests 
of the patient. In this latter instance, reasonable foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff 
is relevant and in acting out of necessity, harm or further harm to the plaintiff may be 
prevented.  
 
No doubt due to the influence of English law on American law, in American law, 
different applications of the reasonable person standard are also apparent. In respect 
of consent, when it is not possible to obtain consent and it reasonably appears that a 
delay in treatment will result in harm to the patient, consent may be waived where it is 
probable that the patient would consent (substituted consent) or that a reasonable 
person would consent. 148 Furthermore, where the consent is determined objectively, 
particularly in establishing apparent consent (not actual consent), the criterion of the 
reasonable person is used in determining whether the defendant’s belief is reasonable 
ex ante, while the act of infringement of the person’s bodily integrity – whether the 
defendant’s reaction to the apparent consent is reasonable is determined partly ex 
ante and partly ex post facto. In determining the reasonableness of conduct stemming 
from the belief, a weighing of the various interests takes place and in this sense from 
a South African perspective, wrongfulness and fault are combined. In the end an 
objective, subjective, ex ante and ex post facto approach is applied.  
 
In South African law, influenced by English law, the criterion of the reasonable person 
test is in some instances applied in different ways, similar to the approaches followed 
in Anglo-American law mentioned above. The reasonable person is considered as the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
145  See chapter 4 para 2 with regard to harassment – the question is whether the reasonable 
person would consider the conduct as harassment. 
146  See chapter 4 para 2.4.1. 
147  See chapter 4 para 2.4.2. 
148  See chapter 5 para 2.5.6.  
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embodiment of the boni mores in the application of certain defences.149 For example, 
in respect of self-defence, the conduct of the person relying on the defence may be 
judged according to the standard of the reasonable person as the embodiment of the 
objective boni mores criterion. With regard to necessity,150 in Crown Chickens (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck,151 the court held that the question that needs to be 
asked “is whether the conduct that caused the harm was a reasonable response to 
the situation that presented itself” and whether the reasonable person would have 
acted in the same manner. The court in this case did not clarify whether necessity 
excluded wrongfulness or fault and this is apparent where the conduct was judged 
objectively ex post facto and subjectively and ex ante. The court here no doubt 
followed the Anglo-American approach where there is no need to differentiate between 
wrongfulness and fault. In determining the reasonableness of conduct in establishing 
provocation,152  the retaliatory conduct must be reasonable according to the boni 
mores, where reasonableness is equated with the reaction of the reasonable person, 
or the question asked by the courts is whether the reasonable person in the position 
of the defendant would have been provoked by the plaintiff’s conduct in the form of 
inter alia assault, defamation or insult. Again an objective ex post facto approach as 
well as a subjective ex ante approach is applied. Furthermore the courts have not yet 
decided whether provocation excludes wrongfulness or fault. In respect of official 
command 153  and whether the command is wrongful, reference is made to the 
judgement of the reasonable person in the position of the subordinate who acted upon 
the official command, in determining wrongfulness. An objective ex post facto 
approach is applied in determining wrongfulness.   
 
It is submitted that grounds of justification or other defences, whether regarded as 
privileges, excuses and so on in the various jurisdictions, are practical expressions of 
reasonableness in that if they succeed they are evidence of reasonableness on the 
part of the person pleading the defence, whether they relate to wrongfulness, fault or 
other elements of delictual or tort liability.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
149  See Neethling and Potgieter Delict 49 fn 83, 92-93, 415, 120-121, 633. See chapter 3 paras 
3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4 and 3.4.7. 
150  See chapter 3 para 3.4.3. 
151  2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122-123. 
152  See chapter 3 para 3.4.4. 
153  See chapter 3 para 3.4.7. 
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In South African law, 154  grounds of justification generally negate the element of 
wrongfulness. Thus the defendant’s conduct in promoting his own interests with his 
freedom to act, which results in the reasonable infringement of the plaintiff’s interests, 
is considered reasonable. In South African law, the grounds of justification discussed 
include: consent to injury or to the risk of injury; private defence or self-defence; 
necessity; provocation; statutory authority; official capacity; official command; and 
discipline.155 In all these grounds of justification, the influence of reasonableness has 
been shown to be clearly apparent.  
 
In English law, the defences relevant to trespass to the person discussed include: 
consent; necessity; self-defence; provocation; discipline; illegality; statutory authority 
and official authority.156 As mentioned,157 Witting158 makes a distinction in English law 
between “absent element defences,” “justification defences” and “public policy 
defences”. Naturally, with absent element defences, an element in a tort is missing. 
This category includes, for example, the defences of consent “doctrines of inevitable 
accident”, “involuntariness”, and “physical compulsion”. The justification defences 
include self-defence, discipline, statutory authority and so on where the 
reasonableness of conduct may apply in upholding a defence. An example of a public 
policy defence is illegality where unlawful or grossly immoral conduct must be proven. 
It is submitted that in general any defence, at the very least, goes to the heart of some 
element of tort liability and if the defence succeeds in negating that element, then it 
may be unreasonable to hold the person pleading the defence liable.  
 
In American tort law, defences to tortious conduct may be in the form of a “privilege”, 
or “affirmative defence”.159 In using a privilege, the defendant in essence “injects 
issues of reasonableness into the case”.160 Fletcher161 refers to justifications as self-
defence, consent and so forth negating wrongful conduct, whereas excuses such as 
                                                                                                                                                                            
154  See in general chapter 3 para 3.4. 
155  See chapter 3 para 3.4. 
156  See chapter 4 para 2.4. 
157  See chapter 4 para 2.4. 
158  Street on torts 316-317. 
159  See chapter 5 para 2.5. 
160  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 42. 
161  1985 Harv L Rev 954-955, 958. See chapter 5 para 2.5. 
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“insanity, involuntary intoxication, duress or mistake of the law” negate the 
blameworthiness in respect of conduct.162 In American law, the defences relevant to 
the torts of trespass to the person include self-defence, defending another person, 
defence of property; the merchant’s privilege to detain or arrest another; privileged 
arrest; discipline; necessity and consent. 163  Once again, the influences of 
reasonableness on these defences are clearly evident. 
 
In the French law of delict, the defences considered are necessity, legitimate defence, 
lawful authority, force majeure, voluntary assumption of risk, consent, contributory fault 
and illegality.164 In French law, the term faute is wide enough to encompass both 
wrongfulness and fault and the victim may choose to bring his claim before the criminal 
or civil courts.165 Necessity, lawful authority and legitimate defence are referred to in 
the French Penal Code166 and may apply as a “bar to liability” negating civil or criminal 
liability, whether based on faute or on the so-called “act of the thing”.167 In respect of 
the defences of consent,168 voluntary assumption of risk169 and contributory fault,170 
the reasonableness of the infringement of interests as well as the reasonableness of 
conduct is considered. In respect of illegality, 171  the defence may be raised if 
compensation itself would lead to “an illicit or immoral result” 172  which may be 
considered reasonable. In respect of all the defences, even if not explicit, the influence 
of reasonableness is to some degree apparent. 
 
Mention should be made briefly of some differences that apply in South African law 
and Anglo-American law with regard to some of the defences.  
 
In respect of necessity, English law does not recognise so-called private necessity 
where the defendant harms another innocent person or causes damage to such 
                                                                                                                                                                            
162  Fletcher 1985 Harv L Rev 961. 
163  See chapter 5 para 2.5. 
164  See chapter 6 para 2.3  
165  See chapter 6 para 2.3.1. 
166  Code pénal. 
167  Moréteau in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 12 with reference to self-defence. 
168  See chapter 6 para 2.3.4. 
169  See chapter 6 para 2.3.3. 
170  See chapter 6 para 2.3.5. 
171  See chapter 6 para 2.3.6. 
172  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 736-737.  
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innocent person’s property to protect his own interests.173 This may be understood in 
light of the fact that the United Kingdom does not have a constitution and the state’s 
rights are afforded more protection than the individual’s rights. Furthermore with the 
advent of Brexit and the uncertainty of the applicability of the Human Rights Act in 
English law, it is uncertain whether the rights of the individual will be held to the same 
status as that of the state. English law makes the distinction on whether the defendant 
acts out of necessity in respect of his own interests, for those of the claimant, and for 
those of third parties. Thus the defence is not recognised where he acts out of 
necessity in protecting his own interest but recognised when acting in the interests of 
others.174  
 
In South African law,175 there is no distinction between private and public necessity 
and where the defendant acts reasonably in protecting his interests or the interests of 
others, depending on the circumstances, liability may be excluded.  
 
In American law, 176  a distinction is explicitly made between private and public 
necessity. Where the defendant acts out of necessity in respect of his own interests 
he acts out of private necessity and where he acts in the interest of the plaintiff or third 
parties, it is considered as public necessity. However, private necessity is not 
considered as a complete defence in that even though, under the circumstances, the 
defendant’s conduct may be considered reasonable, he may still be held liable for the 
loss sustained by the plaintiff. Here it is considered fair and reasonable that the plaintiff 
be compensated for his loss. 
 
In Anglo-American law, 177  where the defences consider the defendant’s belief of 
imminent harm or an attack etcetera, the belief must be a reasonable belief. In 
determining whether the belief was reasonable an ex ante, partly subjective and partly 
objective approach is applied. Thus in order for the belief to be reasonable it must not 
be blameworthy. However, it is evident, as will be demonstrated below, that when the 
courts determine whether the conduct stemming from the belief resulted in the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
173  See chapter 4 para 2.4.2.  
174  See chapter 4 para 2.4.2. 
175  See chapter 3 para 3.4.3.  
176  See chapter 5 para 2.5.5. 
177  See chapter 4 para 2.4.3; chapter 5 para 2.5.1. 
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infringement of interests, an ex ante as well as an ex post facto approach is arguably 
applied. It is submitted that the objective ex post facto approach plays a part in 
determining proportionality and the weighing of various interests. With regard to self-
defence,178 the English case of Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,179 serves 
as a good example for the Anglo-American approach. In this case, the police officer 
alleged that he honestly and mistakenly believed that the deceased was reaching for 
a weapon. This was in fact not the case. At approximately 4:20 am when the police 
raided the deceased’s flat, he had just gotten out of his bed. At the time the deceased 
was shot he was in fact unarmed, unclothed and there was no light on.180 As a result 
of the mistaken belief, the police officer shot and killed the deceased. The police officer 
was acquitted on a criminal charge as his actions resulting from the genuine belief 
were justified. However, the House of Lords held that in a civil claim where the 
intentional torts of battery and assault were alleged, the belief must be held to be 
reasonable. In the civil claim, the police officer’s mistaken belief resulting in the use of 
the defensive force in the circumstances was found to be unreasonable. Lord Scott181 
stated that the function of tort law is different from criminal law, because its: 
 
 “main function is to identify and protect the rights that every person is entitled to assert 
 against, and require to be respected by, others. The rights of one person, however, often run 
 counter to the rights of others and the civil law, in particular the law of tort, must then strike a 
 balance between the conflicting rights. … The balance between these conflicting rights must 
 be struck by the rules and principles of the tort of negligence. As to assault and battery and 
 self-defence, every person has the right in principle not to be subjected to physical harm by 
 the intentional actions of another person. But every person has the right also to protect 
 himself by using reasonable force to repel an attack or to prevent an imminent attack. The 
 rules and principles defining what does constitute legitimate self-defence must strike the 
 balance between these conflicting rights”. 
 
It is submitted that the court in deciding whether the belief and reaction stemming from 
the belief in causing the death of the deceased were reasonable; applied a subjective, 
objective, ex ante and ex post facto approach, in the sense that from a South African 
perspective the enquiries into wrongfulness and fault were combined.  
 
American law holds that the belief must be one that a reasonable person would also 
have had under similar circumstances in respect of self-defence.182 It is submitted that 
                                                                                                                                                                            
178  See chapter 4 para 2.4.3. 
179  2008 1 AC 962. 
180  Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police 2008 1 AC 962 [6] per Lord Scott. 
181  Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police 2008 1 AC 962 [18] per Lord Scott. 
182  See chapter 5 para 2.5.1. 
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the belief and more importantly the reaction stemming from the belief, are judged 
subjectively, objectively, ex ante and ex post facto in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances, taking all the parties’ interests into account.  
 
The views of Fletcher183 provide an interesting insight when comparing American and 
German law. He184 submits that American tort law doctrine easily recognises putative 
defence and a reasonable belief may be regarded as a justification “collapsing the 
problem of putative self-defense into the analysis of actual self-defense”, thereby 
equating reasonableness with justifiability. Fletcher185 submits that the: 
 
 “divergence of common law thinking from continental thinking on putative self-defense derives 
 from a matrix of interrelated assumptions. American lawyers tend to think of all available legal 
 defences as analogous, tend to assume that what is permissible is justified, and tend to view 
 rights as trumpable claims. At the foundation of these assumptions lies the cement of 
 reasonableness, a concept that enables Americans to blur distinctions between objective and 
 subjective, self-defense and putative self-defense, wrongdoing and responsibility”. 
 
Fletcher refers to the “incompatibility theory” where logic tells us that only one person 
can be justified in using force, but in American law a plaintiff who acts in putative 
defence using defensive force on a reasonable mistaken belief and the defendant who 
also uses reasonable defensive force may both be justified. It is justified ex ante 
according to so-called conduct rules where the action is justified and it is judged ex 
post facto according to so-called decision rules.186 Fletcher refers to these approaches 
in judging conduct where, in American law, there is no clear and consistent conceptual 
difference between wrongfulness and fault:187 
 
 “Reasonableness ‒ the ubiquitous modifier ‒ provides the lever for th[e]  flattening of liability. 
 The reasonable person enables us to blur the lines between justification and excuse, 
 between wrongfulness and blameworthiness, and thus renders impossible any ordering of the 
 dimensions of liability. The standard ‘what would a reasonable person do under the 
 circumstances?’ sweeps within one enquiry questions that would otherwise be distinguished 
 as bearing on wrongfulness or on blameworthiness.”  
 
In Anglo-American law, provocation is not recognised as a complete defence,188 
whereas in South African law the majority of academic writers are of the view that it 
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applies as a ground of justification excluding wrongfulness.189 This may be understood 
in light of the fact that Anglo-American law does not make the distinction between 
wrongfulness and fault and therefore it is not crucial to make the distinction of whether 
it applies as a partial or complete defence. Nevertheless, the influence of 
reasonableness is apparent in deciding whether to reduce the plaintiff’s claim, as the 
reasonableness of both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s conduct would have to be 
considered and weighed objectively where the comparative fault of the parties are 
considered. The nature and value of the competing interests would also have to be 
weighed in order to decide whether it is reasonable to reduce the plaintiff’s award of 
damages stemming from provocation or to apply a punitive award as in American 
law.190  
 
As stated above, the South African courts have at times followed an ex ante approach 
in determining some grounds of justification, which coincide with the defences that 
apply to the intentional torts of trespass to the person without appreciating the 
fundamental distinction between the intentional torts and the tort of negligence in 
Anglo-American law. Furthermore Anglo-American law does not distinguish between 
the concepts of wrongfulness and fault but, according to Fletcher’s insights as 
mentioned above, combines (especially from a South African perspective) the tests 
for wrongfulness and fault. Therefore it is understandable that when a subjective ex 
ante approach is used as well as an objective ex post facto approach in actually 
judging the conduct with regard to self-defence using the concept of reasonableness 
or the standard of the reasonable person in different ways, Anglo-American law as 
well as South African law reach the same result. Turning again to the example of 
Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police, 191  the police officer honestly and 
mistakenly believed that the deceased was reaching for a weapon but in actual fact 
was not and the police officer’s shooting and killing of the deceased was not justified. 
In this case inter alia a claim for negligence (in the tort of negligence), assault and 
battery (intentional torts) were instituted. Liability for negligence was conceded but the 
Chief Constable in an appeal denied the allegations of assault and battery, relying on 
the mistaken belief to exclude fault as would apply in criminal law. Looking at it from 
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the South African perspective, judged objectively and ex post facto in determining 
wrongfulness, the conduct is wrongful. Fault would also be absent. Looking at it from 
an Anglo-American perspective, the belief coupled with the conduct was considered 
unreasonable. Putative defence and actual defence were collapsed into one in 
reaching a decision. Thus the conduct of both parties, all the surrounding 
circumstances and the weighing of various interests are considered ‒ a subjective, ex 
ante as well as an objective, ex post facto approach is applied. 
 
The objective, subjective, ex ante and ex post facto approaches that are applied may 
seem theoretically mutually exclusive or nonsensical from some dogmatic 
perspectives, but may also be understood looking at the approaches from different 
angles where both parties’ conduct, the weighing of interests, and all the surrounding 
circumstances are considered using normative standards. In all the jurisdictions 
studied in this thesis and irrespective of elements or terminology employed, the 
influence of reasonableness is clearly apparent when conduct is evaluated and 
interests or rights are evaluated. 
 
2.5.1 Negligence  
 
In all the jurisdictions examined in this thesis, the standard of the “reasonable person”, 
or terms equivalent to it, is used in determining fault in the form of negligence.192 In 
South African and French law, it is dealt with under the element of fault or faute, 
whereas in English and American law it is dealt with under breach of a duty of care in 
the tort of negligence. 193  As mentioned, 194  the standard is objective as well as 
subjective. It is objective in the sense that it applies generally, to cases testing the 
parties’ conduct against the hypothetical model reasonable person. As mentioned 
above,195 the standard may be lowered or raised from the base standard depending 
on subjective factors relative to the person. Depending on the jurisdiction, the standard 
applicable may be the reasonable child, reasonable person with a physical disability, 
reasonable professional and so on, where the test is still objective. Thus it is only 
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reasonable that subjective factors relating to a person’s age, mental and physical 
capabilities, skill, etcetera are taken into account when judging the reasonableness of 
conduct. On yet another level, subjective factual factors relevant to the circumstances 
of the particular case are also considered in judging reasonableness of conduct. 
Taking into account circumstances of the case “brings flexibility and common sense 
to the standard”.196 Circumstances of the case may for example relate to being faced 
with a sudden unforeseen emergency where an ex ante approach is applied but is still 
judged partially objectively based on how the reasonable person faced with such 
emergency would have acted. Thus the courts place the reasonable person in the 
position of the defendant at the time of the alleged breach of duty or alleged 
wrongdoing.197 The test is furthermore partially subjective in so far as the reasonable 
person or his equivalent is placed in the position of the defendant at the time of delict 
or tort, and factors or circumstances that the defendant was aware of, accompanied 
by those factors or circumstances of which the reasonable person in that position 
would have been aware of, are taken into account.198 
 
 In general, in determining how far a person’s conduct strayed from that of the 
reasonable person in all the jurisdictions discussed in this thesis, a number of factors 
may be considered. Reasonable foreseeability of harm is required in the sense that 
not the precise extent or manner of the harm must be foreseeable but whether harm 
is probably or most likely to occur, justifying the need to take precautionary measures. 
If the probability is slight then it may not be reasonably foreseeable but if it is 
considerable then it may be reasonably foreseeable.199 The defendant’s conduct will 
be deemed unreasonable and negligent when he “knew of the risk of foreseeable harm 
or should have known”. 200  In respect of reasonable preventability of harm, the 
following factors are weighed: with respect to the foreseeable harm, the degree or 
extent of the risk of harm materialising and the magnitude of the risk (disadvantages); 
are weighed against the burden, cost, or utility of reducing or avoiding the risk of harm 
(advantages). As Green and Cardi 201  put it, if the disadvantages outweigh the 
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advantages, then the conduct is negligent. If the cost or utility of preventing the harm 
is low compared with the degree and extent of the risk of harm, then the reasonable 
person would have taken the preventative steps. If the cost and difficulty of taking 
preventative measures is high compared to the degree or extent of the risk of harm, 
then the reasonable person would not take preventive steps.202 The Hand Formula, 
albeit in an algebraic formula, considers the following variables in determining 
negligence: the likelihood that the defendant’s conduct will lead to harm; the 
magnitude or seriousness of the harm; weighed against the cost of preventing such 
harm. It is submitted that although the algebraic Hand Formula, which is sometimes 
followed in American law, is not applied expressly in the other jurisdictions discussed 
in this theses, the three variables are indeed factors that are considered in determining 
negligence. They are not followed in a strict mathematical way, but in an informal 
manner based on value judgments.203 
 
In American law, a violation of a statute, for example the violation of a speed limit, may 
serve as an indication of negligence;204 and where conduct is contra to customs or 
practices followed in the community205 it may also be an indication of negligence. A 
weighing of risks and utilities really comes down to a weighing of the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s interests (protected and advanced) and whether harm to the plaintiff could 
have been prevented by less risky alternative measures that could have been taken 
under the circumstances.206 In American law, the element of breach of a duty is usually 
a question for the jury to decide as the representatives of the reasonable people in the 
community. American law does not make a conceptual difference between 
wrongfulness and fault but in determining unreasonableness of conduct and breach of 
a duty of reasonable care, the interests of the parties are weighed, community values 
are considered, and the conduct is generally tested against a standard of 
reasonableness. 
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In English law,207 common practices and expectations also set the benchmark for 
conduct. For example, in Condon v Basi,208 involving the injury of a soccer player, the 
tackle was considered foul play and in breach of the rules of the game but the court 
held that that alone may not lead to a conclusion of negligence. Based on the test of 
reasonableness with respect to sporting activities, the court found the defendant’s 
conduct unreasonable in that he showed “reckless disregard” of his opponent’s safety.  
 
In French law209 too, if conduct is contra to customs; professional rules, practices or 
codes of ethics; technical rules; and private regulations, then the conduct may be 
negligent. The defendant’s conduct may be deemed a faute (referring to the elements 
of wrongfulness and negligence) if it deviates even slightly from the standard of the 
good family father.210 In French law unreasonable conduct may also relate to both 
wrongfulness and negligence.  
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed the influence of reasonableness whether express or 
implied is apparent in determining negligence. 
 
2.5.2 Intention 
 
In South African law, intention encompasses: direction of the will; and subjective 
awareness that the willed conduct is wrongful with reference to the criterion of 
reasonableness, that is, consciousness of wrongfulness or unreasonableness of 
conduct.211 In some instances, in respect of specific forms of iniuria such as unlawful 
detention or wrongful attachment of goods, the courts, due to policy considerations, 
may apply intention, in an attenuated form, where only “direction of the will” is 
required. 212  The three forms of intent recognised are: direct intent (where the 
defendant desires to bring about a particular consequence); indirect intent (where the 
defendant desires to bring about a consequence but simultaneously indirectly causes 
another consequence which he is aware of); and dolus eventualis (where the 
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defendant actually subjectively foresees the possibility of a harmful consequence 
ensuing and, while not desiring it, reconciles himself with such possibility, nevertheless 
continuing with the conduct.)213 A further distinction is made with definite intent, dolus 
determinatus, where the defendant has a specific person or object in mind and intent 
may be present in instances of direct intent, indirect intent or dolus eventualis. In 
respect of indefinite intent, dolus indeterminatus, the defendant does not have a 
specific person or object in mind but may have direct intent (in respect of a specific 
consequence), indirect intent (in realising that other consequences will inevitably 
occur) or dolus eventualis (by foreseeing and reconciling himself with the possibility of 
the harmful consequence as a result of his conduct).214 Even though different forms of 
intent are recognised, in practice any form of intention is sufficient to ground delictual 
liability, providing the other elements are present.215 
 
The following defences, depending on the circumstances may exclude intent: 
emotional distress; jest; intoxication; provocation; and mistake.216 Naturally, if direction 
of the will is absent then there is no intent and it will be unreasonable to hold the 
defendant liable for alleged intentional conduct. With regard to emotional distress, 
provocation, mistake or joke, the focus must be on the defendant’s state of mind at the 
time of the delict. The defendant must show that the lack of intention was reasonable 
thus showing that there was no “consciousness of wrongfulness”. 217  In principle 
whether there is a mistake regarding an aspect of law, a fact, or whether the mistake 
is reasonable or not, such mistake should exclude fault. Where a person is intoxicated, 
intention may be absent if the defendant was not conscious of wrongfulness. However, 
there must be no prior intentional voluntary conduct, which leads to the state of 
intoxication. In instances of provocation where it does not apply as a full defence but 
as a mitigating factor reducing the plaintiff’s claim, then there is some fault on the part 
of the plaintiff as well as the defendant which is taken into account.218  
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In English law it has been mentioned that there is no general definition of “intention” in 
the intentional torts. 219  Recklessness in respect of the consequences and also 
recklessness in respect of the circumstances may fall within the ambit of “intention”.220 
As mentioned above, there are approximately seventy torts in English law and in each 
intentional tort, the required intention varies.221 In respect of battery, intention refers to 
the intention to make direct unlawful physical positive contact. However, where X 
intends to strike Y, but instead strikes Z, intent is present but is referred to as 
“transferred intent”.222 In terms of assault, the positive act by the defendant must 
directly and intentionally cause “the claimant reasonably to apprehend the imminent 
infliction of battery”.223 Intention is required and is sufficient even if the defendant was 
reckless with regard to the consequences of his actions. Liability depends on whether 
the victim reasonably believed that the threat could be carried out soon, so as to qualify 
as an “immediate” threat.224 In respect of false imprisonment, the defendant must 
intentionally and directly cause the confinement of the claimant within a specific area. 
The conduct must be intentional, direct and immediate. With this tort, the claimant 
need not be aware of his deprivation of liberty.225 Where the intentional harm is caused 
indirectly, it does not fall under trespass to the person but the rule in Wilkinson v 
Downton226 will apply. A defendant may thus still be held liable for wilfully causing 
harm, which is regarded as physical harm but caused in an indirect manner.227 Thus 
with the torts of trespass in English law it is apparent that consciousness of 
wrongfulness is not required as in South African law. There are a number of defences 
that may be applied to the intentional torts, as mentioned above.228  
 
In American law, in the majority of the different states, infancy or mental incapacity 
does not negate intent.229 The defendant must have a “purpose” to bring about a 
particular result, or alternatively if he does not have a purpose but acknowledges with 
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“substantial certainty” that his conduct will bring about the result, then intent is 
present.230 American law, from a South African perspective, acknowledges direct and 
indirect intent. When establishing intent, the subjective state of mind of the defendant 
is in question, but the subjective intent is determined from external or objective 
evidence by the trier of facts. There seems to be a desire to move away from so-called 
dual intent, where consciousness of wrongfulness of conduct is not required. In the 
Restatement Third of Torts231 reference is made to “single intent” that is, without 
“culpable intent to harm” but the Restatement Second of Torts232 required the intent to 
cause “harmful or offensive contact”, dual intent requiring culpable intent to harm.233 
In American law, excuses such as insanity, involuntary intoxication, duress or mistake 
of the law may negate the blameworthiness of conduct. 234  Thus the influence of 
English law on American law and South African law, where the intentional torts of 
trespass to a person in English law do not require the element of consciousness of 
wrongfulness as in South African law, aids in understanding why sometimes intention 
in such attenuated form is applied in South African law. 
 
In French law, there are no specific rules requiring intentional conduct with respect to 
liability. In most instances, negligence is sufficient while in others strict liability is 
applicable. Liability for intentional conduct is however relevant with respect to “abuse 
of rights”. There is the objective theory of “abuse of rights” based on society’s 
perception of subjective rights and the subjective theory of abuse of rights which takes 
into consideration the defendant’s motive for promoting his interests. Thus the 
defendant abuses a right, if for example, he has intention to harm. The subjective 
theory is preferred by the Cour de Cassation and the defendant’s mental state in terms 
of intention to harm (intention de nuire), fraudulent fault (faute dolosive), bad faith 
(mauvaise foi) or légèreté blamable (“culpable levity of conduct”) are considered.235 In 
modern French law, “abuse” is defined with reference to a number of criteria, which 
take into account the nature of the right.236 The abuse of rights theory is flexible and 
applicable in a number of situations. The concept of “abuse of rights” does not apply 
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to limit rights but to assist the plaintiff. A violation of a right satisfies the requirements 
of faute and damage for purposes of liability under Article 1382 of the CC.237  
 
The common defences that apply in French, Anglo-American and South African law in 
respect of fault include contributory fault and voluntary assumption of risk. In French 
law, force majeure is a defence that may negate fault or causation. Force majeure as 
a defence is not limited to natural forces and has a much wider application. In respect 
of negating fault and causation, what is relevant is whether the harm was unavoidable 
(not preventable) and unforeseeable. Thus if the harm was unavoidable and 
unforeseeable, then liability will not follow.238  
 
In English law, an unfair contract term in terms of the Unfair Contract Terms Act may 
in principle apply as a defence.239 The influence of reasonableness is apparent in that 
the terms of the contract must be fair and reasonable, otherwise such terms may be 
struck out. A number of factors are considered and weighed in determining the 
reasonableness of a term.240  
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed in this thesis, contributory fault may either exclude 
liability or limit liability, depending on the plaintiff’s fault. 241  The influence of 
reasonableness is apparent where the conduct of the plaintiff is also judged according 
to the reasonable person or good family father.  
 
In South African law,242 voluntary assumption of risk generally applies as a ground of 
justification negating wrongfulness. Consent to the risk of injury (being a ground of 
justification, thus excluding wrongfulness) must not be contra bonos mores, that is, it 
must not be unreasonable, if it is then volenti non fit iniuria cannot apply as a defence 
but contributory fault may.243 In English law it seems that the defence will succeed 
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where the plaintiff’s conduct is clearly unreasonable with some prior fault-related 
conduct. 244 
 
The form of intention known as dolus eventualis in South African law is considered as 
a form of negligence in American law.245 Thus in American law, the requirement that 
the plaintiff must with knowledge and awareness “act unreasonably in choosing to 
confront the risk”, in order for the defence to succeed – is considered an element in 
common with establishing fault in the form of negligence.246 In instances where the 
danger is obvious, such as diving into a clearly visible shallow body of water, the 
plaintiff should have known and appreciated the risk of diving into such shallow water; 
the plaintiff clearly acts unreasonably assuming the risk of harm.247 The Restatement 
Third of Torts248 has done away with the defence of implied assumption of risk but kept 
the defence of express assumption of risk. The court may circumvent the harsh effect 
of the defence of implied assumption of risk by finding that there is no negligence on 
the part of the defendant; no duty of reasonable care owed; or that the plaintiff acted 
contributorily negligent by acting unreasonably in making his choice. Implied risk does 
not apply in the context of employment and some states have also completely 
abolished the general application of the defence.249  
 
In French law, voluntary assumption of risk seems to succeed where the victim has 
“inexcusable” fault, which does contain a subjective element as it takes account of a 
“certain degree of wilful blindness to injury”250, usually involving recklessness and 
suicidal behaviour. Currently the defence can no longer be raised in transportation 
cases and the scope of its application has been restricted in sporting activities.251 It 
has also been excluded when liability is based on the “act of thing” in terms of Article 
1384(1).252 The effect of this is that if for example, a person is injured while racing in 
a rally, voluntary assumption cannot be raised as the injury is caused by the so-called 
act of a thing, the act of the motor vehicle.  
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It is apparent in all the jurisdictions that voluntary assumption of risk is not a defence 
that succeeds often. The defence of contributory negligence is upheld more frequently. 
No doubt, part of the reason why contributory negligence is preferred is because it is 
judged more objectively as opposed to voluntary assumption of risk where the test is 
more subjective, requiring subjective consent, which is more difficult to prove. 253 
Furthermore, the presence of the defence need not lead to exclusion of a claim. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that reasonableness of conduct is important in determining 
the success or failure of the defence of voluntary assumption of risk. 
 
Even though Anglo-American law does not make the distinction between wrongfulness 
and fault and in French law the concept of faute encompasses both wrongfulness and 
fault, at the heart of the enquiries, even in South African law, is the reasonableness of 
harm-causing conduct. Furthermore, whether the reasonableness of the harm-causing 
conduct is considered objectively or subjectively, ex ante or ex post facto; 
reasonableness lies at the heart of the enquiries. 
 
2.6 Causation  
 
In all the jurisdictions that were discussed, the consequences must have been factually 
caused by conduct, either in the form of an omission or commission, with the caveat 
that in French law, the consequences may also have been factually caused by an 
event or so-called act of a thing. The role of causation thereupon moves from the 
factual inquiry into the sequence of events to a “normative assessment of the objective 
imputability of the plaintiff’s injury to the defendant”.254 South African,255 English,256 
and American law explicitly make a distinction between factual and legal causation 
(where either proximate cause, remoteness or scope of liability is the more or less 
equivalent term to legal causation used in South African law) while in French law257 
the distinction is implicit.  
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All the studied legal systems begin the inquiry into causation with the conditio sine qua 
non theory or but-for test. South African, English and American law explicitly refer to 
the but-for test while French law refers to “equivalence of conditions” (l’équivalence 
des conditions) where all acts leading to the harm are considered as causal facts.258 
Therefore, if the harmful consequences would have resulted without conduct or a 
generating event, there is no factual causation and it would be unreasonable to hold 
the wrongdoer liable. Whenever the but-for test produces unfair results, the test may 
be varied or different tests may be applied including common sense standards, either 
as part of the but-for test, or as an independent, additional criterion. It ultimately leads 
to establishing factual causation where it is reasonable to do so.  
 
In instances where the harm results from the defendant’s conduct and some other 
natural or innocent cause, factual causation may be present if the defendant’s conduct 
is considered to be a material cause or contribution to the harm, thereby entitling the 
plaintiff to recover compensation. 259  In English and American law, where the 
defendant’s breach of a duty increases the risk of harm to the claimant, factual 
causation is difficult to prove using the but-for test. It is then sufficient for the claimant 
only to prove the material increase in risk of harm in order to establish causation.260 
The courts take inter alia policy considerations into account in order to reach a 
reasonable outcome.261  
 
In English, American and French law, looking at the example of Fairchild v Glenhaven 
Funeral Services Ltd 262  where the victims were unable to prove which of the 
defendants caused the harm, a pragmatic approach is applied where the burden of 
proof is reversed, requiring each defendant to prove that he did not cause the harm. If 
the defendants are unable to prove that they did not cause the harm, then they may 
all be held jointly liable. In effect, where the defendants are unable to prove that they 
did not cause the harm, the but-for test is applied to the aggregate conduct of the 
defendants. Thus in terms of policy, it is reasonable in such circumstances to find a 
causal link. The claimant as the innocent person should not bear his own loss and be 
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without redress.263 Where two defendants acting independently caused harm to the 
plaintiff, as in the American decision of Landers v East Texas Salt Water Disposal 
Company,264 the joint wrongdoers are held jointly and severally liable for the indivisible 
loss sustained by the plaintiff. Each defendant’s conduct is considered sufficient on its 
own in causing the plaintiff’s loss. The Restatement Third of Torts265 recommends that 
in such instances where each defendant sufficiently causes the plaintiff’s harm, that 
each cause is regarded as a factual cause. The but-for test is not applied, because if 
it were to be applied 266 it would have absolved all the defendants from liability.267 If, 
on the other hand, the loss is divisible, it is reasonable that the defendant should be 
held liable only for that portion of the loss that he caused. 
 
In French and American law, with regard to the DES cases, the “market share” liability 
principle may be applied based of the defendant’s market share of the defective 
products.268 However, in the United States of America, some courts adopted this 
principle, while others rejected it.269 English law, like American law, is divided on the 
loss of chance principle. 270  In South African law the loss of chance principle is 
recognised in determining future loss.271 In French law,272 the loss of chance principle 
is commonly applied. The principle is applied for example, in cases of failure to provide 
medical treatment, or failure to inform the patient of risks involved in medical treatment 
which could have benefited the plaintiff. The loss of chance is expressed as a 
percentage “of the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff”273 or an “advantage that was 
denied as a result of the loss of chance” may be claimed.274 Generally with claims for 
loss of chance, the defendant fails to act positively in preventing the loss of a 
reasonable chance. The plaintiff must establish with “reasonable certainty” a causal 
link between the harm or loss sustained and the defendant’s conduct.275  
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265  (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) §27 (2010).  
266  See chapter 5 para 4.1. 
267  See chapter 5 para 4.1 
268  See chapter 5 para 4.1; chapter 6 para 3. 
269  See chapter 5 para 4.1. 
270  See chapter 4 para 4.1; chapter 5 para 4.1. 
271  See Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 135. 
272  See chapter 6 paras 3.1 and 4.1. 
273  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 460. 
274  Séjean and Knetsch 2014 European tort law yearbook 204. 
275  See chapter 6 para 3.1. 
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In dealing with omissions, hypothetical positive reasonable conduct is inserted in place 
of the omission. American law refers to counter-factual conduct in place of the actual 
omission.276 Anglo-American law acknowledges that it can at times get complicated, 
depending on the facts of the case, to try to establish factual causation where there is 
uncertainty with regard to what happened as a matter of “historical fact” or where there 
is scientific uncertainty as to the cause. Sometimes positive hypothetical conduct of 
the claimant, defendant, or third parties is considered. 277   
 
The question of legal causation in a strict sense deals with limiting liability, involving 
legal policy, and principles of fairness, justice and reasonableness in respect of 
imputing liability for the consequences that occurred.278  
 
In South African law, 279 there is no single test for determining legal causation. Thus 
for example, the “reasonable foreseeability” theory, “adequate cause” theory and the 
“direct consequences” theory apply as subsidiary tests under the umbrella test of the 
flexible approach. According to this flexible approach, the question is asked “whether 
there is a close enough relationship between the wrongdoer’s conduct and its 
consequence for such consequence to be imputed to the wrongdoer in view of policy 
considerations based on reasonableness, fairness and justice”. 280  Thus the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is determined with reference to the 
proximity or remoteness of the act to its consequence or consequences.281 South 
African law considers policy considerations under legal causation.  
 
Like South African law, French law follows a flexible approach whereby a number of 
theories and factors, depending on the circumstances, are used in order to determine 
legal causation. In addition, there is no desire in French law to develop comprehensive 
theories of legal causation. 282 Where required, the adequate cause theory; direct 
consequences theory; reasonable foreseeability of harm; reasonable preventability of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
276  See chapter 5 para 4.1. 
277  See chapter 4 para 4.1; chapter 5 para 4.1. 
278  See chapter 4 para 4.1. 
279  See chapter 3 para 5.2. 
280  S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A) 40-41. See chapter 3 para 5.2. 
281  See chapter 3 para 5.2. 
282  Van Dam European tort law 319. See chapter 6 para 3. 
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harm; fault in the form of negligence or intention; the efficient cause theory; probability 
of harm; presumptions; and policy considerations are all factors that may be applied 
in determining causation.283 The adequate causation theory, where the “wrongful act” 
must have resulted in harm that would be expected to occur “in the normal course of 
things”,284 is applied in cases of strict liability or in instances of negligence.285 Where 
the direct consequences theory is used, only the direct and certain consequences of 
the delict may be recovered.286 It is not always easy to differentiate between causes 
that are certain, uncertain, direct and indirect. The reason for requiring the causation 
of damage to be certain and direct is a policy reason ensuring that the defendant’s 
burden is confined within reasonable limits.287  
 
In English law, with respect to the tort of negligence, the criterion applied to establish 
remoteness or the legal cause (more or less equivalent to the term of “legal causation” 
used in South African law) is currently the reasonable foreseeability of harm. 288 
Witting289 points out that since the decision of Wagon Mound (No. 1),290 courts at all 
levels have followed the principle that “the harm suffered must be of a kind, type, or 
class that was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the defendant’s negligence”. The 
courts have been flexible with their interpretation of what kind of injury could have been 
reasonably foreseeable, depending on the circumstances of the case. At times a 
liberal approach is applied, while at times a more narrow approach is applied. It is 
apparent that in the end when the courts decide to use a narrow or liberal approach 
they consider policy considerations in order to reach a reasonable outcome. The direct 
consequences theory is generally used in determining legal causation in intentional 
torts. The harm or loss suffered by the claimant will not be considered a remote 
consequence if it was a “direct consequence” of the intended tort.291 The intention to 
harm “disposes of any question of remoteness”.292 A defendant who intended to harm 
                                                                                                                                                                            
283  See Spier and Haazen in Spier (ed) Unification of tort law: causation 132. 
284  The focus is on the cause that led directly to the loss discarding causal facts which played a 
trivial or minor part in the outcome. See Moréteau and Lafay in Winiger (ed) Digest of European 
tort law volume 1: essential cases on natural causation 26.  
285  See chapter 3 paras 5.1-5.2. 
286  See chapter 6 para 3 
287  Van Dam European tort law 321. 
288  See chapter 4 para 4.2. 
289  Street on torts 175.  
290  1961 AC 388. 
291  See chapter 4 para 4.2.   
292  Quinn v Leathem 1901 AC 495, 537. 
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the claimant may therefore not only be liable for the intended direct consequences but 
also for unintended consequences. It is apparent that in a sense reasonable 
foreseeable consequences are equated with intended consequences and 
unforeseeable consequences with unintended consequences. Generally causation is 
not an issue in the intentional torts.293 Even though proof of harm is not required in the 
intentional torts of trespass to the person, some form of harm is assumed. This will be 
explained further below under the discussion of harm, loss or damage.294    
 
In American law, in order to determine the proximate cause, or scope of liability (more 
or less equivalent to the term “legal causation” used in South African law),  the courts 
refer to a number of tests. The direct consequences theory, the reasonable 
foreseeability theory, or the inquiry as to whether the consequences are natural and 
probable consequences of the defendant’s conduct without any intervening cause are 
used.295 In terms of the tort of negligence, the harm suffered must be “within the 
defendant’s scope of liability”.296 It deals with the “policy or justice issue” of “limiting 
liability to the risks the defendant negligently created”.297 In reference to proximate 
cause rules it would be unjust and impractical to impose liability on a defendant for 
harm resulting from his negligent conduct which falls outside the scope of risks he 
created. Furthermore the defendant cannot be held liable for unknown risks or risks 
not reasonably known.298 Even though reasonable foreseeability of the general type 
of harm is the most pervasive test applied in establishing scope of liability in the tort of 
negligence, there is still some support for finding legal causation for direct harm as 
opposed to only reasonable foreseeable harm. Whether a cause was direct or indirect 
may be dispensed with by the courts as all that needs to be determined is whether 
“the injury that occurred was within the risk created by the defendant”.299 Adjudicators 
typically instruct juries by stating that a defendant is liable for the “natural and probable 
consequences” of his conduct or that the proximate cause of the harm occurs where 
                                                                                                                                                                            
293  See chapter 4 para 4.2. 
294  See par 2.7 below. 
295  See chapter 5 para 4.2. 
296  Restatement Third of Torts (Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm) § 29 (2010); Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 337. 
297  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 344. 
298  See chapter 5 para 4.2. 
299  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 345. See chapter 5 para 4.2.  
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there is a “natural and continuous sequence, without any efficient intervening 
cause”.300  
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed, a novus actus interveniens may negate legal 
causation. The novus actus interveniens may manifest itself in an act of nature; 
conduct by a third party; or conduct by the plaintiff. In respect of the plaintiff’s own 
conduct, liability may be limited or excluded based on his contributory fault.301 In all 
the jurisdictions discussed, reasonable foreseeability of harm is not the decisive test, 
common sense may be more suitable considering which events are “normal” and 
“abnormal”. Also, depending on the circumstances of the case, the court will not 
impute liability based on policy considerations where it is not reasonable, or 
appropriate to impute liability.302 Thus a new or intervening cause, also referred to as 
a superseding cause, which occurs after the defendant’s negligent conduct may 
depending on the circumstances result in excluding liability. An intervening cause 
breaks the chain of causation and it would be unreasonable to hold the defendant 
liable for the consequences of a superseding or intervening cause.303 
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed, in instances of suicide, the chain of causation is not 
necessarily broken, because the suicide does not necessarily constitute an intervening 
cause. If the suicide was a foreseeable consequence or, in American law, if the suicide 
was within the ambit of the risks created by the defendant, then causation may be 
present.304 Where a person voluntarily acts in a situation of emergency created by the 
defendant’s wrongdoing or attempts a rescue where such reaction is reasonable or 
reasonably foreseeable, such intervening act will not usually constitute a novus actus 
interveniens. The defendant may be held liable for harm caused to a rescuer where 
there is a reasonable rescue attempt.305  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
300  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 346. See chapter 5 para 4. 
301  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 373-375. 
302  See Jones in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 135; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin’s tort law 242-243, 245.   
303  See chapter 3 para 5.2; chapter 4 para 4.2; chapter 5 para 4.2; chapter 6 para 3. 
304  See for example, Road Accident Fund v Russell  2001 2 SA 34 (SCA) in respect of South 
African law; chapter 4 para 4.2; chapter 5 para 4.2; chapter 6 paras 2.3.3 and 3. 
305  See for example, Miller v Road Accident Fund 1999 4 All SA 560 (W) in respect of South African 
law; chapter 4 paras 3.2.2.1, 3.5.2, and 3.3.1; chapter 5 para 4.2; chapter 6 paras 2.3.3 and 3.  
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The thin-skull rule applies in all the jurisdictions discussed. Thus the defendant is held 
liable for a greater extent of harm than that suffered by a normal person. The defendant 
is liable for foreseeable harm as well as unforeseeable harm due to the plaintiff’s 
infirmities.306 From the point of view of the defendant it may seem unreasonable that 
the defendant is held liable for the full extent of the loss, but on the other hand it is fair 
and reasonable to compensate the plaintiff who would not have suffered harm or loss 
had the defendant not caused such harm. All the legal systems that were studied in 
this thesis seem to prefer a claimant-biased approach to reasonableness in this 
regard. Naturally where contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff is applicable, his 
award of compensation may be reduced, although this procedure is not regarded as 
a part of legal causation in all the studied systems.307   
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed, whichever test is used, at the factual or legal 
causation stage, it is only reasonable to hold the defendant liable for the factually 
caused consequences which were not too remote. Van Dam308 is correct in stating 
that in many instances the courts reach decisions based on policy considerations as 
to what is fair, just and reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case. 
However, their decisions are provided using the “language the national law provides. 
For example, the court decides whether the consequences were foreseeable or not, 
whether they were very unlikely or not so unlikely, whether they were direct or indirect, 
or whether they were within or outside the prospective scope of the rule”. 
 
2.6.1 Multiple uses of “reasonable foreseeability”  
 
What English, South African, American and French law all have in common is the 
multiple and somewhat controversial roles of foreseeability of harm in a number of 
elements of liability. It is evident that there are multiple uses of the criterion of 
reasonable foreseeability of harm in a number of elements dealing with tort liability or 
delictual liability. In respect of all the jurisdictions discussed, reasonable foreseeability 
of harm may be used in determining: fault in the form of negligence; legal causation; 
wrongfulness in South African law; and a duty of care in Anglo-American law. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
306  See chapter 3 para 5.2; chapter 4 para 4.2; chapter 5 para 4.2; chapter 6 para 3. 
307  See chapter 3 para 5.2; chapter 4 para 4.2; chapter 5 para 4.2; chapter 6 para 3. 
308  Van Dam European tort law 343.  
732 
 
Particularly under the discussion of American309 and South African law,310 the criticism 
and confusion resulting from this criterion has been discussed in detail and will not be 
repeated here save to point out the manner in which the criterion applies under the 
different elements. 
 
In South African law, as mentioned above, reasonable foreseeability of harm is one of 
the factors that may be considered in determining wrongfulness.311 It is not the main 
criterion used in determining wrongfulness. It is used in determining the 
unreasonableness of conduct and is a factor considered which may indicate the 
presence of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss. Here, the focus is on the 
infringements of interests and whether or not it was infringed by unreasonable conduct 
tested against the boni mores. An objective ex post facto approach is applied based 
on the facts of the case balancing all the affected interests in light of constitutional 
provisions.  
 
In Anglo-American law, at the duty of care stage,312 the reasonable foreseeability of 
harm in a general non-specific sense, that is, foreseeable possible harm to a person 
or class of persons is required.313 Foresight is required, but at this stage the specific 
conduct of the defendant is not yet conclusively evaluated. The question at this stage 
is whether an obligation should be imposed on the defendant to act carefully. 314 
Looking at all the combination of elements applied such as whether it is fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care, a duty of care overall is determined objectively. 
Reasonable foreseeability of harm is one of the criteria that may be applied in 
determining a duty of care. It is not the main criterion and the Restatement Third of 
Torts, as mentioned above, recommends that it does not apply in determining the 
existence of a duty of care.   
 
In all the jurisdictions that have been discussed, when dealing with fault in the form of 
negligence (or breach of a duty of care), the defendant should have foreseen some 
                                                                                                                                                                            
309  See chapter 5 para 4.2. 
310  See chapter 3 para 4.4. 
311  See paras 2.4-2.5 above as well as paras 2.9.1, 2.9.3-2.9.4 below. 
312  See para 2.3 above. 
313  See Dobbs Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 265. 
314  See Lunney and Oliphant Tort 269-270. 
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kind of harm to the plaintiff or his property and should have taken steps to prevent 
harm, if the reasonable person in a similar position would have done so. There is 
consensus that the criterion here deals specifically with a requisite standard of conduct 
and an ex ante approach is applied. It is reasonably foreseeable harm that is most 
likely to occur which may justify the need to take precautionary measures. The 
reasonableness of the conduct of both parties may be considered where contributory 
fault is applicable. Reasonable foreseeability of harm is one of the main criteria in 
determining negligence. 
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed, as mentioned above, reasonable foreseeability of 
harm is one of the tests that may be used to determine legal causation (whether one 
is referring to the terms “proximate cause”, “remoteness”, or “the scope of liability”). At 
this stage of the enquiry, the focus is on the consequences after the conduct has been 
evaluated, after the delict, tort or harm-causing event. The question is whether it is 
reasonable to hold the defendant liable for the factually caused consequences which 
were reasonably foreseeable.  
 
2.7 Harm, loss or damage  
 
Functions of tort law or the law of delict generally include: prevention of future harm;315 
compensation for past and future loss; loss spreading or loss shifting;316 deterrence of 
wrongdoing, also relating to avoiding economically inefficient behaviour; and 
appeasement or satisfaction for the recognition of an infringement of an interest or 
right. Other functions of tort law include “punishment and prevention of unjust 
enrichment”.317 However, compensation is generally considered to be the primary 
aim.318 Civil law has a predominantly compensatory function, while the function in 
criminal law is to punish the offender which takes into account the gravity of the 
offender’s fault.319  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
315  Where injunctions or interdicts may apply. 
316  For example, in cases of strict liability, where insurance liability applies and where the state 
provides social benefits or compensation schemes which may be fault based or no-fault based. 
317  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 19, 739. 
318  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 19. 
319  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 20. 
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In South African320 and French law,321 the element of harm is explicitly referred to as 
a requirement of delictual liability, except in instances where an interdict or injunction 
is sought to prevent harm or the continuation of harm. The same applies to the tort of 
negligence in English and American law.322 Firstly, it must be established whether 
there is harm, based on the proven facts of the case and on a balance of probabilities. 
Secondly, the inquiry into whether compensation should be awarded for the harm 
suffered, and finally the extent of the harm, which involves quantification of the 
damages, must be undertaken.323 It is not necessary to prove damage in all torts in 
Anglo-American law. Some torts, such as the tort of assault and false imprisonment, 
are actionable per se without proof of damage.324 The “tort itself is regarded as harmful 
and the plaintiff is always entitled to recover at least “nominal damages”.325 From a 
South African viewpoint, even though proof of harm, for example, in the form of 
patrimonial loss is not required, some form of harm manifesting itself in the 
infringement of an interest of personality, will be postulated as a requirement. 
However, in the torts of trespass to the person that have been discussed in this study, 
the harm suffered must be significant, in that it must not be trivial, to ground liability.326  
 
The different possible types of damages recoverable in Anglo-American law include: 
compensatory damages; nominal damages; contemptuous damages; aggravated 
damages; punitive or exemplary damages; and gain-based or restitutionary 
damages. 327  Punitive damages are awarded with the aim of deterring further 
misconduct, this relates to the deterrent function of tort law.328 Punitive damages are 
usually awarded where there is some kind of deliberate, intentional or exceptionally 
reprehensible conduct. American law requires some form of outrageous behaviour. 
Awarding of punitive damages has been criticised for inter alia resembling criminal 
fines and for being unpredictable and excessive. However, in spite of the criticism, 
depending on the circumstances of the case, these damages may be awarded. 
Generally, the punitive award should have some kind of reasonable relationship with 
                                                                                                                                                                            
320  See chapter 3 para 6.1. 
321  See chapter 6 para 4. 
322  See chapter 4 para 5; chapter 5 para 5.1. 
323  See chapter 3 para 6.1. 
324  See chapter 4 para 5; chapter 5 para 2. 
325  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 851. 
326  See chapter 4 para 2; chapter 5 para 2. 
327  See chapter 4 para 5; chapter 5 para 5.1. 
328  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
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the harm suffered, or there must be a reasonable proportionality in respect of the 
potential harm or the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff.329 Punitive damages are 
generally not awarded in France but may in the future.330 In South African law, the 
influence of the English principles of “aggravated, punitive, vindictive, penal and 
exemplary damages had a considerable influence”, but in modern South African law 
its application is more relevant under the actio iniuriarum with regard to the 
infringement of personality rights and is more or less irrelevant in respect of patrimonial 
loss.331 Restitution in Anglo-American law is a remedy whereby the defendant must 
repay or return any gains “wrongfully obtained by tort”. 332  Nominal damages are 
usually awarded with regard to the intentional torts in Anglo-American law. 333  In 
France nominal damages are referred to as a franc symbolique. Nominal damages 
may also be awarded in South African law.334 
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed and with regard to the tort of negligence discussed in 
Anglo-American law, compensatory damages in a monetary form are the main award 
for damages. 335  Generally, damages for patrimonial or pecuniary loss and 
compensation for non-patrimonial or non-pecuniary loss may be awarded. 336  In 
France, identifying the different heads of damages is not crucial as any type of damage 
is compensable and even compensation in kind is also possible. 337  In France, 
compensation in kind may entail replacing a damaged item, restoring an item to its 
original state, retracting a statement made, disclosing information previously 
unavailable, re-concluding a legal instrument which was defective or correcting 
incorrect information that was misleading.338  
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed, the idea is to put the plaintiff in the position he would 
have been in had the delict or tort not been committed (restitution in integrum).339 
                                                                                                                                                                            
329  See chapter 5 para 5.5. 
330  See chapter 6 para 4. 
331  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Damages 195-196. 
332  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on torts 4. 
333  See chapter 4 para 5; chapter 5 para 5.1. 
334  See chapter 4 para 5; chapter 5 para 5.1; chapter 6 para 4; Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd 
Damages 198-200 with regard to the award of nominal damages in South African law. 
335  See chapter 3 para 6; chapter 4 para 5; chapter 5 para 5; chapter 6 para 4. 
336  See chapter 3 para 6.2-6.3; chapter 4 para 5; chapter 6 para 4. 
337  See chapter 6 para 4. 
338  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 260. 
339  See chapter 3 para 6.1; chapter 4 para 5; chapter 6 para 4. 
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Compensation is generally awarded for costs reasonably incurred and for future loss 
that is reasonably likely to occur. In this sense, tort law has a restorative or reparation 
function.340 It is accepted that it may not be possible to put the plaintiff in exactly the 
same position he was before the delict or tort; or for the property to be in the same 
position prior to the delict or tort. The idea is to come up with an amount which is fair 
and reasonable in lieu of the loss or harm sustained. The question remains whether it 
is reasonable to compensate the plaintiff for the harm or loss suffered and whether the 
defendant should pay such compensation. The defendant should however, not be 
unnecessarily burdened and this encompasses the idea of corrective justice.341  
 
In respect of non-patrimonial loss in South African and Anglo-American law, it is 
difficult to assess, and there is no exact scientific or mathematical calculation adhered 
to in assessing the awards. The award for pain and suffering is based on the plaintiff’s 
subjective experience. The courts try to attach a monetary value commensurate to the 
nature, duration and intensity of the physical and mental harm experienced. Factors 
such as a person’s life expectancy, age, gender, social status, lifestyle, degree of 
consciousness and culture may be considered. Ultimately a fair and reasonable 
approach is adopted by the courts in assessing non-patrimonial loss.342  
 
In English law,343 the courts make reference to specific guidelines344 in order to ensure 
uniformity when assessing non-pecuniary loss. The guidelines fix a bracket for general 
damages in respect of many types of injuries but cannot provide a bracket for every 
combination of injury that may occur in practice. The adjudicator in the end must make 
an assessment taking all the evidence into account and make an award that is 
reasonable and fair. With regard to pain and suffering, the purpose is to provide 
monetary compensation, as a result of physical injuries sustained.345  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
340  Green and Cardi in Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 442. 
341  See chapter 3 para 6.1; chapter 4 para 5; chapter 5 para 5.1; chapter 6 para 4.1.  
342  See chapter 3 para 6.3; chapter 4 para 5.2; chapter 5 para 5.3. 
343  See chapter 4 para 5.2. 
344  From the Judicial Studies Board entitled Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages 
in Personal Injury Cases (now in its 12th edition, last updated in 2013). See Burrows in Jones 
(gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2042-2043; Steele Tort 508. 
345  See chapter 3 para 6.1. 
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In France, compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not readily awarded because the 
idea behind obtaining money out of one’s tears is considered to be perturbing.346 In 
spite of this view, it is awarded in practice and from the types of injury or harm the 
plaintiff sustained as referred to below, it is evident that French law is in fact more 
liberal with the damages that may be awarded than the other jurisdictions. Non-
pecuniary loss is claimed for the diminution in a person’s well-being which is 
interpreted widely and includes a claim for: “prejudice physiologique”, relating to 
mental and moral harm which includes grief and sorrow; infringement of personality 
interests or rights; injury consequential to the infringement of one’s bodily integrity 
which includes pain and suffering; personal injury; hurt feelings; bereavement or pain 
and suffering suffered by persons affected by the injury or death of the primary victim, 
or due to the death of a beloved animal; “aesthetic damage” (prejudice esthétique); 
loss of amenities or enjoyment; and “sexual injury” (prejudice sexuel) which is separate 
from loss of amenities. A plaintiff who is in a coma, completely unconscious or in a 
vegetative state may even be entitled to claim non-pecuniary loss. It is perceived that 
even though a victim is in an unconscious or vegetative state, such person may feel 
pain and the victim’s failure to communicate or move is considered as harm. By 
excluding compensation for non-pecuniary loss, it would be the same as saying the 
person was dead, which is regarded as contrary to human dignity. There is a list, called 
the “Nomenclature Dintilhac” which generally refers to the “possible miseries” of the 
“human condition”.347 French courts also make use of tariffs, publications published 
periodically by the Jurisclasseur, and special publications by the Gazette du Palais. 
Even though these publications are commonly referred to, in particular, with regard to 
personal injuries, they are only to be used as guidelines. The rule of thumb is to take 
a prior award and adjust it taking into account inflation and circumstances of the 
plaintiff.348 Thus French law too considers all the circumstances in reaching a fair and 
reasonable award. 
 
In South African law, with regard to the actio iniuriarum, in respect of infringement of 
personality rights, the courts are at liberty to make a monetary award based on ex 
                                                                                                                                                                            
346  See chapter 6 para 4.2. 
347  See chapter 6 para 4.2. 
348  See chapter 6 para 4.2. 
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aequo et bono, what is fair and just.349 The customary law principle of ubuntu and the 
remedy amende honorable comprising of a retraction of a statement and an apology 
focus on repair and healing between the parties. The idea is not to penalise the 
defendant but to promote reparation. However, a monetary award is usually awarded 
in addition to requiring an apology.350 In France the publication of a judgement may be 
ordered where the court places emphasis on the reprehensibility of the wrongdoing.351 
 
There is a general rule in all the jurisdictions discussed that that loss of income earned 
illegally cannot be considered in a claim based in delict or tort as it is against public 
policy. The law of delict or tort law in general cannot condone illegal activity.352 In 
French law, there is a possibility that in future “disgorgement of illicit benefits” may be 
awarded. 353  In South African law, when dealing with loss of earning capacity, 
exceptions apply, for instance where the unlawful activity may have discontinued; 
where no harm to the public is envisaged; where the legislation could have been 
challenged; or where the activity was legalised after the breadwinner’s death.354 
 
All the jurisdictions discussed may take into account inter alia prior comparable 
awards, inflation, and interest when making an award.355  
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed, projections of future loss of earnings take into account 
factors such as the age of the plaintiff, education, life expectancy, job status, etcetera. 
In respect of loss of future income, generally a fair and reasonable approach is applied 
and this may be explicit or implicit as in French law. 356 In assessing future loss, French 
courts rarely provide reasons or assumptions with respect to their calculations and a 
gut-feel approach is preferred. However, the requirement that the loss must be certain 
and not hypothetical lends to the implicit influence of reasonableness. 357 Loss of 
income in French law is usually based on the plaintiff’s annual income, life expectancy 
based on statistics, and future loss of income, which is awarded without applying any 
                                                                                                                                                                            
349  See chapter 3 para 6.3. 
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contingencies. Compensation is as a rule not awarded for “loss of earning capacity”, 
only for loss of income. The loss of a chance to earn an income allows the plaintiff to 
claim for future loss of income, however, such loss must be certain and not 
hypothetical.358 The courts in South Africa may rely on actuarial evidence as a guide 
but in general deal with each case based on its own facts, relying on normative 
concepts such as fairness and reasonableness. 359  The courts in the United 
Kingdom360 were previously reluctant to consider evidence in the form of actuarial 
calculations in assessing future financial loss, but have recently considered the value 
of such evidence in a more favourable light, in that it should be used as a starting point 
to check values.361 In English law,362 with regard to future loss of earnings, there is 
much uncertainty and the courts make use of the multiplier method of calculation. 
Deductions are then made reducing the award. The court may adopt any of these 
approaches based on “reasonableness”, “justice” and “public policy”:363 by making the 
defendant liable only for actual loss suffered by deducting benefits received from 
insurance companies, the state, and the employer; not deducting the benefits and 
making the defendant fully liable; holding the defendant liable for the actual losses 
sustained by the claimant as well as liable to those who supported the claimant prior 
to the hearing of the matter.364 In English law,365 loss of life expectancy was abolished 
by section 1(1)(a) of the Administration of Justice Act366  but claimants may claim for 
loss of earnings for “lost years”. The claimant would have been able to work but is 
unable due to his shortened life resulting from the tort. 
 
The collateral source rule applies in South African,367 English368 and American law369 
where the courts generally deduct collateral benefits received by the plaintiff as a result 
of the tort or delict. Voluntary gratuitous (ex gratia) payments received from third 
                                                                                                                                                                            
358  See chapter 6 para 3.1 and 4.1. 
359  See chapter 3 para 6.5. 
360  See chapter 4 para 5.1. 
361  Reference is made to the Ogden Tables (actuarial tables) for use in cases of fatal accidents 
and personal injury. See Burrows in Jones (gen ed) Clerk and Lindsell on torts 2029-2030; 
Giliker Tort 618-619; Steele Tort 492-493. 
362  See chapter 5 para 5.1. 
363  See Parry v Cleaver 1970 AC 1, 13. 
364  See chapter 4 para 5.1. 
365  See chapter 4 para 5.1. 
366  1982. 
367  See chapter 3 para 6.5. 
368  See chapter 4 para 5.1. 
369  See chapter 5 para 5.6. 
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parties and insurance payments from policies, where it is considered unjust and 
unreasonable to penalise the plaintiff for being prudent in taking out insurance, may 
not be deducted. Employment benefits relating to paid sick leave are deductible. In 
South African law, medical insurance payments, pension payments and disability 
benefits generally are considered in reducing the compensation awarded for 
damages.370 In English law,371 contributory pension payments which the claimant is 
entitled to resulting from the tort are not deductible but other benefits received are 
deducted, such as any voluntary payments or items received from the defendant and 
sick pay. The state must not, in terms of policy considerations, subsidise the 
defendant’s liability in tort. Thus section 6 of the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) 
Act372 currently provides that certain social security benefits payed out to the claimant 
for a certain period of time by the state as a result of the injury or accident are 
recovered in full from the defendant, which is his insurer in most instances. The reason 
is to recompense the Secretary of the State. There is then no double recovery by the 
claimant from the state and the defendant, which is also reasonable. In American 
law,373 in line with tort law reform, approximately half of the states have either limited 
or abolished the collateral source rule for certain claims. These claims relate mainly to 
those against public entities and for medical malpractice claims. Some statutes allow 
evidence of collateral benefits, while others require the trier to deduct the collateral 
benefits. The plaintiff whose award has been reduced as a result of deducting 
collateral benefits, may be entitled to add back into the calculation of the award, the 
amounts expended on insurance premiums. Some courts have found the statutes 
unconstitutional, while others have upheld them. Reform legislation in the United 
States has been aimed at regulating damages by modifying the collateral source rule, 
capping awards and limiting awards of punitive damages. Over half the states have 
capped recovery on damages. Some caps apply to particular tort claims such as 
professional malpractice claims, claims against public entities and claims against 
suppliers of alcohol. Some statutes impose a cap on all recoverable damages and 
some on non-pecuniary loss such as for “pain and suffering”.374 In French law, the 
collateral source is not specifically referred to but the principle of “equivalence between 
                                                                                                                                                                            
370  See chapter 3 para 6.5. 
371  See chapter 4 para 5.1 
372  1997. 
373  See chapter 5 para 5.6.  
374  See chapter 5 para 6.5. 
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the harm and compensation” entails that the plaintiff must not be unduly enriched.375 
The principle of “equivalence” prevents recovery of compensation exceeding the real 
value of the damages by combining all benefits, whether private insurance benefits, 
social security benefits, or “guarantee or indemnification funds” with the damages 
payable by the defendant. Naturally this does not mean that the defendant pays less 
and various statutes entitle the insurer, employer and social security “a subrogation 
claim” against the defendant.376 Benefits that replace a person’s income in terms of an 
employment contract or social security scheme, may be deducted from the award. 
 
In South African,377 and Anglo-American law378 where the claimant has incurred or will 
in future incur medical or similar related expenses as a result of the injury sustained, 
the claimant may recover reasonably incurred costs as well as future costs which are 
reasonably likely to occur. The plaintiff is not obliged to use public medical service 
providers in order to comply with the requirement of incurring reasonable medical and 
similar related costs. French law does not explicitly refer to reasonable costs but the 
plaintiff is entitled to hospital, medical and related expenses.379 Reasonable transport 
costs incurred or required in future may be claimed for travelling to and from the 
hospital or other medical providers. This may, depending on the circumstances, apply 
to the claimant’s relatives too.380 In the case of disabilities, where a claimant’s car or 
house needs to be modified, reasonable necessary costs relating to the modification 
of the car or house can be recovered but is limited by what assistance may be provided 
by the government “Mobility Scheme” in English law. 381  In all the jurisdictions 
discussed, reasonable costs of a carer, reasonable costs of employing someone to do 
household tasks, garden or handy work around the house, which the plaintiff 
previously did and is now unable to do, as well as any increased living expenses may 
be claimed.382 In respect of future medical treatment, the courts will be guided by what 
                                                                                                                                                                            
375  Viney in Bermann and Picard (eds) French law 261. 
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379  See chapter 6 para 4.1. 
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law. 
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treatment in the future is reasonably required. The plaintiff must prove the future 
required treatment.383  
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed, loss of support is calculated from the date of death 
of the breadwinner. A dependant must show “that there was a reasonable prospect 
that had the deceased not died, the dependant would have obtained some kind of 
financial benefit from the deceased in the future” and such “dependant would have 
obtained that benefit by virtue of the fact that he was a dependant of the deceased”.384 
Only reasonable funeral expenses may be claimed.385 In the United States of America, 
there are wrongful death statutes that generally regulate compensation to family 
members of the deceased as a result of death of the deceased caused by a wrongful 
or negligent act. The damages for wrongful death are awarded where it is deemed fair 
and just to do so.386  
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed (except France), generally all past and prospective 
loss must be claimed once, based on a single cause of action. 387 Usually lump sums 
are awarded, but periodical payments may be ordered. Interim payments may also be 
awarded as well as provisional damages.388 French law does not make an explicit 
distinction between past and future loss, but damages are awarded for both types of 
loss.389  In French law, if there are changes in the plaintiff’s condition, where for 
example his condition gets worse or the plaintiff proves the “occurrence of a new 
harm”; further compensation may be awarded after the date of judgment. The res 
judicata rule does not affect the plaintiff claiming compensation when his condition 
deteriorates.390 If the plaintiff’s condition improves, the defendant cannot generally 
recover any compensation unless the compensation was paid out periodically with a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
383  See chapter 3 para 6.2; chapter 4 para 5.1. 
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386  See chapter 5 para 5.1. 
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389  See chapter 6 para 4.1. 
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“revision clause”, where the possibility of the plaintiff’s position improving was 
foreseen.391 Again, an approach that favours the claimant is adopted.  
 
In South African law, because of the influence of English law,392  the criterion of the 
reasonable person is once again referred to with regard to the plaintiff’s need to 
mitigate his damages where reasonable. A plaintiff must take reasonable steps to 
mitigate his loss, which is based on the standard of the reasonable person. A failure 
to take such reasonable steps to prevent further loss will result in the plaintiff not being 
entitled to compensation for damages that he could have reasonably prevented.393 In 
South African law, fairness may be “embodied in the judgement of the reasonable 
person: will the reasonable person, in light of all the relevant circumstances, view the 
award as fair in accordance with the legal convictions of the community?”394 In English 
law,395 the use of the reasonable person criterion with regard to the duty to mitigate 
loss, is used in an objective manner based on what the reasonable person would have 
done in the claimant’s position. If the plaintiff’s loss could be reduced by him 
undergoing reasonable medical treatment which could increase his chances of 
employment then he will be expected to undergo such treatment. If the proposed 
medical treatment involves a significant risk, then the claimant will not be expected to 
undergo the treatment in order to mitigate his loss. In American law, the mitigation of 
loss rule also applies.396 In France, a person need not undergo medical treatment to 
mitigate his loss, even if such treatment carries minimal risk or where surgical 
operations are not involved. This principle may be considered reasonable in the sense 
that the victim is free to exercise a legally valid choice. The plaintiff’s fault however is 
also considered where applicable.397 Again, such a perception could be regarded as 
unreasonable only from the defendant’s point of view, while French law takes a 
decidedly victim or claimant-based point of view. Generally what falls within the ambit 
of reasonableness will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
391  See chapter 6 para 4.1. 
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In all the jurisdictions discussed, except France, in respect of damage to property, the 
reasonable market value of the property is considered or the reasonable costs of repair 
of such property. Consequential loss associated with the damage to property may be 
claimed, such as the reasonable costs of hiring a car until such time as the damaged 
vehicle is replaced.398 In France, a more liberal approach is applied and the retail value 
of the property is usually awarded. The market value of the property is usually not 
awarded as it is considered contra to the principle of full reparation.399  In France, loss 
of enjoyment resulting from the damage to property may be claimed if the property 
was used privately or by the family. Damages may also be awarded for loss of use or 
“inconveniences”.400   
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed, the main aim is to compensate the plaintiff for harm 
suffered, where deserving due to the defendant’s conduct. The basic idea behind 
compensation is corrective justice and to restore the balance lost where the plaintiff 
has suffered harm. The idea of only expecting the defendant to pay for reasonably 
incurred expenses; or for future loss which is reasonably likely to occur, in South 
African and Anglo-American law, serves as a limiting factor. In French law where the 
damage must be certain (whether for past or future loss), serves as a limiting function. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable that where the plaintiff gains an advantage or windfall, 
certain amounts he has received must be considered in deducting his claim and that 
double compensation should not occur. The plaintiff should not, however, be penalised 
for being prudent in taking out private insurance and where private insurance pay-outs 
are considered in reducing his claim, at the very least the premiums he has paid should 
be taken into account. That the defendant should not pay more than required is also 
reasonable. Where the plaintiff is partially to blame for his harm or loss, his award of 
damages should be reduced and where his fault is of such a magnitude that it is unfair 
to make the defendant responsible, then it is reasonable that he should not be entitled 
to compensation.  
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2.8 Strict liability  
 
The influence of reasonableness on strict liability in all the jurisdictions discussed is 
apparent, whether stemming from common law, specific legislation or the provisions 
of the CC in France. The risk and profit theory are the main theories advanced for strict 
liability. In light of the fact that the risks were created in the pursuit of some profit or 
advantage, it is considered reasonable and fair that the risk creator should be held 
strictly liable for the harm caused.401 In France, strict liability is more the rule than the 
exception, compared to South African and Anglo-American law where liability is 
predominantly fault-based.  
 
In France, strict liability applies for the so-called act of a private thing,402 of which a 
person is the custodian in terms of Article 1384(1) of the CC.403 A minor or mentally 
impaired person can also be the custodian of a thing. It is also possible that a number 
of persons may be custodians of a thing at the same time. The rule that the defendant 
must be the custodian of the thing at the time of the delict is a reasonable rule. It would 
be unfair and unreasonable if, for example, an owner is liable for damages caused by 
his motor vehicle in an accident, where such motor vehicle was not being used, 
directed or controlled by him. A “thing” is interpreted widely to include animate and 
inanimate objects. Physical contact between the thing and a person is not required. 
Where there is no contact, it must be proven that the thing was defective or “behaved” 
abnormally, or was put in the wrong place.404 The plaintiff must also prove that the 
thing caused harm. The custodian of the thing may escape liability or liability may be 
limited by proving that an external or extraneous cause (cause étrangère) was the 
unforeseeable, unavoidable, external cause of the damage.405 Thus even though a 
custodian may be held strictly liable for the act of the thing, liability is kept within 
reasonable limits where an external or extraneous cause may limit or exclude such 
liability.  
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Article 1384 of the CC is interpreted as providing for inter alia strict liability of parents 
for the acts of their minor children still living with them; and employers for the act of 
their employees.406 An employer is in principle held vicariously liable for the acts of his 
employee, which is reasonable where the employer has effective control over his 
employee and the activities are interpreted as being undertaken during the course and 
scope of employment. Thus the risk and profit theory may also be advanced, where 
the influence of reasonableness is implicit. In respect of strict liability of the parents for 
the acts of their minor children, it must be established that the child directly caused the 
harm or loss. The only defences a parent can rely on are contributory negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff and the presence of some external cause to the damage.407 
Once again the damages are kept within reasonable limits where the unreasonable 
conduct of the plaintiff is taken into account and where there was an external cause to 
the harm sustained. The parents who have children living with them, have the power 
and control over raising their children, therefore in light of this it may be considered 
reasonable to hold the parents strictly liable. Parents take out insurance for such 
potential liability which ameliorates this strict liability rule. Furthermore, even though 
this strict liability rule may seem harsh it may be understood as reasonable in France 
which follows a pro-victim approach. 
 
2.9 Omissions, wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, emotional 
harm or psychiatric injury, pure economic loss 
  
Each legal system has grappled with liability for omissions, pure economic loss, 
psychiatric injury or emotional harm, 408  wrongful conception, wrongful birth and 
wrongful life claims. In all these areas of liability, policy considerations play a role in 
allowing or excluding claims. These claims have been discussed in more detail under 
the discussion of each jurisdiction in this thesis and the main similarities and 
differences will be referred to briefly with regard to the influence of reasonableness.  
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2.9.1 Omissions 
 
In South African law,409 in respect of wrongfulness in cases of omissions, the question 
is whether according to the boni mores, there was a legal duty upon the defendant to 
prevent harm to the plaintiff. There are certain factors that have over time been 
identified as indicators leading to the establishment of whether there was legal duty to 
act positively. These factors are similar to the factors considered in English410 and 
American law411 in determining whether a duty of care exists in cases of omission. The 
factors include prior conduct; a particular office that has been assumed; control over 
a dangerous object or person; rules of law; foreseeability of harm; a special 
relationship between the parties; social and economic concerns; contractual 
undertaking for the safety of a third party; and creation of an impression that the 
interests of a third party will be protected.412  
 
In South African law, if a legal duty to prevent harm exists and the defendant fails to 
prevent the harm ensuing, his omission maybe regarded as unreasonable, contra 
bonos mores and wrongful, according to the traditional approach. Also, providing all 
the other elements are present, according to the recent approach to determining 
wrongfulness, it may be reasonable to hold the defendant liable for the harm sustained 
according to public policy. His failure to act positively is unreasonable and therefore it 
is reasonable to impose liability.413 Even though it is apparent that similar factors are 
considered in determining negligence and the existence of a legal duty to prevent 
harm; in respect of wrongfulness, conduct is tested objectively ex post facto while in 
terms of negligence an ex ante approach is applied, which is objective insofar as the 
defendant’s conduct is measured against the reasonable person standard, but 
subjective insofar as the reasonable person is placed in the particular circumstances 
of the defendant. In South African law,414 liability for the omissions of the state, in 
particular the Minister of Police was discussed extensively and it was highlighted that 
constitutional provisions play a significant role in South African law in holding the state 
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liable when compared to the approach in English law. It will not be repeated here, save 
to point out that English law follows the policy of the state being generally immune 
from liability for its omissions.415 
 
In English law,416 emergency or any other services offering aid or rescue services, 
such as the police, fire brigades and coast guards, are under no legal obligation to 
come to the aid of a member of the public. There is no obligation on a person to give 
a warning either. Some of the policy considerations include that it is not in the general 
public interest to pay compensation to a minority of the public; liability against public 
authorities should be excluded because they need the freedom to operate without 
being too cautious in their practices; and claims against the various public entities 
could lead to the undermining of the framework of public protection offered by certain 
legislation.417 A public authority may however be held liable for making the situation 
worse when it intervenes in a situation. The effect of this is that emergency services 
will not be held liable for failing to respond to a call for assistance, but if the emergency 
service responds, there is an “assumption of responsibility” and they may be held 
liable.418 In the 2008 Consultation Paper Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and 
the Citizen, the Law Commission proposed that, under certain circumstances, a public 
entity should be held liable for harm or loss caused by positive conduct; or failing to 
prevent harm or loss where the authority acts unlawfully; or is at fault. The paper was 
widely criticised in the United Kingdom and there is no indication as to whether the 
proposals will be implemented. Recently, though, there has been a departure from the 
approach of the state being immune from liability and this is evident with the decisions 
of D v East Berkshire NHS Trust 419  and Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough 
Council,420 where the courts interpreted the factors of a special relationship between 
the parties or assumption of responsibility more widely. It may be presumed that 
English law will in future more readily recognise claims in the tort of negligence in 
respect of omissions. Policy considerations will have to be in favour of concluding that 
it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care. The decisions of the European 
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Court of Human Rights no doubt have also influenced the English courts towards 
recognising liability of the state, particularly in cases of omissions. However, with the 
effect of Brexit and the possibility of the government of the United Kingdom repealing 
and replacing the Human Rights Act, it is uncertain if English law will further develop 
tort liability of the state or if state immunity from liability will be perpetuated and 
strengthened.421 
 
In American law,422 there is no general duty to act in cases of pure omissions. There 
are exceptions to the general rule whereby a duty of “reasonable assistance” to the 
plaintiff may be required. These exceptions follow the same factors considered in 
English and South African law in acknowledging an obligation to act positively in order 
to prevent harm to the plaintiff, including where the defendant commences with 
offering assistance. However, the duty to act positively in American law has grown due 
to public sentiment and social policy. 423  Generally with liability for nonfeasance 
(omissions), there must be a relationship between the plaintiff and defendant of such 
a nature that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act. A few states have 
statutes providing that a failure to assist or rescue a person in peril may lead to a 
criminal sanction.424 Thus “reasonable assistance” is required generally when the 
defendant is able to assist without any danger to himself or others and when he knows 
that another has been exposed to grave harm or risk of harm. The notion of 
“reasonable assistance” takes into account the rescuer’s efforts to render aid. 425 
American law takes a different approach from English law when it comes to liability of 
the state. In 1947, the Federal Tort Claims Act became applicable, in effect generally 
abolishing government immunity from tort liability. Thus the government may be held 
liable under the relevant state law in instances where a private person would also have 
been liable.426 If, for example, the police respond to a 911 emergency call but the 
police vehicle goes to the wrong address, the police may be held liable as a duty of 
reasonable care was undertaken. Thus reasonable rescue measures should have 
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been undertaken. This may be compared with the facts of the English decision427 of 
Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police,428 where a woman who feared for 
her life contacted the police requesting assistance. The police, as a result of 
miscommunication between the different police departments, did not attend to her call 
for help immediately and by the time they did arrive at her house, she had already 
been stabbed to death. The Supreme Court following the decision in Hill v Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire429 found that no duty of care was owed to the woman. 
 
In French law a relationship with a place, object, the plaintiff or the defendant may be 
an indication of a duty to act positively. Strict liability rules apply to omissions as well 
as in respect of damage caused by the “acts of things” or acts of others one is 
responsible for. 430  Where there is a relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, for example the relationship between a school and its pupil, or employer 
and employee, there is a strong indication of a duty to act positively.431 In respect of 
omissions, a failure to act positively may be regarded as: violating the general 
obligation of prudence and diligence; or violating an unwritten legal duty to act 
positively which may be deemed as socially unacceptable conduct according to 
Articles 1382 and 1382 of the CC. It is submitted that these general obligations and 
unwritten legal duties to act positively in French law echo the boni mores in South 
African law. In France, in terms of Article 223-6 of the Penal Code (Code pénal), a 
bystander may be held criminally liable if he does not assist a person in peril and where 
he is in a position to do so without risking harm to himself or others. 432 A criminal 
offence is however regarded as a civil faute in terms of Article 1382 of the CC. 
Therefore, by violating Article 223-6 of the French Penal code, Article 1382 of the CC 
provides for civil liability for damage caused.433 The Cour de Cassation434 has however 
held that a bystander will be held liable only if the bystander intentionally refused to 
help when he was in a position to do so. Naturally, if he was not aware of the situation 
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requiring action or if he was unable to assist, he will not be held liable. A subjective 
test is applied to the bystander, taking into account his “personal knowledge and 
abilities”.435  
 
In France, “complete immunity of a public official from liability is unconstitutional”.436 
However, the liability of public entities is regulated mainly by administrative law and 
administrative courts. The administrative courts play a significant role in protecting 
fundamental rights of citizens when such rights are violated by public entities. 437 
Liability of public entities may be fault-based or applied where there is a breach of a 
statutory rule based on the principle of “equality”, entitling a plaintiff to compensation. 
In respect of administrative law, strict liability is also based on “equality before public 
burdens” in terms of Article 13 of the Declaration.438 The notion behind the principle of 
“equality” is that public burdens must be shared equally amongst all the citizens and 
when a citizen bears more than his share of the burden, that is, if a plaintiff has 
sustained “abnormal damage” or “disproportionate damage”, it is reasonable that he 
should be compensated for such abnormal damage sustained. The principle of 
“equality” expresses the community’s thoughts and “solidarity”.  
 
In all the jurisdictions that have been discussed, it is apparent that there is no general 
duty to act. Liability for the failure to act stems from morals and when the community 
believes that a person should have acted under the circumstances, that is, when a 
moral duty is translated into a legal duty. The defendant is not expected to put himself 
in danger or take unreasonable risks. In respect of fault-based liability, the liability 
stems from an unreasonable failure to act positively in preventing the harm in the 
circumstances. Due to this unreasonable conduct, it may, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, be reasonable to hold the defendant liable for the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff. Where there is contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff, 
then it is reasonable that his damages should be reduced. In cases of strict liability, it 
may be reasonable to compensate the plaintiff where he is exposed to abnormal risk 
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or where he sustains an abnormal damage which he should not be burdened with. 
Thus reasonableness plays an influential role in all jurisdictions in cases of omissions.   
 
2.9.2 Wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims 
 
Wrongful conception claims usually stem from failed sterilisation procedures, or where 
the sterilisation procedure was not performed at all, resulting in an unwanted 
pregnancy. The child is born without any disabilities.439 In South African law, child-
raising expenses may be allowed where the parent’s financial reasons for not wanting 
another child are considered, but need not be based on socio-economic reasons. 
Other reasons, such as a couple deciding not to have more children, are acceptable.440 
In English law, a duty of care may be recognised, but the mother is usually only entitled 
to damage resulting from the pregnancy. That is, damages may be awarded for pain 
and suffering experienced during labour; maternity wear; hospital and medical 
expenses; and economic loss resulting from taking time off work; etcetera. The parents 
will generally not be entitled to damages for raising the child as it is considered morally 
offensive to make the defendant liable for the upbringing of the child. It is also 
considered fair, just and reasonable to take into account the benefit and joy of bringing 
up a child.441 In American law, most courts do not allow compensation related to the 
cost of raising a healthy child. Some courts have allowed juries to award child-raising 
costs where the parents wanted to avoid having children for financial or economic 
reasons. Damages relating to inter alia: medical costs incurred during pregnancy and 
delivery of the child; lost wages from taking time off from work due to pregnancy and 
delivery of the baby; and for emotional distress from having an unplanned child, have 
been allowed. Some courts do allow damages for the upbringing of the child, but the 
damages are reduced taking into account the benefit of parenthood rule.442 In France, 
in cases of wrongful conception claims, courts award damages relating to the 
pregnancy and birth, but not for the upbringing of the child.443  
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There seems to be consensus that as a result of the unreasonable conduct of the 
medical practitioner or staff, the parents are entitled to damages related to the 
pregnancy and birth of the child. South African law allows costs for raising the child, 
holding the defendant responsible for unreasonable conduct resulting in the unwanted 
burden of child-raising with its concomitant costs. English and French law, relying on 
policy considerations, deny the costs of child-raising. In English law it is considered 
morally offensive, unfair, unjust and unreasonable to allow the defendant to pay for 
the child-raising costs. American law seems to offer an approach which may be 
considered a balanced approach between two extremes, whereby in some states the 
costs of child-raising are allowed but reduced by the benefit of parenthood rule.444 
 
Wrongful birth claims stem from instances where a congenital condition is not detected 
during pregnancy, resulting in the birth of a child with a disability. As a result of the 
failure to detect and inform the parents of the condition, the parents are denied the 
right to choose to terminate the pregnancy. If they had been informed of the possibility 
or existence of the disability, they would have had the option to terminate the 
pregnancy and, thus, the right to autonomy is infringed. In both wrongful conception 
and birth claims, the claim is usually instituted by the parents of the child against 
medical practitioners or medical institutions. 445  In South African law, claims for 
damages consisting of costs for the child’s maintenance, special schooling needs, as 
well as future hospital and medical costs, are allowed.446 In English law, the parents 
may be entitled to compensation, not for the normal costs of upbringing, but for the 
additional cost associated with bringing up a child with such disability. The birth of a 
child born with disabilities is regarded as a foreseeable consequence of the medical 
practitioner’s negligence.447 In the United States of America, some states have denied 
wrongful life claims or have anti-abortion legislation in place. Other states allow 
recovery for wrongful birth claims, but are tempered by the benefit of parenthood 
rule.448 In France, in cases of wrongful birth claims, the parents are entitled to claim 
for “financial and moral losses” which include non-pecuniary loss. The parents are 
usually entitled to claim medical and related expenses as well as non-material damage 
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for the adverse effect on the quality of their life due to the disability suffered by the 
child.449  
 
It seems that in wrongful birth claims, the negligent and unreasonable conduct of the 
medical practitioner or staff justifies the need for the parents to be compensated for, 
at the very least, medical-related expenses as well as the additional costs of bringing 
up the child with special needs.  
 
Wrongful life claims are instituted by a child living with a disability or disabilities, based 
on the failure of the medical practitioner or employees of medical institutions to detect 
a congenital disability. 450  In South African law, such a claim has recently been 
recognised in H v Fetal Assessment Centre.451 The Constitutional Court held that the 
loss suffered entails the costs of raising a child with a disability. Wrongfulness lies in 
the breach of a legal duty not to cause loss to the child and not to infringe the child’s 
constitutional rights. In using the test similar to the three-fold test in establishing a duty 
of care (in English law), when establishing wrongfulness (in South African law), the 
court with reference to the policy consideration of indeterminate liability, stated that 
the liability is determinate in that either the child or the parents may claim for the loss 
and that it was not unreasonable to impose liability.452 However, the Constitutional 
Court acknowledged that policy considerations may still negate legal causation, but 
that it was for the High Court to determine, including whether all the elements of a 
delict are present.453  In English law, a wrongful life claim is not allowed as it is 
considered against public policy in so far as it is regarded as violating the sanctity of 
human life. Furthermore, in accordance with the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) 
Act,454 a child born after the passing of this Act cannot institute an action based on the 
“loss of a chance to die”. 455  Even though the recent approach to determining 
wrongfulness and the third element of the three-fold test in determining a duty of care 
are similar based on policy and whether it is reasonable to impose a duty of care or 
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liability, two different outcomes are reached. In South African law, the claim is justified 
in protecting the child’s constitutional rights under section 28(2) of the Constitution.456  
 
In American law, most courts do not allow the claim due to policy considerations, in 
that life is preferred to no life, and life cannot be viewed as an injury. In instances 
where claims are allowed, usually only special damages relating to medical expenses 
are awarded. 457  In France, the child was initially entitled to claim based on the 
infringement of a child’s right to bodily health and integrity. From 2002, wrongful life 
claims in France are regulated by legislation.458 Compensation is awarded to the 
parents for the handicap or disabilities and not to the child, as this would mean 
acknowledging the right of the child not to be born.459 This legislation curtails medical 
malpractice claims and Moréteau460 points out that in choosing national solidarity over 
liability of the individual, France gives a clear message that “no life is ever wrongful”.  
 
It seems that with the wrongful life claims, the court and legislature struggle with 
acknowledging that life can ever be wrongful, or that non-existence is better than 
existence. Policy considerations and morality play a role in not accepting the child 
bringing a claim for his wrongful life. South African law allowed claims though based 
on the unreasonable infringement of the child’s rights. Thus the influence of 
reasonableness on wrongful conception, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims is 
apparent. 
 
2.9.3 Emotional harm or psychiatric injury  
 
In South African law, the psychiatric injury or emotional harm sustained must not be 
trivial but “reasonably serious”.461 Evidence must be produced to prove the psychiatric 
injury. Claims for primary and secondary psychiatric injury, stemming from either 
intentional or negligent conduct on the part of the wrongdoer are allowed.462 As a result 
                                                                                                                                                                            
456  Of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
457  See chapter 5 para 3.4.3. 
458  Law No 2002-303 of 4 March 2002. 
459  See Van Dam European tort law 201-202 fn 145 who points out that most European countries 
do not entertain wrongful life claims brought by the child except in Spain and Netherlands. 
460  2006 European tort law yearbook 200-201. 
461  Neethling and Potgieter Delict 287. 
462  See chapter 3 para 8. 
756 
 
of the influence of English law on South African law, the courts place emphasis on the 
criterion of “reasonable foreseeability of harm” which is relevant to determining 
wrongfulness, negligence and legal causation. Wrongfulness lies in the infringement 
of physical-mental integrity. In respect of negligence, the conduct may be considered 
unreasonable and in respect of intention, there must be consciousness of the 
unreasonableness of the conduct. In respect of negligence and the reasonable 
foreseeability of the probability of harm requiring the defendant to take preventative 
measures, the foreseeability of harm is easier to prove in cases of primary emotional 
shock. In respect of legal causation, what must be established is whether there is a 
close enough relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the psychiatric injury 
sustained in order for the defendant to be held liable for the psychiatric injury in view 
of policy considerations based on reasonableness, fairness and justice. If the 
psychiatric injury to the secondary victim is considered too remote, then it 
unreasonable to hold the defendant delictually liable for the psychiatric harm 
sustained. Secondary emotional shock claims are limited by the requirement of a 
strong emotional bond or close relationship between the secondary victim and the 
primary victim. Furthermore, the flexible approach to determining legal causation may 
be easily applied in limiting claims by secondary victims.463  
 
In English law, negligently inflicted psychiatric injury caused by the defendant’s 
unreasonable conduct is compensable. Some form of recognisable psychiatric injury 
is required. Mere mental distress, grief, fear or other emotions are not sufficient to 
ground liability. 464  A duty of care towards primary victims who suffer negligently 
inflicted psychiatric injury is more easily acknowledged than in respect of secondary 
victims. In Page v Smith465 liability for psychiatric injury of primary victims with inherent 
susceptibilities was recognised. Thus general harm must be reasonably foreseeable 
in respect of a primary victim, but psychiatric injury must be reasonably foreseeable in 
respect of a secondary victim. Furthermore, a claim for psychiatric injury by a primary 
victim depends on what was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant ex ante, but ex 
post facto in respect of a claim for psychiatric injury by a secondary victim.466 A 
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secondary victim will have to meet the following requirements in order to succeed in a 
claim for pure psychiatric injury: the claimant must fall within the class of persons 
whose claim should be recognised; proximity must be present with regard to the event 
in time and space, as well as proximity of the relationship between the primary and 
secondary victim; the psychiatric injury must be induced by some form of shock; and 
there must be foreseeability of psychiatric injury to the claimant of normal fortitude.467 
The different approaches applied to primary and secondary victims have been 
criticised.468 Nevertheless, it is evident that the rules of proximity in English law play 
an important role in limiting claims of secondary victims.  
 
In American law, the policy concerns for being cautious in awarding damages for 
stand-alone emotional harm include the danger of a flood of litigation; the difficulty of 
proving and quantifying damages for such harm; how much emotional harm a person 
sustains is subjective; an award for emotional harm may not result in a person no 
longer suffering such harm; and at times it may not be possible to see a reasonable 
limit to claims for emotional harm.469 In respect of emotional harm caused intentionally 
to a primary victim, there must be proof of severe emotional harm, which either a 
reasonable person should not be expected to tolerate, or the plaintiff must provide 
proof of the emotional harm sustained. Intention is required and recklessness or a 
wilful attitude is sufficient. There must be “extreme” or “outrageous” conduct on the 
part of the defendant, which is clearly beyond human decency and social norms.470 
The Restatement Third of Torts 471  limits claims of secondary victims who suffer 
intentional emotional harm, to close family members. Furthermore, the mental harm 
must have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated.472  
 
In the case of primary victims suffering emotional harm inflicted negligently, the 
primary victim must have been in some kind of imminent danger or the harm must 
occur “within the confines of particular undertakings or special relationships”.473 The 
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plaintiff must have suffered severe emotional harm that a normal person would sustain 
or that a reasonable person would foresee. Alternatively, medical evidence may be 
provided proving the emotional harm. In respect of secondary victims, claims for 
negligently inflicted secondary emotional harm are more likely to succeed where: the 
victim was a bystander who witnesses injury or threat of harm to a close relative; the 
victim was in the zone of danger where the victim fears for his own safety; or the 
emotional harm was foreseeable. A close enough relationship may at times be 
interpreted widely, not limiting the relationship to blood or marriage.474  
 
In France,475 in contrast all kinds of mental harm are in principle compensable and the 
mental harm need not result in some form of recognised medical psychological or 
psychiatric injury. The mental harm must result in some damage in terms of Articles 
1382 and 1384 of the CC and any “negative impact on someone’s feelings can amount 
to mental harm”.476 Thus grief is in principle compensable and damages have even 
been awarded for emotional distress as a result of losing one’s pet.477 All that is 
required is a faute relating to the defendant’s unreasonable conduct which must have 
caused immediate, direct and certain mental harm. The courts assess the subjective 
mental harm of the plaintiff in each case and an objective approach is not applied. The 
element of causation plays a role in limiting claims where the damage must be certain 
and direct. If the secondary victim is family or related to the primary victim, there is a 
presumption of a “link of affection” between them. However, the secondary victim need 
not be a relative and what must be proven is a “material or sentimental link” with the 
primary victim. In respect of unmarried couples, the relationship between them must 
have been stable and continuous. Generally there must be some kind of personal 
relationship between the primary and secondary victim.478  
 
It is evident that reasonable foreseeability of harm plays a major role in determining 
liability and limiting liability for psychiatric injury or emotional harm in South African 
and Anglo-American law. Furthermore, American law in applying an objective 
approach makes use of the criterion of the reasonable person, for example, in 
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questioning whether a reasonable person would have suffered emotional harm under 
similar circumstances. Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick479 correctly submit that the “rules 
are not about foreseeability but about pragmatic limits on liability, which are endemic 
to this area”. This is evident particularly where policy considerations are applied. In all 
the jurisdictions discussed, a successful claim for psychiatric injury or emotional harm 
depends on whether there was an unreasonable infringement of the interests in bodily 
integrity, unreasonable conduct in causing the emotional harm and whether it is 
reasonable to hold the defendant liable for the emotional caused. Policy 
considerations play a prevalent role in limiting liability. Thus it is reasonable to 
compensate the plaintiff for emotional harm or psychiatric injury that was not too 
remote. 
 
2.9.4 Pure economic loss 
 
In South African and Anglo-American law, pure economic loss is generally described 
as patrimonial loss which does not stem from physical harm to the plaintiff’s property 
or person. It does not relate to consequential loss which is financial loss resulting 
directly from personal injury or damage to property.480 Conduct must be present, 
whether explicitly mentioned as a requirement or not, and the pure economic loss may 
be caused by intentional or negligent conduct. English law has influenced South 
African and American law with regard to claims for pure economic loss.481 In the 
above-mentioned jurisdictions, the courts are reluctant to award damages for pure 
economic loss for a number of policy reasons. Depending on the circumstances of the 
case, the courts justify their reasons for either acknowledging or excluding a claim by 
referring to policy considerations. 
 
In South African law,482 wrongfulness may lie in the infringement of a right, such as 
with an interference with a contractual relationship, or breach of a legal duty to prevent 
pure economic loss. In applying the boni mores or reasonableness criterion in order 
to determine whether there is a legal duty to prevent pure economic loss, the following 
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factors have inter alia been considered: reasonable foreseeability of harm; practical 
measures that could have been taken to avert the loss; where the defendant as a 
professional professing certain knowledge and competence has a duty not to cause 
economic loss; the degree of the risk of economic loss that may be suffered by the 
plaintiff; the extent of the loss, if it is indeterminate it may be unlikely that the defendant 
had a legal duty to prevent the economic loss; where a statutory provision may indicate 
whether there is a legal duty on a person to prevent economic loss; whether there is 
a special relationship between the parties; and whether there was fraud or dishonesty 
on the part of the defendant.483 It is apparent that the factors in determining negligence 
are also considered in determining whether there was a legal duty to prevent economic 
loss. In addition, the following policy considerations have been considered in order to 
justify not imposing liability for pure economic loss: the concern of indeterminate 
liability; the opening of the floodgates to a high influx of claims; where the parties could 
have protected themselves from loss by other means; the plaintiff’s vulnerability to risk 
of pure economic loss; the law of delict should not undermine and interfere with 
contractual relations where the law of contract may be applied; and liability on the 
defendant would be refused if such imposition is deemed an additional burden which 
would hamper his activities.484 The policy considerations referred to may apply in 
negating the element of wrongfulness and legal causation. The recent approach to 
determining wrongfulness and the flexible approach to determining legal causation, 
which are similar to the third element of the English three-fold test in determining a 
duty of care, apply in allowing or excluding a claim for pure economic loss. The 
question of wrongfulness depends on whether there was a legal duty to act reasonably 
to prevent the pure economic loss, according to the boni mores, judged ex post facto. 
According to the recent approach to determining wrongfulness, it depends on whether 
public policy dictates that it is reasonable to impose liability on the defendant for the 
pure economic loss. In determining legal causation, the question is whether it is fair, 
just and reasonable that the defendant should be held delictually liable for the pure 
economic loss factually caused by his conduct. If the pure economic loss is for 
example, indeterminate, then the consequences may be considered too remote and 
legal causation may be absent. In respect of negligence, it would depend on whether 
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the defendant’s conduct was unreasonable, when judged according to the standard of 
the reasonable person ex ante. If there is contributory fault on the part of plaintiff, then 
liability may be limited or excluded. In respect of intention, what must be determined 
is whether the defendant directed his will towards causing the pure economic loss and 
whether he was conscious of the wrongfulness or unreasonableness of his conduct.485  
 
In English law,486 the policy reasons for not acknowledging a duty of care in instances 
of pure economic loss in the tort of negligence are similar to the policy reasons 
considered in South African law. English law, in addition to the policy reasons referred 
to in South African law, refers to: disproportionate liability on the part of the defendant 
and that the loss is difficult to ascertain and prove. The Hedley Byrne principle487 is 
applied to negligent misstatements. A special relationship between the parties is 
required where the defendant assumes responsibility and there must be reasonable 
reliance on the statement, by the claimant. The extended Hedley Byrne principle488 
extends the principle to instances where services are rendered. For example, using 
this principle, a doctor or dentist is expected to treat his patient with the care and skill 
that a reasonably competent doctor or dentist would exercise. In turn, the patient relies 
on the doctor to exercise care and skill in treating him.489 
 
In American law,490 the economic loss rule is applied and this rule means that in 
general, a person does not owe a duty of reasonable care to prevent economic loss 
to another. There are exceptions, for example, where there is intentional or negligent 
misstatements causing pure economic loss and where the plaintiff relies on the 
statement made. The plaintiff relies on the inaccurate or incorrect information and is 
led to reasonably expect reasonable care of his interests. There must be justified, 
reasonable reliance on the statements made. That is, would the reasonable person 
attach significance to the statement made? The statement must be materially factual 
and not, for example, a mere opinion on future uncertain projections or statements 
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about a product that amounts to “puffing” or “exaggeration”.491 The stranger rule also 
applies, which is similar to the idea of proximity applied in English law, where no duty 
of reasonable care is owed to the third parties, which are considered to be strangers, 
who suffer pure economic loss. The reasons mentioned above as being applicable in 
English and South African law for denying liability for economic loss, are also applied 
in American law.492 In addition, American law refers to the principle that it is unfair and 
unjust to compensate the plaintiff for the economic loss suffered. Thus the plaintiff 
should assess his risk, which includes economic loss he may sustain, and should 
either insure against such loss or contract with another for protection. Some courts bar 
economic loss claims when the parties are considered to be “sophisticated business 
entities” or where the plaintiff is the “sophisticated party”. If however, the plaintiff is 
lacking bargaining power, he may be entitled to an economic loss claim in tort and 
need not be limited to a claim in contract. Intentionally inducing breach of a contract 
and interference with the plaintiff’s contract or economic interests may result in pure 
economic loss. Usually as a result of the defendant’s conduct, a third party breaches 
the contract with the plaintiff or causes economic loss in the form of a reasonably likely 
gain or profit.493  
 
In French law,494 the idea of “pure economic loss” is generally unfamiliar and does not 
exist as an independent jurisprudential topic. However, where there is an infringement 
of legitimate economic interests, then the economic loss may in principle be recovered. 
The damage, however, must be personal, certain and direct. Liability for pure 
economic loss is controlled by all three elements of faute (encompassing an effective 
combination of wrongfulness and fault) causation, and damage. The idea of an 
indeterminate number of plaintiffs is resolved with the element of causation and the 
floodgates argument is not encountered in French legal doctrine.495 In respect of faute, 
the reasonable person test may be replaced with the question of whether one has 
complied with the principles of loyalty, honesty, and good faith. This would apply where 
compensation for pure economic loss is awarded in cases of non-performance of a 
                                                                                                                                                                            
491  See chapter 5 para 3.4.5. 
492  See chapter 5 para 3.4.5. 
493  See chapter 5 para 3.4.5. 
494  See chapter 6 para 9. 
495  See chapter 6 para 9. 
763 
 
contractual obligation.496 Furthermore, the plaintiff would have to prove that the loss 
was reasonably unavoidable. If, for instance, they could have contracted with another 
supplier, then the loss is not unavoidable. If the damage is indirect, hypothetical or 
uncertain, damages are not awarded. It is unfair and unreasonable to compensate the 
plaintiff under the circumstances, as the loss is too remote. In respect of lost 
opportunities relevant to pure economic loss, the courts may either find that the 
damage is not the direct consequence of the defendant’s conduct, or the cause of a 
reasonable loss of chance, or that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of harm 
which would exclude liability. The element of causation is essentially used to control 
unreasonable or excessive claims.497  
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed with regard to pure economic loss, it is evident that 
there is a need to control pure economic loss claims within reasonable limits. South 
African and Anglo-American law specifically rely on policy considerations within some 
different elements of liability to either allow or exclude a claim, while French law mainly 
makes use of the elements of delictual liability in allowing or excluding claims for pure 
economic loss. 
 
3. Recommendations for the South African law of delict  
 
The reason for embarking on this study 498  was a dissatisfaction with the recent 
approach of the courts to determining wrongfulness; 499  the ex ante approach 
sometimes applied by the courts to grounds of justification, which negates the element 
of wrongfulness where wrongfulness should be determined objectively and ex post 
facto;500 the courts’ view that reasonableness in respect of wrongfulness does not 
have anything to do with the reasonableness of the conduct of the defendant;501 the 
equation of breach of a legal duty to prevent harm in South African law, which is the 
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test for determining wrongfulness in cases of omissions, with the duty of care in the 
tort of negligence found in Anglo-American law;502 the conflation of wrongfulness, fault 
and legal causation, in using the criteria of reasonable foreseeability and reasonable 
preventability of harm without appreciating the distinctive functions of each element;503 
and the courts almost dispensing with the requirement of consciousness of 
wrongfulness as the second element of intention. 504  At the centre of all this 
dissatisfaction was the realisation that the concept of reasonableness played a role. 
There is nothing wrong with the concept of reasonableness itself, because it is often 
associated with fairness and justice, whether express or implied in law. These 
concepts are necessary in law even though their application is criticised by some for 
being ambiguous. The real problem lies, it is submitted, in the manner in which 
reasonableness is sometimes used by the adjudicators.505 The distinctive functions of 
the various elements of delictual liability are not clearly kept in mind, and that brings 
about the conflation of the elements and the uncertainty in South African law. It should 
be noted, however, that justice has always been served, and fair results have more or 
less consistently been attained in case law, even though the elements are conflated 
at times. It is desirable in law that there should be uniformity, clarity and certainty. 
Where there is confusion and uncertainty, the adjudicators have the power to remedy 
this by bringing back the certainty and clarity. This is especially the case since the 
South African law of procedure follows the precedent system.506  
 
It is evident from the study of South African and Anglo-American law, that American 
law is based on English law to a large extent and that South African law has been 
significantly influenced by English law. That being said, there are areas in American 
law where there is a notable divergence from English law, particularly in respect of the 
duty of care concept, liability of the state and liability for omissions. To my mind, the 
reason for the divergence in omissions and liability of the state is because American 
common law acknowledges the protection of rights, which is enforced by constitutional 
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provisions. Furthermore, the divergence in the duty of care concept is evident due to 
the acknowledgement of the protection of interests or rights, where the idea of a 
requisite relationship between the parties or proximity is considered to be artificial and 
a duty of reasonable care may be owed to anyone. American law needs to clarify the 
role of foreseeability of harm, or else the roles of the jury and the adjudicator may be 
blurred.507  
 
South African law is referred to as a hybrid system, because, in addition to its English 
law influences, it is also primarily based on Roman-Dutch law. Furthermore, it follows 
a generalising approach and the Constitution has a significant influence on the 
common law.508 This is evident with the constant references of the courts to the 
protection of constitutional rights and the reference to the Constitution in recent delict 
judgments.509  
 
Turning back to the dissatisfaction mentioned above, a study of English, South African 
and French law provided new insights. It is now clear that many of the problems 
relating to the South African law of delict can be traced to the adoption of principles 
from English law. It is understandable that the approaches followed in English law 
work well within their own tort law system. English law has specific torts, there is the 
tort of negligence which deals with negligent conduct, there are specific intentional 
torts which deal with intentional conduct and there are a number of remedies and types 
of damages available in English law.510 Together, as a system, they work in harmony. 
With this understanding, recommendations for South African law can now be made. 
 
To begin with, since South African law follows a generalising approach, all the 
elements of delictual liability, namely: conduct, wrongfulness, fault, causation and 
harm must in principle be present to ground liability. Fault is, however, not a 
requirement in cases of strict liability. All the elements of a delict should remain 
conceptually separate, with their own tests and requirements and each element should 
be determined separately.511 This must apply particularly to wrongfulness and fault 
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and as far as possible the boundaries between them should not be blurred by 
indiscriminately following Anglo-American tort law, where there is no clear-cut 
conceptual difference between these elements.  
 
The recent approach to determining wrongfulness, which is the same as the last 
element of the three-fold test applied in determining a duty of care in English law, was 
an unnecessary approach adopted in South African law. The traditional approach to 
determining wrongfulness in South African law was more than sufficient to deal with 
even novel and problematic cases. 512  Nevertheless, the traditional approach to 
determining wrongfulness, as referred to in this thesis, is still followed in the South 
African law of delict next to the recent approach to determining wrongfulness, which 
is now a part of our law. The two approaches are sometimes combined, with the recent 
approach applying as a final conclusion as to whether the defendant acted wrongfully. 
It is submitted that the recent approach for the sake of clarity could be restated as “is 
it reasonable to impute wrongfulness on the defendant based on policy 
considerations”? In this manner the tests for wrongfulness and legal causation in 
South African law, where reference is commonly made to imputation of liability, are 
distinguished. Furthermore, not all the other elements of a delict need to be 
established before determining wrongfulness, if the test is phrased in such a manner. 
 
In respect of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss, it applies in South African law as 
one of the two main tests for determining wrongfulness according to the traditional 
approach, and should not be equated with the duty of care concept, which applies to 
wrongfulness and negligence without conceptually differentiating between them in 
Anglo-American law. 513  The grounds of justification should remain defences that 
exclude wrongfulness. The South African courts should clearly recognise the defences 
discussed under South African law, namely: consent; private defence or self-defence; 
necessity; statutory authority; official capacity; and official command, as grounds of 
justification negating wrongfulness. By doing this, the courts must ensure that when a 
defence is recognised as a ground of justification, thus excluding wrongfulness, an 
objective ex post facto approach is applied.514 Whether a belief is reasonable or not 
                                                                                                                                                                            
512  See chapter 3 paras 3.1-3.2. 
513  See chapter 3 para 4.4. 
514  See chapter 3 para 3.4. 
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and whether it should exclude liability should be determined under the element of fault 
where an ex ante approach is applied. Anglo-American law does not make the 
distinction between wrongfulness and negligence and does not have a need to make 
a distinction. For example, there is no need to make a distinction between putative 
and actual defence.515 In American law, there is a distinction between private and 
public necessity. South African law developed in a manner whereby necessity as a 
defence, whether private or public necessity from an American perspective, may 
exclude liability and it is not a partial defence.516 If private necessity were to be made 
a partial defence, whereby the innocent plaintiff must be compensated for his loss, 
then there would be a need for the defendant to insure against such potential loss. 
The defence of discipline may soon not be recognised as a defence in South African 
law as the High Court in South Africa has recently ruled that physical reasonable force 
used in disciplining a child is unconstitutional and may be considered as an 
“assault”.517 We have yet to see the Constitutional Court’s ruling on this and whether 
it will affect the defence of discipline in the South African law of delict. Furthermore, 
the courts have not yet pronounced whether provocation applies as a ground 
excluding wrongfulness or as a ground limiting or excluding fault.518 If provocation is 
to be applied as a mitigating factor, it would make sense if it was a defence applied to 
fault and if provocation is applied as a complete defence, as is the defence of consent 
etcetera, then it would make sense that it applies as a ground excluding wrongfulness. 
Again, because Anglo-American law does not make the conceptual distinction 
between wrongfulness and fault, there is no need to decide whether provocation 
applies as a complete or partial defence. Contributory fault is recognised as a defence 
applying to the elements of negligence and intention and the courts do apply an ex 
ante approach.519 
 
It is clearly evident that reasonableness of conduct is considered under both the 
elements of wrongfulness and fault. The courts’ statement that wrongfulness has 
nothing to do with the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct is clearly wrong. As 
shown under the discussion of South African law, reasonableness plays an explicit 
                                                                                                                                                                            
515  See para 2.5 above. 
516  See para 2.5 above.  
517  YG v S 2017 ZAGPJHC 290 (19 October 2017) in a criminal context. 
518  See chapter 3 para 3.4.4. 
519  See chapter 3 para 4.2-4.3. 
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role in determining wrongfulness according to the traditional and recent approach and 
actually plays a role in determining all the elements of delictual liability. The difference 
is that when dealing with reasonableness of conduct under wrongfulness, the test 
focuses on the unreasonable infringement of interests  even if formulated as breach 
of a legal duty, and tested against the boni mores; while when dealing with intention 
and negligence, the focus is on the blameworthiness of the defendant for his conduct 
and hence whether the conduct is unreasonable from that angle.520 In respect of 
negligence, the conduct is tested against the standard of the hypothetical reasonable 
person. 521  In respect of intention, consciousness of wrongfulness or 
unreasonableness of conduct as the second element of intention is required. 522 
Wrongfulness follows an ex post facto approach; while an ex ante approach is followed 
in dealing with fault. Wrongfulness should be determined before fault, which is far 
better when compared to the recent approach to wrongfulness, which requires all the 
other elements to be present before determining wrongfulness. Since the second 
element of intent lies in the consciousness of wrongfulness, wrongfulness should be 
determined before fault. Furthermore, there is nothing wrong in logically determining 
wrongfulness before fault.523  
 
In respect of the role of foreseeability of harm, it should preferably be left to 
determining negligence. However, like the recent approach to determining 
wrongfulness, it is part of our law that is also applied at times in determining 
wrongfulness and often when determining legal causation. At the very least, its role 
should be clarified taking into account the distinctive function of each element. As 
stated above,524 reasonable foreseeability of harm is one of the factors that may be 
considered in determining wrongfulness. 525  It is a factor which may indicate the 
presence of a legal duty to prevent harm or loss. Ultimately, in breaching a legal duty 
to prevent harm or loss, the focus is on interests or rights and whether or not harm or 
loss affecting those interests or rights flowed from unreasonable conduct tested 
against the boni mores. An objective ex post facto approach is applied based on the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
520  See paras 2.4-2.5 above. 
521  See chapter 3 para 4.3. 
522  See chapter 3 para 4.2. 
523  See chapter 3 para 3. 
524  See para 2.6 above. 
525  See above paras 2.4-2.5; para 2.9.1 with regard to omissions; para 2.9.3 with regard to 
emotional harm or psychiatric injury; para 2.9.4 with regard to pure economic loss. 
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facts of the case, balancing all the affected interests in light of constitutional provisions. 
For example, in respect of omissions, where reasonable foreseeability of harm is used, 
the question could be framed in such a manner ‒ was harm to the plaintiff reasonably 
foreseeable requiring the defendant to act positively in protecting the plaintiff’s 
interests or rights? Or in terms of economic loss, the question could be framed in such 
a manner ‒ was economic loss to the plaintiff reasonably foreseeable requiring the 
defendant to protect the plaintiff’s economic interests? In reaching a decision on 
whether the plaintiff’s interests were infringed unreasonably, all interests must be 
weighed taking into consideration constitutional values, the boni mores and the 
surrounding circumstances. In respect of negligence, the defendant should have 
foreseen the probability of some kind of harm to the plaintiff requiring the defendant to 
take steps to prevent harm, if the reasonable person in a similar position would have 
done so. Reasonable foreseeability of harm here deals specifically with 
blameworthiness of conduct and an ex ante approach is applied. In respect of legal 
causation, reasonable foreseeability of harm is one of the subsidiary tests applied to 
determine legal causation. If reasonable foreseeability is used as the test in 
determining legal causation, the question is whether the defendant should be held 
liable for the factually caused consequences that were reasonably foreseeable.526  
 
Under the discussion of American law,527 it is evident that in requiring single intent, it 
will affect children and mentally impaired persons. Accountability in South African law 
is a pre-requisite for fault and is firmly entrenched in our law.528 South African law 
developed in a manner whereby the mentally impaired persons and children, 
depending on their age, may not be held accountable or at fault. Koziol529 points out 
that children pose a special risk and mentally impaired persons require special 
protection. He proposes that the loss stemming from their conduct may be distributed 
amongst everyone by covering such liability in the form of “social liability insurance”. 
Naturally, the legislature would have to intervene in developing such social liability 
insurance as it is unlikely that everyone in South Africa would insure against such 
liability voluntarily. France has dispensed with the element of discernment in delictual 
                                                                                                                                                                            
526  See para 2.6 above. 
527  See paras 2.2 and 2.5.2 above. 
528  See chapter 3 para 4.1. 
529  In Koziol (ed) Basic questions of tort law 793. See para 2.2 above with regard to Koziol’s views. 
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liability but has addressed this by applying strict liability rules. Furthermore, most 
parents are insured against liability for the delictual conduct of the children they have 
control over, at a minimal cost. To reiterate, there is no separate delict of intention and 
separate intentional delictual torts in South Africa, therefore before the second element 
of intent or the requirement of accountability is dispensed with, there is a need to 
thoroughly investigate how it will affect delictual liability and particularly inter alia 
children and their parents, mentally impaired persons, and liability for the infringement 
of personality rights. 
 
The French and Anglo-American approaches to determining causation,530 where there 
are successive causes or where the plaintiff such as in the case of Fairchild531 cannot 
prove which wrongdoer caused the harm, offer commendable answers to some of the 
most difficult legal questions arising in the field of delict or tort. Reversing the burden 
of proof and requesting the defendants to prove that they did not cause the harm is a 
reasonable approach in a claimant-centred system. It is not suggested that policy 
considerations should form a major part of the test for factual causation in South 
African law, but merely that the burden of proof be reversed to the aggregate of the 
defendant’s conduct. The American approach of applying the but-for test to the 
aggregate of the defendants’ conduct is sound. Where the harm is divisible, the but-
for test may be applied to the aggregate conduct of the wrongdoers and they may be 
held liable for their share of the divisible loss. It was mentioned above that where there 
is a delictual and a non-delictual cause of the plaintiff’s harm, the dominant or 
significant cause must be determined. If the delictual cause is the dominant or 
significant cause, it may be considered the “material cause” or contribution to the 
harm, thereby entitling the plaintiff to recover compensation. The but-for test can be 
applied to the combined delictual and natural cause where the delictual cause is the 
material cause.    
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                            
530  See para 2.6 above. 
531  Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services 2003 1 AC 32. 
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4. Closing thoughts 
 
In all the jurisdictions discussed in this thesis and with reference specifically to the 
fields covered by the torts of negligence and trespass to the person, the influence of 
reasonableness is apparent, whether explicitly or implicitly. There must be conduct 
whether in the form of an omission or commission; otherwise it is unreasonable to hold 
the defendant liable. In respect of delictual liability, the tort of negligence and the torts 
of trespass to a person, interests or rights are protected whether express or implied. 
The influence of reasonableness is apparent in the protection of the plaintiff’s interests, 
promotion of the defendant’s interests and the interests of the community, which are 
weighed. The reasonableness of conduct in terms of fault is apparent where the 
blameworthiness of conduct is considered. In respect of the standard of the 
reasonable person in determining negligence, the influence of reasonableness is 
explicit and the standard may be lowered or raised taking into account subjective 
factors relevant to the particular person and circumstances of the case. Where there 
is contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff, it is reasonable to reduce the plaintiff’s 
award or deny his claim because of his unreasonable conduct. A defence which goes 
to the heart of any element will, if upheld, promote the reasonableness of not imposing 
liability as a result of an absent element. It is reasonable to hold the defendant liable 
only if he factually caused the consequences. It is only reasonable to hold the 
defendant liable for the factually caused consequences if such consequences are not 
too remote, in an enquiry that is termed legal causation in some legal systems. It is 
only reasonable to hold the defendant liable if he caused harm, loss or damage. In 
addition, the harm must not be trivial but reasonably serious in order to ground liability. 
 
As shown above there is much common ground in determining liability in delict or tort 
law, because of the influence of reasonableness. Reasonableness, the community’s 
views, morals, policy considerations, equality, fairness and justice are all linked in 
providing value judgments, whether directly or indirectly, in all jurisdictions.  
 
An outcome with regard to liability in tort law or the law of delict must be reasonable 
when looked at holistically. For example, in the case of Fairchild,532 there may be some 
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injustice towards the defendants if only their point of view is considered, but the court 
may decide that this is outweighed by the justice of allowing redress to the victims. 
Thus, in the end, the outcome can be characterised as reasonable. The same should 
apply to policy or policy considerations. For example, in the case of allowing a claim 
for pure economic loss, a policy decision may seem unreasonable to the defendant, 
but may be outweighed by the justice of allowing redress to the plaintiff. Policy should 
holistically be reasonable and justified, if not it should be changed and law reform is in 
principle needed. In principle, looked at holistically while weighing the interests that 
are promoted and those that are adversely affected; policy itself should be reasonable. 
What is regarded as reasonable may change with the times as well as changing social, 
moral and other realities. Ideas of reasonableness vary and this cannot be avoided. 
Any legal system must at least grapple with reasonableness issues and should not 
perpetuate rules that are palpably unreasonable. An implication would be that one 
could personally regard a particular rule in a particular system to be unreasonable, but 
this does not necessarily mean that the legal system does not employ reasonableness 
standards – it could simply mean that reasonableness has, in a specific instance, been 
given a content that may be counterintuitive or even repugnant to a lawyer steeped in 
the tradition of another legal system. Van Dam533 correctly states that reasonableness, 
fairness and justice differ from adjudicator to adjudicator and from country to country 
and so, one could add, also from legal system to legal system.   
 
Fletcher534 states that the “life of law is not simple logic, for all too often there are 
multiple logics, multiple paradigms, at work in legal disputes”. Fletcher535 submits that 
“the standard of reasonableness invites consideration of diverse normative criteria in 
resolving the dispute. It does not, however, necessarily point to a single right answer. 
If there are several reasonable solutions to a particular dispute, then there is no way 
to decide between them but by judicial exercise of choice or discretion”.   
  
Reasonableness is a standard, or a sort of Grundnorm of several standards, by which 
to judge whether the particular elements of a delict are present to ground liability; 
overall whether it is reasonable that a tort or delict is held to be present; whether 
                                                                                                                                                                            
533  European tort law 144. 
534  1993 Harv L Rev 1678. 
535  1985 Harv L Rev 981. 
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compensation should be awarded; and what is a fair and reasonable award in 
quantifying damages. The entire law of delict or tort is steeped in a deep tradition of 
reasonableness - sometimes explicit and immediately apparent, sometimes implicit, 
but at work at an almost subconscious but very fundamental level. No doubt the 
inherent adaptability of delict or tort law when faced with novel challenges, and the 
comparative ease with which the South African law of delict has taken the adoption of 
constitutional values based on equality and freedom in its stride, are in no small 
measure due to the pervasive influence of reasonableness. 
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Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council 1999 3 All ER 193; 2001 2 AC 619 
 
Philco Radio and Television Corp of Great Britain Ltd v J Spurling Ltd 1949 2 All ER 
882 
 
Philips v William Whitely Ltd 1938 1 All ER 566 
 
Phonographic Performance Ltd v DTI 2004 1 WLR 2893 
 
Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd 1980 AC 136 
 
Pilkington v Wood 1953 Ch 770 
 
Pitts v Hunt 1991 1 QB 24 
 
Platform Home Loans v Oysten Shipways Ltd 2000 2 AC 190 
 
Poppleton v Trustees of the Portsmouth Youth Activities a Committee 2007 EWHC 
1567 QB 
 
Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt 2005 1 WLR 3995 
 
Pretty v United Kingdom (2346/02) 2002 35 EHRR 
 
Pritchard v Co-operative Group Ltd 2012 QB 320 
836  
Purdue v Devon Fire and Rescue Services 2002 EWCA Civ 1538 
 
Quinn v Leathem 1901 AC 495 
 
R v Beasley 1981 73 Cr App R 44 
 
R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L 1998 2 WLR 
764 
 
R v Cort 2004 QB 388 
 
R v Dica 2004 QB 1257 
 
R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans (NO 2) 2001 2 AC 19 
 
R v Hopley 1860 2 F & F 202 
 
R v Ireland 1998 AC 147 
 
R v Rahman 1985 81 Cr App R 349 
 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Greenfield 2005 UKHL 14 
 
R v Self 1992 3 All ER 476 
 
R v Williams 1923 1 KB 340 
 
R v Woods 1921 85 JP 272 
 
R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2012 1 AC 245 
 
R (on the application of WL (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
2011 2 WLR 671 
 
Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust 2012 2 AC 72 
 
Rahman v Arearose Ltd 2001 QB 351 
 
Re (A) (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical operation) 2001 Fam 147 
 
Re A (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) 2000 1 FLR 549 CA 
 
Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilization); F v West Berkshire Health Authority 1990 2 AC 1 
 
Re JT (Adult refusal of medical treatment) 1998 1 FLR 48 
 
Re P (A Minor) 1981 80 LGR 301 
 
Re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co Ltd 1921 3 KB 560 
 
Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation: Patient’s Best interests) 2001 Fam 15 CA 
837  
Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) 1993 Fam 95 
 
Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) 1993 Fam 64 
 
Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) 1998 3 All ER 673 
 
Read v Cocker 138 ER 1437 
 
Reeman v Department of Transport 1997 2 Lloyd’s Rep 648 
 
Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust 2004 1 AC 309 
 
Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 2000 1 AC 360 
 
Revill v Newbery 1996 QB 567 
 
Rigby v CC Northhampshire 1985 1 WLR 1242 
 
Roberts v Chief Constable of the Cheshire Constabulary 1999 1 WLR 662 
 
Roberts v Ramsbottom 1980 1 ALL ER 7 (QB); 1980 1 WLR 823 
 
Robertson v Balmain Ferry Co Ltd 1910 AC 295 
 
Robinson v Post Office 1974 2 All ER 737 
 
Roe v Minister of Health 1954 2 QB 66 
 
Rookes v Barnard 1964 AC 1129 
 
Ross v Caunters 1980 Ch 297 
 
Rothwell v Chemical and Insulating Co Ltd 2008 1 AC 281 
 
Rowley v London and North Western Ry Co 1873 LR 8 Exch 221 
 
Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd 1988 AC 473 
 
Rylands v Fletcher 1868 UKHL 1 
 
Savage v Wallis 1966 1 Lloyd’s Rep 357 
 
Sayers v Harlow UDC 1958 1 WLR 623 
 
Scott v Mathew Brown & Co Ltd 1884 51 LT 746 
 
Scott v Shepherd 1773 2 Wm BI 892; 1773 3 Wils 403; 96 ER 525 
 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb 1995 Fam 127 
 
Shaw v Wirral HA 1993 4 Med LR 275 
 
Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital 1985 AC 871 
838  
Sienkiewicz v Grief (UK) Ltd 2011 2 AC 229 
 
Simaan General Contracting v Pilkington Glass Ltd (No 2) 1988 2 WLR 761 
 
Simms v Simms 2003 Fam 83 
 
Slater v Clay Cross Co Ltd 1956 2 QB 264 
 
Smith v Charles Baker & Sons 1891 AC 325 
 
Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police 2009 1 AC 225 
 
Smith v Eric Bush 1990 1 AC 831 
 
Smith v Jenkins 1970 119 CLR 397 
 
Smith v Leech Brain 1962 2 QB 405 
 
Smith v Littlewoods Organisation 1987 AC 241 
 
Smoker v London Fire and Civil Defence Authority 1991 2 AC 502 
 
South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague 1997 AC 191 
 
Southport Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd 1954 2 QB 182 
 
Sowden v Lodge 2004 EWCA Civ 1370 
 
Sowden v Lodge; Crookdale v Drury 2005 1 WLR 2129 
 
Spartan Steel and Alloys v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd 1973 1 QB 27 
 
Spencer v Wincanton Holdings 2010 PIQR P8 
 
Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc 1995 2 AC 296 
 
St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S 1998 2 WLR 936 
 
Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (Nos 2 and 4) 
2003 1 AC 959 
 
Stansbie v Troman 1948 2 KB 48 
 
Stanton v Collinson 2009 EWHC 342 QB 
 
Stephen v Myers 172 ER 735 
 
Stephens v Anglian Water Authority 1987 1 WLR 1381 
 
Sterman v EW & W J Moore Ltd 1970 1 QB 596 
 
Stovin v Wise 1996 AC 923 
839  
Surrey CC v P 2014 2 WLR 642 
 
Sutradhar v National Environment Research Council 2006 4 All ER 490 
 
Swinney v Chief Constable of the Northumbria Police1997 QB 464 
 
Taff v Vale Railway Co v Jenkins 1913 AC 1 
 
Tate & Lyle Industries Ltd v Greater London Council 1983 2 AC 509 
 
Taylor v A Novo (UK) Ltd 2014 QB 150 
 
Taylor v O’Connor 1971 AC 115 
 
The Oropesa 1943 P32 
 
Thomas v Quartermaine 1887 LR 18 QBD 685 
 
Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd 1984 QB 405 
 
Tolley v Carr 2010 EWHC 2191 QB 
 
Tomlinson v Congleton BC 2004 1 AC 46 
 
Tremain v Pike 1969 1 WLR 1556 
 
Tuberville v Savage 1669 1 Mod Rep 3; 86 ER 684 
 
Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police 2009 1 AC 225 
 
Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire and Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex 
2008 UKHL 50; 2009 1 AC 225 
 
Van Colle v United Kingdom 56 EHRR 23 
 
Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 3 Bing NC 468; 132 ER 490 (CP) 
 
Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police 2002 1 WLR 218 
 
Vernon v Bosley 1997 1 All ER 577 
 
Videan v BTC 1963 2 QB 650 
 
W v Essex County Council 2001 2 AC 592 
 
W v Veolia Environment Services (UK) Plc 2011 EWHC 2020 QB 
 
Wainwright v Home Office 2004 2 AC 406 
 
Walker v Northumberland County Council 1995 PIQR 521; 1995 1 All ER 737 
 
Walters v WH Smith & Son 1914 1 KB 595 
840  
Ward v Cannock Chase 1986 Ch 546 
 
Ward v London County Council 1938 2 All ER 341 
 
Watt v Hertfordshire County Council 1954 1 WLR 835 
 
Waugh v James K Allen Ltd 1964 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 
 
Weaver v Ward 1617 80 ER 284 
 
Webb v Barclays Bank Plc and Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust 2002 PIQR P8 
 
Weld-Blundell v Stephens 1920 AC 956 
 
Weldon v GRE Linked Life Assurance Ltd 2000 2 All ER (Comm) 914 
 
Weller & Co v Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute 1966 1 QB 569 
 
Weller, Spartan Steel & Co Ltd v Martin 1973 1 QB 27 
 
Wells v Cooper 1958 2 QB 265 
 
Wells v Wells 1999 1 AC 345 
 
Welton v North Cornwall DC 1997 1 WLR 570 
 
White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 1999 2 AC 455 
 
White v Jones 1995 2 AC 207 
 
Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd 1969 3 All ER 1006 
 
Wilkinson v Downton 1897 2 QB 57 
 
Wilks v Cheltenham Cycle Club 1971 1 WLR 668 
 
Williams v BOC Gases Ltd 2000 1 CR 1181 
 
Williams v Natural Life Foods Ltd 1998 1 WLR 830 
 
Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority 1987 QB 730 
 
Wilson v Pringle 1987 QB 237 
 
Winkworth v Hubbard 1960 1 Lloyd’s Rep 150 
 
Woodrup v Nicol 1993 PIQR Q104 
 
Woolridge v Sumner 1963 2 QB 43 
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Cass ch mixte 30 April 1976 74-90280, Bull ch mixte 1976 3 2 
 
Cass ch mixte 28 November 2008 06-12307, Bull ch mixte 2008 3 
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Cass civ 1 14 December 1965, JCP 1966 II 14753 note Savatier 
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Cass civ 1 17 November 1982, JCP 1983 II 20056, D 1984 305 
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Cass civ 2 5 June 1957, D 1957 Jur 493 (Lizinger v Kintzler) 
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Cass civ 2 8 February 1962, Bull civ 1962 II 180 
 
Cass civ 2 18 October 1962, Bull civ 1962 II 288 201 
 
Cass civ 2 18 January 1963, JCP 1963 II 13316 note Blaevoёt 
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Cass civ 2 1 December 1965, JCP 1966 2 14567 
 
Cass civ 2 15 December 1965, D 1966 Jur 397 (Buguel v Morin) 
Cass civ 2 10 February 1966, D 1966 332 
Cass civ 2 28 April 1966 Bull civ II no 498 
 
Cass civ 2 12 May 1966, Bull civ 1966 II 564 
 
Cass civ 2 12 May 1966, D 1966 700 note Azard 
 
Cass civ 2 19 July 1966, JCP 1967 15228 note Dejean de la Bathie, Gaz Pal 1996 II 
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Cass civ 2 18 September 1996 94-20580, Bull civ 1996 II 217133, D 1998 Jur 118 
 
Cass civ 2 6 October 1966 
 
Cass civ 2 8 October 1967, Bull civ 1967 II 288 
 
Cass civ 2 22 May 1968 note 102; Cass civ 2 9 November 1971, D 1972 75 
 
Cass civ 2 18 March 1969, Bull civ 1969 II 117 
 
Cass civ 2 22 January 1970 68-12064, Bull civ 1970 II 24 17, D 1970 228, RTD civ 
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Cass civ 2 4 March 1970 67-11136, Bull civ 1970 II 76 59 
 
Cass civ 2 8 May 1970 69-11446, Bull civ 1970 II 60 122 
 
Cass civ 2 17 February 1971 70-10124, Bull civ 1971 II 58, 42 
 
Cass civ 2 17 March 1971 70-10241, Bull civ 1979 II 123 82 (Scaglia v Ferricelli) 
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Cass civ 2 9 November 1971, D 1972 75 
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Cass civ 2 4 February 1981 79-11243, Bull civ 1981 II 21, JCP 1981 IV 136 
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Cass civ 2 25 January 1995 92-18802, Bull civ 1995 II 29 17 
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Cass civ 2 20 April 2000 98-18809, Bull civ 2000 66 46 
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Cass civ 2 24 January 2002 99-16576, Bull civ 2002 II 5 4 
 
Cass civ 2 26 September 2002 00-18627, Bull civ 2002 II 198 157 
 
Cass civ 3 3 December 2002 01-02881 
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Cass civ 2 27 March 2003 01-00850, Bull civ 2003 II 76 66 
 
Cass civ 2 19 June 2003 00-22302, Bull civ 2003 II 203 171 
849  
 
Cass civ 2 3 July 2003 
 
Cass civ 2 19 February 2004 02-18796, Bull civ 2004 II 75 64 (Leibrandt2) 
Cass civ 2 18 March 2004 03-10600, Bull civ 2004 II 140 118 
Cass civ 2 21 October 2004 03-17910 03-18942, Bull civ 2004 II 477 404 
 
Cass civ 2 24 February 2005 03-13536, Bull civ 2005 II 5 
 
Cass civ 2 24 February 2005 03-18135, Bull civ 2005 II 52 49 
 
Cass civ 2 13 July 2006 05-10250, Bull civ 2006 II 216 204, JCP 2006 1735 note 
Terré 
 
Cass civ 2 8 November 2007 06-19655, Bull civ 2007 II 246, RTD civ 2008 307 
observations Jordain 
 
Cass civ 2 15 May 2008 07-13483, Bull civ 2008 II 112 
 
Cass civ 2 4 November 2010 09-65947, Bull civ 2010 II 176, JCP 2011 12 note 
Bakouche 
 
Cass civ 2 28 April 2011 10-17380, Bull civ 2011 II  95, RTD civ 2011 538 
 
Cass civ 2 30 June 2011 10-30838, Bull civ 2011 II 146 
 
Cass civ 2 21 May 2015 14-14812 
 
Cass civ 19 February 1941, DC 1941 85 note Flour 
 
Cass civ 27 February 1951, D 1951 329 note Desbois (Branly v Turpain) 
Cass civ 28 February 1910, DP 1913 I 43, S 1911 I 329 (Nourrigat v Pech) 
Cass civ 23 March 1942, Gaz Pal 1942 I 224, S 1942 1 135, D 1942 118 
Cass civ 18 April 2010 08-21058, D 2010 1074 observations Gallmeister 
 
Cass civ 30 April 1952, D 1952 471, JCP 1952 II note Blaevoёt 
 
Cass civ 10 June 1986 85-10127, Bull civ 1986 I 163 164 
 
Cass civ 18 June 1896, S 1897 1 17 note Esmein, D 1897 1 4333, note Saleilles 
(Teffaine) 
 
Cass civ 16 June 1896, D 1897 433 conclusions Sarrut, note Saleilles 
850  
Cass com 17 October 1984 83-12414, Bull com 1984 IV 269, JCP 1985 II 20458 
note Viandier 
 
Cass com 28 February 1989 87-17374, Bull civ 1989 IV 1989 70 
 
Cass com 22 Februray 1994 91-18842, Bull civ 1994 IV 79 61 
 
Cass com 15 May 2012 11-10278, Bull com 2012 IV 101, D2012 2285 note Dondero, 
JCP 2012 1224 
 
Cass crim 22 March 1877 Bull crim 1877 86 
 
Cass crim 5 January 1956, D 1956 216 
 
Cass crim 3 July 1969, JCP 1970 II 16447 (Pourpour v Reynaud) 
Cass crim 16 March 1972 71-92418 
Cass crim 30 October 1974 73-93381, Bull crim 1974 308 790, JCP 1975 II 18038 
note Mourgeon, D 1975 Jur 178 note Savatier 
 
Cass crim 19 February 1975 74-90694, Bull crim 59 161 
 
Cass crim 9 February 1989 87-81359, Bull crim l 1989 63 173, D 1989 614 note 
Bruneau 
 
Cass crim 14 June 1990 89-85234, Bull crim 244 627 
 
Cass crim 6 June 1990 89-83703, Bull crim 1990 224 573, RTD civ  1991 121 
observations Jourdain 
 
Cass crim 5 January 1994 93-83050, Bull Crim 1994 5 8, JCP 1995 IV 862 
 
Cass crim 4 December 1996 96-81163, Bull crim 1996 445 1301 
 
Cass crim 26 March 1997 95-83957, Bull crim 1997 124 414, JCP 1997 II 22868 
 
Cass crim 28 March 2000 99-84075, Bull crim 2000 140 416 
 
Cass  crim  17  October  2000  99-86157,  Bull  crim  2000  297  874,  RTD  civ  379 
observations Jourdain 
 
Cass crim 5 October 2010 D 2010 353; Cass crim 26 March 2013, JCP 2013 675 
 
Cass Req 17 July 1889, S 1891 I 399 
 
Cass Req 6 March 1928, DP 1928 I 97 note Josserand, S 1928 I 225 note Hugue 
 
Cass Req 30 December 1946, D 1947 Jur 178 
851  
Cass soc 19 May 1958, Bull civ 1958 V 612 
 
Cass soc 28 February 2002 00-10051, 99-18389, 00-11793, 99-21255, 99-17201 
and 00-13172 
 
Cass soc 11 May 2010 09-42241, Bull soc 2010 V 206 
 
Cass soc 3 March 2015 13-21832, 13-20474, 13-20486, 13-26175 
 
CÉ 6 December Rec 1855 707; TC 8 February 1873 Blanco, GAJA 1 (Rothschild) 
CÉ 3 February 1911 (Anguet) 
CÉ 28 March 1919, Rec CE 1919 329 (Regnault-Desroziers) 
CÉ 30 November 1923, Rec CE 1923 789 (Couitéas) 
CÉ 14 January 1938, Rec CÉ 1938 25 (SA des produits latiers La Fleurette) 
CÉ 19 November 1949 (Mimeur, Defaux, Besthelsemer) 
CÉ 24 June 1949, Rec CE 1949 307 (Lecomte and Daramy) 
CÉ 23 June 1954 (Litzler) 
CÉ 10 October 1954, Rec 505 arrêt Sadoudi, Rec 603 
 
CÉ 24 November 1961 (Letisserand) 48841 
 
CÉ 24 January 1964, Leb 1964 43 
 
CÉ 29 September 1970 (Commune de Batz-sur-Mer v Tesson) 
CÉ 20 October 1972 80068 
CÉ 2 June 1972, AJDA 1972 356 
 
CÉ 26 October 1973 81977 
 
CÉ 26 January 1973 84768 (Ville de Paris v Driancourt) 
CÉ 4 October 1978 04471 
CÉ comm 3 March 1978 (Dame Muёsser), Rec CÉ 1978 116 
 
CÉ 2 July 1982 23141, D 1984 425 note D’Onorio, Gaz Pal 1983 193 note Moderne 
 
CÉ 21 November 1984, RTD pub 1985 50 
 
CÉ 22 June 1984 53630 (Sealink UK Ltd) 
852  
 
CÉ 20 February 1985, RTD pub 1985 78 
 
CÉ 24 April 1985, RTD pub 1986 39 
 
CÉ 22 January 1986 51300 (Grellier) 
 
CÉ 9 April 1987 (Garde des Sceaux v Banque Populaire de la Région Economique 
de Srasbourgh) 
 
CÉ 27 May 1987 47491 (Legoff) 
 
CÉ 27 January 1988 64076 (Giraud) 
 
CÉ 23 September 1988, Rec CÉ 1988 470 D 1989 267 note Moulin (Martin et 
Société Michel Martin) 
 
CÉ 27 September 1989, D 1991 80 note Verpeaux 
 
CÉ 27 July 1990, AJDA 1991 53 (Bourgeous) 
CÉ 10 April 1992 (Epoux V) 79027 
CÉ 14 February 1997 133238, JCP 1997 II 22828 note Moreau 
 
CÉ 29 December 1999 197502 
 
CÉ 29 March 2000 (Assistance publique-Hospitaux de Paris) 195662 
 
CÉ 30 November 2001 (Kechichian) 219562 
 
CÉ Ass 3 March 2004 241150 
 
CÉ Ass 8 February 2007 (Societé Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine) 287110 
 
CÉ 27 May 2015 371697 
 
Chartier and CA Paris 10 November 1983, D 1984 214 
 
Cour d’appel de Paris 26 April 1983, D 1983 Jur 376 (SA Cogedipresse v C) 
Paris 28 May 1996 D 1996 Jur 617 
Paris Labour Tribunal (Conseil des prud’hommes Paris) 16 January 2015 F 12/10198 
 
TC d’Aix 27 March 1947, D 1947 30 
 
TGI Laval 13 February 1967, D 1968 Jur 39 note Le Roy 
 
TGI St Etienne 15 May 1974, Gaz Pal 1976 109 
853  
 
Germany: 
 
Grundanschauungen loyalen Umgangs unter Rechtsgenossen : BGH 2 June 1981 
 
 
 
United States of America: 
 
Abbott v United States Lines Inc 512 F 2d 118 (4th Cir 1975) 
 
Acuna v Turkish 192 NJ 399, 930 A 2d 416 (2007) 
 
Adams v Lopez 407 P 2d 50 (NM 1965) 
 
Adams v National Bank of Detroit 444 Mich 329, 508 NW 2d 464 (1993) 
 
Adams v Via Christi Regional Medical Center 270 Kan 824, 19 P 3d 132 (2001) 
 
Adams v Wal-Mart Stores Inc 324 F 3d 935 (7th Cir 2003) 
 
Advincula v United Blood Services 176 Ill 2d 1, 678 NE 2d 1009, 223 Ill Dec 1 (1996) 
 
Aiken v Clary 396 SW 2d 668 (Mo 1965) 
 
Alessio v Fire & Ice Inc 197 NJ Super 22, 484 A 2d 24 (1984) 
 
Alexander v Scheid 726 NE 2d 272 (Ind 2000) 
 
Allen v Camp 14 Ala App 341, 70 So 290 (1915) 
 
Allen v Dover Co-Recreational Softball League 148 NH 407, 807 A 2d 1274 (2002) 
 
Allen v Walker 569 So 2d 350 (Ala 1990) 
 
Allison v County of Ventura 68 Cal App 3d 689, 137 Cal Rptr 542 (1977) 
Allison v Fiscus 156 Ohio St 120, 100 NE 2d 237, 44 ALR 2d 369 (1951) 
Alloway v General Marine Indus LP 149 NJ 620, 695 A 2d 264 (1997) 
American Bank & Fruit Co v Federal Reserve Bank 256 US 350 (1921) 
American National Watermattress Corp v Manville 642 P 2d 1330 (Alaska 1982) 
American Print Works v Lawrence 23 NJL 9 (1850), aff’d, 23 NJL 590 (1851) 
American Railway Express Co v Summers 208 Ala 531, 94 So 737 (1922) 
Amsden v Grinnel Mutual Reinsurance Co 203 NW 2d 252 (Iowa 1972) 
854  
Andersen v Edwards 625 P 2d 282 (Alaska 1981) 
 
Anderson v Fox Hill Village Homeowners Corp 424 Mass 365, 676 NE 2d 821 (1997) 
 
Anderson v Minneapolis St Paul & Sault Ste Marie Railway Co 146 Minn 430, 179 
NW 45 (1920) 
 
Anderson v Nashua Corp 246 Neb 420, 519 NW 2d 275 (1994) 
 
Angland v Mountain Creek Resort Inc 213 NJ 573, 66 A 3d 1252 (2013) 
 
Anselemo v Tuck 325 Ark 211, 924 SW 2d 798 (1996) 
Applegreen v Walsh 136 Ill App 3d 700, 483 NE 2d 686 (1985) 
Arche v United States 247 Kan 276, 798 P 2d 477 (1990) 
Ardis v Griffin 239 SC 529, 123 SE 2d 876 (1962) 
 
Ardringer v Hummell 982 P 2d 727 (Alaska 1999) 
 
Armstrong v Paoli Memorial Hospital 430 Pa Super 36, 633 A 2d 605 (1993) 
 
Arnold v City Cedar Rapids 443 NW 2d 332 (Iowa 1989) 
Aronson v Harriman 321 Ark 359, 901 SW 2d 832 (1995) 
Ashe v Radiation Oncology Ass 9 SW 3d 119 (1999) 
Ashland Dry Goods Co v Wages 302 Ky 577, 195 SW 2d 312 (1946) 
Augusta Bank & Trust v Broom-Field 231 Kan 52, 643 P 2d 100 (1982) 
Averyt v Wal-Mart Stores Inc 265 P 3d 456 (Colo 2011) 
Avila v Citrus Community College District 38 Cal 4th 148, 131 P 3d 383, 41 Cal Rptr 
3d 299 (2006) 
 
Ayers v Jackson Township 525 A 2d 287 (1987) 
 
Ayuluk v Red Oaks Assisted Living Inc 201 P 3d 1183 (Alaska 2009) 
 
Babes Showclub Jaba Inc v Liar 918 NE 2d 308 (Ind 2009) 
 
Bagley v Mt Bachelor Inc 340 P 3d 27 (Ore 2014) 
 
Bailey v C S 12 SW 3d 159 (Tex App 2000) 
 
Baker v Joyal 4 AD 3d 596, 771 NYS 2d 269 (2004) 
855  
Balas v Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc 711 F 3d 401 (4th Cir 2013) 
 
Barker v Kallash 63 NY 2d 19, 468 NE 2d 39 (1984) 
 
Barker v Lull Eng Co 573 P 2d 443 (Cal 1978) 
 
Barrie v VP Exterminators Inc 625 So 2d 1007 (La 1993) 
 
Bartell v State 106 Wis 342, 82 NW 142 (1900) 
 
Basham v Hunt 332 Ill App 3d 980, 773 NE 2d 1213 (2002) 
Baska v Scherzer 283 Kan 750, 156 P 3d 617 (2007) 
Battalla v State 176 NE 2d 729 (NY 1961) 
Battle v Kilcrease 54 Ga App 808, 189 SE 573 (1936) 
 
Bayer CropScience LP v Schafer 385 SW 3d 822 (Ark 2011) 
 
BDH ex rel SKL v Mickelson 792 NW 2d 169 (ND 2010) 
 
Beacon Residential Community Ass v Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP 59 Cal 4th 
568, 327 P 3d 850, 173 Cal Rptr 3d 752 (2014) 
 
Beavers v Bowen 26 Ky L Rep 291, 80 SW 1165 (1906) 
 
Beavers v Calloway 270 App Div 873, 61 NYS 2d 804 (1946) 
 
Beck v Minneapolis Union Railway Co 95 Minn 73, 103 NW 746 (1905) 
 
Beckles v Madden 160 NH 118, 993 A 2d 209 (2010) 
 
425 Beecher LLC v Unizan Bank National Ass 186 Ohio App 3d 214, 927 NE 2d 46 
(2010) 
 
Behrendt v Gulf Underwriters Ins Co 318 Wis 2d 622, 768 NW 2d 568 (2009) 
 
Belhumeur v Zilm 949 A 2d 162 (NH 2008) 
 
Below v Norton 751 NW 2d 351 (Wis 2008) 
 
Beninati v Black Rock City LLC 175 Cal App 4th 650, 96 Cal Rptr 3d 105 (2009) 
 
Bennett v Dunn 507 So 2d 451 (Ala 1987) 
 
Bennett v Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction 60 Ohio St 3d 107, 573 NE 
2d 633 (1991) 
 
Bennett v Trevecca Nazarene University 216 SW 3d 293 (Tenn 2007) 
856  
 
Berberian v Lynn 179 NJ 290, 845 A 2d 122 (2004) 
 
Berg v Wiley 264 NW 2d 145 (Minn 1978) 
Berman v Allan 404 A 2d 8 (New Jersey 1979) 
Berte v Bode 692 NW 2d 368 (Iowa 2005) 
Besette v Enderlin School Dist No 22, 310 NW 2d 759 (ND 1981) 
Bettel v Yim 20 OR 2d 617, 88 DLR 3d 543 (Ont Co Ct 1978) 
Bevan v Fix 42 P 3d 1013 (Wyo 2002) 
Bexiga v Havir Manufacturing Corp 60 NJ 402, 290 A 2d 281 (1972) 
 
Biakanja v Irving 320 P 2d 16 (Cal 1958) 
 
Birdsall v Lewis 246 App Div 132, 285 NYS 146, affirmed 271 NY 592, 3 NE 2d 200 
(1936) 
 
Bissell v Town of Amherst 56 AD 3d 1144, 867 NYS 2d 582 (2008) 
 
Bitar v Rahman 272 Va 130, 630 SE 2d 319 (2006) 
 
Black v Comer 38 So 3d 16 (Ala 2009) 
 
Blahd v Richard B Smith Inc 141 Idaho 296, 108 P 3d 996 (2005) 
Blakely v Shortfal’s Estate 236 Iowa 787, 20 NW 2d 28 (1945) 
Blakes v Blakes 517 So 2d 444 (La Ct App 1987) 
BMW of North America v Gore 517 US 559, 116 S Ct 1589, 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996) 
 
Board  of  Education  v  Farmingdale  Classroom  Teachers  Ass  343  NE  2d  278 
(NY1975) 
 
Boiter v South Carolina Dept of Transport 393 SC 123, 712 SE 2d 401 (2011) 
 
Booker Inc v Morrill 639 NE 2d 358 (Ind Ct App 1994) 
 
Boone v William W Backus Hospital 272 Conn 551, 864 A 2d 1 (2005) 
 
Boston v Muncy 233 P 2d 300 (Okla 1951) 
 
Boswell v Barnum & Bailey 135 Tenn 35, 185 SW 692 (1916) 
 
Botelho v Caster’s Inc 970 A 2d 541 (RI 2009) 
857  
 
Bovsun v Sanperi 61 NY 2d 219, 461 NE 2d 843, 473 NYS 2d 357 (1984) 
 
Bowan ex rel Bowan v Express Med Transporters Inc 135 SW 3d 452 (Mo Ct App 
2004) 
 
Bowen v Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co 183 Wis 2d 627, 517 NW 2d 432 (1994) 
 
Bowie v Murphy 271 Va 127, 624 SE 2d 74 (2006) 
 
Boyle v Revici 961 F 2d 1060 (2d Cir 1992) 
 
Boyer v Waples 206 Cal App 2d 725, 24 Cal Rptr 192 (1962) 
 
Brackett v Peters 11 F 3d 78 (7th Cir 1993) Bradley 
v Hunter 413 So 2d 674 (LA App 1982) Bradshaw v 
Frazier 85 NW 752 (Sup Ct Iowa 1901) 
Brandon v County of Richardson 261 Neb 636, 624 NW 2d 604 (2001) 
 
Braski v Ah-Ne-Pee Dimensional Hardwood Inc 630 F Supp 862 (WD Wis 1986) 
 
Breunig v American Family Ins 45 Wis 2d 536, 173 NW 2d 619, 49 ALR 3d 179 
(1970) 
 
Brewer v State 341 P 3d 1107 (Alaska 2014) 
 
Brewster v Colgate-Palmolive Co 279 SW 3d 142 (Ky 2009) 
 
Broadnax v Gonzalez 2 NY 3d 148, 809 NE 2d 645, 777 NYS 2d 416 (2004) 
 
Bronneke v Rutherford 89 P 3d 40 (Nev 2004) 
 
Brooklyn Hospital v Tores 45 Misc 2d 914, 258 NYS 2d 621 (1965) 
 
Brooks v Lewin Realty III Inc 378 Md 70, 835 A 2d 616 (2003) 
 
Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital Inc 497 NE 2d 626 (Mass 1986) 
 
Brown v Crawford 296 Ky 249, 177 SW 2d 1 (1944) 
 
Brown v Kendall 60 Mass 292 (1850) 
 
Brown v Martinez 68 NM 271, 361 P 2d 152 (1961) 
 
Brown v Spokane City Fire Prot Dist No 1 100 Wash 2d 188, 668 P 2d 571 (1983) 
 
Burgess v Shampooch Pet Indus Inc 35 Kan App 2d 458, 131 P 3d 1248 (2006) 
858  
 
Burke v Rivo 406 Mass 764, 551 NE 2d 1 (1990) 
 
Burrow v K-Mart Corp166 Ga App 284, 304 SE 2d 460 (1983) 
 
Busta v Columbus Hospital Corp 276 Mont 342, 916 P 2d 122 (1996) 
 
Byrd v Commonwealth 158 Va 897, 164 SE 400 (1932) 
 
Cain v McKinnon 552 So 2d 91 (Miss 1989) 
 
Campbell v City of Elmira 84 NY 2d 505, 644 NE 2d 993, 620 NYS 2d 302 (1994) 
 
Camper v Minor 915 SW 2d 437 (Tenn 1996) 
Canterbury v Spence 464 F 2d 772 (DC Cir 1972) 
Caputzal v Lindsay Co 48 NJ 69, 222 A 2d 513 (1966) 
Carney v Goodman 38 Tenn App 55, 270 SW 2d 572 (1954) 
 
Carson v Headrick 900 SW 2d 685 (Tenn 1995) 
 
Cartelli v Lanier Worldwide Inc 872 F Supp 1253 (SDNY 1955) 
 
Carter v Williams 792 A 2d 1093 (Me 2002) 
 
Cartwright v Equitable Life Assurance Society 276 Mont 1, 914 P 2d 976 (1996) 
 
Casebolt v Cowan 829 P 2d 352 (Colo 1992) 
Cassady v Tackett 938 F 2d 693 (6th Cir 1991) 
Catron v Lewis 271 Neb 416, 712 NW 2d 245 (2006) 
CH v Los Lunas Schools Board of Education 852 F Supp 2d 1344 (DNM 2012) 
 
Chaffee v Seslar 786 NE 2d 705 (Ind 2003) 
 
Chamberlain v Chandler CC 3 Mason 242, 5 Fed Cas No 2 575 (Mass 1823) 
 
Chapleyn of Greye’s Inn 1400 YB 2 Hen IV 8 pi 40 
 
Chavez v Thomas & Betts Corp 396 F 3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2005) 
 
Chelini v Nieri 32 Cal 2d 480, 196 P 2d 915 (1948) 
 
Chicago City Railway Co v Saxby 213 Ill 274, 72 NE 755 (1904) 
 
Chisum v Behrens 283 NW 2d 235 (SD 1979) 
859  
 
Choi v Anvil 32 P 3d 1 (Ala 2001) 
 
Christensen v Murphy 296 Or 610, 678 P 2d 1210 (1984) 
Christensen v Royal School Dist No 160, 124 P 3d 283 (Wash 2005) 
Cilley v Lane 985 A 2d 418 (Me 2009) 
City of Jackson v Spann 4 So 3d 1029 (Miss 2009) 
 
City of Santa Barbara v Superior Court 41 Cal Rptr 3d 527 (2007) 
 
Clark v Cohen 794 F 2d 79 (3rd Cir 1986) 
 
Clark v Rowe 428 Mass 339, 701 NE 2d 624 (1998) 
 
Cobbs v Grant 8 Cal 3d 229, 104 Cal Rptr 505, 502 P 2d 1 (1972) 
Coburn v Lenox Homes Inc 186 Conn 370, 441 A 2d 620 (1982) 
Coe v City of New York 265 NYS 10 (App Div 1935) 
Cohen v Cabrini Medical Center 94 NY 2d 639, 730 NE 2d 949, 709 NYS 2d 151 
(2000) 
 
Cohen v Five Brooks Stable 159 Cal App 4th 1476, 72 Cal Rptr 3d 471 (2008) 
 
Cohen v McDonnell Douglas Corp 450 NE 2D 581 (Mass 1983) 
 
Cohen v Smith 269 Ill App 3d 1087 648 NE 2d 329 (1995) 
 
Cole v Hubanks 681 NW 2d 147 (Wis 2004) 
 
Coles v McNamara 131 Wash 377, 230 P 430 (1924) 
Collins v Eli Lily Co 116 Wis 2d 166, 342 NW 2d 37 (1984) 
Collins v Reynard 154 Ill 2d 48, 607 NE 2d 1185 (1992) 
Collins v Straight Inc 748 F 2d 916 (4th Cir 1984) 
Collyer v SH Kress Co 5 Cal 2d 175, 54 P 2d 20 (1936) 
 
Commerce Insurance Co v Ultimate Livery Service Inc 452 Mass 639, 897 NE 2d 50 
(2008) 
 
Conder 89 ALR 4th 1072 (1992) 
 
Cone v Inter County Telephone & Telegraph Co 40 So 2d 148 (Fla 1949) 
860  
 
Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v Touche Ross & Co 159 Ill 2d 
137, 161, 636 NE 2d 503, 201 Ill Dec 71 (1994) 
 
Conley v Doyle Drug Co 570 So 2d 275 (Fla 1990) 
 
Considine v City of Waterbury 279 Conn 830, 905 A 2d 70 (2006) 
 
Consolidated Gas Co v Connor 114 Md 140, 78 A 725 (1911) 
 
Consolidated Rail Corp v Gottshall 512 US 532, 114 S Ct 2396, 129 L Ed 2d 427 
(1994) 
 
Conte v Girard Orthopaedic Surgeons Medical Group Inc 107 Cal App 4th 1260, 132 
Cal Rptr 2d 855 (2003) 
 
Contreras v Crown Zellerbach Corp 88 Wash 2d 735, 565 P 2d 1173 (1977) 
 
Cook v Kinzua Pine Mills Co 207 Or 34, 293 P 2d 717 (1956) 
 
Coombs v Curnow 219 P 3d 453 (Idaho 2010) 
 
Coomer v Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp 437 SW 3d 184 (Mo 2014) 
 
Corso v Merrill 119 NH 647, 406 A 2d 300 (1979) 
Cote v Litawa 96 NH 174, 71 A 2d 792 (1950) 
Courtney v Courtney 413 SE 2d 418 (W Va 1991) 
Cowan v Doering 111 NJ 451, 545 A 2d 159 (1988) 
Cowan v Hospice Support Care Inc 268 Va 482, 603 SE 2d 916 (2004) 
 
Cowe v Forum Group Inc 575 NE 2d 630 (Ind 1991) 
Cox v Stolworthy 94 Idaho 683, 496 P 2d 682 (1972) 
Craig v Driscoll 262 Conn 312, 813 A 2d 1003 (2003) 
Cramer v Slater 146 Idaho 868 204 P 3d 508 (2009) 
Creasy v Rusk 730 NE 2d 659 (Ind 2000) 
Creel v L & L Inc 287 P 3d 729 (Wyo 2012) 
 
CSX Transp Inc v Continental Ins Co 343 Md 216, 680 A 2d 1082 (1996) 
 
CSX Transp Inc v Hensley 556 US 838, 129 S Ct 2139, 173 L Ed 2d 1184 (2009) 
861  
Cullison v Medley 570 NE 2d 27 (Ind 1991) 
 
Cumberland Valley Contractors v Bell County Coal Corp 238 SW 3d 644 (Ky 2007) 
 
Cunzo v Shore 958 A 2d 840 (Del 2008) 
 
Curiano v Suozzi 469 NE 2d 1324 (NY 1984) 
 
Curran v Bosze 141 Ill 2d 473, 566 NE 2d 1319, 4 ALR 5th 1163 (1990) 
 
Currie v Silvernale 142 Minn 254, 171 NW 782 (1919) 
 
Curtis v Porter 784 A 2d 18 (Me 2001) 
 
Cyr v State 887 SW 2d 203 (Tex App 1994) 
 
Daggs v St Louis-San Francisco Railway Co 326 Mo 555, 31 SW 2d 769 (1930) 
 
Daluiso v Boone 71 Cal 2d 484, 455 P2d 811, 78 Cal Rptr 707 (1969) 
 
Darling v Charleston Community Memorial Hospital 33 Ill 2d 326, 211 NE 253 (1965) 
 
Dauzat v Curnest Guillot Logging Inc 995 So 2d 1184 (La 2008) 
 
David v MacLeod Regional Medical Center 367 SC 242, 626 SE 2d 1 (2006) 
 
Davies v Butler 95 Nev 763, 602 P 2d 605 (1979) 
 
Davies v White 18 BR 246 (Bkrtcy Va 1982) 
 
Day v Woodworth 54 US 363 (1851) 
 
DeAngelis v Jamesway Department Store 205 NJ Super 519, 501 A 2d 561 (1985) 
 
DeGrella v Elston 858 SW 2d 698 (Ky 1993) 
 
DeJesus v US Dept of Veterans Affairs 384 F Supp 2d 780 (ED Pa 2005) 
 
Delgado v Trax Bar & Grill 36 Cal 4th 224, 113 P 3d 1159, 30 Cal Rptr 3d 145 (2005) 
 
Dellwo v Pearson 259 Minn 452, 107 NW 2d 859, 97 ALR 2d 866 (1961) 
 
Delmarva Power & Light v Stout, 380 A 2d 1365 (Del 1977) 
 
DeLong v County of Erie 60 NY 2d 296, 469 NYS 2d 611, 457 NE 2d 717 (1983) 
 
Depue v Flateau 111 NW 1 (Sup Ct Minnesota 1907) 
 
Derdiarian v Felix Contracting Corp 51 NY 2d 308, 434 NYS 2d 166, 414 NE 2d 666 
(1980) 
862  
 
Desert Healthcare District v PacifiCare FHP Inc 94 Cal App 4th 781, 114 Cal Rptr 2d 
623 (2001) 
 
DeShany v Winnebago County Department of Social Services 489 US 189 
 
Dickens v Puryear 302 NC 437, 276 SE 2d 325 (1981) 
 
Didato v Strehler 262 Va 617, 554 SE 2d 42 (2001) 
 
Didier v Ash Grove Cement Co 272 Neb 28, 718 NW 2d 484 (2006) 
Dillard Department Stores Inc v Silva 148 SW 3d 370 (Tex 2004) 
Dillon v Legg 68 Cal 2d 728, 69 Cal Rptr 72, 441 P 2d 912 (1968) 
District of Columbia v Chinn 839 A 2d 701 (DC 2003) 
District of Columbia v Harris 770 A 2d 82 (DC 2001) 
 
District of Columbia v Tulin 994 A 2d 788 (DC 2010) 
 
Dodias v Mairs 394 NJ Super 338, A 2d 859 (App Div 2007) 
 
Doe v Andujar 297 Ga App 696, 678 SE 2d 163 (2009) 
 
Doe v Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 141 
Wash App 407, 167 P 3d 1193 (2007) 
 
Doe Parent’s No 1 v State Dept of Educ 100 Haw 34, 58 P 3d 545 (2002) 
 
Doerr v Movius 154 Mont 346, 463 P 2d 477 (1970) 
 
Donovan v Philip Morris USA 455 Mass 215, 914 NE 2d 891 (2009) 
 
Dorais v Paquin 113 NH 187, 304 A 2d 369 (1973) 
 
Dore v City of Fairbanks 31 P 3d 788 (Alaska 2001) 
 
Douglas v Freeman 117 Wash 2d 242, 814 P2d 1160 (1991) 
 
Douthit v Jones 619 F 2d 527 (5th Cir 1980) 
Dove v Lowden 47 F Supp 546 (Mo 1942) 
Dowty v Riggs 385 SW 3d 117 (Ark 2010) 
Drabeck v Sabley 31 Wis 2d 184, 142 NW 2d 798 (1966) 
 
Draper v Baker 61 Wis 450, 21 NW 527 (1884) 
863  
 
Dubaniewicz v Houman 910 A 2d 897 (Vt 2006) 
Dubbs v Head Start Inc 336 F 3d 1194 (10th Cir 2003) 
Duda v Phatty McGees 758 NW 2d 754 (SD 2008) 
Duling v Bluefield Sanitarium Inc 149 W Va 567, 142 SE 2d 754 (1965) 
Duncan v Scottsdale Medical Imaging Ltd 205 Ariz 306, 70 P 3d 435 (2003) 
Dunnaway v Duquesne Light Co 423 F 2d 66 (3d Cir 1970) 
Duphily v Delaware Electric Cooperative Inc 662 A 2d 821 (Del 1995) 
 
Dupler v Seubert 69 Wis 2d 373, 230 NW 2d 626 (1975) 
Duvall v Goldin 139 Mich App 342, 362 NW 2d 275 (1984) 
Easton v Broomfield 116 Ariz 576, 570 P 2d 744 (1977) 
Eaton v McLain 891 SW 2d 587 (Tenn 1994) 
Eckenrode v Life of America Insurance Co 70 F 2d 1 (7th Cir 1972) 
 
Eckert v Long Island RR Co 43 NY 502 (1871) 
 
Edward C v City of Albuquerque 148 NM 646, 241 P 3d 1086 (2010) 
 
Edwards v Honeywell Inc 50 F 3d 484 (7th Cir 1995) 
 
Eisel v Board of Education of Montgomery County 324 Md 376, 597 A 2d 447 (1991) 
 
Eliott v Willis 442 NE 2d 163 (Ill 1982) 
 
Emanuel v Great Falls School Dist 351 Mont 56, 209 P 3d 244 (2009) 
 
Emory University v Lee 97 Ga App 680, 104 SE 2d 234 (1958) 
 
Endres v Endres 968 A 2d 336 (Vt 2008) 
 
Eric M v Cajon Valley Union School Dist 174 Cal App 4th 285, 95 Cal Rptr 3d 428 
(2009) 
 
Eskin v Bartee 262 SW 3d 727 (Tenn 2008) 
 
Espinoza v Schulenburg 212 Ariz 215, 129 P 3d 937 (2006) 
 
Espinoza v Thomas 189 Mich App 110, 472 NW 2d 16 (1991) 
864  
Estate of Graves v City of Circleville 922 NE 2d 201 (Ohio 2010) 
 
Estate of Rae v Murphy 956 A 2d 1266 (Del 2008) 
 
Ethyl Corp v Johnson 345 Ark 476, 49 SW 3d 644 (2001) 
 
Etkind v Suarez 271 Ga 352, 519 SE 2d 210 (1999) 
 
eToll Inc v Elias/Savion Advertising Inc 811 A 2d 10 (Pa Super Ct 2002) 
 
Exxon Co USA v Sofec Inc 517 US 830, 116 S Ct 1813, 135 L Ed 2d 113 (1996) 
Exxon Shipping Co v Baker 554 US 471, 128 S Ct 2605, 171 L Ed 2d 570 (2008) 
Farley v Engelken 241 Kan 663, 740 P 2d 1058, 74 ALR 4th 1 (1987) 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co of Arkansas v Henley 275 Ark 122, 628 SW 2d 
301 (1982) 
 
Farmer v B & G Food Enters Inc 181 So 2d 1154 (Miss 2002) 
 
Farmer v Brennan 511 US 825, 114 S Ct 1970, 128 L Ed 2d 811 (1994) 
Farmers Insurance Exchange v State 221 Cal Rptr 225 (Cal App 1985) 
Faya v Almaraz 329 Md 435, 620 A 2d 327 (1993) 
FCH1, LLC v Rodriguez 335 P 3d 183 (Nev 2014) 
Feeley v Baer 424 Mass 875, 679 NE 2d 180 (1997) 
Feld v Borkowski 790 NW 2d 72 (Iowa 2010) 
Felder v Physiotherapy Ass 215 Ariz 154, 158 P 3d 877 (Ct App 2007) 
Feller v First Interstate Bancsystem Inc 299 P 3d 338 (Mont 2013) 
Felton v Lovett 388 SW 3d 656 (Tex 2012) 
Ferrara v Galluchio 5 NY 2d 16, 176 NYS 2d 996, 152 NE 2d 249, 71 ALR 2d 331 
(1958) 
 
Field v Philadelphia Electric Co 388 Pa Super 400, 565 A 2d 1170 (1989) 
Fields v Senior Citizens Center Inc 528 So 2d 573 (La Ct App 1988) 
Fields v State 21 So 2d 412 (Miss 1945) 
Fink v City of New York 206 Misc 79, 132 NYS 2d 172 (Sup Ct 1954) 
865  
First National Bank of Arizona v Dupree 136 Ariz 296, 665 P 2d 1018 (Ct App 1983) 
 
Fisher v Carrousel Motor Hotel Inc 424 SW 2d 627 (Tex 1967) 
Fisher v Swift Transport Co 342 Mont 335, 181 P 3d 601 (2008) 
Flannery v United States 297 SE 2d 433 (W Va 1982) 
Flax v Daimler Chrysler Corp 272 SW 3d 521 (Tenn 2008) 
 
Fletcher v Western National Life Insurance Co 10 Cal App 3d 376, 89 Cal App 3d 
376, 89 Cal Rptr 78 (1970) 
 
Flowers v Rock Creek Terrace Ltd Partnership 308 Md 432, 520 A 2d 361 (1987) 
 
Foddrill v Crane 894 NE 2d 1070 (Ind Ct App 2008) 
 
Fordham v Oldroyd 171 P 3d 411 (Utah 2007) 
 
Fox v Smith 594 So 2d 596 (Miss 1992) 
 
Frank v Superior Court 722 P 2D 955 (Ariz 1986) 
 
Franklin Corp v Tedford 18 So 3d 215 (Miss 209) 
 
Frazier v Commonwealth 845 A 2d 253 (Pa Comm Ct 2004) 
Frazier ex rel Frasier v Norton 334 NW 2d 865 (SD 1983) 
Frechette v Welch 621 F 2d 11 (1st Cir 1980) 
Freeman v Wal-Mart Stores East LP 871 F Supp 2d 665 (ED Tenn 2011) 
 
Friedrich v Fetterman & Ass PA 137 S 3d 362 (Fla 2013) 
 
Frye v Clark County 97 Nev 632, 637 P2d 1215 (1981) 
 
Fuerschbach v Southwest Airlines Co 439 F 3d 1197 (10th Cir 2006) 
Fuqua v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co 542 So 2d 1129 (La Ct App 1989) 
Furlong v German-American Press Association 189 SW 385 (Mo 1916) 
Gabaldon v Jay-Bi Property Management Inc 925 P 2d 510 (NM 1996) 
Galvez v Frields 88 Cal App 4th 1410, 107 Cal Rptr 2d 50 (2001) 
Garcia v Lifemark Hospitals of Florida 754 So 2d 48 (Fla Dist Ct App 1999) 
 
Gardner v National Bulk Carriers Inc 310 F 2d 284, 91 ALR 2d 1023 (4th Cir 1962) 
866  
 
Garr v City of Ottumwa 846 NW 2d 865 (Iowa 2014) 
Garratt v Dailey 46 Wash 2d 197, 279 P 2d 1091 (1995) 
Gates v Richardson 719 P 2d 193 (Wyo 1986) 
Gaudreau v Clinton Irrigation Dist 30 P 3d 1070 (Mont 2001) 
 
Gauvin v Clark 404 Mass 450, 537 NE 2d 94 (1989) 
 
Gazo v City of Stamford 255 Conn 245, 765 A 2d 505 (2001) 
 
Geddes v Daughters of Charity of St Vincent de Paul Inc 348 F 2d 144 (5th Cir 1965) 
 
Gerber v McCall 175 Kan 433, 264 P 2d 490 (1953) 
 
Giggers v Memphis Housing Authority 277 SW 3d 359 (Tenn 2008) 
Gilhooley v Star Market Co Inc 400 Mass 205, 508 NE 2d 609 (1987) 
Gilliam v Roche Biomedical Labs Inc 989 F 2d 278 (8th Cir 1993) 
Gilmore v Shell Oil Co 613 So 2d 1272 (Ala 1993) 
Gilson v Drees Bros 19 Wis 2d 252, 120 NW 2d 63 (1963) 
 
Gipson v Kasey 214 Ariz 141, 150 P 3d 228 (2007) 
 
Giraldo v California Dept of Corrections and Rehabilitation 168 Cal App 4th 231, 85 
Cal Rptr 3d 371 (2008) 
 
Gleason v Smolinski 88 A 3d 589 (Conn 2014) 
 
Gleitman v Cosgrove 49 NJ 22, 227 A 2d 689 (1967) 
 
Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational Indus Inc 462 NW 2d 348, 359 (Mich 1990) 
 
Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational Indus Inc 491 NW 2d 208, 215 (Mich 1992 on 
rehearing) 
 
Glover ex rel Glover v Jackson State Univ 968 So 2d 1267 (Miss 2007) 
 
Goddard v Watters 14 Ga App. 722, 82 SE 304 (1914) 
 
Godfrey v Iverson 559 F 3d 569 (DC Cir 2009) 
 
Goldberg v Florida Power & Light Co 899 So 2d 1105 (Fla 2005) 
 
Goodfellow v Coggburn 98 Idaho 202, 560 P 2d 873 (1977) 
867  
 
Goodrich v Blair 132 Ariz 459, 646 P 2d 890 (1982) 
Gordon v Villagas 1994 WL 86373 (Conn Super Ct 1994) 
Gorman v Abbott Labs 599 A 2d 1364 (R 1 1991) 
Gossett v Jackson 249 Va 549, 457 SE 2d 97 (1995) Gouin 
v Gouin 249 F Supp 2d 62 (D Mass 2003) Grabenstein v 
Sunsted 237 Mont 254, 772 P 2d 865 (1989) 
Graff v Robert M Swendra Agency Inc 800 NW 2d 112 (Min 2011) 
 
Grager v Schudar 770 NW 2d 692 (ND 2009) 
 
Graves v Estabrook 818 A 2d 1255 (NH 2003) 
 
Gregoire v City of Oak Harbour 244 P 3d 924 (Wash 2010) 
 
Gregory v Cott 59 Cal 4th 996, 331 P 3d 179 (2014) 
Griego v Wilson 91 NM 74, 570 P 2d 612 (Ct App 1977) 
Griffin v Clark 42 P 2d 297 (Idaho 1935) 
Griggs v Fleckenstein 14 Minn 81, 14 Gil 62 (1869) 
 
Grimm v Arizona Board of Pardons & Paroles 115 Ariz 260, 564 P 2d 1227 (1977) 
 
Grimshaw v Ford Motors Co 19 Cal App 3d 757, 174 Cal Rptr 348 (1981) 
Gross v Capital Electric Line Builders Inc 253 Kan 798, 861 P 2d 1326 (1993) 
Grynberg v Questar Pipeline Co 70 P 3d 1 (Utah 2003) 
Gulf & Ship Island Railroad v Sullivan 155 Miss 1, 119 So 501, 62 ALR 191 (1928) 
 
Gulf Production Co v Gibson 234 SW 906 (Tex Civ App 1921) 
 
Gulfway General Hosp Inc v Pursley 397 SW 2d 93 (Tex Civ App 1965) 
Gunnell v Arizona Public Service Co 202 Ariz 388, 46 P 3d 399 (2002) 
Haber v County of Nassau 577 F 2d 322 (2nd Cir 1977) 
Hackbart v Cincinnati Bengals Inc 601 F 2d 516 (10th Cir 1979) 
 
Hegel v McMahon 136 Wash 2d 122, 960 P 2d 424 
868  
 
Hagerty v L & L Marine Services Inc 788 F 2d 315 (5th Cir 1986) 
Haley v Pan American World Airways 746 F 2d 311 (5th Cir 1984) 
Hall v Carter 825 A 2d 954 (DC 2003) 
Hall v Hilbun 466 So 2d 856 (Miss1985) 
 
Hall v McBryde 919 P 2d 910 (Colo Ct App 1996) 
Halpin v Schultz 917 NE 2d 436 (Ill 2009) 
Halvorson v Voeller 336 NW 2d 118 (NS 1983) 
Hamilton v Howard 234 Ky 321, 28 SW 2d 7 (1930) 
 
Hamilton v Kinsey 337 So 2d 344 (Ala 1976) 
 
Hammerstein v Jean Development West 111 Nev 1471 907 P 2d 975 (1995) 
 
Hanauer v Coscia 157 Conn 49, 244 A 2d 611 (1968) 
 
Hancock-Underwood v Knight 670 SE 2d 720 (Va 2009) 
 
Hanks v Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp 276 Conn 314, 885 A 2d 734 (2005) 
Happel v Wal-Mart Stores Inc 199 Ill 2d 179, 766 NE 2d 1118, 262 Ill 815 (2002) 
Harbeson v Parke-Davis Inc 98 Wn 2d 460, 656 P 2d 483 (1983) 
Hardingham v United Counselling Service of Bennington 164 Vt 158, 667 A 2d 289 
(1995) 
 
Harlow v Chin 405 Mass 697, 545 NE 2d 602 (1989) 
 
Harold’s Club v Sanchez 70 Nev 518, 275 P2d 384 (1954) 
 
Harris v Forklift Systems Inc 114 S Ct 367, 126 L Ed 2d 295, 510 US 17 (1993) 
 
Harris v Groth 99 Wash 2d 438, 663 P 2d 113 (1983) 
 
Harrison v United States 284 F 3d 293 (1st Cir 2002) 
 
Harry Stoller and Co v City of Lowell 412 Mass 139, 587 NE 2d 780 (1992) 
 
Hartke v McKelway 707 F 2d 1544 (DC Cir 1983) 
 
Hastings v Mechalske 336 Md 663, 650 A 2d 274 (1994) 
869  
Haudrich v Howmedica Inc 169 Ill 2d 525, 662 NE 2d 1248, 215 Ill Dec 108 (1996) 
 
Hawkins v Hawkins 101 NC App 529, 400 SE 2d 472 (1991) 
Hayes v Camel 283 Conn 475, 927 A 2d 880 (2007) 
Healthone v Rodriguez 50 P 3d 879 (Colo 2002) 
Heath v Palmer 181 Vt 545, 915 A 2d 1290 (2006) 
 
Hedgepeth v Whitman Walker Clinic 22 A 3d 789 (DC 2011) 
 
Helfend v Southern California Rapid Transit District 2 Cal 3d 1, 84 Cal Rptr 173, 465 
P 2d 61, 77 ALR 3d 398 (1970) 
 
Helling v Carey 83 Wash 2d 514, 519 P 2d 981 (1974) 
Hellriegel v Tholl 69 Wash 2d 97, 417 P 2d 362 (1966) 
Hellums v Raber 853 NE 2d 143 (Ind Ct App 2006) 
Hendriks v Broderick 284 NW 2d 209 (Iowa 1979) 
Hendricks v Peabody Coal Co 253 NE 2d 56 (Ill App 1969) 
Henry v National Union Fire Insurance Co 542 So 2d 102 (La Ct App 1989) 
 
Herbst v Wuennenberg 83 Wis 2d 768, 266 NW 2D 391 (1978) 
 
Hickey v Zezulka 439 Mich 408, 487 NW 2d 106 (1992) 
 
Hill v Kimball 76 Tex 210, 13 SW 59 (1890) 
 
Hintz v Roberts 98 NJL 768, 121 A 711 (1923) 
 
Hite v Brown 100 Ohio App 3d 606, 654 NE 2d 452 (1995) 
 
Hively v Higgs 120 Or 588, 253 P 363 (1927) 
 
Hodges v Yarian 53 Cal App 4th 973, 62 Cal Rptr 2d 130 (1997) 
Holdorf v Holdorf 185 Iowa 838, 169 NW 737 (1918) 
Hollingsworth v Schminkey 553 NW 2d 591 (Iowa 1996) 
Holodook v Spencer 36 NY 2d 35, 324 NE 2d 338, 364 NYS 2d 859 (1974) 
Holston v Sisters of the Third Order of St Francis 618 NE 2d 334 (Ill App 1993) 
Hood v Phillips 554 SW 2d 160 (Tex 1977) 
870  
 
Horton v Hinley 261 Ga 863, 413 SE 2d 199 (1992) 
Hough v Mooningham 139 Ill App 3d 1018, 487 NE 2d 1281, 94 Ill Dec 404 (1986) 
Houston v Kinder-Care Learning Centers Inc 208 Ga App 235, 430 SE 2d 24 (1993) 
Howard v University of Med & Dentistry of New Jersey 172 NJ 537, 800 A 2d 73 
(2002) 
 
Howen v Cahoon 236 Va 3, 372 SE 2d 363 (1988) 
 
Howle v PYA/Monarch Inc 288 SC 586, 344 SE 2d 157 (1986) 
 
Hudson v Old Guard Ins 3 A 3d 246 (Del 2010) 
 
Hughes v Warman Steel Casting Co 174 Cal 556, 163 P 885 (1917) 
 
Huron Tool & Eng Co v Precision Consulting Servs Inc 209 Mich App 365, 532 NW 
2d 541 (1995) 
 
Hurst v East Coast Hockey League Inc 371 SC 33, 637 SE 2d 560 (2006) 
 
Huston v Konieczny 52 Ohio St 3d 214, 556 NE 2d 505 (1990) 
 
Hutchins v Schwartz 724 P 2d 1194 (Alaska 1986) 
 
Hutchinson v Luddy 896 A 2d 1260 (Pa Super Ct 2006) 
 
Hymowitz v Eli Lily & Co 73 NY 2d 487, 541 NYS 2d 941, 539 NE 2d 1069 (1989) 
 
Illinois Central Railway Co v Oswald 338 Ill 270, 170 NE 247 (1930) 
Interstate Amusement Co v Martin 8 Ala App 481, 62 So 404 (1913) 
Invest Cast Inc v City of Blaine 471 NW 2d 368 (Minn 1991) 
Jackson v Brantley 378 So 2d 1109 (Ala App 1979) 
 
Jackson v Bumgardner 318 NC 172, 347 SE 2d 743 (1986) 
Jackson v District of Columbia 412 A 2d 948 (DC 1980) 
Jackson v McCuiston 448 SW 2d 33 (Ark 1969) 
Jacques v Childs Dining Hall Co 244 Mass 438, 138 NE 843, 26 ALR 1329 (1923) 
Jagger v Mohawk Mountain Ski Area Inc 269 Conn 672, 849 A 2d 813 (2004) 
Jahner v Jacob 233 NW 2d 791 (ND 1975) 
871  
 
Janelsins v Button 102 Md. App 30 648 A 2d 1039 (1994) 
Jay v Moog Auto Inc 264 Neb 875, 652 NW 2d 872 (2002) 
Jelley v Laflame 108 NH 471, 238 A 2d 728 (1968) 
Jennings v Badget 230 P 3d 861 (Okla 2010) 
Jensen v Anderson County Dept of Social Services 304 SC 195, 403 SE 2d 615 
(1991) 
 
Jerkins v Anderson 191 NJ 285, 922 A 2d 1279 (2007) 
Johnson v Bollinger 86 NC App 1, 356 SE 2d 378 (1987) 
Johnson v Brooks 567 So 2d 34 (Fla Dist Ct App 1990) 
Johnson v Clay 38 NC App 542, 248 SE 2d 382 (1978) 
Johnson v General Motors Acceptance Corp 228 F 2d 104 (5th Cir 1955) 
 
Johnson v Hilcrest Health Ctr Inc 70 P 3d 811 (Okla 2003) 
 
Johnson v Kosmos Portland Cement Co 64 F 2d 193 (6th Cir 1933) 
 
Johnson v Ramsey County 424 NW 2d 800 (Minn Ct App 1988) 
 
Johnson v State 37 NY 2d 378, 334 NE 2d 590, 372 NYS 2d 638 (1975) 
Johnson v Superior Court 101 Cal App 4th 869, 124 Cal Rptr 2d 650 (2002) 
Johnson v University Hospital of Cleveland 540 NE 2d 1370 (Ohio 1989) 
Johnston v State of New York 37 NY 2d 378, 372 NYS 2d 638, 334 NE 2d 590 
(1975) 
 
Jolley v Powell 299 So 2d 647 (Fla App 1974) 
Jones v Dressel 623 P 2d 370 (Colo 1981) 
Jones v Fletcher 166 NW 2d 175 (Wis 1969) 
Jones v Malinowski 473 A 2d 429 (Maryland 1984) 
 
Jones v West Side Buick Co 231 Mo App 187, 93 SW 2d 1083 (1936) 
 
Joseph v State 26 P 3d 459 (Alaska 2001) 
 
Jutzi-Johnson v United States 263 F 3d 753 (7th Cir 2001) 
872  
 
Kaiser v Cook 67 Wis 2d 460, 227 NW 2d 50 (1975) 
 
Kaiser Aluminium & Chemical Corp v Marshland Dredging Co 455 F 2d 957 (5th Cir 
1972) 
 
Kalatta v Anheuser-Busch Co Inc 581 NE 2d 656 (Ill 1991) 
Kassama v Magat 368 Md 113, 792 A 2d 1102 (2002) 
Kathleen K v Roni L 164 Cal Rptr 273 (Ct App 1984) 
Katko v Briney 183 NW 2d 657 (Iowa 1971) 
 
Keck v Jackson 122 Ariz 114, 593 P 2d 668 (1979) 
 
Keebler v Winfield Carraway Hosp 531 So 2d 841 (Ala 1988) 
 
Kelley v Middle Tennessee Emergency Physicians PC 133 SW 3d 587 (Tenn 2004) 
 
Kennan v Checker Taxi Co Inc 250 III App 3d 155, 620 NE 2d 1208 (1993) 
Kennis v Mercy Hospital Medical Center 491 NW 2d 161 (Iowa 1992) 
Kenton v Hyatt Hotels Corp 693 SW 2d 83 (Mo 1985) 
Kim v Budget Rent A Car Systems Inc 143 Wash 2d 190, 15 P 3d 1283 (2001) 
 
Kimes v Grosser 195 Cal App 4th 1556, 126 Cal Rptr 3d 581 (2011) 
 
King v Kayak Manufacturing Corp 182 W Va 276, 387 SE 2d 511 (1989) 
 
Kinikin v Heupel 305 NW 2d 589 (Minn 1981) 
 
Kircher v City of Jamestown 74 NY 2d 251, 544 NYS 2d 995, 543 NE 2d 443 (1989) 
 
Kirsch v Plovidba 971 F 2d 1026 (3d Cir 1992) 
 
Kitchen v K-Mart Corporation 697 So 2d 1200 (Fla 1997) 
 
Kline v 1500 Massachusetts Ave Apt Corp 439 F2d 477, 43 ALR 3d 311 (DC Cir 
1970) 
 
KM v Ala Dept of Youth Servs 360 F Supp 2d 1253 (MD Ala 2005) 
 
Knapp v Stanford 329 So 2d 196 (Miss 1980) 
 
Knight v Jewett, 3 Cal 4th 296, 11 Cal Rptr 2d 2, 834 P 2d 696 (1992) 
 
Komlodi v Picciano 217 NJ 387, 89 A 3d 1234 (2014) 
873  
 
Kowalski v St Francis Hospital & Health Centers 1 NY 3d 480 (2013) 
 
Krauth v Geller 31 NJ 270, 157 A 2d 129 (1960) 
 
Kreidt v Burlington NRR 615 NW 2d 153 (ND 2000) 
 
Kreski v Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co 429 Mich 347, 415 NW 2d 178 (1987) 
 
Krieg v Massey 239 Mont 469, 781 P 2d 277 (1989) 
 
Krochalis v Insurance Co of North America 629 F Supp 1360 (ED Pa 1985) 
 
Kuhn v Zabostsky 9 Ohio St 2d 129, 224 NE 2d 137 (1967) 
 
Laeroc Waikiki Parkside LLC v KSK (Oahu) Ltd Partnership 115 Haw 201, 166 P 3d 
961 (2007) 
 
Lafayette Parish School Board v Cormier ex rel Cormier 901 So 2d 1197 (La Ct App 
2005) 
 
Lahm v Farrington 90 A 3d 620 (NH 2014) 
 
Lamb v State 93 Md App 422, 613 A 2d 402 (1993) 
 
Landers v East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co 151 Tex 251, 248 SW 2d 731 (1952) 
 
Landmark Medical Center v Gauthier 635 A 2d 1145 (RI 1994) 
 
Landry v Bellanger 851 So 2d 943 (La 2003) 
 
Lange v Fisher Real Estate Dev Corp 358 Ill App 3d 962, 832 NE 2d 274 (2005) 
 
Latta v New Orleans & Northwestern Railway Co 131 La 272 (Sup Ct Louisiana 
1912) 
 
Lee v Luigi Inc 696 A 2d 1371 (DC 1997) 
 
Lehmuth v Long Beach Unified School Dist 53 Cal 2d 544, 348 P 2d 887 (1960) 
 
Leichtamer v American Motors Corp 424 NE 2d 568 (Ohio 1981) 
 
Leichtman v WLW Jacor Communications Inc 92 Ohio App 3d 232, 634 NE 2d 697 
(1994) 
 
Lenard v Dilley 805 So 2d 175 (La 2002) 
Leonard v State 491 NW 2d 508 (Iowa 1992) 
Leong v Takasaki 520 P 2d 758 (Haw 1974) 
874  
 
Levi v Southwest Louisiana Electric Membership Coop 542 So 2d 1081 (La 1989) 
 
Levine v Chemical Bank 221 AD 2d 175, 633 NYS 2d 296 (1995) 
 
Lewis v Miller 374 Pa Super 515, 543 A 2d 590 (1998) 
Linder v City of Payette 64 Idaho 656, 135 P 2d 440 (1943) 
Livesay v Stock 208 Cal 315, 281 P 70 (1929) 
Livingston v Adams 8 Cow 175 (NY 1828) 
 
Logan v Greenwich Hospital Ass 465 A 2d 294 (Cal 1980) 
 
Lokey v Breuner 2010 MT 216, 358 Mont 8, 243 P 3d 384 (2010) 
Lolley v Charter Woods Hosp Inc 572 So 2d 1223 (Ala 1990) 
Long v Patterson 198 Miss 554, 22 So 2d 490 (1945) 
Lopez v Surchia 112 Cal App 2d 314, 246 P 2d 111 (1952) 
 
Lord v Lovett 770 A 2d 1103 (NH 2001) 
 
Louisiana ex rel Guste v M/V Testbank 752 F 2d 1019 (5th Cir 1985) 
 
Lucero v Holbrook 288 P 3d 1228 (Wyo 2012) 
 
Lugtu v Cal Highway Patrol 26 Cal 4th 703, 110 Cal Rptr 2d 528, 28 P 3d 249 (2011) 
 
Luna v Vela 169 Cal App 4th 102, 86 Cal Rptr 3d 588 (2008) 
 
Lutzkovitz v Murray 339 A 2d 64, 93 ALR 3d 321 (Del 1975) 
 
Lyons v Midnight Sun Transport Services Inc 928 P 2d 1202 (Alaska 1996) 
 
MacGregor v Walker 322 P 3d 706 (Utah 2014) 
 
532 Madison Ave Gourmet Foods Inc v Finlandia Center Inc 96 NY 2d 280, 750 NE 
2d 1097, 727 NYS 2d 49 (2001) 
 
Madrid v Lincoln County Medical Center 923 P 2d 1134 (NM 1996) 
 
Maharam v Maharam 510 NYS 2d 104 (1986) 
 
Mahnke v Moore 197 Md 61, 77 A 2d 923 (1951) 
 
Malco Inc v Mid-West Aluminium Sales Inc 14 Wis 2d 57, 109 NW 2d 516 (1961) 
875  
Maldonado v Southern Pacific Transport Co 129 Ariz 165, 629 P 2d 1001 (Ct App 
1981) 
 
Manning v Michael 188 Conn 607, 452 A 2d 1157 (1982) 
 
Marceaux v Gibbs 699 So 2d 1065 (La 1997) 
 
Marsalis v La Salle 94 So 2d 120 (La App 1957) 
 
Marshall v Burger King Corp 222 Ill 2d 422, 305 Ill Dec 897 (2006) 
 
Martin v Estrella 107 RI 247, 266 A 2d 41 (1970) 
 
Martin v Herzog 126 NE 814 (NY 1920) 
 
Martin v Houck 141 NC 317, 54 SE 291 (1906) 
 
Martin v Yeoham 419 SW 2d 937 (Mo App 1967) 
 
Martin Abbott Labs 102 Wash 2d 581, 689 P 2d 368 (1984) 
Massey v Scripter 401 Mich 385, 258 NW 2d 44 (1977) 
Mastland Inc v Evans Furniture Inc 498 NW 2d 682 (Iowa 1993) 
Matter of Gordy 658 A 2d 613 (Del Ch 1994) 
Maxa v Neidlein 163 Md 366, 163 A 202 (1932) Mayhue 
v Sparksman 653 NE 2d 1384 (Ind 1995) McCain v 
Florida Power Corp 593 So 2d 500 (Fla 1992) 
McCarthy v Volkswagen of America Inc 55 NY 2d 543, 435 NE 2d 1072, 450 NYS 2d 
457 (1982) 
 
McCombs v Hegarty 205 Misc 937, 130 NYS 2d 547 (1954) 
 
McComish v DeSoi 42 NJ 274, 200 A 2d 116 (1964) 
 
McCoy v Taylor Tire Co 254 SW 2d 923 (Ky 1953) 
 
McCraney v Flanagan 47 NC App 498, 267 SE 2d 404 (1980) 
 
McCulloh v Drake 24 P 3d 1162 (Wyo 2001) 
McDougald v Garber 536 NE 2d 372 (NY 1989) 
McDougall v Lamm 211 NJ 203, 48 A 3d 312 (2012) 
876  
MCG Health Inc v Cassey 269 Ga App 125, 603 SE 2d 438 (2004) 
McGarry v Sax 158 Cal App 4th 983, 70 Cal Rptr 3d 519 (2008) 
McGinley v United States 329 F Supp 62 (ED Pa1971) 
McGregor v Walker 322 P 3d 706 (Utah 2014) 
McGuire v Almy 8 NE 2d 760 (Mass 1936) 
McGuire v Rix 225 NW 120 (Neb 1929) 
McIntosh v Bullard, Earnheart & Magness 95 Ark 227, 129 SW 85 (1910) 
 
McKinney v California Portland Cement Co 96 Cal App 4th 1214, 117 Cal Rptr 2d 849 
(2002) 
 
McKinsey v Wade 220 SE 2d 30 (Ga App 1975) 
 
McNeely v M & M Supermarkets Inc 154 Ga App 675, 269 SE 2d 483 (1980) 
 
McQuaig v Tarrant 269 Ga App 236, 603 SE 2d 751 (2004) 
 
McQuay v Guntharp 331 Ark 466, 963 SW 2d 583 (1998) 
 
Mead v Legacy Health System 352 Or 267, 283 P 3d 904 (2012) 
 
Meistrich v Casino Arena Attractions Inc 31 NJ 44, 155 A 2d 90, 82 ALR 2d 1208 
(1959) 
 
Messina v Matarasso 284 AD 2d 32, 729 NYS 2d 4 (2001) 
Metro-North Commuter Railway v Buckley 521 US 424 (1997) 
Meyers v Wal-Mart Stores East Inc 257 F 3d 625 (6th Cir 2001) 
Micari v Mann 126 Misc 2d 422, 481 NYS 2d 967 (1984) 
Michalek v United States Gypsum Co 16 F Supp 708 (WDNY 1936) 
Michigan Central Railroad v Hassenyer 48 Mich 205 (SC 1882) 
Mileski v Long Island Rail Road Co 499 F 2d 1169 (2d Cir 1974) 
Miller v Blanton 213 Ark 246, 210 SW 2d 293 (1948) 
Miller v David Grace Inc 212 P 3d 1223 (Okla 2009) 
 
Miller v HCA Inc 118 SW 3d 758 (Tex 2003) 
877  
Miller v McGuire 202 Ala 351, 80 So 433 (1918) 
 
Miller v Rhode Island Hospital 625 A 2d 778 (RI 1993) 
 
Milliun v New Milford Hospital 310 Conn 711, 80 A 3d 887 (2013) 
Milwaukee & St PR Co v Kellogg 94 US 469, 24 L Ed 256 (1876) 
Mims v Boland 110 Ga App 477, 138 SE 2d 902 (1964) 
Minnich v Med-Waste Inc 349 SC 567, 564 SE 2d 98 (2002) 
Mitchell v Gonzales 54 Cal 3d 1041, 1 Cal Rptr 2d 872 (1991) 
Mitchell v Rochester Railway Co 45 NE 354 (NY 1896) 
Mixon v Dobbs Houses Inc 149 Ga App 481, 254 SE 2d 864 (1979) 
 
Mohr v Williams 95 Minn 261, 104 NW 12 (1905) 
Montas v JJC Constr Corp 985 NE 2d 1225 (NY 2013) 
Moody v Delta Western Inc 38 P 3d 1139 (Alaska 2002) 
Moolien v Kaiser Foundation Hospitals 616 P 3d 813 (Cal 1980) 
 
Moon v Guardian Postacute Services Inc 95 Cal App 4th 1005, 98 ALR 5th 767 
(2002) 
 
Moore v Preenell 38 Md App 243, 379 A 2d 1246 (1977) 
Moos v United States 255 F 2d 705 (8th Cir 1995) 
Morgan v Greenwaldt 786 So 2d 1037 (Miss 2001) 
Morris v Leaf 534 NW 2d 388 (Iowa 1995) 
Morrison v National Broadcasting Co 227 NE 2d 572 (NY 1067) 
 
Motyka v City of Amsterdam 15 NY 2d 134, 204 NE 2d 635, 256 NYS 2d 595 (1965) 
 
Moure v Raeuchle 529 Pa 394, 604 A 2d 1003 (1992) Mull v 
Kerstetter 373 Pa Super 228, 540 A 2d 951 (1988) Munn v 
Hotchkiss School 24 F Supp 3d 155 (D Conn 2014) Murphy v 
Taxicabs of Louisville Inc 330 SW 2d 395 (Ky 1959) 
Murphy v North American River Runners Inc 186 W Va 310, 412 SE 2d 504 (1991) 
878  
 
Murray v UNMC Physicians 282 Neb 260, 806 NW 2d 118 (2011) 
Muslow v AG Edwards & Sons Inc 509 So 2d 1012 (La Ct App 1987) 
Myers v Boleman 151 Ga App 506, 260 SE 2d 359 (1979) 
Nabozny v Barnhill 31 Ill App 3d 212, 334 NE 2d 258, 77 ALR 3d 1294 (1975) 
 
Nallan v Helmsley-Spear Inc 50 NY 2d 507, 429 NYS 2d 606, 407 NE 2d 451 (1980) 
 
National Nutritional Foods Ass v Whelan 492 F Supp 1253 (SDNY 1995) 
 
Natroma County v Blake 81 P 3d 948 (Wyo 2003) 
 
Nguyen v Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center 48 Cal Rptr 2d 301 (Cal 
App 1995) 
 
Nichols v Sukaro Kennels 555 NW 2d 689, 61 ALR 5th 883 (Iowa 1996) 
 
Nims v Harrison 768 So 2d 1198 (Fla Dist Ct App 2000) 
 
Noble v Noble 761 P 2d 1369 (Utah 1988) 
 
Noffke v Bakke 315 Wis 2d 350, 760 NW 2d 156 (2009) 
Noguchi v Nakamura 2 Haw App 655, 638 P 2d 1383 (1982) 
Nold ex rel Nold v Binyon 272 Kan 87, 31 P 3d 274 (2001) 
Norfolk Southern Railway Co v Sorrell 549 US 158 (2007) 
Norfolk & Western Railway v Ayers 538 US 135, 123 S Ct 1210, 155 L Ed 2d 261 
(2003) 
 
O’Brien v Cunard SS Co 154 Mass 272, 28 NE 266 (1891) 
 
Oberempt v Egri 176 Conn 652, 410 A 2d 482 (1979) 
Ochs v Borrelli 187 Conn 253, 445 A 2d 883 (1982) 
Oden v Russell 207 Okl 570, 251 P 2d 184 (1952) 
Ohio v Akron Centre for Reproductive Health 497 US 502, 110 S Ct 2972, 111 L E 2d 
405 (1990) 
 
Olivo v Owens-Illinois Inc 186 NJ 394, 895 A 2d 1143 (2006) 
 
Orlo v Connecticut Co 21 A 2d 402 (Conn 1941) 
879  
Orzel v Scott Drug Co 449 Mich 550, 537 NW 2d 208 (1995) 
Osborn v Mason County 157 Wash 2d 18, 134 P 3d 197 (2006) 
Owens-Illinois Inc v Zenobia 325 Md 420, 601 A 2d 633 (1992) 
Owl Drug Co v Crandall 52 Ariz 322, 80 P 2d 952 (1938) 
Pacht v Morris 107 Ariz 392, 489 P 2d 29 (1971) 
 
Palmer v Ted Stevens Honda Inc 193 Cal App 3d 530, 238 Cal Rptr 363 (1987) 
 
Palmetto Linen Service Inc v UNX Inc 205 F 3d 126 (4th Cir 2000) 
Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co 248 NY 339, 162 NE 2d 99 (1928) 
Parks v Starks 342 Mich 443, 70 NW 2d 805 (1955) 
Parkulo v West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole 199 W Va 161, 483 SE 2d 
507 (1996) 
 
Parvi v City of Kingston 41 NY 2d 553, 362 NE 2d 960, 394 NYS 2d 161 (1977) 
 
Patterson v Henry 72 Ohio L Abs 403, 136 NE 2d 764 (1953) 
 
Patterson v Standley 91 Ill App 671 (1900) 
 
Paz v Brush Engineered Materials Inc 949 So 2d 1 (Miss 2007) 
 
Pearson v Taylor 116 So 2d 833 (La App 1959) 
 
Pehowic v Erie Lackawanna Railroad Co 430 F2d 697 (3d Cir 1970) 
 
People v Kerkovian 517 NW 2d 293 (Mich 1993) 
 
People v Martin 45 Cal App 2d 755, 290 P 2d 855 (1955) 
 
People v McGrandy 9 Mich App 187,156 NW 2d 48 (1967) 
 
People Express Airlines Inc v Consolidated Rail Corp 100 NJ 246, 495 A 2d 107 
(1985) 
 
Perez v Lopez 74 SW 3d 60 (Tex App 2002) 
 
Perodeau v City of Hartford 259 Conn 729, 792 A 2d 752 (2002) 
 
Perry v Shaw 88 Cal App 4th 658, 106 Cal Rptr 2d 70 (2001) 
 
Person v Children’s Hospital National Medical Center 562 A 2d 648 (DC 1989) 
880  
Petefish ex rel Clancy v Dawe 137 Ariz 570, 672 P 2d 914 (1983) 
 
Peterson v Campbell 105 Ill App 3d 992, 61 Ill Dec 572, 434 NE 2d 1169 (1982) 
 
Peterson v Eichhorn 344 Mont 540, 189 P 3d 615 (2008) 
 
Peterson v Sorlien 299 NW 2d 123, 11 ALR 4th 208 (1980) 
 
Pexa v Auto Owners Insurance Co 686 NW 2d 150 (Iowa 2004) 
 
Pfenning v Lineman 947 NE 2d 392 (Ind 2011) 
 
Phelan v Beswick 213 Or 612, 326 P 2d 1034 (1958) 
 
Phelps v Firebird Raceway Inc 210 Ariz 403, 111 P 3d 1003 (2005) 
 
Philip Morris USA v Williams 549 US 346, 127 S Ct 1057, 166 L Ed 2d 940 (2007) 
 
Phillips v United States 508 F Supp 544 (DSC 1981) 
 
Piggly-Wiggly Alabama Co v Rickles 212 Ala 585, 103 So 860 (1925) 
 
Pitre v Opelousas General Hospital 530 So 2d 1151 (La 1988) 
 
Pittway Corp v Collins 409 Md 218, 973 A 2d 771 (2009) 
Pleiss v Barnes 260 Neb 770, 619 NW 2d 825 (2000) 
Ploemankos v Cohn 256 NYS 5 (App Div 1932) 
Ploof v Putnam 71 A 188 (Sup Ct Vermont 1908) 
 
Plotnik v Meihaus 208 Cal App 4th 1590, 146 Cal Rptr 3d 585 (2012) 
 
Pocatello Auto Color Inc v Akzo Coatings Inc 127 Idaho 41, 896 P 2d 949 (1995) 
 
Podias v Marais 394 NJ Super 338, 926 A 2d 859 (App Div 1983) 
 
Polmatier v Russ 206 Conn 229, 537 A 2d 468 (1988) 
 
Poole v Coakley & Williams Construction Inc 423 Md 91, 31 A 3d 212 (2011) 
 
Porter v Crawford & Co 611 SW 2d 265 (Mo Ct App1980) 
 
Poskus v Lombardo’s of Randolph Inc 670 NE 2d 383, 423 Mass 637 (1996) 
 
Potter v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co 863 P 2d 795 (Cal 1993) 
 
Pouzanova v Morton 327 P 3d 865 (Alaska 2014) 
881  
Price v Kitsap Transit 125 Wash 2d 456, 886 P 2d 556 (1994) 
 
Pritchard v Veterans Cab Co 63 Cal 2d 727, 408 P 2d 360, 47 Cal Rptr 904 (1965) 
 
Provenzo v Sam 23 NY 2d 256, 296 NYS 2d 322, 244 NE 2d 26 (1968) 
 
PTI  Associations  LLC  v  Carolina  International  Sales  Co  Inc  2010  WL  363  330 
(DConn 2010) 
 
Pugsley v Privette 220 Va 892, 263 SE 2d 69 (1980) 
 
Purtill v Hess 111 Ill 2d 229,489 NE 2d 867, 95 Ill Dec 305 (1986) 
 
Purtle v Shelton 474 SW 2d 123 (Ark1971) 
 
Purvis v Grant Parish School Board 144 So 3d 922 (La 2014) 
Queen Ins v Hammond 374 Mich 655, 132 NW 2d 792 (1965) 
R & CR v West, 275 P 3d 228 (Utah 2012) 
Raas v State 729 NW 2d 444 (Iowa 2007) 
 
Rains v Bend of the River 124 SW 3d 580 (Tenn App 2003) 
 
Ramey v Fassoulas 414 So 2d 198 (Fla App 1982) 
Ramsey v Beavers 931 SW 2d 527 (Tenn 1996) 
Rascher v Friend 279 Va 370, 689 SE 2d 661 (2010) 
Rasmussen v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co 278 Neb 289, 770 NW 2d 
619 (2009) 
 
Re EG 133 II 2d 98, 549 NE 2d 322 (1989) 
 
Re Guardianship of Jackson 61 Mass App Ct 768, 814 NE 2d 393 (2004) 
 
Re Paul F 543 A 2d 255 (RI 1988) 
 
Re September 11 Litig 280 F Supp 2d 279 (SDNY 2003) 
 
Reardon v Larkin 3 A 3d 376 (Me 2010) 
 
Reavis v Slominski 250 Neb 711, 551 NW 2d 528 (1996) 
 
Rees v State Dept of Health & Welfare 143 Idaho 10, 137 P 3d 397 (2006) 
 
Regenstrief v Phelps 142 SW 3d 1 (Ky 2004) 
882  
Rhine v Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Railway Co 210 Minn 281, 297 NW 852 
(1941) 
 
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v Zapata Corp 848 F 2d 291 (1988) 
 
Richardson v Henley 209 Ga App 868, 434 SE 2d 772 (1993) 
Richardson v Henley 264 Ga 355, 444 SE 2d 317 (1994) 
Ridgway v Yenny 223 Ind 16, 57 NE 2d 581 (1944) 
Ridley v Safety Kleen Corp 693 So 2d 934 (Fla 1996) 
 
Right v Breen 277 Conn 364, 890 A 2d 1287 (2006) 
 
Rinehart v Western Local School Dist Board of Education 87 Ohio App 3d 214, 621 
NE 2d 1365 (1993) 
 
Rissler & McMurry Co v Sheridan Area Water Supply Joint Powers 929 P 2d 1228 
(Wyo 1996) 
 
Ritter v Stanton 745 NE 2d 828 (Ind Ct App 2001) 
 
Rivera v Philadelphia Theological Seminary of St Charles Borromeo Inc 510 Pa 1, 
507 A 2d 1 (1986) 
 
Rizzuto v Davidson Ladders Inc 280 Conn 225, 905 A 2d 1165 (2006) 
 
RJD v Vaughan Clinic PC 572 So 2d 1225 (Ala 1990) 
 
RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres v Century Circuit 37 A 2d 828 (NY App Div 1971) 
 
Roberts v Ring 173 NW 437 (Minn 1919) 
 
Robins v City of Wichita 285 Kan 455, 172 P 3d 1187 (2007) 
 
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co v Flint 275 US 303, 48 S Ct 134, 72 L Ed 290 (1927) 
 
Robinson v Butler 226 Minn 491, 33 NW 2d 821 (1948) 
 
Robinson v Greeley & Hansen, 114 Ill App 3d 720, 449 NE 2d 250 (1983) 
 
Robinson v Lindsay 92 Wash 2d 410, 598 P 2d 392 (1979) 
 
Robinson v Oklahoma Nephrology Associates Inc 154 P 3d 1250 (2007) 
Robinson v Washington Metro Transit Auth 774 F 3d 33 (DC Cir 2014) 
Rockweit v Senecal 197 Wis 2d 409, 541 NW 2d 742 (1995) 
883  
Rodriguez v Primadonna Co LLC 216 P 3d 793 (Nev 2009) 
 
Roger v Sells 178 Okl 103, 61 P 2d 1018 (1936) 
 
Rogers v Loews L’Enfant Plaza Hotel 526 F Supp 523 (DDC 1981) 
 
Rogers v Williard 144 Ark 587, 223 SW 15 (1920) 
 
Romain v Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Co 483 Mich 18, 762 NW 2d 911 (2009) 
Rong Yao Zhou v Jennifer Mall Restaurant Inc 534 A 2d 1268 (DC 1987) 
Rosenbloom v Flygare 501 NW 2d 597 (Minn 1993) 
Ross v A Betterway Rent-A-Car Inc 213 Ga App 288, 444 SE 2d 604 (1994) 
 
Ross v Louise Wise Servs Inc 8 NY 3d 478, 836 NYS 2d 509, 868 NE 2d 189 (2007) 
 
Ross v Michael 246 Mass 126, 140 NE 292 (1923) Ross v 
Nutt 177 Ohio St 113, 203 NE 2d 118 (1964) Rountree v 
Boise Baseball LLC 296 P 3d 373 (Idaho 2013) Rowe v 
Munye 702 NW 2d 729 (Minn 2005) 
Rowland v Christian 443 P 2d 561 (Cal 1968) 
 
Rubio v Davis 231 Ga App 425, 500 SE 2d 367 (1990) 
 
Ruff  v  Charter  Behaviour  Health  Sys  of  NW  Ind  Inc  699  NE  2d  1171  (Ind  Ct 
App1998) 
 
Russ v Western Union Telegraph Co 222 NC 504, 23 SE 2d 681 (1943) 
 
Russell v Mathis 686 So 2d 241 (Ala 1996) 
 
Russell v Salve Regina College 649 F Supp 391 (DR 1986) 
 
Ruth v Ruth 213 Tenn 82, 372 SW 2d 285 (1963) 
 
Ruza v Ruza 286 App Div 767 (NY App Div 1955) 
 
Saarinen v Kerr 84 NY 2d 494, 644 NE 2d 988, 620 NYS 2d 297 (1994) 
Sales v Kecoughtan Housing Co Ltd 279 Va 475, 690 SE 2d 91 (2010) 
Salinetro v Nystrom 341 So 2d 1059 (Fla Dist Ct App 1977) 
Sallee v GTE South Inc 839 SW 2d 277 (Ky 1992) 
884  
 
Sandborg v Blue Earth County 615 NW 2d 61 (Minn 2000) 
 
Sard v Hardy 281 Md 432, 379 A 2d 1014 (1977) 
Savage Industries Inc v Duke 598 So 2d 856 (Ala 1992) 
Sawyer v Comerci 264 Va 68, 563 SE 2d 748 (2002) 
Schanafelt v Seaboard Fin Co 108 Cal App 2d 420, 239 P 2d 42 (1951) 
 
Scheele v Dustin 998 A 2d 697 (Vt 2010) 
 
Scheufele v Newman 187 Or 263, 210 P 2d 573 (1949) 
 
Schleier v Kaiser Found Health Plan 876 F2d 174 (DC Cir 1989) 
Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital 105 NE 92 (NY 1914) 
Schmitz v Smentowski 785 P 2d 726 (NM1990) 
Schork v Huber 648 SW 2d 861 (Ky 1983) 
 
Schumann v McGinn 307 Minn 446, 240 NW 2d 525 (1976) 
 
Schutkowski v Carey 725 P 2d 1057 (Wyo 1986) 
 
Schwinn v Perkins 79 NJL 515, 78 A 19 (1910) 
 
Sears v Morrison 76 Cal App 4th 577, 90 Cal Rptr 2d 528 (1998) 
 
Sebastain v Wood 246 Iowa 94, 66 NW 2d 841 (1954) 
 
Selmeczki v New Mexico Dept of Corrections 139 NM 122, 129 P 3d 158 (Ct App 
2006) 
 
Shaffer v National Can Corp 565 F Supp 909 (ED Pa 1983) 
 
Sharma v Skaarup Ship Management Corp 699 F Supp 440 (SDNY 1988) 
 
Sheehan v City of New York 40 NY 2d 496, 387 NYS 2d 92, 354 NE 2d 832 (1976) 
 
Sherlock v Stillwater Clinic 260 NW 2d 169 (Minn 1977) 
 
Shuler v Garrett 743 F 3d 170 (6th Cir 2014) 
 
Simmons v Frazier 277 Ark 452, 642 SW 2d 314 (1982) 
 
Simmons v Porter 312 P 3d 345 (Kan 2013) 
885  
Simms v D’Avillier 179 So 2d 707 (La App 1965) 
 
Sinai v Polinger Co 498 A 2d 520 (DC 1985) 
 
Sindell v Abbott Labs 26 Ca 3d 588, 163 Cal Rptr 132, 607 P 2d 924 (1980) 
Sindle v New York City Transit Auth 33 NYS 2d 183, 307 NE 2d 245 (1973) 
Singer v Marx 144 Cal App 2d 637, 301 P 2d 440 (1956) 
Slocum v Food Fair Stores of Florida Inc 100 So 2d 396 (Fla 1958) 
Smith v Calvary Christian Church 462 Mich 679, 614 NW 2d 590 (2000) 
Smith v Cutter Biological Inc 72 Haw 416, 823 P 2d 717 (1991) 
Smith v Delery 238 La 180, 114 So 2d 857 (1959) 
 
Smith v Eli Lily & Co 137 Ill 2d 222, 560 NE 2d 324 (1990) 
Smith v Fiber Controls Corp 268 SE 2d 504 (NC 1980) 
Smith v Gore 728 SW 2d 738 (Tenn 1987) 
Smith v Toney 862 NE 2d 656 (Ind 2007) 
 
Smith Maritime Inc v L/B Kaitlyn Eymard 710 F 3d 560 (5th Cir 2013) 
 
Snouffer v Snouffer 621 NE 2d 879 (Ohio Ct App 1933) 
 
Soldono v O’Daniels 141 Cal App 3d 443, 190 Cal Rptr 310, 37 ALR 4th 1183 (1983) 
 
Solomon v Shuell 435 Mich 104, 457 NW 2d 669 (1990) 
 
Soto v New York City Transit Authority 6 NY 3d 487, 846 NE 2d 1211, 813 NY 2d 
701 (2006) 
 
South Dakota Department of Health v Heim 357 NW 2d 522 (SD 1984) 
South v National Railroad Passenger Corp 290 NW 2d 819 (ND 1980) 
Spaur v Owens-Corning Fibreglass Corp 510 NW 2d 854 (Iowa 1994) 
Spencer v Goodill, 17 A 3d 552 (Del 2011) 
Spier v Barker 35 NY 2d 444, 323 NE 2d 164 (1974) 
Splendorio v Bilray Demolition Co 682 A 2d 461 (RI 1996) 
St Mary’s Hospital Inc v Bynum 573 SW 2d 914 (Ark 1978) 
886  
 
St Onge v MacDonald 154 NH 768, 917 A 2d 233 (2007) 
 
Stadler v Cross 295 NW 2d 552 (Minn 1980) 
 
Staelens v Dobert 318 F 3d 77 (1st Cir 2003) 
 
Stanton v University of Maine System 773 A 2d 1045 (Me 2001) 
 
Star Transport Inc v Byard 891 NE 2d 1099 (Ind App 2008) 
 
State v Cessna 170 Iowa 726, 153 NW 194 (1915) 
State v Ford Motor Co Cause No 11-431 (1980) 
State v Hughlett 124 Wash 366, 214 P 841 (1923) 
State v Johnson 261 NC 727, 136 SE 2d 84 (1964) 
State v Smith 56 Wn 2d 368, 353 P 2d 155 (1960) 
State v White 642 So 2d 842 (Fla App 1994) 
State Dept of Corrections v Cowles 151 P 3d 353 (Alaska 2006) 
 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co v Campbell 538 US 408, 123 S Ct 1513, 
155 L Ed 2d 585 (2003) 
 
State Rubbish Collectors Ass v Siliznoff 38 Cal 2d 330, 240 P 2D 282 (1952) 
 
Steele v Holiday Inns Inc 626 So 2d 593 (Miss 1993) 
 
Steinhauser v Hertz Corp 421 F 2d 1169 (2d Cir 1970) 
 
Stephens v United States 106 US App DC 249, 271 F 2d 832 (1959) 
Stephenson v Universal Metrics Inc 251 Wis 2d 171, 642 NW 2d 158 (2002) 
Stewart v Jefferson Plywood Co 255 Or 603, 469 P 2d 783 (1970) 
Stewart v Motts 539 Pa 596, 654 A 2d 535 (1995) 
Stockett v Tolin 791 F Supp 1536 (SD Fla 1992) 
Stockwell v Gee 121 Okl 207, 249 P 389 (1926) 
Strain v Irwin 195 Ala 414, 70 So 734 (1915) 
Summers v Tice 33 Cal 2d 80, 199 P 2d 1 (1948) 
887  
Sundquist v Madison Railways 221 NW 2d 63 (Wis 1960) 
 
Surocco v Geary 3 Cal 69 (1853) 
 
Swenson Trucking & Excavating Inc v Truckweld Equipment Co 604 P 2d 1113 (Ala 
1980) 
 
Swope v Columbian Chemicals Co 281 F 3d 185 (5th Cir 2002) 
 
Szekeres v Robinson 715 P 2d 1076 954 (Cal 1982) 
 
Taft v Taft 40 Vt 229 (1867) 
 
Talent Tree Personnel Services v Fleenor 703 So 2d 917 (Ala 1997) 
 
Talmadge v Smith 59 NW 656 (Mich 1894) 
 
Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California 17 Cal 3d 425, 131 Cal Rptr 14, 551 
P 2d 334 (1976) 
 
Tashman v Gibbs 263 Va 65, 556 SE 2d 772 (2002) 
 
Tatman v Cordingly 672 P 2d 1286 (Wyo 1983) 
 
Tayar v Camelback Ski Corp Inc 47 A 3d 1190 (Pa 2012) 
 
Taylor v Johnston 985 P 2d 460 (Alaska 1999) 
 
Teschendorf v State Farms Insurance Companies 293 Wis 2d 123, 717 NW 2d 258 
(2006) 
 
Texas & Pacific Railway v Behymer 189 US 468, 23 S Ct 622 (1903) 
 
The Nitro-Glycerine Case 82 US 15 Wall 524 (1872) 
 
Thing v La Chusa 48 Cal 3d 644, 257 Cal Rptr 865, 771 P 2d 814 (1989) 
 
Thomas v Bedford 389 So 2d 405 (La App 1980) 
 
Thomas v Panco Management of Maryland LLC 423 Md 387, 31 A 3d 583 (2011) 
 
Thompson v KFB Insurance Co 252 Kan 1010, 850 P 2d 773 (1993) 
 
Thompson v Sun City Community Hospital Inc 141 Ariz 597, 688 P 2d 605 (1984) 
 
Thornhill v Wilson 504 So 2d 1205 (Miss 1987) 
 
Todd v Mass Transit Admin 373 Md 149, 816 A 2d 930 (2003) 
 
Toney v Chester County Hospital 36 A 3d 83 (Pa 2011) 
888  
 
Toole v Richardson-Merrell Inc 251 Cal App 2d 689, 60 Cal Rptr 398 (1967) 
 
Toomey v Farley 2 NY 2d 71, 156 NYS 2d 840, 138 NE 2d 221 (1956) 
 
Torres v City of Los Angeles 58 Cal 2d 35, 372 P 2d 906, 22 Cal Rptr 866 (1962) 
 
Torres v State 34 Misc 2d 488, 288 NYS 2d 1005 (1962) 
 
Townsdin v Nutt 19 Kan 282 (1877) 
 
Trammel v Bradberry 256 Ga App 412, 568 SE 2d 715 (2002) 
 
Trentacoast v Brussel 82 NJ 214, 412 A 2d 436 (1980) 
 
Trombetta v Conkling 82 NY 2d 549, 626 NE 2d 653, 605 NE 2d 653, 605 NYS 2d 
678 (1993) 
 
Tucker v ADG Inc 102 P 3d 660 (Okla 2004) 
 
Turcotte v Fell 68 NY 2d 432, 510 NYS 2d 49, 502 NE 2d 964 (1986) 
Turpin v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 959 F 2d 1349 (6th Cir 1992) 
Turpin v Sortini 31 Cal 3d 220, 182 Cal Rptr 337, 643 P 2d 954 (1982) 
TXO Production Corp v Alliance Resources Corp 509 US 443 (1993) 
U-Haul International Inc v Waldrip 380 SW 3d 118 (Tex 2012) 
Ultrameres Corp v Touche 255 NY 170, 174 NE 441 (1931) 
United States v Caltex Inc 344 US 149 (1952) 
United States v Cannons Eng Corp 899 F 2d 79 (1st Cir 1990) 
United States v Carroll Towing Co 159 F 2d 169 (2nd Cir 1947) 
United States v De Vane 306 F 2d 182 (5th Cir 1962) 
United States v Stevens 994 So 2d 1062 (Fla 2008) 
 
University of Arizona Health Center v Superior Court 136 Ariz 579, 667 P 2d 1294 
(1983) 
 
Vahdat v Holland 274 Va 417, 649 SE 2d 691 (2007) 
 
Valadez v Emmis Communications 229 P 3d 389 (Kan 2010) 
 
Vancherie v Siperly 243 Md 366, 221 A 2d 356 (1966) 
889  
 
Vasa v Compass Medical PC 456 Mass 175, 921 NE 2d 963 (2010) 
Vaughn v Nissan Motor Corporation in USA Inc 77 F 3d 736 (4th Cir 1996) 
Vendetto v Sonat Offshore Drilling Co 725 So 2d 474 (La 1999) 
Verstraelen v Kellog 60 Wash 2d 115, 372 P 2d 543 (1962) 
Vietnamese Fishermen’s Ass v Knights of the Ku Klux Klan 518 F Supp 993 (SD Tex 
1981) 
 
Vigil v Franklin 103 P 3d 322 (Co 2004) 
 
Vincent v Lake Erie Transportation Co 124 NW 221 (Minn 1910) 
 
Vosburg v Putney 50 NW 403 (Wis 1891) 
 
Wadler v City of New York 14 NY 3d 192, 899 NYS 2d 73, 925 NE 2d 875 (2010) 
 
Wager v State 10 NYS 2d 814 (App Div1923) 
 
Wagner v International Railway 232 NY 176, 133 NE 437 (1921) 
 
Walker v Mart 164 Ariz 37, 790 P 2d 735 (1990) 
 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc v Spates 186 SW 3d 566 (Tex 2006) 
 
Wall v Brim 138 F 2d 478 (5th Cir 1943) 
 
Wallace v Shoreham Hotel Corp 49 A 2d 81 (App DC 1946) 
Wallace v Stringer 260 Ga App 850, 553 SE 2d 166 (2001) 
Wangen v Ford Motor Co 294 NW 2d 437 (Wis 1980) 
Ware v Garvey DC 139 F Supp 71 (Mass 1956) 
 
Weaver v Lentz 348 SC 672, 561 SE 2d 360 (Ct App 2002) 
 
Webb v Snow 102 Utah 435, 132 P 2d 114 (1942) 
 
Webbier v Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau Inc 105 RI 605, 254 A 2d 285 
(1969) 
 
Wegner v Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co 479 NW 2d 38 (Minn 1991) 
 
Weitz v Green 230 P 3d 743 (Idaho 2010) 
 
Werne v Executive Women’s Golf Association 158 NH 373, 969 A 2d 346 (2009) 
890  
 
West v Western Casual & Surety Co 846 F 2d 387 (7th Cir 1988) 
Westchester County Medical Center v Hall 531 NE 2d 607 (NY1988) 
White v Brommer 747 F Supp 2d 447 (ED Pa 2010) 
White v Muniz 999 P 2d 814 (Colo 2000) 
 
White v State 419 Md 265, 19 A 3d 369 (2011) 
 
White v University of Idaho 797 P 2d 108 (Idaho 1990) 
Whitley v Anderson 37 Colo App 486, 551 P 2d 1083 (1976) 
Whitten v Cox 799 So 2d 1 (Miss 2000) 
Wiener v Southcoast Childcare Centres Inc 32 Cal 4th 1138, 88 P 3d 517, 12 Cal 
Rptr 3d 615 (2004) 
 
Wightman v Consolidated Rail Corp 86 Ohio St 3d 431, 715 NE 2d 546 (1999) 
 
Wiles v Webb 329 Ark 108, 946 SW 2d 685 (1997) 
 
Wiley v Redd 110 Nev 1310, 885 P 2d 592 (1994) 
 
Willard v Caterpillar Inc 48 Cal Rptr 2d 607 (Ct App 1995) 
 
Williams v Hays 157 NY 541, 52 NE 589 (1899) 
 
Williams v Kearby 775 P 2d 670 (Kan App 1989) 
 
Williams v Southern California Gas Co 176 Cal App 4th 591, 98 Cal Rptr 3d 258 
(2009) 
 
Williamson v Bennett 251 NC 498, 112 SE 2d 48 (1960) 
 
Williamson v Smith 83 NM 336, 491 P 2d 1147 (1971) 
 
Willis v Foster 229 Ill 2d 393, 3233 Ill Dec 26, 892 NE 2d 10 (2008) 
 
Willis v Westerfield 839 NE 2d 1179 (Ind 2006) 
 
Willis v Wu 362 SC 146, 607 SE 2d 63 (2004) 
 
Winn v Inman 119 Ill App 3d 836, 457 NE 2d 141 (1983) 
 
Winschel v Brown 171 P 3d 142 (Alaska 2007) 
 
Withlock v Smith 297 Ark 399, 762 SW 2d 782 (1989) 
891  
 
Wolfinger v Shaw 138 Neb 229, 292 NW 731 (1940) 
 
Wood v Mobil Chemical Co 50 Ill App 3d 465, 8 Ill Dec 701, 365 NE 2d 1087 (1977) 
 
Woolley v Henderson 418 A 2d 1123 (Me 1980) 
 
Wright v NYC Transit Authority 633 NYS 2d 393 (App Div 1995) 
Wyoming Johnson Inc v Stag Industries Inc 662 P 2d 96 (1983) 
Yania v Bigan 307 Pa 316, 155 A 2d 343 (1959) 
Yeager v Hurt 433 So 2d 1176 (Ala 1983) 
 
Yerkes v Asberry 938 SW 2d 307 (Mo Ct App 1997) 
Yoder v Cotton 276 Neb 954, 758 NW 2d 630 (2008) 
Young v Swiney 23 F Supp 3d 596 (D Md 2014) 
Zafft v Eli Lily & Co 676 SW 2d 241 (Mo 1984) 
 
Zager v Dimilia 138 Misc 2d 448, 524 NYS 2d 968 (J Ct 1988) 
 
Zarcone v Perry 572 F 2d 52 (2nd Cir 1978) 
 
Zaza v Marquess and Nell Inc 144 NJ 34, 675 A 2d 620 (1996) 
 
Zelenko v Gimbel Bros 158 Misc 904, 287 NYS 134 (1935) 
 
Zell v Dunaway 115 Md 1, 80 A 215 (1911) 
 
Zeroulias v Hamilton American Legion Ass Inc 705 NE 2d 1164 (Mass App Ct. 1999) 
Zimmerman v Dane County 329 Wis 2d 270, 789 NW 2d 754 (Ct App 2010) 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
 
France Ministѐre de la Justice: Projet de réforme de la responsabilité civile Mars 
2017 (Civil liability reform project March 2017) 
 
Great Britain Department of Constitutional Affairs: Consultation Paper: The Law on 
Damages  CP 9/07 2007 
 
Great  Britain  Judicial  Studies  Board  Guidelines  for  the  Assessment  of  General 
Damages in Personal Injury Cases 12 ed 2013 
892  
Great Britain Law Commission: Consultation Paper: Administrative Redress Public 
Bodies and the Citizen 2008 
 
Great Britain Law Commission: Consultation Paper: Damages for Personal Injury – 
Medical, Nursing and other Expenses LCCP 144 1996 
 
Great Britain Law Commission: Consultation Paper: The Illegality Defence in Tort 
LCCP 160 2001 
 
Great Britain Law Commission: Consultative Report: The Illegality Defence LCCP 
189 2009 
 
Great Britain Law Commission: Report: The Illegality Defence LCCP 320 2010 
 
Great Britain Law Commission: Report on Liability for Psychiatric Illness No 249 1998 
 
Great Britain Parliament: European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 13 July 2017 
 
Great Britain Parliament: The Repeal Bill: White 30 March 2017 
 
Warsaw Convention 1929 (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to 
International Carriage by Air) 
Opsomming 
Redelikheid as ‘n konsep wat gebruik word om deliktuele aanspreeklikheid of 
aanspreeklikheid in delitereg te bepaal, word hetsy verwelkom of deur sommiges as 
frustrerend beskou. Dit is ‘n normatiewe konsep, wat onlosmaaklik verbind is aan die 
konsepte van regverdigheid, geregtigheid, billikheid, openbare beleid en die waardes 
van die gemeenskap. Hierdie konsepte help om waarde-oordele te verskaf ten einde 
aanspreeklikheid te bepaal. 
Dit blyk duidelik uit hierdie studie dat die invloed van redelikheid oorwegend implisiet 
in die Franse deliktereg is, maar meer eksplisiet in die Suid-Afrikaanse deliktereg en 
die Anglo-Amerikaanse deliktereg. Die invloed daarvan wissel ten aansien van elke 
element van onregmatige of deliktuele aanspreeklikheid. Ten einde ’n persoon vir ’n 
delik of onregmatige daad aanspreeklik te kan hou, is dit net redelik dat al die 
elemente van ’n delik of onregmatige daad teenwoordig moet wees. ’n 
Gemeenskaplike element van al die jurisdiksies wat in hierdie tesis bestudeer word, 
is die idee om ’n balans te verkry tussen die bevordering van die verweerder se 
belange, die benadeling van die klaer se belange en die belange van die 
samelewing. Waar aanspreeklikheid op fout gegrond is, word die redelikheid van 
gedrag bevraagteken. Watter toets of teorie ook al gebruik word met betrekking tot 
oorsaaklikheid, moet daar uiteindelik bepaal word of dit op grond van die feite van 
die saak redelik is om aanspreeklikheid  aan die verweerder vir die feitelik 
veroorsaakte gevolge toe te reken. Ongeag of verlies of skade vereis word, 
veronderstel word of nie vereis word nie, word die vraag oor die toepaslike remedie 
of vergoeding wat onder die omstandighede redelik is, bevraagteken.  
In die Suid-Afrikaanse of Anglo-Amerikaanse reg veroorsaak die meervoudige 
gebruike van die standaard van die redelike persoon; redelike voorsienbaarheid van 
skade; redelike voorkombaarheid van skade; die vraag of dit redelik is om ’n element 
van aanspreeklikheid op te lê en of dit redelik is om aanspreeklikheid toe te skryf, 
dikwels verwarring en onsekerheid. Soms kan die rol van hierdie kriteria met 
betrekking tot ’n spesifieke element geldig en versterk wees; ander kere kan hul rol 
weer verswak en omstrede wees. Daar is egter niks verkeerd met die konsep van 
redelikheid self nie; trouens, dit is ’n nodige en nuttige konsep in die reg. Dit is 
eerder die manier waarop dit vertolk en in die bepaling van aanspreeklikheid 
toegepas word, wat problematies is. 
 
Kakaretšo  
Bokgoni bja go dira dikakanyo tše di swanetšego bjalo ka kgopolo ye e šomišwago go 
laetša go rweša motho boikarabelo ka lebaka la go roba molao goba go rweša 
boikarabelo go molato wa ditiro tše di fošagetšego, bo amogelwa goba go bonwa ke 
ba bangwe bjalo ka kgopolo ye e  gakantšhago. Ke kgopolo ya melawana ya 
boitshwaro ye e ka se arogantšhwego le dikgopolo tša botse, toka, tekatekano, 
melaotshepetšo ya setšhaba le ditumelo ka ga boitshwaro bjo bobotse le dilo tše di 
lego bohlokwa  setšhabeng. Dikgopolo tše di thuša go dira dikahlolo tše bohlokwa ge 
go laetšwa go rweša boikarabelo go ditiro tše fošagetšego. 
Go molaleng go tšwa  thutong ye gore khuetšo ya bokgoni bja go dira dikakanyo tše 
di swanetšego ga e hlalošwe thwi molaong wa Fora wa ditiro tše di fošagetšego, eupša 
e hlalošwa gabotse go molao wa Afrika Borwa wa ditiro tše di fošagetšego le molao 
wa ditiro tše di fošagetšego wa Maisemane le Maamerika. Khuetšo ya bjona e fapana 
go ya ka elemente ye nngwe le ye nngwe ya ditiro tše di fošagetšego goba go rweša 
boikarabelo ka lebaka la go roba molao. Gore motho a rwešwe boikarabelo  ka lebaka 
la go robamolao goba  ditiro tše di fošagetsego, go swanetše gore go be le  dielemente 
ka moka tša go roba molao goba tša ditiro tše di fošagetšego. Seo se lego gona 
dipeakanyong tša dikgorotsheko tša molao  tše di ithutilwego go thesisi ye ke kgopolo 
ya go tliša tekatekano gare ga dikgahlego tša molatofatšwa tše di godišitšwego, 
dikgahlego tša mosekiši tše di amegilwego gampe le dikgahlego tša setšhaba. Fao go 
rwešwa boikarabelo go theilwego go phošo, tiro ye e swanetšego ya boitshwaro e 
swanelwa go lekodišišwa. Mabapi le mokgwa wa go tswalanya ditiro le ditlamorago 
tše di hlotšwego , teko goba teori efe goba efe ye e šomišwago, seo se swanetšego 
go laetšwa mafelelong ke ge e ba go ya ka dinnete tša molato,  go a kwagala go  rweša 
mosekišwa boikarabelo go ditlamorago tše di  tše di bakilwego ke ditiro tša gagwe. Ge 
e ba tobo goba kgobalo e ya nyakega, e  naganelwa goba  e sa nyakege, ntlha ya 
tharollo  goba tefelo ya maleba ye e kwagalago le ge go ka ba bjang e swanelwa go 
lekodišišwa . 
Go molao wa Afrika Borwa le wa Maisemane le Maamerika, ditirišo tše ntši tša boemo 
bja motho wa go ba le tlhaologanyo; ponelopele ye e kwagalago ya kgobalo; thibelo 
ye e kwagalago ya kgobalo;  e ka ba e e le mo go kwagalago go tliša elemente ya go 
rweša boikarabelo; goba e le mo go kwagalago go rweša boikarabelo, gantši go hlola 
kgakanego le go se kgonthišišege. Ka dinako tše dingwe, tema ye e kgathwago ke 
dilekanyo tše mabapi le elemete ye e itšego e ka ba ya kgonthe gape ye o 
hlalošitšwego ka botlalo; mola ka dinako tše dingwe, tema ye e di kgathago  e  
fokotšwa le go ka tsoša dingangišano. Le ge go le bjalo, ga go na se se fošagetšego 
ka kgopolo ya bokgoni bja go dira dikakanyo tše di swanetšego ka boyona; ka kgonthe 
ke kgopolo ye e  hlokegago gape ye bohlokwa molaong. Mogongwe, ke ka tsela ye e 
hlathollwago le go dirišwa ka gona go laetša go rweša boikarabelo go go gakantšhago. 
Isifinyezo (isamari) 
Ukulandela inqubo nombandela wokwenzeka kwento ngomqondo ohluzekile 
nezizathu ezizwakayo, (reasonableness) njengomqondo osetshenziswa ekunqumeni 
ukuthi ngabe  umuntu wenze okungalungile nokubangela ukulahlekelwa noma 
ukulinyalelwa komunye umuntu owenza lowo muntu abe necala emahlombe akhe 
ngokulahlekelwa nokulinyalelwa kwalowo muntu (delictual liability) ngokulandela 
inqubo yomthetho kumacala ezokulahlekelwa noma ukulinyalelwa, umthetho obizwa 
nge-tort law, le nqubo yalo mthetho ivamise ukuthi yamukelwe noma ithathwe 
ngabanye njengeyisiphazamiso nesihibe. Inqubo nombandela osetshenziswayo 
ukuhlola nokunquma ukuthi ngabe into noma isenzo ngesilungile noma esingalungile 
noma ukuthi ngabe leso senzo kuyinto okumele yenziwe enhle noma embi 
(normative concept), kanti lokhu kuxhumene nomqondo wokulungile, 
okunobulungisa, okubonelela ngokulinganayo nhlangothi zonke, kanye nomgomo 
kawonke-wonke kanye nezinto ezingamagugu nezilungile kumphakathi. Le miqondo 
nemibandela isiza ekwenzeni izinqumo ngokulungile nokungalungaka kanye 
nokunquma ukuthi ngabe umuntu unomthwalo wecala emahlombe akhe noma 
akunjalo. 
Kuyacaca kulesi sifundo ukuthi umthelela wokwenza into ngomqondo ohluzekile 
nonezizathu ezizwakalayo, kuyinto equkethwe kumthetho wesiFulentshi ngokucacile 
nokungekho obala njengomqondo osetshenziswa kakhulu ekunqumeni ukuthi ngabe 
umuntu wenze isenzo esilungile noma esingalungile nesibangele ukulahlekelwa 
noma ukulinyalelwa komunye umuntu okwenza lowo muntu abe necala emahlombe 
akhe ngokulahlekelwa nokulinyalelwa kwalowo muntu, kanti le nqubo yalo mthetho 
icace nokuba sobala kumthetho waseNingizimu Afrika kanye nomthetho wamaNgisi 
namaMelika (Anglo-American tort law) kumthetho obhekene nezenzo 
ngokulahlekelwa noma ukulinyelelwa. Kodwa umthelelwa walo mthetho 
wehlukahlukene maqondana nomkhakha nomkhakha kwezokubekwa icala 
ngesenzo sokulahlekelwa noma ukulinyalelwa komunye umuntu. Ukuze umuntu 
atholakale enecala emahlombe akhe ngokulahlekelwa noma ukulinyalelwa komunye 
umuntu, kuyinto enomqondo ohluzekile wesizathu esizwakalayo  ukuthi yonke 
imikhakha yokulahlekelwa nokulinyalelwa ibe khona. Okuvamise ukubakhona 
kosomagunya abanquma ngezomthetho, okucwaningwe ngawo kule thesis, ukuthi 
kumele kube nenqubo ebhalansile ebonelela nhlangothi zombili ngokwezidingo 
zommangalelwa nommangali othikamezekile kanye nezidingo zesizwe sonkana. 
Lapho khona ukubeka icala emahlombe omuntu, kubekwe ngokulandela lowo 
owenze iphutha noma ukungalungile, kuba nenkinga ukusebenzisa ukuthatha 
isinqumo ngesenzo ngokulandela umbono wokwenza into ngomqondo ohluzekile 
nonesizathu esizwakalayo. Kodwa ukulandela okwenzeke ngembangela, noma 
yiluphi uhlobo lohlolo noma ithiyori esetshenziswayo, okumele ekugcineni 
kunqunywe ngakho, ukuthi ngabe ngokulandela amaqiniso ecala, ngabe kunesizathu 
esizwakalayo yini ukubeka noma ukwabela icala kummangalelwa ngemiphumela 
eyenzeke ngembangela ethize. Ngishonoma ngabe ukulahlekelwa noma 
ukulinyalelwa kuyadingeka, kuthathwa njengokwenzekile noma akudingekile, 
umbuzo osemqoka ukuthi ngabe kuzoba yini ikhambi lokulungisa ukulahlekelwa 
noma ukulinyalelwa noma isinxephezelo,  lokhu kwenziwe ngokulandela umqondo 
wesisizathu esihluzekile nesizwakalayo, ngaphansi kwalezo zimo ezikhona. 
Kumthetho waseNingizimu Afrika kanye nowamaNgisi kanye namaMelika, 
ukusetshenziswa kwezinga nombandela womuntu onesizathu somqondo ohluzekile 
nesizwakalayo; ukuthi ngabe lowo muntu obengakwazi yini ukubona ngaphambilini 
ukuthi kungahle kube nokulinyalelwa; ukuthi ngabe bekungukulinyalelwa 
obebungavimbeleka, nokuthi ngabe yinto enomqondo ohluzekile yini nozwakalayo 
ukubeka icala; konke lokhu, kuvame ukubangela ukudideka nokungabi nasiqiniseko. 
Kwezinye izikhathi, indima yale mibandela maqondana nengxenye ethize yodaba, 
kungenzeka kufanele kanti futhi kugqanyiswe; kanti kwezinye izikhathi, indima yale 
mibandela nemiqondo indima yayo kungenzeka iphansi noma ibangela isixakaxaka 
nempikiswano. Kodwa, akukho okonakele ngokulandela udaba nombandela 
womqondo ohluzekile nonesizathu esizwakalayo, kanti futhi kufanele nakhona 
kuwumqondo osizayo kwezomthetho. Inkinga ukuthi ngabe le mibandela itolikwa 
nokusetshenziswa kanjani ekunqumeni ukuthi ngabe umuntu unecala noma akanalo, 
yilokhu-ke okubanga inkinga. 
 
